TodayisTuesday,November21,2017

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.L30001June23,1970

THEDIRECTOROFPRISONSandTHEEXECUTIVESECRETARY,petitioners,
vs.

ANGCHOKIO@ANGMINGHUYandTHECOURTOFAPPEALS,respondents.

OfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralFelixV.MakasiarandSolicitorBernardoP.Pardoforpetitioners.

NorbertoJ.Quisumbingforrespondents.

ZALDIVAR,J.:

Anappealbycertiorari,bytheSolicitorGeneralinbehalfoftheDirectorofPrisonsandtheAppealsinCAG.R.No.
39018R of said Court, entitled "Ang Cho Kio (Ang Ming Huy) PetitionerAppellee versus The Director of Prisons
and the Executive Secretary, RespondentsAppellees."1 In his petition the Solicitor General prays this Court "to
render judgment ordering the striking out from said decision of the portions recommending to the Executive
Secretary 'to allow the (petitioner) (respondent Ang Cho Kio @ Ang Ming Huy) to leave this country in the first
availabletransportationabroad'butotherwiseaffirmingthedismissalofthepetitionforhabeascorpus,withcostsin
allinstancesagainstrespondentAngChoKio@AngMingHuy."

Thepertinentfactsforthepurposesofthisdecision,asshownintherecord,areasfollows:

RespondentAngChoKio@AngMingHuyhadbeencharged,triedandconvictedofvariousoffensescommittedin
the Philippines and was sentenced to suffer penalties, to wit: a total of fortyfive (45) years, ten (10) months and
twentyone(21)daysofimprisonment,P6,000indemnity,andP5,000moraldamages,pluslifeimprisonmentand
P6,000 indemnity.2 After serving six and onehalf (6) years of his sentence said respondent was granted
conditional pardon on July 4, 1959 by the President of the Philippines. The conditional pardon partly reads as
follows:

ByvirtueoftheauthorityconferreduponmebytheConstitution,andupontherecommendationofthe
BoardofPardonsandParole,theunexecutedportionsoftheprisontermsofprisonerANGCHOKIO
@KIWA@PHILIPPANG@ANGTIUCHIO@KEWA@LUCIOLEE@GOONG@MR.ANG@
GOANG@MR.ONGisherebyremittedonconditionthathewillvoluntarilyleavethePhilippinesupon
hisreleaseandnevertoreturntothiscountry.Shouldtheabovenamedprisonerrefusetoacceptsaid
condition,beshallcontinueservinghissentenceandupontheexpirationthereof,heshallbedeported
fromthePhilippinesforbeinganundesirablealien.

Ang Cho Kio duly accepted the conditions of his pardon and actually left the Philippines for Taipeh,
NationalistChina,onJuly28,1959.

IntheeveningofJune26,1966AngChoKioarrivedattheManilaInternationalAirportonaPhilippineAirLines
planefromTaipeh,travellingunderthename"AngMingHuy."HeheldaroundtripticketfromTaipehtoHonolulu,to
SanFrancisco,toLosAngeles,toChicago,toWashingtonD.C.toNewYork,toVancouver,toTokyo,toSeoul,to
Osaka,toTaipehtoBangkok,toSaigon,toHongkongandbacktoTaipeh.HewasbookedonPhilippineAirLines
earliestconnectingflighttoHonoluluonJune29,1966at6:30p.m.,orwithastopoverofabout72hoursinManila.
HesurrenderedhispassporttotheimmigrationauthoritiesattheManilaInternationalAirport,andwasissuedanote
thathisdeparturewasscheduledforJune29,1966at6:30p.m.Helefthisluggageattheairportandwasissued
claimtags.HeregisteredforathreedaystayattheElPresidenteHotelatParaaque,Rizal.Hecontactedhistwo
friendsinManila,LimPinandGoBonKim.ThesetwofriendsinvitedhimtostaylongerinthePhilippines.OnJune
28,1966heandhistwofriendswenttotheBureauofImmigration,wherehisfriendLimPinsignedaletter
addressedtotheCommissionerofImmigrationrequestingforafourteendayextensionofstayinthePhilippinesfor
him.AngChoKiowasidentifiedbyinspectorMarianoCristioftheImmigrationBureauastheAngChoKiowhowas
deportedtoTaipehonJuly18,1959.Hisidentityhavingbeenestablished,AngChoKiowasarrested,andthe
immigrationauthoritiesconductedaninvestigationregardinghispresenceinthePhilippines.Theimmigration
authoritiesdidnotallowhimtoproceedwithhistriptoHonolulu.OnJuly5,1966theExecutiveSecretary,by
authorityofthePresident,orderedhimrecommittedtoprisontoservetheunexpiredportionofthesentencethat
wereimposedonhim,forhavingviolatedtheconditionedofhispardon.Thesupplementalorderofrecommitment
readsasfollows:

TOTHEDIRECTOROFPRISONS
MUNTINLUPA,RIZAL

WHEREAS,ANGCHOKIO@KIWA&PHILIPPANG@ANGTIUCHIO@KIWA@LUCIODEE@
GOONG@MR.ANG@GOANG@MR.ONGwasgrantedconditionalpardonbythePresidentof
thePhilippinesonJuly4,1959,upontheconditionthathewillvoluntarilyleavethePhilippinesuponhis
releaseandnevertoreturntothiscountryand
 WHEREAS,saidANGCHOKIOhasviolatedtheconditionofhispardoninthatonJune26,1966,he
returnedtothiscountryfromTaipeiandgainedentryunderanassumedname,ANGMINGHUY,failed
toleaveonthefirstavailableconnectingflighttoHonolulu,hisallegeddestinationinsteadrequesteda
fourteen day extension of his 72hour transient stopover and had in December 1965 applied for a
temporaryvisitor'svisatoManilaalsounderhisassumedname,ANGMINGHUY

