Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, (1971)
For the principle is
37 SCRA 420 Political Law Constitutional Law
Bill of Rights Equal Protection Hernandez
Doctrine
Mario Gumabon et al were charged with rebellion
punished under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code.
Their offense was complexed with multiple murder,
robbery, arson, and kidnapping. They were all
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Their sentence had
become final and executory when the Hernandez
Doctrine was promulgated by the Supreme Court.
The Hernandez Doctrine simply states that murder
cannot be complexed with rebellion because
murder, a regular crime, is necessarily absorbed by
rebellion. Hence, without such complexion, the
penalty must be lower than reclusion perpetua.
Gumabon asserted that a non-application of the
Hernandez Doctrine will lead to a deprivation of a
constitutional right, namely, the denial of equal
protection. Gumabon et al, nonetheless, were
convicted by Court of First Instance but they were
convicted for the very same rebellion for which
Hernandez and others were convicted (The law
under which they [Gumabon et al] were convicted is
the very same law under which the latter [Hernandez
et al] were convicted.) It had not and has not been
changed. For the same crime, committed under the
same law, how can the SC, in conscience, allow
Gumabon et al to suffer life imprisonment, while
others can suffer only prision mayor?
ISSUE: Whether or not Gumabon et al is entitled to
the effects of the Hernandez Doctrine.
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled in favor of Gumabon et
al. The continued incarceration after the twelve-year
period when such is the maximum length of
imprisonment in accordance with the controlling
doctrine, when others similarly convicted have been
freed, is fraught with implications at war with equal
protection. That is not to give it life. On the contrary,
it would render it nugatory. Otherwise, what would
happen is that for an identical offense, the only
distinction lying in the finality of the conviction of one
being before the Hernandez ruling and the other
after, a person duly sentenced for the same crime
would be made to suffer different penalties. If
Gumabon et al would continue to endure
imprisonment, then this would be repugnant to equal
protection, people similarly situated were not
similarly dealt with.
What is required under this constitutional guarantee
is the uniform operation of legal norms so that all
persons under similar circumstances would be
accorded the same treatment both in the privileges
conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted
in a recent decision: Favoritism and undue
preference cannot be allowed.
that equal protection and security shall be given to
every person under circumstances, which if not
identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in
terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a
class should be treated in the same fashion,
whatever restrictions cast on some in the group
equally binding on the rest.
In Re: KAY VILLEGAS KAMI [35 SCRA 429 (1970)]
October 22, 1970
Petitioner : Kay Villegas Kami Inc.
Respondent:
Facts:
Kay Villegas Kami Inc. claiming to be a
recognized non-stock, non-profit corporation
Questions the validity of RA No. 6132 Sec. 8
on the grounds that it violates due process,
rights of association, and freedom of
expression and that it is an ex post facto law.
Issues: Provision violates due process, rights
of association, and freedom of expression?
Is it an ex post facto law?
Held: Petition denied. It is a Constitutional act.
Constitutional inhibition refers only to
criminal laws which are given retroactive
effect. Penalty for violation of law is imposed
to acts committed after the approval of the
law.
1. Provision violates due process, rights of
association, and freedom of expression?
No, the questioned provision is a valid limitation
on due process, rights of association, freedom of
expression, freedom of association, freedom of
assembly and equal protection clause. R.A. No.
6132 is designed to prevent both prostitution of
electoral process and denial of the equal protection
of laws.
2. Is it an ex post facto law?
No. Ex post facto law defined:
a. makes criminal an act done before law was
passed and punishes act innocent when done.
b. aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it
was
c. inflicts greater punishment than the law
prescribed when committed
d. alters legal rules of evidence and authorizes
conviction upon less or different tests
 e. assuming to regulate civil rights and
remedies only in effect imposes penalty or
deprivation of right which when done was
lawful
f. deprives a person accused of a crime some
lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction of acquittal or a proclamation of
amnesty.
While R.A. 6132 penalizes a violation of the
provision it only punishes acts committed after
the approval of the law.
People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389 (1983)
FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of
murder (qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer
and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez
shot Fleischer and Rubia during the time the two
were constructing a fence that would prevent
Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill.
The defendant was taking a nap when he heard
sounds of construction and found fence being made.
He addressed the group and asked them to stop
destroying his house and asking if they could talk
things over. Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit,
proceed, go ahead." Defendant lost his
"equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He
also shot Rubia who was running towards the jeep
where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the
shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of
Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal battle with
the defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato
over certain pieces of property. At the time of the
shooting, the civil case was still pending for
annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to
Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of the
shooting, defendant had leased his property from
Fleisher (though case pending and ownership
uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant
received letter terminating contract because he
allegedly didn't pay rent. He was given 6 months to
remove his house from the land. Shooting was
barely 2 months after letter. Defendant claims he
killed in defense of his person and property. CFI
ruled that Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For
both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral
damages.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting
defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted in
defense of his person. No. The courts concurred that
the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the house
of the defendant was indeed a form of aggression on
the part of the victim. However, this aggression was
not done on the person of the victim but rather on his
rights to property.
On the first issue, the courts did not err. However, in
consideration of the violation of property rights, the
courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil code recognizing
the right of owners to close and fence their land.
Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the
position to subscribe to the article because his
ownership of the land being awarded by the
government was still pending, therefore putting
ownership into question. It is accepted that the victim
was the original aggressor.
2. WON the court erred in convicting
defendant-appellant although he acted in
defence of his rights.
Yes. However, the argument of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense is applicable only
if the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC
enumerates these requisites: Unlawful
aggression. In the case at bar, there was
unlawful aggression towards appellant's
property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6
months and he should have left him in peace
before time was up, instead of chiseling
Narvaez's house and putting up fence. Art. 536
of the Civil Code also provides that possession
may not be acquired through force or
intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that every
possessor has the right to be respected in his
possession Reasonable necessity of means
employed to prevent or repel attack. In the case,
killing was disproportionate to the attack.
Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person
defending himself. Here, there was no
provocation at all since he was asleep Since not
all requisites present, defendant is credited with
the special mitigating circumstance of
incomplete defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6)
RPC. These mitigating circumstances are:
voluntary surrender and passion and
obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation) Crime is
homicide (2 counts) not murder because
treachery is not applicable on account of
provocation by the deceased. Also, assault was
not deliberately chosen with view to kill since
slayer acted instantaneously. There was also
no direct evidence of planning or preparation to
kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is
reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating
circumstances and incomplete defense, it can
be lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to
arrestomayor. 3. WON he should be liable for
subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable to
pay the civil indemnity due to the offended
party. No. He is not liable to be subsidiarily
imprisoned for nonpayment of civil indemnity.
RA 5465 made the provisions of Art. 39
applicable to fines only and not to reparation of
damage caused, indemnification of
consequential damages and costs of
proceedings.
Although it was enacted only after its conviction,
considering that RA 5465 is favorable to the
accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may
be given retroactive effect pursuant to Art. 22 of
the RPC. Judgment: Defendant guilty of
homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances and
extenuating circumstance of incomplete self
defense. Penalty is 4 months arresto mayor and
to indemnify each group of heirs 4,000 w/o
subsidiary imprisonment and w/o award for
moral damages. Appellant has already been
detained 14 years so his immediate release is
ordered. Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of
property can only be invoked when coupled with
form of attack on person defending property. In
the case at bar, this was not so. Appellant
should then be sentenced to prision mayor.
However, since he has served more than that,
he should be released.
People vs. Ringor, 320 SCRA 342 (1999)
FACTS: The accused (Ringor) on the night of
June 23, 1994 was seen entering Peoples
Restaurant. A witness Fely Batanes saw the
accused approach a table where the victim was
sitting, pulled his hair, and poked a knife at the
latters throat. After, leaving the restaurant, the
accused returned with a gun, entered the
kitchen of the restaurant, stealthily approached
the victim from behind and shot him six times
successively. The defendant was later
apprehended and caught in his possession was
an unlicensed weapon. Upon verification in
Camp Crame, it was found out that Ringor is not
a licensed firearm holder and that the gun was
not licensed. Ringor put up self-defense but he
failed to prove Floridas unlawful aggression. He
was found guilty of murder qualified by
treachery and was sentenced to death. He was
found guilty of a separate charge of possession
of an unlicensed firearm with a sentence of 17
to 20 years.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the amendatory law
RA 8294 (which took effect in 1997: crime
occurred in 1994) is applicable
No. At the time of the commission of the crime
the use of an unlicensed firearm was still not an
aggravating circumstance in murder to
homicide. To apply it to Ringor would increase
his penalty from reclusion perpetua to death.
Hence, RA 8294 cannot retroact as it is
unfavorable to the accused, lest it becomes an
ex post facto law.
2. Whether or not RTC erred in convicting
appellant for simple illegal possession of
firearms and sentenced him to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of 17 to 20 years.
Yes. In cases where murder or homicide is
committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, there can be no separate conviction
for the crime of illegal possession of
firearms under PD No. 1866. t is simply
considered as an aggravating
circumstance, no longer as a separate
offence.
According to the article 22 of RPC,
retroactivity of the law must be applied if it is
favourable to the accused. 3. Whether or not
trial court erred in convicting accused of
murder No. For self-defence to prosper,
unlawful aggression, proportionality of
methods to fend said aggression, and lack
of sufficient provocation from defender must
be proven. In this case, defendant failed to
prove unlawful aggression. The statement
that the victim approached him with a bolo
was inconsistent to the witness statement
of the victim being in a prone position in the
table. This does not constitute the requisite
quantum of proof for unlawful aggression.
With the first requirement missing, the last
two requisites have no basis.
3. WON RTC erred in sentencing the accused
to death for muder which was not proven
and that the alleged murder committed by
the appellant, the appropriate penalty for the
 offense is reclusion perpetua due to to the
absence of an aggravating circumstance.
Yes. In the absence of mitigating or
aggravating circumstances to a crime of
murder as described by art 248 of RPC, a
lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua has to
be imposed in according to article 63(2) of
RPC.
People v. Pimentel, 288 SCRA 542 (1998)
Exceptions to the Rule of Prospectivity. (See page
12 of Albano.)
288 SCRA 542 (1998)
Facts:
In 1983, private respondent Antonio Tujan was
charged with subversion under RA 1700 (Anti-
Subversion Law). As a consequence thereof, a
warrant for his arrest has been issued on July 29,
1983but it could not be served because he could
not be found.
7 years later (June 5, 1990), he was arrested on
the basis of his warrant of arrest of the subversion
case. When arrested, an unlicensed .38 caliber
special revolver and six rounds of live ammunition
were found on his possession.
On June 14, 1990, he was charged with illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition in
furtherance of subversion under PD 1866.
On July 16 1990, Tujan filed the motion to quash
the second criminal case (illegal possession)
contending that common crimes such as illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition should
actually be deemed absorbed by the crime
subversion. He is entitled to invoke constitutional
protection against double jeopardy (Art. III,
Constitution; Misolas v. Panga; and Enrile v.
Salazar: alleged possession absorbed in
subversion. It was granted by the trial court and the
court of appeals.)
SIDE ISSUE:
Issue: Whether or not the charge under PD 1866
be quashed on ground of double jeopardy in view
of the previous charge under RA 1700?
Ratio: NO.
WHY?
1. Article III of the Constitution and Rule 117
Revised Rules of Court state that for double
jeopardy to occur, acquittal, conviction or dismissal
in previous cases must have occurred. In this case,
first case was not even arraigned yet.
2. They are different offenses. R.A. 1700
punishes subversion while PD 1866 punishes
illegal possession of firearms.