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority conferred upon the President of the Philippines by
Section64(i)ofthe RevisedAdministrativeCode,youareherebyorderedto recommitto prisonsaid
ANGCHOKIO@KIWA@PHILIPPANG@ANGTIUCHIO@KIWA@LUCIODEE@GOONG@
MR. ANG @ GO ANG @ MR. ONG @ ANG MING HUY to serve the unexpired portion of the
sentencesforwhichhewasoriginallycommittedtoprison,anduponexpirationthereof,todeliversaid
person to the custody of the Commissioner of Immigration for immediate deportation for being an
undesirablealien.

Manila,July5,1966.

ByAuthorityofthePresident:(Sgd.)RAFAELM.SALASExecutiveSecretaryRS/ara.

AngChoKiofiledwiththeExecutiveSecretaryamotion,datedAugust29,1966,forthereconsiderationofthe
supplementalorderofrecommitment.TheExecutiveSecretaryfailedtoactonthemotionforreconsideration,and
soonOctober5,1966AngChoKiofiledapetitionforawritofhabeascorpuswiththeCourtofFirstInstanceof
Rizal(PasayBranch),makingasrespondentsinsaidpetitiontheDirectorofPrisonsandtheExecutivesecretary.
UnderdateofOctober10,1966,theofficerinchargeoftheBureauofPrisonsfiledhisreturn.Underdateof
October17,1966,theSolicitorGeneralfiledareturnfortheDirectorofPrisonsandtheExecutiveSecretary.

After due hearing the Court of First Instance of Rizal, on January 31, 1967, rendered a decision dismissing the
petitionforhabeascorpus.TheCourtofFirstInstanceofRizalheldthatAngChoKio@AngMingHuywasvalidly
recommitted to prison by the President of the Philippines in the exercise of his prerogatives pursuant to the
provisionsofSection64(i)oftheRevisedAdministrativeCode.

Ang Cho Kio appealed to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. In the
decision of a special division of five justices, with three justices concurring, and two justices concurring and
dissenting, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision which in effect affirmed the decision of the Court of First
InstanceofRizaldismissingAngChoKio'spetitionforhabeascorpus.

Wereadthefollowinginthemajorityopinion:

IthavingbeensettledthatSection64(i)oftheRevisedAdministrativeCodeisstillinforce,andthatthe
respondentExecutiveSecretary,inthenameandbyauthorityofthePresident,exercisedthepowerof
recommitmenthereinundertheprovisionsofsaidCode,andnotunderArt.159oftheRevisedPenal
Code, it becomes apparent that any discussion regarding failure to file the corresponding indictment
and the presence or absence of criminal intent,will be offtangent. On the contrary, the issue, in this
connection, is whether the courts of justice may interfere in the exercise by the President, thru his
ExecutiveSecretary,ofhisadministrativepowerofrecommitment.Again,itissettledjurisprudencethat
theChiefExecutivemaydetermine,aloneandbyhimself,whethertheconditionattachedtoapardon
given by him has been violated and in the exercise of this prerogative, the courts may not interfere,
howevererroneousthefindingsmaybe(Espuelasv.TheProvincialWarden,supraTesorov.Director
ofPrisons,68Phil.154).

TheaforequotedportionofthemajorityopinionaffirmsthereasonsoftheCourtofFirstInstanceofRizalin
dismissingthepetitionforhabeascorpus.However,themajorityopinioncontainstherecommendationthatAngCho
Kio

... be sent out at once from this country and that he be allowed to leave Muntinlupa Prisons under
guard only when he has been booked for outward flight at the Manila International Airport so as to
avoidthepossibilityofanyfurtherviolationofhisconditionalpardon.Atanyrateitwouldbetothebest
interestofthesecurityandpeaceofthiscountrytohavethepetitionerexpatriatedfromthePhilippines,
insteadofbeingrecommittedforalongdurationoftimetoprisonwherehispresencemayconstitutea
constant menace to our country's welfare and bring about some sinister influence among the people
withwhomhewillassociateorcomeincontact.

Thenthedispositiveportionofthemajorityopinionreadsasfollows:

FORALLOFTHEFOREGOINGREASONS,thepetitionhereinfiledisherebydismissed,withcosts
againstthepetitioner,andwithareiterationoftherecommendationtoallowthepetitionertoleavethis
countryinthefirstavailabletransportationabroadmadeinthecourseofthisdecision.Letacopyofthis
decisionbefurnishedtheExecutiveSecretary.

Theconcurringanddissentingopinionofthetwojusticesopenswiththefollowingstatement:

Weconcurwiththemajorityopinioninsofarasthedismissalofthepetitionforwritofhabeascorpusof
petitionerappellant Ang Cho Kio is concerned, for such dismissal, in effect, is equivalent to an
affirmance of the appealed decision. However, we beg to dissent from that portion of the majority
opinion recommending that said petitionerappellant be allowed to leave this country by the first
availabletransportation.