Anyway, let us go back to our concern which is the
application of EXECEPTION TO THE RULE OF
PROSPECTIVITY
Since RA 7636 totally repealed subversion
or RA 1700, and since this is favorable to the
accused, we can no longer charge accused with
RA 1700 even if the issue wasnt raised. PD 1866
should be amended to mere ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS without
furtherance of subversion.
Ruling:
1. The subversion charged against
Antonion Tujan is DISMISSED (RA
76736 = Subversion is no longer a
crime. - retroactive effect)
2. The other information for the illegal
possession of firearms and
ammunition in furtherance of
subversion is DEEMED AMENDED to
SIMPLE illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition. The accused-
appellant is hereby ordered RELEASED
IMMEDIATELY (this is so because even
if he was convicted of I.P.o.F.A.a.A.
hehethe length of his detention
while his case is still pending has
ALREADY EXCEEDED the penalty
prescribed by the new law.)
In short:
Held: RTC and CA reversed and set aside. RA
1700 charge
dismissed. PD 1866 change amended. Release
Tujan.
People v. Lacson, 382 SCRA 365
(2002)
FACTS: Petitioner asserts that retroactive
application of penal laws should also cover
procedures, and that these should be applied only to
the sole benefit of the accused. Petitioner asserts
that Sec 8 was meant to reach back in time to
provide relief to the accused in line with the
constitutional guarantee to the right to speedy trial.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the 5 Associate Justices
inhibit themselves from deciding in the Motion for
Reconsideration given they were only appointed in
the SC after his Feb. 19, 2002 oral arguments.
The rule should be applied prospectively. The court
upheld the petitioners contention that while Sec.8
secures the rights of the accused, it does not and
should not preclude the equally important right of
the State to public justice. If a procedural rule
impairs a vested right, or would work injustice, the
said rule may not be given a retroactive application.
2.WON the application of the time-bar under
Section 8 Rule 117 be given a retroactive
application without reservations, only and solely on
the basis of its being favorable to the accused.
The Court is not mandated to apply rules
retroactively simply because it is favorable to the
accused. The time-bar under the new rule is
intended to benefit both the State and the accused.
When the rule was approved by the court, it
intended that the rule be applied prospectively and
not retroactively, for to do so would be tantamount
to the denial of the States right to due process. A
retroactive application would result in absurd,
unjust and oppressive consequences to the State
and to the victims of crimes and their heirs.
PEOPLE, et al. v. Lacson, April 1, 2003
FACTS: Before the court is the petitioners motion of
reconsideration of the resolution dated May 23,
2002, for the determination of several factual issues
relative to the application of Sec. 8 Rule 117 of
RRCP on the dismissal of the cases Q-99- 81679
and Q-99-81689 against the respondent.
The respondent was charged with the shooting and
killing of eleven male persons. The court confirmed
the express consent of the respondent in the
provisional dismissal of the aforementioned cases
when he filed for judicial determination. The court
also ruled the need to determine whether the other
facts for its application are attendant.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the requisites for the
applicability of Sec. 8, Rule 117 of 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure were complied with in the
Kuratong Baleleng cases
a. Was express consent given by the respondent?
b. Was notice for the motion, the hearing and the
subsequent dismissal given to the heirs of the
victims?
Section 8, Rule 117 is not applicable to the case
since the conditions for its applicability, namely: 1)
prosecution with the express consent of the accused
or both of them move for provisional dismissal, 2)
offended party notified, 3) court grants motion and
dismisses cases provisionally, 4) public prosecutor
served with copy of orders of provisional dismissal,
which is the defendants burden to prove, which in
this case has not been done
a. The defendant never filed and denied
unequivocally in his statements, through counsel at
the Court of Appeals, that he filed for dismissal nor
did he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof.
b. No notice of motion for provisional dismissal,
hearing and subsequent dismissal was given to the
heirs of the victims.
2)WON time-bar in Sec 8 Rule 117 should be
applied prospectively or retroactively.
Time-bar should not be applied retroactively.
Though procedural rules may be applied
retroactively, it should not be if to do so would work
injustice or would involve intricate problems of due
process. Statutes should be construed in light of the
purposes to be achieved and the evils to be
remedied. This is because to do so would be
prejudicial to the State since, given that the Judge
dismissed the case on March 29,1999, and the New
rule took effect on Dec 1,2000, it would only in effect
give them 1 year and three months to work instead
of 2 years. At that time, they had no knowledge of
the said rule and therefore they should not be
penalized for that. Indeed for justice to prevail, the
scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed
for the accused alone. The two-year period fixed in
the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and
the accused. It should not be emasculated and
reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of
the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the
accused. To do so would cause an injustice of
hardship to the state and adversely affect the
administration of justice.
PEOPLE vs. Lacson, October 7, 2003
FACTS: Petitioner asserts that retroactive
application of penal laws should also cover
procedures, and that these should be applied only to
the sole benefit of the accused. Petitioner asserts
that Sec 8 was meant to reach back in time to
provide relief to the accused in line with the
constitutional guarantee to the right to speedy trial.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the 5 Associate Justices
inhibit themselves from deciding in the Motion for
Reconsideration given they were only appointed in
the SC after his Feb. 19, 2002 oral arguments.
The rule should be applied prospectively. The court
upheld the petitioners contention that while Sec.8
secures the rights of the accused, it does not and
should not preclude the equally important right of the
State to public justice. If a procedural rule impairs a
vested right, or would work injustice, the said rule
may not be given a retroactive application.
2)WON the application of the time-bar under Section
8 Rule 117 be given a retroactive application without
reservations, only and solely on the basis of its being
favorable to the accused.
The Court is not mandated to apply rules
retroactively simply because it is favorable to the
accused. The time-bar under the new rule is
intended to benefit both the State and the accused.
When the rule was approved by the court, it intended
that the rule be applied prospectively and not
retroactively, for to do so would be tantamount to the
denial of the States right to due process. A
retroactive application would result in absurd, unjust
and oppressive consequences to the State and to
the victims of crimes and their heirs.
PEOPLE vs. Lacson, October 7, 2003
FACTS: Petitioner asserts that retroactive
application of penal laws should also cover
procedures, and that these should be applied only to
the sole benefit of the accused. Petitioner asserts
that Sec 8 was meant to reach back in time to
provide relief to the accused in line with the
constitutional guarantee to the right to speedy trial.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the 5 Associate Justices
inhibit themselves from deciding in the Motion for
Reconsideration given they were only appointed in
the SC after his Feb. 19, 2002 oral arguments.
The rule should be applied prospectively. The court
upheld the petitioners contention that while Sec.8
secures the rights of the accused, it does not and
should not preclude the equally important right of the
State to public justice. If a procedural rule impairs a
vested right, or would work injustice, the said rule
may not be given a retroactive application.
2)WON the application of the time-bar under Section
8 Rule 117 be given a retroactive application without
reservations, only and solely on the basis of its being
favorable to the accused.
The Court is not mandated to apply rules
retroactively simply because it is favorable to the
accused. The time-bar under the new rule is
intended to benefit both the State and the accused.
When the rule was approved by the court, it intended
that the rule be applied prospectively and not
retroactively, for to do so would be tantamount to the
denial of the States right to due process. A
retroactive application would result in absurd, unjust
and oppressive consequences to the State and to
the victims of crimes and their heirs.
Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.125359, 4
September 2001
Statement of the case:
Assailed in this petition is the consolidated decision
rendered on May 23, 1996, by the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 35928 and CA-G.R. SP No.
35719. CA-G.R. SP No. 35928 had affirmed the
order dated September 6, 1994, of the Regional Trial
Court, Manila, Branch 26, insofar as it denied
petitioners respective Motions to Quash the
Informations in twenty-five (25) criminal cases for
violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960. Therein
included were informations involving: (a)
consolidated Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-
101883 filed against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Roberto
S. Benedicto, and Hector T. Rivera; (b) consolidated
Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101884 to 91-101892 filed
against Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto; and (c) Criminal
Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969 also against
Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto. Note, however, that the
Court of Appeals already dismissed Criminal Case
No. 91-101884.
Statement of the facts:
On December 27, 1991, Mrs. Imelda Marcos and
Messrs. Benedicto and Rivera were indicted for
violation of Section 10 of Circular No. 960 1
in relation to Section 34 of the Central Bank
Act (Republic Act No. 265, as amended) in
five Informations filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
91-101879 to 91-101883, the charge sheets alleged
that the trio failed to submit reports of their foreign
exchange earnings from abroad and/or failed to
register with the Foreign Exchange
Department of the Central Bank within the
period mandated by Circular No. 960. Said
Circular prohibited natural and juridical
persons from maintaining foreign exchange
accounts abroad without prior authorization from the
Central Bank. On August 11, 1994, petitioners
moved to quash all the Informations filed against
them in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-
101883; 91-101884 to 91-101892, and 91-101959 to
91-101969. Their motion was grounded on
lack of jurisdiction, forum shopping, absence
of a preliminary investigation and extinction of
criminal liability with the repeal of Circular No.
960.On September 6, 1994, the trial court denied
petitioners' motion. A similar motion filed on May 23,
1994 by Mrs. Marcos seeking to dismiss the dollar-
salting cases against her due to the repeal of
Circular No. 960 had earlier been denied by
the trial court in its order dated June
9,1994. Petitioners then filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the trial court likewise denied
this motion on October 18, 1994..
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Court of
Appeals erred in denying the
Motion to Quash for absence of a
valid preliminary investigation.
2. W hether or not the repeal
of Central Bank Circular No. 960
and Republic Act No. 265 by
Circular No. 1353 and Republic Act No.
7653 respectively, extinguish the criminal
liability of petitioners.
HELD:
1. NO. P r e l i m i n a r y i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s
not part of the due process
g u a r a n t e e d b y t h e Constitution. It is
an inquiry to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has
been committed and the respondent
is probably guilty thereof. Instead,
the right to a preliminary
investigation is personal. It is
afforded to the accused by statute,
and can be waived, either expressly or by
implication. When the records of the case
were disclosed to them, in opting to enter
their respective pleas to the charges, and
filed various motions and pleadings, they
are deemed to have made an express
waiver of their right to have a preliminary
investigation.
2. NO. In the instant case, it must be
noted that despite the repeal of
Circular No. 960,Circular No. 1353
retained the same reportorial
requirement for residents receiving
earnings or profits from non-trade
foreign exchange
transactions. Even the most cursory
glance at the repealing circulars,
Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 shows
that both contain a saving clause,
expressly providing that the repeal of
Circular No. 960 shall have no effect
on pending actions for violation of the
latter Circular. A saving clause operates
to except from the effect of the repealing
law what would otherwise be lost under
the new law. In the present case, the
respective saving clauses of Circular
Nos. 1318 and 1353 clearly manifest the
intent to reserve the right of the State to
prosecute and punish offenses for
violations of the repealed Circular No.
960, where the cases are either pending
or under investigation
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition
is DISMISSED. The assailed consolidated Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated May 23, 1996, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 35928 and CA G.R. SP No. 35719,
is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the
charges against deceased petitioner, Roberto S.
Benedicto, particularly in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-
101879 to 91-101883, 91-101884 to 101892, and
92-101959 to 92-101969, pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26, are
ordered dropped and that any criminal as well as civil
liability ex delicto that might be attributable to him in
the aforesaid cases are declared extinguished by
reason of his death on May 15, 2000. No
pronouncement as to costs.
FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner, vs. SEVERINO
GARCIA and TIMOTEO ALMARIO, respondents
No. 48006. July 8, 1942
Facts:
A head-on collision between a taxicab owned by
Barredo and a carretela occurred. The carretela was
overturned and one of its passengers, a 16-year old
boy, the son of Garcia and Almario, died as a result
of the injuries which he received. The driver of the
taxicab, an employee of Barredo, was prosecuted for
the crime and was convicted. When the criminal
case was instituted, Garcia and Almario reserved
their right to institute a separate civil action for
damages. Subsequently, Garcia and Almario
instituted a civil action for damages against Barredo,
the employer of the taxicab driver.
Issue:
Whether or not they can file a separate civil action
against Fausto Barredo making him primarily and
directly responsible
Held:
(Foreword: The Barredo case was decided by the
Supreme Court prior to the present Civil
Code. However, the principle enunciated in said
case, that responsibility for fault or negligence as
quasi-delict is distinct and separate
from negligence penalized under the Revised Penal
Code, is now specifically embodied in Art. 2177 of
the Civil Code.)
The defendant maintains that
Fontanillas negligence being punishable by the
Penal Code, his (defendants) liability as an
employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal
Code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil
action and his property has not been exhausted. To
decide the main issue, we must cut thru the tangle
that has, in the minds of many, confused and
jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes
under the Penal Code and fault or negligence under
Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. According to
the Supreme Tribunal of Spain:
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-
delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code, with a substantivity
all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart
and independent from a delict or crime. Upon this
principle, and on the wording and spirit of Article
1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct
responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
It will thus be seen that while the terms of Article
1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough to
cover the drivers negligence in the instant case,
nevertheless Article 1903 limits cuasi-delitos TO
ACTS OR OMISSIONS NOT PUNISHABLE BY
LAW. But inasmuch as Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even
simple imprudence or negligence, the fault
or negligence under Article 1902 of the Civil Code
has apparently been crowded out. It is this
overlapping that makes the confusion worse
confounded. However, a closer study shows that
such a concurrence of scope in regard
to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction
between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-
contractual. The same negligent act causing
damages may produce civil liability arising from a
crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code;
or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-
contractual under Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil
Code. Some of the differences between crimes
under the Penal Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while quasi-
delitos are only of private concern.
2. That consequently, the Penal Code punishes or
corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by
means of indemnification, merely repairs the
damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts,
because for the former are punished only if there is
a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter,
cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which any kind of
fault or negligence intervenes. However, it should
be noted that not all violations of the penal law
produce civil responsibility, such as begging
in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game
laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is
hurt.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the
separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically
they show that there is a distinction between civil
liability arising from criminal negligence (governed
by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault
or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may
produce either a civil liability arising from a crime
under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility
for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Civil Code. Still more concretely
the authorities above cited render it inescapable to
conclude that the employer in this case
the defendant-petitioner is primarily and directly
liable under Article 1903 of the Civil Code.
CRIME WITHOUT FRUSTRATED STAGE
ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA y
NATIVIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON.
COURT OF APPEALS NACHURA, respondents.
G. R. No. 160188 June 21, 2007
FACTS:
On 19 May 1994, at around 4:30 p.m., petitioner
and Calderon were sighted outside the Super
Sale Club, a supermarket within the ShoeMart
(SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo
Lago (Lago), a security guard who was then
manning his post at the open parking area of the
supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was
wearing an identification card with the mark
"Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU)," hauling a
push cart with cases of detergent of the well-
known "Tide" brand. Petitioner unloaded these
cases in an open parking space, where Calderon
was waiting. Petitioner then returned inside the
supermarket, and after five (5) minutes, emerged
with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again
unloaded these boxes to the same area in the
open parking space.
Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and
haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it
towards the parking space where Calderon was
waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide
Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the
vehicle. All these acts were eyed by Lago, who
proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the
open parking area. When Lago asked petitioner
for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and
Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot, but Lago
fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security
guards of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon
were apprehended at the scene, and the stolen
merchandise recovered. The filched items seized
from the duo were four (4) cases of Tide
Ultramatic, one (1) case of Ultra 25 grams, and
three (3) additional cases of detergent, the
goods with an aggregate value of P12,090.00.
In a Decision promulgated on 1 February 2000,
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 90, convicted both petitioner and
Calderon of the crime of consummated theft.
They were sentenced to an indeterminate prison
term of two (2) years of prision correccional as
minimum to seven (7) years of prision mayor as
maximum.
Valenzuela appealed before the Court of
Appeals, arguing that he should only be
convicted of frustrated theft since he was not
able to freely dispose of the articles stolen.
Decision dated 19 June 2003,the Court of
Appeals rejected this contention and affirmed
petitioners conviction, thus the Petition for
Review was filed before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed has a
frustrated stage.
HELD: NO.
The petition was DENIED.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that a felony is consummated
when all the elements necessary for its
execution and accomplishment are present.
Article 308 states that, in the crime of theft,
the following elements should be present:
(1) that there be taking of personal property;
(2) that said property belongs to another; (3)
that the taking be done with intent to gain;
(4) that the taking be done without the
consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking
be accomplished without the use of violence
against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things.
The Court held that theft is produced when
there is deprivation of personal property by
one with intent to gain. Thus, it is immaterial
that the offender is able or unable to freely
dispose the property stolen since he has
already committed all the acts of execution
and the deprivation from the owner has
already ensued from such acts. Therefore,
theft cannot have a frustrated stage, and
can only be attempted or consummated.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
CORA ABELLA OJEDA, appellant.
G.R. Nos. 104238-58.
June 3, 2004
Nature of the case:
For review of the decision of the Court
which finds the accused, Cora Abella Ojeda
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Estafa as defined and penalized
under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep.
Act 4885, in Criminal Case No. 88-66228
and hereby sentences her to suffer a
penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the
accessories provided by law and with credit
for preventive imprisonment undergone, if
any, in accordance with Article 29 of the
 Revised Penal Code as amended, and to
pay complainant Ruby Chua the amount of
Two Hundred Twenty Eight Thousand
Three Hundred Six (P228,306.00) Pesos
with interests thereon from the time of
demand until fully paid.