InduetimetheSolicitorGeneralfiledwiththeCourtofAppealsamotionforreconsideration,prayingforthedeletion
fromthemajorityopinionoftherecommendationtoallowAngChoKiotoleavethecountryonthefirstavailable
transportationabroad.TheCourtofAppeals,byavoteofthreetotwointhespecialdivisionwhichdecidedthecase,
deniedthemotion.HencethisappealbycertioraribytheSolicitorGeneraltothisCourt.

ItisnowcontendedbytheSolicitorGeneralthatthemajorityofthespecialdivisionoffivejusticesoftheCourtof
Appeals erred in making a recommendation to allow respondent Ang Cho Kio to have this country on the first
available transportation abroad. The Solicitor General maintains that the recommendation is not a part of the
decision binding upon the parties, and is uncalled for that it gives the decision a political complexion, because
courtsarenotempoweredtomakesucharecommendation,norisitinherentorincidentalintheexerciseofjudicial
powers that there is no law which gives the court the authority to recommend to the President the voluntary
departureofanundesirablealienwhoislawfullycommittedtojailthatthedeportationofalienssentencedbythe
courtsforviolationofthelawsoftheland,andeventheactofmerelyallowingsuchconvictedalienstovoluntarily
leave the country, is an act of state exercised solely in the discretion of the Chief Executive. It is urged by the
Solicitor General that the act of sending an undesirable alien out of the country is political in character, and the
courtsshouldnotinterferewith,norattempttoinfluence,thepoliticalactsoftheChiefExecutive.

InamotiondatedApril7,1969,AngChoKiomanifestedthathewaivedhisrighttofileananswertoanybrieffiled
bytheSolicitorGeneral.4

WeagreewiththeSolicitorGeneral.ThecasebeforetheCourtofAppealswasforhabeascorpus.Theonly
questiontoberesolvedbytheCourtofAppealswaswhether,ornot,theCourtofFirstInstanceofRizal,hadrightly
dismissedthepetitionofAngChoKioforhabeascorpus.TheCourtofAppealswasnotcalledupontoreviewany
sentenceimposeduponAngChoKio.Thesentenceagainsthimhadlongbecomefinal,and,infact,hehasserved
partofthesentencewhenhewasextendedpardononJuly4,1959,upontheconditionthatheshouldleavethe
country,nevertoreturn.TheopinionofthethreejusticesofthespecialdivisionoftheCourtofAppeals,towhichthe
twootherjusticeshaveconcurred,foundthattherecommitmenttoprisonofAngChoKiowasdoneintheexercise
bythePresidentofthePhilippinesofhispowerpursuanttotheprovisionofSection64(i)oftheRevised
AdministrativeCode,andthecourtsshouldnotinterferewiththeexerciseofthatpower.Themajorityopinionshould
havebeenlimitedtotheaffirmanceofthedecisionofthelowercourt,andnomore.

Therecommendatorypowerofthecourtsinthisjurisdictionarelimitedtothoseexpresslyprovidedinthelawand
suchlawistheprovisionofSection5oftheRevisedPenalCode,asfollows:

Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not
punishablebylaw,itshallrendertheproperdecision,andshallreporttotheChiefExecutive,through
theDepartmentofJustice,thereasonswhichinducethecourttobelievethatsaidactshouldbemade
thesubjectofpenallegislation.

InthesamewaythecourtshallsubmittotheChiefExecutive,throughtheDepartmentofJusticesuch
statementasmaybedeemedproper,withoutsuspendingtheexecutionofthesentence,whenastrict
enforcementoftheprovisionsofthisCodewouldresultintheimpositionofaclearlyexcessivepenalty,
takingintoconsiderationthedegreeofmaliceandtheinjurycausedbytheoffense.

Certainly,therecommendationinthemajorityopinionofthespecialdivisionoftheCourtofAppeals,nowin
question,isnotauthorizedundertheaforequotedprovisionofArticle5oftheRevisedPenalCode.TheCourtof
AppealswasnotcalledupontoreviewanysentencethatwasimposedonAngChoKio.Itwassimplycalleduponto
determinewhetherAngChoKiowasillegallyconfined,ornot,intheinsularpenitentiaryundertheDirectorof
Prisons.Wedonotconsideritproperthatthemajorityofthejusticesinthespecialdivisionmakearecommendation
thatwouldsuggestamodificationoracorrectionoftheactoftheChiefExecutive,afterthesamejusticeshavesaid
intheiropinion"thattheChiefExecutivemaydetermine,aloneandbyhimself,whethertheconditionattachedtoa
pardongivenbyhimhadbeenviolatedandintheexerciseofthisprerogative,thecourtsmaynotinterfere,however
erroneousthefindingsmaybe."WhentheChiefExecutive,exercisinghispowerspursuanttoSection64(i)ofthe
RevisedAdministrativeCode,orderedAngChoKiorecommittedtoprison,itisassumedthattheChiefExecutive
haddecidedthatAngChoKioshouldbedealtwiththatwayunderthecircumstances.Forthecourttosuggestto
theChiefExecutivetomodifyhisdecisiontorecommitAngChoKiotoprisonbyallowinghimtoleavethecountry
insteadisindeedtointerferewiththefunctionsoftheChiefExecutive.Itwouldbe,asurgedbytheSolicitorGeneral,
aninterferenceon,oranattempttoinfluence,theexercisebytheChiefExecutiveofthepoliticalpowersofhis
office.Thematterofwhetheranalienwhoviolatedthelawsinthiscountrymayremainorbedeportedisapolitical
questionthatshouldbeleftentirelytotheChiefExecutivetodecide.Undertheprincipleofseparationofpowers,it
isnotwithintheprovinceofthejudiciarytoexpressanopinion,orexpressasuggestion,thatwouldreflectonthe
wisdomorproprietyoftheactionoftheChiefExecutiveonmatterspurelypoliticalinnature.