Facts:
Cora Abella Ojeda used to buy fabrics
from complainant Ruby Chua.
F o r t h e t h r e e years approximately she
transacted business with Chua used
postdated checks to pay for the fabrics she
bought.
On November 5, 1983, appellant purchased
from Chua various fabrics and textile
worthP 2 2 8 , 3 0 6 f o r w h i c h s h e i s s u
e d 2 2 p o s t d a t e d c h e c k s bearing
different dates and amounts. The 22 checks
were all dishonored.
Demandsw e r e a l l e g e d l y m a d e t o m a
ke good the dishonoredchecks, to
no avail.
Estafa and BP 22 charges were
thereafter filed against Ojeda.
T h e t r i a l c o u r t convicted appellant
of the crime of estafa as definedand
penalized under paragraph 2(d) of
Article 315 ofthe Revised Penal Code
(RPC), and sentenced her
tor e c l u s i o n p e r p e t u a .
The trial court also convictedappe
llant of violation of BP 22 for
i s s u i n g b o u n c i n g checks. However,
the court a quo held her guilty of only
14 counts out of the 22 bouncing checks
issued.
Issue:
WON the court erred in not taking into
account the lack of intent by the accused to
commit the crime which may render her not
guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
The ruling of the lower court was reversed
and set aside. The appellant Cora Abella
Ojeda is ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No.
88-66228 for estafa and in Criminal Case
Nos. 88-66230, 88-66232, 88-66235 to 88-
66240, 88-66242, 88-66243, 88-66245 to
88-66248 for violation of BP 22.
Ratio:
There is not intent because:
1. She told Chua not to deposit the
postdated checks because they were
not sufficiently funded.
2. She made partial payment right away.
3. She appealed, however her counsel
filed it late, to dismiss the case with the
affidavit including Chuas statement that
she has made payments for the amount
Ojeda owed her and requesting that the
accused be acquitted of her criminal
liability.
4. The issuance of postdated checks were
only to insure future payments and not
really with intent to deceive.
Intent is an indispensable element of mala
in se crimes of the RPC to convict an
accused with criminal liability.
Conclusion:
Actus non facit reum, insi men sit rea means
the act is culpable unless the mind is guilty.
Applying it to statutory construction, unless
Ojeda had intent to deceive and commit the
crime she should not be held criminally liable.
Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 (1986)
146 SCRA 323 Commercial Law Negotiable
Instruments Law Constitutionality of BP 22
This case is a consolidation of 8 cases regarding
violations of the Bouncing Checks Law or Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (enacted April 3, 1979). In one of
the eight cases, Judge David Nitafan of RTC Manila
declared the law unconstitutional. Among the
arguments against the constitutionality of the law are
a.) it is violative of the constitutional provision on
non-imprisonment due to debt, and b.) it impairs
freedom of contract.
ISSUE: Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional.
HELD: Yes, BP 22 is constitutional.
The Supreme Court first discussed the history of the
law. The SC explained how the law on estafa was
not sufficient to cover all acts involving the issuance
of worthless checks; that in estafa, it only punishes
the fraudulent issuance of worthless checks to cover
prior or simultaneous obligations but not pre-existing
obligations.
BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the
practice of issuing checks that are worthless, i.e.
checks that end up being rejected or dishonored for
payment. The practice is proscribed by the state
because of the injury it causes to public interests.
BP 22 is not violative of the constitutional prohibition
against imprisonment for debt. The debt
contemplated by the constitution are those arising
from contracts (ex contractu). No one is going to
prison for non-payment of contractual debts.
However, non-payment of debts arising from crimes
(ex delicto) is punishable. This is precisely why the
mala prohibita crime of issuing worthless checks as
defined in BP 22 was enacted by Congress. It is a
valid exercise of police power.
Due to the insufficiency of the Revised Penal Code,
BP 22 was enacted to punish the following acts:
any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and
issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or
to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the
check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days
from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it
is dishonored by the drawee bank.
And
any person who makes or draws and issues any
check on account or for value, knowing at the time
of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said
check in full upon presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment.
Congress was able to determine at that time that the
issuance of worthless checks was a huge problem.
The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the
legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the
making and issuance of a worthless check is
deemed public nuisance to be abated by the
imposition of penal sanctions.
Checks are widely used due to the convenience it
brings in commercial transactions and confidence is
the primary basis why merchants rely on it for their
various commercial undertakings. If such confidence
is shaken, the usefulness of checks as currency
substitutes would be greatly diminished or may
become nil. Any practice therefore tending to destroy
that confidence should be deterred for the
proliferation of worthless checks can only create
havoc in trade circles and the banking community.
Thus, the Congress, through their exercise of police
power, declared that the making and issuance of a
worthless check is deemed a public nuisance which
can be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
The Supreme Court however also explained that
(regardless of their previous explanation on ex
delicto debts) the non-payment of a debt is not the
gravamen of the violations of BP 22. The gravamen
of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making
and issuing a worthless check or a check that is
dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is
not the non-payment of an obligation which the law
punishes. The law is not intended or designed to
coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law
is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the
making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the
public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against
property, but an offense against public order.
Magno v. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA 475 (1992)
Date of Promulgation: 26 June 1992
Nature: Appeal by certiorari to review the decision
of Court of Appeals
Facts:
Petitioner was in process of putting up a car
repair shop sometime in April 1983, but he
did not have complete equipment that could
make his venture workable. He lacked funds
to purchase necessary equipment.
He approached Corazon Teng, VP of Mancor
Industries, a distributor of equipment who
referred him to LS Finance
A lease/purchase agreement specifying a
warranty deposit (29,790) of 30% for Magno
to put up. Claimino lg he could not afford it,
Magno asked LS Finance to find a 3rd party
lender to lend him the amount. LENDER =
TENG, specified a 3% interest on short term
loan.