It may be said that the recommendation embodied in the majority opinion of the special division of the Court of
Appealssimplyrepresentstheprivateopinionofthethreejustices,andjudgesshouldbeleftfreetoexpresseven
theirprivateopinionsinjudicialdecisions.Webelieve,however,thatthebetterpracticeshouldbethatthedecision
ofacourtshouldcontainonlyopinionthatisrelevanttothequestionthatisbeforethecourtfordecision.Afterall,
courts are not concerned with the wisdom or morality of laws, but only in the interpretation and application of the
law. We believe that judges should refrain from expressing irrelevant opinions in their decisions which may only
reflectunfavorablyupontheircompetenceandtheproprietyoftheirjudicialactuations.

However, of the ten members of the Court, as presently constituted, only five are of the opinion that the
recommendation embodied in the decision of the majority of the special division of the Court of Appeals, now in
question, should be deleted from the decision.5Two members of the Court are of a different opinion,6 and three
others did not take part in the decision because of their official actuations relative to the case of respondent Ang
ChoKiobeforeitreachedthisCourt.7There is, therefore, one vote less than the majority of the Court that is necessary to grant the certiorari
prayedfor.

WHEREFORE, the petition for writ of certiorari is denied, and the decision of the special division of the Court of
Appealsstands.Nocosts.

Concepcion,C.J.,Reyes,J.B.L.andDizon,JJ.,concur.

Teehankee,BarredoandVillamor,JJ.,tooknopart.

SeparateOpinions

FERNANDO,J.,concurring:

The opinion of the Court penned by Justice Zaldivar, both thorough and meticulous, is, to my mind, equally
noteworthy for expressing with clarity and precision the governing principle that should govern the discharge of
judicialfunctions.Ithasmyfullconcurrencetherefore.Iwouldlike,however,toaddafewwordstothesubjectin
viewofthesignificanceattachedtoamattersofundamentalincharacter.

The basic premise, of course, is the decisive weight to be accorded the fundamental postulate of separation of
powers. While the failure of the majority opinion of the respondent Court of Appeals to yield full obeisance to its
implicationsinsofarastheexecutiveisconcernedisbroughttolightintheopinionofJusticeZaldivar,Iwouldonmy
partviewitfurtherasanunwarrantassumptionbythejudiciaryofarolewhichundertheConstitutionisdeniedit.To
bemoreprecise,itisnotforanyoccupantofanycourttoplaytheroleofadvisertotheExecutive.

Ientertainseriousfearsthatiftherulewereotherwisenotonlywouldtherebeaninfringementoftheseparationof
powersconceptbutthedelicateandgravedutyofthecourtstoassurecompliancewithconstitutionalmandatesand
maintainitssupremacyascalledforbytheruleoflawwouldbegravelyendangered.SuchapointofviewIonce
hadoccasiontomanifestinaconcurringopinion.Thus:"Fortogobacktotheconceptoftheruleoflaw,inthesame
way that the legislative and the executive branches are required to act strictly within the bounds of their
competence,thejudiciary,includingthisCourt,islikewiserestrictedtoitsproperdomain.Thefactthatonquestions
oflawithasthefinalsaymakesitallthemoreimperativethatinpassinguponthequestionofwhetherornotitis
calledupontoact,ittakestheutmostcarethatinassuringcompliancewithconstitutionallimitations,itdoesnot,at
thesametime,ignorethelimitsofitsownauthority."1

WhatwassaidbyJusticeMalcolm,speakingforthisCourtina1932opinion,comestomind.2Timehasnot
impaireditsvalidityithasbutservedtoconfirmit.Thus:"TheSupremeCourtofthePhilippineIslandsrepresents
oneofthethreedivisionsofpowerinourgovernment.Itisjudicialpowerandjudicialpoweronlywhichisexercised
bytheSupremeCourt.JustastheSupremeCourt,astheguardianofconstitutionalrights,shouldnotsanctionby
anyotherdepartmentbythegovernment,soshoulditasstrictlyconfineitsownsphereofinfluencetothepowers
expresslyorbyimplicationconferredonitbytheOrganicAct.TheSupremeCourtanditsmembersshouldnotand
cannotberequiredtoexerciseanypowerortoperformanytrustortoassumeanydutynotpertainingtoor
connectedwiththeadministeringofjudicialfunctions."3

Insupportoftheaboveview,JusticeMalcolmmadereferencetothelastopinionofChiefJusticeTaneyofthe
UnitedStatesSupremeCourt.Thisistheexcerptreferredto:"Itsjurisdictionandpowersanddutiesbeingdefinedin
theorganiclawofthegovernment,andbeingallstrictlyjudicial,Congresscannotrequireorauthorizethecourtto
exerciseanyotherjurisdictionorpower,orperformanyotherduty....Andwhileitexecutesfirmlyallthejudicial
powersentrustedtoit,thecourtwillcarefullyabstainfromexercisinganypowerthatisnotstrictlyjudicialinits
character,andwhichisnotclearlyconfidedtoitbytheConstitution...."4

ThereislikewisetheepochalopinionofJusticeCardozo,asChiefJudgeoftheNewYorkCourtofAppeals,5when
thatCourtnullifiedasectionofaNewYorkstatutethatwouldvestinajusticeofitsSupremeCourtthepowerto
investigateattheinstanceofitsgovernor.Hisopinionexplainedwhy:"HeismadethedelegateoftheGovernorin
aidofanexecutiveact,theremovalofapublicofficer....Atthewordofcommandheistogiveovertheworkof
judging,andsethimselftootherwork,theworkofprobingandadvising.Hisfindingswhenmadewillhavenoneof
theauthorityofajudgment.ToborrowBacon'sphrase,theywillnot'givetheruleorsentence.'Theywillnotbe
preliminaryorancillarytoanyruleorsentencetobepronouncedbythejudiciaryinanyofitsbranches.Theywillbe
mereadvicetotheGovernor,whomayadoptthem,ormodifythem,orrejectthemaltogether.Fromthebeginnings
ofourhistory,theprinciplehasbeenenforcedthatthereisnoinherentpowerinExecutiveorLegislaturetocharge
thejudiciarywithadministrativefunctionsexceptwhenreasonablyincidentaltothefulfillmentofjudicialduties...The
exigenciesofgovernmenthavemadeitnecessarytorelaxamerelydoctrinaireadherencetoaprinciplesoflexible
andpractical,solargelyamatterofsensibleapproximation,asthatoftheseparationofpowers.Elasticityhasnot
meantthatwhatisoftheessenceofthejudicialfunctionmaybedestroyedbyturningthepowertodecideintoa
pallidopportunitytoconsultandrecommend...."

SuchaprincipleinAmericanlaw,JusticeCardozocouldtracebacktoHayburn'sCase,6a1792decision.Hemade
mentionofanotherauthoritativeprecedent,thistoocomingfromthepenofChiefJusticeTaneyin1851,inUnited
Statesv.Ferreira.7A provision of the Treaty of 1819 by virtue of which Florida was ceded by Spain to the United States was to the effect that it was
incumbentonthelattertosatisfyclaimsforinjurybySpaniardswhetherinthearmedforcesorciviliansduetotheoperationsoftheAmericanarmyinFlorida.In
1823CongresspassedanacttocarryintoexecutionthisarticleoftheTreaty.ItwasthereinauthorizedforthejudgesofthesuperiorcourtsestablishedatSt.
AugustineandPensacola,Florida,respectively,toreceiveandadjustallclaimsarisingwithintheirrespectivejurisdictions,agreeablytotheabovearticleofthe
Treaty.DecisionfavorabletoclaimantsweretobereportedbysuchjudgestotheSecretaryoftheTreasury,"who,onbeingsatisfiedthatthesameisjustand
equitable,withintheprovisionsoftheTreaty,shallpaytheamountthereoftothepersonorpersonsinwhosefavorthesaidisadjudged."

AccordingtoChiefJusticeTaney:"Itistooevidentforargumentonthesubjectthatsuchatribunalisnotajudicial
one,andthattheActofCongressdidnotintendtomakeitone.Theauthorityconferredontherespectivejudges
wasnothingmorethanthatofacommissionertoadjustcertainclaimsagainsttheUnitedStatesandtheofficeof
judges,andtheirrespectivejurisdiction,arereferredtointhelaw,merelyasadesignationofthepersonstowhom
theauthorityisconfided,andtheterritoriallimitstowhichitextends.Thedecisionisnotthejudgmentofacourtof
justice.ItistheawardofaCommissioner.TheActof1834callsitanaward.Andanappealtothiscourtfromsucha
decision, by such an authority from the judgment of a court of record, would be an anomaly if the history of
jurisprudence."

Nor was this the first time in the New York bench that Justice Cardozo, speaking for the Court, made such a
pronouncement.8InholdingnotlegallyallowablethereferencetotheNewYorkCourtofAppealsbytheIndustrialCommissionofNewYork,thequestionof
whetherornotitwasauthorizedtorequirepaymentintothestalefundofcertainunpaiddeathbenefits,thedistinguishedjuristdeclared:"Inthatsituationourduty
isnotdoubtful.Thefunctionofthecourtsistodeterminecontroversiesbetweenlitigants....Theydonotgiveadvisoryopinions.Thegivingofsuchopinionsisnot
theexerciseofthejudicialfunction....ItistruethatinEnglandthecustomoftheConstitutionmakesthejudgesofthehighcourttheassistantsoftheLords,and
requiresthem,uponthedemandoftheLordstogive'consultative'opinions.Butthatcustomisasurvivalofthedayswhenthejudgeweremembersofthegreat
counciloftherealm.IntheUnitedStatesnosuchdutyattachestothejudicialofficeintheabsenceofexpressprovisionoftheConstitution."

TherecouldbenodisputingtheaccuracyoftheobservationmadebyJusticeCardozointheRichardsonopinionas
tothefatalinfirmitythatwouldinfecttheroleofajudgeasacounseloroftheExecutiveinthesewords:"Centuriesof
commonlawtraditionwarnuswithechoingimpressivenessthatthisisnotajudge'swork."Inthatsenseweareas
one with the commonlaw although we cannot trace it that far back. Failure to adhere to it gives rise to a grave
concern.

Moreover,Iwouldassumethatthoseofusentrustedwithjudicialresponsibilitycouldnotbeunawarethatwemay
be laying ourselves open to the charge of presumptuousness. Considering that the exercise of judicial authority
does not embrace the alien role of a presidential adviser, indictment of officiousness may be hard to repel. It is
indefinitelyworseiftheadvicethusgratuitouslyofferedisignoredordisregarded.Thelossofjudicialprestigemay
beincalculable.Thereafter,theremaybelessthanfullrespectforcourtdecisions.Itwouldimpairtheconfidencein
itsabilitytoliveuptoitstrustnotonlyonthepartofimmediatepartiestothelitigationbutofthegeneralpublicas
well.EveniftheteachingofdecidedcasesbothhereandinthePhilippinesisnotascleartherefore,thereshould
be, to say the least, the utmost reluctance on the part of any court to arrogate for itself such a prerogative, the
exerciseofwhichisfraughtwithpossibilitiesofsuchundesirablecharacter.

Whenitisborneinmindthatnoundueattentionneedbepaidtosuchadvice,whichmayprovetobeineffectual,
even futile, with consequences farfromflattering to the judiciary, the language of the then Professor Frankfurter
usedwithreferencetoadvisoryopinions,althoughsetinadifferentcontext,wouldnotbeinappropriate.Theyare
"ghoststhatslay."9Thereisnoplacefortheminthelaw,notifrespectbepaidtoacoordinatebranch,theExecutive,andif,tomymindamoreimportant
consideration,therebenodeviationfromwhatthusfarhasrightlybeenconceivedtobethefittingandproperroleofthejudiciary.

MAKALINTAL,J.,dissenting:

Idissentfromtheopinionofmybrethreninsofarasitordersthedeletionoftherecommendationofthreeofthefive
JusticeswhoconstitutedthespecialdivisionoftheCourtofAppealswhichdecidedthiscasethatthepetitionerAng
ChoKiobeallowed"toleavethiscountrybythefirstavailabletransportation."Thisrecommendationisadmittedly
notapartofthejudgmentofthesaidCourtitwasnotwithintheissuepresentedforitsresolutionandthefactthat
it was made at all is a nonprejudicial matter which does not rise to the category of reversible error. I would not
begrudge the three Justices who made it the liberty to do so, nor consider their act as an undue trespass upon
presidentialprerogative.Whatisinvolvedis,tome,nomorethanaquestionoftaste,orpunctiliousobservanceof
certainproprietiesconcerningwhichwellmeaningmenmayhonestlydifferandIamnotpreparedtosaythatthere
hasbeensuchablatantdisregardofeitherastocallfortheinterpositionofthisCourt'spowerofreviewmerelyfor
thepurposeoforderingthedeletionofthematterobjectedto.

#SeparateOpinions

FERNANDO,J.,concurring:

TheopinionoftheCourtpennedbyJusticeZaldivar,boththoroughandmeticulous,is,tomymind,equally
noteworthyforexpressingwithclarityandprecisionthegoverningprinciplethatshouldgovernthedischargeof
judicialfunctions.Ithasmyfullconcurrencetherefore.Iwouldlike,however,toaddafewwordstothesubjectin
viewofthesignificanceattachedtoamattersofundamentalincharacter.

Thebasicpremise,ofcourse,isthedecisiveweighttobeaccordedthefundamentalpostulateofseparationof
powers.WhilethefailureofthemajorityopinionoftherespondentCourtofAppealstoyieldfullobeisancetoits
implicationsinsofarastheexecutiveisconcernedisbroughttolightintheopinionofJusticeZaldivar,Iwouldonmy
partviewitfurtherasanunwarrantassumptionbythejudiciaryofarolewhichundertheConstitutionisdeniedit.To
bemoreprecise,itisnotforanyoccupantofanycourttoplaytheroleofadvisertotheExecutive.

Ientertainseriousfearsthatiftherulewereotherwisenotonlywouldtherebeaninfringementoftheseparationof
powersconceptbutthedelicateandgravedutyofthecourtstoassurecompliancewithconstitutionalmandatesand
maintainitssupremacyascalledforbytheruleoflawwouldbegravelyendangered.SuchapointofviewIonce
hadoccasiontomanifestinaconcurringopinion.Thus:"Fortogobacktotheconceptoftheruleoflaw,inthesame
waythatthelegislativeandtheexecutivebranchesarerequiredtoactstrictlywithintheboundsoftheir
competence,thejudiciary,includingthisCourt,islikewiserestrictedtoitsproperdomain.Thefactthatonquestions
oflawithasthefinalsaymakesitallthemoreimperativethatinpassinguponthequestionofwhetherornotitis
calledupontoact,ittakestheutmostcarethatinassuringcompliancewithconstitutionallimitations,itdoesnot,at
thesametime,ignorethelimitsofitsownauthority."1

WhatwassaidbyJusticeMalcolm,speakingforthisCourtina1932opinion,comestomind.2Timehasnot
impaireditsvalidityithasbutservedtoconfirmit.Thus:"TheSupremeCourtofthePhilippineIslandsrepresents
oneofthethreedivisionsofpowerinourgovernment.Itisjudicialpowerandjudicialpoweronlywhichisexercised
bytheSupremeCourt.JustastheSupremeCourt,astheguardianofconstitutionalrights,shouldnotsanctionby
anyotherdepartmentbythegovernment,soshoulditasstrictlyconfineitsownsphereofinfluencetothepowers
expresslyorbyimplicationconferredonitbytheOrganicAct.TheSupremeCourtanditsmembersshouldnotand
cannotberequiredtoexerciseanypowerortoperformanytrustortoassumeanydutynotpertainingtoor
connectedwiththeadministeringofjudicialfunctions."3

Insupportoftheaboveview,JusticeMalcolmmadereferencetothelastopinionofChiefJusticeTaneyofthe
UnitedStatesSupremeCourt.Thisistheexcerptreferredto:"Itsjurisdictionandpowersanddutiesbeingdefinedin
theorganiclawofthegovernment,andbeingallstrictlyjudicial,Congresscannotrequireorauthorizethecourtto
exerciseanyotherjurisdictionorpower,orperformanyotherduty....Andwhileitexecutesfirmlyallthejudicial
powersentrustedtoit,thecourtwillcarefullyabstainfromexercisinganypowerthatisnotstrictlyjudicialinits
character,andwhichisnotclearlyconfidedtoitbytheConstitution...."4

ThereislikewisetheepochalopinionofJusticeCardozo,asChiefJudgeoftheNewYorkCourtofAppeals,5when
thatCourtnullifiedasectionofaNewYorkstatutethatwouldvestinajusticeofitsSupremeCourtthepowerto
investigateattheinstanceofitsgovernor.Hisopinionexplainedwhy:"HeismadethedelegateoftheGovernorin
aidofanexecutiveact,theremovalofapublicofficer....Atthewordofcommandheistogiveovertheworkof
judging,andsethimselftootherwork,theworkofprobingandadvising.Hisfindingswhenmadewillhavenoneof
theauthorityofajudgment.ToborrowBacon'sphrase,theywillnot'givetheruleorsentence.'Theywillnotbe
preliminaryorancillarytoanyruleorsentencetobepronouncedbythejudiciaryinanyofitsbranches.Theywillbe
mereadvicetotheGovernor,whomayadoptthem,ormodifythem,orrejectthemaltogether.Fromthebeginnings
ofourhistory,theprinciplehasbeenenforcedthatthereisnoinherentpowerinExecutiveorLegislaturetocharge
thejudiciarywithadministrativefunctionsexceptwhenreasonablyincidentaltothefulfillmentofjudicialduties...The
exigenciesofgovernmenthavemadeitnecessarytorelaxamerelydoctrinaireadherencetoaprinciplesoflexible
andpractical,solargelyamatterofsensibleapproximation,asthatoftheseparationofpowers.Elasticityhasnot
meantthatwhatisoftheessenceofthejudicialfunctionmaybedestroyedbyturningthepowertodecideintoa
pallidopportunitytoconsultandrecommend...."

SuchaprincipleinAmericanlaw,JusticeCardozocouldtracebacktoHayburn'sCase,6a1792decision.Hemade
mentionofanotherauthoritativeprecedent,thistoocomingfromthepenofChiefJusticeTaneyin1851,inUnited
Statesv.Ferreira.7AprovisionoftheTreatyof1819byvirtueofwhichFloridawascededbySpaintotheUnitedStateswastotheeffectthatitwas
incumbentonthelattertosatisfyclaimsforinjurybySpaniardswhetherinthearmedforcesorciviliansduetotheoperationsoftheAmericanarmyinFlorida.In
1823CongresspassedanacttocarryintoexecutionthisarticleoftheTreaty.ItwasthereinauthorizedforthejudgesofthesuperiorcourtsestablishedatSt.
AugustineandPensacola,Florida,respectively,toreceiveandadjustallclaimsarisingwithintheirrespectivejurisdictions,agreeablytotheabovearticleofthe
Treaty.DecisionfavorabletoclaimantsweretobereportedbysuchjudgestotheSecretaryoftheTreasury,"who,onbeingsatisfiedthatthesameisjustand
equitable,withintheprovisionsoftheTreaty,shallpaytheamountthereoftothepersonorpersonsinwhosefavorthesaidisadjudged."

AccordingtoChiefJusticeTaney:"Itistooevidentforargumentonthesubjectthatsuchatribunalisnotajudicial
one,andthattheActofCongressdidnotintendtomakeitone.Theauthorityconferredontherespectivejudges
wasnothingmorethanthatofacommissionertoadjustcertainclaimsagainsttheUnitedStatesandtheofficeof
judges,andtheirrespectivejurisdiction,arereferredtointhelaw,merelyasadesignationofthepersonstowhom
theauthorityisconfided,andtheterritoriallimitstowhichitextends.Thedecisionisnotthejudgmentofacourtof
justice.ItistheawardofaCommissioner.TheActof1834callsitanaward.Andanappealtothiscourtfromsucha
decision,bysuchanauthorityfromthejudgmentofacourtofrecord,wouldbeananomalyifthehistoryof
jurisprudence."

NorwasthisthefirsttimeintheNewYorkbenchthatJusticeCardozo,speakingfortheCourt,madesucha
pronouncement.8InholdingnotlegallyallowablethereferencetotheNewYorkCourtofAppealsbytheIndustrialCommissionofNewYork,thequestionof
whetherornotitwasauthorizedtorequirepaymentintothestalefundofcertainunpaiddeathbenefits,thedistinguishedjuristdeclared:"Inthatsituationourduty
isnotdoubtful.Thefunctionofthecourtsistodeterminecontroversiesbetweenlitigants....Theydonotgiveadvisoryopinions.Thegivingofsuchopinionsisnot
theexerciseofthejudicialfunction....ItistruethatinEnglandthecustomoftheConstitutionmakesthejudgesofthehighcourttheassistantsoftheLords,and
requiresthem,uponthedemandoftheLordstogive'consultative'opinions.Butthatcustomisasurvivalofthedayswhenthejudgeweremembersofthegreat
counciloftherealm.IntheUnitedStatesnosuchdutyattachestothejudicialofficeintheabsenceofexpressprovisionoftheConstitution."

TherecouldbenodisputingtheaccuracyoftheobservationmadebyJusticeCardozointheRichardsonopinionas
tothefatalinfirmitythatwouldinfecttheroleofajudgeasacounseloroftheExecutiveinthesewords:"Centuriesof
commonlawtraditionwarnuswithechoingimpressivenessthatthisisnotajudge'swork."Inthatsenseweareas
onewiththecommonlawalthoughwecannottraceitthatfarback.Failuretoadheretoitgivesrisetoagrave
concern.

Moreover,Iwouldassumethatthoseofusentrustedwithjudicialresponsibilitycouldnotbeunawarethatwemay
belayingourselvesopentothechargeofpresumptuousness.Consideringthattheexerciseofjudicialauthority
doesnotembracethealienroleofapresidentialadviser,indictmentofofficiousnessmaybehardtorepel.Itis
indefinitelyworseiftheadvicethusgratuitouslyofferedisignoredordisregarded.Thelossofjudicialprestigemay
beincalculable.Thereafter,theremaybelessthanfullrespectforcourtdecisions.Itwouldimpairtheconfidencein
itsabilitytoliveuptoitstrustnotonlyonthepartofimmediatepartiestothelitigationbutofthegeneralpublicas
well.EveniftheteachingofdecidedcasesbothhereandinthePhilippinesisnotascleartherefore,thereshould
be,tosaytheleast,theutmostreluctanceonthepartofanycourttoarrogateforitselfsuchaprerogative,the
exerciseofwhichisfraughtwithpossibilitiesofsuchundesirablecharacter.

Whenitisborneinmindthatnoundueattentionneedbepaidtosuchadvice,whichmayprovetobeineffectual,
evenfutile,withconsequencesfarfromflatteringtothejudiciary,thelanguageofthethenProfessorFrankfurter
usedwithreferencetoadvisoryopinions,althoughsetinadifferentcontext,wouldnotbeinappropriate.Theyare
"ghoststhatslay."9Thereisnoplacefortheminthelaw,notifrespectbepaidtoacoordinatebranch,theExecutive,andif,tomymindamoreimportant
consideration,therebenodeviationfromwhatthusfarhasrightlybeenconceivedtobethefittingandproperroleofthejudiciary.

MAKALINTAL,J.,dissenting:

Idissentfromtheopinionofmybrethreninsofarasitordersthedeletionoftherecommendationofthreeofthefive
JusticeswhoconstitutedthespecialdivisionoftheCourtofAppealswhichdecidedthiscasethatthepetitionerAng
ChoKiobeallowed"toleavethiscountrybythefirstavailabletransportation."Thisrecommendationisadmittedly
notapartofthejudgmentofthesaidCourtitwasnotwithintheissuepresentedforitsresolutionandthefactthat
itwasmadeatallisanonprejudicialmatterwhichdoesnotrisetothecategoryofreversibleerror.Iwouldnot
begrudgethethreeJusticeswhomadeitthelibertytodoso,norconsidertheiractasanunduetrespassupon
presidentialprerogative.Whatisinvolvedis,tome,nomorethanaquestionoftaste,orpunctiliousobservanceof
certainproprietiesconcerningwhichwellmeaningmenmayhonestlydifferandIamnotpreparedtosaythatthere
hasbeensuchablatantdisregardofeitherastocallfortheinterpositionofthisCourt'spowerofreviewmerelyfor
thepurposeoforderingthedeletionofthematterobjectedto.

#Footnotes

1DecisionofaSpecialDivisionoffiveJusticesoftheCourtofAppealsVillamor,Pres.J.,Rodriguez
andCaizares,JJ.concurringNolascoandMojica,JJ.concurringanddissenting.

2Hehadbeenprosecutedformurder,frustratedmurder,frustratedhomicide,gravecoercionwith
murder,illegalpossessionofexplosivesandammunitions,gravecoercionandillegalpossessionof
firearm.(Brief,SolicitorGeneralintheCourtofAppeals,pp.1and10).(page22oftherollo)

3Appellant'sBriefintheCourtofAppeals,pp.34(page21oftherollo).

4Page57oftherollo.

5ChiefJusticeConcepcionandJusticesReyes,Dizon,ZaldivarandFernando.

6JusticesMakalintalandCastro.
 7JusticeTeehankee,asSecretaryofJustice,recommendedtothePresidenttherecommitmentto
prisonofAngChoKioJusticeBarredo,asSolicitorGeneral,appearedfortheExecutiveSecretaryand
theDirectorofPrisonsintheCourtofAppealsandJusticeVillamorwasoneofthethreejusticesthat
renderedthemajorityopinionofthespecialdivisionoftheCourtofAppeals.

FERNANDO,J.,concurring:

1Arulav.Espino,L28949,June23,1969,28SCRA540,575.

2ManilaElectricCo.v.PasayTransportationCo.,57Phil.600,(1932).

3Ibid,p.605.

4Ibid,p.606citingGordonv.UnitedStates,2Wall.561(1864).

5Inre:Richardson,160NE655(1928).

62Dall.409.

713How.40.Cf.Gordonv.UnitedStates,117US697(1865)MatterofSanborn,148US222(1893)
InterstateCommerceCommissionv.Brimson,154US447(1894)Muskratv.UnitedStates,219US
346(1911)Tutunv.UnitedStates,270US738(1926)LibertyWarehouseCo.v.Grannis,273US70
(1927).

8InreWorkmen'sCompensationFund,119NE1027(1918).

9ANoteorAdvisoryOpinions37Harv.LawReview1002,1008(1924).

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