Magno issued postdated checks to LS
Finance, who gave it to Teng. When check
matured, Magno said he could not cover it
and he was not banking with Pacific Bank
anymore. In lieu, he issued 6 check - first 2
checks honored, last 4 in question. When
business failed, Magno could no longer pay
rent to LS Finance, LS pulled out equipment.
Magno promised to pay the rest of the
warranty deposit, but the remaining checks
were no longer honored due to closed
account. He was convicted of four counts of
violating BP 22. CA affirmed this decision
because issuing a bouncing check is a crime
ISSUE:
(1) WON Magno is guilty of violating B.P. 22
upon review
(2) WON post-dated checks were drawn or
issued "to apply on account or for value",
as required under Section 1 of B.P. Blg, 22.

Ruling: Decision REVERSED, accused-
petitioner, ACQUITTED
Held:
(1) NO. There is no violation of BP22 by
issuance of check to cover warranty deposit
given by complainant to enable drawer to
import equipment financed on lease-
purchase agreement. Since transaction did
not become purchase when Magno failed to
pay rent and LS Finance pulled out
equipment. No need for Magno to continue
paying warranty deposit (warranty deposit is
for purchase of equipment).
(2) NO violation is committed when complainant
told drawer that he has insufficient funds in
the bank. The 4 checks were issued to
collateralize rent/ an accommodation and
not for purchase equipment/receipt of an
actual account or credit for value.
Ratio: RTC and CAs decision merely relied on
the law, without looking into the real nature of
warranty deposit. Acquittal based on action not
constituting a wrong sought to be punished in
offense charged (not because of lack of intent).
Protective theory affirms that the primary
function of punishment is the protective of society
against actual and potential wrongdoers
Ex. Actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng amount to that
of potential wrongdoers whose operations should
also be clipped in order that the unwary public will
not fall prey to vicious transactions
ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001
Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder,
wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed
law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that
thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the
constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly
based on the effects of the said law that it suffers
from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the
"reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens
rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised
Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental
rights of the accused.
The focal point of the case is the alleged
vagueness of the law in the terms it uses.
Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and
unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the
facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus
standi to attack the validity of the law using the facial
challenge.
Ruling:
On how the law uses the terms combination and
series does not constitute vagueness. The
petitioners contention that it would not give a fair
warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks
to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-
vagueness doctrine is manifestly misplaced under
the petitioners reliance since ordinary intelligence
can understand what conduct is prohibited by the
statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of
legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein
clarification by a saving clause or construction
cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in
this case since the statute is clear and free from
ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a
reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be
upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical
exactitude.
On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees
that governmental purpose may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial
challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute
and to one which is overbroad because of possible
chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore,
in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take
chances as in the area of free speech. A facial
challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully since the challenger
must establish that no set of circumstances exists.
Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed
for facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases.
With respect to such statue, the established rule is
that one to who application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute
on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which
its application might be unconstitutional. On its face
invalidation of statues results in striking them down
entirely on the ground that they might be applied to
parties not before the Court whose activities are
constitutionally protected. It is evident that the
purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more
imagined than real.
The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to
have been resolve in the Congress decision to
include it among the heinous crime punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death.
Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional
and petition is dismissed for lacking merit.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
BENJAMIN ORTEGA, JR. and Manuel Garcia,
accused-appellants
G.R. No. 116736 July 24, 1997
FACTS:
On October 15, 1992 at 5:30 in the afternoon,
Andre Mar Masangkay, Ariel Caranto, Romeo
Ortega, Roberto San Andres and Diosdado
Quitlong were having a drinking spree in the
compound near the house of Benjamin Ortega, Jr.
On October 15, 1992 11:00 pm, the accused
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia who were
already drank joined them. At about 12:30 a.m of
October 16, 1992 the victim Andre Mar Masangkay
answered the call of nature and went to the back
portion of the house. Benjamin Ortega, Jr. followed
him and suddenly, they heard a shout from Andre
Dont, help me! (Huwag, tulungan ninyo ako!)
Diosdado and Ariel ran and saw Benjamin
on top of Andre who was lying down being
stabbed. Ariel got Benjamin Ortega, Sr.,
Benjamins father while Diosdado called Romeo to
pacify his brother. Romeo, Benjamin and Manuel
lifted Andre from the canal and dropped him in the
well. They dropped stones to Andres body to weigh
the body down. Romeo warned Diosdado not to
tell anybody what he saw. He agreed so he was
allowed to go home. But, his conscience bothered
him so he told his mother, reported it to the police
and accompanied them to the crime scene.
Manuel Garcia alibi
o He was asked to go home by his wife to fetch
his mother-in-law who performed a ritual called
tawas on his sick daughter and stayed home after
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. story
o After Masangkay left, he left to urinate and he
saw Andre peeking through the room of his sister
Raquel. Then, Andre approached him to ask where
his sister was. When he answered he didnt know,
Andre punched him so he bled and fell to the
ground. Andre drew a knife and stabbed him, hitting
him on the left arm, thereby immobilizing
him. Andre then gripped his neck with his left arm
and threatened to kill him. Unable to move, Ortega
shouted for help. Quitlong came, seized the knife
and stabbed Andre 10 times with it. Andre then ran
towards the direction of the well. Then, he tended
his wound in the lips and armpit and slept.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Benjamin and Manuel should be
liable for murder.
HELD:
NO. PARTLY GRANTED. Benjamin is guilty only of
homicide. Manuel deserves acquittal
If Ortegas version of the assault was true, he
should have immediately reported the matter to the
police authorities. If Ortegas version of the assault
was true, he should have immediately reported the
matter to the police authorities. It is incredible that
Diosdado would stab Andre 10 times successively,
completely ignoring Benjamin who was grappling
with Masangkay and that Andre was choking him
while being stabbed.
Abuse of superior strength requires deliberate
intent on the part of the accused to take advantage
of such superiority none shown
o Andre was a 6-footer, whereas Ortega, Jr. was
only 54
Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code
states that criminal liability shall be incurred by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
o The essential requisites
1. The intended act is felonious assisting
Benjamin by carrying the body to the well
2. The resulting act is likewise a felony
- concealing the body of the crime to prevent its
discovery
3. The unintended albeit graver wrong was
primarily caused by the actors wrongful acts
(praeter intentionem) still alive and was drowned
to death
a person may be convicted of homicide although
he had no original intent to kill
Garcia is a brother-in-law of Benjamin
o Exempt by Article 20 of RPC
ART. 20. Accessories who are exempt from
criminal liability. -- The penalties prescribed for
accessories shall not be imposed upon those who
are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants,
descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted
brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within
the same degrees with the single exception of
accessories falling within the provisions of
paragraph 1 of the next preceding article.
The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, which
is imposable in its medium period, absent any
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, as in the
 case of Appellant Ortega. Because he is entitled to
the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum term shall be one degree lower, that is,
prision mayor.
G.R. No. 180363, April 28, 2009
EDGAR Y. TEVES, Petitioner, vs. THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HERMINIO
G. TEVES
Facts:
Petitioner was a candidate for the position of
Representative of the 3rd legislative district of
Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections.
Respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to
disqualify petitioner on the ground that in Teves v.
Sandiganbayan,3 he was convicted of violating
Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for
possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a
cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of
the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991.
Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified
from running for public office because he was
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude which
carries the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from public office.
The COMELEC First Division disqualified
petitioner from running for the position of member
of House of Representatives and ordered the
cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy.
Upon MR, COMELEC en banc denied the
motion saying that since petitioner lost in the last 14
May 2007 congressional elections, it thereby
rendered the instant MR moot and academic.
Issue: Whether petitioners violation of Section
3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves moral turpitude.
Held:
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything
which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good
morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in
the private and social duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general.
The essential elements of the violation of said
provision are as follows: 1) The accused is a public
officer; 2) he has a direct or indirect financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction; 3) he either: a) intervenes or takes part
in his official capacity in connection with such
interest, or b) is prohibited from having such
interest by the Constitution or by law.
Thus, there are two modes by which a public
officer who has a direct or indirect financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or
transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019.
The first mode is when the public officer intervenes
or takes part in his official capacity in connection
with his financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract, or transaction. The second
mode is when he is prohibited from having such an
interest by the Constitution or by law.
In Teves v. Sandiganbayan, petitioner was
convicted under the second mode for having
pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit which is
prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
o The evidence for the prosecution has established
that petitioner Edgar Teves, then mayor of
Valencia, Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit in
question.
o Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves
over the cockpit were transferred to his wife, still he
would have a direct interest thereon because, as
correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan, they
remained married to each other from 1983 up to
1992, and as such their property relation can be
presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of
gains in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
o Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct
and is, therefore, prohibited under Section 89(2) of
the LGC of 1991.
However, conviction under the second mode
does not automatically mean that the same
involved moral turpitude. A determination of all
surrounding circumstances of the violation of the
statute must be considered. Besides, moral
turpitude does not include such acts as are not
of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies
in their being positively prohibited, as in the
instant case.
The Court clarified that not every criminal act,
however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this
reason that "as to what crime involves moral
turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine." In
resolving the foregoing question, the Court is
guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala
in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala
prohibita do not.
Moral turpitude implies something immoral in
itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by
law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but
the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing
of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute
fixes the moral turpitude.
Consequently, considering all circumstances,
the Court held that petitioners conviction does
not involve moral turpitude.
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable
issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is
 generally considered inimical to the interests of the
people, there is nothing in the Constitution
categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or,
for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to
Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit.
In the exercise of its own discretion, the
legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or
allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some
forms of gambling and allow others for whatever
reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has
prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries,
cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such
choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom,
which this Court has no authority to review, much
less reverse.
EVANGELINE LADONGA VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 141066. February 17, 2005
Facts: In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline
Ladonga became Alfredo Oculams regular
customers in his pawnshop business. Sometime in
May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a
P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743,
post dated to July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico;
sometime in the last week of April 1990 and during
the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses
obtained an additional loan of P12,730.00,
guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post
dated to July 26, 1990 issued by Adronico; between
May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses
obtained a third loan in the amount of P8,496.55,
guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post
dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico; the
three checks bounced upon presentment for the
reason CLOSED ACCOUNT; when the Ladonga
spouses failed to redeem the check, despite
repeated demands, he filed a criminal complaint
against them. While admitting that the checks
issued by Adronico bounced because there was no
sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the
Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks were
issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an
agreement that Oculam should not encash the
checks when they mature; and, that petitioner is not
a signatory of the checks and had no participation
in the issuance thereof. The RTC rendered a joint
decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22.
Petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of
petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner who was not
the drawer or issuer of the three checks that
bounced but her co-accused husband under the
latters account could be held liable for violations of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 as conspirator.
Held: The conviction must be set aside. Article 8 of
the RPC provides that a conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it. To be held guilty as a co-principal by
reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown
to have performed an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity. The overt act or acts
of the accused may consist of active participation in
the actual commission of the crime itself or may
consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators
by moving them to execute or implement the
criminal plan. In the present case, the prosecution
failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt
act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy.
Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that
may be attributed to petitioner is that she was
present when the first check was issued. However,
this inference cannot be stretched to mean
concurrence with the criminal design. Conspiracy
must be established, not by conjectures, but by
positive and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy
transcends mere companionship and mere
presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself
amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge,
acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not
enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy,
absent any active participation in the commission of
the crime with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose