Persons 4th Exam Cases
MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, petitioner, On appeal, however, the Decision of the trial court was reversed on May
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ LIRIO AND FEODOR
BENITEZ AGUILAR, respondents.
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the 12th Division of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV No. 30862 dated May 29, 1992.1
The facts show that the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian
owned various properties especially in Laguna. Isabel died on April 25,
1982. Vicente followed her in the grave on November 13, 1989. He died
intestate.
The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued. On September 24,
1990, private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar
(Vicente's sister and nephew, respectively) instituted Sp. Proc. No. 797 (90)
before the RTC of San Pablo City, 4th Judicial Region, Br. 30. They prayed
for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente's estate in favor of
private respondent Aguilar. They alleged, inter alia, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
4. The decedent is survived by no other heirs or
relatives be they ascendants or descendants, whether
legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted; despite
claims or representation to the contrary, petitioners can
well and truly establish, given the chance to do so, that
said decedent and his spouse Isabel Chipongian who
pre-deceased him, and whose estate had earlier been
settled extra-judicial, were without issue and/or without
descendants whatsoever, and that one Marissa
Benitez-Badua who was raised and cared by them
since childhood is, in fact, not related to them by blood,
nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal heir; . .
. of Marissa's birth, still the respondent appellate Court
On November 2, 1990, petitioner opposed the petition. She alleged that she
is the sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of
administering his estate. The parties further exchanged reply and rejoinder
to buttress their legal postures.
The trial court then received evidence on the issue of petitioner's heirship
to the estate of the deceased. Petitioner tried to prove that she is the only
legitimate child of the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. She
submitted documentary evidence, among others: (1) her Certificate of Live
Birth (Exh. 3); (2) Baptismal Certificate (Exh. 4); (3) Income Tax Returns
and Information Sheet for Membership with the GSIS of the late Vicente
naming her as his daughter (Exhs. 10 to 21); and (4) School Records (Exhs.
5 & 6). She also testified that the said spouses reared an continuously
treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other hand, private
respondents tried to prove, mostly thru testimonial evidence, that the said
spouses failed to beget a child during their marriage; that the late Isabel,
then thirty six (36) years of age, was even referred to Dr. Constantino
Manahan, a noted obstetrician-gynecologist, for treatment. Their primary
witness, Victoria Benitez-Lirio, elder sister of the late Vicente, then 77 years
of age,2 categorically declared that petitioner was not the biological child of
the said spouses who were unable to physically procreate.
On December 17, 1990, the trial court decided in favor of the petitioner. It
dismissed the private respondents petition for letters and administration and
declared petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses
Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. The trial court relied on Articles
166 and 170 of the Family Code.
29, 1992 by the 17th Division of the Court of Appeals. The dispositive
portion of the Decision of the appellate court states:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from herein is
REVERSED and another one entered declaring that
appellee Marissa Benitez is not the biological daughter
or child by nature of the spouse Vicente O. Benitez and
Isabel Chipongian and, therefore, not a legal heir of the
deceased Vicente O. Benitez. Her opposition to the
petition for the appointment of an administrator of the
intestate of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez is,
consequently, DENIED; said petition and the
proceedings already conducted therein reinstated; and
the lower court is directed to proceed with the hearing
of Special proceeding No. SP-797 (90) in accordance
with law and the Rules.
Costs against appellee.
SO ORDERED.
In juxtaposition, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in applying
Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.
In this petition for review, petitioner contends:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed error of
law and misapprehension of facts when it failed to
apply the provisions, more particularly, Arts. 164, 166,
170 and 171 of the Family Code in this case and in
adopting and upholding private respondent's theory
that the instant case does not involve an action to
impugn the legitimacy of a child;
2. Assuming arguendo that private respondents can
question or impugn directly or indirectly, the legitimacy
committed grave abuse of discretion when it gave more
weight to the testimonial evidence of witnesses of
private respondents whose credibility and demeanor
have not convinced the trial court of the truth and
sincerity thereof, than the documentary and testimonial
evidence of the now petitioner Marissa Benitez-Badua;
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals has decided the
case in a way not in accord with law or with applicable
decisions of the supreme Court, more particularly, on
prescription or laches.
We find no merit to the petition.
Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171
of the Family Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained. These articles
provide:
Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination
of the wife with sperm of the husband or that of a donor
or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband
and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or
ratified such insemination in a written instrument
executed and signed by them before the birth of the
child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil
registry together with the birth certificate of the child.
Art. 166. Legitimacy of child may be impugned only on
the following grounds:
1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to
have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120
days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the
birth of the child because of:
a) the physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife;
b) the fact that the husband and
wife were living separately in such
a way that sexual intercourse was
not possible; or
c) serious illness of the husband,
which absolutely prevented
sexual intercourse.
2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific
reasons, the child could not have been that of the
husband except in the instance provided in the second
paragraph of Article 164; or
3) That in case of children conceived through artificial
insemination, the written authorization or ratification of
either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation, or undue influence.
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the
child shall be brought within one year from the
knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil
register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his
heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the
birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not
reside at the place of birth as defined in the first
paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall
be two years if they should reside in the Philippines;
and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has
been concealed from or was unknown to the husband
or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the
discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the
fact of registration of said birth, which ever is earlier.
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the
filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the
preceding Article only in the following case:
1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the
period fixed for bringing his action;
2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint,
without having desisted therefrom; or
3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not
contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not
to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these
articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own
a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can
impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically
impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first
120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child;
(2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have
been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial
insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was
obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive
period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action
impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court
did not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For
the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are
contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear
submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling
in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited
in the impugned decision is apropos, viz.:
Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil
Code [now Article 170 of the Family Code] is not well-
taken. This legal provision refers to an action to impugn
legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is
not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an
action of the private respondents to claim their
inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased
aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat
Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she
is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither legally
adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor
a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta
is not a legal heir of the deceased.
We now come to the factual finding of the appellate court that petitioner was
not the biological child or child of nature of the spouses Vicente Benitez and
Isabel Chipongian. The appellate court exhaustively dissected the evidence
of the parties as follows:
. . . And on this issue, we are constrained to say that
appellee's evidence is utterly insufficient to establish
her biological and blood kinship with the aforesaid
spouses, while the evidence on record is strong and
convincing that she is not, but that said couple being
childless and desirous as they were of having a child,
the late Vicente O. Benitez took Marissa from
somewhere while still a baby, and without he and his
wife's legally adopting her treated, cared for, reared,
considered, and loved her as their own true child,
giving her the status as not so, such that she herself
had believed that she was really their daughter and
entitled to inherit from them as such.
The strong and convincing evidence referred to us are the following:
First, the evidence is very cogent and clear that Isabel
Chipongian never became pregnant and, therefore,
never delivered a child. Isabel's own only brother and
sibling, Dr. Lino Chipongian, admitted that his sister
had already been married for ten years and was
already about 36 years old and still she has not
begotten or still could not bear a child, so that he even
had to refer her to the late Dr. Constantino Manahan, a
well-known and eminent obstetrician-gynecologist and
the OB of his mother and wife, who treated his sister
for a number of years. There is likewise the testimony
of the elder sister of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez,
Victoria Benitez Lirio, who then, being a teacher,
helped him (he being the only boy and the youngest of
the children of their widowed mother) through law
school, and whom Vicente and his wife highly
respected and consulted on family matters, that her
brother Vicente and his wife Isabel being childless,
they wanted to adopt her youngest daughter and when
she refused, they looked for a baby to adopt
elsewhere, that Vicente found two baby boys but Isabel
wanted a baby girl as she feared a boy might grow up
unruly and uncontrollable, and that Vicente finally
brought home a baby girl and told his elder sister
Victoria he would register the baby as his and his wife's
child. Victoria Benitez Lirio was already 77 years old
and too weak to travel and come to court in San Pablo
City, so that the taking of her testimony by the presiding
judge of the lower court had to be held at her residence
in Paraaque, MM. Considering, her advanced age
and weak physical condition at the time she testified in
this case, Victoria Benitez Lirio's testimony is highly
trustworthy and credible, for as one who may be called
by her Creator at any time, she would hardly be
interested in material things anymore and can be
expected not to lie, especially under her oath as a
witness. There were also several disinterested
neighbors of the couple Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian in Nagcarlan, Laguna (Sergio Fule, Cecilia
Coronado, and Benjamin C. Asendido) who testified in
this case and declared that they used to see Isabel
almost everyday especially as she had drugstore in the
ground floor of her house, but they never saw her to
have been pregnant, in 1954 (the year appellee
Marissa Benitez was allegedly born, according to her
birth certificate Exh. "3") or at any time at all, and that
it is also true with the rest of their townmates.
Ressureccion A. Tuico, Isabel Chipongian's personal
beautician who used to set her hair once a week at her
(Isabel's) residence, likewise declared that she did not
see Isabel ever become pregnant, that she knows that
Isabel never delivered a baby, and that when she saw
the baby Marissa in her crib one day she went to
Isabel's house to set the latter's hair, she was surprised
and asked the latter where the baby came from, and
"she told me that the child was brought by Atty. Benitez
and told me not to tell about it" (p. 10, tsn, Nov. 29,
1990).
The facts of a woman's becoming pregnant and
growing big with child, as well as her delivering a baby,
are matters that cannot be hidden from the public eye,
and so is the fact that a woman never became pregnant
and could not have, therefore, delivered a baby at all.
Hence, if she is suddenly seen mothering and caring
for a baby as if it were her own, especially at the rather
late age of 36 (the age of Isabel Chipongian when
appellee Marissa Benitez was allegedly born), we can
be sure that she is not the true mother of that baby.
Second, appellee's birth certificate Exh. "3" with the
late Vicente O. Benitez appearing as the informant, is
highly questionable and suspicious. For if Vicente's
wife Isabel, who wads already 36 years old at the time
of the child's supposed birth, was truly the mother of
that child, as reported by Vicente in her birth certificate,
should the child not have been born in a hospital under
the experienced, skillful and caring hands of Isabel's
obstetrician-gynecologist Dr. Constantino Manahan,
since delivery of a child at that late age by Isabel would
have been difficult and quite risky to her health and
even life? How come, then, that as appearing in
appellee's birth certificate, Marissa was supposedly
born at the Benitez home in Avenida Rizal, Nagcarlan,
Laguna, with no physician or even a midwife
attending?
At this juncture, it might be meet to mention that it has
become a practice in recent times for people who want
to avoid the expense and trouble of a judicial adoption
to simply register the child as their supposed child in
the civil registry. Perhaps Atty. Benitez, though a
lawyer himself, thought that he could avoid the trouble
if not the expense of adopting the child Marissa through
court proceedings by merely putting himself and his
wife as the parents of the child in her birth certificate.
Or perhaps he had intended to legally adopt the child
when she grew a little older but did not come around
doing so either because he was too busy or for some
other reason. But definitely, the mere registration of a
child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the
supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not
confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and
the legal rights of such child, and even amounts of
simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her
birth certificate, which is a public document.
Third, if appellee Marissa Benitez is truly the real,
biological daughter of the late Vicente O. Benitez and
his wife Isabel Chipongian, why did he and Isabel's
only brother and sibling Dr. Nilo Chipongian, after
Isabel's death on April 25, 1982, state in the
extrajudicial settlement
Exh. "E" that they executed her estate, "that we are the
sole heirs of the deceased ISABEL CHIPONGIAN
because she died without descendants or
ascendants?" Dr. Chipongian, placed on a witness
stand by appellants, testified that it was his brother-in-
law Atty. Vicente O. Benitez who prepared said
document and that he signed the same only because
the latter told him to do so (p. 24, tsn, Nov. 22, 1990).
But why would Atty. Benitez make such a statement in
said document, unless appellee Marissa Benitez is not
really his and his wife's daughter and descendant and,
therefore, not his deceased wife's legal heir? As for Dr.
Chipongian, he lamely explained that he signed said
document without understanding completely the
meaning of the words "descendant and ascendant" (p.
21, tsn, Nov. 22, 1990). This we cannot believe, Dr.
Chipongian being a practicing pediatrician who has
even gone to the United States (p. 52, tsn, Dec. 13,
1990). Obviously,
Dr. Chipongian was just trying to protect the interests
of appellee, the foster-daughter of his deceased sister
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and brother-in-law, as against those of the latter's therein stated." As related above, the totality of contrary evidence,
collateral blood relatives. presented by the private respondents sufficiently rebutted the truth of the
Fourth, it is likewise odd and strange, if appellee content of petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth. of said rebutting evidence,
Marissa Benitez is really the daughter and only legal the most telling was the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of
heir of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel the Deceased Isabel Chipongian (Exh. "E") executed on July 20, 1982 by
Chipongian, that the latter, before her death, would Vicente Benitez, and
write a note to her husband and Marissa stating that: Dr. Nilo Chipongian, a brother of Isabel. In their notarized document, they
even without any legal papers, I stated that "(they) are the sole heirs of the deceased Isabel Chipongian
wish that my husband and my because she died without descendants or ascendants". In executing this
child or only daughter will inherit Deed, Vicente Benitez effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of
what is legally my own property, in petitioner where it appeared that he was petitioner's father. The repudiation
case I die without a will, was made twenty-eight years after he signed petitioner's Certificate of Live
and in the same handwritten note, she even implored her Birth.
husband IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for review is dismissed for lack of merit.
that any inheritance due him from Costs against petitioner.
my property when he die to SO ORDERED.
make our own daughter his sole
heir. This do [sic] not mean what
he legally owns or his inherited
property. I leave him to decide for
himself regarding those.
(Exhs. "F-1", "F-1-A" and "F-1-B")
We say odd and strange, for if Marissa Benitez is really
the daughter of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and
Isabel Chipongian, it would not have been necessary
for Isabel to write and plead for the foregoing requests
to her husband, since Marissa would be their legal heir
by operation of law. Obviously, Isabel Chipongian had
to implore and supplicate her husband to give appellee
although without any legal papers her properties when
she dies, and likewise for her husband to give Marissa
the properties that he would inherit from her (Isabel),
since she well knew that Marissa is not truly their
daughter and could not be their legal heir unless her
(Isabel's) husband makes her so.
Finally, the deceased Vicente O. Benitez' elder sister
Victoria Benitez Lirio even testified that her brother
Vicente gave the date
December 8 as Marissa's birthday in her birth
certificate because that date is the birthday of their
(Victoria and Vicente's) mother. It is indeed too much
of a coincidence for the child Marissa and the mother
of Vicente and Victoria to have the same birthday
unless it is true, as Victoria testified, that Marissa was
only registered by Vicente as his and his wife's child
and that they gave her the birth date of Vicente's
mother.
We sustain these findings as they are not unsupported by the evidence on
record. The weight of these findings was not negated by documentary
evidence presented by the petitioner, the most notable of which is her
Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. "3") purportedly showing that her parents were
the late
Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. This Certificate registered on
December 28, 1954 appears to have been signed by the deceased Vicente
Benitez. Under Article 410 of the New Civil Code, however, "the books
making up the Civil Registry and all documents relating thereto shall be
considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
TEOFISTA BABIERA, petitioner, vs. PRESENTACION B.
CATOTAL, respondent.
A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate proof that it is
fictitious. Thus, void is a certificate which shows that the mother was already
fifty-four years old at the time of the child's birth and which was signed
neither by the civil registrar nor by the supposed mother. Because her
inheritance rights are adversely affected, the legitimate child of such mother
is a proper party in the proceedings for the cancellation of the said
certificate.
Statement of the Case
Submitted for this Courts consideration is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking reversal of the
March 18, 1999 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals[3] (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
56031. Affirming the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte in Special
Proceedings No. 3046, the CA ruled as follows:
"IN VIEW HEREOF, the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the instant appeal is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the
defendant-appellant, TEOFISTA BABIERA, a.k.a.
Teofista Guinto."[4]
The dispositive portion of the affirmed RTC Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings and
pronouncements of the Court, judgment is hereby
rendered, to wit[:]
1) Declaring the Certificate of Birth of respondent
Teofista Guinto as null and void 'ab initio';
2) Ordering the respondent Local Civil Registrar of
Iligan to cancel from the registry of live birth of Iligan
City BIRTH CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry No.
16035;
Furnish copies of this decision to the Local Civil
Registrar of Iligan City, the City Prosecutor, counsel for
private respondent Atty. Tomas Cabili and to counsel
for petitioner.
SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
"Presentacion B. Catotal (hereafter referred to as
PRESENTACION) filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Lanao del Norte, Branch II, Iligan City, a petition for the
cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera
(herafter referred to as TEOFISTA) in the Civil Registry
of Iligan City. The case was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 3046.
"From the petition filed, PRESENTACION asserted
'that she is the only surviving child of the late spouses
Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa, who died
on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990 respectively; that on
September 20, 1996 a baby girl was delivered by 'hilot'
in the house of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena
Babiera and without the knowledge of said spouses,
Flora Guinto, the mother of the child and a housemaid
of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, caused
the registration/recording of the facts of birth of her
child, by simulating that she was the child of the
spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hermogena,
then 54 years old, and made Hermogena Babiera
appear as the mother by forging her signature x x x;
that petitioner, then 15 years old, saw with her own
eyes and personally witnessed Flora Guinto give birth
to Teofista Guinto, in their house, assisted by 'hilot';
that the birth certificate x x x of Teofista Guinto is void
ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth, signature of
informant forged, and it contained false entries, to wit:
a) The child is made to appear as the legitimate child
of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena
Cariosa, when she is not; b) The signature of
Hermogena Cariosa, the mother, is falsified/forged.
She was not the informant; c) The family name
BABIERA is false and unlawful and her correct family
name is GUINTO, her mother being single; d) Her real
mother was Flora Guinto and her status, an illegitimate
child; The natural father, the carpenter, did not sign it;
that the respondent Teofista Barbiera's birth certificate
is void ab initio, and it is patently a simulation of birth,
since it is clinically and medically impossible for the
supposed parents to bear a child in 1956 because: a)
Hermogena Cariosa Babiera, was already 54 years
old; b) Hermogena's last child birth was in the year
1941, the year petitioner was born; c) Eugenio was
already 65 years old, that the void and simulated birth
certificate of Teofista Guinto would affect the hereditary
rights of petitioner who inherited the estate of cancelled
and declared void and theretofore she prays that after
publication, notice and hearing, judgment [be]
render[ed] declaring x x x the certificate of birth of
respondent Teofista Guinto as declared void, invalid
and ineffective and ordering the respondent local civil
registrar of Iligan to cancel from the registry of live birth
of Iligan City BIRTH CERTIFICATE recorded as
Registry No. 16035.
"Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and
substance, the trial court issued an order directing the
publication of the petition and the date of hearing
thereof 'in a newspaper, the Local Civil Registrar of
Iligan City, the office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City
and TEOFISTA.
"TEOFISTA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
that 'the petition states no cause of action, it being an
attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child
of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena
Cariosa Babiera; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to
file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the
Family Code; and finally that the instant petition is
barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of
the Family Code.' The trial court denied the motion to
dismiss.
"Subsequently, 'Attys. Padilla, Ulindang and Padilla
appeared and filed an answer/opposition in behalf of
private respondent Teofista Babiera, [who] was later on
substituted by Atty. Cabili as counsel for private
respondent.'
"In the answer filed, TEOFISTA averred 'that she was
always known as Teofista Babiera and not Teofista
Guinto; that plaintiff is not the only surviving child of the
late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena C.
Babiera, for the truth of the matter [is that] plantiff
Presentacion B. V. Catotal and [defendant] Teofista
Babiera are sisters of the full-blood. Her Certificate of
Birth, signed by her mother Hermogena Babiera, x x x
Certificate of Baptism, x x x Student's Report Card x x
x all incorporated in her answer, are eloquent
testimonies of her filiation. By way of special and
affirmative defenses, defendant/respondent contended
that the petition states no cause of action, it being an
attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as the child
of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena
Carioza Babiera; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to
file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the
Family Code; and finally that the instant petition is
barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of
the Family Code." [5]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held that the evidence adduced during trial proved
that petitioner was not the biological child of Hermogena Babiera. It also
ruled that no evidence was presented to show that Hermogena became
pregnant in 1959. It further observed that she was already 54 years old at
the time, and that her last pregnancy had occurred way back in 1941. The
CA noted that the supposed birth took place at home, notwithstanding the
advanced age of Hermogena and its concomitant medical complications.
Moreover, petitioner's Birth Certificate was not signed by the local civil
registrar, and the signature therein, which was purported to be that of
Hermogena, was different from her other signatures.
The CA also deemed inapplicable Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code,
which stated that only the father could impugn the child's legitimacy, and
that the same was not subject to a collateral attack. It held that said
provisions contemplated a situation wherein the husband or his heirs
asserted that the child of the wife was not his. In this case, the action
involved the cancellation of the childs Birth Certificate for being void ab
initio on the ground that the child did not belong to either the father or the
mother.
Hence, this appeal.[6]
Issues
Petitioner presents the following assignment of errors:
"1) Respondent (plaintiff in the lower court a quo) does
not have the legal capacity to file the special
proceeding of appeal under CA GR No. CV-56031
subject matter of this review on certiorari;
2) The special proceeding on appeal under CA GR No.
CV-56031 is improper and is barred by [the] statute of
limitation (prescription); [and]
3) The Honorable Court of Appeals, the fifteenth
division utterly failed to hold, that the ancient public
record of petitioner's birth is superior to the self-serving
oral testimony of respondent."[7]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
First Issue: Subject of the Present Action
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Petitioner contends that respondent has no standing to sue, because Article
171[8] of the Family Code states that the child's filiation can be impugned
only by the father or, in special circumstances, his heirs. She adds that the
legitimacy of a child is not subject to a collateral attack.
This argument is incorrect. Respondent has the requisite standing to initiate
the present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that a
real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit."[9] The
interest of respondent in the civil status of petitioner stems from an action
for partition which the latter filed against the former.[10] The case concerned
the properties inherited by respondent from her parents.
Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present
case. A close reading of this provision shows that it applies to instances in
which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wifes child. The provision,
however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the
mother. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give
birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that
petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the
former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present action does not
impugn petitioners filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera,
because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place.
In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals,[11] the Court ruled thus:
"Petitioners insistence on the applicability of Articles
164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the case
at bench cannot be sustained. These articles provide:
x x x.....x x x.....x x x
"A careful reading of the above articles will show that
they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant
case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of
nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather,
these articles govern a situation where a husband (or
his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus,
under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn
the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was
physically impossible for him to have sexual
intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the
300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the
child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons,
the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case
of children conceived through artificial insemination,
the written authorization or ratification by either parent
was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence,
intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171
reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive
period within which the husband or any of his
heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of
said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not
err when it refused to apply these articles to the case
at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the
heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner
is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission
is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and
Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the
impugned decision is apropos, viz:
Petitioners recourse to Article 263
of the New Civil Code [now Art.
170 of the Family Code] is not
well-taken. This legal provision
refers to an action to impugn
legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this
case because this is not an action
to impugn the legitimacy of a child,
but an action of the private
respondents to claim their
inheritance as legal heirs of their
childless deceased aunt. They do
not claim that petitioner Violeta
Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate
child of the deceased, but that she
is not the decedents child at all.
Being neither [a] legally adopted
child, nor an acknowledged
natural child, nor a child by legal
fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat,
Violeta is not a legal heir of the
deceased."[12] (Emphasis
supplied.)
Second Issue: Prescription
Petitioner next contends that the action to contest her status as a child of
the late Hermogena Babiera has already prescribed. She cites Article 170
of the Family Code which provides the prescriptive period for such action:
"Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the
child shall be brought within one year from the
knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil
register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his
heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the
birth took place or was recorded.
"If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not
reside at the place of birth as defined in the first
paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall
be two years if they should reside in the Philippines;
and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has
been concealed from or was unknown to the husband
or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the
discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the
fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier."
This argument is bereft of merit. The present action involves the
cancellation of petitioners Birth Certificate; it does not impugn her
legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the Family
Code does not apply. Verily, the action to nullify the Birth Certificate does
not prescribe, because it was allegedly void ab initio.[13]
Third Issue: Presumption in Favor of the Birth Certificate
Lastly, petitioner argues that the evidence presented, especially
Hermogenas testimony that petitioner was not her real child, cannot
overcome the presumption of regularity in the issuance of the Birth
Certificate.
While it is true that an official document such as petitioners Birth Certificate
enjoys the presumption of regularity, the specific facts attendant in the case
at bar, as well as the totality of the evidence presented during trial,
sufficiently negate such presumption. First, there were already irregularities
regarding the Birth Certificate itself. It was not signed by the local civil
registrar.[14] More important, the Court of Appeals observed that the mothers
signature therein was different from her signatures in other documents
presented during the trial.
Second, the circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner show that
Hermogena is not the former's real mother. For one, there is no evidence of
Hermogenas pregnancy, such as medical records and doctors
prescriptions, other than the Birth Certificate itself. In fact, no witness was
presented to attest to the pregnancy of Hermogena during that time.
Moreover, at the time of her supposed birth, Hermogena was already 54
years old. Even if it were possible for her to have given birth at such a late
age, it was highly suspicious that she did so in her own home, when her
advanced age necessitated proper medical care normally available only in
a hospital.
The most significant piece of evidence, however, is the deposition of
Hermogena Babiera which states that she did not give birth to petitioner,
and that the latter was not hers nor her husband Eugenios. The deposition
reads in part:
"q.....Who are your children?
a.....Presentation and Florentino Babiera.
q.....Now, this Teofista Babiera claims that she is your
legitimate child with your husband Eugenio Babiera,
what can you say about that?
a.....She is not our child.
x x x.....x x x.....x x x
q.....Do you recall where she was born?
a.....In our house because her mother was our house
helper.
q.....Could you recall for how long if ever this Teofista
Babiera lived with you in your residence?
a.....Maybe in 1978 but she [would] always go ou[t]
from time to time.
q.....Now, during this time, do you recall if you ever
assert[ed] her as your daughter with your husband?
a.....No, sir."[15]
Relying merely on the assumption of validity of the Birth Certificate,
petitioner has presented no other evidence other than the said document to
show that she is really Hermogenas child. Neither has she provided any
reason why her supposed mother would make a deposition stating that the
former was not the latter's child at all.
All in all, we find no reason to reverse or modify the factual finding of the
trial and the appellate courts that petitioner was not the child of respondents
parents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
5
Persons 4th Exam Cases
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS,
minors, represented by their mother, CAROLINA A. DE
JESUS, petitioners, vs. THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN
GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS DIZON,
FELIPE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and
as proper parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD
MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC.
and AMITY CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES,
INC., respondents.
The petition involves the case of two illegitimate children who, having
been born in lawful wedlock, claim to be the illegitimate scions of the
decedent in order to enforce their respective shares in the latters estate
under the rules on succession.
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23
August 1964. It was during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and
Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born, the former on 01
March 1979 and the latter on 06 July 1982.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon
acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate
children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12
March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of
stock in various corporations and some real property. It was on the strength
of his notarized acknowledgment that petitioners filed a complaint on 01
July 1993 for Partition with Inventory and Accounting of the Dizon estate
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon City.
Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the
decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased
was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the
complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would
nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the
legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus
to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased
Juan Dizon. The trial court denied, due to lack of merit, the motion to
dismiss and the subsequent motion for reconsideration on, respectively, 13
September 1993 and 15 February 1994. Respondents assailed the denial
of said motions before the Court of Appeals.
On 20 May 1994, the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower
court and ordered the case to be remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings. It ruled that the veracity of the conflicting assertions should be
threshed out at the trial considering that the birth certificates presented by
respondents appeared to have effectively contradicted petitioners allegation
of illegitimacy.
On 03 January 2000, long after submitting their answer, pre-trial brief
and several other motions, respondents filed an omnibus motion, again
praying for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the action
instituted was, in fact, made to compel the recognition of petitioners as
being the illegitimate children of decedent Juan G. Dizon and that the
partition sought was merely an ulterior relief once petitioners would have
been able to establish their status as such heirs. It was contended, in fine,
that an action for partition was not an appropriate forum to likewise ascertain
the question of paternity and filiation, an issue that could only be taken up
in an independent suit or proceeding.
Finding credence in the argument of respondents, the trial court,
ultimately, dismissed the complaint of petitioners for lack of cause of action
and for being improper.[1] It decreed that the declaration of heirship could
only be made in a special proceeding inasmuch as petitioners were seeking
the establishment of a status or right.
Petitioners assail the foregoing order of the trial court in the instant
petition for review on certiorari. Basically, petitioners maintain that their
recognition as being illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an
authentic writing, is in itself sufficient to establish their status as such and
does not require a separate action for judicial approval following the doctrine
enunciated in Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo.[2]
In their comment, respondents submit that the rule
in Divinagracia being relied by petitioners is inapplicable to the case
because there has been no attempt to impugn legitimate filiation
in Divinagracia. In praying for the affirmance of dismissal of the complaint,
respondents count on the case of Sayson vs. Court of Appeals,[3] which has
ruled that the issue of legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for
partition and accounting but must be seasonably brought up in a direct
action frontally addressing the issue.
The controversy between the parties has been pending for much too
long, and it is time that this matter draws to a close.
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or
a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the
absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.[4] The due recognition of
an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated
act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required.[5] In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for
compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not
require a separate action for judicial approval.[6]Where, instead, a claim
for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to
prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within
the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish
the childs acknowledgment.[7]
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during
the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify
Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established
and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate.[8] This
presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there
is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120
days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due
to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with
his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such
a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the
husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse.[9] Quite remarkably,
upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170,[10] and in proper
cases Article 171,[11] of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August
1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be
legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed
and unassailable.[12]
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the
late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate
status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de
Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the
legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child
born in wedlock, and only the father,[13] or in exceptional instances the
latters heirs,[14] can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of
a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child
has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can
be rejected.
Respondents correctly argued that petitioners hardly could find
succor in Divinagracia. In said case, the Supreme Court remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings the action for partition filed by an
illegitimate child who had claimed to be an acknowledged spurious child by
virtue of a private document, signed by the acknowledging parent,
evidencing such recognition. It was not a case of legitimate children
asserting to be somebody elses illegitimate children. Petitioners totally
ignored the fact that it was not for them, given the attendant circumstances
particularly, to declare that they could not have been the legitimate children,
clearly opposed to the entries in their respective birth certificates, of Danilo
and Carolina de Jesus.
The rule that the written acknowledgment made by the deceased
Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners alleged illegitimate filiation to the
decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this
instance. This issue, i.e., whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged
illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without
an action having been first been instituted to impugn their legitimacy as
being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born
in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount
declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally,[15] one that
can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for
that purpose.[16] Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered
legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or
may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.[17]
WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant
petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
6
Persons 4th Exam Cases
WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon
Garcia, petitioner, vs. JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL
MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND LINDA CHRISTINA
LIYAO, respondents.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision dated
June 4, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.V. No. 45394[1] which
reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila,
Branch 167 in declaring William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the
deceased William Liyao and ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L.
Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao to recognize and acknowledge
William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao and entitled
to all successional rights as such and to pay the costs of the suit.
On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother
Corazon G. Garcia, filed Civil Case No. 24943 before the RTC of Pasig, Branch
167 which is an action for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate (spurious)
child of the late William Liyao against herein respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao,
Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao.[2] The
complaint was later amended to include the allegation that petitioner was in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William
Liyao, petitioner having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the
decedent during his lifetime."[3]
The facts as alleged by petitioner are as follows:
Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon
M. Yulo for more than ten (10) years at the time of the institution of the said civil
case. Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of
Williams untimely demise on December 2, 1975. They lived together in the
company of Corazons two (2) children from her subsisting marriage, namely:
Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo, in a succession of rented
houses in Quezon City and Manila. This was with the knowledge of William
Liyaos legitimate children, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga,
from his subsisting marriage with Juanita Tanhoti Liyao. Tita Rose and Christina
were both employed at the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. of which Corazon
and William were then vice president and president, respectively.
Sometime in 1974, Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas and Co. which
required the signature of her husband, Ramon Yulo, to show his consent to the
aforesaid sale. She failed to secure his signature and, had never been in touch
with him despite the necessity to meet him. Upon the advice of William Liyao,
the sale of the parcel of land located at the Valle Verde Subdivision was
registered under the name of Far East Realty Investment, Inc.
On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal
Santos Memorial Hospital. During her three (3) day stay at the hospital, William
Liyao visited and stayed with her and the new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All
the medical and hospital expenses, food and clothing were paid under the
account of William Liyao. William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary,
Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to secure a copy of Billys birth certificate. He likewise
instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank
and Trust Company[4] and gave weekly amounts to be deposited
therein.[5]William Liyao would bring Billy to the office, introduce him as his good
looking son and had their pictures taken together.[6]
During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures were taken showing,
among others, William Liyao and Corazon together with Billys godfather, Fr.
Julian Ruiz, William Liyaos legal staff and their wives while on vacation in
Baguio.[7] Corazon also presented pictures in court to prove that that she usually
accompanied William Liyao while attending various social gatherings and other
important meetings.[8] During the occasion of William Liyaos last birthday on
November 22, 1975 held at the Republic Supermarket, William Liyao expressly
acknowledged Billy as his son in the presence of Fr. Ruiz, Maurita Pasion and
other friends and said, Hey, look I am still young, I can still make a good looking
son."[9] Since birth, Billy had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of
the status of a recognized and/or acknowledged child of William Liyao by the
latters direct and overt acts. William Liyao supported Billy and paid for his food,
clothing and other material needs. However, after William Liyaos death, it was
Corazon who provided sole support to Billy and took care of his tuition fees at La
Salle, Greenhills. William Liyao left his personal belongings, collections, clothing,
old newspaper clippings and laminations at the house in White Plains where he
shared his last moments with Corazon.
Testifying for the petitioner, Maurita Pasion declared that she knew both
Corazon G. Garcia and William Liyao who were godparents to her children. She
used to visit Corazon and William Liyao from 1965-1975. The two children of
Corazon from her marriage to Ramon Yulo, namely, Bernadette and Enrique
(Ike), together with some housemaids lived with Corazon and William Liyao as
one family. On some occasions like birthdays or some other celebrations,
Maurita would sleep in the couples residence and cook for the family. During
these occasions, she would usually see William Liyao in sleeping clothes. When
Corazon, during the latter part of 1974, was pregnant with her child Billy, Maurita
often visited her three (3) to four (4) times a week in Greenhills and later on in
White Plains where she would often see William Liyao. Being a close friend of
Corazon, she was at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital during the birth of
Billy. She continuously visited them at White Plains and knew that William Liyao,
while living with her friend Corazon, gave support by way of grocery supplies,
money for household expenses and matriculation fees for the two (2) older
children, Bernadette and Enrique. During William Liyaos birthday on November
22, 1975 held at the Republic Supermarket Office, he was carrying Billy and told
everybody present, including his two (2) daughters from his legal marriage, Look,
this is my son, very guapo and healthy.[10] He then talked about his plan for the
baptism of Billy before Christmas. He intended to make it engrande and make
the bells of San Sebastian Church ring.[11] Unfortunately, this did not happen
since William Liyao passed away on December 2, 1975. Maurita attended Mr.
Liyaos funeral and helped Corazon pack his clothes. She even recognized a
short sleeved shirt of blue and gray[12] which Mr. Liyao wore in a photograph[13] as
well as another shirt of lime green[14] as belonging to the deceased. A note was
also presented with the following inscriptions: To Cora, Love From
William.[15] Maurita remembered having invited the couple during her mothers
birthday where the couple had their pictures taken while exhibiting affectionate
poses with one another. Maurita knew that Corazon is still married to Ramon
Yulo since her marriage has not been annulled nor is Corazon legally separated
from her said husband. However, during the entire cohabitation of William Liyao
with Corazon Garcia, Maurita had not seen Ramon Yulo or any other man in the
house when she usually visited Corazon.
Gloria Panopio testified that she is the owner of a beauty parlor and that
she knew that Billy is the son of her neighbors, William Liyao and Corazon
Garcia, the latter being one of her customers. Gloria met Mr. Liyao at Corazons
house in Scout Delgado, Quezon City in the Christmas of 1965. Gloria had
numerous occasions to see Mr. Liyao from 1966 to 1974 and even more so when
the couple transferred to White Plains, Quezon City from 1974-1975. At the time
Corazon was conceiving, Mr. Liyao was worried that Corazon might have another
miscarriage so he insisted that she just stay in the house, play mahjong and not
be bored. Gloria taught Corazon how to play mahjong and together with Atty.
Brillantes wife and sister-in-law, had mahjong sessions among themselves.
Gloria knew that Mr. Liyao provided Corazon with a rented house, paid the salary
of the maids and food for Billy. He also gave Corazon financial support. Gloria
knew that Corazon is married but is separated from Ramon Yulo although Gloria
never had any occasion to see Mr. Yulo with Corazon in the house where Mr.
Liyao and Corazon lived.
Enrique Garcia Yulo testified that he had not heard from his father, Ramon
Yulo, from the time that the latter abandoned and separated from his family.
Enrique was about six (6) years old when William Liyao started to live with them
up to the time of the latters death on December 2, 1975. Mr. Liyao was very
supportive and fond of Enriques half brother, Billy. He identified several pictures
showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy at the house as well as in the office. Enriques
testimony was corroborated by his sister, Bernadette Yulo, who testified that the
various pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy could not have been
superimposed and that the negatives were in the possession of her mother,
Corazon Garcia.
Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the story.
Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga stated that her parents, William Liyao and
Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married.[16] Linda grew up and lived with her
parents at San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro Manila until she got married; that
her parents were not separated legally or in fact and that there was no reason
why any of her parents would institute legal separation proceedings in court. Her
father lived at their house in San Lorenzo Village and came home regularly. Even
during out of town business trips or for conferences with the lawyers at the office,
her father would change his clothes at home because of his personal hygiene
and habits. Her father reportedly had trouble sleeping in other peoples homes.
Linda described him as very conservative and a strict disciplinarian. He believed
that no amount of success would compensate for failure of a home. As a
businessman, he was very tough, strong, fought for what he believed in and did
not give up easily. He suffered two strokes before the fatal attack which led to
his death on December 2, 1975. He suffered a stroke at the office sometime in
April-May 1974 and was attended by Dr. Santiago Co. He then stayed in the
house for two (2) to three (3) months for his therapy and acupuncture treatment.
He could not talk, move, walk, write or sign his name. In the meantime, Linda
and her sister, Tita Rose Liyao-Tan, ran the office. She handled the collection of
rents while her sister referred legal matters to their lawyers. William Liyao was
bedridden and had personally changed. He was not active in business and had
dietary restrictions. Mr. Liyao also suffered a milder stroke during the latter part
of September to October 1974. He stayed home for two (2) to three (3) days and
went back to work. He felt depressed, however, and was easily bored. He did
not put in long hours in the office unlike before and tried to spend more time with
his family.
Linda testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon
Yulo. Corazon was not legally separated from her husband and the records from
the Local Civil Registrar do not indicate that the couple obtained any
annulment[17] of their marriage. Once in 1973, Linda chanced upon Ramon Yulo
picking up Corazon Garcia at the company garage. Immediately after the death
of Lindas father, Corazon went to Lindas office for the return of the formers
alleged investments with the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. including a parcel
of land sold by Ortigas and Company. Linda added that Corazon, while still a
Vice-President of the company, was able to take out documents, clothes and
several laminated pictures of William Liyao from the office. There was one
instance when she was told by the guards, Mrs. Yulo is leaving and taking out
things again.[18] Linda then instructed the guards to bring Mrs. Yulo to the office
upstairs but her sister, Tita Rose, decided to let Corazon Garcia go. Linda did
not recognize any article of clothing which belonged to her father after having
been shown three (3) large suit cases full of mens clothes, underwear, sweaters,
shorts and pajamas.
Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testified that her parents were legally married and
had never been separated. They resided at No. 21 Hernandez Street, San
Lorenzo Village, Makati up to the time of her fathers death on December 2,
1975.[19] Her father suffered two (2) minor cardio-vascular arrests (CVA) prior to
his death. During the first heart attack sometime between April and May 1974,
his speech and hands were affected and he had to stay home for two (2) to three
(3) months under strict medication, taking aldomet, serpadil and cifromet which
were prescribed by Dr. Bonifacio Yap, for high blood pressure and cholesterol
level control.[20]Tita Rose testified that after the death of Mr. Liyao, Corazon
Garcia was paid the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)
representing her investment in the Far East Realty Investment Inc. Tita Rose
also stated that her family never received any formal demand that they recognize
a certain William Liyao, Jr. as an illegitimate son of her father, William Liyao.
After assuming the position of President of the company, Tita Rose did not come
across any check signed by her late father representing payment to lessors as
rentals for the house occupied by Corazon Garcia. Tita Rose added that the
7
Persons 4th Exam Cases
laminated photographs presented by Corazon Garcia are the personal collection
of the deceased which were displayed at the latters office.
The last witness who testified for the respondents was Ramon Pineda,
driver and bodyguard of William Liyao from 1962 to 1974, who said that he
usually reported for work at San Lorenzo Village, Makati to pick up his boss at
8:00 oclock in the morning. At past 7:00 oclock in the evening, either Carlos
Palamigan or Serafin Villacillo took over as night shift driver. Sometime between
April and May 1974, Mr. Liyao got sick. It was only after a month that he was
able to report to the office. Thereafter, Mr. Liyao was not able to report to the
office regularly. Sometime in September 1974, Mr. Liyao suffered from another
heart attack. Mr. Pineda added that as a driver and bodyguard of Mr. Liyao, he
ran errands for the latter among which was buying medicine for him
like capasid and aldomet. On December 2, 1975, Mr. Pineda was called inside
the office of Mr. Liyao. Mr. Pineda saw his employer leaning on the table. He
tried to massage Mr. Liyaos breast and decided later to carry and bring him to
the hospital but Mr. Liyao died upon arrival thereat. Mrs. Liyao and her daughter,
Linda Liyao-Ortiga were the first to arrive at the hospital.
Mr. Pineda also declared that he knew Corazon Garcia to be one of the
employees of the Republic Supermarket. People in the office knew that she was
married. Her husband, Ramon Yulo, would sometimes go to the office. One time,
in 1974, Mr. Pineda saw Ramon Yulo at the office garage as if to fetch Corazon
Garcia. Mr. Yulo who was also asking about cars for sale, represented himself
as car dealer.
Witness Pineda declared that he did not know anything about the claim of
Corazon. He freely relayed the information that he saw Mr. Yulo in the garage of
Republic Supermarket once in 1973 and then in 1974 to Atty. Quisumbing when
he went to the latters law office. Being the driver of Mr. Liyao for a number of
years, Pineda said that he remembered having driven the group of Mr. Liyao,
Atty. Astraquillo, Atty. Brillantes, Atty. Magno and Atty. Laguio to Baguio for a
vacation together with the lawyers wives. During his employment, as driver of
Mr. Liyao, he does not remember driving for Corazon Garcia on a trip to Baguio
or for activities like shopping.
On August 31, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendants as follows:
(a) Confirming the appointment of Corazon G. Garcia as the
guardian ad litem of the minor William Liyao, Jr.;
(b) Declaring the minor William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate
(spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao;
(c) Ordering the defendants Juanita Tanhoti Liyao, Pearl Margaret
L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Christian Liyao, to recognize, and
acknowledge the minor William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir
of the deceased William Liyao, entitled to all succesional rights
as such; and
(d) Costs of suit.[21]
In ruling for herein petitioner, the trial court said it was convinced by
preponderance of evidence that the deceased William Liyao sired William Liyao,
Jr. since the latter was conceived at the time when Corazon Garcia cohabited
with the deceased. The trial court observed that herein petitioner had been in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a child of the deceased
by direct and overt acts of the latter such as securing the birth certificate of
petitioner through his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez; openly and
publicly acknowledging petitioner as his son; providing sustenance and even
introducing herein petitioner to his legitimate children.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the ruling of the trial court saying
that the law favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the child and the
presumption of legitimacy is thwarted only on ethnic ground and by proof that
marital intimacy between husband and wife was physically impossible at the
period cited in Article 257 in relation to Article 255 of the Civil Code. The appellate
court gave weight to the testimonies of some witnesses for the respondents that
Corazon Garcia and Ramon Yulo who were still legally married and have not
secured legal separation, were seen in each others company during the
supposed time that Corazon cohabited with the deceased William Liyao. The
appellate court further noted that the birth certificate and the baptismal certificate
of William Liyao, Jr. which were presented by petitioner are not sufficient to
establish proof of paternity in the absence of any evidence that the deceased,
William Liyao, had a hand in the preparation of said certificates and considering
that his signature does not appear thereon. The Court of Appeals stated that
neither do family pictures constitute competent proof of filiation. With regard to
the passbook which was presented as evidence for petitioner, the appellate court
observed that there was nothing in it to prove that the same was opened by
William Liyao for either petitioner or Corazon Garcia since William Liyaos
signature and name do not appear thereon.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the
present petition.
It must be stated at the outset that both petitioner and respondents have
raised a number of issues which relate solely to the sufficiency of evidence
presented by petitioner to establish his claim of filiation with the late William
Liyao. Unfortunately, both parties have consistently overlooked the real crux of
this litigation: May petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from
the estate of his supposed father, William Liyao?
We deny the present petition.
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid
marriage is presumed to be legitimate.[22] The presumption of legitimacy of
children does not only flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is
based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the
mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring
from the odium of illegitimacy.[23]
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and
consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article
255 of the New Civil Code[24] provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the
celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its
dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the
physical impossibility of the husband having access to his wife within the first one
hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the
child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such
a way that access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living
separately for ten (10) years from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time that she
cohabited with the late William Liyao and it was physically impossible for her to
have sexual relations with Ramon Yulo when petitioner was conceived and born.
To bolster his claim, petitioner presented a document entitled, Contract of
Separation,[25] executed and signed by Ramon Yulo indicating a waiver of rights
to any and all claims on any property that Corazon Garcia might acquire in the
future.[26]
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her
husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no
moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse
with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it
bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child
mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband,
or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of
the Civil Code.[27] Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right
of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he
is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of
his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that
infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. [28] It is
only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy.
Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would
amount o an insult to his memory.[29]
It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia
as guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition
by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late
William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage
is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.[30] We cannot allow
petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the
law that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could
impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child
himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father
does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed,
and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mothers alleged paramour. On
the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot
elect the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption.[31]
Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of
Corazon Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein petitioner amount to
impugnation of the legitimacy of the latter?
We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs
of the husband are allowed to contest the legitimacy of the child. There is nothing
on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time
of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of this proceedings.
Notably, the case at bar was initiated by petitioner himself through his mother,
Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that
the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for
that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.
Considering the foregoing, we find no reason to discuss the sufficiency of
the evidence presented by both parties on the petitioners claim of alleged filiation
with the late William Liyao. In any event, there is no clear, competent and positive
evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or
recognized his paternity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45394 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
8
Persons 4th Exam Cases
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and MA. THERESA ALMONTE, respondents.
The child, by reason of his mental and physical immaturity, needs
special safeguard and care, including appropriate legal protection before as
well as after birth.[1] In case of assault on his rights by those who take
advantage of his innocence and vulnerability, the law will rise in his defense
with the single-minded purpose of upholding only his best interests.
This is the story of petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and private
respondent Ma. Theresa Almonte, and a child named Jose Gerardo.
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December 29, 1989.[2] After their
marriage, they lived with Ma. Theresas parents in Fairview, Quezon
City.[3] Almost a year later, on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth
to Jose Gerardo.[4]
Gerardo and Ma. Theresas relationship turned out to be short-lived,
however. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his
marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. [5] He alleged
that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa on December 10, 1980, she
had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never
annulled.[6] Gerardo also found out that Mario was still alive and was
residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon City.[7]
Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years
old. She, however, averred that the marriage was a sham and that she
never lived with Mario at all.[8]
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid
and subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the
latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child
as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while
Gerardo was granted visitation rights.[9]
Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their
marriage annulled. She held him responsible for the bastardization of
Gerardo. She moved for the reconsideration of the above decision
INSOFAR ONLY as that portion of the decision which grant(ed) to the
petitioner so-called visitation rights between the hours of 8 in the morning
to 12:00 p.m. of any Sunday.[10] She argued that there was nothing in the
law granting visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate
child.[11] She further maintained that Jose Gerardos surname should be
changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, following the rule
that an illegitimate child shall use the mothers surname.
Gerardo opposed the motion. He insisted on his visitation rights and
the retention of Concepcion as Jose Gerardos surname.
Applying the best interest of the child principle, the trial court denied
Ma. Theresas motion and made the following observations:
It is a pity that the parties herein seem to be using their son to get at or to
hurt the other, something they should never do if they want to assure the
normal development and well-being of the boy.
The Court allowed visitorial rights to the father knowing that the minor needs
a father, especially as he is a boy, who must have a father figure to
recognize something that the mother alone cannot give. Moreover, the
Court believes that the emotional and psychological well-being of the boy
would be better served if he were allowed to maintain relationships with his
father.
There being no law which compels the Court to act one way or the other on
this matter, the Court invokes the provision of Art. 8, PD 603 as amended,
otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, to wit:
In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and property of the
child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
WHEREFORE, the respondents Motion for Reconsideration has to be, as it
is hereby DENIED.[12]
Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, assigning as
error the ruling of the trial court granting visitation rights to Gerardo. She
likewise opposed the continued use of Gerardos surname (Concepcion)
despite the fact that Jose Gerardo had already been declared illegitimate
and should therefore use her surname (Almonte). The appellate court
denied the petition and affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.[13]
On the issue raised by Ma. Theresa that there was nothing in the law
that granted a putative father visitation rights over his illegitimate child, the
appellate court affirmed the best interest of the child policy invoked by the
court a quo. It ruled that [a]t bottom, it (was) the childs welfare and not the
convenience of the parents which (was) the primary consideration in
granting visitation rights a few hours once a week.[14]
The appellate court likewise held that an illegitimate child cannot use
the mothers surname motu proprio. The child, represented by the mother,
should file a separate proceeding for a change of name under Rule 103 of
the Rules of Court to effect the correction in the civil registry.[15]
Undaunted, Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the
adverse decision of the appellate court. She also filed a motion to set the
case for oral arguments so that she could better ventilate the issues
involved in the controversy.
After hearing the oral arguments of the respective counsels of the
parties, the appellate court resolved the motion for reconsideration. It
reversed its earlier ruling and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of
Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage:
It is, therefore, undeniable established by the evidence in this case that the
appellant [Ma. Theresa] was married to Mario Gopiao, and that she had
never entered into a lawful marriage with the appellee [Gerardo] since the
so-called marriage with the latter was void ab initio. It was [Gerardo] himself
who had established these facts. In other words, [Ma. Theresa] was
legitimately married to Mario Gopiao when the child Jose Gerardo was born
on December 8, 1990. Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo under the law is
the legitimate child of the legal and subsisting marriage between [Ma.
Theresa] and Mario Gopiao; he cannot be deemed to be the illegitimate
child of the void and non-existent marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and
[Gerardo], but is said by the law to be the child of the legitimate and existing
marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao (Art. 164, Family Code).
Consequently, [she] is right in firmly saying that [Gerardo] can claim neither
custody nor visitorial rights over the child Jose Gerardo. Further, [Gerardo]
cannot impose his name upon the child. Not only is it without legal basis
(even supposing the child to be his illegitimate child [Art. 146, The Family
Code]); it would tend to destroy the existing marriage between [Ma.
Theresa] and Gopiao, would prevent any possible rapproachment between
the married couple, and would mean a judicial seal upon an illegitimate
relationship.[16]
The appellate court brushed aside the common admission of Gerardo
and Ma. Theresa that Jose Gerardo was their son. It gave little weight to
Jose Gerardos birth certificate showing that he was born a little less than a
year after Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married:
We are not unaware of the movants argument that various evidence exist
that appellee and the appellant have judicially admitted that the minor is
their natural child. But, in the same vein, We cannot overlook the fact that
Article 167 of the Family Code mandates:
The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress. (underscoring ours)
Thus, implicit from the above provision is the fact that a minor cannot be
deprived of his/her legitimate status on the bare declaration of the mother
and/or even much less, the supposed father. In fine, the law and only the
law determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate children for ones
legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not even the
birth certificate of the minor can change his status for the information
contained therein are merely supplied by the mother and/or the supposed
father. It should be what the law says and not what a parent says it
is.[17] (Emphasis supplied)
Shocked and stunned, Gerardo moved for a reconsideration of the
above decision but the same was denied.[18] Hence, this appeal.
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. [19] Article
164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the
marriage of his parents is legitimate.[20]
As a guaranty in favor of the child[21] and to protect his status of
legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as
an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor
of legitimacy.[22] We explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case
of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals[23]:
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the
statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the
supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the policy to protect the
innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b)[24] of the Family Code. He cannot.
He has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma.
Theresas husband Mario or, in a proper case,[25] his heirs, who can contest
the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife. [26] Impugning the
legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in
exceptional cases, his heirs.[27] Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma.
Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband
and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in
marriage, particularly during the period of conception. [28] To overthrow this
presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must
be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could
have enabled the husband to father the child.[29] Sexual intercourse is to be
presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless such
presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.[30]
The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the
evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within
the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of
the child.[31]
To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must
be such as to make marital intimacy impossible.[32] This may take place, for
instance, when they reside in different countries or provinces and they were
never together during the period of conception.[33] Or, the husband was in
prison during the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union
took place through the violation of prison regulations.[34]
Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living
together in Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which
is also in Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant four
kilometers apart.
Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but
also that no evidence at all was presented to disprove personal access
9
Persons 4th Exam Cases
between them. Considering these circumstances, the separation between
Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such as to
make it physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to
defeat the assumption should be presented by him who asserts the
contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the presumption of
legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between
Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.
Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresas statement in her answer[35] to the
petition for annulment of marriage[36] that she never lived with Mario. He
claims this was an admission that there was never any sexual relation
between her and Mario, an admission that was binding on her.
Gerardos argument is without merit.
First, the import of Ma. Theresas statement is that Jose Gerardo is
not her legitimate son with Mario but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This
declaration an avowal by the mother that her child is illegitimate is the
very declaration that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code.
The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother
against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born
or conceived within a valid marriage.
Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean
that there was never an instance where Ma. Theresa could have been
together with Mario or that there occurred absolutely no intercourse
between them. All she said was that she never lived with Mario. She never
claimed that nothing ever happened between them.
Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City during
the time material to Jose Gerardos conception and birth. Far from
foreclosing the possibility of marital intimacy, their proximity to each other
only serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus, the impossibility of physical
access was never established beyond reasonable doubt.
Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresas statement is to allow her to
arrogate unto herself a right exclusively lodged in the husband, or in a
proper case, his heirs.[37] A mother has no right to disavow a child because
maternity is never uncertain.[38] Hence, Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law
to question Jose Gerardos legitimacy.
Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman
cannot say that she had no intercourse with her husband and that her
offspring is illegitimate.[39] The proscription is in consonance with the
presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also promotes the intention of the
law to lean toward the legitimacy of children.[40]
Gerardos insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo was never an
issue both in the trial court and in the appellate court does not hold water.
The fact that both Ma. Theresa and Gerardo admitted and agreed that Jose
Gerardo was born to them was immaterial. That was, in effect, an
agreement that the child was illegitimate. If the Court were to validate that
stipulation, then it would be tantamount to allowing the mother to make a
declaration against the legitimacy of her child and consenting to the denial
of filiation of the child by persons other than her husband. These are the
very acts from which the law seeks to shield the child.
Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and
filiation of a child.[41] Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those who
may be so minded to exploit his defenselessness.
The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardos birth certificate is
misplaced. It has no evidentiary value in this case because it was not
offered in evidence before the trial court. The rule is that the court shall not
consider any evidence which has not been formally offered.[42]
Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,
moment of his birth.[43] Although a record of birth or birth certificate may be Article 49 of the Family Code grants visitation rights to a parent who is
used as primary evidence of the filiation of a child,[44] as the status of a child deprived of custody of his children. Such visitation rights flow from the
is determined by the law itself, proof of filiation is necessary only when the natural right of both parent and child to each others company. There being
legitimacy of the child is being questioned, or when the status of a child born no such parent-child relationship between them, Gerardo has no legally
after 300 days following the termination of marriage is sought to be demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo.
established.[45] Our laws seek to promote the welfare of the child. Article 8 of PD 603,
Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, is clear and
attack as it could not be contested collaterally and, even then, only by the unequivocal:
husband or, in extraordinary cases, his heirs. Hence, the presentation of Article 8. Childs Welfare Paramount. In all questions regarding the care,
proof of legitimacy in this case was improper and uncalled for. custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall be the
In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the paramount consideration.
facts contained therein.[46] As prima facie evidence, the statements in the Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child
record of birth may be rebutted by more preponderant evidence. It is not of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the statements made Article 3
therein by the interested parties.[47] Between the certificate of birth which 1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
is prima facie evidence of Jose Gerardos illegitimacy and the quasi- public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond reasonable administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not only does it bear more interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
weight, it is also more conducive to the best interests of the child and in The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children
consonance with the purpose of the law. from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
It perplexes us why both Gerardo and Ma. Theresa would doggedly development. It is mandated to provide protection to those of tender
press for Jose Gerardos illegitimacy while claiming that they both had the years.[52]Through its laws, the State safeguards them from every one, even
childs interests at heart. The law, reason and common sense dictate that a their own parents, to the end that their eventual development as responsible
legitimate status is more favorable to the child. In the eyes of the law, the citizens and members of society shall not be impeded, distracted or
legitimate child enjoys a preferred and superior status. He is entitled to bear impaired by family acrimony. This is especially significant where, as in this
the surnames of both his father and mother, full support and full case, the issue concerns their filiation as it strikes at their very identity and
inheritance.[48] On the other hand, an illegitimate child is bound to use the lineage.
surname and be under the parental authority only of his mother. He can WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The September 14,
claim support only from a more limited group and his legitime is only half of 1995 and January 10, 1996 resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
that of his legitimate counterpart.[49] Moreover (without unwittingly CV No. 40651 are hereby AFFIRMED.
exacerbating the discrimination against him), in the eyes of society, a Costs against petitioner.
bastard is usually regarded as bearing a stigma or mark of dishonor. SO ORDERED.
Needless to state, the legitimacy presumptively vested by law upon Jose
Gerardo favors his interest.
It is unfortunate that Jose Gerardo was used as a pawn in the bitter
squabble between the very persons who were passionately declaring their
concern for him. The paradox was that he was made to suffer supposedly
for his own sake. This madness should end.
This case has been pending for a very long time already. What is
specially tragic is that an innocent child is involved. Jose Gerardo was
barely a year old when these proceedings began. He is now almost fifteen
and all this time he has been a victim of incessant bickering. The law now
comes to his aid to write finis to the controversy which has unfairly hounded
him since his infancy.
Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the presumption of
his legitimacy.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the
surnames of his father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with
the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames.[50] A persons surname or
family name identifies the family to which he belongs and is passed on from
parent to child.[51] Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose
Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not related to him in any way.
The matter of changing Jose Gerardos name and effecting the
corrections of the entries in the civil register regarding his paternity and
filiation should be threshed out in a separate proceeding.
10
Persons 4th Exam Cases
ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG,
Petitioner,
- versus -
Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, Represented by Her Mother and Guardian,
JINKY C. DIAZ,
Respondent.
This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assailing (1) the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and (2) the Resolution[2] of the same court
dated 1 March 2006 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R.
CV No. 70125.
A Complaint[3] for compulsory recognition with prayer for support
pending litigation was filed by minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented
by her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz (Jinky), against Rogelio G. Ong
(Rogelio) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City. In her Complaint,
Jinky prayed that judgment be rendered:
(a) Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff Joanne Rodjin
Diaz as his daughter.
(b) Ordering defendant to give plaintiff monthly support
of P20,000.00 pendente lite and thereafter to fix monthly
support.
(c) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorneys fees in
the sum of P100,000.00.
(d) Granting plaintiff such other measure of relief as maybe
just and equitable in the premises.[4]
As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac City, she and
Rogelio got acquainted. This developed into friendship and later blossomed into
love. At this time, Jinky was already married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa
Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on 19 February 1993 by Municipal Trial
Court Judge Panfilo V. Valdez.[5]
From January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived
together at Fairlane Subdivision, and later at Capitol Garden, Tarlac City.
From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was conceived and
on 25 February 1998 was born at the Central Luzon Doctors
Hospital, Tarlac City.
Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky home
after delivery. Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and
provided for all of minor Joannes needs recognizing the child as his.
In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped
supporting minor Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father of the child.
Rogelio, despite Jinkys remonstrance, failed and refused and continued failing
and refusing to give support for the child and to acknowledge her as his daughter,
thus leading to the filing of the heretofore adverted complaint.
After summons had been duly served upon Rogelio, the latter failed to file any
responsive pleading despite repeated motions for extension, prompting the trial
court to declare him in default in its Order dated 7 April 1999. Rogelios Answer
with Counterclaim and Special and Affirmative Defenses was received by the
trial court only on 15 April 1999. Jinky was allowed to present her evidence ex
parte on the basis of which the trial court on 23 April 1999 rendered a decision
granting the reliefs prayed for in the complaint.
In its Decision[6] dated 23 April 1999, the RTC held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff as his natural
child;
2. Ordering defendant to provide plaintiff with a monthly
support of P10,000.00 and further
3. Ordering defendant to pay reasonable attorneys fees in
the amount of P5,000.00 and the cost of the suit.
On 28 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion to lift the order of default and a motion
for reconsideration seeking the courts understanding, as he was then in a
quandary on what to do to find a solution to a very difficult problem of his life.[7]
On 29 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion for new trial with prayer that the decision
of the trial court dated 23 April 1999 be vacated and the case be considered for
trial de novo pursuant to the provisions of Section 6, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.[8]
On 16 June 1999, the RTC issued an Order granting Rogelios Motion for New
Trial:
WHEREFORE, finding defendants motion for new trial to
be impressed with merit, the same is hereby granted.
The Order of this court declaring defendant in default and
the decision is this court dated April 23, 1999 are hereby
set aside but the evidence adduced shall remain in record,
subject to cross-examination by defendant at the
appropriate stage of the proceedings.
In the meantime defendants answer is hereby admitted,
subject to the right of plaintiff to file a reply and/or answer
to defendants counterclaim within the period fixed by the
Rules of Court.
Acting on plaintiffs application for support pendente lite
which this court finds to be warranted, defendant is hereby
ordered to pay to plaintiff immediately the sum
of P2,000.00 a month from January 15, 1999 to May 1999
as support pendente lite in arrears and the amount
of P4,000.00 every month thereafter as regular support
pendente lite during the pendency of this case.[9]
The RTC finally held:
The only issue to be resolved is whether or not the
defendant is the father of the plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
Since it was duly established that plaintiffs mother Jinky
Diaz was married at the time of the birth of Joanne Rodjin
Diaz, the law presumes that Joanne is a legitimate child of
the spouses Hasegawa Katsuo and Jinky Diaz (Article
164, Family Code). The child is still presumed legitimate
even if the mother may have declared against her
legitimacy (Article 167, Ibid).
The legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the
following grounds provided for in Article 166 of the same
Code. Paragraph 1 of the said Article provides that there
must be physical impossibility for the husband to have
sexual intercourse with the wife within the first 120 days of
the 300 days following the birth of the child because of
a) physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife;
b) husband and wife were living
separately in such a way
that sexual intercourse
was not possible;
c) serious illness of the husband
which prevented sexual
intercourse.
It was established by evidence that the husband is a
Japanese national and that he was living outside of the
country (TSN, Aug. 27, 1999, page 5) and he comes home
only once a year. Both evidence of the parties proved that
the husband was outside the country and no evidence was
shown that he ever arrived in the country in the year 1997
preceding the birth of plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
While it may also be argued that plaintiff Jinky had a
relationship with another man before she met the
defendant, there is no evidence that she also had sexual
relations with other men on or about the conception of
Joanne Rodjin. Joanne Rodjin was her second child (see
Exh. A), so her first child, a certain Nicole (according to
defendant) must have a different father or may be the son
of Hasegawa K[u]tsuo.
The defendant admitted having been the one who
shouldered the hospital bills representing the expenses in
connection with the birth of plaintiff. It is an evidence of
admission that he is the real father of plaintiff.Defendant
also admitted that even when he stopped going out with
Jinky, he and Jinky used to go to motels even after
1996. Defendant also admitted that on some instances, he
still used to see Jinky after the birth of Joanne
Rodjin. Defendant was even the one who fetched Jinky
after she gave birth to Joanne.
On the strength of this evidence, the Court finds that
Joanne Rodjin is the child of Jinky and defendant Rogelio
Ong and it is but just that the latter should support
plaintiff.[10]
On 15 December 2000, the RTC rendered a decision and disposed:
11
Persons 4th Exam Cases
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
Joanne Rodjin Diaz to be the illegitimate child of defendant
Rogelio Ong with plaintiff Jinky Diaz. The Order of this
Court awarding support pendente lite dated June 15, 1999,
is hereby affirmed and that the support should continue
until Joanne Rodjin Diaz shall have reached majority
age.[11]
Rogelio filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied for lack of merit in
an Order of the trial court dated 19 January 2001.[12] From the denial of his
Motion for Reconsideration, Rogelio appealed to the Court of Appeals. After all
the responsive pleadings had been filed, the case was submitted for decision
and ordered re-raffled to another Justice for study and report as early as 12 July
2002.[13]
During the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals, Rogelios counsel
filed a manifestation informing the Court that Rogelio died on 21 February 2005;
hence, a Notice of Substitution was filed by said counsel praying that Rogelio be
substituted in the case by the Estate of Rogelio Ong,[14] which motion was
accordingly granted by the Court of Appeals.[15]
In a Decision dated 23 November 2005, the Court of Appeals held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal
is hereby GRANTED. The appealed Decision
dated December 15, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of
Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 8799 is hereby
SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the
court a quo for the issuance of an order directing the
parties to make arrangements for DNA analysis for the
purpose of determining the paternity of plaintiff minor
Joanne Rodjin Diaz, upon consultation and in coordination
with laboratories and experts on the field of DNA analysis.
No pronouncement as to costs.[16]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution dated 1 March 2006.
In disposing as it did, the Court of Appeals justified its Decision as follows:
In this case, records showed that the late defendant-
appellant Rogelio G. Ong, in the early stage of the
proceedings volunteered and suggested that he and
plaintiffs mother submit themselves to a DNA or blood
testing to settle the issue of paternity, as a sign of good
faith. However, the trial court did not consider resorting to
this modern scientific procedure notwithstanding the
repeated denials of defendant that he is the biological
father of the plaintiff even as he admitted having actual
sexual relations with plaintiffs mother. We believe that
DNA paternity testing, as current jurisprudence affirms,
would be the most reliable and effective method of settling
the present paternity dispute. Considering, however, the
untimely demise of defendant-appellant during the
pendency of this appeal, the trial court, in consultation with
out laboratories and experts on the field of DNA analysis,
can possibly avail of such procedure with whatever
remaining DNA samples from the deceased defendant
alleged to be the putative father of plaintiff minor whose
illegitimate filiations is the subject of this action for
support.[17]
Hence, this petition which raises the following issues for resolution:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS RESPONDENTS
COMPLAINT FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION
DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED FAILED TO PROVE THAT ROGELIO G.
ONG WAS HER FATHER.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT DID NOT DECLARE RESPONDENT AS THE
LEGITIMATE CHILD OF JINKY C. DIAZ AND HER
JAPANESE HUSBAND, CONSIDERING THAT
RESPONDENT FAILED TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION
OF HER LEGITIMACY.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT REMANDED THE CASE TO THE COURT A
QUO FOR DNA ANALYSIS DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT
IS NO LONGER FEASIBLE DUE TO THE DEATH OF
ROGELIO G. ONG.[18]
Petitioner prays that the present petition be given due course and the Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated November 23, 2005 be modified, by setting aside
the judgment remanding the case to the trial court for DNA testing analysis, by
dismissing the complaint of minor Joanne for compulsory recognition, and by
declaring the minor as the legitimate child of Jinky and Hasegawa Katsuo.[19]
From among the issues presented for our disposition, this Court finds it prudent
to concentrate its attention on the third one, the propriety of the appellate courts
decision remanding the case to the trial court for the conduct of DNA testing.
Considering that a definitive result of the DNA testing will decisively lay to rest
the issue of the filiation of minor Joanne, we see no reason to resolve the first
two issues raised by the petitioner as they will be rendered moot by the result of
the DNA testing.
As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of filiation of minor
Joanne for purposes of support in favor of the said minor.
Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to
secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in
the present case), or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the
person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the
child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity
action which parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses,
presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father
and child.[20]
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed
legitimate.[21] As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of
legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of
legitimacy. We explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania
v. Court of Appeals[22]:
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of
a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad
principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of
the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy
to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of
illegitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and
consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article
255 of the New Civil Code[23] provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty
days following the celebration of the marriage, and before
three hundred days following its dissolution or the
separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be
legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted
other than that of the physical impossibility of the husbands
having access to his wife within the first one hundred and
twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth
of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately
in such a way that access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.[24]
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established
by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
12
Persons 4th Exam Cases
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
There had been divergent and incongruent statements and assertions
bandied about by the parties to the present petition. But with the advancement
in the field of genetics, and the availability of new technology, it can now be
determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the biological father of
the minor, through DNA testing.
DNA is the fundamental building block of a persons entire genetic
make-up. DNA is found in all human cells and is the same in every cell of the
same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a persons DNA profile can
determine his identity.[25]
DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample
obtained from an individual is examined. The DNA is processed to generate a
pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual from whom the sample is taken. This
DNA profile is unique for each person, except for identical twins.
Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint called
DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). It is exclusive to an individual
(except in the rare occurrence of identical twins that share
a single, fertilized egg), and DNA is unchanging throughout
life. Being a component of every cell in the human body,
the DNA of an individuals blood is the very DNA in his or
her skin cells, hair follicles, muscles, semen, samples from
buccal swabs, saliva, or other body parts.
The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They are
known as A (Adenine), G (guanine), C (cystosine) and T
(thymine). The order in which the four bases appear in an
individuals DNA determines his or her physical make
up. And since DNA is a double stranded molecule, it is
composed of two specific paired bases, A-T or T-A and G-
C or C-G. These are called genes.
Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs
distributed in a particular sequence. This gives a person
his or her genetic code. Somewhere in the DNA
framework, nonetheless, are sections that differ. They are
known as polymorphic loci, which are the areas analyzed
in DNA typing (profiling, tests, fingerprinting). In other
words, DNA typing simply means determining
the polymorphic loci.
How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample
obtained or extracted, a molecular biologist may proceed
to analyze it in several ways. There are five (5) techniques
to conduct DNA typing. They are: the RFLP(restriction
fragment length polymorphism); reverse dot blot or HLA
DQ a/Pm loci which was used in 287 cases that were
admitted as evidence by 37 courts in the U.S. as of
November 1994; DNA process; VNTR (variable number
tandem repeats); and the most recent which is known as
the PCR-([polymerase] chain reaction) based STR (short
tandem repeats) method which, as of 1996, was availed of
by most forensic laboratories in the world. PCR is the
process of replicating or copying DNA in an evidence
sample a million times through repeated cycling of a
reaction involving the so-called DNA polymerize
enzyme. STR, on the other hand, takes measurements in
13 separate places and can match two (2) samples with a
reported theoretical error rate of less than one (1) in a
trillion.
Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, matches are
determined. To illustrate, when DNA or fingerprint tests are
done to identify a suspect in a criminal case, the evidence
collected from the crime scene is compared with
the known print. If a substantial amount of the identifying
features are the same, the DNA or fingerprint is deemed to
be a match. But then, even if only one feature of the DNA
or fingerprint is different, it is deemed not to have come
from the suspect.
As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show
variations between people. In each of these regions, a
person possesses two genetic types called allele, one
inherited from each parent. In [a] paternity test, the
forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable
regions in an individual to produce a DNA
profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and
child, it is possible to determine which half of the childs
DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must
have been inherited from the biological father. The alleged
fathers profile is then examined to ascertain whether he
has the DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal
types in the child. If the mans DNA types do not match that
of the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA
types match, then he is not excluded as the father.[26]
In the newly promulgated rules on DNA evidence it is provided:
SEC. 3 Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Rule, the
following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxxx
(c) DNA evidence constitutes the totality of the DNA
profiles, results and other genetic information
directly generated from DNA testing of
biological samples;
(d) DNA profile means genetic information derived from
DNA testing of a biological sample obtained
from a person, which biological sample is
clearly identifiable as originating from that
person;
(e) DNA testing means verified and credible scientific
methods which include the extraction of DNA
from biological samples, the generation of DNA
profiles and the comparison of the information
obtained from the DNA testing of biological
samples for the purpose of determining, with
reasonable certainty, whether or not the DNA
obtained from two or more distinct biological
samples originates from the same person
(direct identification) or if the biological samples
originate from related persons (kinship
analysis); and
(f) Probability of Parentage means the numerical estimate
for the likelihood of parentage of a putative
parent compared with the probability of a
random match of two unrelated individuals in a
given population.
Amidst the protestation of petitioner against the DNA analysis, the resolution
thereof may provide the definitive key to the resolution of the issue of support for
minor Joanne. Our articulation in Agustin v. Court of Appeals[27] is particularly
relevant, thus:
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so
steadfast in the previous decade. In Pe Lim v. Court of
Appeals (336 Phil. 741, 270 SCRA 1), promulgated in
1997, we cautioned against the use of DNA because DNA,
being a relatively new science, (had) not as yet been
accorded official recognition by our courts. Paternity
(would) still have to be resolved by such conventional
evidence as the relevant incriminating acts,verbal and
written, by the putative father.
In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting
DNA as evidence of parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v.
Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 125901, 8 March 2001, 354
SCRA 17]:
x x x Parentage will still
be resolved using conventional
methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways
available. Fortunately, we have now
the facility and expertise in using
DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The University of
the Philippines Natural Science
Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the
capability to conduct DNA typing
using short tandem repeat (STR)
analysis. The analysis is based on
the fact that the DNA of a
child/person has two (2) copies, one
copy from the mother and the other
from the father. The DNA from the
mother, the alleged father and child
are analyzed to establish
parentage. Of course, being a novel
scientific technique, the use of DNA
test as evidence is still open to
challenge. Eventually, as the
appropriate case comes, courts
should not hesitate to rule on the
13
Persons 4th Exam Cases

admissibility of DNA evidence. For it
was said, that courts should apply
the results of science when
competently obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject
said results is to deny progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as
admissible and authoritative evidence in Philippine
jurisprudence came in 2002 with out en banc decision
in People v. Vallejo [G.R. No. 144656, 9 May 2002, 382
SCRA 192] where the rape and murder victims DNA
samples from the bloodstained clothes of the accused
were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that the purpose
of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an association
exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the reference
sample. The samples collected (were) subjected to various
chemical processes to establish their profile.
A year later, in People v. Janson [G.R. No.
125938, 4 April 2003, 400 SCRA 584], we acquitted the
accused charged with rape for lack of evidence because
doubts persist(ed) in our mind as to who (were) the real
malefactors. Yes, a complex offense (had) been
perpetrated but who (were) the perpetrators? How we wish
we had DNA or other scientific evidence to still our doubts.
In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC [G.R.
Nos. 161434, 161634 and 161824, 3 March 2004, 424
SCRA 277], where the Court en banc was faced with the
issue of filiation of then presidential candidate Fernando
Poe, Jr., we stated:
In case proof of filiation or
paternity would be unlikely to
satisfactorily establish or would be
difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which
examines genetic codes obtained
from body cells of the illegitimate
child and any physical residue of the
long dead parent could be resorted
to. A positive match would clear up
filiation or paternity. In Tijing v. Court
of Appeals, this Court has
acknowledged the strong weight of
DNA testing...
impossibility of complying with the order of remand for purposes of DNA testing
is more ostensible than real. Petitioners argument is without basis especially as
the New Rules on DNA Evidence[28]allows the conduct of DNA testing,
either motu proprio or upon application of any person who has a legal interest in
the matter in litigation, thus:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate court
may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of
any person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after
due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of
the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected
to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii)
was previously subjected to DNA testing, but
the results may require confirmation for good
reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce
new information that is relevant to the proper
resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court
may consider as potentially affecting the
accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso
facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate
biological samples of his DNA.
As defined above, the term biological sample means any organic
material originating from a persons body, even if found in inanimate objects, that
is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids,
tissues, hairs and bones.[29]
Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as
enumerated above as may be available, may be used for DNA testing. In this
case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate
biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.
accomplished through DNA testing, is material to the fair
and correct adjudication of the instant appeal.Under
Section 4 of the Rules, the courts are authorized, after due
hearing and notice, motu proprio to order a DNA
testing. However, while this Court retains jurisdiction over
the case at bar, capacitated as it is to receive and act on
the matter in controversy, the Supreme Court is not a trier
of facts and does not, in the course of daily routine,
conduct hearings. Hence, it would be more appropriate
that the case be remanded to the RTC for reception of
evidence in appropriate hearings, with due notice to the
parties. (Emphasis supplied.)
As we have declared in the said case of Agustin v. Court of
Appeals[32]:
x x x [F]or too long, illegitimate children have
been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their
existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing
technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for
such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long
believed in the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly
expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a
perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a
dependable and authoritative form of evidence
gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully
reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of
determining paternity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and its Resolution dated 1 March
2006 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Moreover, in our en
banc decision in People v.
Yatar [G.R. No. 150224, 19 May
2004, 428 SCRA 504], we affirmed
the conviction of the accused for
rape with homicide, the principal
evidence for which included DNA
test results. x x x.
Coming now to the issue of remand of the case to the trial court, petitioner
questions the appropriateness of the order by the Court of Appeals directing the
remand of the case to the RTC for DNA testing given that petitioner has already
died. Petitioner argues that a remand of the case to the RTC for DNA analysis is
no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio. To our mind, the alleged
And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing. In People
v. Umanito,[30] citing Tecson v. Commission on Elections,[31] this Court held:
The 2004 case of Tecson v. Commission on
Elections [G.R. No. 161434, 3 March 2004, 424 SCRA
277] likewise reiterated the acceptance of DNA testing in
our jurisdiction in this wise: [i]n case proof of filiation or
paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or
would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines
genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate
child and any physical residue of the long dead parent
could be resorted to.
It is obvious to the Court that the determination of whether
appellant is the father of AAAs child, which may be
14
Persons 4th Exam Cases
JOHN PAUL E. FERNANDEZ, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and CARLITO S.
FERNANDEZ, respondents.
The legal dispute between the parties began when the petitioners filed Civil
Case No. Q-45567 for support against the private respondent before the
RTC of Quezon City. The complaint was dismissed on December 9, 1986
by Judge Antonio P. Solano,1 who found that "(t)here is nothing in the
material allegations in the complaint that seeks to compel (private
respondent) to recognize or acknowledge (petitioners) as his illegitimate
children," and that there was no sufficient and competent evidence to prove
the petitioners filiation.2
Petitioners plodded on. On February 19, 1987, they file the case at bench,
another action for recognition and support against the private respondent
before another branch of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 87. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-50111.
The evidence shows that VIOLETA P. ESGUERRA, single, is the mother
and guardian ad litem of the two petitioners, CLARO ANTONIO
FERNANDEZ and JOHN PAUL FERNANDEZ, met sometime in 1983, at
the Meralco Compound tennis courts. A Meralco employee and a tennis
enthusiast, Carlito used to spend his week-ends regularly at said courts,
where Violeta's father served as tennis instructor.
Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of her two sons. She claimed that
they started their illicit sexual relationship six (6) months after their first
meeting. The tryst resulted in the birth of petitioner Claro Antonio on March
1, 1984, and of petitioner John Paul on not know that Carlito was married
until the birth of her two children. She averred they were married in civil rites
in October, 1983. In March, 1985, however, she discovered that the
marriage license which they used was spurious.
To bolster their case, petitioners presented the following documentary
evidence: their certificates of live birth, identifying respondent Carlito as
their father; the baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro which also states
that his father is respondent Carlito; photographs of Carlito taken during the
baptism of petitioner Claro; and pictures of respondent Carlito and Claro
taken at the home of Violeta Esguerra.
Petitioners likewise presented as witnesses, Rosario Cantoria, 3 Dr.
Milagros Villanueva,4 Ruby Chua Cu,5 and Fr. Liberato Fernandez.6 The
first three witnesses told the trial court that Violeta Esguerra had, at different
times,7introduced the private respondent to them as her "husband". Fr.
Fernandez, on the other hand, testified that Carlito was the one who
presented himself as the father of petitioner Claro during the latter's
baptism.
In defense, respondent Carlito denied Violeta's allegations that he sired the
two petitioners. He averred he only served as one of the sponsors in the
baptism of petitioner Claro. This claim was corroborated by the testimony
of Rodante Pagtakhan, an officemate of respondent Carlito who also stood
as a sponsor of petitioner Claro during his baptism. The Private respondent
also presented as witness, Fidel Arcagua, a waiter of the Lighthouse
Restaurant. He disputed Violeta's allegation that she and respondent Carlito
frequented the said restaurant during their affair. Arcagua stated he never
saw Violeta Esguerra and respondent Carlito together at the said
restaurant. Private respondent also declared he only learned he was named
in the birth certificates of both petitioners as their father after he was sued
for support in Civil Case No.
Q-45567.
Based on the evidence adduced by the parties, the trial court ruled in favor
of petitioners, viz.:
In view of the above, the Court concludes and so holds
that the plaintiffs minors (petitioners herein) are entitled
to the relief's prayed for in the complaint. The
defendant (herein private respondent) is hereby
ordered to recognize Claro Antonio Carlito Fernandez,
now aged 6, and John Paul Fernandez, now aged 41/2
as his sons. As the defendant has admitted that he has
a supervisory job at the Meralco, he shall give the
plaintiffs support in the amount of P2,000 each a
month, payment to be delivered to Violeta Esguerra,
the children's mother and natural guardian, with arrears
reckoned as of the filing of the complaint on February
19, 1987.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the decision was set aside and petitioners complaint dismissed
by the respondent Court of Appeals8 in its impugned decision, dated
October 20, 1992. It found that the "proof relied upon by the (trial) court (is)
inadequate to prove the (private respondent's) paternity and filiation of
(petitioners)." It further held that the doctrine of res judicata applied because
of the dismissal of the petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. Q-45567.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on December 22, 1992.
Petitioners now contend that the respondent appellate court erred in: (1) not
giving full faith and credit to the testimony in of Violeta Esguerra; (2) not
giving weight and value to the testimony of Father Liberato Fernandez; (3)
not giving probative value to the numerous pictures of respondent Carlito
Fernandez taken during the baptismal ceremony and inside the bedroom of
Violeta Esguerra; (4) not giving probative value to the birth certificates of
petitioners; (5) giving so much credence to the self-serving and incredible
testimony of respondent Carlito Fernandez; and (6) holding that the
principle of res judicata is applicable in the case at bar.
We find no merit in the petition.
The rule is well-settled that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals may be
reviewed by this court only under exceptional circumstances. One such
situation is when the findings of the appellate court clash with those of the
trial court as in the case at bench. It behooves us therefore to exercise our
extraordinary power, and settle the issue of whether the ruling of the
appellate court that private respondent is not the father of the petitioners is
substantiated by the evidence on record.
We shall first examine the documentary evidence offered by the petitioners
which the respondent court rejected as insufficient to prove their filiation.
Firstly, we hold that petitioners cannot rely on the photographs showing the
presence of the private respondent in the baptism of petitioner Claro (Exh.
"B-8", Exh. "B-12", Exh. "H" and Exh. "I"). These photographs are far from
proofs that private respondent is the father of petitioner Claro. As explained
by the private respondent, he was in the baptism as one of the sponsors of
petitioner Claro. His testimony was corroborated by Rodante Pagtakhan.
Secondly, the pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing private
respondent showering affection to Claro fall short of the evidence required
to prove paternity (Exhibits "B", "B-1", "B-2", "B-7", "B-14" and "B-15"). As
we held in Tan vs. Trocio, 192 SCRA 764, viz:
. . . The testimonies of complainant and witness Marilou
Pangandaman, another maid, to show unusual
closeness between Respondent and Jewel, like
playing with him and giving him paternity. The same
must be said of . . . (the) pictures of Jewels and
Respondent showing allegedly their physical likeness
to each other. Said evidence is inconclusive to prove
paternity and much less would prove violation of
complaint's person and honor. (Emphasis supplied)
Thirdly, the baptismal certificates (Exh. "D") of petitioner Claro naming
private respondent as his father has scant evidentiary value. There is no
showing that private respondent participated in its preparation. On this
score, we held in Berciles vs. Systems, et al. 128 SCRA 53 (1984):
As to the baptismal certificates, Exh. "7-A", the rule is
that although the baptismal record of a natural child
describes her as a child of the record the decedent had
no intervening, the baptismal record cannot be held to
be a voluntary recognition of parentage. . . . The reason
for this rule that canonical records do not constitute the
authentic document prescribed by Arts. 115 and 117 to
prove the legitimate filiation of a child is that such
canonical record is simply proof of the only act to which
the priest may certify by reason of his personal
knowledge, an act done by himself or in his presence,
like the administration of the sacrament upon a day
stated; it is no proof of the declarations in the record
with respect to the parentage of the child baptized, or
of prior and distinct facts which require separate and
concrete evidence.
In Macandang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980), we also ruled
that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they
can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the
dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the
veracity of entries therein with respect to the child's paternity.
Fourth, the certificates of live birth (Exh. "A"; Exh. "B") of the petitioners
identifying private respondent as their father are not also competent
evidence on the issue of their paternity. Again, the records do no show that
private respondent had a hand in the preparation of said certificates. In
rejecting these certificates, the ruling of the respondent court is in accord
with our pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar, 102 Phil. 1050
(1958), viz:
. . . Section 5 of Act No. 3793 and Article 280 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines explicity prohibited, not
only the naming of the father or the child born outside
wedlock, when the birth certificates, or the recognition,
is not filed or made by him, but, also, the statement of
any information or circumstances by which he could be
identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no
authority to make or record the paternity of an
illegitimate child upon the information of a third person
and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when
signed only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent
evidence of fathership of said child. (Emphasis
supplied)
We reiterated this rule in Berciles, op. cit., when we held that "a birth
certificate no signed by the alleged father therein indicated is not competent
evidence of paternity."
We have also reviewed the relevant testimonies of the witnesses for the
petitioners and we are satisfied that the respondent appellate court properly
calibrated their weight. Petitioners capitalize on the testimony of Father
Liberato Fernandez who solemnized the baptismal ceremony of petitioner
Claro. He declared on the witness stand:
15
Persons 4th Exam Cases

Q Do you recall Father, whether wearing the blue T-shirt is the

on that occasion when you called father?
for the father and the mother of the A Yes, sir.
child, that both father and mother Q So, it was Violeta Esguerra
were present? who. . .
A Yes. A Yes.
Q Would you able to recognized (TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 18 to 22)
the father and the mother who Indeed, there is no proof that Father Fernandez is a close friend of Violeta
were present at that time? Esguerra and the private respondent which should render unquestionable
A Yes. his identification of the private respondent during petitioner Claro's baptism.
Q Please point to the court? In the absence of this proof, we are not prepared to concede that Father
A There (witness pointing to the Fernandez who officiates numerous baptismal ceremonies day in and day
defendant, Carlito Fernandez). out can remember the parents of the children he has baptized.
Q For instance, just give us more We cannot also disturb the findings of the respondent court on the credibility
specifically what question do you of Violeta Esguerra. Her testimony is highly suspect as it is self-serving and
remember having asked him? by itself, is insufficient to prove the paternity of the petitioners.
A Yes, like for example, do you We shall not pass upon the correctness of the ruling of the respondent
renounce Satan and his works? appellate court applying the doctrine of res judicata as additional reason in
Q What was the answer of dismissing petitioners action for recognition and support. It is unnecessary
Fernandez? considering our findings that petitioners evidence failed to substantiate their
A Yes, I do. cause of action.
Q I just want to be sure, Father, IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED and the Decision of the
will you please look at the respondent court in CA-G.R. CV No. 29182 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
defendant again. I want to be sure petitioners.
if he is the person who appeared SO ORDERED.
before you on that occasion?
A I am sure.
(TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 14-16)
However, on cross examination, Father Fernandez admitted that he has to
be shown a picture of the private respondent by Violeta Esguerra to
recognize the private respondent, viz:
Q When was the, approximately,
when you were first shown this
picture by Violeta Esguerra?
A I cannot recall.
Q At least the month and the
year?
A It must be in 1986.
Q What month in 1986.
A It is difficult. . .
Q When was the first time you
know you are going to testify
here?
A Let us see, you came there two
times and first one was you want
to get a baptismal certificate and
then the second time was I asked
you for what is this? And you said
it is for the court.
Q On the second time that Ms.
Violeta Esguerra went to your
place, you were already informed
that you will testify here before this
Honorable Court?
A Yes.
Q And you were informed by this
Ms. Violeta Esguerra that this man
16
Persons 4th Exam Cases
RODOLFO FERNANDEZ and MERCEDES CARANTO FERNANDEZ,
HUSBAND and WIFE, EDDIE C. FERNANDEZ and LUZ
FERNANDEZ, SPOUSES, petitioners, vs. ROMEO
FERNANDEZ, POTENCIANO FERNANDEZ, FRANCISCO
FERNANDEZ, JULITA FERNANDEZ, WILLIAM FERNANDEZ,
MARY FERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO FERNANDEZ, GERARDO
FERNANDEZ, RODOLFO FERNANDEZ and GREGORIO
FERNANDEZ, respondents.
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
decision[1] of the respondent Court of Appeals dated December 22, 1999
affirming the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court Branch 40, Dagupan City
in an action for nullity of contracts, partition, recovery of possession and
damages in favor of plaintiffs-appellees, herein respondents.
The facts as found by the respondent Court of Appeals, are as
follows:[3]
The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa A. de Venecia
were the registered owners of a parcel of land located at Dagupan City
covered by TCT No. T-9267 (525) consisting of 194 sq. meters, and the
two-storey building constructed thereon covered by Tax Declaration 22-
592-1. It is undisputed that Generosa gave birth to a baby boy named
Rogelio who died when he was only twelve (12) years old as paralytic. In
the testimony of Romeo Fernandez (TSN, Aug. 31, 1994, pp. 9-14) it was
revealed that the late Spouses being childless by the death of their son,
purchased from a certain Miliang for P20.00 a one (1) month baby boy. The
boy being referred to was later on identified as Rodolfo Fernandez, the
herein appellant. Appellant was taken care of by the couple and was sent
to school and became a dental technician. He lived with the couple until
they became old and disabled.
On July 20, 1982, Jose K. Fernandez died thereby leaving his wife
Generosa A. de Venecia and Rodolfo Fernandez and an estate consisting
of the following:
(a) A parcel of land (Lot 9132, before Lot No. 444-C, of the
Cadastral Survey of Dagupan, Cadastral Case No. 41,
G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 925), situated in the Barrio
of Pantal, City of Dagupan. Bounded on the NE. by Lot No.
447; on the SE. by Lot No. 9134; on the SW. by the
Arellano Street; and on the NW. by Lot No.
9131. Containing an area of One Hundred Ninety Four
(194) square meters, more or less. Covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 525 (T-9267) Pangasinan Registry
of Deeds.
(b) A two (2) storey residential building made of concrete and
wood, G.I. roofing with a floor area of 154 square meters
and 126 square meters of the first and second floor,
respectively. Declared under Tax Decl. No. 22-592-1 and
assessed therein at P26,000.00.
On August 31, 1989, appellant and Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed
of Extra-judicial Partition dividing and allocating to themselves the following:
To: Generosa de Venecia Vda. De Fernandez
(a) 119.5 sq. m. located on the southwestern portion of the land;
(b) Whole residential house above-mentioned;
To: Rodolfo V. Fernandez
74.5 square meters to be taken on the northeastern portion of the land.
On the same day, Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
in favor of Eddie Fernandez, appellants son over the following:
A portion of One Hundred Nineteen and One-Half (119.5) Square meters
including the building and/or all existing thereon to be taken from the
southwestern portion of the parcel of land described as follows, to wit:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 9132, before Lot No. 444-C, of the Cadastral
Survey of Dagupan, Cadastral Case No. 41, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record
No. 925), situated in the Barrio of Pantal, City of Dagupan. Bounded on the
NE. by Lot No. 447; on the SE by Lot No. 9134; on the SW. by the Arellano
Street; and on the NW. by Lot No. 9131. Containing an area of One
Hundred and Ninety-Four (194), Square Meters, more or less, covered by
TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 525 (T-9267) Pangasinan
Registry of Deeds (Exh. 8, Exhibits for the Defendants)
After learning the transaction, Romeo, Potenciano, Francisco, Julita,
William, Mary, Alejandro, Gerardo, Rodolfo and Gregorio, all surnamed
Fernandez, being nephews and nieces of the deceased Jose K. Fernandez,
their father Genaro being a brother of Jose, filed on September 21, 1994,
an action to declare the Extra-Judicial Partition of Estate and Deed of Sale
void ab initio (docketed as Civil Case No. 94-00016-D).
The complaint alleged that defendants (herein appellants), motivated by
unmitigated greed, deliberate and malicious acts of depriving the plaintiff
and other heirs (herein appellees) of the deceased spouses, without basis
of heirship or any iota of rights to succession or inheritance, taking
advantage of the total physical and mental incapacity of the deceased
Generosa de Venecia aggravated by unlawful scheme confederated,
colluded and conspired with each other in causing the fake, simulated
grossly inauthentic contracts purporting to be executed on August 31, 1989
and jointly on the same date, caused the execution of the deed of absolute
sale purportedly signed by Generosa de Venecia covering the same
property described in the deed of extra-judicial partition and by virtue of the
said acts, appellants were able to secure new land titles in their favor
(Records, pp. 3-4, Complaint). Appellees thus prayed that the Deed of
Extra-judicial Partition, Deed of Absolute Sale and Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 54641 be declared void from the beginning.
Significantly, in their answer, defendants alleged:
16. That the deceased Sps. Jose K. Fernandez and Generosa were
husband and wife blessed with one child the herein defendant Rodolfo V.
Fernandez whom they acknowledged during their lifetime. (underscoring
supplied)
18. That the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by the late Generosa de
Venecia and defendant Rodolfo V. Fernandez
which are now in question were all made with the
full knowledge, consent and approval of the parties
thereto and for value. (Records, pp. 20-21,
Answer).
On May 10, 1996, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in
favor of the plaintiffs, the dispositive portion reads:[4]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and
against the defendants;
1. Declaring the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition dated August
31, 1989 (Exh. 3), the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August
31, 1989 (Exh. 8), the TCT No. 54641, and the TCT No.
54693 null and void;
2. Ordering the defendants to reconvey to, and to peacefully
surrender to the plaintiffs the possession of the house and
lot in question;
3. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally to pay to
plaintiffs the following:
(a) P50,000.00 as compensatory damages;
(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) P20,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
(d) P2,000.00 as litigation costs.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the trial court found that defendant Rodolfo Fernandez
was not a legitimate nor a legally adopted child of spouses Dr. Jose
Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia Fernandez, hence Rodolfo could not
inherit from the spouses. Rodolfos claim as a son of the deceased spouses
Fernandez was negated by the fact that (1) he only reached high school
and was told to stop studying so that he could help in the clinic of Dr.
Fernandez, (2) he failed to present any birth certificate, (3) the book entitled
Fercolla clan which was compiled and edited by respected people such as
Ambassador Armando Fernandez, Justice Jorge Coquia and Teresita
Coquia-Sison, showed the geneology of the family of Dr. Jose and
Generosa Fernandez without a child; a pedigree may be admitted in
evidence to prove the facts of genealogy and that entries in a family bible
or other family books or charts, engravings or rings, family portraits and the
like, may be received as evidence of pedigree,[5] (4) the certification issued
by the Records Management and Archives Office that there was no
available information about the birth of petitioner Rodolfo to the spouses
Fernandez, (5) the application of Dr. Jose Fernandez for backpay certificate
naming petitioner Rodolfo as his son was doubtful considering that there
were blemishes or alteration in the original copy; (6) that Rodolfos baptismal
certificate was spurious and falsified since there were no available records
of baptism with the parish from June 7, 1930 to August 8, 1936, while
Rodolfos baptismal certificate which was issued in 1989 showed that
he was baptized on November 24, 1934. The court found that the extra-
judicial partition and the deed of absolute sale were prepared and executed
under abnormal, unusual and irregular circumstances which rendered the
documents null and void.
Defendants Rodolfo Fernandez et. al appealed to the respondent
Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial courts judgment in its assailed
decision dated December 22, 1999.
In resolving the appeal, the respondent court delved into the
legitimacy of defendant-appellant Rodolfo Fernandez filiation with the
deceased spouses. It found that appellants evidence which consisted of a
certificate of baptism stating that he was a child of the spouses Fernandez
and the application for recognition of rights to back pay under RA 897 filed
by Dr. Jose Fernandez, wherein the latter referred to Rodolfo as his son,
did not acquire evidentiary weight to prove his filiation. The appellate court
concluded that while baptismal certificates may be considered public
documents, they were evidence only to prove the administration of the
sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the
statements or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk; that
while the application for back pay was a public document, it was not
executed to admit the filiation of Jose K. Fernandez with Rodolfo V.
Fernandez, the herein appellant; that the public document contemplated in
Article 172 of the Family Code referred to the written admission of filiation
embodied in a public document purposely executed as an admission of
filiation and not as obtaining in this case wherein the public document was
executed as an application for the recognition of rights to back pay under
Republic Act No. 897. Appellants Rodolfo Fernandez et al filed their motion
for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated May 17, 2000. [6]
Rodolfo Fernandez et al filed the instant petition for review with the
following issues:
I
17
Persons 4th Exam Cases
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF
THE TRIAL COURT ORDERING THE DEFENDANTS, PETITIONERS
HEREIN, TO RECONVEY TO, AND PEACEFULLY SURRENDER TO THE
PLAINTIFFS, RESPONDENTS HEREIN, THE POSSESSION OF THE
HOUSE AND LOT IN QUESTION BECAUSE THE SAID ORDER IS
PALPABLY CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTED FACTS THE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE, FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
(a) THE HOUSE AND LOT IN QUESTION ARE ADMITTED BY THE
PARTIES TO BE CONJUGAL PROPERTIES OF THE SPOUSES DR.
JOSE K. FERNANDEZ AND GENEROSA DE VENECIA, AND
(b) RESPONDENTS, WHO ARE NOT RELATED TO GENEROSA DE
VENECIA BY CONSANGUINITY, ARE NOT HER INTESTATE HEIRS AND
CANNOT SUCCEED AB INTESTATO TO HER INTESTATE ESTATE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF
THE TRIAL COURT DECLARING (1) THE DEED OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL
PARTITION DATED AUGUST 31, 1989 (EXH. 3), THE DEED OF
ABSOLUTE SALE ALSO DATED AUGUST 31, 1989 (EXH. 8), TCT NO.
54641, AND TCT NO. 54693 NULL AND VOID FOR THE FOLLOWING
REASONS:
(a) IT HAS NO FACTUAL BASIS DULY ESTABLISHED BY THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD, AND
(b) RESPONDENTS, NOT BEING PARTIES TO THE QUESTIONED
DEEDS, HAVE NO PERSONALITY TO CONTEST THE VALIDITY OF
SAID DOCUMENTS.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS
FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER RODOLFO FERNANDEZ WAS NOT
THE CHILD OF SPOUSES DR. JOSE K. FERNANDEZ AND GENEROSA
DE VENECIA BECAUSE
(a) THE FILIATION OF PETITIONER RODOLFO FERNANDEZ COULD
NOT BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED IN AN ACTION FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF DOCUMENTS, PARTITION,
RECOVERY OF POSSESSION AND DAMAGES, AND;
(b) THE DECISION AS AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS DID
NOT DECLARE IN THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION THEREOF THAT
PETITIONER RODOLFO FERNANDEZ IS NOT THE CHILD OF
SPOUSES DR. JOSE FERNANDEZ AND GENEROSA FERNANDEZ.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES TO THE RESPONDENTS, THERE
BEING NO FACTUAL BASIS IN THE AFFIRMED DECISION TO JUSTIFY
SUCH AWARD.
The principal issue for resolution in this case concerns the rights of
the parties to the conjugal property of the deceased spouses Fernandez.
Petitioners allege that the respondent court found the extra-judicial
partition executed by petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez and Generosa
Fernandez, widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez, null and void because the former
allegedly failed to prove legitimate filiation to his putative father, the late Dr.
Jose Fernandez. Petitioners, contend, however, that the burden of proof
lies with the respondents because they were the ones contesting the filiation
of Rodolfo Fernandez. They insist that both lower courts had no power to
pass upon the matter of filiation because it could not be collaterally attacked
in the present action but in a separate and independent action directly
impugning such filiation.
We are not persuaded.
It must be noted that the respondents principal action was for the
declaration of absolute nullity of two documents, namely: deed of extra-
judicial partition and deed of absolute sale, and not an action to impugn
ones legitimacy. The respondent court ruled on the filiation of petitioner
Rodolfo Fernandez in order to determine Rodolfos right to the deed of extra-
judicial partition as the alleged legitimate heir of the spouses
Fernandez. While we are aware that ones legitimacy can be questioned
only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, this doctrine has
no application in the instant case considering that respondents claim was
that petitioner Rodolfo was not born to the deceased spouses Jose and
Generosa Fernandez; we do not have a situation wherein they
(respondents) deny that Rodolfo was a child of their uncles wife. The case
of Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals,[7] which has a similar factual
backdrop is instructive:
A careful reading of the above articles[8] will show that they do not
contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not
to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these
articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own
a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn
the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for
him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the
300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for
biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child;
(3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the
written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through
mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and
171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within
which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the
legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when
it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench
is not where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is
not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was
not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is
apropos, viz:
Petitioners recourse to Art. 263 of the New Civil Code (now Art. 170 of the
Family Code) is not well taken. This legal provision refers to an action to
impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an
action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private
respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless
deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an
illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedents child at
all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child,
nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir
of the deceased.
Thus, it is necessary to pass upon the relationship of petitioner
Rodolfo Fernandez to the deceased spouses Fernandez for the purpose of
determining what legal right Rodolfo has in the property subject of the extra-
judicial partition. In fact, the issue of whether or not Rodolfo Fernandez was
the son of the deceased spouses Jose Fernandez and Generosa de
Venecia was squarely raised by petitioners in their pre-trial brief[9] filed
before the trial court, hence they are now estopped from assailing the trial
courts ruling on Rodolfos status.
We agree with the respondent court when it found that petitioner
Rodolfo failed to prove his filiation with the deceased spouses Fernandez.
Such is a factual issue which has been thoroughly passed upon and settled
both by the trial court and the appellate court. Factual findings of the Court
of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court
and they carry even more weight[10] when the Court of Appeals affirms the
factual findings of the trial court.[11] We accordingly find no cogent reason to
disagree with the respondent courts evaluation of the evidence presented,
thus:[12]
The Records Management and Archives Office is bereft of any records of
the birth of appellant Rodolfo Fernandez. On October 11, 1995, it issued a
certification worded as follows:
This is to certify that the Register of Births for the Municipality of Dagupan,
Pangasinan in the year 1984 is not on file with the National Archives, hence,
there is no available information about the birth of Rodolfo V. Fernandez
alleged to have been born on November 24, 1934 to the spouses Jose K.
Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia in Dagupan, Pangasinan (Records,
p. 146)
Appellant nonetheless, contends that the Application for Recognition of
Back Pay Rights Under Act No. 897 is a public document and a conclusive
proof of the legitimate filiation between him and the deceased spouses
(Rollo, p. 41, Appellants Brief). We do not agree.
It may be conceded that the Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights
Under Act No. 897 is a public document nevertheless, it was not executed
to admit the filiation of Jose K. Fernandez with Rodolfo V. Fernandez, the
herein appellant. The public document contemplated in Article 172 of the
Family Code refer to the written admission of filiation embodied in a public
document purposely executed as an admission of filiation and not as
obtaining in this case wherein the public document was executed as an
application for the recognition of rights to back pay under Republic Act No.
897. Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 32. Public documents as evidence Documents consisting of entries in
public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public documents
are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to
their execution and of the date of the latter.
The rule is not absolute in the sense that the contents of a public document
are conclusive evidence against the contracting parties as to the
truthfulness of the statements made therein.They constitute only prima facie
evidence of the facts which give rise to their execution and of the date of
the latter. Thus, a baptismal certificate issued by a Spanish priest under the
Spanish regime constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts certified to by
the parish priest from his own knowledge such as the administration of the
sacrament on the day and in the place and manner set forth in the
certificate; but it does not constitute proof of the statements made therein
concerning the parentage of the person baptized (Francisco, Evidence,
1994 ed., p. 516, citing Garcia vs. Gajul, 53 Phil. 642; Adriano vs. de Jesus,
23 Phil. 350; Buan vs. Arquiza, 5 Phil. 193; Siguion vs. Siguion, 8 Phil.
7). Public documents are perfect evidence of the fact which give rise to their
execution and of the date of the latter if the act which the officer witnessed
and certified to or the date written by him are not shown to be false; but they
are not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the
statements made therein by the interested parties (Martin, Rules of Court in
the Philippines with Note and Comments, vol. 4, p. 577).
Corollarily, the Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights Under Act
No. 897 is only a proof that Jose K. Fernandez filed said application on June
5, 1954 in Dagupan City but it does not prove the veracity of the declaration
and statement contained in the said application that concern the relationship
of the applicant with herein appellant. In like manner, it is not a conclusive
proof of the filiation of appellant with his alleged father, Jose K. Fernandez
the contents being, only prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
18
Persons 4th Exam Cases
Additionally, appellant claims that he enjoyed and possessed the status of
being a legitimate child of the spouses openly and continuously until they
died (Rollo, p. 42; Appellants Brief).Open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child is meant the enjoyment by the child of the
position and privileges usually attached to the status of a legitimate child
such as bearing the paternal surname, treatment by the parents and family
of the child as legitimate, constant attendance to the childs support and
education, and giving the child the reputation of being a child of his parents
(Sempio-Diy, The Family Code of the Philippines, pp. 245-246). However,
it must be noted that, as was held in Quismundo vs. WCC, 132 SCRA 590,
possession of status of a child does not in itself constitute an
acknowledgment; it is only a ground for a child to compel recognition by his
assumed parent.
Lastly, to substantiate his claim of being a legitimate child appellant
presented a baptismal certificate issued by Fr. Rene Mendoza of the St.
John Metropolitan Cathedral of Dagupan City on August 10, 1989 stating
therein that appellant is a child of the late spouses having been born on
November 15, 1934 and baptized on November 24, 1934 (Exh. "1 Exhibits
for the Defendants). As stated, while baptismal certificates may be
considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove the
administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the
veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with respect to his
kinsfolk (Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439). It may be argued that
a baptismal certificate is one of the other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws of proving filiation but in this case, the authenticity
of the baptismal certificate was doubtful when Fr. Raymundo Q. de Guzman
of St. John the Evangelist Parish of Lingayen-Dagupan, Dagupan City
issued a certification on October 16, 1995 attesting that the records of
baptism on June 7, 1930 to August 8, 1936 were all damaged (Records, p.
148, Exh. G). Neither the family portrait offered in evidence establishes a
sufficient proof of filiation Pictures do not constitute proof of filiation
(Reyes vs. Court of Appeals) (supra). In fine, the evidence presented by
appellant did not acquire evidentiary weight to prove his
filiation. Consequently the Extra-Judicial Partition dated August 31, 1989
executed by appellant Rodolfo Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia is null
and void.
Considering the foregoing findings, petitioner Rodolfo is not a child by
nature of the spouses Fernandez and not a legal heir of Dr. Jose Fernandez
, thus the subject deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Jose
Fernandez between Generosa vda. de Fernandez and Rodolfo is null and
void insofar as Rodolfo is concerned[13] pursuant to Art.1105 of the New Civil
Code which states:
A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not,
shall be void only with respect to such person.
Petitioners next contend that respondents admitted that the property
in question was the conjugal property of the late spouses Dr. Jose
Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia, thus when Dr. Jose Fernandez died
intestate in 1982, his estate consisted solely of pro indiviso of the conjugal
property and the other half belonged to his wife Generosa de Venecia;
that granting Dr. Jose Fernandez was only survived by his wife, the
respondents nephews and nieces of Dr. Jose are entitled to inherit the share
of the decedents estate while the share of the conjugal property will still
belong to Generosa as the widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez, hence the trial
courts order reconveying the possession of the subject lot and building to
respondents was contrary to the admitted facts and law since respondents
are not related by consanguinity to Generosa vda de Fernandez.
We agree.
Article 1001 of the Civil Code provides:
Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
Generosa was the widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez and as provided in
the above-quoted Article 1001, she is entitled to the of the inheritance and
the respondents to the other . In effect, pro indiviso is the share of Generosa
as the surviving spouse, i.e., as her share of the conjugal property estate
and of the remaining as share as heir from her husbands estate. Thus, we
find well taken the petitioners assertion that the annulment of the extra-
judicial partition between Generosa and petitioner Rodolfo does not
necessarily result in respondents having exclusive right to the conjugal
property, as erroneously found by the respondent court. Generosa, during
her lifetime, had the right to enjoy and dispose of her property without other
limitations than those established by law,[14] which right she exercised by
executing a deed of sale in favor of petitioner Eddie Fernandez.
Petitioners assails respondents right, not being heirs of Generosa, to
question the validity of the deed of sale since the action for the annulment
of contracts may only be instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally
or subsidiarily.[15]
We disagree.
As a rule, a contract cannot be assailed by one who is not a party
obliged principally or subsidiarily under a contract. However, when a
contract prejudices the rights of a third person, he may exercise an action
for nullity of the contract if he is prejudiced in his rights with respect to one
of the contracting parties, and can show detriment which would positively
result to him from the contract in which he had no intervention. [16] As we
have discussed above, respondents are entitled to the of the entire conjugal
property, ie., lot and building; however considering that widow Generosa,
during her lifetime , sold the entire building to petitioner Eddie Fernandez,
respondents had been deprivedof their share therein, thus the deed of sale
was prejudicial to the interest of respondents as regards their share in the
building. Respondents therefore, have a cause of action to seek the
annulment of said deed of sale.
Petitioners further allege that the respondent court erred in declaring
null and void the deed of sale executed between Generosa and petitioner
Eddie Fernandez concluding that the same was simulated or false and in
affirming the trial courts findings that the deed was prepared and executed
under abnormal, unusual and irregular circumstances without however,
particularly stating the circumstances.
We agree.
Respondents allege that the deed of sale was fictitious and simulated
because there was no consideration for the sale. However, this assertion
was controverted by vendee petitioner Eddie Fernandez declaration, that
the money he paid for the sale came from his savings as overseas contract
worker in Saudi Arabia from 1982-1989 which respondents failed to
controvert by presenting evidence to the contrary. The presumption that a
contract has sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by a mere
assertion that it has no consideration.[17] Under Art. 1354 of the Civil Code,
consideration is presumed unless the contrary is proven.
Respondents also claim that the signature appearing in the deed of
sale was not that of Generosa because she was already bedridden with
both legs amputated before she died. Forgery cannot be presumed; it must
be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence[18] and whoever
alleges it has the burden of proving the same;[19] a burden respondents
failed to discharge. The respondents had not presented any convincing
proof to override the evidentiary value of the duly notarized deed of sale. A
notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal manner
therein expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To
contradict all these, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and
more than merely preponderant.[20]
We note however, that Generosa sold the entire 2 storey building to
petitioner Eddie Fernandez, i.e. she did not only sell her undivided share in
the building but also the share of the respondents. We rule, that such a sale
of the entire building without the consent of the respondents is not null and
void as only the rights of the co-owner seller are transferred, thereby making
the buyer, petitioner Eddie , a co-owner of the share of the building together
with the respondents who owned the share therein.[21]
Finally, anent the issue of actual and moral damages and attorneys
fees awarded by the trial court, we find them to be bereft of factual basis. A
party is entitled to an adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss
actually suffered by him as he has duly proven.[22] Such damages, to be
recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved
with a reasonable degree of certainty.[23] Courts cannot simply rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of
damages.[24] The testimony of respondent Romeo Fernandez that he
suffered around P100,000 actual damages was not supported by any
documentary or other admissible evidence. We also agree with the
petitioners that the respondent court should not have awarded moral
damages in the amount of P100,000 since they also failed to show proof of
moral suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings and social humiliation. Attorneys fees should likewise be
deleted for lack of factual basis and legal justification. Both the lower courts
did not cite specific factual basis to justify the award of attorneys fees, which
is in violation of the proscription against the imposition of a penalty on the
right to litigate.[25]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed judgment is
hereby Affirmed with Modification, as follows:
1. Respondents as legitimate heirs of Dr. Jose Fernandez are entitled to the
share of the conjugal lot and building of the deceased spouses Jose and
Generosa Fernandez who died childless and intestate;
2. The deed of extra-judicial partition is nullified insofar as the share of
petitioner Rodolfo in the conjugal lot is concerned and the title issued
pursuant thereto in the name of Rodolfo Fernandez;
3. Considering that the deed of sale is valid insofar as the share of Generosa
sold to petitioner Eddie Fernandez, TCT No. 54693 is cancelled and a new
title should be issued in the names of petitioner Eddie Fernandez and
respondents as co-owners of the and shares respectively in the conjugal
building.
4. The awards of actual and moral damages and attorneys fees are deleted.
SO ORDERED.
19
Persons 4th Exam Cases
IDA C. LABAGALA, petitioner, vs. NICOLASA T. SANTIAGO,
AMANDA T. SANTIAGO and HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the decision dated
March 4, 1997,[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 32817, which
reversed and set aside the judgment dated October 17, 1990,[2] of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54, in Civil Case No. 87-41515,
finding herein petitioner to be the owner of 1/3 pro indiviso share in a parcel
of land.
The pertinent facts of the case, as borne by the records, are as
follows:
Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 64729,
located in Rizal Avenue Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Alleging that Jose
had fraudulently registered it in his name alone, his sisters Nicolasa and
Amanda (now respondents herein), sued Jose for recovery of 2/3 share of
the property.[3] On April 20, 1981, the trial court in that case decided in favor
of the sisters, recognizing their right of ownership over portions of the
property covered by TCT No. 64729. The Register of Deeds of Manila was
required to include the names of Nicolasa and Amanda in the certificate of
title to said property.[4]
Jose died intestate on February 6, 1984. On August 5, 1987,
respondents filed a complaint for recovery of title, ownership, and
possession against herein petitioner, Ida C. Labagala, before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, to recover from her the 1/3 portion of said property
pertaining to Jose but which came into petitioners sole possession upon
Joses death.
Respondents alleged that Joses share in the property belongs to
them by operation of law, because they are the only legal heirs of their
brother, who died intestate and without issue. They claimed that the
purported sale of the property made by their brother to petitioner sometime
in March 1979[5] was executed through petitioners machinations and with
malicious intent, to enable her to secure the corresponding transfer
certificate of title (TCT No. 172334[6]) in petitioners name alone.[7]
Respondents insisted that the deed of sale was a forgery. The deed
showed that Jose affixed his thumbmark thereon but respondents averred
that, having been able to graduate from college, Jose never put his
thumbmark on documents he executed but always signed his name in
full. They claimed that Jose could not have sold the property belonging to
his poor and unschooled sisters who sacrificed for his studies and personal
welfare.[8] Respondents also pointed out that it is highly improbable for
petitioner to have paid the supposed consideration of P150,000 for the sale
of the subject property because petitioner was unemployed and without any
visible means of livelihood at the time of the alleged sale. They also
stressed that it was quite unusual and questionable that petitioner
registered the deed of sale only on January 26, 1987, or almost eight years
after the execution of the sale.[9]
On the other hand, petitioner claimed that her true name is not Ida C.
Labagala as claimed by respondent but Ida C. Santiago. She claimed not
to know any person by the name of Ida C. Labagala. She claimed to be the
daughter of Jose and thus entitled to his share in the subject property. She
maintained that she had always stayed on the property, ever since she was
a child. She argued that the purported sale of the property was in fact a
donation to her, and that nothing could have precluded Jose from putting
his thumbmark on the deed of sale instead of his signature. She pointed out
that during his lifetime, Jose never acknowledged respondents claim over
the property such that respondents had to sue to claim portions thereof. She
lamented that respondents had to disclaim her in their desire to obtain
ownership of the whole property.
Petitioner revealed that respondents had in 1985 filed two ejectment
cases against her and other occupants of the property. The first was
decided in her and the other defendants favor, while the second was
dismissed. Yet respondents persisted and resorted to the present action.
Petitioner recognized respondents ownership of 2/3 of the property
as decreed by the RTC. But she averred that she caused the issuance of a
title in her name alone, allegedly after respondents refused to take steps
that would prevent the property from being sold by public auction for their
failure to pay realty taxes thereon. She added that with a title issued in her
name she could avail of a realty tax amnesty.
On October 17, 1990, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner,
decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered recognizing the plaintiffs
[herein respondents] as being entitled to the ownership and possession
each of one-third (1/3) pro indiviso share of the property originally covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 64729, in the name of Jose T. Santiago
and presently covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 172334, in the
name of herein defendant [herein petitioner] and which is located at No.
3075-A Rizal Avenue Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila, as per complaint, and
the adjudication to plaintiffs per decision in Civil Case No. 56226 of this
Court, Branch VI, and the remaining one-third (1/3) pro indiviso share
adjudicated in said decision to defendant Jose T. Santiago in said case, is
hereby adjudged and adjudicated to herein defendant as owner and entitled
to possession of said share. The Court does not see fit to adjudge damages,
attorneys fees and costs. Upon finality of this judgment, Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 172334 is ordered cancelled and a new title issued in the names
of the two (2) plaintiffs and the defendant as owners in equal shares, and
the Register of Deeds of Manila is so directed to effect the same upon
payment of the proper fees by the parties herein.
SO ORDERED.[10]
According to the trial court, while there was indeed no consideration
for the deed of sale executed by Jose in favor of petitioner, said deed
constitutes a valid donation. Even if it were not, petitioner would still be
entitled to Joses 1/3 portion of the property as Joses daughter. The trial
court ruled that the following evidence shows petitioner to be the daughter
of Jose: (1) the decisions in the two ejectment cases filed by respondents
which stated that petitioner is Joses daughter, and (2) Joses income tax
return which listed petitioner as his daughter. It further said that respondents
knew of petitioners existence and her being the daughter of Jose, per
records of the earlier ejectment cases they filed against
petitioner. According to the court, respondents were not candid with the
court in refusing to recognize petitioner as Ida C. Santiago and insisting that
she was Ida C. Labagala, thus affecting their credibility.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
decision of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and one is entered
declaring the appellants Nicolasa and Amanda Santiago the co-owners in
equal shares of the one-third (1/3) pro indiviso share of the late Jose
Santiago in the land and building covered by TCT No. 172334. Accordingly,
the Register of Deeds of Manila is directed to cancel said title and issue in
its place a new one reflecting this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Apart from respondents testimonies, the appellate court noted that
the birth certificate of Ida Labagala presented by respondents showed that
Ida was born of different parents, not Jose and his wife. It also took into
account the statement made by Jose in Civil Case No. 56226 that he did
not have any child.
Hence, the present petition wherein the following issues are raised
for consideration:
1. Whether or not petitioner has adduced preponderant evidence to
prove that she is the daughter of the late Jose T. Santiago, and
2. Whether or not respondents could still impugn the filiation of the
petitioner as the daughter of the late Jose T. Santiago.
Petitioner contends that the trial court was correct in ruling that she
had adduced sufficient evidence to prove her filiation by Jose Santiago,
making her his sole heir and thus entitled to inherit his 1/3 portion. She
points out that respondents had, before the filing of the instant case,
previously considered[11] her as the daughter of Jose who, during his
lifetime, openly regarded her as his legitimate daughter. She asserts that
her identification as Joses daughter in his ITR outweighs the strange
answers he gave when he testified in Civil Case No. 56226.
Petitioner asserts further that respondents cannot impugn her filiation
collaterally, citing the case of Sayson v. Court of Appeals[12] in which we
held that (t)he legitimacy of (a) child can be impugned only in a direct action
brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited
by law.[13] Petitioner also cites Article 263 of the Civil Code in support of this
contention.[14]
For their part, respondents contend that petitioner is not the daughter
of Jose, per her birth certificate that indicate her parents as Leo Labagala
and Cornelia Cabrigas, instead of Jose Santiago and Esperanza
Cabrigas.[15] They argue that the provisions of Article 263 of the Civil Code
do not apply to the present case since this is not an action impugning a
childs legitimacy but one for recovery of title, ownership, and possession of
property.
The issues for resolution in this case, to our mind, are (1) whether or
not respondents may impugn petitioners filiation in this action for recovery
of title and possession; and (2) whether or not petitioner is entitled to Joses
1/3 portion of the property he co-owned with respondents, through
succession, sale, or donation.
On the first issue, we find petitioners reliance on Article 263 of the
Civil Code to be misplaced. Said article provides:
Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought
within one year from the recording of the birth in the Civil Register, if the
husband should be in the same place, or in a proper case, any of his heirs.
If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen months if they
should reside in the Philippines; and two years if abroad. If the birth of the
child has been concealed, the term shall be counted from the discovery of
the fraud.
This article should be read in conjunction with the other articles in the
same chapter on paternity and filiation in the Civil Code. A careful reading
of said chapter would reveal that it contemplates situations where a doubt
exists that a child is indeed a mans child by his wife, and the husband (or,
in proper cases, his heirs) denies the childs filiation. It does not refer to
situations where a child is alleged not to be the child at all of a particular
couple.[16]
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to
assert and prove that a person is not a mans child by his wife. However, the
present case is not one impugning petitioners legitimacy. Respondents are
asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that
she is not a child of Jose at all.[17] Moreover, the present action is one for
recovery of title and possession, and thus outside the scope of Article 263
on prescriptive periods.
20
Persons 4th Exam Cases
Petitioners reliance on Sayson is likewise improper. The factual
milieu present in Sayson does not obtain in the instant case. What was
being challenged by petitioners in Sayson was (1) the validity of the
adoption of Delia and Edmundo by the deceased Teodoro and Isabel
Sayson, and (2) the legitimate status of Doribel Sayson. While asserting
that Delia and Edmundo could not have been validly adopted since Doribel
had already been born to the Sayson couple at the time, petitioners at the
same time made the conflicting claim that Doribel was not the child of the
couple. The Court ruled in that case that it was too late to question the
decree of adoption that became final years before.Besides, such a
challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally but in
a direct proceeding.[18]
In this case, respondents are not assailing petitioners legitimate
status but are, instead, asserting that she is not at all their brothers
child. The birth certificate presented by respondents support this allegation.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that::
The Certificate of Record of Birth (Exhibit H)[19] plainly states that Ida was
the child of the spouses Leon Labagala and [Cornelia] Cabrigas. This
document states that it was Leon Labagala who made the report to the
Local Civil Registrar and therefore the supplier of the entries in said
Certificate. Therefore, this certificate is proof of the filiation of Ida. Appellee
however denies that Exhibit H is her Birth Certificate. She insists that she is
not Ida Labagala but Ida Santiago. If Exhibit H is not her birth certificate,
then where is hers? She did not present any though it would have been the
easiest thing to do considering that according to her baptismal certificate
she was born in Manila in 1969. This court rejects such denials and holds
that Exhibit H is the certificate of the record of birth of appellee Ida
Against such evidence, the appellee Ida could only present her testimony
and a baptismal certificate (Exhibit 12) stating that appellees parents were
Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas.But then, a decisional rule in
evidence states that a baptismal certificate is not a proof of the parentage
of the baptized person. This document can only prove the identity of the
baptized, the date and place of her baptism, the identities of the baptismal
sponsors and the priest who administered the sacrament -- nothing
more.[20] (Citations omitted.)
At the pre-trial conducted on August 11, 1988, petitioners counsel
admitted that petitioner did not have a birth certificate indicating that she is
Ida Santiago, though she had been using this name all her life.[21]
Petitioner opted not to present her birth certificate to prove her
relationship with Jose and instead offered in evidence her baptismal
certificate.[22] However, as we held in Heirs of Pedro Cabais v. Court of
Appeals:
a baptismal certificate is evidence only to prove the administration of
the sacrament on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of
the declarations therein stated with respect to [a persons]
kinsfolk. The same is conclusive only of the baptism administered,
according to the rites of the Catholic Church, by the priest who
baptized subject child, but it does not prove the veracity of the
declarations and statements contained in the certificate concerning
the relationship of the person baptized.[23]
A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of
filiation.[24] More so are the entries made in an income tax return, which only
shows that income tax has been paid and the amount thereof.[25]
We note that the trial court had asked petitioner to secure a copy of
her birth certificate but petitioner, without advancing any reason therefor,
failed to do so. Neither did petitioner obtain a certification that no record of
her birth could be found in the civil registry, if such were the case. We find
petitioners silence concerning the absence of her birth certificate telling. It Art. 1471. If the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be shown
raises doubt as to the existence of a birth certificate that would show to have been in reality a donation, or some other act or contract.
petitioner to be the daughter of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Her Neither may the purported deed of sale be a valid deed of
failure to show her birth certificate would raise the presumption that if such donation. Again, as explained by the Court of Appeals:
evidence were presented, it would be adverse to her claim. Petitioners Even assuming that the deed is genuine, it cannot be a valid donation. It
counsel argued that petitioner had been using Santiago all her lacks the acceptance of the donee required by Art. 725 of the Civil
life. However, use of a family name certainly does not establish pedigree. Code. Being a minor in 1979, the acceptance of the donation should have
Further, we note that petitioner, who claims to be Ida Santiago, has been made by her father, Leon Labagala or [her] mother Cornelia Cabrigas
the same birthdate as Ida Labagala.[26] The similarity is too uncanny to be a or her legal representative pursuant to Art. 741 of the same Code. No one
mere coincidence. of those mentioned in the law - in fact no one at all - accepted the donation
During her testimony before the trial court, petitioner denied knowing for Ida.[32]
Cornelia Cabrigas, who was listed as the mother in the birth certificate of In sum, we find no reversible error attributable to the assailed decision
Ida Labagala. In her petition before this Court, however, she stated that of the Court of Appeals, hence it must be upheld.
Cornelia is the sister of her mother, Esperanza. It appears that petitioner WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court
made conflicting statements that affect her credibility and could cast a long of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 32817 is AFFIRMED.
shadow of doubt on her claims of filiation. Costs against petitioner.
Thus, we are constrained to agree with the factual finding of the Court SO ORDERED.
of Appeals that petitioner is in reality the child of Leon Labagala and
Cornelia Cabrigas, and contrary to her averment, not of Jose Santiago and
Esperanza Cabrigas. Not being a child of Jose, it follows that petitioner can
not inherit from him through intestate succession. It now remains to be seen
whether the property in dispute was validly transferred to petitioner through
sale or donation.
On the validity of the purported deed of sale, however, we agree with
the Court of Appeals that:
This deed is shot through and through with so many intrinsic defects
that a reasonable mind is inevitably led to the conclusion that it is
fake. The intrinsic defects are extractable from the following
questions: a) If Jose Santiago intended to donate the properties in
question to Ida, what was the big idea of hiding the nature of the
contract in the faade of the sale? b) If the deed is a genuine
document, how could it have happened that Jose Santiago who was
of course fully aware that he owned only 1/3 pro indiviso of the
properties covered by his title sold or donated the whole properties to
Ida? c) Why in heavens name did Jose Santiago, a college graduate,
who always signed his name in documents requiring his signature
(citation omitted) [affix] his thumbmark on this deed of sale? d) If Ida
was [the] child of Jose Santiago, what was the sense of the latter
donating his properties to her when she would inherit them anyway
upon his death? e) Why did Jose Santiago affix his thumbmark to a
deed which falsely stated that: he was single (for he was earlier
married to Esperanza Cabrigas); Ida was of legal age (for [s]he was
then just 15 years old); and the subject properties were free from liens
and encumbrances (for Entry No. 27261, Notice of Adverse Claim
and Entry No. 6388, Notice of Lis Pendens were already annotated
in the title of said properties). If the deed was executed in 1979, how
come it surfaced only in 1984 after the death of Jose Santiago and of
all people, the one in possession was the baptismal sponsor of
Ida?[27]
Clearly, there is no valid sale in this case. Jose did not have the right
to transfer ownership of the entire property to petitioner since 2/3 thereof
belonged to his sisters.[28] Petitioner could not have given her consent to the
contract, being a minor at the time.[29] Consent of the contracting parties is
among the essential requisites of a contract,[30] including one of sale, absent
which there can be no valid contract. Moreover, petitioner admittedly did not
pay any centavo for the property,[31] which makes the sale void. Article 1471
of the Civil Code provides:
21
Persons 4th Exam Cases
In the matter of the intestate estate of the late JUAN "JHONNY" LOCSIN,
SR., LUCY A. SOLINAP (Daughter of the late Maria Locsin
Araneta), the successors of the late LOURDES C. LOCSIN,
MANUEL C. LOCSIN, ESTER LOCSIN JARANTILLA and the
intestate estate of the late JOSE C. LOCSIN, JR., petitioners,
vs. JUAN C. LOCSIN, JR., respondent.
A Certificate of Live Birth duly recorded in the Local Civil Registry, a copy
of which is transmitted to the Civil Registry General pursuant to the Civil Registry
Law, is prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. However, if there are
material discrepancies between them, the one entered in the Civil Registry
General prevails.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking the reversal of the September 13, 2000
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57708 which affirmed in
toto the September 13, 1996 order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, of
Iloilo City in Special Proceeding No. 4742. The September 13 order of the trial
court appointed Juan E. Locsin, Jr., respondent, as the sole administrator of the
Intestate Estate of the late Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr.
Records show that on November 11, 1991, or eleven (11) months after
Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr.[1] died intestate on December 11, 1990, respondent
Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 30, a
"Petition for Letters of Administration" (docketed as Special Proceeding No.
4742) praying that he be appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the
deceased. He alleged, among others, (a) that he is an acknowledged natural
child of the late Juan C. Locsin; (b) that during his lifetime, the deceased owned
personal properties which include undetermined savings, current and time
deposits with various banks, and 1/6 portion of the undivided mass of real
properties owned by him and his siblings, namely: Jose Locsin, Jr., Manuel
Locsin, Maria Locsin Yulo, Lourdes Locsin and Ester Locsin; and (c) that he is
the only surviving legal heir of the decedent.
On November 13, 1991, the trial court issued an order setting the petition
for hearing on January 13, 1992, which order was duly published,[2] thereby
giving notice to all persons who may have opposition to the said petition.
Before the scheduled hearing, or on January 10, 1992, the heirs of Jose
Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and Ester Jarantilla,
claiming to be the lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition to respondents
petition for letters of administration. They averred that respondent is not a child
or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his
lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his name .
On January 5, 1993, another opposition to the petition was filed by Lucy
Salinop (sole heir of the late Maria Locsin Vda. De Araneta, sister of the
deceased), Manuel Locsin and the successors of the late Lourdes C. Locsin
alleging that respondent's claim as a natural child is barred by prescription or the
statute of limitations.
The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr. (brother of the deceased)
also entered its appearance in the estate proceedings, joining the earlier
oppositors. This was followed by an appearance and opposition dated January
26, 1993 of Ester Locsin Jarantilla (another sister of Juan C. Locsin), likewise
stating that there is no filial relationship between herein respondent and the
deceased.
Thereupon, the trial court conducted hearings.
To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the
deceased and, therefore, entitled to be appointed administrator of the intestate
estate, respondent submitted a machine copy (marked as Exhibit "D")[3] of his
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the bound volume of birth records in the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Exhibit "D" contains the
information that respondent's father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he was the
informant of the facts stated therein, as evidenced by his signatures (Exhibit "D-
2" and "D-3"). To prove the existence and authenticity of Certificate of Live Birth
No. 477 from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied, respondent presented
Rosita J. Vencer, the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. She produced and
identified in court the bound volume of 1957 records of birth where the alleged
original of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 is included.
Respondent also offered in evidence a photograph (Exhibit "C")[4] showing
him and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin bearing Juan C.
Locsin's dead body. The photograph, respondent claims, shows that he and his
mother have been recognized as family members of the deceased.
In their oppositions, petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live Birth No.
477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious. They submitted a certified true copy of Certificate
of Live Birth No. 477 found in the Civil Registrar General, Metro Manila, marked
as Exhibit "8",[5] indicating that the birth of respondent was reported by his
mother, Amparo Escamilla, and that the same does not contain the signature of
the late Juan C. Locsin. They observed as anomalous the fact that while
respondent was born on October 22, 1956 and his birth was recorded on January
30, 1957, however, his Certificate of Live Birth No. 447 (Exhibit "D") was
recorded on a December 1, 1958 revised form. Upon the other hand, Exhibit
"8" appears on a July, 1956 form, already used before respondent's birth. This
scenario clearly suggests that Exhibit "D" was falsified. Petitioners presented as
witness, Col. Pedro L. Elvas, a handwriting expert. He testified that the
signatures of Juan C. Locsin and Emilio G. Tomesa (then Civil Registrar of Iloilo
City) appearing in Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") are forgeries. He
thus concluded that the said Certificate is a spurious document surreptitiously
inserted into the bound volume of birth records of the Local Civil Registrar of
Iloilo City.
After hearing, th trial court, finding that Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
(Exhibit "D") and the photograph (Exhibit "C") are sufficient proofs of
respondent's illegitimate filiation with the deceased, issued on September 13,
1996 an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this PETITION is hereby GRANTED and
the petitioner Juan E. Locsin, Jr. is hereby appointed Administrator of the
Intestate Estate of the late Juan Johnny Locsin, Sr.
"Let Letters of Administration be issued in his favor, upon his filing of a bond in
the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) to be approved by this
Court.
"SO ORDERED.[6]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered the challenged Decision
affirming in toto the order of the trial court dated September 13, 1996. Petitioners
moved for a reconsideration, while respondent filed a motion for execution
pending appeal. Both motions were, however, denied by the Appellate Court in
its Resolution dated January 10, 2001.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari by petitioners.
The focal issue for our resolution is which of the two documents -
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
(Exhibit "8") is genuine.
The rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by
the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal[7] does not apply when there appears in the record of the case some
facts or circumstances of weight and influence which have been overlooked, or
the significance of which have been misinterpreted, that if considered, would
affect the result of the case.[8] Here, the trial court failed to appreciate facts and
circumstances that would have altered its conclusion.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the persons
preferred who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Section 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent,
refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration
shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both,
in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or
wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow,
or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of a person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person,
it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and
willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted
to such other person as the court may select. (Emphasis ours)
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec.2 Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters
of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far
as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts; x x x" (Emphasis ours)
An "interested party", in estate proceedings, is one who would be
benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the
estate, such as a creditor.[9] Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin"
refers to those whose relationship with the decedent is such that they are entitled
to share in the estate as distributees.[10] In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals,[11] this
Court held that in the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a
deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in
said estate of the one to be appointed administrator.
Here, undisputed is the fact that the deceased, Juan C. Locsin, was not
survived by a spouse. In his petition for issuance of letters of administration,
respondent alleged that he is an acknowledged natural son of the deceased,
implying that he is an interested person in the estate and is considered as next
of kin. But has respondent established that he is an acknowledged natural son
of the deceased? On this point, this Court, through Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug,
held:
"The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by
(1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgement; or (2)
an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof,
filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself,
a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action
is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for
compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require
a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is
predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing,
judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to
establish the child's acknowledgment."[12] (Emphasis ours)
Here, respondent, in order to establish his filiation with the deceased,
presented to the trial court his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and
a photograph (Exhibit "C") taken during the burial of the deceased.
Regarding the genuineness and probative value of Exhibit "D", the trial
court made the following findings, affirmed by the Appellate Court:
"It was duly established in Court that the Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 in the
name of Juan E. Locsin, Jr., the original having been testified to by Rosita
Vencer, exists in the files of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo. Petitioner since
birth enjoyed the open and continuous status of an acknowledged natural child
of Juan C. Locsin, Sr., he together with his mother was summoned to attend to
the burial as evidenced by a picture of relatives facing the coffin of the deceased
with petitioner and his mother in the picture. x x x. It was duly proven at the trial
that the standard signatures presented by oppositors were not in public
document and may also be called questioned document whereas in the
certificate of live birth No. 477, the signature of Juan C. Locsin, Sr. was the
original or primary evidence. The anomalous and suspicious characteristic of the
22
Persons 4th Exam Cases
bound volume where the certificate of live birth as alleged by oppositors was
found was testified to and explained by Rosita Vencer of the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar that they run out of forms in 1957 and requisitioned
forms. However, the forms sent to them was the 1958 revised form and that she
said their office usually paste the pages of the bound volume if destroyed. All the
doubts regarding the authenticity and genuineness of the signatures of Juan C.
Locsin, Sr. and Emilio Tomesa, and the suspicious circumstances of the bound
volume were erased due to the explanation of Rosita Vencer."
This Court cannot subscribe to the above findings.
Pursuant to Section 12 of Act 3753 (An Act to Establish a Civil Register),
the records of births from all cities and municipalities in the Philippines are
officially and regularly forwarded to the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila
by the Local Civil Registrars. Since the records of births cover several decades
and come from all parts of the country, to merely access them in the Civil Registry
General requires expertise. To locate one single birth record from the mass, a
regular employee, if not more, has to be engaged. It is highly unlikely that any of
these employees in Metro Manila would have reason to falsify a particular 1957
birth record originating from the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo City.
With respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by interested parties
is obviously easier. Thus, in proving the authenticity of Exhibit "D," more
convincing evidence than those considered by the trial court should have been
presented by respondent.
The trial court held that the doubts respecting the genuine nature of Exhibit
"D" are dispelled by the testimony of Rosita Vencer, Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo
City.
The event about which she testified on March 7, 1994 was the record of
respondent's birth which took place on October 22, 1956, on 37 or 38 years
ago. The Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City at that time was Emilio G.
Tomesa.Necessarily, Vencer's knowledge of respondent's birth record allegedly
made and entered in the Local Civil Registry in January, 1957 was based merely
on her general impressions of the existing records in that Office.
When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in the Local Civil
Registry vary from those appearing in the copy transmitted to the Civil Registry
General, pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, the variance has to be clarified in
more persuasive and rational manner. In this regard, we find Vencer's
explanation not convincing.
Respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") was recorded
in a December 1, 1958 revised form. Asked how a 1958 form could be used
in 1957 when respondent's birth was recorded, Vencer answered that "xxx
during that time, maybe the forms in 1956 were already exhausted so the former
Civil Registrar had requested for a new form and they sent us the 1958 Revised
Form."[13]
The answer is a "maybe", a mere supposition of an event. It does not
satisfactorily explain how a Revised Form dated December 1, 1958 could have
been used on January 30, 1957 or almost (2) years earlier.
Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" of the petitioners found in the Civil
Registrar General in Metro Manila is on Municipal Form No. 102, revised in
July, 1956. We find no irregularity here. Indeed, it is logical to assume that the
1956 forms would continue to be used several years thereafter. But for a 1958
form to be used in 1957 is unlikely.
There are other indications of irregularity relative to Exhibit "D." The back
cover of the 1957 bound volume in the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo is torn. Exhibit
"D" is merely pasted with the bound volume, not sewn like the other entries.
The documents bound into one volume are original copies. Exhibit "D" is
a carbon copy of the alleged original and sticks out like a sore thumb because
the entries therein are typewritten, while the records of all other certificates are
handwritten. Unlike the contents of those other certificates, Exhibit "D" does not
indicate important particulars, such as the alleged father's religion, race,
occupation, address and business. The space which calls for an entry of the
legitimacy of the child is blank. On the back page of Exhibit "D", there is a
purported signature of the alleged father, but the blanks calling for the date and The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate filiation is further elucidated
other details of his Residence Certificate were not filled up. in Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals [17] where this Court said that "a birth
When asked to explain the torn back cover of the bound volume, Vencer certificate not signed by the alleged father (who had no hand in its preparation)
had no answer except to state, "I am not aware of this because I am not a is not competent evidence of paternity."
bookbinder." As to why Exhibit "D" was not sewn or bound into the volume, she A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the
explained as follows: Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes of recognition and
"COURT: filiation. However, birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and
I will butt in. Are these instances where your employees would only paste a may be refuted by contrary evidence.[18] Its evidentiary worth cannot be
document like this Certificate of Live Birth? sustained where there exists strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity
WITNESS: or nullity. In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 entered in
Yes, Your Honor, we are pasting some of the leaves just to replace the the records of the Local Civil Registry (from which Exhibit "D" was machine
record. Sometimes we just have it pasted in the record when the leaves were copied) has all the badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on file in
taken. that office was removed and substituted with a falsified Certificate of Live Birth.
ATTY. TIROL: At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule 132 of the
You mean to say you allow the leaves of the bound volume to be taken out? Revised Rules of Court that "(d)ocuments consisting of entries in public records
A: No sir. It is because sometimes the leaves are detached so we have to made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facieevidence of
paste them."[14] (Emphasis ours) the facts therein stated." In this case, the glaring discrepancies between the two
There is no explanation why out of so many certificates, this vital Certificates of Live Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have overturned the genuineness
document, Exhibit "D", was merely pasted with the volume. of Exhibit "D" entered in the Local Civil Registry. What is authentic is Exhibit "8"
Vencer's testimony suffers from infirmities. Far from explaining the recorded in the Civil Registry General.
anomalous circumstances surrounding Exhibit "D", she actually highlighted the Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of
suspicious circumstances surrounding its existence. the late Juan C. Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation,[19] lest we
The records of the instant case adequately support a finding that Exhibit recklessly set a very dangerous precedent that would encourage and sanction
"8" for the petitioners, not respondent's Exhibit "D", should have been given more fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture taken while standing before a
faith and credence by the courts below. coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the deceased.
The Civil Registry Law requires, inter alia, the Local Civil Registrar to send Respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. failed to prove his filiation with the late
copies of registrable certificates and documents presented to them for entry to Juan C. Locsin, Sr.. His Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is
the Civil Registrar General, thus: spurious. Indeed, respondent is not an interested person within the meaning of
Duties of Local Civil Registrar. Local civil registrars shall (a) file registrable Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court entitled to the issuance of letters
certificates and documents presented to them for entry; (b) compile the same of administration.
monthly and prepare and send any information required of them by the Civil- WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged
Registrar; (c) issue certified transcripts or copies of any document registered Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 57708 are
upon payment of proper fees; (d) order the binding, properly classified, of all REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent's petition for issuance of letters of
certificates or documents registered during the year; (e) send to the Civil administration is ORDERED DISMISSED.
Registrar-General, during the first ten days of each month, a copy of the SO ORDERED.
entries made during the preceding month, for filing; (f) index the same to
facilitate search and identification in case any information is required; and (g)
administer oaths, free of charge, for civil register purposes"[15] (Emphasis ours)
In light of the above provisions, a copy of the document sent by the Local
Civil Registrar to the Civil Registrar General should be identical in form and in
substance with the copy being kept by the latter. In the instant case, Exhibit "8",
as transmitted to the Civil Registrar General is not identical with Exhibit "D" as
appearing in the records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Such
circumstance should have aroused the suspicion of both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals and should have impelled them to declare Exhibit "D" a
spurious document.
Exhibit "8" shows that respondent's record of birth was made by his
mother. In the same Exhibit "8", the signature and name of Juan C. Locsin listed
as respondent's father and the entry that he and Amparo Escamilla were married
in Oton, Iloilo on November 28, 1954 do not appear.
In this connection, we echo this Court's pronouncement in Roces vs. Local
Civil Registrar[16] that:
Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines x x
x explicitly prohibit, not only the naming of the father of the child born out of
wedlock, when the birth certificate, or the recognition, is not filed or made
by him, but also, the statement of any information or circumstances by which he
could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to
make or record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third
person and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only
by the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of said
child. (Emphasis ours)
23
Persons 4th Exam Cases
ERNESTINA BERNABE, petitioner, vs. CAROLINA ALEJO as
guardian ad litem for the minor ADRIAN
BERNABE, respondent.
The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate
children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect cannot
be impaired or taken away. The minors have up to four years from attaining
majority age within which to file an action for recognition.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition[1] for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, praying for (1) the nullification of the July 7, 1999 Court of
Appeals[2] (CA) Decision[3] in CA-GR CV No. 51919 and the October 14,
1999 CA Resolution[4] denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, as
well as (2) the reinstatement of the two Orders issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasay City (Branch 109) concerning the same case.
The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the lower court
dismissing Civil Case No. 94-0562 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the
records of this case be remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits.[5]
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this
wise:
The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his
secretary of twenty-three (23) years, herein plaintiff-appellant
Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18, 1981 and was named
Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife
Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina as the
sole surviving heir.
On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid complaint
praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of
Fiscal Bernabe and as such he (Adrian) be given his share in
Fiscal Bernabes estate, which is now being held by Ernestina as the sole
surviving heir.
On July 16, 1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, ruling
that under the provisions of the Family Code as well as the case
of Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, the complaint is now barred x x x.[6]
Orders of the Trial Court
In an Order dated July 26, 1995, the trial court granted
Ernestina Bernabes Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts Decision
and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for recognition. Citing Article
175 of the Family Code, the RTC held that the death of the putative father
had barred the action.
In its Order dated October 6, 1995, the trial court added that since the
putative father had not acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in
writing, the action for recognition should have been filed during the lifetime
of the alleged father to give him the opportunity to either affirm or deny the
childs filiation.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of
justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son
of Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy was born in 1981, his rights are
governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows an action for
recognition to be filed within four years after the child has attained the age
of majority. The subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take
away that right.
Hence, this appeal.[7]
Issues
In her Memorandum,[8] petitioner raises the following issues for our
consideration:
I The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding
Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against
petitioner, the legitimate daughter of the putative father, for recognition and
partition with accounting after the putative fathers death in the absence of
any written acknowledgment of paternity by the latter.
II
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
respondents had four years from the attainment of minority to file an action
for recognition as provided in Art. 285 of the Civil Code, in complete
disregard of its repeal by the [express] provisions of the Family Code and
the applicable jurisprudence as held by the Honorable Court of Appeals.
III
Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the petition[er] is fatally
defective for failure to implead the Court of Appeals as one of the
respondents.[9]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First and Second Issues: Period to File Action for Recognition
Because the first and the second issues are interrelated, we shall
discuss them jointly.
Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from filing an action for
recognition, because Article 285 of the Civil Code has been supplanted by
the provisions of the Family Code. She argues that the latter Code should
be given retroactive effect, since no vested right would be impaired. We do
not agree.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides the period for filing an action for
recognition as follows:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought
only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following
cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child,
in which case the latter may file the action before the
expiration of four years from the attainment of his
majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document
should appear of which nothing had been heard and in
which either or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the
finding of the document.
The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision, have
however been omitted by Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code,
which we quote:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child;
or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during
his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die
during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have
a period of five years within which to institute the action.
the death of either or both of the parties.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in
which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent.
Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child
must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The Family Code
makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter
died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a chance to dispute
the claim, considering that illegitimate children are usually begotten and
raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their
existence. x x x The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to
affirm or deny the childs filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she
is already dead.[10]
Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that
have already vested prior to its enactment should not be prejudiced or
impaired as follows:
ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws.
The crucial issue to be resolved therefore is whether Adrians right to
an action for recognition, which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code,
had already vested prior to the enactment of the Family Code. Our answer
is affirmative.
A vested right is defined as one which is absolute, complete and
unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency
x x x.[11] Respondent however contends that the filing of an action for
recognition is procedural in nature and that as a general rule, no vested
right may attach to [or] arise from procedural laws.[12]
Bustos v. Lucero[13] distinguished substantive from procedural law in
these words:
x x x. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this
respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which
includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the
disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which
creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and
duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts
are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law,
which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their
invasion.[14] (Citations omitted)
Recently, in Fabian v. Desierto,[15] the Court laid down the test for
determining whether a rule is procedural or substantive:
[I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the
practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies
any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure,
that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not
procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.[16]
24
Persons 4th Exam Cases
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article 285 of the
Civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition
for recognition within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the
Family Code cannot impair or take Adrians right to file an action for
recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its enactment.
Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals[17] is not applicable to the case at bar,
because the plaintiff therein sought recognition as an illegitimate child when
he was no longer a minor. On the other hand, in Aruego Jr. v. Court of
Appeals[18] the Court ruled that an action for recognition filed while the Civil
Code was in effect should not be affected by the subsequent enactment of
the Family Code, because the right had already vested.
Not Limited to Natural Children
To be sure, Article 285 of the Civil Code refers to the action for
recognition of natural children. Thus, petitioner contends that the provision
cannot be availed of by respondent, because at the time of his conception,
his parents were impeded from marrying each other. In other words, he is
not a natural child.
A natural child is one whose parents, at the time of conception, were
not disqualified by any legal impediment from marrying each other. Thus,
in De Santos v. Angeles,[19] the Court explained:
A childs parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at
the time of conception for him to qualify as a natural child.[20]
A strict and literal interpretation of Article 285 has already been
frowned upon by this Court in the aforesaid case of Aruego, which allowed
minors to file a case for recognition even if their parents were disqualified
from marrying each other. There, the Complaint averred that the late
Jose Aruego Sr., a married man, had an extramarital liason with Luz
Fabian. Out of this relationship were born two illegitimate children who in
1983 filed an action for recognition. The two children were born in 1962 and
1963, while the alleged putative father died in 1982. In short, at the time of
their conception, the two childrens parents were legally disqualified from
marrying each other. The Court allowed the Complaint to prosper, even
though it had been filed almost a year after the death of the presumed
father. At the time of his death, both children were still minors.
Moreover, in the earlier case Divinagracia v. Rovira,[21] the Court said
that the rules on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment of natural
children, as well as the prescriptive period for filing such action, may
likewise be applied to spurious children. Pertinent portions of the case are
quoted hereunder:
The so-called spurious children, or illegitimate children other than natural
children, commonly known as bastards, include those adulterous children
or those born out of wedlock to a married woman cohabiting with a man
other than her husband or to a married man cohabiting with a woman other
than his wife. They are entitled to support and successional rights. But
their filiation must be duly proven.
How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the
investigation of the paternity or maternity or spurious children under the
circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284 of the Civil Code. The
implication is that the rules on compulsory recognition of natural children
are applicable to spurious children.
Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children.
The rules on proof of filiation of natural children or the rules on voluntary
and compulsory acknowledgment for natural children may be applied to
spurious children.
That does not mean that spurious children should be acknowledged, as that
term is used with respect to natural children. What is simply meant is that
the grounds or instances for the acknowledgment of natural children are
utilized to establish the filiation of spurious children.
A spurious child may prove his filiation by means of a record of birth, a will,
a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. These are
the modes of voluntary recognition of natural children.
In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of the spurious
child, then his filiation may be established by means of the circumstances
or grounds for compulsory recognition prescribed in the aforementioned
articles 283 and 284.
The prescriptive period for filing the action for compulsory recognition in the
case of natural children, as provided for in article 285 of the Civil Code,
applies to spurious children.[22](Citations omitted, italics supplied)
Thus, under the Civil Code, natural children have
superior successional rights over spurious ones.[23] However, Rovira treats
them as equals with respect to other rights, including the right to recognition
granted by Article 285.
To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors at the time
the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their
minority are thus given the right to seek recognition (under Article 285 of the
Civil Code) for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This
vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family
Code.
Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of
minors who could not have filed suit, on their own, during the lifetime of their
putative parents. As respondent aptly points out in his Memorandum,[24] the
State as parens patriae should protect a minors right. Born in
1981, Adrian was only seven years old when the Family Code took effect
and only twelve when his alleged father died in 1993. The minor must be
given his day in court.
Third Issue: Failure to Implead the CA
Under Section 4(a) of Rule 45 of the current Rules of Court, it is
no longer required to implead the lower courts or judges x x x either as
petitioners or respondents. Under Section 3, however, the lower tribunal
should still be furnished a copy of the petition. Hence, the failure of petitioner
to implead the Court of Appeals as a party is not a reversible error; it is
in fact the correct procedure.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
25
Persons 4th Exam Cases
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED
JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA.
DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN,
Respondents.3
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11,
1990 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55,4 in SP
Case No. 97668, which was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals in
its decision5 dated October 24, 2002.
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado.6 The main issue in this case is relatively simple: who,
between petitioners and respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents.
However, it is attended by several collateral issues that complicate its resolution.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be
divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her
half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and
grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his
sisters,7 his nephews and nieces,8 his illegitimate child,9 and the de
facto adopted child10 (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.
The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa11 Delgado by one
Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple,
namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado.
Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-
blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgados life.
Before him was Ramon Osorio12 with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But,
unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without the
benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorios and Felisa Delgados
union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is
crucial to the claimants because the answer will determine whether their
successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate
succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.13 If Ramon Osorio and
Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado was
a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from
the latters intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the principle of
absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely,
if the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to
inherit from Josefa Delgados intestate estate, as they would all be within the
illegitimate line.
Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In
support thereof, they assert that no evidence was ever presented to establish it,
not even so much as an allegation of the date or place of the alleged marriage.
What is clear, however, is that Felisa retained the surname Delgado. So did Luis,
her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married, his Partida de
Casamiento14 stated that he was "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural
child of Felisa Delgado),15 significantly omitting any mention of the name and
other circumstances of his father.16 Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents)
insist that the absence of a record of the alleged marriage did not necessarily
mean that no marriage ever took place.
Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by
Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several
months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of self-
adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado17 but
whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the
two eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never married. To
prove their assertion, petitioners point out that no record of the contested
marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming
Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as "Seorita" or unmarried
woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of
a marriage certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They
maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3,
1919 and from then on lived together as husband and wife until the death of
Josefa on September 8, 1972. During this period spanning more than half a
century, they were known among their relatives and friends to have in fact been
married. To support their proposition, oppositors presented the following pieces
of evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to
Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident
Commissioner to the United States of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines;
2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June
25, 1947;
3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability
Resulting from Service in the Active Military or Naval Forces of the
United States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the
Veterans Administration of the United States of America by Dr.
Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to
his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919;18
4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated
that he was married to Josefa Delgado.
The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children
of their own, they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia
and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the couple, were
what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an
illegitimate child,19 the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo
Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his
daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous
possession of that status from her birth in 1920 until her fathers demise. In fact,
Josefa Delgados obituary which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the
intervenor-respondent as one of their children. Also, her report card from the
University of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian.20
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no
interest in the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly
acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend that her right to compulsory
acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she cannot
claim voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she presented were not
the authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil Code.21
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado,
Guillermo Rustia filed a petition for the adoption22 of their ampun-
ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate,
legitimated, acknowledged natural children or natural children by legal
fiction."23 The petition was overtaken by his death on February 28, 1974.
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by
his sisters Marciana Rustia vda. deDamian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by
the children of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina
Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia,
Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda.24
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado,
filed the original petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the
"spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch
55.25 This petition was opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo
Rustia, namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-
Cruz;26 (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustias late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and
(3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was
grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other
claimants were barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate half-
blood relative Josefa Delgado.
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the
proceedings, claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of
Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the oppositors (respondents herein),
the motion was granted.
On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended
to state that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married but had
merely lived together as husband and wife.
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss
the petition in the RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned.
The motion was denied on the ground that the interests of the petitioners and the
other claimants remained in issue and should be properly threshed out upon
submission of evidence.
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her
sister, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as
administratrix of both estates.27 The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the
estate of the late Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated
elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby declared as the only legal heirs of the said
Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City of Manila on September 8, 1972,
and entitled to partition the same among themselves in accordance with the
proportions referred to in this Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and
only surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire
estate of the said decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and the other
parties hereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by
the late Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared
of no force and effect.
As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their
settlement [is] considered consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with
law, a single administrator therefor is both proper and necessary, and, as the
petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has established her right to the
appointment as administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby APPOINTS her
as the ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA
DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the
petitioner CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the
requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P500,000.00).
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease
and desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates, and is likewise
ordered to turn over to the appointed administratix all her collections of the
rentals and income due on the assets of the estates in question, including all
documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the petitioner
and appointed administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA,
immediately upon receipt of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required
to render an accounting of her actual administration of the estates in controversy
within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.28
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground
that the record on appeal was not filed on time.29 They then filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus30 which was dismissed by the Court of
Appeals.31 However, on motion for reconsideration and after hearing the parties
26
Persons 4th Exam Cases
oral arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to
oppositors appeal in the interest of substantial justice.32
In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the
Court of Appeals, on the ground that oppositors failure to file the record on
appeal within the reglementary period was a jurisdictional defect which nullified
the appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court allowed the continuance of the
appeal. The pertinent portion of our decision33 read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under
exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on
grounds of substantial justice.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial courts pronouncements as to
certain matters of substance, relating to the determination of the heirs of the
decedents and the party entitled to the administration of their estate, which were
to be raised in the appeal, but were barred absolutely by the denial of the record
on appeal upon too technical ground of late filing.
xxx xxx xxx
In this instance, private respondents intention to raise valid issues in the appeal
is apparent and should not have been construed as an attempt to delay or
prolong the administration proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
A review of the trial courts decision is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court
hereby AFFIRMS the Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for the APPROVAL of the private
respondents Record on Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal from the
Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial Courts May 11, 1990 decision.
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals34 partially set aside the trial courts
decision. Upon motion for reconsideration,35 the Court of Appeals amended its
earlier decision.36 The dispositive portion of the amended decision read:
With the further modification, our assailed decision
is RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently, the decision of the trial
court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is
hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Rustia to have been legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo
Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo)
entitled to partition among themselves the intestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in
accordance with the proportion referred to in this decision; 3.) the oppositors-
appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled
to partition his estate in accordance with the proportion referred to herein; and
4.) the intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the
late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as administratrix of his
estate.
The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in
relation to the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of
the oppositors-appellants upon his or her qualification and filing of the requisite
bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and
desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates and to turn over to
the appointed administrator all her collections of the rentals and incomes due on
the assets of the estates in question, including all documents, papers, records
and titles pertaining to such estates to the appointed administrator, immediately
upon notice of his qualification and posting of the requisite bond, and to render
an accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the
estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from notice of the
administrators qualification and posting of the bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr.
Guillermo Rustia on June 15, 1973 is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings to determine the extent of the shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas
and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by the said adjudication.
Hence, this recourse.
The issues for our resolution are:
1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and
Josefa Delgado;
2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado are;
3. who should be issued letters of administration.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which
courts are permitted to draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions are
classified into presumptions of law and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of
law are, in turn, either conclusive or disputable.37
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory
if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid
marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their
cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends
knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was such
that even the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa
Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply
lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make
much of the absence of a record of the contested marriage, the testimony of a
witness38 attesting that they were not married, and a baptismal certificate which
referred to Josefa Delgado as "Seorita" or unmarried woman.39
We are not persuaded.
First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage,
its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place. 40 Once the
presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support
thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but
must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the
certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, 41 the
passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia,42 the declaration under oath of no
less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado43 and the titles
to the properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado,"
more than adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are public
documents which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.44 No clear
and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of
the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners own witness whose testimony they
primarily relied upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia
had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived
together as husband and wife." This again could not but strengthen the
presumption of marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive proof only of the baptism
administered by the priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity
of the declarations and statements contained therein,46 such as the alleged
single or unmarried ("Seorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand
in its preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and
Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward
legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are
presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if
the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living in
constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur
pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.47
The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status
of the cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first
be addressed.
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable.
Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory
that no contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn them.48On the other
hand, disputable presumptions, one of which is the presumption of marriage, can
be relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and
Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the
disputable presumption of marriage even in the face of such countervailing
evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon
Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgados and Caridad
Concepcions Partida de Casamiento49 identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa
Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado).50
All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the
rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were
never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations
with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings
Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all
surnamed Delgado,51 were her natural children.52
Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:
Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then
X and Y would be natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can
they succeed each other reciprocally?
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and
legitimate children of the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie
of blood between them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab
intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from
that of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a
legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that
succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters
are only of the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal
successions between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the
case under consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference in
category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such
difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even
if begotten with different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the
law, just like legitimate children of half-blood relation. We submit, therefore, that
the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should be
applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive
double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are either of the
full blood or of the half-blood, they shall share equally.53
Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-
blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all
illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled
to inherit from Josefa Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews,
nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of
the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place
only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces).
Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and
grandnieces.54 Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are
entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their
children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They
have a vested right to participate in the inheritance.55 The records not being clear
on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving
brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death.
27
Persons 4th Exam Cases
Together with Guillermo Rustia,56 they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado
in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:57
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or their children to the other one-half.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not
have validly adjudicated Josefas estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedents entire estate to
himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the
decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are
represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the
purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the
estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in
the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in
an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to
himself the estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register
of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child58 of
Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon
proof of an admission or recognition of paternity.59 She, however, claimed the
status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the
death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new
Civil Code that was in effect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate
children absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, however,
later relaxed in the new Civil Code which granted certain successional rights to
illegitimate children but only on condition that they were first recognized or
acknowledged by the parent.
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary. 60 Recognition
is compulsory in any of the following cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the
offense coincides more or less with that of the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of
the alleged father (or mother)61 by the direct acts of the latter or of his
family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother
cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the
defendant is his father. 62
On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing.63
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory
recognition through the open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate
child from her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia.
However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which
she could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts.64 Furthermore,
any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the
lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent.65 On the death of
either, the action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed.66 In this case,
intervenor Guillermas right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed
upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillermas second ground) must likewise fail.
An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a
genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This
includes a public instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be
his.67 Did intervenors report card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa
Delgados obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings
under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa
Guillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.
appears there as intervenors parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision
participation in its preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24,
Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado which 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following
was published in the Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that published modifications:
obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have 1. Guillermo Rustias June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is
been admitted as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, hereby ANNULLED.
in the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the 2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the
newspaper clipping of the obituary. The failure to present the original signed intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to
manuscript was fatal to intervenors claim. (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgados full- or half-siblings who
who was never adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death.
adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and was Josefa Delgados grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from
dismissed upon the latters death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and her estate. In this connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to
the Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are
therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. We quote: entitled to share in her estate.
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two 3. Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half share of Josefa
persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and Delgados estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda.
filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall
procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this be per capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who
jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per
establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out, stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and
otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective shares
presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its shall pertain to their estates.
existence.68 4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of
Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota
Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun- Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee from among the heirs
ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their qualification
Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants, and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may be determined
illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to by the trial court.
the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia No pronouncement as to costs.
are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters,69 nieces and nephews.70 SO ORDERED.
Entitlement To Letters Of Administration
An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate
estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an
order of preference in the appointment of an administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is
named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust,
or fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such
surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed,
if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if
the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after
the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
the administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted
to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may
be granted to such other person as the court may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest
in the estate of the one to be appointed.71 The order of preference does not rule
out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in
the management of the estates,72 a situation which obtains here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of
Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces
28
Persons 4th Exam Cases
TEOFISTO I. VERCELES, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIA CLARISSA POSADA, in her own behalf, and as mother of
minor VERNA AIZA POSADA, CONSTANTINO POSADA and
FRANCISCA POSADA, Respondents.
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the Decision 1 dated May
30, 2003 and the Resolution2 dated August 27, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50557. The appellate court had affirmed
with modification the Judgment3 dated January 4, 1995 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 42, in Civil Case No.
1401. The RTC held petitioner liable to pay monthly support to Verna
Aiza Posada since her birth on September 23, 1987 as well as moral
and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.
The facts in this case as found by the lower courts are as follows:
Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada (Clarissa), a young lass from the
barrio of Pandan, Catanduanes, sometime in 1986 met a close family
friend, petitioner Teofisto I. Verceles, mayor of Pandan. He then called
on the Posadas and at the end of the visit, offered Clarissa a job.
Clarissa accepted petitioners offer and worked as a casual employee
in the mayors office starting on September 1, 1986. From November
10 to 15 in 1986, with companions Aster de Quiros, Pat del Valle, Jaime
and Jocelyn Vargas, she accompanied petitioner to Legaspi City to
attend a seminar on town planning. They stayed at the Mayon Hotel.
On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., petitioner fetched
Clarissa from "My Brothers Place" where the seminar was being held.
Clarissa avers that he told her that they would have lunch at Mayon
Hotel with their companions who had gone ahead. When they reached
the place her companions were nowhere. After petitioner ordered food,
he started making amorous advances on her. She panicked, ran and
closeted herself inside a comfort room where she stayed until someone
knocked. She said she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the
mayor, she kept the incident to herself. She went on as casual
employee. One of her tasks was following-up barangay road and
maintenance projects.
On December 22, 1986, on orders of petitioner, she went to Virac,
Catanduanes, to follow up funds for barangay projects. At around
11:00 a.m. the same day, she went to Catanduanes Hotel on
instructions of petitioner who asked to be briefed on the progress of her
mission. They met at the lobby and he led her upstairs because he said
he wanted the briefing done at the restaurant at the upper floor.
Instead, however, petitioner opened a hotel room door, led her in, and
suddenly embraced her, as he told her that he was unhappy with his
wife and would "divorce" her anytime. He also claimed he could appoint
her as a municipal development coordinator. She succumbed to his
advances. But again she kept the incident to herself.
Sometime in January 1987, when she missed her menstruation, she
said she wrote petitioner that she feared she was pregnant. In another
letter in February 1987, she told him she was pregnant. In a handwritten
letter dated February 4, 1987, he replied:
My darling Chris,
Should you become pregnant even unexpectedly, I should have no
regret, because I love you and you love me.
Let us rejoice a common responsibility you and I shall take care of it
and let him/her see the light of this beautiful world.
We know what to do to protect our honor and integrity.
Just relax and be happy, if true.
With all my love,
Ninoy
2/4/874
Clarissa explained petitioner used an alias "Ninoy" and addressed her
as "Chris," probably because of their twenty-five (25)-year age gap. In
court, she identified petitioners penmanship which she claims she was
familiar with as an employee in his office.
Clarissa presented three other handwritten letters 5 sent to her by
petitioner, two of which were in his letterhead as mayor of Pandan. She
also presented the pictures6 petitioner gave her of his youth and as a
public servant, all bearing his handwritten notations at the back.
Clarissa avers that on March 3, 1987, petitioner, aware of her
pregnancy, handed her a letter and 2,000 pocket money to go to
Manila and to tell her parents that she would enroll in a CPA review
course or look for a job. In June 1987, petitioner went to see her in
Manila and gave her another 2,000 for her delivery. When her parents
learned of her pregnancy, sometime in July, her father fetched her and
brought her back to Pandan. On September 23, 1987, 7 she gave birth
to a baby girl, Verna Aiza Posada.
Clarissas mother, Francisca, corroborated Clarissas story. She said
they learned of their daughters pregnancy through her husbands
cousin. She added that she felt betrayed by petitioner and shamed by
her daughters pregnancy.
The Posadas filed a Complaint for Damages coupled with
Support Pendente Lite before the RTC, Virac, Catanduanes against
petitioner on October 23, 1987.8
On January 4, 1995, the trial court issued a judgment in their favor, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the [respondents] and against the [petitioner] and ordering
the latter:
1. to pay a monthly support of 2,000.00 to Verna Aiza
Posada since her birth on September 23, 1987 as he was
proved to be the natural father of the above-named minor as
shown by the exhibits and testimonies of the [respondents];
2. to pay the amount of 30,000.00 as moral damages;
3. to pay the amount of 30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. to pay the sum of 10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
5. to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.9
Verceles appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment
with modification, specifying the party to whom the damages was
awarded. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with modification
by ordering [petitioner] Teofisto I. Verceles:
1. To pay a monthly support of 2,000.00 to Verna Aiza
Posada from her birth on September 23, 1987.
2. To pay [respondent] Maria Clarissa Posada the sum of
15,000.00 as moral damages and [P]15,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
3. To pay [respondents] spouses Constantino and Francisca
Posada the sum of 15,000.00 as moral damages and
15,000.00 as exemplary damages.
4. To pay each of the said three [respondents] 10,000.00 as
attorneys fees; and
5. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner now presents the following issues for resolution:
I.
WAS THERE ANY EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO PROVE THAT
APPELLANT VERCELES WAS THE FATHER OF THE CHILD?
II.
WOULD THIS ACTION FOR DAMAGES PROSPER?
III.
WOULD THE RTC COURT HAVE ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER
THIS ISSUE OF APPELLANTS PATERNITY OF THE CHILD, WHICH
IS MADE COLLATERAL TO THIS ACTION FOR DAMAGES?11
In sum, the pertinent issues in this case are: (1) whether or not paternity
and filiation can be resolved in an action for damages with
support pendente lite; (2) whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza
Posada as the illegitimate child of petitioner was proven; and (3)
whether or not respondents are entitled to damages.
In his Memorandum, petitioner asserts that the fact of paternity and
filiation of Verna Aiza Posada has not been duly established or proved
in the proceedings; that the award for damages and attorneys fees has
no basis; and that the issue of filiation should be resolved in a direct
and not a collateral action.
Petitioner argues he never signed the birth certificate of Verna Aiza
Posada as father and that it was respondent Clarissa who placed his
name on the birth certificate as father without his consent. He further
contends the alleged love letters he sent to Clarissa are not admissions
of paternity but mere expressions of concern and advice. 12 As to the
award for damages, petitioner argues Clarissa could not have suffered
moral damages because she was in pari delicto, being a willing
participant in the "consensual carnal act" between them. 13 In support of
his argument that the issue on filiation should have been resolved in a
separate action, petitioner cited the case of Rosales v. Castillo
Rosales14 where we held that the legitimacy of a child which is
controversial can only be resolved in a direct action.15
On the other hand, respondents in their Memorandum maintain that the
Court of Appeals committed no error in its decision. They reiterate that
Clarissas clear narration of the circumstances on "how she was
deflowered" by petitioner, the love letters and pictures given by
petitioner to Clarissa, the corroborating testimony of Clarissas mother,
the fact that petitioner proffered no countervailing evidence, are
preponderant evidence of paternity. They cited the case of De Jesus v.
Syquia16 where we held that a conceived child can be acknowledged
because this is an act favorable to the child. 17 They also argue that
damages should be awarded because petitioner inveigled Clarissa to
succumb to his sexual advances.18
29
Persons 4th Exam Cases

Could paternity and filiation be resolved in an action for damages? On presented by respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies,
this score, we find petitioners stance unmeritorious. The caption is not to us, are convincing, and irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is,
determinative of the nature of a pleading. In a string of cases we made indeed, petitioners illegitimate child.
the following rulings. It is not the caption but the facts alleged which Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself
give meaning to a pleading. Courts are called upon to pierce the form presented no evidence of his own. His bare denials are telling. Well-
and go into the substance thereof.19 In determining the nature of an settled is the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and
action, it is not the caption, but the averments in the petition and the convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no
character of the relief sought, that are controlling. 20 weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the
A perusal of the Complaint before the RTC shows that although its testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. 23
caption states "Damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite," We, however, cannot rule that respondents are entitled to damages.
Clarissas averments therein, her meeting with petitioner, his offer of a Article 221924of the Civil Code which states moral damages may be
job, his amorous advances, her seduction, their trysts, her pregnancy, recovered in cases of seduction is inapplicable in this case because
birth of her child, his letters, her demand for support for her child, all Clarissa was already an adult at the time she had an affair with
clearly establish a case for recognition of paternity. We have held that petitioner.
the due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a Neither can her parents be entitled to damages. Besides, there is
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, nothing in law or jurisprudence that entitles the parents of a consenting
a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further adult who begets a love child to damages. Respondents Constantino
court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just and Francisca Posada have not cited any law or jurisprudence to justify
a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition awarding damages to them.
that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. 21 We, however, affirm the grant of attorneys fees in consonance with
The letters of petitioner marked as Exhibits "A" to "D" are declarations Article 2208 (2)25 and (11)26 of the New Civil Code.
that lead nowhere but to the conclusion that he sired Verna Aiza. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated May 30, 2003 and the
Although petitioner used an alias in these letters, the similarity of the Resolution dated August 27, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
penmanship in these letters vis the annotation at the back of CV No. 50557 are AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the
petitioners fading photograph as a youth is unmistakable. Even an award of moral damages and exemplary damages be DELETED.
inexperienced eye will come to the conclusion that they were all written SO ORDERED.
by one and the same person, petitioner, as found by the courts a quo.
We also note that in his Memorandum, petitioner admitted his affair with
Clarissa, the exchange of love letters between them, and his giving her
money during her pregnancy. 22
Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code are the rules for establishing
filiation. They are as follows:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or
a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall
be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in
the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article
173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of
Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime
of the alleged parent.
The letters, one of which is quoted above, are private handwritten
instruments of petitioner which establish Verna Aizas filiation under
Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the array of evidence
30
Persons 4th Exam Cases
JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA
CRUZ AQUINO, represented by JENIE SANJUAN DELA CRUZ,
Petitioners,
Versus
RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar
of Antipolo City,
Respondent.
For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie
San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old Christian Dominique
Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage. They resided in the house of
Dominiques parents Domingo B. Aquino and Raquel Sto. Tomas
Aquino at Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal.
On September 4, 2005, Dominique died.[1] After almost two
months, or on November 2, 2005, Jenie, who continued to live with
Dominiques parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child
Christian Dela Cruz Aquino at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo
City.
Jenie applied for registration of the childs birth, using
Dominiques surname Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil
Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the
childs Certificate of Live Birth,[2] Affidavit to Use the Surname of the
Father[3] (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and Affidavit of
Acknowledgment executed by Dominiques father Domingo Butch
Aquino.[4] Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime of
Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child,
and that his paternity had never been questioned. Jenie attached to the
AUSF a document entitled AUTOBIOGRAPHY which Dominique,
during his lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting, the pertinent portions
of which read:
AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T.
AUTOBIOGRAPHY
IM CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO.
TOMAS AQUINO, 19 YEARS OF AGE TURNING
20 THIS COMING OCTOBER 31, 2005.[5] I RESIDE
AT PULANG-LUPA STREET BRGY.
DULUMBAYAN, TERESA, RIZAL. I AM THE
YOUNGEST IN OUR FAMILY. I HAVE ONE
BROTHER NAMED JOSEPH BUTCH STO.
TOMAS AQUINO. MY FATHERS NAME IS
DOMINGO BUTCH AQUINO AND MY MOTHERS
NAME IS RAQUEL STO. TOMAS AQUINO. x x x.
xxxx
AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED
JENIE DELA CRUZ. WE MET EACH OTHER IN
OUR HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST
WE BECAME GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE FELL
IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE
BECAME GOOD COUPLES. AND AS OF
NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE
LIVE TOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE NOW. THATS
ALL.[6] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By letter dated November 11, 2005,[7] the City Civil Registrar
of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia (respondent), denied Jenies
application for registration of the childs name in this wise:
7. Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series
of 2004 (Implementing Rules and Regulations
of Republic Act No. 9255 [An Act Allowing
Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of
their Father, Amending for the Purpose, Article
176 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
Known as the Family Code of the Philippines])
provides that:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the
Surname of the Father
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the
surname of the father if a
public document is
executed by the father,
either at the back of the
Certificate of Live Birth or in
a separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made
through a private
handwritten instrument, the
child shall use the surname
of the father, provided the
registration is supported by
the following documents:
a. AUSF[8]
b. Consent of the child, if 18
years old and over at
the time of the filing of
the document.
c. Any two of the following
documents showing
clearly the paternity
between the father
and the child:
1. Employment records
2. SSS/GSIS records
3. Insurance
4. Certification of membership in any
organization
5. Statement of Assets and Liability
6. Income Tax Return (ITR)
In summary, the child cannot use the surname of
his father because he was born out of wedlock and
the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and
has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity
to the child (either through the back of Municipal
Form No. 102 Affidavit of
Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity or the
Authority to Use the Surname of the Father).
(Underscoring supplied)
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint [9] for
injunction/registration of name against respondent before
the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, docketed as SCA Case No.
06-539, which was raffled to Branch 73 thereof. The complaint alleged
that, inter alia, the denial of registration of the childs name is a violation
of his right to use the surname of his deceased father under Article 176
of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9255,[10] which provides:
Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use
the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code.
However, illegitimate children may use the surname
of their father if their filiation has been expressly
recognized by the father through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register, or when an
admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the
father. Provided, the father has the right to institute
an action before the regular courts to prove non-
filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the
legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
They maintained that the Autobiography executed by Dominique
constitutes an admission of paternity in a private handwritten
instrument within the contemplation of the above-quoted provision of
law.
For failure to file a responsive pleading or answer despite
service of summons, respondent was declared in default.
Jenie thereupon presented evidence ex-parte. She testified
on the circumstances of her common-law relationship with Dominique
and affirmed her declarations in her AUSF that during his lifetime, he
had acknowledged his yet unborn child.[11] She offered Dominiques
handwritten Autobiography (Exhibit A) as her documentary evidence-
31
Persons 4th Exam Cases
in-chief.[12] Dominiques lone brother, Joseph Butch S.T. Aquino, also
testified, corroborating Jenies declarations. [13]
By Decision[14] of April 25, 2007, the trial court dismissed the
complaint for lack of cause of action as the Autobiography
was unsigned, citing paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 (Definition of Terms)
of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series of 2004 (the Rules and
Regulations Governing the Implementation of R.A. 9255) which
defines private handwritten document through which a father may
acknowledge an illegitimate child as follows:
2.2 Private handwritten instrument an
instrument executed in the handwriting of the father
and duly signed by him where he expressly
recognizes paternity to the child. (Underscoring
supplied)
The trial court held that even if Dominique was the author of the
handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express
recognition of paternity.
Hence, this direct resort to the Court via Petition for Review
on Certiorari raising this purely legal issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED
HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE
DECEASED FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN
DELA CRUZ CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A
RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY IN A PRIVATE
HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT WITHIN THE
CONTEMPLATION OF ARTICLE 176 OF THE
FAMILY CODE, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 9255,
WHICH ENTITLES THE SAID MINOR TO USE HIS
FATHERS SURNAME.[15] (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family Code, as
amended, does not expressly require that the private handwritten
instrument containing the putative fathers admission of paternity must
be signed by him. They add that the deceaseds handwritten
Autobiography, though unsigned by him, is sufficient, for the
requirement in the above-quoted paragraph 2.2 of the Administrative
Order that the admission/recognition must be duly signed by the father
is void as it unduly expanded the earlier-quoted provision of Article 176
of the Family Code.[16]
Petitioners further contend that the trial court erred in not
finding that Dominiques handwritten Autobiography contains a clear
and unmistakable recognition of the childs paternity. [17]
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
submits that respondents position, as affirmed by the trial court, is in
consonance with the law and thus prays for the dismissal of the
petition. It further submits that Dominiques Autobiography merely
acknowledged Jenies pregnancy but not [his] paternity of the child she
was carrying in her womb.[18]
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255,
permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the
latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through
the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through
an admission made in a public or private handwritten
instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in
itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the childs paternity;
hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary. [19]
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not,
indeed, explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument
acknowledging the childs paternity must be signed by the putative
father. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction with
related provisions of the Family Code which require that recognition by
the father must bear his signature, thus:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may
establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children
is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through
a written instrument must affix his signature thereon is clearly implied
in Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1,
Series of 2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not unduly
expand the import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioners.
In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to
hold that Dominiques Autobiography, though unsigned by
him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.
First, Dominique died about two months prior to the childs
birth. Second, the relevant matters in the Autobiography,
unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts
culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered. [20] Third, Jenies
testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of
Dominiques father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother
Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the
registration of the questioned recognition of the child. These
circumstances indicating Dominiques paternity of the child give life to
his statements in his Autobiography that JENIE DELA CRUZ is
MY WIFE as WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER and NOW SHE
IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER.
In Herrera v. Alba,[21] the Court summarized the laws, rules,
and jurisprudence on establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant part:
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence
Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family
Code provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may
establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate
children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in
the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence,
the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on
pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130
provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about
pedigree. The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the
pedigree of another person related to him by birth
or marriage, may be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the
32
Persons 4th Exam Cases
relationship between the two persons is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration. The
word "pedigree" includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when
and the places where these facts occurred, and the
names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of
family history intimately connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition
regarding pedigree. The reputation or tradition
existing in a family previous to the controversy, in
respect to the pedigree of any one of its members,
may be received in evidence if the witness testifying
thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or
other family books or charts, engraving on rings,
family portraits and the like, may be received as
evidence of pedigree.
This Court's rulings further specify what
incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to
establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner
often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still
has to be resolved by such conventional evidence
as the relevant incriminating verbal and written
acts by the putative father. Under Article 278 of
the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a
parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of
filiation must be made by the putative father
himself and the writing must be the writing of
the putative father. A notarial agreement to
support a child whose filiation is admitted by the
putative father was considered acceptable
evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be a good
father to the child and pictures of the putative father
cuddling the child on various occasions, together
with the certificate of live birth, proved filiation.
However, a student permanent record, a written
consent to a father's operation, or a marriage
contract where the putative father gave consent,
cannot be taken as authentic writing. Standing
alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family
pictures are sufficient to establish filiation.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements
in Dominiques Autobiography have been made and written by
him. Taken together with the other relevant facts extant herein that
Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as
common-law spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents house
in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant when
Dominique died on September 4, 2005; and about two months after his in his Certificate of Live Birth, and record the same in the Register of
death, Jenie gave birth to the child they sufficiently establish that the Births.
child of Jenie is Dominiques.
SO ORDERED.
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees
it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the requirement of affixing
the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten
instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or
illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece
of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict
compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the
acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument
is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices
that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and
handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative
of such other evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the
paramount consideration in resolving questions affecting him.[22] Article
3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which
the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities
or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child
shall be a primary consideration.[23] (Underscoring
supplied)
It is thus (t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule
on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially
of illegitimate children x x x.[24] Too, (t)he State as parens
patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation
and other conditions prejudicial to their development.[25]
In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears
the stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner minor childs best interests to
allow him to bear the surname of the now deceased Dominique and
enter it in his birth certificate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The City Civil
Registrar of Antipolo City is DIRECTED to immediately enter the
surname of the late Christian Dominique Sto.
Tomas Aquino as the surname of petitioner minor Christian dela Cruz
33
Persons 4th Exam Cases
BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO,
Petitioner,
- versus -
ARHBENCEL ANN LOPEZ, represented by her mother ARACELI
LOPEZ,
Respondent.
Respondent Arhbencel Ann Lopez (Arhbencel), represented by her mother
Araceli Lopez (Araceli), filed a Complaint[1] with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Caloocan City for recognition and support against Ben-Hur
Nepomuceno (petitioner).
Born on June 8, 1999, Arhbencel claimed to have been begotten
out of an extramarital affair of petitioner with Araceli; that petitioner refused
to affix his signature on her Certificate of Birth; and that, by a handwritten
note dated August 7, 1999, petitioner nevertheless obligated himself to give
her financial support in the amount of P1,500 on the 15th and 30th days of
each month beginning August 15, 1999.
Arguing that her filiation to petitioner was established by the
handwritten note, Arhbencel prayed that petitioner be ordered to: (1)
recognize her as his child, (2) give her support pendente lite in the
increased amount of P8,000 a month, and (3) give her adequate monthly
financial support until she reaches the age of majority.
Petitioner countered that Araceli had not proven that he was the father of
Arhbencel; and that he was only forced to execute the handwritten note on
account of threats coming from the National Peoples Army.[2]
By Order of July 4, 2001,[3] Branch 130 of the Caloocan RTC, on
the basis of petitioners handwritten note which it treated as contractual
support since the issue of Arhbencels filiation had yet to be determined
during the hearing on the merits, granted Arhbencels prayer for
support pendente lite in the amount of P3,000 a month.
After Arhbencel rested her case, petitioner filed a demurrer to
evidence which the trial court granted by Order dated June 7,
2006,[4] whereupon the case was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
The trial court held that, among other things, Arhbencels
Certificate of Birth was not prima facie evidence of her filiation to petitioner
as it did not bear petitioners signature; that petitioners handwritten
undertaking to provide support did not contain a categorical
acknowledgment that Arhbencel is his child; and that there was no showing
that petitioner performed any overt act of acknowledgment of Arhbencel as
his illegitimate child after the execution of the note.
On appeal by Arhbencel, the Court of Appeals, by Decision
of July 20, 2007,[5] reversed the trial courts decision, declared Arhbencel to
be petitioners illegitimate daughter and accordingly ordered petitioner to
give Arhbencel financial support in the increased amount of P4,000 every
15th and 30th days of the month, or a total of P8,000 a month.
The appellate court found that from petitioners payment of
Aracelis hospital bills when she gave birth to Arhbencel and his subsequent
commitment to provide monthly financial support, the only logical
conclusion to be drawn was that he was Arhbencels father; that petitioner
merely acted in bad faith in omitting a statement of paternity in his
handwritten undertaking to provide financial support; and that the amount
of P8,000 a month was reasonable for Arhbencels subsistence and not
burdensome for petitioner in view of his income.
His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution
dated January 3, 2008,[6] petitioner comes before this Court through the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari.[7]
Petitioner contends that nowhere in the documentary evidence
presented by Araceli is an explicit statement made by him that he is the
father of Arhbencel; that absent recognition or acknowledgment, illegitimate
children are not entitled to support from the putative parent; that the
supposed payment made by him of Aracelis hospital bills was neither
alleged in the complaint nor proven during the trial; and that Arhbencels
claim of paternity and filiation was not established by clear and convincing
evidence.
Arhbencel avers in her Comment that petitioner raises questions
of fact which the appellate court had already addressed, along with the
issues raised in the present petition.[8]
The petition is impressed with merit.
[9]
The relevant provisions of the Family Code that treat of the right
to support are Articles 194 to 196, thus:
Article 194. Support compromises everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be
supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall
include his schooling or training for some profession,
trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.
Transportation shall include expenses in going to and
from school, or to and from place of work.
Article 195. Subject to the provisions of the
succeeding articles, the following are obliged to
support each other to the whole extent set forth in the
preceding article:
1. The spouses;
2. Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
3. Parents and their legitimate children and the
legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;
4. Parents and their illegitimate children and the
legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and
5. Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of the full or
half-blood.
Article 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately
related, whether of the full or half-blood, are likewise
bound to support each other to the full extent set forth
in Article 194, except only when the need for support
of the brother or sister, being of age, is due to a cause
imputable to the claimant's fault or
negligence. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Arhbencels demand for support, being based on her claim of filiation to
petitioner as his illegitimate daughter, falls under Article 195(4). As such,
her entitlement to support from petitioner is dependent on the determination
of her filiation.
Herrera v. Alba[10] summarizes the laws, rules, and jurisprudence
on establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant part as follows:
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence
Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as
follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or
a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree.
The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The
act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person
related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in
evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and
the relationship between the two persons is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration. The word
"pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy,
birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places
where these facts occurred, and the names of the
relatives. It embraces also facts of family history
intimately connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding
pedigree. The reputation or tradition existing in a family
previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree
of any one of its members, may be received in
evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a
34
Persons 4th Exam Cases

member of the family, either by consanguinity or
affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or
charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the like,
may be received as evidence of pedigree.
This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating
acts are acceptable as evidence to establish
filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites,
we stated that the issue of paternity still has to be
resolved by such conventional evidence as the
relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by
the putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil
Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made
in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective,
the claim of filiation must be made by the putative
father himself and the writing must be the writing of the
putative father. A notarial agreement to support a
child whose filiation is admitted by the putative
father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters
to the mother vowing to be a good father to the child
and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on
various occasions, together with the certificate of live
birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent
record, a written consent to a father's operation, or a
marriage contract where the putative father gave
consent, cannot be taken as authentic
writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism
nor family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation
in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.
The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial
agreement to support the child referred to in Herrera. For it is not even
notarized. And Herrera instructs that the notarial agreement must be
accompanied by the putative fathers admission of filiation to be an
acceptable evidence of filiation. Here, however, not only has petitioner not
admitted filiation through contemporaneous actions. He has consistently
denied it.
The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a
copy of her Certificate of Birth,[11] has no probative value to establish filiation
to petitioner, the latter not having signed the same.
At bottom, all that Arhbencel really has is petitioners handwritten
undertaking to provide financial support to her which, without more, fails to
establish her claim of filiation. The Court is mindful that the best interests of
the child in cases involving paternity and filiation should be advanced. It is,
however, just as mindful of the disturbance that unfounded paternity suits
cause to the privacy and peace of the putative fathers legitimate family.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals
Decision of July 20, 2007 is SET ASIDE. The Order dated June 7, 2006 of
Branch 130 of the Caloocan City RTC dismissing the complaint for
insufficiency of evidence is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

In the present case, Arhbencel relies, in the main, on the handwritten note
executed by petitioner which reads:

Manila, Aug. 7, 1999

I, Ben-Hur C. Nepomuceno, hereby undertake to give

and provide financial support in the amount
of P1,500.00 every fifteen and thirtieth day of each
month for a total of P3,000.00 a month starting Aug.
15, 1999, to Ahrbencel Ann Lopez, presently in the
custody of her mother Araceli Lopez without the
necessity of demand, subject to adjustment later
depending on the needs of the child and my income.

The abovequoted note does not contain any statement

whatsoever about Arhbencels filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not within
the ambit of Article 172(2) vis--vis Article 175 of the Family Code which

35
Persons 4th Exam Cases
CHARLES GOTARDO, Petitioner,
vs.
DIVINA BULING, Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR.,*
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari, 1 filed by petitioner Charles
Gotardo, to challenge the March 5, 2004 decision2 and the July 27, 2004
resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA GR CV No. 76326. The CA
decision ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his
minor son, Gliffze 0. Buling. The CA resolution denied the petitioner's
subsequent motion for reconsideration.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, for
compulsory recognition and support pendente lite, claiming that the petitioner is
the father of her child Gliffze.4
In his answer, the petitioner denied the imputed paternity of Gliffze. 5 For the
parties failure to amicably settle the dispute, the RTC terminated the pre-trial
proceedings.6 Trial on the merits ensued.
The respondent testified for herself and presented Rodulfo Lopez as witness.
Evidence for the respondent showed that she met the petitioner on December 1,
1992 at the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, Maasin, Southern Leyte
branch where she had been hired as a casual employee, while the petitioner
worked as accounting supervisor.7 The petitioner started courting the respondent
in the third week of December 1992 and they became sweethearts in the last
week of January 1993.8 The petitioner gave the respondent greeting cards on
special occasions, such as on Valentines Day and her birthday; she reciprocated
his love and took care of him when he was ill.9
Sometime in September 1993, the petitioner started intimate sexual relations
with the respondent in the formers rented room in the boarding house managed
by Rodulfo, the respondents uncle, on Tomas Oppus St., Agbao, Maasin,
Southern Leyte.10 The petitioner rented the room from March 1, 1993 to August
30, 1994.11 The sexual encounters occurred twice a month and became more
frequent in June 1994; eventually, on August 8, 1994, the respondent found out
that she was pregnant.12 When told of the pregnancy, the petitioner was happy
and made plans to marry the respondent.13 They in fact applied for a marriage
license.14 The petitioner even inquired about the costs of a wedding reception
and the bridal gown.15 Subsequently, however, the petitioner backed out of the
wedding plans.16
The respondent responded by filing a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of
Maasin, Southern Leyte for damages against the petitioner for breach of promise
to marry.17 Later, however, the petitioner and the respondent amicably settled
the case.18
The respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995.19 When the
petitioner did not show up and failed to provide support to Gliffze, the respondent
sent him a letter on July 24, 1995 demanding recognition of and support for their
child.20 When the petitioner did not answer the demand, the respondent filed her
complaint for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite.21
The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He denied the
imputed paternity,22 claiming that he first had sexual contact with the respondent
in the first week of August 1994 and she could not have been pregnant for twelve
(12) weeks (or three (3) months) when he was informed of the pregnancy on
September 15, 1994.23
During the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the respondents motion,24 granted
a 2,000.00 monthly child support, retroactive from March 1995.25
THE RTC RULING
In its June 25, 2002 decision, the RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency
of evidence proving Gliffzes filiation. It found the respondents testimony
inconsistent on the question of when she had her first sexual contact with the
petitioner, i.e., "September 1993" in her direct testimony while "last week of
January 1993" during her cross-testimony, and her reason for engaging in sexual
contact even after she had refused the petitioners initial marriage proposal. It
ordered the respondent to return the amount of support pendente
lite erroneously awarded, and to pay 10,000.00 as attorneys fees.26
The respondent appealed the RTC ruling to the CA.27
THE CA RULING
In its March 5, 2004 decision, the CA departed from the RTC's appreciation of
the respondents testimony, concluding that the latter merely made an honest
mistake in her understanding of the questions of the petitioners counsel. It noted
that the petitioner and the respondent had sexual relationship even before
August 1994; that the respondent had only one boyfriend, the petitioner, from
January 1993 to August 1994; and that the petitioners allegation that the
respondent had previous relationships with other men remained
unsubstantiated. The CA consequently set aside the RTC decision and ordered
the petitioner to recognize his minor son Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC order
granting a 2,000.00 monthly child support.28
When the CA denied29 the petitioners motion for reconsideration,30 the petitioner
filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
THE PETITION
The petitioner argues that the CA committed a reversible error in rejecting the
RTCs appreciation of the respondents testimony, and that the evidence on
record is insufficient to prove paternity.
THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENT
The respondent submits that the CA correctly explained that the inconsistency in
the respondents testimony was due to an incorrect appreciation of the questions
asked, and that the record is replete with evidence proving that the petitioner was
her lover and that they had several intimate sexual encounters during their
relationship, resulting in her pregnancy and Gliffzes birth on March 9, 1995.
THE ISSUE
The sole issue before us is whether the CA committed a reversible error when it
set aside the RTCs findings and ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide
legal support to his minor son Gliffze.
OUR RULING
We do not find any reversible error in the CAs ruling.
We have recognized that "[f]iliation proceedings are usually filed not just to
adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity,
such as citizenship, support (as in this case) or inheritance. [In paternity cases,
the burden of proof] is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the
biological father of the child."31
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.32 We have held that such other proof of one's filiation may be a "baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which his name has been
entered, common reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the
[testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130
of the Rules of Court."33
In Herrera v. Alba,34 we stressed that there are four significant procedural
aspects of a traditional paternity action that parties have to face: a prima
facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical
resemblance between the putative father and the child.35 We explained that
a prima facie case exists if a woman declares supported by corroborative
proof that she had sexual relations with the putative father; at this point, the
burden of evidence shifts to the putative father.36 We explained further that the
two affirmative defenses available to the putative father are: (1) incapability of
sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or impotency, or
(2) that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of
conception.37
In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is
the putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually
involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her conception.38Rodulfo
corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the respondent had intimate
relationship.39
On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual encounters with
the respondent, only that it occurred on a much later date than the respondent
asserted, such that it was physically impossible for the respondent to have been
three (3) months pregnant already in September 1994 when he was informed of
the pregnancy.40 However, the petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of
infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot be
given credence for lack of evidentiary support. The petitioners denial cannot
overcome the respondents clear and categorical assertions.
The petitioner, as the RTC did, made much of the variance between the
respondents direct testimony regarding their first sexual contact as "sometime
in September 1993" and her cross-testimony when she stated that their first
sexual contact was "last week of January 1993," as follows:
ATTY. GO CINCO:
When did the defendant, according to you, start courting you?
A Third week of December 1992.
Q And you accepted him?
A Last week of January 1993.
Q And by October you already had your sexual intercourse?
A Last week of January 1993.
COURT: What do you mean by accepting?
A I accepted his offer of love.41
We find that the contradictions are for the most part more apparent than real,
having resulted from the failure of the respondent to comprehend the question
posed, but this misunderstanding was later corrected and satisfactorily
explained. Indeed, when confronted for her contradictory statements, the
respondent explained that that portion of the transcript of stenographic notes was
incorrect and she had brought it to the attention of Atty. Josefino Go Cinco (her
former counsel) but the latter took no action on the matter.42
Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his testimony
must be considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in
deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and to anchor a
conclusion based on these parts. "In ascertaining the facts established by a
witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and redirect examinations must
be calibrated and considered."43 Evidently, the totality of the respondent's
testimony positively and convincingly shows that no real inconsistency exists.
The respondent has consistently asserted that she started intimate sexual
relations with the petitioner sometime in September 1993.44
Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a
parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate.45 Support
consists of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity
of the family.46 Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no
final judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in
proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the
recipient.47 It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the
reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or
means of the person obliged to support.48
In this case, we sustain the award of 2,000.00 monthly child support, without
prejudice to the filing of the proper motion in the RTC for the determination of
any support in arrears, considering the needs of the child, Gliffze, during the
pendency of this case.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. The March 5,
2004 decision and the July 27, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA GR
CV No. 76326 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
36
Persons 4th Exam Cases
NARCISO SALAS, Petitioners, v.ANNABELLE
MATUSALEM, Respondent.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse
and set aside the Decision1dated July 18, 2006 and Resolution2 dated October
19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64379.
The factual antecedents:
On May 26, 1995, Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a complaint for
Support/Damages against Narciso Salas (petitioner) in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) ofCabanatuan City (Civil Case No. 2124-AF).
Respondent claimed that petitioner is. the father of her son Christian Paulo
Salas who was born on December 28, 1994. Petitioner, already 56 years old at
the time, enticed her as she was then only 24 years old, making her believe
that he is a widower. Petitioner rented an apartment where respondent stayed
and shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their child, including the cost of
caesarian operation and hospital confinement. However, when respondent
refused the offer of petitioners family to take the child from her, petitioner
abandoned respondent and her child and left them to the mercy of relatives and
friends. Respondent further alleged that she attempted suicide due to
depression but still petitioner refused to support her and their child.
Respondent thus prayed for support pendente lite and monthly support in the
amount of P20,000.00, as well as actual, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorneys fees.
Petitioner filed his answer4 with special and affirmative defenses and
counterclaims. He described respondent as a woman of loose morals, having
borne her first child also out of wedlock when she went to work in Italy. Jobless
upon her return to the country, respondent spent time riding on petitioners
jeepney which was then being utilized by a female real estate agent named
Felicisima de Guzman. Respondent had seduced a senior police officer in San
Isidro and her charge of sexual abuse against said police officer was later
withdrawn in exchange for the quashing of drug charges against respondents
brother-in-law who was then detained at the municipal jail. It was at that time
respondent introduced herself to petitioner whom she pleaded for charity as
she was pregnant with another child. Petitioner denied paternity of the child
Christian Paulo; he was motivated by no other reason except genuine altruism
when he agreed to shoulder the expenses for the delivery of said child,
unaware of respondents chicanery and deceit designed to scandalize him in
exchange for financial favor.
At the trial, respondent and her witness Grace Murillo testified. Petitioner was
declared to have waived his right to present evidence and the case was
considered submitted for decision based on respondents evidence.
Respondent testified that she first met petitioner at the house of his kumadre
Felicisima de Guzman at Bgy. Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. During their
subsequent meeting, petitioner told her he is already a widower and he has no
more companion in life because his children are all grown-up. She also learned
that petitioner owns a rice mill, a construction business and a housing
subdivision (petitioner offered her a job at their family-owned Ma. Cristina
Village). Petitioner at the time already knows that she is a single mother as she
had a child by her former boyfriend in Italy. He then brought her to a motel,
promising that he will take care of her and marry her. She believed him and
yielded to his advances, with the thought that she and her child will have a
better life. Thereafter, they saw each other weekly and petitioner gave her
money for her child. When she became pregnant with petitioners child, it was
only then she learned that he is in fact not a widower. She wanted to abort the
baby but petitioner opposed it because he wanted to have another child.5
On the fourth month of her pregnancy, petitioner rented an apartment where
she stayed with a housemaid; he also provided for all their expenses. She gave
birth to their child on December 28, 1994 at the Good Samaritan Hospital in
Cabanatuan City. Before delivery, petitioner even walked her at the hospital
room and massaged her stomach, saying he had not done this to his wife. She
filled out the form for the childs birth certificate and wrote all the information
supplied by petitioner himself. It was also petitioner who paid the hospital bills
and drove her baby home. He was excited and happy to have a son at his
advanced age who is his look-alike, and this was witnessed by other
boarders, visitors and Grace Murillo, the owner of the apartment unit petitioner
rented. However, on the 18th day after the babys birth, petitioner went to
Baguio City for a medical check-up. He confessed to her daughter and
eventually his wife was also informed about his having sired an illegitimate
child. His family then decided to adopt the baby and just give respondent
money so she can go abroad. When she refused this offer, petitioner stopped
seeing her and sending money to her. She and her baby survived through the
help of relatives and friends. Depressed, she tried to commit suicide by drug
overdose and was brought to the hospital by Murillo who paid the bill. Murillo
sought the help of the Cabanatuan City Police Station which set their meeting
with petitioner. However, it was only petitioners wife who showed up and she
was very mad, uttering unsavory words against respondent.6
Murillo corroborated respondents testimony as to the payment by petitioner of
apartment rental, his weekly visits to respondent and financial support to her,
his presence during and after delivery of respondents baby, respondents
attempted suicide through sleeping pills overdose and hospitalization for which
she paid the bill, her complaint before the police authorities and meeting with
petitioners wife at the headquarters.7
On April 5, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision8in favor of respondent,
the dispositive portion of which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendant as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant to give as monthly
support of TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00)
PESOS for the child Christian Paulo through
the mother;
2. Directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the
sum of P20,000.00 by way of litigation
expenses; and
3. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.9
Petitioner appealed to the CA arguing that: (1) the trial court decided the case
without affording him the right to introduce evidence on his defense; and (2) the
trial court erred in finding that petitioner is the putative father of Christian Paulo
and ordering him to give monthly support.
By Decision dated July 18, 2006, the CA dismissed petitioners appeal. The
appellate court found no reason to disturb the trial courts exercise of discretion
in denying petitioners motion for postponement on April 17, 1998, the
scheduled hearing for the initial presentation of defendants evidence, and the
motion for reconsideration of the said order denying the motion for
postponement and submitting the case for decision.
On the paternity issue, the CA affirmed the trial courts ruling that respondent
satisfactorily established the illegitimate filiation of her son Christian Paulo, and
consequently no error was committed by the trial court in granting respondents
prayer for support. The appellate court thus held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Christian Paulo, in instant case, does not enjoy the benefit of a record of birth in
the civil registry which bears acknowledgment signed by Narciso Salas. He
cannot claim open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child.
It had been established by plaintiffs evidence, however, that during her
pregnancy, Annabelle was provided by Narciso Salas with an apartment at a
rental of P1,500.00 which he paid for (TSN, October 6, 1995, p. 18). Narciso
provided her with a household help with a salary of P1,500.00 a month (TSN,
October 6, 1995, ibid). He also provided her a monthly food allowance of
P1,500.00 (Ibid, p. 18). Narciso was with Annabelle at the hospital while the
latter was in labor, walking her around and massaging her belly (Ibid, p. 11).
Narciso brought home Christian Paulo to the rented apartment after
Annabelles discharge from the hospital. People living in the same apartment
units were witnesses to Narcisos delight to father a son at his age which was
his look alike. It was only after the 18th day when Annabelle refused to give
him Christian Paulo that Narciso withdrew his support to him and his mother.
Said testimony of Annabelle aside from having been corroborated by Grace
Murillo, the owner of the apartment which Narciso rented, was never rebutted
on record. Narciso did not present any evidence, verbal or documentary, to
repudiate plaintiffs evidence.
In the cases of Lim vs. CA (270 SCRA 1) and Rodriguez vs. CA (245 SCRA
150), the Supreme Court made it clear that Article 172 of the Family Code is an
adaptation of Article 283 of the Civil Code. Said legal provision provides that
the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child x x 3) when the
child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.
In fact, in Ilano vs. CA (230 SCRA 242, 258-259), it was held that
The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision that practically
covers all the other cases in the preceding paragraphs. Any other evidence or
proof that the defendant is the father is broad enough to render unnecessary
the other paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted in the action
for compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet [the] requirements of the
first three paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last paragraph. This
paragraph permits hearsay and reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules
of Court, with respect to illegitimate filiation.
As a necessary consequence of the finding that Christian Paulo is the son of
defendant Narciso Salas, he is entitled to support from the latter (Ilano vs.
CA, supra).
It shall be demandable from the time the person who has the right to recover
the same needs it for maintenance x x. (Art. 203, Family Code of the
Philippines).10
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition submitting the following
arguments:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. THE VENUE OF THE CASE WAS IMPROPERLY LAID BEFORE THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CABANATUAN CITY CONSIDERING THAT
BOTH PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT ARE ACTUAL RESIDENTS OF
BRGY. MALAPIT, SAN ISIDRO, NUEVA ECIJA.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN PRONOUNCING
THAT PETITIONER WAS AFFORDED THE FULL MEASURE OF HIS RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND IN UPHOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT
DID NOT GRAVELY ABUSE ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DECIDED THE INSTANT CASE
WITHOUT AFFORDING PETITIONER THE RIGHT TO INTRODUCE
37
Persons 4th Exam Cases
EVIDENCE IN HIS DEFENSE.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
FILIATION OF CHRISTIAN PAULO WAS DULY ESTABLISHED PURSUANT
TO ARTICLE 175 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 172 OF THE FAMILY CODE
AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AND THEREFORE ENTITLED TO
SUPPORT FROM THE PETITIONER.11
We grant the petition.
It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed for
the convenience of the plaintiffs and their witnesses. Equally settled, however,
is the principle that choosing the venue of an action is not left to a plaintiffs
caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.12
In personal actions such as the instant case, the Rules give the plaintiff the
option of choosing where to file his complaint. He can file it in the place (1)
where he himself or any of them resides, or (2) where the defendant or any of
the defendants resides or may be found.13 The plaintiff or the defendant must
be residents of the place where the action has been instituted at the time the
action is commenced.14
However, petitioner raised the issue of improper venue for the first time in the
Answer itself and no prior motion to dismiss based on such ground was filed.
Under the Rules of Court before the 1997 amendments, an objection to an
improper venue must be made before a responsive pleading is filed. Otherwise,
it will be deemed waived.15 Not having been timely raised, petitioners objection
on venue is therefore deemed waived.
As to the denial of the motion for postponement filed by his counsel for the
resetting of the initial presentation of defense evidence on April 17, 1998, we
find that it was not the first time petitioners motion for postponement was
denied by the trial court.
Records disclosed that after the termination of the testimony of respondents
last witness on November 29, 1996, the trial court as prayed for by the parties,
set the continuation of hearing for the reception of evidence for the defendant
(petitioner) on January 27, February 3, and February 10, 1997. In the Order
dated December 17, 1996, petitioner was advised to be ready with his evidence
at those hearing dates earlier scheduled. At the hearing on January 27, 1997,
petitioners former counsel, Atty. Rolando S. Bala, requested for the
cancellation of the February 3 and 10, 1997 hearings in order to give him time
to prepare for his defense, which request was granted by the trial court which
thus reset the hearing dates to March 3, 14 and 17, 1997. On March 3, 1997,
upon oral manifestation by Atty. Bala and without objection from respondents
counsel, Atty. Feliciano Wycoco, the trial court again reset the hearing to March
14 and 17, 1997. With the non-appearance of both petitioner and Atty. Bala on
March 14, 1997, the trial court upon oral manifestation by Atty. Wycoco
declared their absence as a waiver of their right to present evidence and
accordingly deemed the case submitted for decision.16
On July 4, 1997, Atty. Bala withdrew as counsel for petitioner and Atty. Rafael
E. Villarosa filed his appearance as his new counsel on July 21, 1997. On the
same date he filed entry of appearance, Atty. Villarosa filed a motion for
reconsideration of the March 14, 1997 Order pleading for liberality and
magnanimity of the trial court, without offering any explanation for Atty. Balas
failure to appear for the initial presentation of their evidence. The trial court
thereupon reconsidered its March 14, 1997 Order, finding it better to give
petitioner a chance to present his evidence. On August 26, 1997, Atty. Villarosa
received a notice of hearing for the presentation of their evidence scheduled on
September 22, 1997. On August 29, 1997, the trial court received his motion
requesting that the said hearing be re-set to October 10, 1997 for the reason
that he had requested the postponement of a hearing in another case which
was incidentally scheduled on September 22, 23 and 24, 1997. As prayed for,
the trial court reset the hearing to October 10, 1997. On said date, however, the
hearing was again moved to December 15, 1997. On February 16, 1998, the
trial court itself reset the hearing to April 17, 1998 since it was unclear whether
Atty. Wycoco received a copy of the motion.17
On April 17, 1998, petitioner and his counsel failed to appear but the trial court
received on April 16, 1998 an urgent motion to cancel hearing filed by Atty.
Villarosa. The reason given by the latter was the scheduled hearing on the
issuance of writ of preliminary injunction in another case under the April 8, 1998
Order issued by the RTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Branch 36 in Civil Case No.
1946. But as clearly stated in the said order, it was the plaintiffs therein who
requested the postponement of the hearing and it behoved Atty. Villarosa to
inform the RTC of Gapan that he had a previous commitment considering that
the April 17, 1998 hearing was scheduled as early as February 16, 1998.
Acting on the motion for postponement, the trial court denied for the second
time petitioners motion for postponement. Even at the hearing of their motion
for reconsideration of the April 17, 1998 Order on September 21, 1998, Atty.
Villarosa failed to appear and instead filed another motion for postponement.
The trial court thus ordered that the case be submitted for decision stressing
that the case had long been pending and that petitioner and his counsel have
been given opportunities to present their evidence. It likewise denied a second
motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Villarosa, who arrived late during the
hearing thereof on December 4, 1998.18
A motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right, but a request
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Parties asking for postponement
have absolutely no right to assume that their motions would be granted. Thus,
they must be prepared on the day of the hearing.19 Indeed, an order declaring a
party to have waived the right to present evidence for performing dilatory
actions upholds the trial courts duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the
deliberate delay and refusal to proceed on the part of one party.20
Atty. Villarosas plea for liberality was correctly rejected by the trial court in view
of his own negligence in failing to ensure there will be no conflict in his trial
schedules. As we held in Tiomico v. Court of
Appeals21:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Motions for postponement are generally frowned upon by Courts if there is
evidence of bad faith, malice or inexcusable negligence on the part of the
movant. The inadvertence of the defense counsel in failing to take note of the
trial dates and in belatedly informing the trial court of any conflict in his
schedules of trial or court appearances, constitutes inexcusable negligence. It
should be borne in mind that a client is bound by his counsels conduct,
negligence and mistakes in handling the case.22
With our finding that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial courts denial
of the motion for postponement filed by petitioners counsel, petitioners
contention that he was deprived of his day in court must likewise fail. The
essence of due process is that a party is given a reasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of ones defense.
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but
failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. If the
opportunity is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating
the constitutional guarantee.23
We now proceed to the main issue of whether the trial and appellate courts
erred in ruling that respondents evidence sufficiently proved that her son
Christian Paulo is the illegitimate child of petitioner.
Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation may
be established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
Article 172 of the Family Code of the
Philippines states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
(Underscoring supplied.)
Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth24 (Exhibit A-1) of Christian
Paulo Salas in which the name of petitioner appears as his father but which is
not signed by him. Admittedly, it was only respondent who filled up the entries
and signed the said document though she claims it was petitioner who supplied
the information she wrote therein.
We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the
putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate.25 Thus, if the
father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother,
doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity. 26 Neither
can such birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument 27 and
it has no probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father.28
As to the Baptismal Certificate29 (Exhibit B) of Christian Paulo Salas also
indicating petitioner as the father, we have ruled that while baptismal
certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as
evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified.
They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein
with respect to the childs paternity.30
The rest of respondents documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes
and letters, hospital bill and photographs taken of petitioner and respondent
inside their rented apartment unit.
Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are
inconclusive evidence to prove paternity.31 Exhibits E and F32 showing
petitioner and respondent inside the rented apartment unit thus have scant
evidentiary value. The Statement of Account33 (Exhibit C) from the Good
Samaritan General Hospital where respondent herself was indicated as the
payee is likewise incompetent to prove that petitioner is the father of her child
notwithstanding petitioners admission in his answer that he shouldered the
expenses in the delivery of respondents child as an act of charity.
As to the handwritten notes34 (Exhibits D to D-13) of petitioner and
respondent showing their exchange of affectionate words and romantic trysts,
these, too, are not sufficient to establish Christian Paulos filiation to petitioner
as they were not signed by petitioner and contained no statement of admission
by petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were
authentic, they do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-- vis Article 175 of the
38
Persons 4th Exam Cases
Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an
admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned.35
Petitioners reliance on our ruling in Lim v. Court of Appeals36 is misplaced. In
the said case, the handwritten letters of petitioner contained a clear admission
that he is the father of private respondents daughter and were signed by him.
The Court therein considered the totality of evidence which established beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner was indeed the father of private respondents
daughter. On the other hand, in Ilano v. Court of Appeals,37 the Court sustained
the appellate courts finding that private respondents evidence to establish her
filiation with and paternity of petitioner was overwhelming, particularly the
latters public acknowledgment of his amorous relationship with private
respondents mother, and private respondent as his own child through acts and
words, her testimonial evidence to that effect was fully supported by
documentary evidence. The Court thus ruled that respondent had adduced
sufficient proof of continuous possession of status of a spurious child.
Here, while the CA held that Christian Paulo Salas could not claim open and
continuous possession of status of an illegitimate child, it nevertheless
considered the testimonial evidence sufficient proof to establish his filiation to
petitioner.
An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, like his baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been
entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.38Reviewing the records, we find the totality of respondents
evidence insufficient to establish that petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo.
The testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the circumstances of the birth
of Christian Paulo, petitioners financial support while respondent lived in
Murillos apartment and his regular visits to her at the said apartment, though
replete with details, do not approximate the overwhelming evidence,
documentary and testimonial presented in Ilano. In that case, we sustained the
appellate courts ruling anchored on the following factual findings by the
appellate court which was quoted at length in
the ponencia:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of Merceditas (sic) at
the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital. Prior to the delivery, Leoncia underwent
prenatal examination accompanied by Artemio (TSN, p. 33, 5/17/74). After
delivery, they went home to their residence at EDSA in a car owned and driven
by Artemio himself (id. p. 36).
Merceditas (sic) bore the surname of Ilano since birth without any objection
on the part of Artemio, the fact that since Merceditas (sic) had her discernment
she had always known and called Artemio as her Daddy (TSN, pp. 28-29,
10/18/74); the fact that each time Artemio was at home, he would play with
Merceditas (sic), take her for a ride or restaurants to eat, and sometimes
sleeping with Merceditas (sic) (id. p. 34) and does all what a father should do
for his child bringing home goodies, candies, toys and whatever he can bring
her which a child enjoys which Artemio gives to Merceditas (sic) (TSN, pp. 38-
39, 5/17/74) are positive evidence that Merceditas (sic) is the child of Artemio
and recognized by Artemio as such. Special attention is called to Exh. E-7
where Artemio was telling Leoncia the need for a frog test to know the status
of Leoncia.
Plaintiff pointed out that the support by Artemio for Leoncia and Merceditas
(sic) was sometimes in the form of cash personally delivered to her by Artemio,
thru Melencio, thru Elynia (Exhs. E-2 and E-3, and D-6), or thru Merceditas The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
(sic) herself (TSN, p. 40, 5/17/74) and sometimes in the form of a check as the without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court
Manila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532 (Exh. G) and the signature may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
appearing therein which was identified by Leoncia as that of Artemio because
Artemio often gives her checks and Artemio would write the check at home and The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to
saw Artemio sign the check (TSN, p. 49, 7/18/73). Both Artemio and Nilda appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
admitted that the check and signature were those of Artemio (TSN, p. 53,
10/17/77; TSN, p. 19, 10/9/78). If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if
the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may
During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, order the opposing party, within a specified time to procure the appointment of
Artemio has shown concern as the father of Merceditas (sic). When Merceditas an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall
(sic) was in Grade 1 at the St. Joseph Parochial School, Artemio signed the immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in
Report Card of Merceditas (sic) (Exh. H) for the fourth and fifth grading procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be
period(s) (Exh. H-1 and H-2) as the parent of Merceditas (sic). Those recovered as costs.
signatures of Artemio [were] both identified by Leoncia and Merceditas (sic)
because Artemio signed Exh. H-1 and H-2 at their residence in the presence WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision
of Leoncia, Merceditas (sic) and of Elynia (TSN, p. 57, 7/18/73; TSN, p. 28, dated July 18, 2006 and Resolution dated October 19, 2007 of the Court of
10/1/73). x x x. Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 64379 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
xxx xxx xxx Civil Case No. 2124-AF of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch
26 is DISMISSED.
When Artemio run as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite[,] Artemio
gave Leoncia his picture with the following dedication: To Nene, with best No pronouncement as to costs. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
regards, Temiong. (Exh. I). (pp. 19-20, Appellants Brief)
SO ORDERED.
The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to offset the
totality of the evidence indubitably showing that the signature thereon belongs
to him. The entry in the Certificate of Live Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was
falsely stated therein as married does not mean that Leoncia is not appellees
daughter. This particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio himself in
order to avoid embarrassment.39
In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by themselves
are not competent proof of paternity and the totality of respondents evidence
failed to establish Christian Paulos filiation to petitioner.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to
establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create
an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the
parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by
clear and convincing evidence.40
Finally, we note the Manifestation and Motion41 filed by petitioners counsel
informing this Court that petitioner had died on May 6, 2010.
The action for support having been filed in the trial court when petitioner was
still alive, it is not barred under Article 175 (2)42 of the Family Code. We have
also held that the death of the putative father is not a bar to the action
commenced during his lifetime by one claiming to be his illegitimate child.43 The
rule on substitution of parties provided in Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, thus applies.
SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a pending
action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his
counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact
thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or
representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for
disciplinary action.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in
which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
39
Persons 4th Exam Cases
RODOLFO S. AGUILAR, Petitioner.
vs.
EDNA G. SIASAT, Respondent.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the August 30, 2006
Decision2 and December 20, 2011 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 64229 affirming the August 17, 1999 Decision4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 49 in Civil Case No. 96-9591
and denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.5
Factual Antecedents
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar spouses)
died, intestate and without debts, on August 26, 1983 and February 8, 1994,
respectively. Included in their estate are two parcels of land (herein subject
properties) covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462)
1070 of the Registries of Deeds of Bago and Bacolod (the subject titles).6
In June 1996, petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the RTC of Bacolod City
(Bacolod RTC) a civil case for mandatory injunction with damages against
respondent Edna G. Siasat. Docketed as Civil Case No. 96-9591 and assigned
to Branch 49 of the Bacolod RTC, the Complaint7 alleged that petitioner is the
only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses; that he (petitioner)
discovered that the subject titles were missing, and thus he suspected that
someone from the Siasat clan could have stolen the same; that he executed
affidavits of loss of the subject titles and filed the same with the Registries of
Deeds of Bacolod and Bago; that on June 22, 1996, he filed before the Bacolod
RTC a Petition for the issuance of second owners copy of Certificate of Title No.
T-25896,which respondent opposed; and that during the hearing of the said
Petition, respondent presented the two missing owners duplicate copies of the
subject titles. Petitioner thus prayed for mandatory injunctive relief, in that
respondent be ordered to surrender to him the owners duplicate copies of the
subject titles in her possession; and that damages, attorneys fees, and costs of
suit be awarded to him.
In her Answer,8 respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole
surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who was raised by the
Aguilar spouses out of generosity and kindness of heart; that petitioner is not a
natural or adopted child of the Aguilar spouses; that since Alfredo Aguilar
predeceased his wife, Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the latter inherited the conjugal
share of the former; that upon the death of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, her
brothers and sisters inherited her estate as she had no issue; and that the subject
titles were not stolen, but entrusted to her for safekeeping by Candelaria Siasat-
Aguilar, who is her aunt. By way of counterclaim, respondent prayed for an award
of moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.
During trial, petitioner testified and affirmed his relationship to the Aguilar
spouses as their son. To prove filiation, he presented the following documents,
among others:
1. His school records at the Don J.A. Araneta Elementary School,
Purok No. 2, Bacolod-Murcia Milling Company (BMMC), Bacolod City
(Exhibit "C" and submarkings), wherein it is stated that Alfredo Aguilar
is petitioners parent;
2. His Individual Income Tax Return (Exhibit "F"), which indicated that
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar is his mother;
3. Alfredo Aguilars Social Security System (SSS) Form E-1 dated
October 10, 1957 (Exhibit "G"), a public instrument subscribed and
made under oath by Alfredo Aguilar during his employment with
BMMC, which bears his signature and thumb marks and indicates that
petitioner, who was born on March 5, 1945, is his son and dependent;
4. Alfredo Aguilars Information Sheet of Employment with BMMC
dated October 29, 1954 (Exhibit "L"), indicating that petitioner is his
son;
5. Petitioners Certificate of Marriage to Luz Abendan (Exhibit "M"),
where it is declared that the Aguilar spouses are his parents; and
6. Letter of the BMMC Secretary (Exhibit "O") addressed to a BMMC
supervisor introducing petitioner as Alfredo Aguilars son and
recommending him for employment.
7. Certification dated January 27, 1996 issued by the Bacolod City
Civil Registry to the effect that the record of births during the period
1945 to 1946 were "all destroyed by nature," hence no true copies of
the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner could be issued as requested
(Exhibit "Q").9
Petitioner also offered the testimonies of his wife, Luz Marie Abendan-Aguilar
(Abendan-Aguilar), and Ester Aguilar-Pailano (Aguilar-Pailano), his aunt and
sister of Alfredo Aguilar. Abendan-Aguilar confirmed petitioners identity, and she
testified that petitioner is the son of the Aguilar spouses and that during her
marriage to petitioner, she lived with the latter in the Aguilar spouses conjugal
home built on one of the subject properties. On the other hand, 81-year old
Aguilar-Pailano testified that she is the sister of Alfredo Aguilar; that the Aguilar
spouses have only one son herein petitioner who was born at BMMC; that
after the death of the Aguilar spouses, she and her siblings did not claim
ownership of the subject properties because they recognized petitioner as the
Aguilar spouses sole child and heir; that petitioner was charged with murder,
convicted, imprisoned, and later on paroled; and that after he was discharged on
parole, petitioner continued to live with his mother Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar in
one of the subject properties, and continues to live there with his family.10
For her evidence, respondent testified among others that she is a retired teacher;
that she does not know petitioner very well, but only heard his name from her
aunt Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that she is not related by consanguinity or affinity
to petitioner; that she attended to Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar while the latter was
under medication in a hospital until her death; that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilars
hospital and funeral expenses were paid for by Nancy Vingno; that Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar executed an affidavit to the effect that she had no issue and that
she is the sole heir to her husband Alfredo Aguilars estate; that she did not steal
the subject titles, but that the same were entrusted to her by Candelaria Siasat-
Aguilar; that a prior planned sale of the subject properties did not push through
because when petitioners opinion thereto was solicited, he expressed
disagreement as to the agreed price.11
Respondent likewise offered the testimony of Aurea Siasat-Nicavera (Siasat-
Nicavera), 74 years old, who stated that the Aguilar spouses were married on
June 22, 1933 in Miag-ao, Iloilo; that she is the sister of Candelaria Siasat-
Aguilar; that she does not know petitioner, although she admitted that she knew
a certain "Rodolfo" whose nickname was "Mait"; that petitioner is not the son of
the Aguilar spouses; and that Alfredo Aguilar has a sister named Ester Aguilar-
Pailano.12
Respondent also offered an Affidavit previously executed by Candelaria Siasat-
Aguilar (Exhibit "2")announcing among others that she and Alfredo have no
issue, and that she is the sole heir to Alfredos estate.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On August 17, 1999, the Bacolod RTC issued its Decision, decreeing as follows:
From the evidence thus adduced before this Court, no solid evidence attesting
to the fact that plaintiff herein is either a biological son or a legally adopted one
was ever presented. Neither was a certificate of live birth of plaintiff ever
introduced confirming his biological relationship as a son to the deceased
spouses Alfredo and Candelaria S. Aguilar. As a matter of fact, in the affidavit of
Candelaria S. Aguilar (Exhibit 2) she expressly announced under oath that
Alfredo and she have no issue and that she is the sole heir to the estate of Alfredo
is (sic) concrete proof that plaintiff herein was never a son by consanguinity nor
a legally adopted one of the deceased spouses Alfredo and Candelaria Aguilar.
This being the case, Petitioner is not deemed vested with sufficient interest in
this action to be considered qualified or entitled to the issuance of the writ of
mandatory injunction and damages prayed for.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiffs complaint with
cost.
The counterclaim of the defendant is likewise dismissed for lack of legal basis.
SO ORDERED.13
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA.14 Docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-CV No.
64229, the appeal essentially argued that petitioner is indeed the Aguilar
spouses son; that under Article 172 of the Family Code, 15 an admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
signed by the parent concerned constitutes proof of filiation; that through the
documentary evidence presented, petitioner has shown that he is the legitimate
biological son of the Aguilar spouses and the sole heir to their estate. He argued
that he cannot present his Certificate of Live Birth as all the records covering the
period 1945-194616 of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed as
shown by Exhibits "Q" to "Q-3"; for this reason, he presented the foregoing
documentary evidence to prove his relationship to the Aguilar spouses. Petitioner
made particular reference to, among others, Alfredo Aguilars SSS Form E-1
(Exhibit "G"), arguing that the same was made under oath and thus sufficient
under Article 172 of the Family Code to establish that he is a child and heir of the
Aguilar spouses. Finally, petitioner questioned the trial courts reliance upon
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilars affidavit (Exhibit "2") attesting that she and Alfredo
have no children and that she is the sole heir to the estate of Alfredo, when such
piece of evidence has been discarded by the trial court in a previous Order dated
April 1, 1998, stating thus:
Except for defendants Exhibit "2", all other Exhibits, Exhibits "1", "3", "4" and "5",
together with their submarkings, are all admitted in evidence.17
On August 30, 2006, the CA issued the assailed Decision affirming the trial
courts August 17, 1999 Decision, pronouncing thus:
The exhibits relied upon by plaintiff-appellant to establish his filiation with the
deceased spouses Aguilar deserve scant consideration by this Court. The
Elementary School Permanent Record of plaintiff-appellant cannot be
considered as proof of filiation. As enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case
of Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439:
"Student record or other writing not signed by alleged father do not constitute
evidence of filiation."
As regards the Income Tax Return of plaintiff-appellant filed with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, WE hold thatit cannot be considered as evidence of filiation.
As stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Labagala vs. Santiago, 371 SCRA
360:
"A baptismal certificate, a private document is not conclusive proof of filiation.
More so are the entries made in an income tax return, which only shows that
income tax has been paid and the amount thereof."
With respect to the Certificate of Marriage x x x wherein it is shown that the
parents of the former are Alfredo and Candelaria Siasat Aguilar does not prove
filiation. The Highest Tribunal declared that a marriage contract not signed by
the alleged father of bride is not competent evidence of filiation nor is a marriage
contract recognition in a public instrument.
The rest of the exhibits offered x x x, except the Social Security Form E-1 (Exhibit
"G") and the Information Sheet of Employment of Alfredo Aguilar (Exhibit "L"),
allegedly tend to establish that plaintiff-appellant has been and is presently
known as Rodolfo Siasat Aguilar and he has been bearing the surname of his
alleged parents.
WE cannot sustain plaintiff-appellants argument. Use of a family surname
certainly does not establish pedigree.
Insofar as the SSS Form E-1 and Information Sheet of Employment of Alfredo
Aguilar are concerned, WE cannot accept them as sufficient proof to establish
and prove the filiation of plaintiff-appellant to the deceased Aguilar spouses.
While the former is a public instrument and the latter bears the signature of
Alfredo Aguilar, they do not constitute clear and convincing evidence to show
filiation based on open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child. Filiation is a serious matter that must be resolved according to the
requirements of the law. All told, plaintiff-appellants evidence failed to hurdle the
"high standard of proof" required for the success of an action to establish ones
legitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding open and
40
Persons 4th Exam Cases
continuous possession or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
Having resolved that plaintiff-appellant is not an heir of the deceased spouses
Aguilar, thereby negating his right to demand the delivery of the subject TCTs in
his favor, this Court cannot grant the writ of mandatory injunction being prayed
for.
xxxx
In the present case, plaintiff-appellant failed to show that he has a clear and
unmistakable right that has been violated. Neither had he shown permanent and
urgent necessity for the issuance of the writ.
With respect to the damages prayed for, WE sustain the trial court in denying the
same. Aside from the fact that plaintiff-appellant failed to show his clear right over
the subject parcels of land so that he has not sustained any damage by reason
of the withholding of the TCTs from him, there is no clear testimony on the
anguish or anxiety he allegedly suffered as a result thereof. Well entrenched in
law and jurisprudence is the principle that the grant of moral damages is
expressly allowed by law in instances where proofs of the mental anguish,
serious anxiety and moral shock were shown.
ACCORDINGLY, in line with the foregoing disquisition, the appeal is hereby
DENIED. The impugned Decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.18
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,19 but in a December 20, 2011
Resolution, the CA held its ground. Hence, the present Petition.
Issues
In an August 28, 2013 Resolution,20 this Court resolved to give due course to the
Petition, which raises the following issues:
In issuing the assailed DECISION affirming in toto the Decision of RTC Branch
49, Bacolod City, and the Resolution denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed reversible error [in]
not taking into consideration petitioners Exhibit "G" (SSS E-1 acknowledged and
notarized before a notary public, executed by Alfredo Aguilar, recognizing the
petitioner as his son) as public document that satisfies the requirement of Article
172 of the [Family] Code in the establishment of the legitimate filiation of the
petitioner with his father, Alfredo Aguilar.
The herein [P]etition raises the issue of pure question of law with respect to the
application of Article 172 of the Family Code particularly [paragraph] 3 thereof in
conjunction with Section 19 and Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
relating to public document which is substantial enough to merit consideration of
this Honorable Court as it will enrich jurisprudence and forestall future litigation.21
Petitioners Arguments
In his Petition and Reply22 seeking to reverse and set aside the assailed CA
dispositions and praying that judgment be rendered ordering respondent to
surrender the owners duplicates of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896
and T-(15462) 1070, petitioner argues that Alfredo Aguilars SSS Form E-1
(Exhibit "G") satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the
Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code. Petitioner contends that
said SSS Form E-1 is a declaration under oath by his father, Alfredo Aguilar, of
his status as the latters son; this recognition should be accorded more weight
than the presumption of legitimacy, since Article 172 itself declares that said
evidence establishes legitimate filiation without need of court action. He adds
that in contemplation of law, recognition in a public instrument such as the SSS
Form E-1 is the "highest form of recognition which partake (sic) of the nature of
a complete act of recognition bestowed upon" him as the son of the late Alfredo
Aguilar; that respondent has no personality to impugn his legitimacy and cannot
collaterally attack his legitimacy; that the action to impugn his legitimacy has
already prescribed pursuant to Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code;23 and
that having proved his filiation, mandatory injunction should issue, and an award
of damages is in order.
Respondents Arguments
In her Comment24 and Memorandum,25 respondent simply echoes the
pronouncements of the CA, adding that the Petition is a mere rehash of the CA
appeal which has been passed upon succinctly by the appellate court.
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.
This Court, speaking in De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon,26 has held that
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1)
the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation
shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory
recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate
action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated
on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial
action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish
the childs acknowledgment.
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the
marriage of their parents.1wphi1 The certificates of live birth would also identify
Danilo de Jesus as being their father. There is perhaps no presumption of the
law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof
that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first
120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due
to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his
wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way
that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband,
which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the
expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171,
of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn
the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status
conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.27 (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, applying the foregoing pronouncement to the instant case, it must be
concluded that petitioner who was born on March 5, 1945, or during the
marriage of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar28 and before their
respective deaths29 has sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue of the
Aguilar spouses. As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilars SSS Form E-1
(Exhibit "G") satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the
Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code; by itself, said document
constitutes an "admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned."
Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live Birth since all
the records covering the period 1945-1946 of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod
City were destroyed, which necessitated the introduction of other documentary
evidence particularly Alfredo Aguilars SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit "G") to prove
filiation. It was erroneous for the CA to treat said document as mere proof of
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under the
second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code; it is evidence of filiation
under the first paragraph thereof, the same being an express recognition in a
public instrument.
To repeat what was stated in De Jesus, filiation may be proved by an admission
of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned, and such due recognition in any authentic
writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no
further court action is required. And, relative to said form of acknowledgment, the
Court has further held that:
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the
following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the
acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an
admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of
evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict
compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the
acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other
relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation
therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the
acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other
evidence. Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the
"paramount consideration" in resolving questions affecting him.
Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child
of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative
bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.
It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation
of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children x x x."
Too, "(t)he State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from
abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development."30 (Emphasis supplied)
This case should not have been so difficult for petitioner if only he obtained a
copy of his Certificate of Live Birth from the National Statistics Office (NSO),
since the Bacolod City Civil Registry copy thereof was destroyed. He would not
have had to go through the trouble of presenting other documentary evidence;
the NSO copy would have sufficed. This fact is not lost on petitioner; the
Certification dated January 27, 1996 issued by the Bacolod City Civil Registry
(Exhibit "Q") contained just such an advice for petitioner to proceed to the Office
of the Civil Registrar General at the NSO in Manila to secure a copy of his
Certificate of Live Birth, since for every registered birth in the country, a copy of
the Certificate of Live Birth is submitted to said office.
As to petitioner's argument that respondent has no personality to impugn his
legitimacy and cannot collaterally attack his legitimacy, and that the action to
impugn his legitimacy has already prescribed pursuant to Articles 170 and 171
of the Family Code, the Court has held before that -Article 26331 refers to an
action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a person is
not a man's child by his wife. However, the present case is not one impugning
petitioner's legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is
not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all. 32
Finally, if petitioner has shown that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar
spouses, then he is as well heir to the latter's estate. Respondent is then left with
no right to inherit from her aunt Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar's. estate, since
succession pertains, in the first place, to the descending direct line.33
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The August 30, 2006 Decision and
December 20, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No.
64229, as well as the August 17, 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Bacolod City, Branch 49 in Civil Case No. 96-9591 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent Edna G. Siasat is hereby ordered to SURRENDER to the
petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar the owner's duplicates of Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462) 1070.
SO ORDERED.
41
Persons 4th Exam Cases
ALEJANDRA ARADO HEIRS: JESUSA ARADO, VICTORIANO
ALCORIZA, PEDRO ARADO, HEIRS: JUDITHO ARADO, JENNIFER
ARADO, BOBBIE ZITO ARADO, SHIRLY ABAD, ANTONIETA ARADO,
NELSON SOMOZA, JUVENIL ARADO, NICETAS VENTULA, AND NILA
ARADO, PEDRO ARADO, TOMASA V.
ARADO, Petitioners, v. ANACLETO ALCORAN AND ELENETTE
SUNJACO, Respondents.
Under review on certiorari is the decision promulgated on February 28,
2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment rendered
on January 15, 1997 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, in
Dumaguete City (RTC)2 dismissing the complaint and the counterclaim for
being without merit.
Antecedents
Raymundo Alcoran (Raymundo) was married to Joaquina Arado
(Joaquina), and their marriage produced a son named Nicolas Alcoran
(Nicolas).3 In turn, Nicolas married Florencia Limpahan (Florencia)4 but
their union had no offspring. During their marriage, however, Nicolas had
an extramarital affair with Francisca Sarita (Francisca), who gave birth to
respondent Anacleto Alcoran (Anacleto) on July 13, 19515during the
subsistence of Nicolas' marriage to Florencia.6 In 1972, Anacleto married
Elenette Sonjaco.7redarclaw
Raymundo died in 1939, while Nicolas died m 1954. Likewise, Florencia
died in 1960, and Joaquina in 1981.8redarclaw
Florencia had three siblings, namely: Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica
Limpahan.9 Joaquina had four siblings, i.e., Alejandra, Nemesio,
Celedonia and Melania, all surnamed Arado.10 Nemesio had six children,
namely: (1) Jesusa, who was married to Victoriano Alcoriza; (2) Pedro,
who was married to Tomasa Arado; (3) Teodorico; (4) Josefina; (5)
Gliceria;11 and (6) Felicisima.12 During the pendency of the case, Pedro
died, and was substituted by his following heirs, to wit: (1) Juditho and his
spouse, Jennifer Ebrole; (2) Bobbie Zito and his spouse, Shirly Abad; (3)
Juvenil and his spouse, Nicetas Ventula; (4) Antonieta and her spouse,
Nelson Somoza; and (5) Nila.
On January 14, 1992, Alejandra, Jesusa, Victoriano Alcoriza, Pedro and
Tomasa filed in the RTC a complaint for recovery of property and
damages (with application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction)
against Anacleto and Elenette.13 Named as unwilling co-plaintiffs were
Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica Limpahan, along with Teodorico, Josefina,
Gliceria and Felicisima.
The properties subject of the action were the following: (1) Lot No. 4100,
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. OV-1379; (2) Lot No.
4054, covered by OCT No. OV-1380; (3) a parcel of land covered by Tax
Declaration No. 6065; (4) a parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No.
20470; (5) a parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 11-028-A; (6)
Lot No. 709 covered by OCT No. OV-7784; (7) a parcel of land covered by
Tax Declaration No. 87-011-215-A; (8) a parcel of land covered by Tax
Declaration No. 87-011-217; (9) Lot No. 5234 covered by OCT No. 3489-
A; and (10) Lot No. 5224 covered by Tax Declaration No. 8-201.14 The
parties later stipulated that the first eight of the subject properties had
previously belonged to Raymundo, while the last two had been the
paraphernal properties of Joaquina.15redarclaw
The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that when Raymundo died in 1939,
his properties were inherited by his son Nicolas alone "as it was during the
period of the old Civil Code, where the spouse could not inherit but only a
share of the usufruct, which was extinguished upon the death of the
usufructuary;"16that when Nicolas died in 1954 without issue, half of his
properties were inherited by his wife, Florencia, and the other half by his
mother, Joaquina; that Florencia was, in turn, succeeded by her siblings
Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica; that during the marriage of Nicolas and
Florencia, the former had an affair with Francisca, from which affair
Anacleto was born, but it was unknown whether he was the spurious son
of Nicolas; that Nicolas did not recognize Anacleto as his spurious child
during Nicolas' lifetime; hence, Anacleto was not entitled to inherit from
Nicolas; that nonetheless, Anacleto claimed entitlement to the properties
as the heir of Nicolas and by virtue of the will executed by Joaquina; that
the will was void for not having been executed according to the formalities
of the law, and the same did not reflect the true intention of Joaquina; that
the supposed testator did not acknowledge the will, which was not
submitted for probate; that they were the rightful heirs to the properties;
that notwithstanding their repeated demands for the return of the
properties, the defendants persistently refused; that a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction should issue to prevent the defendants from further
violating their rights in the properties; and that the defendants should be
ordered to reconvey the properties, and to pay; P20,000.00 as actual
damages; P20,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and P20,000.00
as attorney's fees.17redarclaw
In their answer,18 the defendants (respondents herein) countered that
Anacleto was expressly recognized by Nicolas as the latter's son, a fact
evidenced by the certificate of birth of Anacleto; that Anacleto thus had the
right to inherit the properties from Nicolas; that because Anacleto was still
too young when Nicolas died, the administration of the properties passed
to Anacleto's grandmother, Joaquina; that Joaquina executed a last will
and testament in Anacleto's favor; that Joaquina's possession of the
properties was for and in behalf of Anacleto, who had been living with her
since his birth; that such possession began in 1954 when Nicolas died and
continued until Joaquina's death in 1981; that Anacleto then took over the
possession of the properties to the exclusion of all others; that granting for
the sake of argument that the plaintiffs had rights in the properties, the
same were already lost through laches, estoppel and prescription; and
that Anacleto was the rightful owner of the properties, and his ownership
and possession should not be disturbed.
By way of counterclaim, the defendants prayed that the plaintiffs be
ordered to pay 50,000.00 as moral damages, 1,000.00 "as initial expenses
as costs of this litigation which will increase as the case progresses"19 and
10,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Veronica Limpahan and Sulpicio Limpahan likewise filed their answer20 to
the complaint, stating that they were not interested in pursuing any claim
of ownership in the properties; that assuming that they were entitled, they
were abandoning their rights, interests, title and participation in the
properties; and that they be excluded from further court processes.
Judgrnent of the RTC
On January 15, 1997, the RTC rendered judgment, decreeing
thusly:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing
the complaint and the counterclaim for lack of merit.
Costs against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.21
The RTC opined that Anacleto established that he was really the
acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas. It cited the certificate of birth of
Anacleto (Exhibit 4) and Page 53, Book 4, Register No. 214 of the
Register of Births of the Municipality of Bacong (Exhibit 3), which proved
that Nicolas had himself caused the registration of Anacleto's birth by
providing the details thereof and indicating that he was the father of
Anacleto. It observed that the name of Nicolas appeared under the column
"Remarks" in the register of births, which was the space provided for the
name of the informant; that because the plaintiffs did not present evidence
to refute the entry in the register of births, the entry became conclusive
with respect to the facts contained therein; that Anacleto's claim of
recognition was bolstered by his baptismal certificate (Exhibit F), in which
was indicated that his parents were Nicolas Alcoran and Francisca Sarita;
that also presented was a picture taken during the wake of Nicolas
(Exhibit 5) showing the young Anacleto being carried by Joaquina, and
also Nicolas' wife, Florencia; that in addition, the school records of
Anacleto (Exhibit 6) showed that Joaquina stood as his guardian during
his grade school years; that when Anacleto got married, it was Joaquina
who gave consent to his marriage because he was then still a minor
(Exhibit 8); and that Joaquina executed her will in 1978 (Exhibit 9),
bequeathing the subject properties to Anacleto, but the will was yet to be
probated.
As the case was filed during the effectivity of the Family Code, the RTC
ruled that Articles 172,22 17323and 17524 of the Family Code allowed
Anacleto to establish his filiation during his lifetime through the record of
his birth appearing in the civil register. It further ruled that because there
were no legitimate children of Nicolas who contested Anacleto's right to
inherit, the rule on the separation of the legitimate from the illegitimate
family was rendered irrelevant; and that, accordingly, Anacleto was
entitled to possess the subject properties upon having established that he
was the acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas. Consequently, it also
dismissed the defendants' counterclaim for lack of sufficient basis.
The plaintiffs appealed to the CA.25redarclaw
Decision of the CA
On February 28, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision,26 affirming the
judgment of the RTC in this wise:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby
DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City, Branch 43 stands.
The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC to the effect that Anacleto was an
acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas. It agreed that the Register of
Births of the Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental showed that Nicolas
was the father of Anacleto, and that the former had supplied the
information on the latter's birth. It declared that the plaintiffs did not rebut
the filiation of Anacleto by contrary evidence; that the baptismal certificate
42
Persons 4th Exam Cases
of Anacleto and the picture taken during the wake of Nicolas further
showed that Anacleto had been acknowledged by Nicolas; that based on
the Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, the law applicable at the
time of the filing of the case, Anacleto's filiation was established by the
record of his birth appearing in the civil register; and that Anacleto
possessed rights in the subject properties.
Anent the successional rights of the parties, the CA pronounced that after
Raymundo died in 1939, his wife, Joaquina, and his son, Nicolas, inherited
his properties; that when Nicolas died in 1954, he was survived by
Joaquina (his mother), Florencia (his legitimate wife), and Anacleto (his
illegitimate son); that Joaquina was entitled to one-half of Nicolas' estate,
and the remaining half should be divided between Florencia and Anacleto;
that in 1960, when Florencia died without issue, the share she had
inherited from Nicolas was inherited by her siblings Sulpicio, Braulia and
Veronica; and that when Joaquina died in 1981, she was survived by her
sibling Alejandra; her nieces Jesusa,27 Josefina, Gliceria and Felicisima;
her nephews Pedro and Teodorico; and her illegitimate grandson,
Anacleto.
The CA declared that the plaintiffs were already barred from asserting
their rights in the properties by estoppel by laches; that Joaquina had
executed her last will and testament on April 19, 1978, whereby she
bequeathed her properties to Anacleto; that the properties were thus
transmitted to Anacleto upon her death in 1981; that the plaintiffs filed their
complairtt in the RTC only on January 14, 1992; that it would be unjust to
award the subject properties to the plaintiffs who had slept on their rights
for a long time; and that the plaintiffs could probably pursue their claim in
the appropriate intestate or testate proceedings.
28
The plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied their
motion on March 24, 2004.
Issues
In this appeal, the plaintiffs, herein petitioners,29 implore the Court to nullify
the assailed rulings of the CA, and to determine once and for all the
following issues:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(a) Whether Anacleto Alcoran is the illegitimate son of Nicolas Alcoran x x
x; and
(b) Whether he is entitled to the properties in litigation.30
The petitioners insist that Anacleto was not duly recognized as Nicolas'
illegitimate son; that inasmuch as Anacleto was born to Francisca during
the subsistence of Nicolas' marriage to Florencia, Anacleto could only be
the spurious child of Nicolas; that there was no law for the
acknowledgment of a spurious child; that even if Anacleto would be given
the benefit of the doubt and be considered a natural child. Article 278 of
the Civil Code states that "[r]ecognition shall be made in the record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing;" that the appearance of the father's name in the certificate of birth
alone, without his actual intervention, was insufficient to prove paternity;
that the mere certificate by the civil registrar that the father himself
registered the child, without the father's signature, was not proof of the
father's voluntary acknowledgment; that the baptismal certificate was
insufficient proof of paternity; and that if there was ground for Anacleto's
recognition, the period to claim recognition already prescribed.
The petitioners reject the claim of Anacleto that Joaquina bequeathed the
subject properties to him by last will and testament. They assail the validity
and due execution of the will, which was not submitted for probate; that
the joint affidavit allegedly executed in favor of Anacleto by Sulpicio,
Braulia and Veronica Limpahan, with Josefina, Gliceria and Felicisima
Arado, whereby they ceded their rights in the subject properties in favor of
Anacleto, was unwarranted; and that the veracity of the affidavit was
doubtful because it was purportedly inconsistent with Anacleto's stance
that he had inherited the properties in his own right.
In tum, the defendants, herein respondents, counter that Nicolas
recognized Anacleto as his illegitimate child because Nicolas had himself
caused the registration of Anacleto's birth; that the petitioners' allegation of
prescription lacked basis inasmuch as Anacleto was not seeking
compulsory recognition; and that Anacleto had already been voluntarily
recognized by Nicolas as his illegitimate son.
Ruling of the Court
We affirm the dismissal of the petitioners' complaint by the RTC, albeit for
different reasons.
The complaint filed by the petitioners in the RTC to recover the subject
properties is properly characterized as an accion reivindicatoria. According
to Caezo v. Bautista,31 an "[a]ccion reivindicatoriaseeks the recovery of
ownership and includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi brought in the
proper regional trial court. Accion reivindicatoria is an action whereby
plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its
full possession." In essence, the petitioners seek to put an end to
Anacleto's possession of the properties on the basis of their being the
rightful heirs considering that Anacleto, being the spurious child of Nicolas,
held no successional rights in the estate of Nicolas.
The burden of proof to establish the averments of the complaint by
preponderance of evidence pertained to the petitioners as the plaintiffs. In
that regard, we have discoursed on preponderance of
evidence in Amoroso v. Alegre, Jr.,32 thusly:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
"Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the
aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater
weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a
phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto. If plaintiff claims a
right granted or created by law, he must prove his claim by
competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his opponent. (Bold
underscoring for emphasis)
The petitioners did not discharge their burden of proof.
At the outset, the Court affirms the holding by the RTC and the CA that the
provisions of the Family Code33 should apply because the petitioners'
complaint was filed, litigated and decided by the RTC during the effectivity
of the Family Code. Under the Family Code, the classification of children
is limited to either legitimate or illegitimate.34 Illegitimate filiation is proved
in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code, to
wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in
the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article
173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article
I72, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent.
On the other hand, legitimate filiation is established m accordance with
Articles 172 and 173 of the Family Code, which state:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child;
or laws.
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child
during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the
child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs
shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding
the death of either or both of the parties.
Rightly enough, the RTC and the CA unanimously concluded that Nicolas
had duly acknowledged Anacleto as his illegitimate son. The birth
certificate of Anacleto appearing in the Register of Births of the
Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental (Exhibits 3, 3-A) showed that
Nicolas had himself caused the registration of the birth of Anacleto. The
showing was by means of the name of Nicolas appearing in the column
"Remarks" in Page 53, Book 4, Register No. 214 of the Register of Births.
Based on the certification (Exhibit 3-B) issued by the Local Civil Registrar
of the Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental, the column in the Register
of Births entitled "Remarks" (Observaciones) was the space provided for
the name of the informant of the live birth to be registered. Considering
that Nicolas, the putative father, had a direct hand in the preparation of the
birth certificate, reliance on the birth certificate of Anacleto as evidence of
his paternity was fully warranted.35redarclaw
Anacleto's baptismal certificate (Exhibit 7) was of no consequence in
determining his filiation. We have already held in Cabatania v. Court of
Appeals36 that "while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public
document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with
respect to the child's paternity;" and that baptismal certificates were "per
se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation," and thus "cannot be
43
Persons 4th Exam Cases
admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove [filiation]." Hence,
we attach no probative value to the baptismal certificate as proof of the
filiation of Anacleto.
The weight accorded by the RTC and the CA to the picture depicting the
young Anacleto in the arms of Joaquina as she stood beside the coffin of
the departed Nicolas (Exhibit 5) was also undeserved. At best, the picture
merely manifested that it was Joaquina who had acknowledged her
filiation with Anacleto. Cautioning against the admission in evidence of a
picture of similar nature, we have pointed out in Solinap v. Locsin,
Jr.37 that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[R]espondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan
C. Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation, lest we recklessly
set a very dangerous precedent that would encourage and sanction
fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture taken while standing before
a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the
deceased.
The school records of Anacleto (Exhibit 6), which evinced that Joaquina
was the guardian of Anacleto in his grade school years, and the marriage
contract between Anacleto and Elenette (Exhibits 8 to 8-C), which
indicated that Joaquina had given consent to Anacleto's marriage, did not
have the evidentiary value accorded by the RTC and the CA. Joaquina's
apparent recognition of Anacleto mattered little, for, as we stressed
in Cenido v. Apacionado,38 the recognition "must be made personally by
the parent himself or herself, not by any brother, sister or relative; after all,
the concept of recognition speaks of a voluntary declaration by the parent,
of if the parent refuses, by judicial authority, to establish the paternity or
maternity of children born outside wedlock."
The lack of probative value of the respondents' aforecited corroborative
evidence notwithstanding, Anacleto's recognition as Nicolas' illegitimate
child remained beyond question in view of the showing that Nicolas had
personally and directly acknowledged Anacleto as his illegitimate son.
How should the acknowledgment of Anacleto by Nicolas affect the
respective rights of the parties in relation to the specific properties subject
of the complaint?
To recall, the parties stipulated that the first eight of the subject properties
had previously belonged to Raymundo, while the remaining two had been
the paraphernal properties of Joaquina.
With Raymundo having died in 1939, the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 was
the governing law on succession. Under Article 807 thereof,39 Joaquina
and Nicolas, i.e., the surviving spouse and the legitimate son of
Raymundo, were the forced heirs who acquired legal title to Raymundo's
estate upon his death. In accordance with Article 834 thereof, 40 Nicolas
was entitled to inherit the entire estate of Raymundo, while Joaquina was
entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to the one third portion available for
betterment.
When Nicolas died in 1954, the Civil Code of the Philippines was already
in effect.41 Under Article 1000 thereof,42 the heirs entitled to inherit from
Nicolas's estate were Joaquina (his mother), Florencia (his surviving
spouse), and Anacleto (his acknowledged illegitimate son). Said heirs
became co-owners of the properties comprising the entire estate of
Nicolas prior to the estate's partition in accordance with Article 107843 of either by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceeding, a co-
the Civil Code. heir cannot dispose of a specific portion of the estate. For where there are
two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition,
Anacleto had an established right to inherit from Nicolas, whose estate owned in common by such heirs. Upon the death of a person, each of his
included the first eight of the subject properties that had previously heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to
belonged to Raymundo. Anacleto became a co-owner of said the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of
properties, pro indiviso, when Nicolas died in 1954.44 Likewise, Joaquina ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of the estate or co-
succeeded to, and became a pro indiviso co-owner of, the properties that heirs while it remains undivided.
formed part of the estate of Nicolas. When Joaquina died in 1981, her Without the showing that the respective estates of Raymundo, Nicolas and
hereditary estate included the two remaining properties, as well as her Joaquina had been previously partitioned, the Court concludes and holds
share in the estate of Nicolas. In as much as Joaquina died without any that none of the parties herein can lay claim over any of the disputed
surviving legitimate descendant, ascendant, illegitimate child or spouse, specific properties. The petitioners cannot contend, therefore, that they
Article 100345 of the Civil Code mandated that her collateral relatives were the rightful owners of the properties of the late Joaquina to the
should inherit her entire estate. exclusion of Anacleto. Thus, we uphold the dismissal of the petitioners'
complaint for recovery of such properties.
Contrary to the rulings of the lower courts, Anacleto was barred by law
from inheriting from the estate of Joaquina. To start with, Anacleto could WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
not inherit from Joaquina by right of representation of Nicolas, the February 28, 2003 by the Court of Appeals; and ORDERS the petitioners
legitimate son of Joaquina.46 Under Article 992 of the Civil Code, an to pay the costs of suit.
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; in the same manner, such SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
children or relatives shall not inherit from the illegitimate child. As certified
in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court,47 the right of representation is not
available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the
inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. And, secondly, Anacleto could not
inherit from the estate of Joaquina by virtue of the latter's last will and
testament, i.e., the Katapusan Tugon (Testamento) (Exhibit K). Article 838
of the Civil Code dictates that no will shall pass either real or personal
property unless the same is proved and allowed in accordance with
the Rules of Court. We have clarified in Gallanosa v. Arcangel48 that in
order that a will may take effect, "it has to be probated, legalized or
allowed in the proper testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will is
mandatory." It appears that such will remained ineffective considering that
the records are silent as to whether it had ever been presented for
probate, and had been allowed by a court of competent jurisdiction. The
petitioners alleged this fact in their complaint, and the respondents did not
controvert the allegation. In the absence of proof showing that the
supposed will of Joaquina had been duly approved by the competent
court, we hold that it had not been so approved. Hence, we cannot sustain
the CA's ruling to the effect that Joaquina had bequeathed her properties
to Anacleto by will, and that the properties had been transmitted to him
upon her death.
As the petitioners were among the collateral relatives of Joaquina, they
are the ones entitled to inherit from her estate.
Nonetheless, the petitioners' appeal still fails because the parties did not
establish that the estates of Raymundo, Nicolas and Joaquina had been
respectively settled with finality through the appropriate testate or intestate
proceedings, and partitioned in due course. Unless there was a proper
and valid partition of the assets of the respective estates of Raymundo,
Nicolas and Joaquina, whether extrajudicially or judicially, their heirs could
not adjudicate unto themselves and claim specific portions of their estates,
because, as we have declared in Carvajal v. Court of Appeals:49
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x Unless a project of partition is effected, each heir cannot claim
ownership over a definite portion of the inheritance. Without partition,
44
Persons 4th Exam Cases
EUGENIO SAN JUAN GERONIMO, Petitioner,
vs.
KAREN SANTOS, Respondent.
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 and Resolution2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 88650 promulgated on
January 17, 2011 and May 24, 2011, respectively, which affirmed the
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Bulacan,
Branch 8. Both courts a quo ruled that the subject document
titled Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman is null and void, and ordered
herein petitioner Eugenio San Juan Geronimo (Eugenio), who was
previously joined by his brother Emiliano San Juan Geronimo (Emiliano) as
codefendant, to vacate the one-half portion of the subject 6,542-square
meter property and surrender its possession to respondent Karen Santos.
In a Resolution4 dated November 28, 2011, this Court ordered the deletion
of the name of Emiliano from the title of the instant petition_ as co-
petitioner, viz.:
x x x The Court resolves:
xxxx
(2) to AMEND the title of this petition to read "Eugenio San Juan Geronimo,
petitioner vs. Karen Santos, respondent," considering the sworn statement
of Eugenio San Juan Geronimo that he does not know whether his brother
is still alive and that his brother did not verify the instant petition; x x x5
The following facts were found by the trial court and adopted by the
appellate court in its assailed Decision, viz.:
On April 17, 2001, plaintiff Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of
deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for annulment of
document and recovery of possession against the defendants Eugenio and
Emiliano Geronimo who are the brothers of her father. She alleged that with
the death of her parents, the property consisting of one half of the parcel of
land located at San Jose, Paombong, Bulacan with Tax Declaration No. 99-
02017-00219 and belonging to her parents was passed on to her by the law
on intestacy; that lately, she discovered that defendants executed a
document entitled Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman declaring
themselves as the only heirs of spouses Rufino and Caridad and
adjudicating to themselves the property in question; and that
consequently[,] they took possession and were able to transfer the tax
declaration of the subject property to their names. She prayed that the
document Exhibit C be annulled and the tax declaration of the land
transferred to her, and that the defendants vacate the property and pay her
damages.
In an amended answer, the defendants denied the allegation that plaintiff
was the only child and sole heir of their brother. They disclosed that the
deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo were childless and took in as their
ward the plaintiff who was in truth, the child of Caridads sister. They claimed
that the birth certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document. It was
allegedly impossible for Rufino and Caridad to have registered the plaintiff
in Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur because they had never lived or sojourned in the
place and Caridad, who was an elementary teacher in Bulacan never filed
any maternity leave during the period of her service from August 1963 until
October 1984.
The plaintiff took the stand and testified that her parents were Rufino and
Caridad Geronimo. The defendants Eugenio and Emiliano were the half-
brothers of her father Rufino, being the children of Rufinos father Marciano
Geronimo with another woman Carmen San Juan. Rufino co-owned Lot
1716 with the defendants mother Carmen, and upon his death in 1980,
when the plaintiff was only 8 years old, his share in the property devolved
on his heirs. In 1998, some 18 years later, Caridad and she executed an
extra-judicial settlement of Rufinos estate entitled Pagmamanahan Sa
Labas ng Hukuman Na May Pagtalikod Sa Karapatan, whereby the
plaintiffs mother Caridad waived all her rights to Rufinos share and in the
land in question to her daughter the plaintiff. Be that as it may, in 1985,
guardianship proceedings appeared to have been instituted with the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos by Caridad in which it was established that
the plaintiff was the minor child of Caridad with her late husband Rufino.
Caridad was thus appointed guardian of the person and estate of the
plaintiff.
The plaintiff further declared that she and her mother had been paying the
real estate taxes on the property, but in 2000, the defendants took
possession of the land and had the tax declaration transferred to them. This
compelled her to file the present case.
Eugenio Geronimo, the defendant, disputes the allegation that the plaintiff
is the only child and legal heir of his brother Rufino. He disclosed that when
Rufinos wife could not bear a child, the couple decided to adopt the plaintiff
who was Caridads niece from Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur. It was in 1972, 13
years after the marriage, when Karen joined her adoptive parents
household. Believing that in the absence of a direct heir, his brother
Emiliano and he should succeed to the estate of their brother, they executed
in 2000 an extra-judicial settlement called
Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman.
Eugenio was able to obtain a copy of the plaintiffs alleged birth certificate.
It had irregular features, such as that it was written in pentel pen, the entry
in the box date of birth was erased and the word and figure April 6,
1972 written and the name Emma Dao was superimposed on the entry in
the box intended for the informants signature.
Two more witnesses were adduced. Atty. Elmer Lopez, a legal consultant
of the DECS in Bulacan brought the plaintiff's service record as an
elementary school teacher at Paombong[,] Bulacan to show that she did not
have any maternity leave during the period of her service from March 11,
1963 to October 24, 1984, and a certification from the Schools Division
Superintendent that the plaintiff did not file any maternity leave during her
service. He declared that as far as the service record is concerned, it
reflects the entry and exit from the service as well as the leaves that she
availed of. Upon inquiry by the court, he clarified that the leaves were
reflected but the absences were not. Testifying on the plaintiffs birth
certificate, Exhibit 14, Arturo Reyes, a representative of the NSO, confirmed
that there was an alteration in the date of birth and signature of the
informant. In view of the alterations, he considered the document
questionable.6
On October 27, 2006, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, viz.:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the document Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman
dated March 9, 2000 executed in favor of Eugenio San Juan-
Geronimo and Emilio San Juan-Geronimo as null and void;
2. Annulling Tax Declaration No. 99-02017-01453 of the subject
property in the names of Eugenio San Juan-Geronimo and
Emiliano San Juan-Geronimo;
3. Ordering defendants Eugenio San Juan-Geronimo and
Emiliano San Juan-Geronimo to vacate the portion of the
subject property and to surrender the possession to the plaintiff;
4. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the amount of
[P]30,000.00 as attorneys fees;
5. To pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.7
The trial court ruled that respondent is the legal heir being the legitimate
child of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad Geronimo (spouses
Rufino and Caridad). It found that respondents filiation was duly established
by the certificate of live birth which was presented in evidence. The RTC
dismissed the claim of petitioner that the birth certificate appeared to have
been tampered, specifically on the entries pertaining to the date of birth of
respondent and the name of the informant. The trial court held that petitioner
failed to adduce evidence to explain how the erasures were done. Petitioner
also failed to prove that the alterations were due to the fault of respondent
or another person who was responsible for the act. In the absence of such
contrary evidence, the RTC relied on the prima faciepresumption of the
veracity and regularity of the birth certificate as a public document.
The trial court further stated that even granting arguendo that the birth
certificate is questionable, the filiation of respondent has already been
sufficiently proven by evidence of her open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child under Article 172 of the Family Code of the
Philippines. The RTC considered the following overt acts of the deceased
spouses as acts of recognition that respondent is their legitimate child: they
sent her to school and paid for her tuition fees; Caridad made respondent a
beneficiary of her burial benefits from the Government Service Insurance
System; and, Caridad filed a petition for guardianship of respondent after
the death of her husband Rufino. Lastly, the trial court held that to be
allowed to impugn the filiation and status of respondent, petitioner should
have brought an action for the purpose under Articles 170 and 171 of
the Family Code. Since petitioner failed to file such action, the trial court
ruled that respondent alone is entitled to the ownership and possession of
the subject land owned by Rufino. The extrajudicial settlement executed by
petitioner and his brother was therefore declared not valid and binding as
respondent is Rufinos only compulsory heir.
On appeal, petitioner raised the issue on the alterations in the birth
certificate of respondent and the offered evidence of a mere certification
from the Office of the Civil Registry instead of the birth certificate itself.
According to petitioner, respondents open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child is only secondary evidence to the birth
certificate itself. Respondent questioned if it was legally permissible for
petitioner to question her filiation as a legitimate child of the spouses Rufino
and Caridad in the same action for annulment of document and recovery of
possession that she herself filed against petitioner and his then co-
defendant.
Respondent argued that the conditions enumerated under Articles 170 and
171 of the Family Code, giving the putative father and his heirs the right to
bring an action to impugn the legitimacy of the child, are not present in the
instant case. She further asserted that the Family Code contemplates a
direct action, thus her civil status may not be assailed indirectly or
collaterally in this suit.
In the assailed Decision dated January 17, 2011, the appellate court held
that under Article 170, the action to impugn the legitimacy of the child must
be reckoned from either of these two dates: the date the child was born to
the mother during the marriage, or the date when the birth of such child was
recorded in the civil registry. The CA found no evidence or admission that
Caridad indeed gave birth to respondent on a specific date. It further
resolved that the birth certificate presented in this case, Exhibit 14, does not
qualify as the valid registration of birth in the civil register as envisioned by
the law, viz.:
x x x The reason is that under the statute establishing the civil register, Act
No. 3753, the declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the
birth or in default thereof, that declaration of either parent of the newborn
45
Persons 4th Exam Cases
child, shall be sufficient for the registration of birth in the civil register. The
document in question was signed by one Emma Dao who was not
identified as either the parent of the plaintiff or the physician or midwife who
attended to her birth. Exhibit 14, legally, cannot be the birth certificate
envisioned by the law; otherwise, with an informant as shadowy as Emma
Dao, the floodgates to spurious filiations will be opened. Neither may the
order of the court Exhibit E be treated as the final judgment mentioned in
Article 172 as another proof of filiation.
The final judgment mentioned refers to a decision of a competent court
finding the child legitimate. Exhibit G is merely an order granting letters of
guardianship to the parent Caridad based on her representations that she
is the mother of the plaintiff.8
Noting the absence of such record of birth, final judgment or admission in a
public or private document that respondent is the legitimate child of the
spouses Rufino and Caridad, the appellate court similar to the trial court
relied on Article 172 of the Family Code which allows the introduction and
admission of secondary evidence to prove ones legitimate filiation via open
and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. The CA
agreed with the trial court that respondent has proven her legitimate
filiation, viz.:
We agree with the lower court that the plaintiff has proven her filiation by
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. The
evidence consists of the following: (1) the plaintiff was allowed by her
putative parents to bear their family name Geronimo; (2) they supported her
and sent her to school paying for her tuition fees and other school expenses;
(3) she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad before the GSIS;
(4) after the death of Rufino, Caridad applied for and was appointed legal
guardian of the person and property of the plaintiff from the estate left by
Rufino; and (5) both Caridad and the plaintiff executed an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of Rufino on the basis of the fact that they are both
the legal heirs of the deceased.
It is clear that the status enjoyed by the plaintiff as the legitimate child of
Rufino and Caridad has been open and continuous. x x x The conclusion
follows that the plaintiff is entitled to the property left by Rufino to the
exclusion of his brothers, the defendants, which consists of a one-half share
in Lot 1716.9
Petitioners moved for reconsideration10 but the motion was denied in the
assailed Resolution dated May 24, 2011. Hence, this petition raising the
following assignment of errors:
I. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION, WHEN IT ALLOWED THE INTRODUCTION OF
SECONDARY EVIDENCE AND RENDERED JUDGMENT
BASED THEREON NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE OF
PRIMARY EVIDENCE OF BIRTH CERTIFICATE [EXHIBIT 14].
II. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS HAVE
NO PERSONALITY TO IMPUGN RESPONDENTS
LEGITIMATE FILIATION.11
On the first issue, petitioner argues that secondary evidence to prove ones
filiation is admissible only if there is no primary evidence, i.e, a record of
birth or an authentic admission in writing.12 Petitioner asserts that herein
respondents birth certificate, Exhibit 14, constitutes the primary evidence
enumerated under Article 172 of the Family Code and the ruling of both
courts a quo that the document is not the one "envisioned by law" should
have barred the introduction of secondary evidence. Petitioner expounds
this proposition, viz.:
The findings of the courts a quo that the birth certificate [Exhibit 14] is not
[the] one envisioned by law finds support in numerous cases decided by the
Honorable Supreme Court. Thus, a certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence as to the issue of
paternity, when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in
the preparation of said certificates, and the Local Civil Registrar is devoid
of authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the
information of a third person. Where the birth certificate and the baptismal
certificate are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation, they
cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
xxx
x x x The birth certificate Exhibit 14 contains erasures. The date of birth
originally written in ball pen was erased and the date April 6, 1972 was
superimposed using a pentel pen; the entry on the informant also originally
written in ball pen was erased and the name E. Dano was superimposed
using also a pentel pen; there is no signature as to who received it from the
office of the registry. Worst, respondent Karen confirms the existence of her
birth certificate when she introduced in evidence [Exhibit A] a mere
Certification from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Sta. Maria, Ilocos
Sur, which highlighted more suspicions of its existence, thus leading to
conclusion and presumption that if such evidence is presented, it would be
adverse to her claim. True to the suspicion, when Exhibit 14 was introduced
by the petitioner and testified on by no less than the NSO representative,
Mr. Arturo Reyes, and confirmed that there were alterations which renders
the birth certificate questionable.
Argued differently, with the declaration that the birth certificate is a nullity or
falsity, the courts a quo should have stopped there, ruled that respondent
Karen is not the child of Rufino, and therefore not entitled to inherit from the
estate.13
On the second issue, petitioner alleges that the CA gravely erred and
abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that he
does not have personality to impugn respondents legitimate filiation.14
While petitioner admits that the CA "did not directly rule on this particular
issue,"15 he nonetheless raises the said issue as an error since the
appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner argues that
in so affirming, the CA also adopted the ruling of the trial court that the
filiation of respondent is strictly personal to respondents alleged father and
his heirs under Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code,16 thereby denying
petitioner the "right to impugn or question the filiation and status of the
plaintiff."17 Petitioner argues, viz.:
x x x [T]he lower courts reliance on Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code
is totally misplaced, with due respect. It should be read in conjunction with
the other articles in the same chapter on paternity and filiation of the Family
Code. A careful reading of said chapter would reveal that it contemplates
situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a mans child, and the
father [or, in proper cases, his heirs] denies the childs filiation. It does not
refer to situations where a child is alleged not to be the child at all of a
particular couple. Petitioners are asserting not merely that respondent
Karen is not a legitimate child of, but that she is not a child of Rufino
Geronimo at all. x x x18
We grant the petition.
Despite its finding that the birth certificate which respondent offered in
evidence is questionable, the trial court ruled that respondent is a legitimate
child and the sole heir of deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad. The RTC
based this conclusion on secondary evidence that is similar to proof
admissible under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code
to prove the filiation of legitimate children, viz.:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the following evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.
Petitioner argues that such secondary evidence may be admitted only in a
direct action under Article 172 because the said provision of law is meant
to be instituted as a separate action, and proof of filiation cannot be raised
as a collateral issue as in the instant case which is an action for annulment
of document and recovery of possession.
Petitioner is correct that proof of legitimacy under Article 172, or illegitimacy
under Article 175, should only be raised in a direct and separate action
instituted to prove the filiation of a child. The rationale behind this procedural
prescription is stated in the case of Tison v. Court of Appeals,19 viz.:
x x x [W]ell settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked
collaterally.
The rationale for these rules has been explained in this wise:
"The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code x x x actually fixes a civil
status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked
collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct
action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period
limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or
as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. The
necessity of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more
clearly expressed in the Mexican Code (Article 335) which provides: The
contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made
by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any
other way is void. This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles
170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to "the action
to impugn the legitimacy."
This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the
periods fixed in the present articles.
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action to
impugn the legitimacy of a child can no longer be brought. The status
conferred by the presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer
be questioned.1wphi1 The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the
status of a child born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a
long time. It also aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the
paternity of such child, so that the evidence material to the matter, which
must necessarily be facts occurring during the period of the conception of
the child, may still be easily available.
xxxx
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He
is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the
infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that
infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic interest involved.
46
Persons 4th Exam Cases
It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such
legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none even his heirs can impugn
legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory."20
What petitioner failed to recognize, however, is that this procedural rule is
applicable only to actions where the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child
is at issue. This situation does not obtain in the case at bar.
In the instant case, the filiation of a child herein respondent is not at
issue. Petitioner does not claim that respondent is not the legitimate child
of his deceased brother Rufino and his wife Caridad. What petitioner alleges
is that respondent is not the child of the deceased spouses Rufino and
Caridad at all. He proffers this allegation in his Amended Answer before the
trial court by way of defense that respondent is not an heir to his brother
Rufino. When petitioner alleged that respondent is not a child of the
deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad in the proceedings below,
jurisprudence shows that the trial court was correct in admitting and ruling
on the secondary evidence of respondent even if such proof is similar to
the evidence admissible under the second paragraph of Article 172 and
despite the instant case not being a direct action to prove ones filiation. In
the following cases, the courts a quo and this Court did not bar the
introduction of secondary evidence in actions which involve allegations that
the opposing party is not the child of a particular couple even if such
evidence is similar to the kind of proof admissible under the second
paragraph of Article 172.
In the 1994 case of Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals,21 therein deceased
spouses Vicente Benitez (Vicente) and Isabel Chipongian (Isabel) owned
various properties while they were still living. Isabel departed in 1982, while
Vicente died intestate in 1989. In 1990, Vicentes sister (Victoria Benitez-
Lirio) and nephew (Feodor Benitez Aguilar) instituted an action before the
trial court for the issuance of letters of administration of his estate in favor
of Feodor. In the said proceedings, they alleged that Vicente was "survived
by no other heirs or relatives be they ascendants or descendants, whether
legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted x x x."22 They further argued that
one "Marissa Benitez[-]Badua who was raised and cared for by them since
childhood is, in fact, not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted, and
is therefore not a legal heir [of Vicente]."23 Marissa opposed the petition and
proffered evidence to prove that she is an heir of Vicente. Marissa submitted
the following evidence, viz.:
1. her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. 3);
2. Baptismal Certificate (Exh. 4);
3. Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for Membership
with the GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as his daughter
(Exhs. 10 to 21); and
4. School Records (Exhs. 5 & 6).
She also testified that the said spouses reared and continuously treated her
as their legitimate daughter.24
Feodor and his mother Victoria offered mostly testimonial evidence to show
that the spouses Vicente and Isabel failed to beget a child during their
marriage. They testified that the late Isabel, when she was 36 years old,
was even referred to an obstetrician-gynecologist for treatment. Victoria,
who was 77 years old at the time of her testimony, also categorically stated
that Marissa was not the biological child of the said spouses who were
unable to physically procreate.25
The trial court, relying on Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code, declared
Marissa as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses Vicente and
Isabel. The appellate court reversed the RTCs ruling holding that the trial
court erred in applying Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code. On appeal
to this Court, we affirmed the reversal made by the appellate court, viz.:
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not
contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged
not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple.
Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs)
denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is
the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it
was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife
within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the
birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child
could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through
artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either
parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue
influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the
prescriptive period within which the husband or any of hisheirs should file
the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the
appellate court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to
the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of
the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by
Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born
to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat- Lim vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is
apropos, viz:
"Petitioners recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of
the Family Code] is not welltaken.
This legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is
inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their
inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not
claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimatechild of the
deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being neither
legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal
fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased."26
Similarly, the 2001 case of Labagala v. Santiago27 originated from a
complaint for recovery of title, ownership and possession before the trial
court. Respondents therein contended that petitioner is not the daughter of
the decedent Jose and sought to recover from her the 1/3 portion of the
subject property pertaining to Jose but which came into petitioners sole
possession upon Joses death. Respondents sought to prove that petitioner
is not the daughter of the decedent as evidenced by her birth certificate
which did not itself indicate the name of Jose as her father. Citing the case
of Sayson v. Court of Appeals and Article 263 of the Civil Code (now Article
170 of the Family Code),28petitioner argued that respondents cannot
impugn her filiation collaterally since the case was not an action impugning
a childs legitimacy but one for recovery of title, ownership and possession
of property. We ruled in this case that petitioners reliance on Article 263 of
the Civil Code is misplaced and respondents may impugn the petitioners
filiation in an action for recovery of title and possession. Thus, we affirmed
the ruling of the appellate court that the birth certificate of petitioner
Labagala proved that she "was born of different parents, not Jose and his
wife."29 Citing the aforecited cases of Benitez-Badua and Lim v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,30 we stated, viz.:
This article should be read in conjunction with the other articles in the same
chapter on paternity and filiation in the Civil Code. A careful reading of said
chapter would reveal that it contemplates situations where a doubt exists
that a child is indeed a mans child by his wife, and the husband (or, in
proper cases, his heirs) denies the childs filiation. It does not refer to
situations where a child is alleged not to be the child at all of a particular
couple.31
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert
and prove that a person is not a mans child by his wife. However, the
present case is not one impugning petitioners legitimacy.
Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a
legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all.
x x x32
Be that as it may, even if both courts a quo were correct in admitting
secondary evidence similar to the proof admissible under Article 172 of the
Family Code in this action for annulment of document and recovery of
possession, we are constrained to rule after a meticulous examination of
the evidence on record that all proof points to the conclusion that herein
respondent is not a child of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad.
While we ascribe to the general principle that this Court is not a trier of
facts,33 this rule admits of the following exceptions where findings of fact
may be passed upon and reviewed by this Court, viz.:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna v.
Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion
(Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4)
When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact areconflicting (Casica
v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.); (6) Whenthe Court of Appeals,
in making its findings, went beyond the issues of thecase and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant andappellee (Evangelista v.
Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401[1958]); (7) The findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those ofthe trial court (Garcia v. Court of
Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593
[1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the
Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242
[1970]).34
It is clear in the case at bar that the ruling of both courts a quo declaring
respondent as a legitimate child and sole heir of the deceasedspouses
Rufino and Caridad is one based on a misapprehension of facts.
A mere cursory reading of the birth certificate of respondent would show
that it was tampered specifically on the entries pertaining to the date of birth
of respondent and the name of the informant. Using pentel ink, the date of
birth of respondent April 6, 1972 and the name of the informant Emma
Dao were both superimposed on the document. Despite these glaring
erasures, the trial court still relied on the prima facie presumption of the
veracity and regularity of the birth certificate for failure of petitioner to
explain how the erasures were done and if the alterations were due to the
fault of respondent. It thus ruled that respondents filiation was duly
established by the birth certificate. The appellate court did not agree with
this finding and instead ruled that the birth certificate presented does not
qualify as the valid registration of birth in the civil register as envisioned by
the law. We reiterate the relevant pronouncement of the CA, viz.:
x x x The document in question was signed by one Emma Dao who was
not identified as either the parent of the plaintiff or the physician or midwife
who attended to her birth. Exhibit 14, legally, cannot be the birth certificate
envisioned by the law; otherwise, with an informant as shadowy as Emma
47
Persons 4th Exam Cases
Dao, the floodgates to spurious filiations will be opened. Neither may the
order of the court Exhibit E be treated as the final judgment mentioned in
Article 172 as another proof of filiation. The final judgment mentioned refers
to a decision of a competent court finding the child legitimate. Exhibit G is
merely an order granting letters of guardianship to the parent Caridad based
on her representations that she is the mother of the plaintiff.35
Nonetheless, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that respondent
has proven her filiation by showing that she has enjoyed that open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child of the deceased
spouses Rufino and Caridad, viz.:
x x x The evidence consists of the following: (1) the plaintiff was allowed by
her putative parents to bear their family name Geronimo; (2) they supported
her and sent her to school paying for her tuition fees and other school
expenses; (3) she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad
before the GSIS; (4) after the death of Rufino, Caridad applied for and was
appointed legal guardian of the person and property of the plaintiff from the
estate left by Rufino; and (5) both Caridad and the plaintiff executed an
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino on the basis of the fact that
they are both the legal heirs of the deceased.36
We do not agree with the conclusion of both courts a quo. The appellate
court itself ruled that the irregularities consisting of the superimposed
entries on the date of birth and the name of the informant made the
document questionable. The corroborating testimony of Arturo Reyes, a
representative of the NSO, further confirmed that the entries on the date of
birth and the signature of the informant are alterations on the birth certificate
which rendered the document questionable. To be sure, even the
respondent herself did not offer any evidence to explain such irregularities
on her own birth certificate. These irregularities and the totality of the
following circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are
sufficient to overthrow the presumption of regularity attached to
respondents birth certificate, viz.:
1. The identity of one Emma Dao, whose name was
superimposed as the informant regarding the birth of respondent,
remains unknown.
2. The testimony of Atty. Elmer De Dios Lopez, a legal consultant
of the Department of Education in Bulacan, proved that the
deceased Caridad did not have any maternity leave during the
period of her service from March 11, 1963 to October 24, 1984
as shown by her Service Record as an elementary school teacher
at Paombong, Bulacan. This was corroborated by a certification
from Dr. Teofila R. Villanueva, Schools Division Superintendent,
that she did not file any maternity leave during her service. No
testimonial or documentary evidence was also offered to prove
that the deceased Caridad ever had a pregnancy.
3. Based on the birth certificate, respondent was born in 1972 or
13 years into the marriage of the deceased spouses Rufino and
Caridad. When respondent was born, Caridad was already 40
years old. There are no hospital records of Caridads delivery,
and while it may have been possible for her to have given birth at
her own home, this could have been proven by medical or non-
medical records or testimony if they do, in fact, exist.
4. It is worthy to note that respondent was the sole witness for
herself in the instant case.
Finally, we also find that the concurrence of the secondary evidence relied
upon by both courts a quo does not sufficiently establish the one crucial fact
in this case: that respondent is indeed a child of the deceased spouses.
Both the RTC and the CA ruled that respondent is a legitimate child of her
putative parents because she was allowed to bear their family name extrajudicial partition which she executed with Villanueva on August 8, 1980
"Geronimo", they supported her and her education, she was the beneficiary was invalid.39
of the burial benefits of Caridad in her GSIS policy, Caridad applied for and In view of these premises, we are constrained to disagree with both courts a
was appointed as her legal guardian in relation to the estate left by Rufino, quo and rule that the confluence of the circumstances and the proof
and she and Caridad executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of presented in this case do not lead to the conclusion that respondent is a
Rufino as his legal heirs. child of the deceased spouses.
In the case of Rivera v. Heirs of Romualdo Villanueva37 which incisively WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision
discussed its parallelisms and contrasts with the case of Benitez- Badua v. and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88650 dated
Court of Appeals,38 we ruled that the presence of a similar set of January 17, 2011 and May 24, 2011, respectively,
circumstances which were relied upon as secondary proof by both are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint in Civil Case No. 268-M-
courts a quo in the case at bar does not establish that one is a child of the 2001 for Annulment of Document and Recovery of Possession is hereby
putativeparents. Our discussion in the Rivera case is instructive, viz.: ordered DISMISSED.
In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, Marissa Benitez-Badua, in With costs against the respondent.
attempting to prove that she was the sole heir of the late Vicente Benitez, SO ORDERED.
submitted a certificate of live birth, a baptismal certificate, income tax
returns and an information sheet for membership in the Government
Service Insurance System of the decedent naming her as his daughter, and
her school records. She also testified that she had been reared and
continuously treated as Vicentes daughter.
By testimonial evidence alone, to the effect that Benitez-Baduas alleged
parents had been unable to beget children, the siblings of Benitez- Baduas
supposed father were able to rebut all of the documentary evidence
indicating her filiation. One fact that was counted against Benitez-Badua
was that her supposed mother Isabel Chipongian, unable to bear any
children even after ten years of marriage, all of a sudden conceived and
gave birth to her at the age of 36.
Of great significance to this controversy was the following pronouncement:
But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth
certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption,
does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the
legal rights of such child, and even amounts to simulation of the child's
birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public
document.(emphasis ours)
Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima
facie evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence
of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the
interestedparties. Following the logic of Benitez, respondent Angelina and
her codefendants in SD-857 should have adduced evidence of her
adoption, in view of the contents of her birth certificate. The records,
however, are bereft of any such evidence.
There are several parallels between this case and Benitez- Badua that are
simply too compelling to ignore. First, both Benitez-Baduaand respondent
Angelina submitted birth certificates as evidence offiliation. Second, both
claimed to be children of parents relativelyadvanced in age. Third, both
claimed to have been born after their allegedparents had lived together
childless for several years.
There are, however, also crucial differences between BenitezBadua and
this case which ineluctably support the conclusion thatrespondent Angelina
was not Gonzales' daughter, whether illegitimate oradopted. Gonzales,
unlike Benitez-Badua's alleged mother Chipongian,was not only 36 years
old but 44 years old, and on the verge of menopauseat the time of the
alleged birth. Unlike Chipongian who had been marriedto Vicente Benitez
for only 10 years, Gonzales had been living childlesswith Villanueva for 20
years. Under the circumstances, we hold that it was not sufficiently
established that respondent Angelina was Gonzales' biological daughter,
nor even her adopted daughter. Thus, she cannot inherit from Gonzales.
Since she could not have validly participated in Gonzales' estate, the
48
Persons 4th Exam Cases
VIRGINIA D. CALIMAG, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF SILVESTRA N.
MACAPAZ, REPRESENTED BY ANASTACIO P. MACAPAZ,
JR., Respondents.
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on October 20, 2009 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 90907 which affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated
September 28, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 147, in Civil Case No. 06-173, an action for annulment of
deed of sale and cancellation of title with damages. The CA
Resolution4 dated April 5, 2010 denied the motion for reconsideration
thereof.
The Facts
Virginia D. Calimag (petitioner) co-owned the property, the subject
matter of this case, with Silvestra N. Macapaz (Silvestra).
On the other hand, Anastacio P. Macapaz, Jr. (Anastacio, Jr.) and
Alicia Macapaz-Ritua (Alicia) (respondents) are the children of
Silvestra's brother, Anastacio Macapaz, Sr. (Anastacio, Sr.) and
Fidela O. Poblete Vda. de Macapaz (Fidela).
The subject property, with a total area of 299 square meters, is
located at No. 1273 Bo. Visaya Street, Barangay Guadalupe Nuevo,
Makati City, and was duly registered in the names of the petitioner
(married to Demetrio Calimag) and Silvestra under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 183088.5 In said certificate of title,
appearing as Entry No. 02671 is an annotation of an Adverse Claim of
Fidela asserting rights and interests over a portion of the said property
measuring 49.5 sq m.6
On November 11, 2002, Silvestra died without issue. On July 7, 2005,
TCT No. 183088 was cancelled and a new certificate of title, TCT No.
221466,7 was issued in the name of the petitioner by virtue of a Deed
of Sale8 dated January 18, 2005 whereby Silvestra allegedly sold her
99-sq-m portion to the petitioner for P300,000.00. Included among the
documents submitted for the purpose of cancelling TCT No. 183088
was an Affidavit9 dated July 12, 2005 purportedly executed by both
the petitioner and Silvestra. It was stated therein that the affidavit of
adverse claim filed by Fidela was not signed by the Deputy Register
of Deeds of Makati City, making the same legally ineffective. On
September 16, 2005, Fidela passed away.10
On December 15, 2005, Anastacio, Jr. filed a criminal complaint for
two counts of falsification of public documents under Articles 171 and
172 of the Revised Penal Code against the petitioner. 11 However, said
criminal charges were eventually dismissed.
On March 2, 2006, the respondents, asserting that they are the heirs
of Silvestra, instituted the action for Annulment of Deed of Sale and
Cancellation of TCT No. 221466 with Damages against the petitioner
and the Register of Deeds of Makati City.12
In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,13 the petitioner averred
that the respondents have no legal capacity to institute said civil
action on the ground that they are illegitimate children of Anastacio,
Sr. As such, they have no right over Silvestra's estate pursuant to
Article 992 of the Civil Code which prohibits illegitimate children from
inheriting intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of their
father and mother.
After trial, the RTC found for the respondents and rendered its
Decision on September 28, 2007.14 The fallo of the RTC decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered as
follows:
1. Declaring the Deed of Sale purportedly executed
by [Silvestra] in favor of [the petitioner] on January
18, 2005 over a parcel of land covered by TCT No.
183088 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City, as
Null and Void;
2. Ordering the Registrar of Deeds of Makati City to
cancel TCT No. 221466 issued in the name of [the
petitioner], the same having been issued on the
basis of a fraudulent/falsified Deed of Sale, and
thereafter to reinstate TCT No. 183088 issued in
the name of [the petitioner] and [Silvestra] with all
the liens and encumbrances annotated thereon,
including the adverse claim of [Fidela]; [and]
3. Ordering [the petitioner] to pay the [respondents]
the sum of PI00,000.00 as moral damages and
another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages,
P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees, plus
costs of suit.
[The petitioner's] counter-claim is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.15
The RTC found that the Deed of Sale dated January 18, 2005
presented for the cancellation of TCT No. 183088 was a forgery
considering that Silvestra, who purportedly executed said deed of sale
died on November 11, 2002, about three years before the execution
of the said Deed of Sale.16 Respecting the respondents' legal capacity
to sue, the RTC favorably ruled in this wise:
Demetrio Calimag, Jr. sought, but failed, to impugn the personality of
the [respondents] to initiate this action as the alleged heirs of
[Silvestra]. The marriage between [Anastacio Sr.J and [FidclaJ is
evidenced by the Certificate of (canonical) Marriage (Exh. "M").
The name 'Fidela Obera Poblete' is indicated in [the
respondents'] respective birth certificates as the mother's
maiden name but Fidela signed the same as the informant as
"Fidela P. Macapaz". In both birth certificates, "Anastacio Nator
Macapaz" is indicated as the name of the father.17 (Emphasis
ours)
Ruling of the CA
Aggrieved, the petitioner elevated her case to the CA resting on the
argument that the respondents are without legal personality to
institute the civil action for cancellation of deed of sale and title on the
basis of their claimed status as legitimate children of Anastacio, Sr.,
the brother and sole heir of the deceased, Silvestra. 18
On October 20, 2009, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the RTC
decision with modification as to the amount of damages. The fallo of
the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby
DISMISSED, for lack of merit. The Decision dated September 28,
2007 of the [RTC] of Makati City, Branch 147 in Civil Case No. 06-173
is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the award of moral
and exemplary damages is hereby reduced from PI00,000.00 to
P50,000.00, respectively.
With costs against the [petitioner].
SO ORDERED.19
The CA sustained the RTC ruling that the cancellation of TCT No.
183088 and the issuance of TCT No. 221466 in the name of the
petitioner were obtained through forgery. As to the question of
whether the respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra and thus have the
legal capacity to institute the action, the CA ruled in this wise:
Reviewing the evidence on record, we concur with the trial court in
sustaining the appellees' legitimate filiation to Silvestra's brother
[Anastacio, Sr.] The trial court found unsuccessful the attempt of Atty.
Demetrio Calimag, Jr. to assail the validity of marriage between
[Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] with a certification from the NSO that
their office has no record of the certificate of marriage of [Anastacio,
Sr.] and [Fidela], and further claiming the absence of a marriage
license.
The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a marriage
contract. A certificate of marriage issued by the Most Holy Trinity
Parish, Alang[-]alang, Leyte (Exh. "M") as well as a copy of the
marriage contract were duly submitted in evidence by the
[respondents].
xxxx
The Marriage Contract (Exh. "U") in this case clearly reflects a
marriage license number and in the absence of a certification from the
local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued, the
marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] may not be invalidated
on that ground.
x x x.
xxxx
Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony.
Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in
the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the
49
Persons 4th Exam Cases
case, to be in fact married. This jurisprudential attitude towards
marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into
a lawful contract of marriage. The Courts look upon this presumption
with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the
presumption is of great weight.
Here, the fact of marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] was
established by competent and substantial proof. [The respondents]
who were conceived and born during the subsistence of said marriage
are therefore presumed to be legitimate children of [Anastacio, Sr.], in
the absence of any contradicting evidence.20 (Citations omitted)
The petitioner sought reconsideration,21 but her motion was denied in
the Resolution22 dated April 5, 2010.
Hence, this petition.
Notably, even before the CA, the petitioner never assailed the factual
finding that forgery was indeed committed to effect the cancellation of
TCT No. 183088 and the consequent transfer of title of the property in
her name. Verily, in this petition, the petitioner continues to assail the
legal capacity of the respondents to institute the present action.
Invoking the provisions of Article 992 of the Civil Code, 23 the petitioner
insists that the respondents have no legal right over the estate left by
Silvestra for being illegitimate children of Anastacio, Sr.
While the petitioner does not question that Anastacio, Sr. is the legal
heir of Silvestra, she, however, claims that the respondents failed to
establish their legitimate filiation to Anastacio, Sr. considering that the
marriage between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was not sufficiently
proven. According to the petitioner, the marriage contract24 presented
by the respondents is not admissible under the Best Evidence Rule
for being a mere fax copy or photocopy of an alleged marriage
contract, and which is not even authenticated by the concerned Local
Civil Registrar. In addition, there is no mark or stamp showing that
said document was ever received by said office. Further, while the
respondents also presented a Certificate of (Canonical)
Marriage,25 the petitioner asserts that the same is not the marriage
license required under Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code; 26 that said
Certificate of (Canonical) Marriage only proves that a marriage
ceremony actually transpired between Anastacio, Sr. and
Fidela.27cralawred
Moreover, the petitioner contends that the certificates of live birth of
the respondents do not conclusively prove that they are legitimate
children of Anastacio, Sr.
In their Comment,28 the respondents reiterate the finding and ruling of
the CA that the petitioner's argument has no leg to stand on
considering that one's legitimacy can only be questioned in a direct
action seasonably filed by a party who is related to the former either
by consanguinity or affinity.29
Thereupon, the resolution of this case rests upon this fundamental
issue: whether or not the respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is bereft of merit.
While it is true that a person's legitimacy can only be questioned in a
direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, as held in Spouses
Fidel v. Hon. CA, et al.,30 this Court however deems it necessary to
pass upon the respondents' relationship to Silvestra so as to
determine their legal rights to the subject property. Besides, the
question of whether the respondents have the legal capacity to sue as
alleged heirs of Silvestra was among the issues agreed upon by the
parties in the pre-trial.
At first blush, the documents presented as proof of marriage between
Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela, viz: (1) fax or photo copy of the marriage
contract, and (2) the canonical certificate of marriage, cannot be used
as legal basis to establish the fact of marriage without running afoul
with the Rules on Evidence of the Revised Rules of Court. Rule 130,
Section 3 of the Rules on Evidence provides that: "When the subject
of the inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, x x x."
Nevertheless, a reproduction of the original document can still be
admitted as secondary evidence subject to certain requirements
specified by law. In Dantis v. Maghinang, Jr.,31 it was held that:
A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule
130, Section 5, which states that: when the original has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of
its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without
bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital
of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated. Accordingly, the offeror of the
secondary evidence is burdened to satisfactorily prove the predicates
thereof, namely: (1) the execution or existence of the original; (2) the
loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and
(3) the unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part
of the proponent/offeror. Proof of the due execution of the document
and its subsequent loss would constitute the basis for the introduction
of secondary evidence, x x x.32 (Citation omitted)
On the other hand, a canonical certificate of marriage is not a public
document. As early as in the case of United States v. Evangelista,33
it has been settled that church registries of births, marriages, and
deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No.
68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor
are they kept by duly authorized public officials. 34 They are private
writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all
other private writings in accordance with the rules of
evidence.35 Accordingly, since there is no showing that the
authenticity and due execution of the canonical certificate of marriage
of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was duly proven, it cannot be admitted in
evidence.
Notwithstanding, it is well settled that other proofs can be offered to
establish the fact of a solemnized marriage. 36 Jurisprudence teaches
that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other
than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person's birth certificate
may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between
his parents.37
Thus, in order to prove their legitimate filiation, the respondents
presented their respective Certificates of Live Birth issued by the
National Statistics Office38 where Fidela signed as the Informant in
item no. 17 of both documents.
A perusal of said documents shows that the respondents were
apparently born to the same parents their father's name
is Anastacio Nator Macapaz, while their mother's maiden name
is Fidela Overa Poblete. In item no. 24 thereof where it asks: "24.
DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARENTS (For legitimate
birth)" it was stated therein that respondents' parents were married on
"May 25, 1955 in Alang-alang, Leyte."39
The petitioner asserts that said documents do not conclusively prove
the respondents' legitimate filiation, albeit, without offering any
evidence to the contrary. The certificates of live birth contain no entry
stating whether the respondents are of legitimate or illegitimate
filiation, making said documents unreliable and unworthy of weight
and value in the determination of the issue at hand.
Moreover, the petitioner states that in the respondents' certificates of
live birth, only the signature of Fidela appears, and that they were not
signed by Anastacio, Sr. She argues that the birth certificate must be
signed by the father in order to be competent evidence to establish
filiation, whether legitimate or illegitimate, invoking Roces v. Local
Civil Registrar of Manila40 where it was held that a birth certificate not
signed by the alleged father is not competent evidence of paternity. 41
The petitioner's contentions are untenable.
"A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries
(regarding the facts of birth) in public records (Civil Registry) made in
the performance of a duty by a public officer (Civil Registrar)."42Thus,
being public documents, the respondents' certificates of live birth are
presumed valid, and are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts
stated in them.43
"Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient on
its face. Such evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to
establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the
party's claim or defense and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will
remain sufficient."44
The petitioner's assertion that the birth certificate must be signed by
the father in order to be a competent evidence of legitimate filiation
does not find support in law and jurisprudence. In fact, the petitioner's
reliance on Roces45 is misplaced considering that what was sought to
50
Persons 4th Exam Cases
be proved is the fact of paternity of an illegitimate child, and not
legitimate filiation.
Verily, under Section 5 of Act No. 3753,46 the declaration
of either parent of the new-born legitimate child shall be sufficient for
the registration of his birth in the civil register, and only in the
registration of birth of an illegitimate child does the law require that the
birth certificate be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the
infant, or only by the mother if the father refuses to acknowledge the
child.
The pertinent portion of Section 5 of Act No. 3753 reads:
Sec. 5. Registration and Certification of Birth. - The declaration of the
physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default
thereof, the declaration of cither parent of the newborn child,
shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil
register. Such declaration shall be exempt from the documentary
stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than
thirty days after the birth, by the physician, or midwife in attendance at
the birth or by either parent of the newly born child.
In such declaration, the persons above mentioned shall certify to the
following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of
infant; (c) names, citizenship, and religion of parents or, in case the
father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e)
place where the infant was born; if) and such other data as may be
required in the regulations to be issued.
xxxx
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be
signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only
the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be
permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father
who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any
information by which such father could be identified, x x x (Emphasis
Ours)
Forsooth, the Court finds that the respondents' certificates of live birth
were duly executed consistent with the provision of the law respecting
the registration of birth of legitimate children. The fact that only the
signatures of Fidela appear on said documents is of no moment
because Fidela only signed as the declarant or informant of the
respondents' fact of birth as legitimate children.
Nonetheless, the respondents' certificates of live birth also intimate
that Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela had openly cohabited as husband and
wife for a number of years, as a result of which they had two children
the second child, Anastacio, Jr. being born more than three years
after their first child, Alicia. Verily, such fact is admissible proof to
establish the validity of marriage. Court Resolution dated February 13,
2013 in GR. No. 183262 entitled Social Security System (SSS) v.
Lourdes S. Enobiso47 had the occasion to state:
Sarmiento v. CA is instructive anent the question of what other proofs
can be offered to establish the fact of a solemnized marriage, viz:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court ruled that as
proof of marriage may be presented: a) testimony of a witness to
the matrimony; b) the couple's public and open cohabitation as
husband and wife after the alleged wedlock; c) the birth and
baptismal certificate of children born during such union; and d) the
mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents. 48 (Citations omitted
and emphasis ours)
Moreover, in a catena of cases,49 it has been held that, "[p]ersons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case,
to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves
out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency
and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure
is 'that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage."50
Furthermore, as the established period of cohabitation of Anastacio,
Sr. and Fidela transpired way before the effectivity of the Family
Code, the strong presumption accorded by then Article 220 of the
Civil Code in favor of the validity of marriage cannot be disregarded.
Thus:
Art. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the
family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity
of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of
children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of
parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member
of the family in case of unlawful aggression.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.
The Decision dated October 20, 2009 and Resolution dated April 5,
2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90907
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
51
Persons 4th Exam Cases
GLORIA ZOLETA-SAN AGUSTIN, Petitioner
vs.
ERNESTO SALES, Respondent
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure filed by Gloria Zoleta-San Agustin (petitioner) assails
the Decision2 dated May 29, 2009 and the Resolution3 dated August
25, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90302.
Factual Antecedents
On March 14, 1994, brothers Teodoro Sales (Teodoro) (now deceased)
and Ernestp Sales (Ernesto) (collectively, the plaintiffs) filed an action
for the judicial approval of their recognition as the illegitimate children
of the late Louis C. Fernandez (Louis) before the Regional ;Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-19781 and
raffled to Branch 110. 4 Subsequently, an Amended Complaint was
filed on March 13, 1996, before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 225,
where it was alleged that Ernesto and Teodoro were born in Pasay City
on March 20, 1948 and October 22, 1943, respectively. They are the
illegitimate children of Louis and his common-law wife named Epitacia
Sales (Epitacia) who was a house helper in the Fernandez household.
Louis5 and his legal wife, Marie Louise Fernandez (Marie
Louise)6 (Spouses Fernandez), a French national, did not have any
child. According to the plaintiffs, Louis formally recognized them as his
children by Epitacia in two public documents bearing his thumb marks,
viz: (1) a notarized document dated November 11, 1980 jointly
executed by Louis and Epitacia fonnally recognizing the plaintiffs as
their children; and (2) a document solely executed by Louis on
December 2, 1980, dominated as Acknowledgement of Children. 7
The plaintiffs, having no knowledge of any relatives of Spouses
Fernandez, directed the action against unknown defendants. However,
on May 30, 1994, the petitioner raised her opposition. She alleged in
her Amended Answer filed on July 26, 1994 that she is the niece of
Louis and that the Spouses Fernandez informally adopted her as their
child when she was only 2 years old. She insisted that the father of the
plaintiffs is Corpus Micabalo (Corpus), the former houseboy of the
Fernandez household. 8
One of the principal allegations in the amended answer of the petitioner
is that the documents presented by the plaintiffs to sustain the
complaint were spurious. These documents of recognition were
forwarded by the RTC to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for
examination. Bayani Palad (Palad), a Fingerprint Examiner of the NBI,
compared the thumbprint of Louis on the documents of recognition with
the other documents containing his thumb marks. Thereafter, Palad
concluded that all the thumbprints in the disputed documents belong to
Louis.9 On February 17, 2001, the petitioner filed a motion to allow
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) Testing on Louis who already died on
January 1, 1987. The RTC, in its Resolution dated June 4, 2001, denied
the petitioner's motion. Subsequently, the presentation of evidence
proceeded. 10
On April 15, 2002, the RTC issued an order denying the admission of
the photographs presented by the petitioner seeking to prove that she
was 'treated by the Spouses Fernandez as their own child. The
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order of denial,
but it was denied by the RTC on July 10, 2002. 11 Thereafter, the
petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the CA
ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction against the RTC judge for declaring the photographs
irrelevant and immaterial to the issue of recognition submitted before
the RTC. In a Decision12 dated September 29, 2003, the CA denied the
petition for lack of merit. It ruled that even if the photographs were
admitted, they remained to be immaterial and irrelevant to the issue of
recognition of the plaintiffs as the illegitimate children of Louis. 13
Teodoro died on July 23, 1997 and was substituted by his mother
Epitacia who subsequently died on March 19, 2004 leaving Ernesto the
lone respondent in the present case.
Ruling of the RTC
After trial on the merits, the RTC in a Decision14 dated July 12, 2007
ruled in favor of the recognition of the plaintiffs as the illegitimate
children of Louis. The dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby GRANTS
plaintiffs' prayer for judicial approval of the recognition made by [Louis]
during his lifetime. Accordingly, [Ernesto] and [Teodoro] (deceased) are
hereby declared the illegitimate children of the deceased [Louis] with
the appurtenant rights of illegitimate children under the law.
SO ORDERED. 15
The petitioner elevated the adverse judgment of the RTC before the
CA. The parties filed their respective briefs. The petitioner filed her
Reply Brief (with Application for DNA Testing of Louis). 16 Ernesto filed
his Comment17 objecting to the proposed DNA Testing. In a
Resolution18 dated February 10, 2009, the CA deferred its
determination of the petitioner's application for DNA Testing.
Ruling of the CA
In a Decision19 dated May 29, 2009, the CA found the appeal devoid of
merit. The CA gave due weight to the deeds of acknowledgment
executed by Louis. The self-serving denial of the petitioner did not
prevail over the presumption of regularity accorded to the deeds of
recognition in favor of the plaintiffs. Quoted hereunder is the dispositive
portion of the decision of the CA, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision dated 12
July 2007 of the [RTC], Branch 225, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-
94-19781, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.20
On June 22, 2009, the petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration21 contending that the CA failed to act on her
application for DNA Testing despite its previous Resolution on February
10, 2009 that it would treat the same as one of the assigned errors in
the appeal. The CA denied the motion for reconsideration in a
Resolution22 dated August 25, 2009.
The Issues
Undaunted, the petitioner urges the allowance of her Petition for
Review on Certiorari enumerating the following as errors committed by
the CA:
I.
THE CA GROSSLY MISAPPREHENDED THE FACTS AND
MANIFESTLY IGNORED THE UNDISPUTED AND OVERWHELMING
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONER WHICH, IF
PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD HA VE JUSTIFIED A
DIFFERENT CONCLUSION.
A. The CA gravely erred in giving weight and credence to the two
"notarized" documents submitted by Ernesto despite the petitioner's
overwhelming contrary documentary evidence.
B. The CA gravely erred in giving credence to the testimony of
Ernesto's so-called expert witness.
II.
THE CA ARBITRARILY REFUSED AND/OR FAILED TO RULE ON
THE PETITIONER'S APPLICATION FOR DNA TESTING DESPITE
ITS EARLIER PRONOUNCEMENT THAT IT WILL RESOLVE THE
SAME AS AN ASSIGNED ERROR.
A. The CA's failure to act on the petitioner's Application for DNA Testing
is a substantial departure from this Honorable Court's decisions
favoring DNA Testing. Moreover, it is contrary to the CA's very own
Resolution dated February 10, 2009 wherein it undertook to resolve the
petitioner's application in the resolution of the main appeal. The
exercise of the Court's power of review and supervision is, thus, proper
and necessary under the circumstances.23
Ruling of the Court
The Court denies the instant petition and upholds the assailed decision
and resolution of the CA.
The petitioner calls for the relaxation of the general rule that only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. It is
a well-settled principle that the findings of fact of the CA especially
those upholding the trial court are final and conclusive and cannot be
reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court. The following are the
recognized exceptions to the said rule:
(a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when the [CA], in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same
is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) where
the [CA] manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; and (h) where the findings of fact of the [CA] are contrary
to those of the trial court, or are mere conclusions without citation of
specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not
disputed by the respondent, or where the findings of fact of the [CA] are
premised on absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence
on record. x x x. 24 (Citation omitted)
None of these enumerated exceptions exists in the case at bar.
Nonetheless, the Court will take up the petitioner's other assignment of
errors to the extent that they touch upon legal issues and in order to
support the Court's ruling that the RTC and CA's factual findings are
sufficiently justified by evidence and jurisprudence.
At the center of the present controversy are the documents executed
by Louis evidencing his voluntary recognition of Teodoro and Ernesto
as his illegitimate children. The petitioner, in an effort to oppose the
judicial approval of Teodoro and Ernesto's status as illegitimate
children, mainly argued that the subject documents are spurious. The
legitimate filiation of a child may be established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment;
or
52
Persons 4th Exam Cases

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private law that determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate children for
handwritten instrument and signed by the present concerned. one's legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. 34
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall All told, the authenticity of the documents of recognition executed by
be proven by: Louis which is the core of the present controversy, as well as the
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate credibility of the expert witness in the person of Palad, are questions of
child; or fact for they involve the examination of the probative value of the
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. 25 evidence presented by the litigants. There exists a question of law
These requirements likewise apply to establish the filiation of when the doubt arises as to what the law is pertaining to a certain state
illegitimate children. 26 In order to cast doubt as to the authenticity of of facts while a question of fact concerns itself with the truth or falsity
the documentary evidence presented by Ernesto, the petitioner of the alleged facts. 35 To reiterate, a petition for review
purported that the circumstances surrounding the execution and on certiorari covers only questions of law.
notarization of the said documents are highly suspicious thereby The petitioner sought the conduct of DNA Testing to resolve the issue
warranting the overturn of the presumption of regularity in favor of these of paternity. However, the RTC already arrived at a definitive
documents. The petitioner claimed that during the execution and conclusion that Teodoro and Ernesto are the illegitimate children of the
notarization of the documents, Louis could still write, rendering deceased Louis rendering the petitioner's request for DNA Testing
incredible the mere affixing of his thumbprints to the contested immaterial.
documents.27 However, Ernesto testified before the RTC that Louis WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no reversible error
was no longer capable of writing his name as he was already blind and committed by the Court of Appeals, the petition is DENIED. The
bedridden at the time he affixed his thumb mark to the document dated Decision dated May 29, 2009 and the Resolution dated August 25,
November 11, 1980. The witnesses to the document were Margarita 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90302 are
Almeda, the hairdresser of Louis' sister, and Romeo Gadones, hereby AFFIRMED.
Teodoro's acquaintance.28 A thumb mark has been repeatedly SO ORDERED.
considered as a valid mode of signature. The Court, in the case of Dr.
Yason v. Arciaga,29 held that a signature may be made by a person's
cross or mark.30
There being no cogent reason to deviate from the conclusion of the
RTC finding the testimony of Ernesto worthy of belief, the Court adopts
such testimony and considers it against the contention of the petitioner.
It is settled in a catena of cases that the findings of fact of trial courts
are given weight on appeal because they are in a better position to
examine the real evidence, and observe the demeanor of the witnesses
and therefore discern whether they are telling the truth. 31
The other inconsistencies cited by the petitioner are of no importance
and insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity in favor of
the notarized documents.1wphi1 A notarized document is a public
document and as such it enjoys the presumption of regularity which can
only be overthrown by clear and convincing evidence. 32 It serves as
a prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein and a
conclusive
presumption of its existence and due execution. 33 The bare allegations
of the petitioner cannot qualify as clear and convincing evidence to
overturn such presumption.
The petitioner maintained that the real father of Teodoro and Ernesto
is Corpus. She presented various evidence like school report card and
death certificate wherein Teodoro's surname followed that of Corpus.
The use of Corpus' surname by Teodoro does not in itself negate the
illegitimate filiation of Teodoro and Ernesto. As correctly observed by
the CA, Louis' existing marriage to Marie Louise must have prevented
him from making any declaration that would have exposed his
relationship with Epitacia. The use of 1,ouis' surname by his children
during the lifetime of Marie Louise would run counter to his intention to
cover such relationship. It is no less than the putative father who
voluntary recognized that Teodoro and Ernesto are his illegitimate
children. It is emphatically underscored that it is the law and only the
53
Persons 4th Exam Cases
MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA
TAMARGO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC
Judge, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC; and CLARA
BUNDOC, respondents.
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age,
shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her
death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Civil Case
No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and
petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents
against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural
parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. In addition
to this case for damages, a criminal information or Homicide through
Reckless Imprudence was filed [Criminal Case No. 1722-V] against
Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from
criminal liability on the ground that he bad acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and
Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in
Special Proceedings No. 0373-T before the then Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was grunted on, 18 November 1982,
that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents,
reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not
they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa
Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority
had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition
for adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then
actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased
nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for
adoption.
The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling
that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable
parties to the action.
Petitioners received a copy of the trial court's Decision on 7 December
1987. Within the 15-day reglementary period, or on 14 December 1987,
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration followed by a supplemental
motion for reconsideration on 15 January 1988. It appearing, however, that
the motions failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised
Rules of Court that notice of the motion shall be given to all parties
concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing of said motion; and
that said notice shall state the time and place of hearing both motions
were denied by the trial court in an Order dated 18 April 1988. On 28 April
1988, petitioners filed a notice of appeal. In its Order dated 6 June 1988,
the trial court dismissed the notice at appeal, this time ruling that the notice
had been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period ending 22 December
1987.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition
for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial court's Decision dated 3
December 1987 and the Orders dated 18 April 1988 and 6 June 1988, The
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their
right to appeal.
In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again contend that
respondent spouses Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the action for
damages caused by the acts of their minor child, Adelberto Bundoc.
Resolution of this Petition hinges on the following issues: (1) whether or not
petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may still file the
instant Petition; conversely, whether the Court may still take cognizance of
the case even through petitioners' appeal had been filed out of time; and (2)
whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is
concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting
parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their
adopted child, for acts committed by the latter, when actual custody was yet
lodged with the biological parents.
1. It will be recalled that, petitioners' motion (and supplemental motion) for
reconsideration filed before the trial court, not having complied with the
requirements of Section 13, Rule 41, and Section 4, Rule 15, of the Revised
Rules of Court, were considered pro forma and hence did not interrupt and
suspend the reglementary period to appeal: the trial court held that the
motions, not having contained a notice of time and place of hearing, had
become useless pieces of paper which did not interrupt the reglementary
period. 1 As in fact repeatedly held by this Court, what is mandatory is the
service of the motion on the opposing counsel indicating the time and place
of hearing. 2
In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the instant. Petition,
and in order that substantial justice may be served, the Court, invoking its
right to suspend the application of technical rules to prevent manifest
injustice, elects to treat the notice of appeal as having been seasonably filed
before the trial court, and the motion (and supplemental motion) for
reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial court as having interrupted the
reglementary period for appeal. As the Court held in Gregorio v. Court of
Appeals: 3
Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical grounds is
frowned upon where the policy of the courts is to
encourage hearings of appeal on their merits. The
rules of procedure ought not be applied in a very rigid
technical sense, rules of procedure are used only to
help secure not override, substantial justice. if d
technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made
their aim would be defeated. 4
2. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting
Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-
delict against him. As Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . .
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be
caused by a minor child who lives with them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code
reads:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by
the minor children who live in their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease
when the person herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage. (Emphasis supplied)
This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently
designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence"
under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not only liable for torts
committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he
has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental
liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and
responsibilities of parents their parental authority which includes the
instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child. 5 The basis for the
doctrine of vicarious liability was explained by the Court in Cangco v. Manila
Railroad Co. 6 in the following terms:
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising
from negligence, whether of act or omission, it is
competent for the legislature to elect and our
Legislature has so elected to limit such liability to
cases in which the person upon whom such an
obligation is imposed is morally culpable or, on the
contrary, for reasons of public policy. to extend that
liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability,
so as to include responsibility for the negligence of
those persons whose acts or omissions are imputable,
by a legal fiction, to others who are in a position to
exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The
legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected
to limit extra-contractual liability with certain well-
defined exceptions to cases in which moral
culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be
charged. This moral responsibility may consist in
having failed to exercise due care in one's own acts, or
in having failed to exercise due care in the selection
and control of one's agent or servants, or in the control
of persons who, by reasons of their status, occupy a
position of dependency with respect to the person
made liable for their conduct. 7 (Emphasis Supplied)
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor
children living with them, may be seen to be based upon the
parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents.
The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living
with its parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were
negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty closely
to supervise the child who is in their custody and control. Parental
liability is, in other words, anchored upon parental authority
coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of
the duties accompanying such authority. The parental dereliction
is, of course, only presumed and the presumption can be
overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the
parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle
occured when parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc
spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that
the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are
the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that because a
decree of adoption was issued by the adoption court in favor of the Rapisura
spouses, parental authority was vested in the latter as adopting parents as
54
Persons 4th Exam Cases
of the time of the filing of the petition for adoption that is, before Adelberto
had shot Jennifer which an air rifle. The Bundoc spouses contend that they
were therefore free of any parental responsibility for Adelberto's allegedly
tortious conduct.
Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code 8 which reads as follows:
Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. If, after considering the
report of the Department of Social Welfare or duly
licensed child placement agency and the evidence
submitted before it, the court is satisfied that the
petitioner is qualified to maintain, care for, and educate
the child, that the trial custody period has been
completed, and that the best interests of the child will
be promoted by the adoption, a decree of adoption
shall be entered, which shall be effective he date the
original petition was filed. The decree shall state the
name by which the child is thenceforth to be known.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36
should be read in relation to Article 39 of the same Code:
Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. The adoption shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents,
except where the adopter is the spouse of the surviving
natural parent;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to have been
dissolved as of the time the Petition for adoption was filed.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis
of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing
between the parents and the minor child living with them and over whom,
the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control. Article 58
of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this rule:
Article 58 Torts Parents and guardians are
responsible for the damage caused by the child under
their parental authority in accordance with the civil
Code. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines 9 has similarly insisted
upon the requisite that the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have beer in
the actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing
damage:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising
parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries
and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their
unemancipated children living in their companyand
under their parental authority subject to the appropriate
defenses provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having
been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not
consider that retroactive effect may be giver to the decree of adoption so as
to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when
adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted child.
Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for
adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or
advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to
hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura
spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could
not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they
were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the
child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result,
moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis
underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no
presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject
to their control at the time the tort was committed.
Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the conclusion
reached above. Article 35 provides as follows:
Art. 35. Trial Custody. No petition for adoption shall
be finally granted unless and until the adopting parents
are given by the courts a supervised trial custody
period of at least six months to assess their adjustment
and emotional readiness for the legal union. During the
period of trial custody, parental authority shall be
vested in the adopting parents. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the
adopting parents during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance
of a decree of adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given
actual custody of the child during such trial period. In the instant case, the
trial custody period either had not yet begun or bad already been completed
at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto
was then with his natural parents, not the adopting parents.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's
natural parents, were indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought
by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the trial court of petitioners'
complaint, the indispensable parties being already before the court,
constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby
GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
6 September 1988, in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-15016 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Petitioners' complaint filed before the trial court is hereby
REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that court for further
proceedings consistent with this Decision. Costs against respondent
Bundoc spouses. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
55
Persons 4th Exam Cases
ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner, vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO
(previously referred to as DR. MELVIN S.
LAHOM), respondent.
The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than
complete without children. The realization could have likely prodded
the spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to take into their
care Isabelitas nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their
own. At the tender age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love
and support of the couple who treated the child like their own. Indeed,
for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally adopting Jose
Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for
adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order granting the petition was issued
that made all the more intense than before the feeling of affection of the
spouses for Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar
of Naga City changed the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin
Lahom.
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in
December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the
decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22,
of Naga City. In her petition, she averred -
7. That x x x despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses,
respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to
the frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the latter
died, and even before his death he had made known his desire to
revoke respondents adoption, but was prevented by petitioners
supplication, however with his further request upon petitioner to give to
charity whatever properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the
future.
xxxxxxxxx
10. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter
disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his records with the
Professional Regulation Commission showed his name as Jose Melvin
M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978 until the present, and in all his
dealings and activities in connection with his practice of his profession,
he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.
xxxxxxxxx
13. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city
with only her household helps to attend to her, has yearned for the care
and show of concern from a son, but respondent remained indifferent
and would only come to Naga to see her once a year.
14. That for the last three or four years, the medical check-up of
petitioner in Manila became more frequent in view of a leg ailment, and
those were the times when petitioner would need most the care and
support from a love one, but respondent all the more remained callous
and utterly indifferent towards petitioner which is not expected of a son.
15. That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioners
nephews and nieces whenever they would find time to visit her,
respondent alleging that they were only motivated by their desire for
some material benefits from petitioner.
16. That in view of respondents insensible attitude resulting in a
strained and uncomfortable relationship between him and petitioner,
the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that after all
respondents only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged
rights over the properties of herein petitioner and her late husband,
clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil Case No. 99-4463 for partition
against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and affection towards
respondent, rendering the decree of adoption, considering respondent
to be the child of petitioner, for all legal purposes, has been negated for
which reason there is no more basis for its existence, hence this petition
for revocation.[1]
Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption
Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of
adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.
Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:
SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. Upon petition of the
adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if over
eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel,
the adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds
committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal
maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling;
(b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or
(d) abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations.
Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be
subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s)
may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of
the Civil Code. (emphasis supplied)
Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending
principally (a) that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case and
(b) that the petitioner had no cause of action in view of the aforequoted
provisions of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner asseverated, by way of
opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should not
retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for rescission of the
adoption vested under the regime of then Article 348[2] of the Civil Code
and Article 192[3] of the Family Code.
In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court held thusly:
On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, Section
5(c) of R.A. No. 8369 confers jurisdiction to this Court, having been
designated Family Court in A.M. No. 99-11-07 SC.
On the matter of no cause of action, the test on the sufficiency of the
facts alleged in the complaint, is whether or not, admitting the facts
alleged, the Court could render a valid judgment in accordance with the
prayer of said complaint (De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino, et al., 95 Phil.
365).
Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 deleted the right of
an adopter to rescind an adoption earlier granted under the Family
Code. Conformably, on the face of the petition, indeed there is lack of
cause of action.
Petitioner however, insists that her right to rescind long acquired under
the provisions of the Family Code should be respected. Assuming for
the sake of argument, that petitioner is entitled to rescind the adoption
of respondent granted on May 5, 1972, said right should have been
exercised within the period allowed by the Rules. From the averments
in the petition, it appears clear that the legal grounds for the petition
have been discovered and known to petitioner for more than five (5)
years, prior to the filing of the instant petition on December 1, 1999,
hence, the action if any, had already prescribed. (Sec. 5, Rule 100
Revised Rules of Court)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the petition is
ordered dismissed.[4]
Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Court, petitioner raises the following questions; viz:
1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still
be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?
2. In the affirmative, has the adopters action prescribed?
A brief background on the law and its origins could provide some
insights on the subject. In ancient times, the Romans undertook
adoption to assure male heirs in the family. [5] The continuity of the
adopters family was the primary purpose of adoption and all matters
relating to it basically focused on the rights of the adopter. There was
hardly any mention about the rights of the adopted. [6] Countries, like
Greece, France, Spain and England, in an effort to preserve inheritance
within the family, neither allowed nor recognized adoption. [7] It was only
much later when adoption was given an impetus in law and still later
when the welfare of the child became a paramount concern. [8] Spain
itself which previously disfavored adoption ultimately relented and
accepted the Roman law concept of adoption which, subsequently, was
to find its way to the archipelago. The Americans came and introduced
their own ideas on adoption which, unlike most countries in Europe,
made the interests of the child an overriding consideration. [9] In the
early part of the century just passed, the rights of children invited
universal attention; the Geneva Declaration of Rights of the Child of
1924 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948,[10] followed by the United Nations Declarations of the Rights of
the Child,[11] were written instruments that would also protect and
safeguard the rights of adopted children. The Civil Code of the
Philippines[12] of 1950 on adoption, later modified by the Child and
Youth Welfare Code[13] and then by the Family Code of the
Philippines,[14] gave immediate statutory acknowledgment to the rights
of the adopted. In 1989, the United Nations initiated the Convention of
the Rights of the Child. The Philippines, a State Party to the
Convention, accepted the principle that adoption was impressed with
social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent was
geared to favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights
and privileges for the adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed the
legitimate status of the adopted child, not only in his new family but also
in the society as well.The new law withdrew the right of an adopter to
rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right
to sever the legal ties created by adoption.
Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not
adversely affect her right to annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the
trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, both being vested under
the Civil Code and the Family Code, the laws then in force.
The concept of vested right is a consequence of the constitutional
guaranty of due process[15] that expresses a present fixed
interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against
arbitrary state action;[16] it includes not only legal or equitable title to the
enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations
created after the right has become vested.[17] Rights are considered
56
Persons 4th Exam Cases

vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest, [18] absolute, where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains,
unconditional, and perfect[19] or fixed and irrefutable. nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,[20] a petition to adopt Jason sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law
Condat was filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles on 02 February 1988 when the have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while
Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603) allowed barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid
an adoption to be sought by either spouse or both of them. After the reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to
trial court had rendered its decision and while the case was still pending an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by
on appeal, the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will
209), mandating joint adoption by the husband and wife, took and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the
effect. Petitioner Republic argued that the case should be dismissed for disposable portion of his estate.
having been filed by Mrs. Bobiles alone and without being joined by the WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is
husband. The Court concluded that the jurisdiction of the court is AFFIRMED. No costs.
determined by the statute in force at the time of the SO ORDERED.
commencement of the action. The petition to adopt Jason, having
been filed with the court at the time when P.D. No. 603 was still in
effect, the right of Mrs. Bobiles to file the petition, without being joined
by her husband, according to the Court had become
vested. In Republic vs. Miller,[21]spouses Claude and Jumrus Miller,
both aliens, sought to adopt Michael Madayag. On 29 July 1988, the
couple filed a petition to formalize Michaels adoption having theretofore
been taken into their care. At the time the action was commenced, P.D.
No. 603 allowed aliens to adopt. After the decree of adoption and while
on appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Family Code was enacted
into law on 08 August 1988 disqualifying aliens from adopting Filipino
children. The Republic then prayed for the withdrawal of the adoption
decree. In discarding the argument posed by the Republic, the
Supreme Court ruled that the controversy should be resolved in the
light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed.
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein
petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in
1975. By then, the new law,[22] had already abrogated and repealed the
right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind
a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the
Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption
decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had
come into force, no longer could be pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to
set aside the adoption is subject to the fiveyear bar rule under Rule
100[23] of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to
revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise
of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill
the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also be
acknowledged that a person has no vested right in statutory
privileges.[24] While adoption has often been referred to in the context
of a right, the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or
fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. [25] It is a
privilege that is governed by the states determination on what it may
deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. [26] Matters
relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter
to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the
State.[27] Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be
taken away at anytime before it has been exercised. [28]
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter
a consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases
57
Persons 4th Exam Cases
DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN
Petitioner,
- versus -
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77826
which reversed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Tarlac City, Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 2733 granting the Petition for
Adoption of the petitioner herein.
The Antecedents
On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the
United States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of
Guam, USA, filed a petition[3] for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos
who was born on August 31, 1986;[4] Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born
on September 7, 1987;[5] and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on
August 5, 1989.[6] The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos,
petitioners brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel
died on May 19, 1990,[7] the children were left to their paternal grandmother,
Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-
married there and now has two children by her second marriage and no
longer communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-
laws from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption; the minors
are being financially supported by the petitioner and her children, and
relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000, petitioner
desires to adopt the children; the minors have given their written
consent[8] to the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that
she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who are already
married, gainfully employed and have their respective families; she lives
alone in her own home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and
works as a restaurant server. She came back to the Philippines to spend
time with the minors; her children gave their written consent [9] to the
adoption of the minors. Petitioners brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns
substantial income, signified his willingness and commitment to support the
minors while in petitioners custody.
Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered
in her favor, as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed
to this Honorable Court that after publication and
hearing, judgment be rendered allowing the adoption
of the minor children Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon
Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos by the petitioner,
and ordering that the minor childrens name follow the
family name of petitioner.
Petitioner prays for such other reliefs, just
and equitable under the premises.[10]
On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) to conduct a case study as mandated by Article 34
of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, and to submit a report thereon
not later than April 4, 2002, the date set for the initial hearing of the
petition.[11] The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
appearance[12] but deputized the City Prosecutor of Tarlac to appear in its
behalf.[13] Since her petition was unopposed, petitioner was allowed to
present her evidence ex parte.[14]
The petitioner testified in her behalf. She also presented Elaine
Ramos, the eldest of the adoptees, to testify on the written consent
executed by her and her siblings.[15] The petitioner marked in evidence the
Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children Ann, Errol, Dennis
and Ricfel Branitley, all surnamed Landingin, and notarized by a notary
public in Guam, USA, as proof of said consent.[16]
On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social Welfare Officer II of
the DSWD, Field Office III, Tarlac, submitted a Child Study Report, with the
following recommendation:
In view of the foregoing, undersigned finds minors
Elaine, Elma & Eugene all surnamed Ramos, eligible
for adoption because of the following reasons:
1. Minors surviving parent, the mother
has voluntarily consented to their
adoption by the paternal aunt, Diwata
Landingin this is in view of her inability
to provide the parental care, guidance
and support they need. An Affidavit of
Consent was executed by the mother
which is hereto attached.
2. The three minors subject for adoption
have also expressed their willingness
to be adopted and joins the petitioners
in Guam, USA in the future. A joint
Affidavit of consent is hereto
attached. The minors developed close
attachment to the petitioners and they
regarded her as second parent.
3. The minors are present under the care
of a temporary guardian who has also
family to look after. As young
adolescents they really need parental
love, care, guidance and support to
ensure their protection and well being.
In view of the foregoing, it is hereby
respectfully recommended that minors
Elaine D. Ramos, Elma D. Ramos and
Eugene D. Ramos be adopted by their
maternal aunt Diwata Landingin. Trial
custody is hereby further recommended to
be dispensed with considering that they are
close relatives and that close attachments
was already developed between the
petitioner and the 3 minors.[17]
Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her interview, as
follows:
The mother of minors came home together
with her son John Mario, this May 2002 for 3 weeks
vacation. This is to enable her appear for the personal
interview concerning the adoption of her children.
The plan for the adoption of minors by their
paternal aunt Diwata Landingin was conceived after
the death of their paternal grandmother and
guardian. The paternal relatives including the
petitioner who attended the wake of their mother were
very much concerned about the well-being of the three
minors. While preparing for their adoption, they have
asked a cousin who has a family to stay with minors
and act as their temporary guardian.
The mother of minors was consulted about
the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of
adoption to her children, she voluntarily
consented. She realized that her children need
parental love, guidance and support which she could
not provide as she already has a second family &
residing in Italy. Knowing also that the petitioners & her
children have been supporting her children up to the
present and truly care for them, she believes her
children will be in good hands. She also finds
petitioners in a better position to provide a secured and
bright future to her children.[18]
However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and
offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption;
petitioner, likewise, failed to present any documentary evidence to prove
that Amelia assents to the adoption.
On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in the petition for
adoption, rendered a decision granting said petition. The dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that
henceforth, minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon
Ramos, Eugene Dizon Ramos be freed from all legal
obligations obedience and maintenance from their
natural parents and that they be declared for all legal
intents and purposes the children of Diwata Ramos
Landingin. Trial custody is dispensed with considering
that parent-children relationship has long been
established between the children and the adoptive
parents. Let the surnames of the children be changed
from Dizon-Ramos to Ramos-Landingin.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the 1. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS adoption, the written consent of the following to the
Local Civil Registrar of Tarlac, Tarlac for him to effect OVERLOOKED AND MISAPPLIED SOME FACTS adoption is hereby required:
the corresponding changes/amendment in the birth AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE OF WEIGHT
certificates of the above-mentioned minors. AND IMPORTANCE AND WHICH IF CONSIDERED (a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age
WOULD HAVE AFFECTED THE RESULT OF THE or over;
SO ORDERED.[19] CASE.
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if
2. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER known, or the legal guardian, or the
The OSG appealed[20] the decision to the Court of Appeals COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE proper government instrumentality
on December 2, 2002. In its brief[21] for the oppositor-appellant, the OSG PETITIONER-APPELLEE IS NOT FINANCIALLY which has legal custody of the child;
raised the following arguments: CAPABLE TO SUPPORT THE THREE CHILDREN.[27]
(c) The legitimate and adopted
I sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee,
PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF following: (a) whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without if any;
CONSENT OF THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES the written consent of their biological mother, Amelia Ramos; (b) whether or
BIOLOGICAL MOTHER. not the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopters (d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten
children sufficiently complies with the law; and (c) whether or not petitioner (10) years of age or over, of the
II is financially capable of supporting the adoptees. adopter, if living with said adopter and
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE the latters souse, if any;
PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF
THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE PETITIONERS (e) The spouse, if any, of the person
CHILDREN AS REQUIRED BY LAW. The Courts Ruling adopting or to be adopted.

III The petition is denied for lack of merit.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE PETITIONERS
FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THAT SHE IS IN A
POSITION TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSED
ADOPTEES.
On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a decision[22] reversing the
ruling of the RTC. It held that petitioner failed to adduce in evidence the
voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos, the childrens natural
mother. Moreover, the affidavit of consent of the petitioners children could
not also be admitted in evidence as the same was executed
in Guam, USA and was not authenticated or acknowledged before a
Philippine consular office, and although petitioner has a job, she was not
stable enough to support the children. The dispositive portion of the CA
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
appealed decision dated November 25, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Tarlac City in Spec.
Proc. No. 2733 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.[23]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[24] on May 21, 2004,
which the CA denied in its Resolution dated August 12, 2004.[25]
Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari[26] on September 7, 2004, assigning the following errors:
It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal concept,
as stated in Malkinson v. Agrava,[28] that adoption statutes, being humane
and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the child to be of paramount
consideration and are designed to provide homes, parental care and
education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the
protection of society and family in the person of the adopter as well as to
allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and
give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation
of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should thus
be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.[29]
However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals,[30] the Court also ruled that
the liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar
as it carries out the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and
privileges of the adopted child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the
paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted
child, should be understood in its proper context and perspective. The
Courts position should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend
to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence. Thus, the
discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on
best interests of the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights
of the parents over the child.[31]
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, provides:
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption.
- After being properly counseled and informed of
his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural
parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from
unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to
safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed
adoption.[32]
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is
indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural
right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained
before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established
in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she was able
to interview Amelia Ramos who arrived in the Philippines with her son, John
Mario in May 2002. If said Amelia Ramos was in
the Philippines and Pagbilao was able to interview her, it is incredible that
the latter would not require Amelia Ramos to execute a Written Consent to
the adoption of her minor children. Neither did the petitioner bother to
present Amelia Ramos as witness in support of the petition.
Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the
biological mother is no longer necessary because when Amelias husband
died in 1990, she left for Italy and never came back. The children were then
left to the guidance and care of their paternal grandmother. It is the paternal
relatives, including petitioner, who provided for the childrens financial
needs. Hence, Amelia, the biological mother, had effectively abandoned the
children. Petitioner further contends that it was by twist of fate that after 12
years, when the petition for adoption was pending with the RTC that Amelia
and her child by her second marriage were on vacation in
the Philippines. Pagbilao, the DSWD social worker, was able to meet her,

59
Persons 4th Exam Cases
and during the meeting, Amelia intimated to the social worker that she
conformed to the adoption of her three children by the petitioner.
Petitioners contention must be rejected. When she filed her
petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section
9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot
be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will
suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors
had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written
consent of their legal guardian.
Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his
child without his consent, is a conduct which evinces a settled purpose to
forego all parental duties.[33] The term means neglect and refusal to perform
the filial and legal obligations of love and support. If a parent
withholds presence, love, care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and
neglects to lend support and maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons
the child.[34]
Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the
care of others is not such an abandonment.[35] To dispense with the
requirement of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed
at the time of adoption.[36]
In this case, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of
Elaine Ramos to prove her claim that Amelia Ramos had abandoned her
children. Petitioners testimony on that matter follows:
Q Where is the mother of these three children now?
A She left for Italy on November 20, 1990, sir.
Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left for Italy, was
there an instance where she communicated
with the family?
A None, sir.
Q How about with her children?
A None, sir.
Q Do you know what place in Italy did she reside?
A I do not know, sir.
Q Did you receive any news about Amelia Ramos?
A What I know, sir, was that she was already married
with another man.
Q From whom did you learn that?
A From others who came from Italy, sir.
Q Did you come to know whether she has children by
her second marriage?
A Yes, sir, she got two kids.[37]
Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified, thus:
Q Where is your mother now?
A In Italy, sir.
Q When did your mother left for Italy?
A After my father died, sir.
Q How old were you when your mother left
for Italy in 1990?
A Two years old, sir.
Q At the time when your mother left for Italy, did your
mother communicate with you?
A No, sir.[38]
However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD Social Worker
also stated the following:
IV. Background of the Case:
xxxx
Since the mother left for Italy, minors siblings had been
under the care and custody of their maternal
grandmother. However, she died in Nov. 2001 and an
uncle, cousin of their deceased father now serves as
their guardian. The petitioner, together with her
children and other relatives abroad have been
supporting the minor children financially, even
during the time that they were still living with their
natural parents.Their mother also sends financial
support but very minimal.[39]
xxxx
V. Background Information about the Minors
Being Sought for Adoption:
xxxx
As the eldest she tries her best to be a role model to
her younger siblings. She helps them in their lessons,
works and has fun with them. She also encourages
openness on their problems and concerns and
provides petty counseling. In serious problems she
already consult (sic) her mother and petitioner-
aunt.[40]
xxxx
In their 5 years of married life, they begot 3 children,
herein minors, Amelia recalled that they had a happy
and comfortable life. After the death of her husband,
her in-laws which include the petitioner had continued
providing support for them. However being ashamed of
just depending on the support of her husbands
relatives, she decided to work abroad. Her parents are
also in need of financial help as they are undergoing
maintenance medication. Her parents mortgaged their
farm land which she used in going to Italy and worked
as domestic helper.
When she left for Italy in November 1990, she
entrusted her 3 children to the care & custody of her
mother-in-law who returned home for good, however
she died on November 2000.
While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a married
man from Tarlac. They became live-in partners since
1995 and have a son John Mario who is now 2 years
old. The three of them are considered Italian
residents.Amelia claimed that Mr. Tayag is planning to
file an annulment of his marriage and his wife is
amenable to it. He is providing his legitimate family
regular support.
Amelia also sends financial support ranging from
P10,000-P15,000 a month through her parents who
share minimal amount of P3,000-P5,000 a month to
his (sic) children. The petitioner and other paternal
relatives are continuously providing support for most of
the needs & education of minors up to present.[41]
Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her
children, or to permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She was
merely impelled to leave the country by financial constraints. Yet, even
while abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly
obligations of rearing the children to her now deceased mother-in-law, for,
as claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted her mother, Amelia, for serious
personal problems. Likewise, Amelia continues to send financial support to
the children, though in minimal amounts as compared to what her affluent
in-laws provide.
Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the adoption of the
minors herein will have the effect of severing all legal ties between the
biological mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and that the same shall then
be vested on the adopter.[42] It would thus be against the spirit of the law if
financial consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding
whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his/her children. More
proof has to be adduced that Amelia has emotionally abandoned the
children, and that the latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if they
are given to an adopting parent.[43] Again, it is the best interest of the child
that takes precedence in adoption.
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for
which the evidence is offered must be specified. The offer of evidence is
necessary because it is the duty of the Court to rest its findings of fact and
its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the
parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose
or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap
of paper barren of probative weight. Mere identification of documents and
the markings thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary weight on
documents unless formally offered.[44]
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilaos Report and of the Joint
Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity
of which she, likewise, failed to prove. The joint written consent of
petitioners children[45] was notarized on January
2002 in Guam, USA; for it to be treated by the Rules of Court in the same
way as a document notarized in this country it needs to comply with Section
2 of Act No. 2103,[46] which states:
Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged
and authenticated in a foreign country shall be
considered authentic if the acknowledgment and
authentication are made in accordance with the
following requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be
made before (1) an ambassador,
minister, secretary of
legation, charg d affaires, consul,
vice-consul, or consular agent of
the Republic of the Philippines,
acting within the country or place
to which he is accredited, or (2) a
notary public or officer duly
authorized by law of the country to
take acknowledgments of
instruments or documents in the
place where the act is done.
(b) The person taking the
acknowledgment shall certify that
the person acknowledging the
instrument or document is known
to him, and that he is the same
person who executed it, and
acknowledged that the same is his
free act and deed. The certificate
shall be under his official seal, if
he is by law required to keep a
seal, and if not, his certificate shall
so state. In case the
acknowledgment is made before a
notary public or an officer
mentioned in subdivision (2) of the
preceding paragraph, the
certificate of the notary public or
the officer taking the
acknowledgment shall be
authenticated by an ambassador,
minister, secretary of
legation, charg de
affaires, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent of the Republic of
the Philippines, acting within the
country or place to which he is
accredited. The officer making the
authentication shall certify under
his official seal that the person
who took the acknowledgment the US. She only has a part-time job, and she is rather of age. While
was at the time duly authorized to petitioner claims that she has the financial support and backing of her
act as notary public or that he was children and siblings, the OSG is correct in stating that the ability to support
16, duly exercising the functions of the the adoptees is personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal
office by virtue of which he relation between the former and the latter. Moreover, the records do not
assumed to act, and that as such prove nor support petitioners allegation that her siblings and her children
he had authority under the law to are financially able and that they are willing to support the minors
take acknowledgment of herein. The Court, therefore, again sustains the ruling of the CA on this
instruments or documents in the issue.
place where the acknowledgment
was taken, and that his signature While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of intentions for
and seal, if any, are genuine. her nieces and nephew, there are legal infirmities that militate against
reversing the ruling of the CA. In any case, petitioner is not prevented from
filing a new petition for adoption of the herein minors.
As the alleged written consent of petitioners legitimate children
did not comply with the afore-cited law, the same can at best be treated by WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.
the Rules as a private document whose authenticity must be proved either
by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or by evidence of SO ORDERED.
the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the makers.[47]
Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by
petitioner to authenticate the written consent of her legitimate children, the
same is inadmissible in evidence.
In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner was not stable
enough to support the children and is only relying on the financial backing,
support and commitment of her children and her siblings.[48] Petitioner
contradicts this by claiming that she is financially capable as she has
worked in Guam for 14 years, has savings, a house, and currently earns
$5.15 an hour with tips of not less than $1,000.00 a month. Her children and
siblings have likewise committed themselves to provide financial backing
should the need arise. The OSG, again in its comment, banks on the
statement in the Home Study Report that petitioner has limited
income. Accordingly, it appears that she will rely on the financial backing of
her children and siblings in order to support the minor adoptees. The law,
however, states that it is the adopter who should be in a position to provide
support in keeping with the means of the family.
Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child,
it follows that the financial capacity of prospective parents should also
be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter should be in
a position to support the would-be adopted child or children, in keeping with
the means of the family.
According to the Adoption Home Study Report[49] forwarded by the
Department of Public Health & Social Services of the Government of Guam
to the DSWD, petitioner is no longer supporting her legitimate children, as
the latter are already adults, have individual lives and families. At the time
of the filing of the petition, petitioner was 57 years old, employed on a part-
time basis as a waitress, earning $5.15 an hour and tips of around $1,000
a month. Petitioners main intention in adopting the children is to bring the
latter to Guam, USA. She has a house at Quitugua Subdivision in
Yigo, Guam, but the same is still being amortized. Petitioner likewise knows
that the limited income might be a hindrance to the adoption proceedings.
Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be able
to sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the three children in
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner)
seeking to set aside the Decision[1] dated 15 September 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL.
PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, which dismissed without prejudice the
consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P.
Lim.
The Facts
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by
profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were
childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to
them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child
of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear
that they were the childrens parents. The children[2] were named Michelle
P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely
eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on
15 March 1977.[3] Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to
petitioners clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983.[4]
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own.
They sent the children to exclusive schools. They used the surname Lim in
all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November
1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario
(Olario), an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the
amnesty[5] given under Republic Act No. 8552[6] (RA 8552) to those
individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002,
petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael
before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259,
respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle
was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was 18 years and
seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced
by their Affidavits of Consent.[7] Michael also gave his consent to his
adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent.[8]Petitioners husband Olario
likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent[9] for the adoption of Michelle and
Michael.
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered as an abandoned child
and the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown. [10] The DSWD
issued a similar Certification for Michael.[11]
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the
petitions. The trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner
should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court
ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing
Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion
was denied in the Order dated 16 June 2005. In denying the motion, the
trial court ruled that petitioner did not fall under any of the exceptions under
Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552. Petitioners argument that mere consent
of her husband would suffice was untenable because, under the law, there
are additional requirements, such as residency and certification of his
qualification, which the husband, who was not even made a party in this
case, must comply.
As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint
adoption is merely for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court
ruled that joint adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising parental
authority because an emancipated child acquires certain rights from his
parents and assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether
or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
The Courts Ruling
Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because
it is the duty of the court and the State to protect the paramount interest and
welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal
maxim dura lex sed lex is not applicable to adoption cases. She argues that
joint parental authority is not necessary in this case since, at the time the
petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while
Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore
necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the age of
majority.
We deny the petition.
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without
being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm
the trial courts decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed
lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full
civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character,
has not been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of
caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than
the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and
care for his/her children in keeping with the means of
the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year
difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee
may be waived when the adopter is the biological
parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptees
parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as
above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That
his/her country has diplomatic relations with the
Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living
in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years
prior to the filing of the application for adoption and
maintains such residence until the adoption decree is
entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her
diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate
government agency that he/she has the legal capacity
to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government
allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her
adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the
requirements on residency and certification of the
aliens qualification to adopt in his/her country may be
waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to
adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree
of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen
and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse
a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino
spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the
termination of the guardianship and clearance of
his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the
following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own
illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has signified
his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from
each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse
adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint
62
Persons 4th Exam Cases

parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
(Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word shall in the above-quoted provision means that joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance
with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also
insures harmony between the spouses.[12]
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having
remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt.
Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without
joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the
petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated
in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children
of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the
illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not
legally separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his
Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that
Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the
qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove
that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines;
(2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous
years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain
such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal
capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter
the adopters country as the latters adopted child. None of these
qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification
to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or
adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate
children of petitioner.
Effects of Adoption
parental authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then
be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life.[17] However, parental
authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA
8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:
ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where
the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all
legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the
adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be
vested on the adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be
considered the legitimate son/daughter of the
adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is
entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law
to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without
discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is
entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with
the means of the family.
SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate
succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have
reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from
legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her
biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on
testamentary succession shall govern.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the
biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is
the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the
adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations
arising from the relationship of parent and child, including but not limited to:
(i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and
(ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of
each other.[18] Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental
authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter
with all the rights[19] of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of
the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3)
to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the
adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the
benefits to which biological parents are entitled[20] such as support[21] and
successional rights.[22]
liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat
said purpose. The law must also be applied with
compassion, understanding and less severity in view of
the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care
and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably,
the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial courts
decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the
law is clear and it cannot be modified without
violating the proscription against judicial
legislation. Until such time however, that the law on
the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the
respondent-spouses petition for adoption. (Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
should have jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make
our own legislation to suit petitioner.
Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show
that joint adoption could no longer be possible because Olario has filed a
case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior
Court.
We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between
petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of
dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the
dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still
subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions
for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is
mandatory.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15
September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch
22 in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary
since the children have been emancipated having reached the age of
majority. This is untenable.
Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental
and physical character and well-being.[13] The father and the mother shall
jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common
children.[14] Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the
parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another
person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children.[15]
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation that is, when
he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age[16] emancipation terminates
We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and
salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount
consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and
education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the
protection of society and family, as well as to allow childless couples or
persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child
in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental
instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and
fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. [23] But, as we
have ruled in Republic v. Vergara:[24]
We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption
statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of the
children. Accordingly, the law should be construed
63
Persons 4th Exam Cases
ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA
M. CASTRO, A.K.A. "MARIA SOCORRO M. CASTRO" AND "JAYROSE
M. CASTRO," Petitioners, v. JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO
AND ANA MARIA REGINA GREGORIO, Respondents.
The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there must be
a showing of notice and consent. This cannot be defeated by mere
procedural devices. In all instances where it appears that a spouse
attempts to adopt a child out of wedlock, the other spouse and other
legitimate children must be personally notified through personal service of
summons. It is not enough that they be deemed notified through
constructive service.
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the decision2 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101021, which denied the petition for
annulment of judgment filed by petitioners. The petition before the
appellate court sought to annul the judgment of the trial court that granted
respondents' decree of adoption.3chanrobleslaw
The case originally stemmed from the adoption of Jose Maria Jed Lemuel
Gregorio (Jd) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) by Atty. Jose G.
Castro (Jose). Jose is the estranged husband of Rosario Mata Castro
(Rosario) and the father of Joanne Benedicta Charissima M. Castro
(Joanne), also known by her baptismal name, "Maria Socorro M. Castro"
and her nickname, "Jayrose."
Rosario alleged that she and Jose were married on August 5, 1962 in
Laoag City. Their marriage had allegedly been troubled. They had a child,
Rose Marie, who was born in 1963, but succumbed to congenital heart
disease and only lived for nine days. Rosario allegedly left Jose after a
couple of months because of the incompatibilities between
them.4chanrobleslaw
Rosario and Jose, however, briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario gave birth
to Joanne a year later. She and Jose allegedly lived as husband and wife
for about a year even if she lived in Manila and Jose stayed in Laoag City.
Jose would visit her in Manila during weekends. Afterwards, they
separated permanently because Rosario alleged that Jose had
homosexual tendencies.5 She insisted, however, that they "remained
friends for fifteen (15) years despite their separation(.)"6chanrobleslaw
On August 1, 2000, Jose filed a petition7 for adoption before the Regional
Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte. In the petition, he alleged that Jed and
Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Fernandez Gregorio
(Lilibeth),8 whom Rosario alleged was his erstwhile housekeeper. 9 At the
time of the filing of the petition, Jose was 70 years old.10chanrobleslaw
According to the Home Study Report11 conducted by the Social Welfare
Officer of the trial court, Jose belongs to a prominent and respected
family, being one of the three children of former Governor Mauricio Castro.
He was also a well-known lawyer in Manila and Ilocos Norte.12 The report
mentioned that he was once married to Rosario, but the marriage did not
produce any children.13 It also stated that he met and fell in love with
Lilibeth in 1985, and Lilibeth was able to bear him two children, Jed on
August 1987, and Regina on March 1989.14 Under "Motivation for
Adoption," the social welfare officer noted:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Since, he has no child with his marriaged [sic] to Rosario Mata, he was not
able to fulfill his dreams to parent a child. However, with the presence of
his 2 illegitimate children will fulfill his dreams [sic] and it is his intention to
legalize their relationship and surname. . . .15
At the time of the report, Jose was said to be living with Jed and Regina
temporarily in Batac, Ilocos Norte.16 The children have allegedly been in
his custody since Lilibeth's death in July 1995.17chanrobleslaw
On October 16, 2000, the trial court approved the adoption,18 having ruled
that "[n]o opposition had been received by this Court from any person
including the government which was represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General."19 A certificate of finality20 was issued on February 9,
2006.
Meanwhile, on July 3, 2006, Rosario, through her lawyer, Atty. Rene V.
Saguisag, filed a complaint for disbarment against Jose with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.21 In her complaint, she alleged that Jose
had been remiss in providing support for their daughter, Joanne, for the
past 36 years.22 She alleged that she single-handedly raised and provided
financial support to Joanne while Jose had been showering gifts to his
driver and alleged lover, Larry R. Rentegrado (Larry), and even went to
the extent of adopting Larry's two children, Jed and Regina, without her
and Joanne's knowledge and consent.23She also alleged that Jose made
blatant lies to the trial court by alleging that Jed and Regina were his
illegitimate children with Larry's wife, Lilibeth, to cover up for his
homosexual relationship with Larry.24chanrobleslaw
In his answer before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose denies
being remiss in his fatherly duties to Joanne during her minority. He
alleged that he always offered help, but it was often declined.25 He also
alleged that he adopted Jed and Regina because they are his illegitimate
children. He denied having committed any of the falsification alluded to by
Rosario. He also stated that he had suffered a stroke in 1998 that left him
paralyzed. He alleged that his income had been diminished because
several properties had to be sold to pay for medical treatments.26 He then
implored the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to weigh on the case with
"justice and equity."27chanrobleslaw
On October 8, 2006, Jose died in Laoag City, Ilocos Norte.28chanrobleslaw
On October 18, 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of
judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court of
Appeals, seeking to annul the October 16, 2000 decision of the trial court
approving Jed and Regina's adoption.29chanrobleslaw
In their petition, Rosario and Joanne allege that they learned of the
adoption sometime in 2005.30 They allege that Rosario's affidavit of
consent, marked by the trial court as "Exh. K,"31 was fraudulent.32 They
also allege that Jed and Regina's birth certificates showed different sets of
information, such as the age of their mother, Lilibeth, at the time she gave
birth. They argue that one set of birth certificates states the father to be
Jose and in another set of National Statistic Office certificates shows the
father to be Larry, Jose's driver and alleged lover.33 It was further alleged
that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose's illegitimate children but the
legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at the time of
their birth.34chanrobleslaw
On May 26, 2009, the Court of Appeals denied the petition.
While admittedly, no notice was given by the trial court to Rosario and
Joanne of the adoption, the appellate court ruled that there is "no explicit
provision in the rules that the spouse and legitimate child of the adopter . .
. should be personally notified of the hearing."35chanrobleslaw
The appellate court "abhor[red] the mind baffling scheme employed by
[Jose] in obtaining an adoption decree in favor of [his illegitimate children]
to the prejudice of the interests of his legitimate heirs"36 but stated that its
hands were bound by the trial court decision that had already attained
"finality and immutability."37chanrobleslaw
The appellate court also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information
contained in the different sets of birth certificates required the
determination of the identities of the persons stated therein and was,
therefore, beyond the scope of the action for annulment of judgment. The
alleged fraud was also perpetrated during the trial and could not be
classified as extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action for annulment of
judgment.38chanrobleslaw
When Rosario and Joanne's motion for reconsideration was denied on
July 10, 2009,39 they filed this petition.
The issue before this court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
denying the petition for annulment for failure of petitioners to (1) show that
the trial court lacked jurisdiction and (2) show the existence of extrinsic
fraud.
In their petition, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in its
application of the law on extrinsic fraud as ground to annul a
judgment.40 They argue that because of the fabricated consent obtained
by Jose and the alleged false information shown in the birth certificates
presented as evidence before the trial court,41 they were not given the
opportunity to oppose the petition since the entire proceedings were
concealed from them.42chanrobleslaw
Petitioners also argue that the appellate court misunderstood and
misapplied the law on jurisdiction despite the denial of due process,
notice, and non-inclusion of indispensable parties.43 They argue that the
adoption of illegitimate children requires the consent, not only of the
spouse, but also the legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter,
and such consent was never secured from Joanne.44chanrobleslaw
Respondents, however, argue in their comment that petitioners could not
have been deprived of their day in court since their interest was "amply
protected by the participation and representation of the Solicitor General
through the deputized public prosecutor."45chanrobleslaw
Respondents also argue that there was constructive notice through
publication for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation, which constitutes not only notice to them but also notice to the
world of the adoption proceedings.46 They argue that since the alleged
fraud was perpetrated during the trial, it cannot be said to be extrinsic
fraud but intrinsic fraud, which is not a ground for annulment of
judgment.47 They also argue that petitioners were not indispensable
64
Persons 4th Exam Cases
parties because adoption is an action in rem and, as such, the only
indispensable party is the state.48chanrobleslaw
The petition is granted.
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47
of the Rules of Civil Procedure
Under Rule 47, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may file
an action with the Court of Appeals to annul judgments or final orders and
resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts. This remedy will only
be available if "the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of
the petitioner."49chanrobleslaw
In Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of Appeals:50chanrobleslaw
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional
in nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting,
and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought, to be
annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic
fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be
so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments,
orders or resolutions. The Court has thus instituted safeguards by limiting
the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud,
and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the
petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner. A petition for annulment that ignores or
disregards any of the safeguards cannot prosper.
The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment,
final order or final resolution is understandable, for the remedy disregards
the time-honored doctrine of immutability and unalterability of final
judgments, a solid corner stone in the dispensation of justice by the
courts. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold
purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and
thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and
(b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors,
which is precisely why the courts exist. As to the first, a judgment that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and is no longer to
be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct an
erroneous conclusion of fact or of law, and whether the modification is
made by the court that rendered the decision or by the highest court of the
land. As to the latter, controversies cannot drag on indefinitely because
fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice demand
that the rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense
for an indefinite period of time.51 (Emphasis supplied)
Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there are only two
grounds by which annulment of judgment may be availed of: extrinsic
fraud, which must be brought four years from discovery, and lack of
jurisdiction, which must be brought before it is barred by estoppel or
laches.52chanrobleslaw
Lack of jurisdiction under this rule means lack of jurisdiction over the
nature of the action or subject matter, or lack of jurisdiction over the
parties.53 Extrinsic fraud, on the other hand, is "[that which] prevents a
party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or
[that which] operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but
to the manner in which it is procured."54chanrobleslaw
The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as the trial
court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the
favorable decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud.
Jurisdiction over adoption proceedings
vis-a-vis the law on adoption
Petitioners argue that they should have been given notice by the trial court
of the adoption, as adoption laws require their consent as a requisite in the
proceedings.
Petitioners are correct.
It is settled that "the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in
force at the time of the commencement of the action."55 As Jose filed the
petition for adoption on August 1, 2000, it is Republic Act No. 855256 which
applies over the proceedings. The law on adoption requires that the
adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the
consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children.
Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband must
first obtain the consent of his wife if he seeks to adopt his own children
born out of wedlock:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE III
ELIGIBILITY
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. The following may
adopt:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following
cases:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other;
or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter:
Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified, his/her consent
thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. . . (Emphasis
supplied)
The provision is mandatory. As a general rule, the husband and wife must
file a joint petition for adoption. The rationale for this is stated in In Re:
Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim:57chanrobleslaw
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance
with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also
insures harmony between the spouses.58
The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a
situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out
of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. However, the
spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and
Rosario remained legally married despite their de facto separation. For
Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her
consent to the adoption. Jose, however, did not validly obtain Rosario's
consent. His submission of a fraudulent affidavit of consent in her name
cannot be considered compliance of the requisites of the law. Had Rosario
been given notice by the trial court of the proceedings, she would have
had a reasonable opportunity to contest the validity of the affidavit. Since
her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter's children if they
are 10 years old or older. In Article III, Section 9 of Republic Act No.
8552:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. After being
properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her
approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the
adoption is hereby required:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or
over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any; (Emphasis supplied)
The consent of the adopter's other children is necessary as it ensures
harmony among the prospective siblings. It also sufficiently puts the other
children on notice that they will have to share their parent's love and care,
as well as their future legitimes, with another person.
It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario's legitimate child and
that she was over 10 years old at the time of the adoption proceedings.
Her written consent, therefore, was necessary for the adoption to be valid.
To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial
court that he and Rosario were childless, thereby preventing Joanne from
being notified of the proceedings. As her written consent was never
obtained, the adoption was not valid.
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners' consent was required by Republic
Act No. 8552. Personal service of summons should have been effected on
the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive
rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in
this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be
privileged over substantive statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and
Joanne of the proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.
There was extrinsic fraud
The appellate court, in denying the petition, ruled that while fraud may
have been committed in this case, it was only intrinsic fraud, rather than
extrinsic fraud. This is erroneous.
In People v. Court of Appeals and Socorro Florece:59chanrobleslaw
65
Persons 4th Exam Cases
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in
litigation committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated
party is prevented from fully exhibiting his side of the case by fraud
or deception practiced on him by his opponent, such as by keeping
him away from court, by giving him a false promise of a compromise, or
where the defendant never had the knowledge of the suit, being kept in
ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff, or where an attorney fraudulently or
without authority connives at his defeat.60 (Emphasis supplied)
An action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be brought within
four years from discovery.61Petitioners alleged that they were made aware
of the adoption only in 2005. The filing of this petition on October 18, 2007
is within the period allowed by the rules.
The badges of fraud are present in this case.
First, the petition for adoption was filed in a place that had no relation to
any of the parties. Jose was a resident of Laoag City, llocos Norte. 62 Larry
and Lilibeth were residents of Barangay 6, Laoag City.63 Jed and Regina
were born in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.64 Rosario and Joanne were
residents of Paraaque City, Manila.65 The petition for adoption, however,
was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte.66 The trial court
gave due course to the petition on Jose's bare allegation in his petition
that he was a resident of Batac,67 even though it is admitted in the Home
Study Report that he was a practicing lawyer in Laoag
City.68chanrobleslaw
Second, using the process of delayed registration,69 Jose was able to
secure birth certificates for Jed and Regina showing him to be the father
and Larry as merely the informant.70 Worse still is that two different sets of
fraudulent certificates were procured: one showing that Jose and Lilibeth
were married on December 4, 1986 in Manila,71 and another wherein the
portion for the mother's name was not filled in at all.72 The birth certificates
of Jed and Regina from the National Statistics Office, however, show that
their father was Larry R. Rentegrado.73 These certificates are in clear
contradiction to the birth certificates submitted by Jose to the trial court in
support of his petition for adoption.
Third, Jose blatantly lied to the trial court when he declared that his
motivation for adoption was because he and his wife, Rosario, were
childless,74 to the prejudice of their daughter, Joanne. The consent of
Rosario to the adoption was also disputed by Rosario and alleged to be
fraudulent.75chanrobleslaw
All these tactics were employed by Jose, not only to induce the trial court
in approving his petition, but also to prevent Rosario and Joanne from
participating in the proceedings or opposing the petition.
The appellate court erroneously classified the fraud employed by Jose as
intrinsic on the basis that they were "forged instruments or perjured
testimonies"76 presented during the trial. It failed to understand, however,
that fraud is considered intrinsic when the other party was either present
at the trial or was a participant in the proceedings when such instrument or
testimony was presented in court, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[I]ntrinsic fraud refers to the acts of a party at a trial that prevented a fair
and just determination of the case, but the difference is that the acts or
things, like falsification and false testimony, could have been litigated and
determined at the trial or adjudication of the case. In other words, intrinsic love and care of a father, her parents having separated a year after her
fraud does not deprive the petitioner of his day in court because he can birth. She has never even benefited from any monetary support from her
guard against that kind of fraud through so many means, including a father. Despite all these adversities, Joanne was able to obtain a medical
thorough trial preparation, a skillful, cross-examination, resorting to the degree from the University of the Philippines College of Medicine80 and is
modes of discovery, and proper scientific or forensic applications. Indeed, now working as a doctor in Canada.81 These accomplishments, however,
forgery of documents and evidence for use at the trial and perjury in court are poor substitutes if the injustice done upon her is allowed to continue.
testimony have been regarded as not preventing the participation of any
party in the proceedings, and are not, therefore, constitutive of extrinsic WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated October 16,
fraud.77 (Emphasis supplied) 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Branch 17 in SP.
Proc. No. 3445-17 is rendered NULL and VOID.
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of
any other interested party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, SO ORDERED.
regardless of whether the fraud was committed through the use of forged
documents or perjured testimony during the trial.
Jose's actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable
opportunity to contest the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been
allowed to participate, the trial court would have hesitated to grant Jose's
petition since he failed to fulfill the necessary requirements under the law.
There can be no other conclusion than that because of Jose's acts, the
trial court granted the decree of adoption under fraudulent circumstances.
The law itself provides for penal sanctions for those who violate its
provisions. Under Article VII, Section 21 of Republic Act No.
8552:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE VII
VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES
SEC. 21. Violations and Penalties.
(a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1)
day to twelve (12) years and/or a fine not less than Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00), but not more than Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) at the discretion of the court shall be imposed on any
person who shall commit any of the following acts:
(i) obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion, undue influence,
fraud, improper material inducement, or other similar acts;
(ii) non-compliance with the procedures and safeguards provided by the
law for adoption; or
(iii) subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger, abuse, or
exploitation.
(b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of the birth of a
child under the name(s) of a person(s) who is not his/her biological
parent(s) shall be guilty of simulation of birth, and shall be punished by
prision mayor in its medium period and a fine not exceeding Fifty
thousand pesos (P50.000.00). (Emphasis supplied)
Unfortunately, Jose's death carried with it the extinguishment of any of his
criminal liabilities.78 Republic Act No. 8552 also fails to provide any
provision on the status of adoption decrees if the adoption is found to have
been obtained fraudulently. Petitioners also cannot invoke Article VI,
Section 19 of Republic Act No. 855279 since rescission of adoption can
only be availed of by the adoptee. Petitioners, therefore, are left with no
other remedy in law other than the annulment of the judgment.
The fraud employed in this case has been to Joanne's prejudice. There is
reason to believe that Joanne has grown up having never experienced the
66
Persons 4th Exam Cases
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME
SERVICES, INC., Respondents.
Nature of the Case
This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul
the March 17, 2010 Decision1 of the Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, entitled
Bernardina P. Bartolome v. Social Security System (SSS) [Scanmar
Maritime Services, Inc.}, declaring that petitioner is not a beneficiary of
the deceased employee under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442,
otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by
PD 626.2
The Facts
John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician
by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk
Danville, since February 2008. As such, he was enrolled under the
government's Employees' Compensation Program
(ECP).3 Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident occurred on board
the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to his untimely
death the following day.4
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus,
petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, Johns biological mother and,
allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits
under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando
City, La Union. However, the SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June
10, 20095 addressed to petitioner, denied the claim, stating:
We regret to inform you that wecannot give due course to your claim
because you are no longer considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL
as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL based on
documents you submitted to us.
The denial was appealed tothe Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC), which affirmed the ruling of the SSS La Union
Branch through the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the claim is
hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.6
In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled
against petitioners entitlement to the death benefits sought after under
PD 626 on the ground she can no longer be considered Johns primary
beneficiary. As culled from the records, John and his sister Elizabeth
were adopted by their great grandfather, petitioners grandfather,
Cornelio Colcol (Cornelio), by virtue of the Decision7 in Spec. Proc. No.
8220-XII of the Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated February 4,
1985, which decree of adoption attained finality. 8 Consequently, as
argued by the agencies, it is Cornelio who qualifies as Johns primary
beneficiary, not petitioner. Neither, the ECC reasoned, would petitioner
qualify as Johns secondary beneficiary even if it wereproven that
Cornelio has already passed away. As the ECC ratiocinated:
Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic) that
beneficiaries are the "dependent spouse until he remarries and
dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their
absence, the dependent parentsand subject to the restrictions imposed
on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate
descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided; that the
dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a
primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who
are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit."
The dependent parent referred to by the above provision relates to the
legitimate parent of the covered member, as provided for by Rule XV,
Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation.
This Commission believes that the appellant is not considered a
legitimate parent of the deceased, having given up the latter for
adoption to Mr. Cornelio C. Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption
divested her of the statusas the legitimate parent of the deceased.
xxxx
In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the biological parent
of the adopted child shall now be upon the adopting parent. Hence, in
this case, the legal parent referred to by P.D. 626, as amended, as the
beneficiary, who has the right to file the claim, is the adoptive father of
the deceased and not herein appellant.9 (Emphasis supplied)
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
likewise denied by the ECC.10 Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. The Honorable ECCs Decision is contrary to evidence on
record.
II. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in denying the
just, due and lawful claims of the petitioner as a lawful
beneficiary of her deceased biological son.
III. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse of discretion
in not giving due course/denying petitioners otherwise
meritorious motion for reconsideration.11
In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are the biological parents
of the covered, but legally adopted, employee considered secondary
beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases, to receive the
benefits under the ECP?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The ECCs factual findings are not consistent with the evidence on
record
To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied petitioners
claim for death benefits is that eventhough she is Johns biological
mother, it was allegedly not proven that his adoptive parent, Cornelio,
was no longer alive. As intimated by the ECC:
Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to whether
the legally adoptive parent, Mr. Colcol, is dead, which would
immediately qualify the appellant [petitioner] for Social Security
benefits. Hence, absent such proof of death of the adoptive father, this
Commission will presume him to be alive and well, and as such, is the
one entitled to claim the benefit being the primary beneficiary of the
deaceased. Thus, assuming that appellant is indeed a qualified
beneficiary under the Social Security law, in view of her status as other
beneficiary, she cannot claim the benefit legally provided by law to the
primary beneficiary, in this case the adoptive father since he is still
alive.
We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this point.
Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally
accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts by reason of the
special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agenciesover
matters falling under their jurisdiction. 12 However, in the extant case,
the ECC had overlooked a crucial piece of evidence offered by the
petitioner Cornelios death certificate.13
Based on Cornelios death certificate, it appears that Johns adoptive
father died on October 26, 1987,14 or only less than three (3) years
since the decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which attained
finality.15 As such, it was error for the ECC to have ruled that it was not
duly proven that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed
away.
The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is
contrary to law
This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to
the death benefits claim in view of Johns work-related demise. The
pertinent provision, in this regard, is Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code,
as amended, which reads:
ART. 167. Definition of terms. - Asused in this Title unless the context
indicates otherwise:
xxxx
(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and
dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their
absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions
imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate
descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided, that the
dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a
primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who
are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit. (Emphasis
supplied)
Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article 177(c) supervising the
ECC "[T]o approve rules and regulations governing the processing of
claims and the settlement of disputes arising therefrom as prescribed
by the System," the ECC has issued the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensation, interpreting the above-cited provision as
follows:
RULE XV BENEFICIARIES
SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or
secondary, and determined atthe time of employees death.
(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:
(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee
at the time of the employees death until he
remarries; and
(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or
acknowledged natural children, who are unmarried
not gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age, or
over 21 years of age provided that he is
incapacitated and incapable of self - support due to
physicalor mental defect which is congenital or
acquired during minority; Provided, further, that a
dependent acknowledged natural child shall be
67
Persons 4th Exam Cases
considered as a primary beneficiary only when
there are no other dependent children who are
qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit;
provided finally, that if there are two or more
acknowledged natural children, they shall be
counted from the youngest and without substitution,
but not exceeding five.
(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:
(1) The legitimate parentswholly dependent upon
the employee for regular support;
(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate
children who are unmarried, not gainfully employed,
and not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of
age providedthat he is incapacitated and incapable
of self - support dueto physical or mental defect
which is congenital or acquired during minority.
(Emphasis supplied)
Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioners claim on the ground
that she is no longer the deceaseds legitimate parent, as required by
the implementing rules. As held by the ECC, the adoption decree
severed the relation between John and petitioner, effectively divesting
her of the status of a legitimate parent, and, consequently, that of being
a secondary beneficiary.
We disagree.
a. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation deviates from the clear language of Art. 167 (j) of the
Labor Code, as amended
Examining the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation in light
of the Labor Code, as amended, it is at once apparent that the ECC
indulged in an unauthorized administrative legislation. In net effect, the
ECC read into Art. 167 of the Code an interpretation not contemplated
by the provision. Pertinent in elucidating on this point isArticle 7 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, which reads:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall not beexcused by disuse, or custom
or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution,
the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid
only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution.(Emphasis supplied)
As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Fortune Tobacco Corporation16 that:
As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined
to details for regulating the mode or proceedings in order to carry into
effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to
amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not
covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must always be in
harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting
discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the
basic law. (Emphasis supplied)
Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules
on Employees Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and
a substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it
interpreted the phrase "dependent parents" to refer to "legitimate
parents."
It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction was
resolved by this Court in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court 17 in this
wise:
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its
general acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not
defined by it. In accordancetherefore with the canons of statutory
interpretation, it should beunderstood to have a general and inclusive
scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt
generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not make a distinction
prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos
distinguera debemus. xxx
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992
in a more restrictive sense thanit is used and intended is not warranted
by any rule ofinterpretation. Besides, he further states that when the
law intends to use the termin a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the
term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New
Civil Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute
it embraces not only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the
person spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a
more restrictive or limited sense which as already discussed earlier,
is not so in the case at bar. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents"
in the afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is usedand ought
to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to
"legitimate parents" as what the ECC did. The phrase "dependent
parents" should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or
illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When the law does
not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent
parents" are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by
adoption,who are in need of support or assistance.
Moreover, the same Article 167 (j),as couched, clearly shows that
Congress did not intend to limit the phrase "dependent parents" to
solely legitimate parents. At the risk of being repetitive, Article 167
provides that "in their absence, the dependent parents and subject to
the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children
and legitimate descendants who are secondary beneficiaries." Had the
lawmakers contemplated "dependent parents" to mean legitimate
parents, then it would have simply said descendants and not "legitimate
descendants." The manner by which the provision in question was
crafted undeniably show that the phrase "dependent parents" was
intended to cover all parents legitimate, illegitimate or parents by
nature or adoption.
b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation is in contravention of the equal protection clause
To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is
an affront to the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the
laws for the rule, as worded, prevents the parents of an illegitimate child
from claiming benefits under Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended
by PD 626. To Our mind, such postulation cannot be countenanced.
As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies
and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner.18 In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law
requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not drawdistinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
legitimate governmental objective.19
The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the
universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires isequality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however,
to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It
is germane tothe purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same
class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification." 20
In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to
discriminate against illegitimate parents. Simply put, the above-cited
rule promulgated by the ECC that limits the claim of benefits to the
legitimate parents miserably failed the test of reasonableness since the
classification is not germane to the law being implemented. We see no
pressing government concern or interest that requires protection so as
to warrant balancing the rights of unmarried parents on one hand and
the rationale behind the law on the other. On the contrary, the SSS can
better fulfill its mandate, and the policy of PD 626 that employees and
their dependents may promptly secure adequate benefits in the event
of work-connected disability or death - will be better served if Article
167 (j) of the Labor Code is not so narrowly interpreted.
There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries
to the legitimate ones, there can be no other course of action to take
other than to strikedown as unconstitutional the phrase "illegitimate" as
appearing in Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensation.
Petitioner qualifies as Johns dependent parent
In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the adverted
rule, the ECC extended illegitimate parents an opportunity to file claims
for and receive death benefitsby equating dependency and legitimacy
to the exercise of parental authority. Thus, as insinuated by the ECC in
its assailed Decision, had petitioner not given up John for adoption, she
could have still claimed death benefits under the law.
To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that
"legitimate parents" pertain to those who exercise parental authority
over the employee enrolled under the ECP. Itwas only in the assailed
Decision wherein such qualification was made. In addition, assuming
arguendothat the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the
adverted Labor Code provision to the deceaseds legitimate parents,
and that the commission properly equated legitimacy to parental
authority, petitioner can still qualify as Johns secondary beneficiary.
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then about two (2) years
old, petitioners parental authority over John was severed. However,
lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from
Cornelios death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than
68
Persons 4th Exam Cases
three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at
about four (4) years of age.
Johns minority at the time of his adopters death is a significant factor
in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should
be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents.
Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a
personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue
of adoption,21 who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if
the adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of
the biological parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic
Act No. 855222 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption
Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission. If the petition [for rescission of
adoption] is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's biological
parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be
restored if the adoptee is still a minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal
rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other
shall be extinguished. (emphasis added)
The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the
restoration of custody is concerned.1wphi1 The manner herein of
terminating the adopters parental authority, unlike the grounds for
rescission,23 justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations
between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration
of parental authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously,
ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for
himself at such a tender age.
To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since
RA 8552 was enacted after Cornelios death. Truth be told, there is a
lacuna in the law as to which provision shall govern contingencies in all
fours with the factual milieu of the instant petition. Nevertheless, We
are guided by the catena of cases and the state policies behind RA
855224 wherein the paramount consideration is the best interest of the
child, which We invoke to justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the
best interest of the child that someone will remain charged for his
welfare and upbringing should his or her adopter fail or is rendered
incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a time the adoptee
isstill in his formative years, and, to Our mind, in the absence or, as in
this case, death of the adopter, no one else could reasonably be
expected to perform the role of a parent other than the adoptees
biological one.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental
authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee
and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate,
the biological parents, insome instances, are able to inherit from the
adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code:
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall
be governed by the following rules:
xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate
ascendants of the adopted concur withthe adopter, they shall divide the
entire estate, one-half tobe inherited by the parents or ascendants and
the other half, by the adopters;
xxx
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the parental authority, the documents showing singularity of address, and
ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply. Johns clear intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary -
Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcols death, which was prior to the effectively made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death benefit claims
effectivity of the Family Code, the governing provision is Art. 984 of the as a secondary beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent parent.
New Civil Code, which provides: All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children basis. Cornelios adoption of John, without more, does not deprive
or descendants, his parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from Johns
adoption, shall be his legal heirs. death as a dependent parent given Cornelios untimely demise during
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their Johns minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the
rights of succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of death benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program shall
adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered accrue solely to herein petitioner, John's sole remaining beneficiary.
employee do not form part of the estateof the adopted child, the WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2010
pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission, in ECC Case
policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis- No. SL-18483-0218-10, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ECC is
-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way hereby directed to release the benefits due to a secondary beneficiary
that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too of the deceased covered employee John Colcol to petitioner
should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of Bernardina P. Bartolome.
parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor No costs.
offsprings adoptive parent. We cannot leave undetermined the fate of SO ORDERED.
a minor child whose second chance ata better life under the care of the
adoptive parents was snatched from him by deaths cruel grasp.
Otherwise, the adopted childs quality of life might have been better off
not being adopted at all if he would only find himself orphaned in the
end. Thus, We hold that Cornelios death at the time of Johnsminority
resulted in the restoration of petitioners parental authority over the
adopted child.
On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of petitioners
dependence on John can be established from the documentary
evidence submitted to the ECC. As it appears in the records, petitioner,
prior to Johns adoption, was a housekeeper. Her late husband died in
1984, leaving her to care for their seven (7) children. But since she was
unable to "give a bright future to her growing children" as a
housekeeper, she consented to Cornelios adoption of Johnand
Elizabeth in 1985.
Following Cornelios death in 1987, so records reveal, both petitioner
and John repeatedly reported "Brgy. Capurictan, Solsona, Ilocos Norte"
as their residence. In fact, this veryaddress was used in Johns Death
Certificate25 executed in Brazil, and in the Report of Personal Injury or
Loss of Life accomplished by the master of the vessel boarded by
John.26 Likewise, this is Johns known address as per the ECCs
assailed Decision.27Similarly, this same address was used by petitioner
in filing her claim before the SSS La Union branch and, thereafter, in
her appeal with the ECC. Hence, it can be assumed that aside from
having been restored parental authority over John, petitioner indeed
actually execised the same, and that they lived together under one roof.
Moreover, John, in his SSS application, 28 named petitioner as one of
his beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as
the "Social Security Law." While RA 8282 does not cover compensation
for work-related deaths or injury and expressly allows the designation
of beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the member unlike in
PD 626, Johns deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary
at least evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his
dependent. Consequently, the confluence of circumstances from
Cornelios death during Johns minority, the restoration ofpetitioners
69
Persons 4th Exam Cases
MANUEL DE ASIS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
JAIME T. HAMOY, Branch 130, RTC, Kalookan City and
GLEN CAMIL ANDRES DE ASIS represented by her
mother/guardian VIRCEL D. ANDRES, respondents.
Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
seeking to nullify the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the trial courts Orders, dated November 25, 1993 and February 4,
1994, respectively, denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint in Civil Case No. C-16107, entitled Glen Camil Andres de
Asis, etc. vs. Manuel de Asis, and the motion for reconsideration.
The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the petition at bar are,
as follows:
On October 14, 1988, Vircel D. Andres, (the herein
private respondent) in her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor,
Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and
support against Manuel de Asis, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-935
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, alleging that
the defendant Manuel de Asis (the petitioner here) is the father of
subject minor Glen Camil Andres de Asis, and the former refused
and/or failed to provide for the maintenance of the latter, despite
repeated demands.
In his Answer, petitioner denied his paternity of the said minor
and theorized that he cannot therefore be required to provide support
for him.
On July 4, 1989, private respondent Vircel D. Andres, through
counsel, sent in a manifestation the pertinent portion of which, reads;
1. That in his proposed Amended Answer, defendant (herein
petitioner) has made a judicial admission/declaration that 1)
defendant denies that the said minor child (Glen Camil) is his
child; 2) he (petitioner) has no obligation to the plaintiff Glen
Camil xxx.
2. That with the aforesaid judicial admissions/declarations by the
defendant, it seems futile and a useless exercise to claim support
from said defendant.
3. That under the foregoing circumstances it would be more
practical that plaintiff withdraws the complaint against the
defendant subject to the condition that the defendant should not
pursue his counterclaim in the above-entitled case, xxx.[1]
By virtue of the said manifestation, both the plaintiff and the
defendant agreed to move for the dismissal of the case. Acting
thereupon, the Regional Trial Court a quo issued the following Order of
August 8, 1989, dismissing Civil Case No. Q-88-935 with prejudice, to
wit:
Acting on the manifestation of Atty. Romualdo C. delos Santos, counsel
for the defendant, that counsel for the plaintiff Atty. Ismael J. Andres
has no objection that this case be withdrawn provided that the
defendant will withdraw the counterclaim, as prayed for, let the case be
dismissed with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.[2]
On September 7, 1995, another Complaint for maintenance and
support was brought against Manuel A. de Asis, this time in the name
of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, represented by her legal
guardian/mother, Vircel D. Andres.Docketed as Civil Case No. C-
16107 before Branch 130 of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan, the
said Complaint prayed, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering defendant:
1. To pay plaintiff the sum of not less than P2,000.00 per month for
every month since June 1, 1987 as support in arrears which defendant
failed to provide plaintiff shortly after her birth in June 1987 up to the
present;
2. To give plaintiff a monthly allowance of P5,000.00 to be paid in
advance on or before the 5th of each and every month;
3. To give plaintiff by way of support pendente lite, a monthly allowance
of P5,000.00 per month, the first monthly allowance to start
retroactively from the first day of this month and the subsequent ones
to be paid in advance on or before the 5th of each succeeding month;
4. To pay the costs of suit.
Plaintiff prays for such other relief just and equitable under the
premises.[3]
On October 8, 1993, petitioner moved to dismiss the Complaint
on the ground of res judicata, alleging that Civil Case C-16107 is barred
by the prior judgment which dismissed with prejudice Civil Case Q-88-
935.
In the Order dated November 25, 1993 denying subject motion to
dismiss, the trial court ruled that res judicata is inapplicable in an action
for support for the reason that renunciation or waiver of future support
is prohibited by law. Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said
Order met the same fate. It was likewise denied.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari.
But on June 7, 1996, the Court of Appeals found the said Petition
devoid of merit and dismissed the same.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this court via the present
petition, posing the question whether or not the public respondent acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in upholding the denial of the motion to dismiss by the trial
court, and holding that an action for support cannot be barred
by res judicata.
To buttress his submission, petitioner invokes the previous
dismissal of the Complaint for maintenance and support, Civil Case Q-
88-935, filed by the mother and guardian of the minor, Glen Camil
Andres de Asis, (the herein private respondent). In said case, the
complainant manifested that because of the defendants judicial
declaration denying that he is the father of subject minor child, it
was futile and a useless exercise to claim support from
defendant.Because of such manifestation, and defendants assurance
that he would not pursue his counterclaim anymore, the parties
mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint. The motion
was granted by the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, which then
dismissed the case with prejudice.
Petitioner contends that the aforecited manifestation, in effect,
admitted the lack of filiation between him and the minor child, which
admission binds the complainant, and since the obligation to give
support is based on the existence of paternity and filiation between the
child and the putative parent, the lack thereof negates the right to claim
for support. Thus, petitioner maintains that the dismissal of the
Complaint by the lower court on the basis of the said manifestation bars
the present action for support, especially so because the order of the
trial court explicitly stated that the dismissal of the case was with
prejudice.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
The right to receive support can neither be renounced
nor transmitted to a third person. Article 301 of the Civil Code, the law
in point, reads:
Art. 301. The right to receive support cannot be renounced, nor can it
be transmitted to a third person. Neither can it be compensated with
what the recipient owes the obligor. xxx
Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a
compromise.
Article 2035, ibid, provides, that:
No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime.
The raison d etre behind the proscription against renunciation,
transmission and/or compromise of the right to support is stated, thus:
The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to
maintain his existence, he is not entitled to renounce or transfer the
right for this would mean sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life
itself. The right to life cannot be renounced; hence, support, which is
the means to attain the former, cannot be renounced.
xxx
To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family
right of a person to support is virtually to allow either suicide or the
conversion of the recipient to a public burden.This is contrary to public
policy.[4]
In the case at bar, respondent minors mother, who was the
plaintiff in the first case, manifested that she was withdrawing the case
as it seemed futile to claim support from petitioner who denied his
paternity over the child. Since the right to claim for support is predicated
on the existence of filiation between the minor child and the putative
parent, petitioner would like us to believe that such manifestation
admitting the futility of claiming support from him puts the issue to rest
and bars any and all future complaint for support.
The manifestation sent in by respondents mother in the first case,
which acknowledged that it would be useless to pursue its complaint
for support, amounted to renunciation as it severed the vinculum that
gives the minor, Glen Camil, the right to claim support from his putative
parent, the petitioner. Furthermore, the agreement entered into
between the petitioner and respondents mother for the dismissal of the
complaint for maintenance and support conditioned upon the dismissal
of the counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise which cannot be
countenanced. It violates the prohibition against any compromise of the
right to support.
Thus, the admission made by counsel for the wife of the facts alleged
in a motion of the husband, in which the latter prayed that his obligation
to support be extinguished cannot be considered as an assent to the
prayer, and much less, as a waiver of the right to claim for support.[5]
70
Persons 4th Exam Cases

It is true that in order to claim support, filiation and/or paternity WHEREFORE, the petition under consideration is hereby
must first be shown between the claimant and the parent. However, DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. No
paternity and filiation or the lack of the same is a relationship that must pronouncement as to costs.
be judicially established and it is for the court to declare its existence or SO ORDERED.
absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.
The civil status of a son having been denied, and this civil status, from
which the right to support is derived being in issue, it is apparent that
no effect can be given to such a claim until an authoritative declaration
has been made as to the existence of the cause. [6]
Although in the case under scrutiny, the admission may be
binding upon the respondent, such an admission is at most evidentiary
and does not conclusively establish the lack of filiation.
Neither are we persuaded by petitioners theory that the dismissal
with prejudice of Civil Case Q-88-935 has the effect of res judicata on
the subsequent case for support. The case of Advincula vs.
Advincula[7] comes to the fore. In Advincula, the minor, Manuela
Advincula, instituted a case for acknowledgment and support against
her putative father, Manuel Advincula. On motion of both parties and
for the reason that the plaintiff has lost interest and is no longer
interested in continuing the case against the defendant and has no
further evidence to introduce in support of the complaint, the case was
dismissed. Thereafter, a similar case was instituted by Manuela, which
the defendant moved to dismiss, theorizing that the dismissal of the first
case precluded the filing of the second case.
In disposing such case, this Court ruled, thus:
The new Civil Code provides that the allowance for support is
provisional because the amount may be increased or decreased
depending upon the means of the giver and the needs of the recipient
(Art. 297); and that the right to receive support cannot be renounced
nor can it be transmitted to a third person; neither can it be
compensated with what the recipient owes the obligator (Art.
301). Furthermore, the right to support can not be waived or transferred
to third parties and future support cannot be the subject of compromise
(Art. 2035; Coral v. Gallego, 38 O.G. 3135, cited in IV Civil Code by
Padilla, p. 648, 1956 Ed.). This being true, it is indisputable that the
present action for support can be brought, notwithstanding the fact the
previous case filed against the same defendant was dismissed. And it
also appearing that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3553, was not an
adjudication upon the merits, as heretofore shown, the right of herein
plaintiff-appellant to reiterate her suit for support and acknowledgment
is available, as her needs arise. Once the needs of plaintiff arise, she
has the right to bring an action for support, for it is only then that her
cause of action accrues.xxx
xxx
It appears that the former dismissal was predicated upon a
compromise. Acknowledgment, affecting as it does the civil status of
persons and future support, cannot be the subject of
compromise. (pars. 1 & 4, Art. 2035, Civil Code). Hence, the first
dismissal cannot have force and effect and can not bar the filing
of another action, asking for the same relief against the same
defendant.(emphasis supplied)
Conformably, notwithstanding the dismissal of Civil Case 88-935
and the lower courts pronouncement that such dismissal was with
prejudice, the second action for support may still prosper.
71
Persons 4th Exam Cases
AUGUSTUS CAEZAR R. GAN, petitioner, vs. HON. ANTONIO C.
REYES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Br. 61,
Baguio City, ALBERT G. TOLENTINO, in his capacity as
RTC Sheriff of Baguio City, and FRANCHESKA JOY C.
PONDEVIDA, assisted by BERNADETTE C.
PONDEVIDA, respondents.
Quite apprehensive that she would not be able to send to school her
three (3)-year old daughter Francheska Joy S. Pondevida, Bernadette S.
Pondevida wrote petitioner Augustus Caezar R. Gan[1] demanding support
for their "love child." Petitioner, in his reply, denied paternity of the child. An
exasperated Bernadette thereafter instituted in behalf of her daughter a
complaint against petitioner for support with prayer for support pendente
lite.[2]
Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to
state a cause of action. He argued that since Francheska's certificate of
birth indicated her father as "UNKNOWN," there was no legal or factual
basis for the claim of support.[3] His motion, however, was denied by the trial
court.[4]
Despite denial of his motion, petitioner failed to file his answer within
the reglementary period. Thus, on 19 January 2000 private respondent
moved that petitioner be declared in default, which motion was granted. In
its Orderdeclaring petitioner in default the trial court noted that
petitioner's Motion to Admit Answer was filed more than ninety (90) days
after the expiration of the reglementary period, and only after private
respondent moved that petitioner be declared in default. Petitioner's motion
for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, the court received the
evidence of private respondent ex parte.
After finding that the claim of filiation and support was adequately
proved, the trial court rendered its Decision on 12 May 2000 ordering
petitioner to recognize private respondent Francheska Joy S. Pondevida as
his illegitimate child and support her with P20,000.00 every month to be
paid on or before the 15th of each month starting 15 April 2000. Likewise
petitioner was ordered to pay Francheska Joy S. Pondevida the
accumulated arrears of P20,000.00 per month from the day she was
born, P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and P25,000.00 for expenses of
litigation, plus P20,000.00 on or before the 15th of every month from 15 May
2000 as alimony pendente lite should he desire to pursue further remedies
against private respondent.[5]
Forthwith, private respondent moved for execution of the judgment of
support, which the trial court granted by issuing a writ of execution, citing as
reason therefor private respondent's immediate need for
schooling.[6] Pursuant to the writ, the sheriff levied upon a motor vehicle, a
Honda City, with Plate No. UMT 884, registered in the name of "A.B.
Leasing & Fin. Corp., Leased to: G & G Trading," and found within the
premises of petitioner's warehouse in Caloocan City.[7]
Meanwhile, petitioner appealed the Judgment to the Court of
Appeals.[8]
On 9 June 2000 petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the Court of Appeals imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court
for ordering the immediate execution of the judgment. Petitioner averred
that the writ of execution was issued despite the absence of a good reason
for immediate enforcement. Petitioner insisted that as the judgment sought
to be executed did not yet attain finality there should be an exceptional
reason to warrant its execution. He further alleged that the writ proceeded
from an order of default and a judgment rendered by the trial court in
complete disregard of his "highly meritorious defense." Finally, petitioner
impugned the validity of the writ as he argued that it was issued without
notice to him. Petitioner stressed the fact that he received copy of the
motion for immediate execution two (2) weeks after its scheduled hearing.[9]
On 31 August 2000 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on
the ratiocination that under Sec. 4, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure judgments for support are immediately executory and cannot be
stayed by an appeal. Thus, it did not help petitioner any to argue that there
were no good reasons to support its immediate execution. The second
challenge hurled against the validity of the writ concerning the lack of notice
and hearing was likewise dismissed with the appeals court favoring
substantial justice over technicalities. Lastly, petitioner's justification for
belatedly filing his answer, i.e., miscommunication with his lawyer, was
disregarded since it fell short of the statutory requirements of "fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence."[10]
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner came
to us impugning the dismissal of his petition for certiorari. Petitioner argues
that under the rules a judgment for support which is subject of an appeal
cannot be executed absent any good reason for its immediate
execution. Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of the writ asserting that it
was issued in violation of his right to notice and hearing. Petitioner also
seeks the setting aside of the default order and the judgment rendered
thereafter for the reason that should he be allowed to prove his defense of
adultery, the claim of support would be most likely denied.[11] Petitioner
claims that in an action by a child against his putative father, adultery of the
child's mother would be a valid defense to show that the child is a fruit of
adulterous relations for, in such case, it would not be the child of the
defendant and therefore not entitled to support.Parenthetically, how could
he be allowed to prove the defense of adultery when it was not even hinted
that he was married to the mother of Francheska Joy. Petitioner consents
to submit to Dioxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Testing to resolve the issue of
paternity, which test he claims has a reputation for accuracy.[12]
A careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case fails to
persuade this Court to brand the issuance of the writ of execution by the
trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals with the vice of grave abuse
of discretion.There is no evidence indeed to justify the setting aside of the
writ on the ground that it was issued beyond the legitimate bounds of judicial
discretion.
Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court clearly states that, unless
ordered by the trial court, judgments in actions for support are immediately
executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. This is an exception to the
general rule which provides that the taking of an appeal stays the execution
of the judgment and that advance executions will only be allowed if there
are urgent reasons therefor. The aforesaid provision peremptorily calls for
immediate execution of all judgments for support and makes no distinction
between those which are the subject of an appeal and those which are
not. To consider then petitioner's argument that there should be good
reasons for the advance execution of a judgment would violate the clear
and explicit language of the rule mandating immediate execution.
Petitioner is reminded that to the plain words of a legal provision we
should make no further explanation. Absoluta sententia expositore non
indiget. Indeed, the interpretation which petitioner attempts to foist upon us
would only lead to absurdity, its acceptance negating the plain meaning of
the provision subject of the petition.
Petitioner would also have us annul the writ of execution on the
ground that he was not notified of its issuance. We are unable to accept
such a plea for enough has been done by petitioner to delay the execution
of the writ. As the records show, in partial fulfillment of the writ of execution
petitioner surrendered a sedan which apparently was not his as it was later
ordered released to a third party who laid claim over the levied
vehicle.[13] Also, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Motion for
Leave to Deposit in Court Support Pendente Lite promising to deposit the
amount due as support every 15th of the month, but to date has not
deposited any amount in complete disavowal of his undertaking. [14] He was
not even deterred from appealing before us and needlessly taking up our
time and energy by posing legal questions that can be characterized, at
best, as flimsy and trivial. We are thus not prepared to abrogate the writ of
execution issued in favor of private respondent for substantial justice would
be better served if petitioner be precluded from interposing another barrier
to the immediate execution of the support judgment.
We are not intimating that in every case the right to notice of hearing
can be disregarded. That is not so. It appears in this case that there has
been too much temporizing in the execution of the writ which must not be
allowed to thwart the constitutional mandate for speedy disposition of
cases. As has been said, a technicality should be an aid to justice and not
its great hindrance and chief enemy.[15] Truly, if the writ of execution would
be voided on this ground alone, then procedural rules which were primarily
drafted to protect parties in the realm of constitutional guarantees would
acquire a new sanctity at the expense of equity and justice.
Lastly, we note that no useful purpose would be served if we dwell on
petitioner's arguments concerning the validity of the judgment by default
and his insistence that he be subjected, together with private respondent
Bernadette C. Pondevida to DNA testing to settle the issue of paternity. The
futility of his arguments is very apparent. It is not for us at this instance to
review or revise the Decision rendered by the trial court for to do so would
pre-empt the decision which may be rendered by the Court of Appeals in
the main case for support.
In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the
paramount concerns. There may be instances where, in view of the poverty
of the child, it would be a travesty of justice to refuse him support until the
decision of the trial court attains finality while time continues to slip away. An
excerpt from the early case of De Leon v. Soriano[16] is relevant, thus:
The money and property adjudged for support and education should and
must be given presently and without delay because if it had to wait the final
judgment, the children may in the meantime have suffered because of lack
of food or have missed and lost years in school because of lack of
funds. One cannot delay the payment of such funds for support and
education for the reason that if paid long afterwards, however much the
accumulated amount, its payment cannot cure the evil and repair the
damage caused. The children with such belated payment for support and
education cannot act as gluttons and eat voraciously and unwisely,
afterwards, to make up for the years of hunger and starvation. Neither may
they enrol in several classes and schools and take up numerous subjects
all at once to make up for the years they missed in school, due to non-
payment of the funds when needed.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the Decision sought to
be reviewed, the instant petition is DENIED. The 31 August
2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the Petition for Certiorari
instituted by petitioner Augustus Caezar C. Gan and upholding the validity
of the 2 June 2000 Writ of Execution issued by the Regional Trial Court Br.
61, Baguio City, in Civil Case No. 4234-R, is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
72
Persons 4th Exam Cases
MA. BELEN B. MANGONON, for and in behalf of her minor children
REBECCA ANGELA DELGADO and REGINA ISABEL DELGADO.
Petitioner,
- versus -
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-
SALONGA, Presiding Judge, RTC-Makati, Branch 149, FEDERICO C.
DELGADO and FRANCISCO C. DELGADO,
Respondents.
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals dated 20 March 1996, affirming the Order, dated 12
September 1995[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 149, Makati,
granting support pendente lite to Rebecca Angela (Rica) and Regina Isabel
(Rina), both surnamed Delgado.
The generative facts leading to the filing of the present petition are as
follows:
On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her
then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy
and Support, with application for support pendente lite with
the RTC Makati.[3] In said petition, it was alleged that on 16 February 1975,
petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married by then
City Court Judge EleuterioAgudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At that time,
petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was only 19
years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the required consent
per Article 85 of the New Civil Code,[4] it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by
the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.[5]
On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their
marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to
petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second
husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private
respondents had totally abandoned them. At the time of the institution of the
petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United States of
America (USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters and second
husband, had moved to and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to
the University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by
the Long Island University and Western New England College. Despite
their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina were, however,
financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education because of the
following:
i) The average annual cost for college education in
the US is about US$22,000/year, broken down as
follows:
Tuition Fees US$13,000.00
Room & Board 5,000.00
Books 1,000.00
Yearly Transportation &
Meal Allowance 3,000.00
Total US$ 22,000.00
or a total of US$44,000.00, more or less, for both Rica
and Rina
ii) Additionally, Rica and Rina need general
maintenance support each in the amount of
US$3,000.00 per year or a total of US$6,000 per year.
iii) Unfortunately, petitioners monthly income from her
2 jobs is merely US$1,200 after taxes which she can
hardly give general support to Rica and Rina, much
less their required college educational support.
iv) Neither can petitioners present husband be
compelled to share in the general support and college
education of Rica and Rina since he has his own son
with petitioner and own daughter (also in college) to
attend to.
v) Worse, Rica
and Rinas petitions for Federal
Student Aid have been rejected by
the U.S. Department of
Education.[6]
Petitioner likewise averred that demands[7] were made upon
Federico and the latters father, Francisco,[8] for general support and for the
payment of the required college education of Rica and Rina. The twin
sisters even exerted efforts to work out a settlement concerning these
matters with respondent Federico and respondent Francisco, the latter
being generally known to be financially well-off.[9] These demands,
however, remained unheeded. Considering the impending deadline for
admission to college and the opening of classes, petitioner and her then
minor children had no choice but to file the petition before the trial court.
Petitioner also alleged that Rica and Rina are her legitimate
daughters by respondent Federico since the twin sisters were born within
seven months from the date of the annulment of her marriage to respondent
Federico. However, as respondent Federico failed to sign the birth
certificates of Rica and Rina, it was imperative that their status as legitimate
children of respondent Federico, and as granddaughters of respondent
Francisco, be judicially declared pursuant to Article 173 of the Family
Code.[10]
As legitimate children and grandchildren, Rica and Rina are
entitled to general and educational support under Articles 174[11] and
195(b) in relation to Articles 194(1 and 2)[13] and 199(c)[14] of the Family
[12]
Code. Petitioner alleged that under these provisions, in case of default on
the part of the parents, the obligation to provide support falls upon the
grandparents of the children; thus, respondent Federico, or in his default,
respondent Francisco should be ordered to provide general and educational
support for Rica and Rina in the amount of US$50,000.00, more or less, per
year.
Petitioner also claimed that she was constrained to seek
support pendente lite from private respondents - who are millionaires with
extensive assets both here and abroad - in view of the imminent opening of
classes, the possibility of a protracted litigation, and Rica and Rinas lack of
financial means to pursue their college education in the USA.
In his Answer,[15] respondent Francisco stated that as the birth
certificates of Rica and Rina do not bear the signature of respondent
Federico, it is essential that their legitimacy be first established as there is
no basis to claim support until a final and executory judicial declaration has
been made as to the civil status of the children.[16] Whatever good deeds he
may have done to Rica and Rina, according to respondent Francisco, was
founded on pure acts of Christian charity. He, likewise, averred that the
order of liability for support under Article 199 of the Family Code is not
concurrent such that the obligation must be borne by those more closely
related to the recipient. In this case, he maintained that responsibility should
rest on the shoulders of petitioner and her second husband, the latter having
voluntarily assumed the duties and responsibilities of a natural father. Even
assuming that he is responsible for support, respondent Francisco contends
that he could not be made to answer beyond what petitioner and the father
could afford.
On 24 May 1994, petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Defendant
(respondent herein) Federico in Default.[17] This was favorably acted upon
by the trial court in the Order dated 16 June 1994.[18]
On 5 August 1994, respondent Federico filed a Motion to Lift
Order of Default alleging that the summons and a copy of the petition were
not served in his correct address.[19] Attached thereto was his
Answer[20] where he claimed that petitioner had no cause of action against
him. According to him, he left for abroad and stayed there for a long time
[w]ithin the first one hundred twenty (120) days of the three hundred days
immediately preceding March 25, 1976 and that he only came to know
about the birth of Rica and Rina when the twins introduced themselves to
him seventeen years later. In order not to antagonize the two, respondent
Federico claimed he did not tell them that he could not be their father. Even
assuming that Rica and Rina are, indeed, his daughters, he alleged that he
could not give them the support they were demanding as he was only
making P40,000.00 a month.
Finding sufficient ground in the motion filed by respondent
Federico, the trial court lifted its Order dated 16 June 1994 and admitted his
Answer.[21]
In the meantime, on 25 April 1994, petitioner filed an Urgent
Motion to Set Application for Support Pendente Lite for Hearing because
Rica and Rina both badly needed immediate financial resources for their
education.[22] This Motion was opposed by respondent Francisco.[23] After
both parties submitted supplemental pleadings to bolster their respective
positions, the trial court resolved the motion in an Order dated 12
September 1995 in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing
considerations, respondents are hereby directed to
provide a monthly support (pendente lite) of P5,000.00
each or a total of P10,000.00 for the education of
Rebecca Angela and Regina Isabel Delgado to be
delivered within the first five days of each month
without need of demand.[24]
Unsatisfied with the Order of the trial court, petitioner brought the
case to the Court of Appeals via Petition for Certiorari. The Court of
73
Persons 4th Exam Cases
Appeals affirmed the holding of the trial court and disposed the petition in
the following manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED and the Order of the lower court
dated September 12, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED.[25]
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied through the Resolution
of the Court of Appeals dated 16 May 1996.[26]
Petitioner is now before this Court claiming that the Decision of the Court of
Appeals was tainted with the following errors:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE DID
NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
FIXING THE AMOUNT OF MONTHLY SUPPORT
PENDENTE LITE GRANTED TO PETITIONERS
CHILDREN AT A MEASLEY P5,000.00 PER CHILD.
I.
RESPONDENT COURT IGNORED EVIDENCE ON
RECORD OF THE FINANCIAL INCAPACITY OF RICA
AND RINAS PARENTS IN DEFAULT OF WHOM THE
OBLIGATION TO GIVE SUPPORT DEVOLVES ON
THE GRANDFATHER.
II.
IT BEING ESTABLISHED THAT THE PERSON
OBLIGED TO GIVE SUPPORT GRANDFATHER DON
PACO IS UNDOUBTEDLY CAPABLE OF GIVING
THE AMOUNT DEMANDED, RESPONDENT COURT
ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT
JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN FIXING AN AMOUNT OF SUPPORT
PENDENTE LITE THAT IS OBVIOUSLY
INADEQUATE TO SUPPORT THE EDUCATIONAL
REQUIREMENTS OF THE RECIPIENTS.[27]
At the time of the filing of the present Petition, it is alleged that Rica had
already entered Rutgers University in New Jersey with a budget of
US$12,500.00 for academic year 1994-1995. She was able to obtain a
tuition fee grant of US$1,190.00 and a Federal Stafford loan from
the US government in the amount of US$2,615.00.[28] In order to defray the
remaining balance of Ricas education for said school year, petitioner claims
that she had to secure a loan under the Federal Direct Student Loan
Program.
Meanwhile, Rina entered CW Post, Long Island University,
where she was expected to spend US$20,000.00 for the school year 1994-
1995. She was given a financial grant of US$6,000.00, federal work study
assistance of US$2,000.00, and a Federal Stafford loan of
US$2,625.00.[29] Again, petitioner obtained a loan to cover the remainder
of Rinas school budget for the year.
Petitioner concedes that under the law, the obligation to furnish support to
Rica and Rina should be first imposed upon their parents. She contends,
however, that the records of this case demonstrate her as well as
respondent Federicos inability to give the support needed for Rica
and Rinas college education. Consequently, the obligation to provide
support devolves upon respondent Francisco being the grandfather of Rica
and Rina.
Petitioner also maintains that as respondent Francisco has the financial
resources to help defray the cost of Rica and Rinas schooling, the Court of
Appeals then erred in sustaining the trial courts Order directing respondent
Federico to pay Rica and Rina the amount of award P5,000.00 each as
monthly support pendente lite.
On the other hand, respondent Francisco argues that the trial court correctly
declared that petitioner and respondent Federico should be the ones to
provide the support needed by their twin daughters pursuant to Article 199
of the Family Code. He also maintains that aside from the financial package
availed of by Rica and Rina in the form of state tuition aid grant, work study
program and federal student loan program, petitioner herself was eligible
for, and had availed herself of, the federal parent loan program based on
her income and properties in the USA. He, likewise, insists that assuming
he could be held liable for support, he has the option to fulfill the obligation
either by paying the support or receiving and maintaining in the dwelling
here in the Philippines the person claiming support.[30] As an additional point
to be considered by this Court, he posits the argument that because
petitioner and her twin daughters are now US citizens, they cannot invoke
the Family Code provisions on support as [l]aws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.[31]
Respondent Federico, for his part, continues to deny having sired Rica
and Rina by reiterating the grounds he had previously raised before the trial
court. Like his father, respondent Federico argues that assuming he is
indeed the father of the twin sisters, he has the option under the law as to
how he would provide support. Lastly, he assents with the declaration of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals that the parents of a child should
primarily bear the burden of providing support to their offspring.
The petition is meritorious.
As a preliminary matter, we deem it necessary to briefly discuss the
essence of support pendente lite. The pertinent portion of the Rules of
Court on the matter provides:
Rule 61
SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE
SECTION 1. Application.- At the commencement of
the proper action or proceeding, or at any time prior to
the judgment or final order, a verified application for
support pendente lite may be filed by any party stating
the grounds for the claim and the financial conditions
of both parties, and accompanied by affidavits,
depositions or other authentic documents in support
thereof.
xxxx
SEC. 4. Order.- The court shall determine provisionally
the pertinent facts, and shall render such orders as
justice and equity may require, having due regard to
the probable outcome of the case and such other
circumstances as may aid in the proper resolution of
the question involved. If the application is granted, the
court shall fix the amount of money to be provisionally
paid or such other forms of support as should be
provided, taking into account the necessities of the
applicant and the resources or means of the adverse
party, and the terms of payment or mode for providing
the support. If the application is denied, the principal
case shall be tried and decided as early as possible.
Under this provision, a court may temporarily grant
support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final
order. Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully
into the merits of the case before it can settle an application for this relief. All
that a court is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of evidence
which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is enough
that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence
appearing in the record.[32]
After the hearings conducted on this matter as well as the evidence
presented, we find that petitioner was able to establish, by prima facie proof,
the filiation of her twin daughters to private respondents and the twins
entitlement to support pendente lite. In the words of the trial court
By and large, the status of the twins as children of
Federico cannot be denied. They had maintained
constant communication with their
grandfather Francisco. As a matter of fact, respondent
Francisco admitted having wrote several letters to Rica
and Rina (Exhs. A, B, C, D, E, F, G, G-1 to G-30). In
the said letters, particularly at the bottom thereof,
respondent Francisco wrote the names of Rica
and Rina Delgado. He therefore was very well aware
that they bear the surname Delgado. Likewise, he
referred to himself in his letters as either Lolo Paco or
Daddy Paco. In his letter of October 13, 1989 (Exh. G-
21), he said as the grandfather, am extending a
financial help of US$1,000.00. On top of this,
respondent Federico even gave the twins a treat
to Hongkong during their visit to
the Philippines. Indeed, respondents, by their
actuations, have shown beyond doubt that the twins
are the children of Federico.[33]
Having addressed the issue of the propriety of the trial courts grant of
support pendente lite in favor of Rica and Rina, the next question is who
should be made liable for said award.
The pertinent provision of the Family Code on this subject states:
74
Persons 4th Exam Cases
ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons
are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve
upon the following persons in the order herein
provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest
degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree;
and
(4) The brothers and sisters.
An eminent author on the subject explains that the obligation
to give support rests principally on those more closely related to the
recipient. However, the more remote relatives may be held to shoulder
the responsibility should the claimant prove that those who are called
upon to provide support do not have the means to do so.[34]
In this case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held
respondent Federico liable to provide monthly support pendente lite in
the total amount of P10,000.00 by taking into consideration his
supposed income of P30,000.00 to P40,000.00 per month. We are,
however, unconvinced as to the veracity of this ground relied upon by
the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
It is a basic procedural edict that questions of fact cannot be the
proper subject of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. The rule finds a more stringent application where the Court
of Appeals upholds the findings of fact of the trial court; in such a situation,
this Court, as the final arbiter, is generally bound to adopt the facts as
determined by the appellate and the lower courts. This rule, however, is not
ironclad as it admits of the following recognized exceptions: (1) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on
a misapprehension of facts; (5)when the findings of facts are conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues
of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of the
trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and
(11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.[35] The case at bar falls within the seventh and eleventh
exceptions.
The trial court gave full credence to respondent Federicos allegation in his
Answer[36] and his testimony[37] as to the amount of his income. We have,
however, reviewed the records of this case and found them bereft of
evidence to support his assertions regarding his employment and his
earning. Notably, he was even required by petitioners counsel to present to
the court his income tax return and yet the records of this case do not bear
a copy of said document.[38] This, to our mind, severely undermines the
truthfulness of respondent Federicos assertion with respect to his financial
status and capacity to provide support to Rica and Rina.
In addition, respondent Francisco himself stated in the witness stand that
as far as he knew, his son, respondent Federico did not own anything
Atty. Lopez:
I have here another letter under the letter head of Mr.
& Mrs. Dany Mangonon, dated October 19,
1991 addressed to Mr. Francisco Delgado signed by
sincerely, Danny Mangonon, can you remember.
xxxx
WITNESS:
A: I do remember this letter because it really irritated
me so much that I threw it away in a waste
basket. It is a very demanding letter, that is
what I do not like at all.
ATTY. LOPEZ:
Q: It is stated in this letter that I am making this request
to you and not to your son, Rico, for reasons
we both are aware of. Do you know what
reason that is?
A: Yes. The reason is that my son do not have fix
employment and do not have fix salary
and income and they want to depend on
the lolo.
xxxx
Q: Would you have any knowledge if Federico owns a
house and lot?
A: Not that I know. I do not think he has anything.
Q: How about a car?
A: Well, his car is owned by my company.[39]
Respondent Federico himself admitted in court that he had no property of
his own, thus:
Q: You also mentioned that you are staying at
Mayflower Building and you further earlier testified that
this building belongs to Citadel Corporation. Do you
confirm that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What car are you driving, Mr. Witness?
A: I am driving a lancer, sir.
Q: What car, that registered in the name of the
corporation?
A: In the corporation, sir.
Q: What corporation is that?
A: Citadel Commercial, Inc., sir.
Q: What properties, if any, are registered in your name,
do you have any properties, Mr. Witness?
A: None, sir.[40] (Emphasis supplied.)
Meanwhile, respondent Francisco asserts that petitioner possessed the
capacity to give support to her twin daughters as she has gainful
employment in the USA. He even went as far as to state that petitioners
income abroad, when converted to Philippine peso, was much higher than
that received by a trial court judge here in the Philippines. In addition, he
claims that as she qualified for the federal parent loan program, she could
very well support the college studies of her daughters.
We are unconvinced. Respondent Franciscos assertion that petitioner had
the means to support her daughters education is belied by the fact that
petitioner was even forced by her financial status in the USA to secure the
loan from the federal government. If petitioner were really making enough
money abroad, she certainly would not have felt the need to apply for said
loan. The fact that petitioner was compelled to take out a loan is enough
indication that she did not have enough money to enable her to send her
daughters to college by herself. Moreover, even Rica and Rina themselves
were forced by the circumstances they found themselves in to secure loans
under their names so as not to delay their entrance to college.
There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent
Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent
Federico are primarily charged to support their childrens college
education. In view however of their incapacities, the obligation to furnish
said support should be borne by respondent Francisco. Under Article 199
of the Family Code, respondent Francisco, as the next immediate relative
of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default
of their parents. It bears stressing that respondent Francisco is the majority
stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citadel Commercial,
Incorporated, which owns and manages twelve gasoline stations,
substantial real estate, and is engaged in shipping, brokerage and freight
forwarding. He is also the majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board
of Directors of Citadel Shipping which does business with Hyundai of
Korea. Apart from these, he also owns the Citadel Corporation which, in
turn, owns real properties in different parts of the country. He is likewise the
Chairman of the Board of Directors of Isla Communication Co. and he owns
shares of stocks of Citadel Holdings. In addition, he owns real properties
here and abroad.[41] It having been established that respondent Francisco
has the financial means to support his granddaughters education, he, in lieu
of petitioner and respondent Federico, should be held liable for
support pendente lite.
75
Persons 4th Exam Cases

Anent respondent Francisco and Federicos claim that they have the resolution of the trial court. After all, in case it would be resolved that Rica
option under the law as to how they could perform their obligation to and Rina are not entitled to support pendente lite, the court shall then order
support Rica and Rina, respondent Francisco insists that Rica the return of the amounts already paid with legal interest from the dates of
and Rina should move here to the Philippines to study in any of the actual payment.[44]
local universities. After all, the quality of education here, according to
him, is at par with that offered in the USA. The applicable provision of WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Petition
the Family Code on this subject provides: is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20
March 1996 and Resolution dated 16 May 1996 affirming the Order dated
Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have 12 September 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati, fixing
the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the the amount of support pendente lite to P5,000.00 for Rebecca Angela and
allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the Regina Isabel, are hereby MODIFIED in that respondent Francisco
family dwelling the person who has a right to receive Delgado is hereby held liable for support pendente lite in the amount to be
support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in determined by the trial court pursuant to this Decision. Let the records of
case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto. this case be remanded to the trial court for the determination of the proper
amount of support pendente lite for Rebecca Angela and Regina Isabel as
Under the abovecited provision, the obligor is given the choice as to well as the arrearages due them in accordance with this Decision within ten
how he could dispense his obligation to give support. Thus, he may (10) days from receipt hereof. Concomitantly, the trial court is directed to
give the determined amount of support to the claimant or he may allow proceed with the trial of the main case and the immediate resolution of the
the latter to stay in the family dwelling. The second option cannot be same with deliberate dispatch. The RTC Judge, Branch 149, Makati, is
availed of in case there are circumstances, legal or moral, which further directed to submit a report of his compliance with the directive
should be considered. regarding the support pendente lite within ten (10) days from compliance
thereof.
In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco
could not avail himself of the second option. From the records, we
gleaned that prior to the commencement of this action, the
relationship between respondent Francisco, on one hand, and SO ORDERED.
petitioner and her twin daughters, on the other, was indeed quite
pleasant. The correspondences exchanged among them expressed
profound feelings of thoughtfulness and concern for one anothers
well-being. The photographs presented by petitioner as part of her
exhibits presented a seemingly typical family celebrating kinship. All
of these, however, are now things of the past. With the filing of this
case, and the allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the
relationships among the parties had certainly been
affected. Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that
those who they had considered and claimed as family denied having
any familial relationship with them. Given all these, we could not see
Rica and Rinamoving back here in the Philippines in the company of
those who have disowned them.

Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we take our bearings from
the provision of the law mandating the amount of support to be
proportionate to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities
of the recipient.[42] Guided by this principle, we hold respondent Francisco
liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica
and Rina as support pendente lite. As established by petitioner, respondent
Francisco has the financial resources to pay this amount given his various
business endeavors.

Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already been done
with their education by the time of the promulgation of this decision, we
deem it proper to award support pendente lite in arrears[43] to be computed
from the time they entered college until they had finished their respective
studies.

The issue of the applicability of Article 15 of the Civil Code on petitioner and
her twin daughters raised by respondent Francisco is best left for the
76
Persons 4th Exam Cases
SPOUSES PRUDENCIO and FILOMENA LIM,
Petitioners,
- versus
MA. CHERYL S. LIM, for herself and on behalf of her minor
children LESTER EDWARD S. LIM, CANDICE
GRACE S. LIM, and MARIANO S. LIM, III,
Respondents.
The Case
For review[1] is the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals, dated 28 April
2003, ordering petitioners Prudencio and Filomena Lim (petitioners) to
provide legal support to respondents Cheryl, Lester Edward, Candice
Grace and Mariano III, all surnamed Lim (respondents).
The Facts
In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward
Lim (Edward), son of petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children,
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl,
Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes
Park, Makati City, together with Edwards ailing grandmother, Chua
Giak and her husband Mariano Lim (Mariano). Edwards family
business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000,
shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of
income.
On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park
residence, bringing the children with her (then all minors), after a violent
confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife
of Chua Giak in what the trial court described a very compromising
situation.[3]
Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua
Giak and Mariano (defendants) in the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 140 (trial court) for support. The trial court ordered Edward
to provide monthly support of P6,000 pendente lite.[4]
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 31 January 1996, the trial court rendered judgment
ordering Edward and petitioners to jointly provide P40,000 monthly
support to respondents, with Edward shouldering P6,000 and
petitioners the balance of P34,000 subject to Chua Giaks subsidiary
liability.[5]
The defendants sought reconsideration, questioning their
liability. The trial court, while denying reconsideration, clarified that
petitioners and Chua Giak were held jointly liable with Edward because
of the latters inability x x x to give sufficient support x x x.[6]
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals assailing, among others,
their liability to support respondents. Petitioners argued that while
Edwards income is insufficient, the law itself sanctions its effects by
providing that legal support should be in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family under Article 194 of the Civil Code, as amended
by Executive Order No. 209 (The Family Code of the Philippines).[7]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision dated 28 April 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court. On the issue material to this appeal, that is, whether there is
basis to hold petitioners, as Edwards parents, liable with him to support
respondents, the Court of Appeals held:
The law on support under Article 195 of the Family
Code is clear on this matter. Parents and their
legitimate children are obliged to mutually support
one another and this obligation extends down to the
legitimate grandchildren and great grandchildren.
In connection with this provision, Article 200
paragraph (3) of the Family Code clearly provides
that should the person obliged to give support does
not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the
other persons enumerated in Article 199 in its order
shall provide the necessary support. This is
because the closer the relationship of the relatives,
the stronger the tie that binds them. Thus, the
obligation to support is imposed first upon the
shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their
default is the obligation moved to the next nearer
relatives and so on.[8]
Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied
their motion in the Resolution dated 12 April 2004.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The issue is whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to
provide support to respondents.
The Ruling of the Court
We rule in the affirmative. However, we modify the appealed judgment
by limiting petitioners liability to the amount of monthly support needed
by respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III only.
Petitioners Liable to Provide Support
but only to their Grandchildren
By statutory[9] and jurisprudential mandate,[10] the liability of ascendants
to provide legal support to their descendants is beyond cavil.
Petitioners themselves admit as much they limit their petition to the
narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable.
Relying on provisions[11] found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended,
on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that their liability is activated
only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by its
termination[12] or suspension[13] during the childrens minority. Because
at the time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised
parental authority over their children, [14] petitioners submit that the
obligation to support the latters offspring ends with them.
Neither the text of the law nor the teaching of jurisprudence supports
this severe constriction of the scope of familial obligation to give
support. In the first place, the governing text are the relevant provisions
in Title VIII of the Civil Code, as amended, on Support, not the
provisions in Title IX on Parental Authority. While both areas share a
common ground in that parental authority encompasses the obligation
to provide legal support,[15] they differ in other concerns including
the duration of the obligation and its concurrence among relatives of
differing degrees.[16] Thus, although the obligation to provide support
arising from parental authority ends upon the emancipation of the
child,[17] the same obligation arising from spousal and general familial
ties ideally lasts during the obligee's lifetime. . Also, while parental
authority under Title IX (and the correlative parental rights) pertains to
parents, passing to ascendants only upon its termination or
suspension, the obligation to provide legal support passes on to
ascendants not only upon default of the parents but also for the latters
inability to provide sufficient support. As we observed in another case
raising the ancillary issue of an ascendants obligation to give support
in light of the fathers sufficient means:
Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren
cannot demand support directly from their
grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of
nearest degree) who are capable of supporting
them. This is so because we have to follow the
order of support under Art. 199. We agree with this
view.
xxxx
There is no showing that private respondent
is without means to support his son; neither is
there any evidence to prove that petitioner, as the
paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily
provide for her grandson's legal support. x x
x[18] (Emphasis supplied; internal citations omitted)
Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her
obligation to provide sufficient legal support to her children, then all
school-bound. It is also undisputed that the amount of support Edward
77
Persons 4th Exam Cases

is able to give to respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet
respondents basic needs. This inability of Edward and Cheryl to
sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of their obligation
to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal
(petitioners) and maternal[19] lines, following the ordering in Article 199.
To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners theory, is to
sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material
deprivation of children because of parental inability to give adequate
support even if ascendants one degree removed are more than able to
fill the void.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated 28 April 2003, and its Resolution dated 12 April
2004 with the MODIFICATION that petitioners Prudencio and
Filomena Lim are liable to provide support only to respondents Lester
Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III, all surnamed Lim.
We REMAND the case to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 140, for further proceedings consistent with this ruling.
SO ORDERED.

However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation extends only to

their descendants as this word is commonly understood to refer to
relatives, by blood of lower degree. As petitioners grandchildren by
blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano
III belong to this category. Indeed, Cheryls right to receive support from
the Lim family extends only to her husband Edward, arising from their
marital bond.[20] Unfortunately, Cheryls share from the amount of
monthly support the trial court awarded cannot be determined from the
records. Thus, we are constrained to remand the case to the trial court
for this limited purpose.[21]

Petitioners Precluded from Availing

of the Alternative Option Under
Article 204 of the Civil Code, as Amended

As an alternative proposition, petitioners wish to avail of the option in

Article 204 of the Civil Code, as amended, and pray that they be
allowed to fulfill their obligation by maintaining respondents at
petitioners Makati residence. The option is unavailable to petitioners.

The application of Article 204 which provides that

The person obliged to give support shall have the

option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the
allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in
the family dwelling the person who has a right to
receive support. The latter alternative cannot be
availed of in case there is
a moral or legal obstacle thereto. (Emphasis
supplied)

is subject to its exception clause. Here, the persons entitled to receive

support are petitioners grandchildren and daughter-in-law. Granting
petitioners the option in Article 204 will secure to the grandchildren a
well-provided future; however, it will also force Cheryl to return to the
house which, for her, is the scene of her husbands infidelity. While not
rising to the level of a legal obstacle, as indeed, Cheryls charge against
Edward for concubinage did not prosper for insufficient evidence, her
steadfast insistence on its occurrence amounts to a moral impediment
bringing the case within the ambit of the exception clause of Article 204,
precluding its application.

78
Persons 4th Exam Cases
CHERRYL B. DOLINA,
Petitioner,
- versus -
GLENN D. VALLECERA,
Respondent.
This case is about a mothers claim for temporary support of an
unacknowledged child, which she sought in an action for the issuance
of a temporary protection order that she brought against the supposed
father.
The Facts and the Case
In February 2008 petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina filed a petition
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary protection order against
respondent Glenn D. Vallecera before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Tacloban City in P.O. 2008-02-07[1] for alleged woman and child
abuse under Republic Act (R.A.) 9262.[2] In filling out the blanks in
the pro-forma complaint, Dolina added a handwritten prayer for
financial support[3] from Vallecera for their supposed child. She based
her prayer on the latters Certificate of Live Birth which listed Vallecera
as the childs father. The petition also asked the RTC to order Philippine
Airlines, Valleceras employer, to withhold from his pay such amount of
support as the RTC may deem appropriate.
Vallecera opposed the petition. He claimed that Dolinas
petition was essentially one for financial support rather than for
protection against woman and child abuses; that he was not the childs
father; that the signature appearing on the childs Certificate of Live Birth
is not his; that the petition is a harassment suit intended to force him to
acknowledge the child as his and give it financial support; and that
Vallecera has never lived nor has been living with Dolina, rendering
unnecessary the issuance of a protection order against him.
On March 13, 2008[4] the RTC dismissed the petition after
hearing since no prior judgment exists establishing the filiation of
Dolinas son and granting him the right to support as basis for an order
to compel the giving of such support. Dolina filed a motion for
reconsideration but the RTC denied it in its April 4, 2008 Order,[5] with
an admonition that she first file a petition for compulsory recognition of
her child as a prerequisite for support. Unsatisfied, Dolina filed the
present petition for review directly with this Court.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the
RTC correctly dismissed Dolinas action for temporary protection and
denied her application for temporary support for her child.
The Courts Ruling
Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for
her child. The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the case is the
protection and safety of women and children who are victims of abuse
or violence.[6] Although the issuance of a protection order against the
respondent in the case can include the grant of legal support for the
wife and the child, this assumes that both are entitled to a protection
order and to legal support.
Dolina of course alleged that Vallecera had been abusing her
and her child. But it became apparent to the RTC upon hearing that this
was not the case since, contrary to her claim, neither she nor her child
ever lived with Vallecera. As it turned out, the true object of her action
was to get financial support from Vallecera for her child, her claim being
that he is the father. He of course vigorously denied this.
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper
action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted
or acknowledged. Since Dolinas demand for support for her son is
based on her claim that he is Valleceras illegitimate child, the latter is
not entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina
shall have proved his relation to him.[7] The childs remedy is to file
through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory
recognition.[8] If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter
of obligation.[9] In short, illegitimate children are entitled to support and
successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved. [10]
Dolinas remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action
against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to establish
filiation and then demand support. Alternatively, she may directly file an
action for support, where the issue of compulsory recognition may be
integrated and resolved.[11]
It must be observed, however, that the RTC should not have
dismissed the entire case based solely on the lack of any judicial
declaration of filiation between Vallecera and Dolinas child since the
main issue remains to be the alleged violence committed by Vallecera
against Dolina and her child and whether they are entitled to
protection. But of course, this matter is already water under the bridge
since Dolina failed to raise this error on review. This omission lends
credence to the conclusion of the RTC that the real purpose of the
petition is to obtain support from Vallecera.
While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the child in
cases involving paternity and filiation, it is just as aware of the
disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and
peace of the putative fathers legitimate family. [12] Vallecera disowns
Dolinas child and denies having a hand in the preparation and signing
of its certificate of birth. This issue has to be resolved in an appropriate
case.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition
and AFFIRMS the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban Citys Order dated
March 13, 2008 that dismissed petitioner Cherryl B. Dolinas action in
P.O. 2008-02-07, and Order dated April 4, 2008, denying her motion
for reconsideration dated March 28, 2008.
SO ORDERED.
79
Persons 4th Exam Cases
G.R. Nos. 175279-80 June 5, 2013
SUSAN LIM-LUA, Petitioner,
vs.
DANILO Y. LUA, Respondent.
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner seeks to set
aside the Decision1 dated April 20, 2006 and Resolution2 dated October 26,
2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing her petition for contempt (CA-
G.R. SP No. 01154) and granting respondent's petition for certiorari (CA-
G.R. SP No. 01315).
The factual background is as follows:
On September 3, 2003,3 petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua,
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-29346 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cebu City, Branch 14.
In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children,
petitioner sought the amount of 500,000.00 as monthly support, citing
respondents huge earnings from salaries and dividends in several
companies and businesses here and abroad.4
After due hearing, Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order5 dated
March 31, 2004 granting support pendente lite, as follows:
From the evidence already adduced by the parties, the amount of Two
Hundred Fifty (250,000.00) Thousand Pesos would be sufficient to take
care of the needs of the plaintiff. This amount excludes the One hundred
thirty-five (135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for medical attendance expenses
needed by plaintiff for the operation of both her eyes which is demandable
upon the conduct of such operation. The amounts already extended to the
two (2) children, being a commendable act of defendant, should be
continued by him considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.
According to Art. 203 of the Family Code, support is demandable from the
time plaintiff needed the said support but is payable only from the date of
judicial demand. Since the instant complaint was filed on 03 September
2003, the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250,000.00) Thousand should be
paid by defendant to plaintiff retroactively to such date until the hearing of
the support pendente lite. 250,000.00 x 7 corresponding to the seven (7)
months that lapsed from September, 2003 to March 2004 would tantamount
to a total of One Million Seven Hundred Fifty (1,750,000.00) Thousand
Pesos. Thereafter, starting the month of April 2004, until otherwise ordered
by this Court, defendant is ordered to pay a monthly support of Two
Hundred Fifty Thousand (250,000.00) Pesos payable within the first five
(5) days of each corresponding month pursuant to the third paragraph of
Art. 203 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The monthly support of
250,000.00 is without prejudice to any increase or decrease thereof that
this Court may grant plaintiff as the circumstances may warrant i.e.
depending on the proof submitted by the parties during the proceedings for
the main action for support.6
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,7 asserting that petitioner is
not entitled to spousal support considering that she does not maintain for
herself a separate dwelling from their children and respondent has
continued to support the family for their sustenance and well-being in
accordance with familys social and financial standing. As to the
250,000.00 granted by the trial court as monthly support pendente lite, as
well as the 1,750,000.00 retroactive support, respondent found it
unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law for not having
considered the needs of the respondent.
In its May 13, 2004 Order, the trial court stated that the March 31, 2004
Order had become final and executory since respondents motion for
reconsideration is treated as a mere scrap of paper for violation of the
threeday notice period under Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, and therefore did not interrupt the running of the
period to appeal. Respondent was given ten (10) days to show cause why
he should not be held in contempt of the court for disregarding the March
31, 2004 order granting support pendente lite.8
His second motion for reconsideration having been denied, respondent filed
a petition for certiorari in the CA.
On April 12, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision, 9 finding merit in
respondents contention that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in
granting 250,000.00 monthly support to petitioner without evidence to
prove his actual income. The said court thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this petition is given due
course. The assailed Orders dated March 31, 2004, May 13, 2004, June 4,
2004 and June 18, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City
issued in Civil Case No. CEB No. 29346 entitled "Susan Lim Lua versus
Danilo Y. Lua" are hereby nullified and set aside and instead a new one is
entered ordering herein petitioner:
a) to pay private respondent a monthly support pendente lite of
115,000.00 beginning the month of April 2005 and every month
thereafter within the first five (5) days thereof;
b) to pay the private respondent the amount of 115,000.00 a
month multiplied by the number of months starting from
September 2003 until March 2005 less than the amount
supposedly given by petitioner to the private respondent as her
and their two (2) children monthly support; and
c) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.10
Neither of the parties appealed this decision of the CA. In a
Compliance11 dated June 28, 2005, respondent attached a copy of a check
he issued in the amount of 162,651.90 payable to petitioner. Respondent
explained that, as decreed in the CA decision, he deducted from the amount
of support in arrears (September 3, 2003 to March 2005) ordered by the CA
-- 2,185,000.00 -- plus 460,000.00 (April, May, June and July 2005),
totaling 2,645,000.00, the advances given by him to his children and
petitioner in the sum of 2,482,348.16 (with attached photocopies of
receipts/billings).
In her Comment to Compliance with Motion for Issuance of a Writ of
Execution,12 petitioner asserted that none of the expenses deducted by
respondent may be chargeable as part of the monthly support contemplated
by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740.
On September 27, 2005, the trial court issued an Order13 granting
petitioners motion for issuance of a writ of execution as it rejected
respondents interpretation of the CA decision. Respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration and subsequently also filed a motion for inhibition of
Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. On November 25, 2005, Judge Yrastorza,
Sr. issued an Order14 denying both motions.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, both motions are
DENIED. Since a second motion for reconsideration is prohibited under the
Rules, this denial has attained finality; let, therefore, a writ of execution be
issued in favor of plaintiff as against defendant for the accumulated support
in arrears pendente lite.
Notify both parties of this Order.
SO ORDERED.15
Since respondent still failed and refused to pay the support in arrears
pendente lite, petitioner filed in the CA a Petition for Contempt of Court with
Damages, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 01154 ("Susan Lim Lua versus
Danilo Y. Lua"). Respondent, on the other hand, filed CA-G.R. SP No.
01315, a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court ("Danilo
Y. Lua versus Hon. Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr., in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 14, and Susan Lim Lua").
The two cases were consolidated.
By Decision dated April 20, 2006, the CA set aside the assailed orders of
the trial court, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the case of Petition for
Contempt of Court with Damages filed by Susan Lim Lua against
Danilo Y. Lua with docket no. SP. CA-GR No. 01154;
b) GRANTING Danilo Y. Luas Petition for Certiorari docketed as
SP. CA-GR No. 01315. Consequently, the assailed Orders dated
27 September 2005 and 25 November 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 14, Cebu City issued in Civil Case No. CEB-29346
entitled "Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua, are hereby
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and instead a new one is entered:
i. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of
Ph2,482,348.16 plus 946,465.64, or a total of
PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in
arrears of Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and
their two (2) children;
ii. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of his
monthly support of Ph115,000.00 pesos starting from
the time payment of this amount was deferred by him
subject to the deductions aforementioned.
iii. DIRECTING the issuance of a permanent writ of
preliminary injunction.
SO ORDERED.16
The appellate court said that the trial court should not have completely
disregarded the expenses incurred by respondent consisting of the
purchase and maintenance of the two cars, payment of tuition fees, travel
expenses, and the credit card purchases involving groceries, dry goods and
books, which certainly inured to the benefit not only of the two children, but
their mother (petitioner) as well. It held that respondents act of deferring the
monthly support adjudged in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 was not contumacious
as it was anchored on valid and justifiable reasons. Respondent said he just
wanted the issue of whether to deduct his advances be settled first in view
of the different interpretation by the trial court of the appellate courts
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740. It also noted the lack of contribution
from the petitioner in the joint obligation of spouses to support their children.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition raising the following errors allegedly committed by the
CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING
RESPONDENT GUILTY OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE
DEDUCTION OF THE AMOUNT OF PH2,482,348.16 PLUS
946,465.64, OR A TOTAL OF PH3,428,813.80 FROM THE
CURRENT TOTAL SUPPORT IN ARREARS OF THE
RESPONDENT TO THE PETITIONER AND THEIR
CHILDREN.17
The main issue is whether certain expenses already incurred by the
respondent may be deducted from the total support in arrears owing to
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
petitioner and her children pursuant to the Decision dated April 12, 2005 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 84740.
The pertinent provision of the Family Code of the Philippines provides:
Article 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the
preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some
profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.
Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and
from place of work. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner argues that it was patently erroneous for the CA to have allowed
the deduction of the value of the two cars and their maintenance costs from
the support in arrears, as these items are not indispensable to the
sustenance of the family or in keeping them alive. She points out that in the
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740, the CA already considered the said
items which it deemed chargeable to respondent, while the monthly support
pendente lite (115,000.00) was fixed on the basis of the documentary
evidence of respondents alleged income from various businesses and
petitioners testimony that she needed 113,000.00 for the maintenance of
the household and other miscellaneous expenses excluding the
135,000.00 medical attendance expenses of petitioner.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that disallowing the subject
deductions would result in unjust enrichment, thus making him pay for the
same obligation twice. Since petitioner and the children resided in one
residence, the groceries and dry goods purchased by the children using
respondents credit card, totalling 594,151.58 for the period September
2003 to June 2005 were not consumed by the children alone but shared
with their mother. As to the Volkswagen Beetle and BMW 316i respondent
bought for his daughter Angelli Suzanne Lua and Daniel Ryan Lua,
respectively, these, too, are to be considered advances for support, in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Respondent stressed that
being children of parents belonging to the upper-class society, Angelli and
Daniel Ryan had never in their entire life commuted from one place to
another, nor do they eat their meals at "carinderias". Hence, the cars and
their maintenance are indispensable to the childrens day-to-day living, the
value of which were properly deducted from the arrearages in support
pendente lite ordered by the trial and appellate courts.
As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage
and family relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in
proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the
recipient.18 Such support comprises everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage or for annulment of voidable marriage, or for legal separation, and
at any time during the proceeding, the court, motu proprio or upon verified
application of any of the parties, guardian or designated custodian, may
temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or
final order.19 Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to
delve fully into the merits of the case before it can settle an application for
this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount
of evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application.
It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary
evidence appearing in the record.20
In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite for petitioner and
her two children was determined after due hearing and submission of
documentary evidence by the parties. Although the amount fixed by the trial
court was reduced on appeal, it is clear that the monthly support pendente
lite of 115,000.00 ordered by the CA was intended primarily for the
sustenance of petitioner and her children, e.g., food, clothing, salaries of
drivers and house helpers, and other household expenses. Petitioners
testimony also mentioned the cost of regular therapy for her scoliosis and
vitamins/medicines.
ATTY. ZOSA:
xxxx
Q How much do you spend for your food and your two (2) children every
month?
A Presently, Sir?
ATTY. ZOSA:
Yes.
A For the food alone, I spend not over 40,000.00 to 50,000.00 a month
for the food alone.
xxxx
ATTY. ZOSA:
Q What other expenses do you incur in living in that place?
A The normal household and the normal expenses for a family to have a
decent living, Sir.
Q How much other expenses do you incur?
WITNESS:
A For other expenses, is around over a 100,000.00, Sir.
Q Why do you incur that much amount?
A For the clothing for the three (3) of us, for the vitamins and medicines.
And also I am having a special therapy to straighten my back because I am
scoliotic. I am advised by the Doctor to hire a driver, but I cannot still afford
it now. Because my eyesight is not reliable for driving. And I still need
another househelp to accompany me whenever I go marketing because for
my age, I cannot carry anymore heavy loads.
xxxx
ATTY. FLORES:
xxxx
Q On the issue of the food for you and the two (2) children, you mentioned
40,000.00 to 50,000.00?
A Yes, for the food alone.
Q Okay, what other possible expenses that you would like to include in
those two (2) items? You mentioned of a driver, am I correct?
A Yes, I might need two (2) drivers, Sir for me and my children.
Q Okay. How much would you like possibly to pay for those two (2) drivers?
A I think 10,000.00 a month for one (1) driver. So I need two (2) drivers.
And I need another househelp.
Q You need another househelp. The househelp nowadays would charge
you something between 3,000.00 to 4,000.00. Thats quite
A Right now, my househelp is receiving 8,000.00. I need another which I
will give a compensation of 5,000.00.
Q Other than that, do you still have other expenses?
A My clothing.
COURT:
How about the schooling for your children?
WITNESS:
A The schooling is shouldered by my husband, Your Honor.
COURT:
Everything?
A Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
ATTY. FLORES:
Q Madam witness, let us talk of the present needs. x x x. What else, what
specific need that you would like to add so I can tell my client, the defendant.
WITNESS:
A I need to have an operation both of my eyes. I also need a special therapy
for my back because I am scoliotic, three (3) times a week.
Q That is very reasonable. [W]ould you care to please repeat that?
A Therapy for my scoliotic back and then also for the operation both of my
eyes. And I am also taking some vitamins from excel that will cost
20,000.00 a month.
Q Okay. Lets have piece by piece. Have you asked the Doctor how much
would it cost you for the operation of that scoliotic?
A Yes before because I was already due last year. Before, this eye will cost
60,000.00 and the other eyes 75,000.00.
Q So for both eyes, you are talking of 60,000.00 plus 75,000.00 is
135,000.00?
A Yes.
xxxx
Q You talk of therapy?
A Yes.
Q So how much is that?
A Around 5,000.00 a week.21
As to the financial capacity of the respondent, it is beyond doubt that he can
solely provide for the subsistence, education, transportation, health/medical
needs and recreational activities of his children, as well as those of
petitioner who was then unemployed and a full-time housewife. Despite this,
respondents counsel manifested during the same hearing that respondent
was willing to grant the amount of only 75,000.00 as monthly support
pendente lite both for the children and petitioner as spousal support.
Though the receipts of expenses submitted in court unmistakably show how
much respondent lavished on his children, it appears that the matter of
spousal support was a different matter altogether. Rejecting petitioners
prayer for 500,000.00 monthly support and finding the 75,000.00
monthly support offered by respondent as insufficient, the trial court fixed
the monthly support pendente lite at 250,000.00. However, since the
supposed income in millions of respondent was based merely on the
allegations of petitioner in her complaint and registration documents of
various corporations which respondent insisted are owned not by him but
his parents and siblings, the CA reduced the amount of support pendente
lite to 115,000.00, which ruling was no longer questioned by both parties.
Controversy between the parties resurfaced when respondents compliance
with the final CA decision indicated that he deducted from the total amount
in arrears (2,645,000.00) the sum of 2,482,348.16, representing the
value of the two cars for the children, their cost of maintenance and
advances given to petitioner and his children. Respondent explained that
the deductions were made consistent with the fallo of the CA Decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordering him to pay support pendente lite in arrears
less the amount supposedly given by him to petitioner as her and their two
childrens monthly support.
The following is a summary of the subject deductions under Compliance
dated June 28, 2005, duly supported by receipts22:
Car purchases for Angelli Suzanne - Php1,350,000.00
and Daniel Ryan - 613,472.86
81
Persons 4th Exam Cases
Car Maintenance fees of Angelli - 51,232.50
Suzanne
Credit card statements of Daniel Ryan - 348,682.28
Car Maintenance fees of Daniel Ryan - 118,960.52
Php2,482,348.16
After the trial court disallowed the foregoing deductions, respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration further asserting that the following amounts,
likewise with supporting receipts, be considered as additional advances
given to petitioner and the children23:
Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua Php 42,450.71
Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan 11,500.00
Travel expenses of Susan Lim-Lua 14,611.15
Credit card purchases of Angelli 408,891.08
Suzanne
Salon and travel expenses of Angelli 87,112.70
Suzanne
School expenses of Daniel Ryan Lua 260,900.00
Cash given to Daniel and Angelli 121,000.00
TOTAL - Php 946,465.64
GRAND TOTAL - Php 3,428,813.80
The CA, in ruling for the respondent said that all the foregoing expenses
already incurred by the respondent should, in equity, be considered
advances which may be properly deducted from the support in arrears due
to the petitioner and the two children. Said court also noted the absence of
petitioners contribution to the joint obligation of support for their children.
We reverse in part the decision of the CA.
Judicial determination of support pendente lite in cases of legal separation
and petitions for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage are guided
by the following provisions of the Rule on Provisional Orders24
Sec. 2. Spousal Support.In determining support for the spouses, the court
may be guided by the following rules:
(a) In the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement
between the spouses, the spouses may be supported from the
properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership.
(b) The court may award support to either spouse in such amount
and for such period of time as the court may deem just and
reasonable based on their standard of living during the marriage.
(c) The court may likewise consider the following factors: (1)
whether the spouse seeking support is the custodian of a child
whose circumstances make it appropriate for that spouse not to
seek outside employment; (2) the time necessary to acquire
sufficient education and training to enable the spouse seeking
support to find appropriate employment, and that spouses future
earning capacity; (3) the duration of the marriage; (4) the
comparative financial resources of the spouses, including their
comparative earning abilities in the labor market; (5) the needs
and obligations of each spouse; (6) the contribution of each
spouse to the marriage, including services rendered in home-
making, child care, education, and career building of the other
spouse; (7) the age and health of the spouses; (8) the physical
and emotional conditions of the spouses; (9) the ability of the
supporting spouse to give support, taking into account that
spouses earning capacity, earned and unearned income, assets,
and standard of living; and (10) any other factor the court may
deem just and equitable.
(d) The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional
support from the salary of the spouse.
Sec. 3. Child Support.The common children of the spouses shall be
supported from the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership.
Subject to the sound discretion of the court, either parent or both may be
ordered to give an amount necessary for the support, maintenance, and
education of the child. It shall be in proportion to the resources or means of
the giver and to the necessities of the recipient.
In determining the amount of provisional support, the court may likewise
consider the following factors: (1) the financial resources of the custodial
and non-custodial parent and those of the child; (2) the physical and
emotional health of the child and his or her special needs and aptitudes; (3)
the standard of living the child has been accustomed to; (4) the non-
monetary contributions that the parents will make toward the care and well-
being of the child.
The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from
the salary of the parent.
Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as fixed by the CA was
not appealed by either party, there is no controversy as to its sufficiency
and reasonableness. The dispute concerns the deductions made by
respondent in settling the support in arrears.
On the issue of crediting of money payments or expenses against accrued
support, we find as relevant the following rulings by US courts.
In Bradford v. Futrell,25 appellant sought review of the decision of the Circuit
Court which found him in arrears with his child support payments and
entered a decree in favor of appellee wife. He complained that in
determining the arrearage figure, he should have been allowed full credit
for all money and items of personal property given by him to the children
themselves, even though he referred to them as gifts. The Court of Appeals
of Maryland ruled that in the suit to determine amount of arrears due the
divorced wife under decree for support of minor children, the husband
(appellant) was not entitled to credit for checks which he had clearly
designated as gifts, nor was he entitled to credit for an automobile given to
the oldest son or a television set given to the children. Thus, if the children
remain in the custody of the mother, the father is not entitled to credit for
money paid directly to the children if such was paid without any relation to
the decree.
In the absence of some finding of consent by the mother, most courts refuse
to allow a husband to dictate how he will meet the requirements for support
payments when the mode of payment is fixed by a decree of court. Thus he
will not be credited for payments made when he unnecessarily interposed
himself as a volunteer and made payments direct to the children of his own
accord. Wills v. Baker, 214 S. W. 2d 748 (Mo. 1948); Openshaw v.
Openshaw, 42 P. 2d 191 (Utah 1935). In the latter case the court said in
part: "The payments to the children themselves do not appear to have been
made as payments upon alimony, but were rather the result of his fatherly
interest in the welfare of those children. We do not believe he should be
permitted to charge them to plaintiff. By so doing he would be determining
for Mrs. Openshaw the manner in which she should expend her allowances.
It is a very easy thing for children to say their mother will not give them
money, especially as they may realize that such a plea is effective in
attaining their ends. If she is not treating them right the courts are open to
the father for redress."26
In Martin, Jr. v. Martin,27 the Supreme Court of Washington held that a
father, who is required by a divorce decree to make child support payments
directly to the mother, cannot claim credit for payments voluntarily made
directly to the children. However, special considerations of an equitable
nature may justify a court in crediting such payments on his indebtedness
to the mother, when such can be done without injustice to her.
The general rule is to the effect that when a father is required by a divorce
decree to pay to the mother money for the support of their dependent
children and the unpaid and accrued installments become judgments in her
favor, he cannot, as a matter of law, claim credit on account of payments
voluntarily made directly to the children. Koon v. Koon, supra; Briggs v.
Briggs, supra. However, special considerations of an equitable nature may
justify a court in crediting such payments on his indebtedness to the mother,
when that can be done without injustice to her. Briggs v. Briggs, supra. The
courts are justifiably reluctant to lay down any general rules as to when such
credits may be allowed.28 (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by
respondent to be credited against the accrued support pendente lite. As
earlier mentioned, the monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial
court was intended primarily for food, household expenses such as salaries
of drivers and house helpers, and also petitioners scoliosis therapy
sessions. Hence, the value of two expensive cars bought by respondent for
his children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses of petitioner and
Angelli, purchases through credit card of items other than groceries and dry
goods (clothing) should have been disallowed, as these bear no relation to
the judgment awarding support pendente lite. While it is true that the
dispositive portion of the executory decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740
ordered herein respondent to pay the support in arrears "less than the
amount supposedly given by petitioner to the private respondent as her and
their two (2) children monthly support," the deductions should be limited to
those basic needs and expenses considered by the trial and appellate
courts. The assailed ruling of the CA allowing huge deductions from the
accrued monthly support of petitioner and her children, while correct insofar
as it commends the generosity of the respondent to his children, is clearly
inconsistent with the executory decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740. More
important, it completely ignores the unfair consequences to petitioner
whose sustenance and well-being, was given due regard by the trial and
appellate courts. This is evident from the March 31, 2004 Order granting
support pendente lite to petitioner and her children, when the trial court
observed:
While there is evidence to the effect that defendant is giving some forms of
financial assistance to his two (2) children via their credit cards and paying
for their school expenses, the same is, however, devoid of any form of
spousal support to the plaintiff, for, at this point in time, while the action for
nullity of marriage is still to be heard, it is incumbent upon the defendant,
considering the physical and financial condition of the plaintiff and the
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
overwhelming capacity of defendant, to extend support unto the latter. x x
x29
On appeal, while the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 reduced the
amount of monthly support fixed by the trial court, it nevertheless held that
considering respondents financial resources, it is but fair and just that he
give a monthly support for the sustenance and basic necessities of
petitioner and his children. This would imply that any amount respondent
seeks to be credited as monthly support should only cover those incurred
for sustenance and household expenses.1avvphi1
In the case at bar, records clearly show and in fact has been admitted by
petitioner that aside from paying the expenses of their two (2) childrens
schooling, he gave his two (2) children two (2) cars and credit cards of which
the expenses for various items namely: clothes, grocery items and repairs
of their cars were chargeable to him which totaled an amount of more than
One Hundred Thousand (100,000.00) for each of them and considering
that as testified by the private respondent that she needs the total amount
of 113,000.00 for the maintenance of the household and other
miscellaneous expenses and considering further that petitioner can afford
to buy cars for his two (2) children, and to pay the expenses incurred by
them which are chargeable to him through the credit cards he provided them
in the amount of 100,000.00 each, it is but fair and just that the monthly
support pendente lite for his wife, herein private respondent, be fixed as of
the present in the amount of 115,000.00 which would be sufficient enough
to take care of the household and other needs. This monthly support
pendente lite to private respondent in the amount of 115,000.00 excludes
the amount of One Hundred ThirtyFive (135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for
medical attendance expenses needed by private respondent for the
operation of both her eyes which is demandable upon the conduct of such
operation. Likewise, this monthly support of 115,000.00 is without
prejudice to any increase or decrease thereof that the trial court may grant
private respondent as the circumstances may warrant i.e. depending on the
proof submitted by the parties during the proceedings for the main action
for support.
The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a
commendable act of petitioner, should be continued by him considering the
vast financial resources at his disposal.30 (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, only the following expenses of respondent may be allowed as
deductions from the accrued support pendente lite for petitioner and her
children:
1wphi1
Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua Php 42,450.71
Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan 11,500.00
Credit card purchases of Angelli 365,282.20
(Groceries and Dry Goods) 228,869.38
Credit Card purchases of Daniel Ryan
TOTAL Php 648,102.29
As to the contempt charge, we sustain the CA in holding that respondent is
not guilty of indirect contempt.
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in
opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful
disregard or disobedience of the courts order, but such conduct which
tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into
disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of SO ORDERED."
justice.31 To constitute contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an No pronouncement as to costs.
illegitimate or improper purpose.32 The good faith, or lack of it, of the alleged SO ORDERED.
contemnor should be considered.33
Respondent admittedly ceased or suspended the giving of monthly support
pendente lite granted by the trial court, which is immediately executory.
However, we agree with the CA that respondents act was not contumacious
considering that he had not been remiss in actually providing for the needs
of his children. It is a matter of record that respondent continued shouldering
the full cost of their education and even beyond their basic necessities in
keeping with the familys social status. Moreover, respondent believed in
good faith that the trial and appellate courts, upon equitable grounds, would
allow him to offset the substantial amounts he had spent or paid directly to
his children.
Respondent complains that petitioner is very much capacitated to generate
income on her own because she presently maintains a boutique at the Ayala
Center Mall in Cebu City and at the same time engages in the business of
lending money. He also claims that the two children have finished their
education and are now employed in the family business earning their own
salaries.
Suffice it to state that the matter of increase or reduction of support should
be submitted to the trial court in which the action for declaration for nullity
of marriage was filed, as this Court is not a trier of facts. The amount of
support may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the
reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources
or means of the person obliged to support.34 As we held in Advincula v.
Advincula35
Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of
such nature that its allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire
period that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be
modified or altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs,
and with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final
determination.36
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated
April 20, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 01154 and 01315
is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the case of Petition for
Contempt of Court with Damages filed by Susan Lim Lua against
Danilo Y. Lua with docket no. SP. CA-G.R. No. 01154;
b) GRANTING IN PART Danilo Y. Lua's Petition for Certiorari
docketed as SP. CA-G.R. No. 01315. Consequently, the assailed
Orders dated 27 September 2005 and 25 November 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City issued in Civil Case
No. CEB-29346 entitled "Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua,
are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and instead a new one
is entered:
i. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of Php
648,102.29 from the support pendente lite in arrears of
Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two
(2) children;
ii. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of his
monthly support of Ph115,000.00 pesos starting from
the time payment of this amount was deferred by him
subject to the deduction aforementioned.
iii. DIRECTING the immediate execution of this
judgment.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
BBB,*Petitioner, v. AAA,*Respondent.
Petitioner BBB is now before this Court with a Petition for Review
on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to assail the
Decision2 dated November 6, 2009 and Resolution3 dated August 3, 2010 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89581, which affirmed with
modification the issuance against him on August 14, 2007 of a Permanent
Protection Order (PPO)4 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City,
Branch 162, in favor of his wife, herein respondent AAA.
Antecedent Facts
The CA aptly summarized as follows the facts of the case until the RTCs
issuance of the PPO against BBB:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Both [BBB] and [AAA] allege that they first met in 1991 but started to date
seriously only in 1996. [AAA] was then a medical student and was raising her
first child borne from a previous relationship, a boy named [CCC], with the help
of her parents.
During the relationship with [BBB], [AAA] bore two more children namely,
[DDD] (born on December 11, 1997) and [EEE] (born on October 19, 2000).
To legalize their relationship, [BBB] and [AAA] married in civil rights on October
10, 2002 and thereafter, the birth certificates of the children, including [CCCs],
was amended to change their civil status to legitimated by virtue of the said
marriage.
The relationship, both admit, was far from ideal and has had its share of happy
moments and heated arguments. The two however have contradicting
statements as to the cause of their present situation.
[BBB] alleges that [AAAs] irrational jealousy has caused their frequent
arguments. According to [BBB], [AAA] has been suspicious of [BBB] and his
relationship with his female co-workers, which [BBB] alleges, contrary to
[AAAs] suspicion, are purely professional. According to [BBB], because of their
repeated fights, he was forced to leave the family home to prevent the brewing
animosity between him and his wife. Soon after [BBB] left, [AAA] herself
decided to leave the family home and brought the children with her, which
made it difficult for [BBB] to see their kids regularly. This has also caused the
family expense to double, making it even more difficult for [BBB] to fulfill his
financial obligations.
[AAA], on the other hand, alleges that their heated arguments were often due to
[BBBs] incessant womanizing. When confronted about it, [BBB], instead of
denying the same, would even curse [AAA].
The breaking point for [AAA] came when, [BBBs] alleged mistress, a woman
by the name of [FFF], insulted and humiliated [AAA] in public, in the presence
of [BBB] himself, who, according to [AAA], did nothing to stop the same.
Extremely hurt, [AAA] decided to leave the conjugal home with the children and
lived temporarily at a friends house. She however went back to the conjugal
home with [DDD] and [EEE] after some time, leaving her son [CCC] at her
friends house.
What made matters worse, according to [AAA], was the apparent biases of
[BBB] in favor of [DDD] and [EEE]. That despite his promise to treat [CCC] as
his own, [BBB] would still treat the latter differently from the two kids, putting
[CCC] at a disadvantage. [AAA], cites as example the instances when, [BBB]
would buy food and toys for [DDD] and [EEE] only, buying nothing for [CCC].
While living separately from [BBB], [AAA] discovered that [BBB] was not paying
the rentals due on the condominium unit they were occupying, forcing [AAA] to
move out. [AAA] was likewise compelled to find work to support the family, after
[BBB] has started to be remiss in his financial obligations to the family.
According to [AAA], the amounts given by [BBB] were not sufficient to cover the
family expenses, forcing her to request for loans from friends.
[AAA] likewise feels threatened after discovering [that BBB] was stalking her
and/or their children. [AAA] alleges that she found out that [BBB] has sought
the help of one [GGG], a friend of [BBB] who lives within the same compound
where [AAA] lives, to go through the guards logbook to monitor their every
move, i.e., who visits them, what time [AAA] leaves and returns back home,
etc.
Citing the foregoing as constituting economic and psychological abuse, [AAA]
filed an application for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order with a
request to make the same permanent after due hearing, before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City.
Finding good ground in [AAAs] application, the court a quo issued a Temporary
Protection Order (TPO). The TPO was thereafter, made permanent by virtue of
a Decision of the RTC dated August [14, 2007], the dispositive portion of which
orders:
x x x x
Prohibiting [BBB], directly and indirectly, from stalking, harassing, annoying, or
otherwise verbally abusing [AAA], directly or indirectly, to refrain from insulting
her, cursing her and shouting invectives at her;
Prohibiting [BBB] from committing or threatening to commit any act that may
cause mental and emotional anguish to [AAA], i.e. publicly displaying her
extramarital relations with his mistress [FFF] and anyone else for that matter;
Prohibiting [BBB] from exposing the minor children to immoral and illicit
environment, specifically prohibiting him to allow her (sic) mistress [FFF] and
anyone else to be with them in instances where he would be allowed by this
Court to see their children;
Allowing [BBB] ALONE to see and visit his children once a month (for a total of
12 visits per year) at the latters residence for a maximum period of 2 years [sic]
each visit, subject to further orders from this Court. For this purpose, [BBBs
every visit] shall be accompanied by the Court Sheriff, who shall coordinate
with [AAA] as to the availability of time and date of children for such visit, at the
expense of [BBB]. For every visit, the Court Sheriff is directed to submit his
report within 5 days from the date [BBB] visited the children;
Directing [BBB] to allow [AAA] to continue to have lawful use and possession of
the motor vehicle more particularly described as follows:
One (1) Hyundai Starex Van
1997 Model
Plate Number: WJP 902
Chassis Number:
Serial Number KMJWH7HPXU158443
Granting [AAA] permanent sole custody over their common children until further
orders from this Court;
Ordering [BBB] to provide support in the amount of Php 62,918.97 per month
(not Php 81,650.00 being prayed by [AAA]) to [AAA] as monthly support,
inclusive of educational expenses, groceries, medicines, medical bills, and
insurance premiums, starting from the month of January 2007 to be given
within the first five (5) days of the month through the Court Sheriff, who shall
coordinate with [AAA] in receiving such support;
Requiring [BBB] to stay away from the offended party and any designated
family or household member at a distance of 100 meters;
Requiring [BBB] to stay away from the residence, school, place of employment
or any specified place frequented regularly by the offended party and children
and any designated family or household member;
Ordering [BBB] to post bond of Php 300,000.00 to keep peace pursuant to
Section 23 of RA 9262 with the undertaking that [BBB] will not commit the
violence sought to be prevented and that in case such violence is committed[,]
he will pay the amount determined by the Court in its judgment;
Ordering [BBB] to pay the sum of Php 100,000.00 (not Php 200,000.00 being
prayed by [AAA]) representing both reasonable attorneys fees and cost of
litigation, including cost of suit.
x x x x.5
Ruling of the CA
BBB filed before the CA an appeal6 to challenge the RTC Decision dated
August 14, 2007. BBB alleged that the RTCs (a) issuance of the PPO against
him, (b) award to AAA of the sole custody over their children, (c) directives for
him to pay attorneys fees and costs of litigation and to post an excessive
amount of bond, and (d) declaration that he had an abusive character lack
factual bases.
On November 6, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the
factual findings and dispositions of the RTC, but ordering the remand of the
case for the latter to determine in the proper proceedings who shall be awarded
custody of the children. Like the RTC, the CA found that under the provisions of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,7 BBB had subjected AAA and their children to
psychological, emotional and economic abuses. BBB displayed acts of marital
infidelity which exposed AAA to public ridicule causing her emotional and
psychological distress. While BBB alleged that FFF was only a professional
colleague, he continued to have public appearances with her which did not help
to dispel AAAs accusation that the two had an extra-marital relation. Further,
BBB verbally abused AAA either in person or through text messages. The CA
likewise did not favorably consider BBBs claim that he cannot provide financial
support to AAA and the children in the amount required by the RTC as his
income merely depended on contractual hosting and events management
assignments. The CA emphasized that AAA was in the position to know the
sources of BBBs income. Citing Section 288 of R.A. No. 9262 and Article
2139 of the Family Code, the CA, however, ordered the RTC to determine who
shall be entitled to exercise custody over the children, who at that time were
already older than seven years of age.
The CA denied BBBs Motion for Partial Reconsideration10 by way of the
Resolution11 dated August 3, 2010 which is likewise assailed in the instant
petition.
Issues
Undaunted, BBB now comes before this Court raising the following
issues:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA] COMMITTED ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE
RTCS DECISION TO MAKE THE [TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
(TPO)] PERMANENT.
84
Persons 4th Exam Cases
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA] COMMITTED ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE
RTCS AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND COST OF LITIGATION IN
FAVOR OF [AAA].
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA] COMMITTED ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE
RTCS ORDER REQUIRING [BBB] TO POST AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF
BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE.12cralawlawlibrary
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA AND THE RTC CORRECTLY ADMITTED INTO
EVIDENCE THE UNAUTHENTICATED TEXT MESSAGES ADDUCED BY
AAA.13cralawlawlibrary
V Alleging psychological violence and economic abuse, AAA anchored her
WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF SUPPORT SHOULD BE DELETED AS
THE SPOUSES COMMON BIOLOGICAL CHILDREN, DDD AND EEE, ARE
ALREADY UNDER BBBS ACTUAL CARE AND CUSTODY SINCE AUGUST
2010 WHEN AAA LEFT TO WORK AS A NURSE IN THE UNITED STATES.14
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In support of the instant petition, BBB merely reiterates his factual claims in the
proceedings below relative to his financial position and AAAs supposedly
baseless accusations and demands from him. In addition, he posits that the
text messages offered by AAA as evidence were unauthenticated; hence,
doubt exists as to their admissibility. Further, he points out that due to the
current whereabouts and circumstances of the parties, the PPO issued against
him is rendered moot. He now has actual care and custody of DDD and EEE,
while CCC, who is not his biological son, resides in a college dormitory. BBB
and AAA barely get in touch with each other except when the latter initiates the
same.
In her Comment15 to the petition, AAA counters that BBB erroneously raises
factual issues which are subjects beyond the contemplation of a petition filed
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, BBB continuously
violates the PPO, which under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262, is supposed to
be immediately executory upon its issuance by the RTC. AAA claims that BBB
still verbally abuses her. BBB has not posted the P300,000.00 bond required
from him. He likewise has not paid the attorneys fees and costs of litigation
awarded to AAA. He does not provide support for CCC, who, in the eyes of the
law, is also among his legitimated children. AAA further alleges that in 2010,
she left DDD and EEE under the care of BBB only because the circumstances
then obtaining forced her to do so. Three years had then lapsed from the time
she filed an application for a protection order and still, no execution of the PPO
ensued. She could not depend for financial support from BBB. She was thus
left with no choice but to yield custody over DDD and EEE even if the set-up
exposed the children to BBBs illicit affairs. AAA points out that since their
children are all older than seven years of age, they are already capable of
choosing for themselves whom they want to exercise custody over them.
Pending the Courts deliberation of the instant case, BBB filed a Manifestation
and Motion to Render Judgment Based on a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA).16 BBB alleges that on July 29, 2013, he and AAA had entered into a
compromise anent the custody, exercise of parental authority over, and support
of DDD and EEE.17cralawlawlibrary
AAAs counsel, Atty. Shielah Elbinias-Uyboco (Atty. Uyboco), filed a Comment
to the MOA18 pointing out that AAA signed the MOA while emotionally
distressed and sans the formers advice and guidance. Atty. Uyboco likewise
emphasizes that BBBs illicit relationship with FFF continues in violation of the
PPO issued by the RTC.
In BBBs Reply,19 he counters that AAA should be presumed to have acted with
due care and full knowledge of the contents of the MOA which she signed.
Further, BBBs alleged involvement with FFF is an issue which need not be
resolved in a judgment based on compromise.
Disquisition of the Court
The instant petition is not a proper
subject of a compromise agreement.
The Court cannot take the simplest course of finally writing finis to the instant
petition by rendering a judgment merely based on compromise as prayed for by
BBB due to reasons discussed below.
application for the issuance of a TPO and a PPO on the basis of the provisions
of R.A. No. 9262. In the instant petition, what is essentially being assailed is the
PPO issued by the RTC and which was affirmed by the CA. The rules,
however, intend that cases filed under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 be not
subjects of compromise agreements.
It bears stressing that Section 23(d) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC20 explicitly
prohibits compromise on any act constituting the crime of violence against
women. Thus, in Garcia v. Drilon,21 the Court declared
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves
parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at
fault. x x x.22(Emphasis deleted)
AM No. 10-4-16-SC,23 on the other hand, directs the referral to mediation of all
issues under the Family Code and other laws in relation to support, custody,
visitation, property relations and guardianship of minor
children, excepting therefrom those covered by R.A. No. 9262.
While AAA filed her application for a TPO and a PPO as an independent
action and not as an incidental relief prayed for in a criminal suit, the instant
petition cannot be taken outside the ambit of cases falling under the provisions
of R.A. No. 9262. Perforce, the prohibition against subjecting the instant
petition to compromise applies.
The courts a quo committed no
error in issuing a PPO against BBB.
Anent the main issues raised in the instant petition, the Court finds no error in
the CAs ruling that the RTC properly issued a PPO against BBB and that a
remanding of the case to the trial court is necessary to determine who shall
exercise custody over CCC, DDD and EEE. However, the choices of the
children as with whom they would prefer to stay would alter the effects of the
PPO. Hence, this Court affirms the herein assailed PPO except items (d), (f),
(g), (h) and (i)24 thereof relative to who shall be granted custody over the three
children, how the spouses shall exercise visitation rights, and the amount and
manner of providing financial support, which are matters the RTC is now
directed to determine with dispatch.
The Court notes BBBs manifestation that he and AAA had arrived at an
amicable settlement as regards the issues of custody, exercise of parental
authority over, and support of DDD and EEE. While these matters can be lawful
subjects of compromise, AAAs vacillation, as expressed by her counsel,
compels the Court to exercise prudence by directing the RTC to resolve with
finality the aforesaid issues. The parties are, however, not precluded from
entering into a compromise as regards the aforesaid issues, but the Court now
requires the RTCs direct supervision lest the parties muddle the issues anew
and fail to put an end to their bickering.
No grounds exist which compel this
Court to resolve the first three issues
raised by BBB since they are merely
factual in character.
In Padalhin v. Lavia,25 the Court declared that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Primarily, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that the
petition filed shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same
must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest
solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is
clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question
posed is one of fact.cralawred
x x x [T]he substantive issue of whether or not the petitioners are entitled to
moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees is a factual issue
which is beyond the province of a petition for review on certiorari. x x x
In the case at bar, the petitioner spouses present to us issues with an
intent to subject to review the uniform factual findings of the RTC and the
CA. Specifically, the instant petition challenges the existence of clear and
substantial evidence warranting the award of damages and attorneys fees in
Lavias favor. Further, the instant petition prays for the grant of the Spouses
Padalhins counterclaims on the supposed showing that the complaint filed by
Lavia before the RTC was groundless. It bears stressing that we are not a
trier of facts. Undoubtedly, the questions now raised before us are factual and
not legal in character, hence, beyond the contemplation of a petition filed under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.26 (Italics in the original and emphasis
ours)
In BBBs case, he avers that the RTC and the CAs (a) issuance of the PPO,
(b) award of attorneys fees and costs of litigation in AAAs favor, and (c)
directive for him to post a bond in the amount of P300,000.00 all lack factual
bases. The first three issues presented unmistakably call for a re-calibration of
evidence. While the general rule that only legal issues can be resolved in a
petition filed under Rule 45 recognizes exceptions,27 BBBs case does not fall
in the latter category. The RTC and the CA are in accord with each other as to
their factual findings, which are supported by substantial evidence, thus,
binding upon this Court.
The doubt raised by BBB anent the
admissibility of the text messages as
evidence is not genuinely a legal issue.
In the case of Justice Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud,28 it is stated that any question
as to the admissibility of text messages as evidence is rendered moot and
academic if the party raising such issue admits authorship of the subject
messages.29cralawlawlibrary
BBB argues that the RTC and the CA erred in admitting as evidence the text
messages which were sent by him and FFF to AAA since they were
unauthenticated. However, BBB himself effectively admitted in the pleadings
filed with this Court and the CA that he indeed sent the text messages
attributed to him by AAA. The Appellants Brief30 filed before the CA stated in
part that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
[AAA] conveniently chose to leave out the initiatory messages to which [BBB]
replied to. It is totally obvious that the alleged messages from [BBB] are only
messages that are in response to an ongoing verbal or virtual tussle and the
adamant refusal of [AAA] to bring the children home despite the entreaties of
[BBB]. Be it noted that [BBB], for the past several months leading up to their
separation, and up to the time that the instant case has been filed, continuously
endured the extreme mood swings, malicious accusations, haranguing, curses,
insults, and even violence from [AAA].31 (Emphasis and underscoring in the
original and italics ours)
Further, in the instant petition, BBB repleads that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[I]t is utterly apparent that the alleged messages from [BBB] are only messages
that are in response to an ongoing verbal or virtual tussle between the
parties.32
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the above-quoted portions of the pleadings, BBB attempted to justify why he
sent the messages to AAA. However, in doing so, he, in effect, admitted
authorship of the messages which AAA adduced as evidence. It is likewise
noted that BBB did not deny ownership of the cellphone number from which the
text messages were sent.
Hence, while at first glance, it would seem that the issue of admissibility of the
text messages requires an interpretation of the rules of evidence, this Court
does not find the same to be necessary. While BBB had admitted authorship of
the text messages, he pleads for this Court to consider those messages as
inadmissible for allegedly being unauthenticated. BBBs arguments are
unbearably self-contradictory and he cannot be allowed to take refuge under
technical rules of procedure to assail what is already apparent.
The deletion from the PPO of the
directive of the RTC and the CA relative
to the award of support is not warranted.
While CCC is not BBBs biological son,
he was legitimated under the latters name.
Like DDD and EEE, CCC is entitled to
receive support from BBB.
BBB claims that DDD and EEE are now under his sole care and custody, which
allegedly renders moot the provision in the PPO relative to support. BBB points
out that CCC is not his biological son. Impliedly then, BBB justifies why CCC is
not entitled to receive support from him.
This Court is not persuaded.
Article 177 of the Family Code provides that [o]nly children conceived and born
outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former,
were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be
legitimated. Article 178 states that [l]egitimation shall take place by a
subsequent valid marriage between parents.
In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute the fact that BBB is not CCCs
biological father. Such being the case, it was improper to have CCC legitimated
after the celebration of BBB and AAAs marriage. Clearly then, the legal
process of legitimation was trifled with. BBB voluntarily but falsely
acknowledged CCC as his son. Article 1431 of the New Civil Code pertinently
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered
conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as
against the person relying thereon.
At least for the purpose of resolving the instant petition, the principle of
estoppel finds application and it now bars BBB from making an assertion
contrary to his previous representations. He should not be allowed to evade a Pending the resolution of the instant petition, BBB claims that he and AAA had
responsibility arising from his own misrepresentations. He is bound by the executed a MOA, upon which basis a judgment by compromise is sought to be
effects of the legitimation process. CCC remains to be BBBs son, and pursuant rendered. Atty. Uyboco, on her part, pointed out AAAs vacillation anent the
to Article 179 of the Family Code, the former is entitled to the same rights as MOAs execution. With the foregoing circumstances, the parties, wittingly or
those of a legitimate child, including the receipt of his fathers support. unwittingly, have imposed upon this Court the undue burden of speculating
whether or not AAAs half-hearted acquiescence to the MOA is tantamount to
Notwithstanding the above, there is no absolute preclusion for BBB from raising an application for the revocation of the PPO. The Court, however, refuses to
before the proper court the issue of CCCs status and filiation. However, BBB indulge the whims of either parties. The questions raised in the instant petition
cannot do the same in the instant petition before this Court now. In Tison v. for the Court to dispose of revolve around the propriety of the PPOs issuance.
CA,33 the Court held that the civil status [of a child] cannot be attacked The Court resolves that principal query in the affirmative. The PPO thus stands
collaterally. The childs legitimacy cannot be contested by way of defense or unless AAA, categorically and without any equivocation, files an application for
as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose.34 The instant its revocation.
petition sprang out of AAAs application for a PPO before the RTC. Hence,
BBBs claim that CCC is not his biological son is a collateral issue, which this IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
Court has no authority to resolve now. November 6, 2009 and Resolution dated August 3, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89581 are AFFIRMED. The Permanent
All told, the Court finds no merit in BBBs petition, but there exists a necessity Protection Order, dated August 14, 2007, issued against BBB by the Regional
to remand the case for the RTC to resolve matters relative to who shall be Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 162 STANDS except items (d), (f), (g), (h)
granted custody over the three children, how the spouses shall exercise and (i)36 thereof. The case is hereby remanded to the trial court for it to
visitation rights, and the amount and manner of providing financial support. accordingly modify the aforecited items after determining with dispatch the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The RTC and the CA found substantial evidence and did not commit reversible (1) who between BBB and AAA shall exercise custody over the three children;
errors when they issued the PPO against BBB. Events, which took place after (2) how the parties shall exercise their respective visitation rights; and
the issuance of the PPO, do not erase the fact that psychological, emotional (3) the amount and manner of providing financial support.
and economic abuses were committed by BBB against AAA. Hence, BBBs
claim that he now has actual sole care of DDD and EEE does not necessarily The Reply and Manifestation dated November 10, 2014 and December 4,
call for this Courts revocation of the PPO and the award to him of custody over 2014, respectively, are NOTED.
the children.
SO ORDERED.
This Court, thus, affirms the CAs order to remand the case for the RTC to
resolve the question of custody. Since the children are now all older than seven
years of age, they can choose for themselves whom they want to stay with. If
all the three children would manifest to the RTC their choice to stay with AAA,
then the PPO issued by RTC shall continue to be executed in its entirety.
However, if any of the three children would choose to be under BBBs care,
necessarily, the PPO issued against BBB relative to them is to be modified.
The PPO, in its entirety, would remain effective only as to AAA and any of the
children who opt to stay with her. Consequently, the RTC may accordingly alter
the manner and amount of financial support BBB should give depending on
who shall finally be awarded custody over the children. Pursuant to Articles 201
and 202 of the Family Code, BBBs resources and means and the necessities
of AAA and the children are the essential factors in determining the amount of
support, and the same can be reduced or increased proportionately. The RTC
is reminded to be circumspect in resolving the matter of support, which is a
mutual responsibility of the spouses. The parties do not dispute that AAA is
now employed as well, thus, the RTC should consider the same with the end in
mind of promoting the best interests of the children.
A final note on the effectivity and
violation of a PPO
The Court reminds the parties that the application for the issuance of a PPO is
not a process to be trifled with. It is only granted after notice and hearing. Once
issued, violation of its provisions shall be punishable with a fine ranging from
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
and/or imprisonment of six (6) months.35cralawlawlibrary
Section 16 of R.A. No. 9262, on the other hand, provides that [a] PPO shall be
effective until revoked by a court upon application of the person in whose favor
the order was issued.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
CARAVAN TRAVEL AND TOURS INTERNATIONAL,
INC., Petitioner, v. ERMILINDA R. ABEJAR, Respondent.
The plaintiff may first prove the employer's ownership of the vehicle
involved in a mishap by presenting the vehicle's registration in evidence.
Thereafter, a disputable presumption that the requirements for an
employer's liability under Article 21801 of the Civil Code have been
satisfied will arise. The burden of evidence then shifts to the defendant to
show that no liability under Article 2180 has ensued. This case, thus,
harmonizes the requirements of Article 2180, in relation to Article 21762 of
the Civil Code, and the so-called registered-owner rule as established in
this court's rulings in Aguilar, Sr. v. Commercial Savings Bank,3Del
Carmen, Jr. v. Bacoy,4Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas,5 and Mendoza
v. Spouses Gomez.6
Through this Petition for Review on Certiorari,7 Caravel Travel and Tours
International, Inc. (Caravan) prays that the Decision8 dated October 3,
2005 and the Resolution9 dated November 29, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals Twelfth Division be reversed and set aside.10
On July 13, 2000, Jesmariane R. Reyes (Reyes) was walking along the
west-bound lane of Sampaguita Street, United Paraaque Subdivision IV,
Paraaque City.11 A Mitsubishi L-300 van with plate number PKM
19512 was travelling along the east-bound lane, opposite Reyes.13 To
avoid an incoming vehicle, the van swerved to its left and hit Reyes.14 Alex
Espinosa (Espinosa), a witness to the accident, went to her aid and
loaded her in the back of the van.15 Espinosa told the driver of the van,
Jimmy Bautista (Bautista), to bring Reyes to the hospital. 16 Instead of
doing so, Bautista appeared to have left the van parked inside a nearby
subdivision with Reyes still in the van.17 Fortunately for Reyes, an
unidentified civilian came to help and drove Reyes to the hospital.18
Upon investigation, it was found that the registered owner of the van was
Caravan.19 Caravan is a corporation engaged in the business of
organizing travels and tours.20 Bautista was Caravan's employee assigned
to drive the van as its service driver.21
Caravan shouldered the hospitalization expenses of Reyes.22 Despite
medical attendance, Reyes died two (2) days after the accident.23
Respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar (Abejar), Reyes' paternal aunt and the
person who raised her since she was nine (9) years old,24 filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque a Complaint25 for damages against
Bautista and Caravan. In her Complaint, Abejar alleged that Bautista was
an employee of Caravan and that Caravan is the registered owner of the
van that hit Reyes.26
Summons could not be served on Bautista.27 Thus, Abejar moved to drop
Bautista as a defendant.28 The Regional Trial Court granted her Motion.29
After trial, the Regional Trial Court found that Bautista was grossly
negligent in driving the vehicle.30 It awarded damages in favor of Abejar,
as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, considering that the [respondent] was able to provide by
preponderance of evidence her cause of action against the defendants,
judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants JIMMY BAUTISTA and
CARAVAN TRAVEL and TOURS[,] INC., to jointly and solidarity pay the
plaintiff, the following, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. The amount of P35,000.00 representing actual damages;
2. The amount of P300,000.00 as moral damages;
3. The amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. The amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees; and
5. The cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.31ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Caravan's Motion for Reconsideration32 was denied through the October
20, 2003 Order33 of the Regional Trial Court.
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Regional Trial Court's
July 31, 2003 Decision and October 20, 2003 Order, as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED for
lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated 31 July 2003 and Order dated
20 October 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, City of Para[]aque, Branch
258, in Civil Case No. 00-0447 are AFFIRMEDwith the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1. Moral Damages is REDUCED to Php 200,000.00;
2. Death Indemnity of Php 50,000.00 is awarded;
3. The Php 35,000.00 actual damages, Php 200,000.00
moral damages, Php 30,000.00 exemplary damages
and Php 50,000.00 attorney's fees shall earn interest
at the rate of 6% per annum computed from 31 July
2003, the date of the [Regional Trial Court's] decision;
and upon finality of this Decision, all the amounts due
shall earn interest at the rate of 12% per annum, in
lieu of 6% per annum, until full payment; and
4. The Php 50,000.00 death indemnity shall earn
interest at the rate of 6% per annum computed from
the date of promulgation of this Decision; and upon
finality of this Decision, the amount due shall earn
interest at the rate of 12% per annum, in lieu of
6% per annum, until full payment.
Costs against [Caravan].
SO ORDERED.34ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Caravan filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied in the Court
of Appeals' assailed November 29, 2005 Resolution.35
Hence, this Petition was filed.
Caravan argues that Abejar has no personality to bring this suit because
she is not a real party in interest. According to Caravan, Abejar does not
exercise legal or substitute parental authority. She is also not the judicially
appointed guardian or the only living relative of the deceased.36 She is
also not "the executor or administrator of the estate of the
deceased."37 According to Caravan, only the victim herself or her heirs can
enforce an action based on culpa aquiliana such as Abejar's action for
damages.38
Caravan adds that Abejar offered no documentary or testimonial evidence
to prove that Bautista, the driver, acted "within the scope of his assigned
tasks"39 when the accident occurred.40 According to Caravan, Bautista's
tasks only pertained to the transport of company personnel or products,
and when the accident occurred, he had not been transporting personnel
or delivering products of and for the company.41
Caravan also argues that "it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of its employees."42
Caravan further claims that Abejar should not have been awarded moral
damages, actual damages, death indemnity, exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees.43 It questions the Certificate provided by Abejar as proof of
expenses since its signatory, a certain Julian Pealoza (Pealoza), was
not presented in court, and Caravan was denied the right to cross-
examine him.44 Caravan argues that the statements in the Certification
constitute hearsay.45 It also contends that based on Article 2206(3)46 of the
Civil Code, Abejar is not entitled to moral damages.47 It insists that moral
and exemplary damages should not have been awarded to Abejar
because Caravan acted in good faith.48 Considering that moral and
exemplary damages are unwarranted, Caravan claims that the award of
attorney's fees should have also been removed.49
Lastly, Caravan argues that it should not be held solidarily liable with
Bautista since Bautista was already dropped as a party.50
Abejar counters that Caravan failed to provide proof that it exercised the
requisite diligence in the selection and supervision of Bautista. 51 She adds
that the Court of Appeals' ruling that Caravan is solidarily liable with
Bautista for moral damages, exemplary damages, civil indemnity ex
delicto, and attorney's fees should be upheld.52 Abejar argues that since
Caravan is the registered owner of the van, it is directly, primarily, and
solidarity liable for the tortious acts of its driver.53
For resolution are the following issues:
First, whether respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar is a real party in interest
who may bring an action for damages against petitioner Caravan Travel
and Tours International, Inc. on account of Jesmariane R. Reyes' death;
and
Second, whether petitioner should be held liable as an employer, pursuant
to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
We deny the Petition.
I
Having exercised substitute parental authority, respondent suffered actual
loss and is, thus, a real party in interest in this case.
In her Complaint, respondent made allegations that would sustain her
action for damages: that she exercised substitute parental authority over
Reyes; that Reyes' death was caused by the negligence of petitioner and
its driver; and that Reyes' death caused her damage.54 Respondent
properly filed an action based on quasi-delict. She is a real party in
interest.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines a real party
in interest:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RULE 3. Parties to Civil Actions
....
SECTION 2. Parties in Interest. A real party in interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or
these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest.
"To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in whose name an action
must be prosecuted, he [or she] must appear to be the present real owner
of the right sought to be enforced."55 Respondent's capacity to file a
complaint against petitioner stems from her having exercised substitute
parental authority over Reyes.
Article 216 of the Family Code identifies the persons who exercise
substitute parental authority:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the
following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child
in the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;56
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit
or disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit
or disqualified.
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the
child becomes necessary, the same order of preference shall be
observed. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 233 of the Family Code provides for the extent of authority of
persons exercising substitute parental authority, that is, the same as those
of actual parents:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have
the sameauthority over the person of the child as the parents. (Emphasis
supplied)
Both of Reyes' parents are already deceased.57 Reyes' paternal
grandparents are also both deceased.58The whereabouts of Reyes'
maternal grandparents are unknown.59 There is also no record that Reyes
has brothers or sisters. It was under these circumstances that respondent
took custody of Reyes when she was a child, assumed the role of Reyes'
parents, and thus, exercised substitute parental authority over her. 60 As
Reyes' custodian, respondent exercised the full extent of the statutorily
recognized rights and duties of a parent. Consistent with Article 22061 of
the Family Code, respondent supported Reyes' education62 and provided
for her personal needs.63 To echo respondent's words in her Complaint,
she treated Reyes as if she were her own daughter.64
Respondent's right to proceed against petitioner, therefore, is based on
two grounds.
First, respondent suffered actual personal loss. With her affinity for Reyes,
it stands to reason that when Reyes died, respondent suffered the same
anguish that a natural parent would have felt upon the loss of one's child.
It is for this injury as authentic and personal as that of a natural parent
that respondent seeks to be indemnified.
Second, respondent is capacitated to do what Reyes' actual parents would
have been capacitated to do.
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,65Tapdasan, Jr. v.
People,66 and Aguilar, Sr. v. Commercial Savings Bank,67 this court
allowed natural parents of victims to recover damages for the death of
their children. Inasmuch as persons exercising substitute parental
authority have the full range of competencies of a child's actual parents,
nothing prevents persons exercising substitute parental authority from
similarly possessing the right to be indemnified for their ward's death.
We note that Reyes was already 18 years old when she died. Having
reached the age of majority, she was already emancipated upon her
death. While parental authority is terminated upon
emancipation,68respondent continued to support and care for Reyes even
after she turned 18.69 Except for the legal technicality of Reyes'
emancipation, her relationship with respondent remained the same. The
anguish and damage caused to respondent by Reyes' death was no
different because of Reyes' emancipation.
In any case, the termination of respondent's parental authority is not an
insurmountable legal bar that precludes the filing of her Complaint. In
interpreting Article 190270 of the old Civil Code, which is substantially
similar to the first sentence of Article 217671 of the Civil Code, this court
in The Receiver For North Negros Sugar Company, Inc. v. Ybaez, et
al.72 ruled that brothers and sisters may recover damages, except moral
damages, for the death of their sibling.73 This court declared that Article
1902 of the old Civil Code (now Article 2176) is broad enough to
accommodate even plaintiffs who are not relatives of the deceased, thus: 74
This Court said: "Article 1902 of the Civil Code declares that any person
who by an act or omission, characterized by fault or negligence, causes
damage to another shall be liable for the damage done ... a person is
liable for damage done to another by any culpable act; and by any
culpable act is meant any act which is blameworthy when judged by
accepted legal standards. The idea thus expressed is undoubtedly broad
enough to include any rational conception of liability for the tortious acts
likely to be developed in any society." The word "damage" in said article,
comprehending as it does all that are embraced in its meaning, includes
any and all damages that a human being may suffer in any and all the
manifestations of his life: physical or material, moral or psychological,
mental or spiritual, financial, economic, social, political, and religious.
It is particularly noticeable that Article 1902 stresses the passive subject of
the obligation to pay damages caused by his fault or negligence. The
article does not limit or specify the active subjects, much less the relation
that must exist between the victim of the culpa aquiliana and the person
who may recover damages, thus warranting the inference that, in
principle, anybody who suffers any damage from culpa aquiliana, whether
a relative or not of the victim, may recover damages from the person
responsible therefor[.]75(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
II
Respondent's Complaint is anchored on an employer's liability for quasi-
delict provided in Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
Articles 2176 and 2180 read:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
.....
ARTICLE 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated
persons who are under their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special
agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom
the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article
2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so
long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage. (Emphasis supplied)
Contrary to petitioner's position, it was not fatal to respondent's cause that
she herself did not adduce proof that Bautista acted within the scope of his
authority. It was sufficient that Abejar proved that petitioner was the
registered owner of the van that hit Reyes.
The resolution of this case must consider two (2) rules. First, Article 2180's
specification that "[e]mployers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees . . . acting within the scope of their assigned tasks[.]"
Second, the operation of the registered-owner rule that registered owners
are liable for death or injuries caused by the operation of their vehicles. 76
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
These rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to cases in which the
employer is also the registered owner of a vehicle. Article 2180 requires
proof of two things: first, an employment relationship between the driver
and the owner; and second, that the driver acted within the scope of his or
her assigned tasks. On the other hand, applying the registered-owner rule
only requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant-employer is the
registered owner of the vehicle.
The registered-owner rule was articulated as early as 1957 in Erezo, et al.
v. Jepte,77 where this court explained that the registration of motor
vehicles, as required by Section 5(a)78 of Republic Act No. 4136, the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, was necessary "not to make said
registration the operative act by which ownership in vehicles is transferred,
. . . but to permit the use and operation of the vehicle upon any public
highway[.]"79 Its "main aim . . . is to identify the owner so that if any
accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle
on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite
individual, the registered owner."80
Erezo notwithstanding, Castilex Industrial Corporation v. Vasquez,
Jr.81 relied on Article 2180 of the Civil Code even though the employer was
also the registered owner of the vehicle.82 The registered-owner rule was
not mentioned.
In Castilex, Benjamin Abad (Abad) was a manager of Castilex Industrial
Corporation (Castilex). Castilex was also the registered owner of a Toyota
Hi-Lux pick-up truck. While Abad was driving the pick-up truck, it collided
with a motorcycle driven by Romeo Vasquez (Vasquez). Vasquez died a
few days after. Vasquez's parents filed a case for damages against Abad
and Castilex.83 Castilex denied liability, arguing that Abad was acting in his
private capacity at the time of the accident.84
This court absolved Castilex of liability, reasoning that it was incumbent
upon the plaintiff to prove that the negligent employee was acting within
the scope of his assigned tasks.85 Vasquez's parents failed to prove
this.86 This court outlined the process necessary for an employer to be
held liable for the acts of its employees and applied the process to the
case:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any
business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by
employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to
establish the employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the
plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was
acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of
was committed. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to
interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
the employee.
....
Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope
of the functions entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to
show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity require
that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of the
negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle. (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)87ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Aguilar, Sr. v. Commercial Savings Bank recognized the seeming conflict
between Article 2180 and the registered-owner rule and applied the
latter.88
In Aguilar, Sr., a Mitsubishi Lancer, registered in the name of Commercial
Savings Bank and driven by the bank's assistant vice-president Ferdinand
Borja, hit Conrado Aguilar, Jr. The impact killed Conrado Aguilar, Jr. His
father, Conrado Aguilar, Sr. filed a case for damages against Ferdinand
Borja and Commercial Savings Bank. The Regional Trial Court found
Commercial Savings Bank solidarity liable with Ferdinand Borja.89
However, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court's Decision
and dismissed the complaint against the bank. The Court of Appeals
reasoned that Article 2180 requires the plaintiff to prove that at the time of
the accident, the employee was acting within the scope of his or her
assigned tasks. The Court of Appeals found no evidence that Ferdinand
Borja was acting as the bank's assistant vice-president at the time of the
accident.90
The Court of Appeals' ruling was reversed by this court.91Aguilar,
Sr. reiterated the following pronouncements made in Erezo in ruling that
the bank, as the registered owner of the vehicle, was primarily liable to the
plaintiff:92
The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if
any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the
vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a
definite individual, the registered owner....
....
A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without means
to discover or identify the person actually causing the injury or damage.
He has no means other than by a recourse to the registration in the Motor
Vehicles Office to determine who is the owner. The protection that the law
aims to extend to him would become illusory were the registered owner
given the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his
ownership.93ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thus, Aguilar, Sr. concluded:
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In our view, respondent bank, as the registered owner of the vehicle, is
primarily liable for Aguilar, Jr.'s death. The Court of Appeals erred when it
concluded that the bank was not liable simply because (a) petitioner did
not prove that Borja was acting as the bank's vice president at the time of
the accident; and (b) Borja had, according to respondent bank, already
bought the car at the time of the mishap. For as long as the respondent
bank remained the registered owner of the car involved in the vehicular
accident, it could not escape primary liability for the death of petitioner's
son.94 (Emphasis supplied)
Preference for the registered-owner rule became more pronounced in Del
Carmen, Jr. v. Bacoy:95
Without disputing the factual finding of the [Court of Appeals] that Allan
was still his employee at the time of the accident, a finding which we see
no reason to disturb, Oscar Jr. contends that Allan drove the jeep in his
private capacity and thus, an employer's vicarious liability for the
employee's fault under Article 2180 of the Civil Code cannot apply to him.
The contention is no longer novel. In Aguilar Sr. v. Commercial Savings
Bank, the car of therein respondent bank caused the death of Conrado
Aguilar, Jr. while being driven by its assistant vice president. Despite
Article 2180, we still held the bank liable for damages for the accident
as said provision should defer to the settled doctrine concerning
accidents involving registered motor vehicles, i.e., that the registered
owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily
be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the
latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets. We
have already ratiocinated that:
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The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if
any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the
vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a
definite individual, the registered owner. Instances are numerous where
vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to
pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or
drivers, or with very scant means of identification. It is to forestall these
circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor
vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the
determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on
public highways.96 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas97 stated that the registered owner of a
vehicle can no longer use the defenses found in Article 2180: 98
Neither can Filcar use the defenses available under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code - that the employee acts beyond the scope of his assigned task
or that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage - because the motor vehicle registration law, to a certain extent,
modified Article 2180 of the Civil Code by making these defenses
unavailable to the registered owner of the motor vehicle. Thus, for as long
as Filcar is the registered owner of the car involved in the vehicular
accident, it could not escape primary liability for the damages caused to
Espinas.99ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Mendoza v. Spouses Gomez100 reiterated this doctrine.
However, Aguilar, Sr., Del Carmen, Filcar, and Mendoza should not be
taken to mean that Article 2180 of the Civil Code should be completely
discarded in cases where the registered-owner rule finds application.
As acknowledged in Filcar, there is no categorical statutory
pronouncement in the Land Transportation and Traffic Code stipulating
the liability of a registered owner.101 The source of a registered owner's
liability is not a distinct statutory provision, but remains to be Articles 2176
and 2180 of the Civil Code:
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While Republic Act No. 4136 or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code
does not contain any provision on the liability of registered owners in case
of motor vehicle mishaps, Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the
Civil Code imposes an obligation upon Filcar, as registered owner, to
answer for the damages caused to Espinas'
car.102ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thus, it is imperative to apply the registered-owner rule in a manner that
harmonizes it with Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Rules must
be construed in a manner that will harmonize them with other rules so as
to form a uniform and consistent system of jurisprudence. 103 In light of this,
the words used in Del Carmen are particularly notable. There, this court
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
stated that Article 2180 "should defer to"104 the registered-owner rule. It
never stated that Article 2180 should be totally abandoned.
Therefore, the appropriate approach is that in cases where both the
registered-owner rule and Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first
establish that the employer is the registered owner of the vehicle in
question. Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership, there arises a
disputable presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have been
proven. As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to
show that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen.
This disputable presumption, insofar as the registered owner of the vehicle
in relation to the actual driver is concerned, recognizes that between the
owner and the victim, it is the former that should carry the costs of moving
forward with the evidence. The victim is, in many cases, a hapless
pedestrian or motorist with hardly any means to uncover the employment
relationship of the owner and the driver, or any act that the owner may
have done in relation to that employment.
The registration of the vehicle, on the other hand, is accessible to the
public.
Here, respondent presented a copy of the Certificate of Registration105 of
the van that hit Reyes.106 The Certificate attests to petitioner's ownership
of the van. Petitioner itself did not dispute its ownership of the van.
Consistent with the rule we have just stated, a presumption that the
requirements of Article 2180 have been satisfied arises. It is now up to
petitioner to establish that it incurred no liability under Article 2180. This it
can do by presenting proof of any of the following: first, that it had no
employment relationship with Bautista; second, that Bautista acted outside
the scope of his assigned tasks; or third, that it exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Bautista.107
On the first, petitioner admitted that Bautista was its employee at the time
of the accident.108
On the second, petitioner was unable to prove that Bautista was not acting
within the scope of his assigned tasks at the time of the accident. When
asked by the court why Bautista was at the place of the accident when it
occurred, Sally Bellido, petitioner's accountant and supervisor,109 testified
that she did not "have the personal capacity to answer [the
question]"110 and that she had no knowledge to answer it:
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COURT : Madam Witness, do you know the reason why your
driver, Jimmy Bautista, at around 10:00 o' clock in
the morning of July 13, 2000 was in the vicinity of
Barangay Marcelo Green, United Paraaque
Subdivision 4?
WITNESS : I don't have the personal capacity to answer that, Sir.
Q : So you don't have any knowledge why he was Q : Is it a professional driver's license or non-proffesional
there? [sic] driver's license?
A : Yes, Sir.111 (Emphasis supplied) A : Non-professional.
Sally Bellido's testimony does not affect the presumption that Article
2180's requirements have been satisfied. Mere disavowals are not proof
that suffice to overturn a presumption. To this end, evidence must be
adduced. However, petitioner presented no positive evidence to show that Q : You are not sure?
Bautista was acting in his private capacity at the time of the incident.
On the third, petitioner likewise failed to prove that it exercised the
requisite diligence in the selection and supervision of Bautista. COURT : Non professional, professional?
In its selection of Bautista as a service driver, petitioner contented itself
with Bautista's submission of a non-professional driver's license.112 Hence,
in Sally Balledo's cross-examination:
A : It's a non-professional.113 (Emphasis supplied)
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Employing a person holding a non-professional driver's license to operate
Q : . . . when he was promoted as service driver, of
another's motor vehicle violates Section 24 of the Land Transportation and
course, there were certain requirements and among
Traffic Code, which provides:
other else, you made mention about a driver's license.
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SEC. 24. Use of driver's license and badge. ...
....
A : Yes, Sir.
No owner of a motor vehicle shall engage, employ, or hire any person to
operate such motor vehicle, unless the person sought to be employed is a
duly licensed professional driver.
Q : Would you be able to show to this Honorable Court Evidently, petitioner did not only fail to exercise due diligence when it
selected Bautista as service driver; it also committed an actual violation of
whether indeed this person did submit a driver's
law.
license to your company?
To prove that it exercised the required diligence in supervising Bautista,
petitioner presented copies of several memoranda and company
rules.114 These, however, are insufficient because petitioner failed to prove
A : Yes, Sir. actual compliance. Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of
Appeals115 emphasized that to establish diligence in the supervision of
employees, the issuance of company policies must be coupled with proof
of compliance:
.... chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Due diligence in the supervision of employees, on the other hand, includes
the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of
employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the
protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations
Q : Do you recall what kind of driver's license is this? through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary
measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to
ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and
beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual
A : The Land Transportation Office. implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules
should be the constant concern of the employer, acting through
dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory
functions.
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In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision
of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough
to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and
policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee
gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer,
the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the
selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The
mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory
policies, without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome
presumption.
We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that
"(t)he mere formulation of various company policies on safety without
showing that they were being complied with is not sufficient to exempt
petitioner from liability arising from negligence of its employees. It is
incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the
erring driver the recruitment procedures and company policies on
efficiency and safety were followed." Paying lip-service to these
injunctions or merely going through the motions of compliance therewith
will warrant stern sanctions from the Court.116(Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
For failing to overturn the presumption that the requirements of Article
2180 have been satisfied, petitioner must be held liable.
III
Petitioner's argument that it should be excused from liability because
Bautista was already dropped as a party is equally unmeritorious. The
liability imposed on the registered owner is direct and primary.117 It does
not depend on the inclusion of the negligent driver in the action. Agreeing
to petitioner's assertion would render impotent the rationale of the motor
registration law in fixing liability on a definite person.
Bautista, the driver, was not an indispensable party under Rule 3, Section
7118 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Rather, he was a necessary
party under Rule 3, Section 8.119 Instead of insisting that Bautista who
was nothing more than a necessary party should not have been
dropped as a defendant, or that petitioner, along with Bautista, should
have been dropped, petitioner (as a co-defendant insisting that the action
must proceed with Bautista as party) could have opted to file a cross-claim
against Bautista as its remedy.
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure spell out the rules on joinder of
indispensable and necessary parties. These are intended to afford "a
complete determination of all possible issues, not only between the parties
themselves but also as regards to other persons who may be affected by
the judgment."120
However, while an exhaustive resolution of disputes is desired in every
case, the distinction between indispensable parties and necessary parties
delineates a court's capacity to render effective judgment. As defined by
Rule 3, Section 7, indispensable parties are "[p]arties in interest without
whom no final determination can be had of an action[.]" Thus, their non-
inclusion is debilitating: "the presence of indispensable parties is a
condition for the exercise of juridical power and when an indispensable
party is not before the court, the action should be dismissed."121
In contrast, a necessary party's presence is not imperative, and his or her
absence is not debilitating. Nevertheless, it is preferred that they be It was respondent herself who identified the Certificate. She testified that
included in order that relief may be complete. she incurred funeral expenses amounting to P35,000.00, that she paid this
amount to Pealoza, and that she was present when Pealoza signed the
The concept of indispensable parties, as against parties whose inclusion Certificate:
only allows complete relief, was explained in Arcelona v. Court of chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Appeals:122
An indispensable party is a party who has such an interest in the [ATTY. Did you incur any expenses?
controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in LIM] :
his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest, a party who has not
only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but also has an
interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be made without
affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its A: Meron po.
final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good
conscience. It has also been considered that an indispensable party is a
person in whose absence there cannot be a determination between the
parties already before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable.
Further, an indispensable party is one who must be included in an action Q: How much did you spend for the death of Jesmarian [sic]
before it may properly go forward. Reyes?
A person is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the
controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other
parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a A: 'Yun pong P35,000.00 na pagpapalibing at saka...
decree which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is not
an indispensable party if his presence would merely permit complete relief
between him and those already parties to the action, or if he has no
interest in the subject matter of the action. It is not a sufficient reason to
Q: You said that you spent P35,000.00. Do you have any
declare a person to be an indispensable party that his presence will avoid
evidence or proof that you spent that amount?
multiple litigation.123ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner's interest and liability is distinct from that of its driver.
Regardless of petitioner's employer-employee relationship with Bautista,
liability attaches to petitioner on account of its being the registered owner
of a vehicle that figures in a mishap. This alone suffices. A determination A: Meron po.
of its liability as owner can proceed independently of a consideration of
how Bautista conducted himself as a driver. While certainly it is desirable
that a determination of Bautista's liability be made alongside that of the
owner of the van he was driving, his non-inclusion in these proceedings Q: Showing to you this sort of certification. What relation
does not absolutely hamper a judicious resolution of respondent's plea for has this...
relief.
IV
The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it awarded
actual damages to respondent. Respondent's claim for actual damages A: 'Yan po' yung contractor nagumawa.
was based on the Certificate124 issued and signed by a certain Pealoza
showing that respondent paid Pealoza P35,000.00 for funeral expenses.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, this Certificate is not hearsay. Evidence is Q: Contractor of what?
hearsay when its probative value is based on the personal knowledge of a
person other than the person actually testifying.125 Here, the Certificate
sought to establish that respondent herself paid Pealoza P35,000.00 as
funeral expenses for Reyes' death:126
3. Na ang aking kontrata ay nagkakahalaga ng P35,000- A: 'Yan po' yung mismong binilhan ko ng lupa at nitso.
00 [sic] sa lahat ng nagamit na materiales at labor nito
kasama ang lote na ibinayad sa akin ni Gng.
ERMILINDA REYES ABEJAR na siyang aking
kakontrata sa pagsasagawa ng naturang ....
paglilibingan.127 (Emphasis supplied)
91
Persons 4th Exam Cases
ATTY. There is a signature at the top of the printed name Julian
LIM : Penalosa [sic]. Whose signature is this?
A: 'Yan po' yung mismong contractor.
....
Q: Did you see him sign this?
A: Opo.128 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent had personal knowledge of the facts sought to be proved by
the Certificate, i.e. that she spent P35,000.00 for the funeral expenses of
Reyes. Thus, the Certificate that she identified and testified to is not
hearsay. It was not an error to admit this Certificate as evidence and basis
for awarding P35,000.00 as actual damages to respondent.
The Court of Appeals likewise did not err in awarding civil indemnity and
exemplary damages.
Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime
or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there
may have been mitigating circumstances[.]
Further, Article 2231 of the Civil Code provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if
the defendant acted with gross negligence.
Both the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court found Bautista
grossly negligent in driving the van and concluded that Bautista's gross
negligence was the proximate cause of Reyes' death. Negligence and
causation are factual issues.129 Findings of fact, when established by the
trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this court
unless they are patently unsupported by evidence or unless the judgment
is grounded on a misapprehension of facts.130 Considering that petitioner
has not presented any evidence disputing the findings of the lower courts
regarding Bautista's negligence, these findings cannot be disturbed in this
appeal. The evidentiary bases for the award of civil indemnity and
exemplary damages stand. As such, petitioner must pay the exemplary
damages arising from the negligence of its driver.131 For the same
reasons, the award of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity is justified. 132
The award of moral damages is likewise proper.
Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code provides: the demand can be established with reasonable
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is
ARTICLE 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime established with reasonable certainty, the interest
or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there shall begin to run from the time the claim is made
may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition: judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but
when such certainty cannot be so reasonably
.... established at the time the demand is made, the
interest shall begin to run only from the date the
judgment of the court is made (at which time the
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and quantification of damages may be deemed to have
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the
mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on
(Emphasis supplied) the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of
For deaths caused by quasi-delict, the recovery of moral damages is money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal
limited to the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants, and interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
ascendants of the deceased.133 paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from
such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period
Persons exercising substitute parental authority are to be considered being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a
ascendants for the purpose of awarding moral damages. Persons forbearance of credit.146 (Emphasis supplied)
exercising substitute parental authority are intended to stand in place of a WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 3,
child's parents in order to ensure the well-being and welfare of a 2005 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (a) actual
child.134 Like natural parents, persons exercising substitute parental damages in the amount of P35,000.00 shall earn interest at the rate of 6%
authority are required to, among others, keep their wards in their per annum from the time it was judicially or extrajudicially demanded from
company,135 provide for their upbringing,136 show them love and
petitioner Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. until full
affection,137 give them advice and counsel,138 and provide them with satisfaction; (b) moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees
companionship and understanding.139 For their part, wards shall always
shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the
observe respect and obedience towards the person exercising parental Regional Trial Court Decision until full satisfaction; and (c) civil indemnity
authority.140 The law forges a relationship between the ward and the shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the Court
person exercising substitute parental authority such that the death or of Appeals Decision until full satisfaction.
injury of one results in the damage or prejudice of the other.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Moral damages are awarded to compensate the claimant for his or her
actual injury, and not to penalize the wrongdoer.141 Moral damages enable
the injured party to alleviate the moral suffering resulting from the
defendant's actions.142 It aims to restore to the extent possible "the
spiritual status quo ante[.]"143
Given the policy underlying Articles 216 and 220 of the Family Code as
well as the purposes for awarding moral damages, a person exercising
substitute parental authority is rightly considered an ascendant of the
deceased, within the meaning of Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code. Hence,
respondent is entitled to moral damages.
As exemplary damages have been awarded and as respondent was
compelled to litigate in order to protect her interests, she is rightly entitled
to attorney's fees.144
However, the award of interest should be modified. This modification must
be consistent with Nacar v. Gallery Frames,145 in which we ruled:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or
forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the
amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the
discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum.
No interest, however, shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until
92
Persons 4th Exam Cases
SCHOOL OF THE HOLY SPIRIT OF QUEZON CITY and/or SR.
CRISPINA A. TOLENTINO, S.Sp.S.,
Petitioners,
- versus -
CORAZON P. TAGUIAM,
Respondent.
This petition assails the Decision[1] dated June 7, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81480, which reversed the
Resolution[2] dated September 20, 2002 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CA No. 031627-02. The
NLRC had affirmed the Decision[3] dated March 26, 2002 of the Labor
Arbiter dismissing respondents complaint for illegal dismissal. This
petition likewise assails the Resolution[4] dated September 30, 2004 of
the Court of Appeals denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Respondent Corazon P. Taguiam was the Class Adviser of Grade 5-
Esmeralda of the petitioner, School of the Holy Spirit of Quezon
City. On March 10, 2000, the class president, wrote a letter [5] to the
grade school principal requesting permission to hold a year-end
celebration at the school grounds. The principal authorized the activity
and allowed the pupils to use the swimming pool. In this connection,
respondent distributed the parents/guardians permit forms to the
pupils.
Respondent admitted that Chiara Mae Federicos permit
form[6] was unsigned. Nevertheless, she concluded that Chiara Mae
was allowed by her mother to join the activity since her mother
personally brought her to the school with her packed lunch and
swimsuit.
Before the activity started, respondent warned the pupils who did not
know how to swim to avoid the deeper area. However, while the pupils
were swimming, two of them sneaked out. Respondent went after them
to verify where they were going.
Unfortunately, while respondent was away, Chiara Mae
drowned. When respondent returned, the maintenance man was
already administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation
on Chiara Mae. She was still alive when respondent rushed her to
the General Malvar Hospital where she was pronounced dead on
arrival.
On May 23, 2000, petitioners issued a Notice of Administrative
Charge[7] to respondent for alleged gross negligence and required her
to submit her written explanation. Thereafter, petitioners conducted a
clarificatory hearing which respondent attended. Respondent also
submitted her Affidavit of Explanation.[8]
On July 31, 2000, petitioners dismissed respondent on the ground of
gross negligence resulting to loss of trust and
confidence.[9] Meanwhile, Chiara Maes parents filed a P7 Million
damage suit against petitioners and respondent, among others. They
also filed against respondent a criminal complaint for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide.
On July 25, 2001, respondent in turn filed a complaint [10] against the
school and/or Sr. Crispina Tolentino for illegal dismissal, with a prayer
for reinstatement with full backwages and other money claims,
damages and attorneys fees.
In dismissing the complaint, the Labor Arbiter declared that
respondent was validly terminated for gross neglect of duty. He opined
that Chiara Mae drowned because respondent had left the pupils
without any adult supervision. He also noted that the absence of
adequate facilities should have alerted respondent before allowing the
pupils to use the swimming pool. The Labor Arbiter further concluded
that although respondents negligence was not habitual, the same
warranted her dismissal since death resulted therefrom.
Respondent appealed to the NLRC which, however, affirmed
the dismissal of the complaint.
Aggrieved, respondent instituted a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which ruled in her favor. The
appellate court observed that there was insufficient proof that
respondents negligence was both gross and habitual. The Court of
Appeals disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Court
hereby GRANTS the petition. The assailed
September 20, 2002 Resolution of the National
Labor Relations Commission entitled Corazon
Taguiam vs. School of the Holy Spirit and/or Sister
Crispina Tolentino[,] NLRC NCR Case No. 00-07-
03877-01[,] NLRC NCR CA No. 031627-02 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new
one is hereby ENTERED directing the private
respondent the School of the Holy Spirit to:
(1) Pay the petitioner full backwages,
plus all other benefits, bonuses and
general increases to which she
would have been normally entitled,
had she not been dismissed and had
she not been forced to stop working
computed up to the finality of this
decision;
(2) Pay the petitioner separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month for every
year of service in addition to full
backwages;
(3) Pay the petitioner an amount
equivalent to 10% of the judgment
award as attorneys fees;
(4) Pay the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED.[11]
In this petition, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals
erred in:
REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE THE
DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LABOR
ARBITER DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR
LACK OF MERIT.[12]
Simply stated, the sole issue presented for our resolution is
whether respondents dismissal on the ground of gross negligence
resulting to loss of trust and confidence was valid.
The issue of whether a party is negligent is a question of
fact. As a rule, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and this applies
with greater force in labor cases. [13] However, where the issue is
shrouded by a conflict of factual perception, we are constrained to
review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. In this case, the
findings of facts of the appellate court contradict those of the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC.[14]
Under Article 282[15] of the Labor Code, gross and habitual
neglect of duties is a valid ground for an employer to terminate an
employee. Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or a failure
to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It
evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any
effort to avoid them.[16] Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to
perform ones duties for a period of time, depending upon the
circumstances.[17]
Our perusal of the records leads us to conclude that
respondent had been grossly negligent. First, it is undisputed
that Chiara Maes permit form was unsigned. Yet, respondent allowed
her to join the activity because she assumed that Chiara Maes mother
has allowed her to join it by personally bringing her to the school with
her packed lunch and swimsuit.
The purpose of a permit form is precisely to ensure that the
parents have allowed their child to join the school activity
involved. Respondent cannot simply ignore this by resorting to
assumptions.Respondent admitted that she was around
when Chiara Mae and her mother arrived. She could have requested
the mother to sign the permit form before she left the school or at least
called her up to obtain her conformity.
Second, it was respondents responsibility as Class Adviser to
supervise her class in all activities sanctioned by the school. [18] Thus,
she should have coordinated with the school to ensure that proper
safeguards, such as adequate first aid and sufficient adult personnel,
were present during their activity. She should have been mindful of the
fact that with the number of pupils involved, it would be impossible for
her by herself alone to keep an eye on each one of them.
As it turned out, since respondent was the only adult present,
majority of the pupils were left unsupervised when she followed the two
pupils who sneaked out. In the light of the odds involved, respondent
should have considered that those who sneaked out could not have left
the school premises since there were guards manning the gates. The
guards would not have allowed them to go out in their swimsuits and
without any adult accompanying them. But those who stayed at the
pool were put at greater risk, when she left them unattended by an
adult.
Notably, respondents negligence, although gross, was not
habitual. In view of the considerable resultant damage, however, we are
in agreement that the cause is sufficient to dismiss respondent. This is
not the first time that we have departed from the requirements laid down
by the law that neglect of duties must be both gross and
habitual. In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC,[19] we ruled that Philippine
Airlines (PAL) cannot be legally compelled to continue with the
employment of a person admittedly guilty of gross negligence in the
performance of his duties although it was his first offense. In that case,
we noted that a mere delay on PALs flight schedule due to aircraft
93
Persons 4th Exam Cases

damage entails problems like hotel accommodations for its passengers, WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
re-booking, the possibility of law suits, and payment of special landing Decision dated June 7, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
fees not to mention the soaring costs of replacing aircraft parts.[20] In No. 81480 is SET ASIDE. The Resolution dated September 20,
another case, Fuentes v. National Labor Relations Commission,[21] we 2002 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA
held that it would be unfair to compel Philippine Banking Corporation to No. 031627-02 is REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
continue employing its bank teller. In that case, we observed that SO ORDERED.
although the tellers infraction was not habitual, a substantial amount of
money was lost. The deposit slip had already been validated prior to its
loss and the amount reflected thereon is already considered as current
liabilities in the banks balance sheet.[22] Indeed, the sufficiency of the
evidence as well as the resultant damage to the employer should be
considered in the dismissal of the employee. In this case, the damage
went as far as claiming the life of a child.
As a result of gross negligence in the present case,
petitioners lost its trust and confidence in respondent. Loss of trust and
confidence to be a valid ground for dismissal must be based on a willful
breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts. A breach is
willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without
justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly,
thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. [23] Otherwise stated, it must
rest on substantial grounds and not on the employers arbitrariness,
whims, caprices or suspicion; otherwise, the employee would eternally
remain at the mercy of the employer. It should be genuine and not
simulated; nor should it appear as a mere afterthought to justify earlier
action taken in bad faith or a subterfuge for causes which are improper,
illegal or unjustified. It has never been intended to afford an occasion
for abuse because of its subjective nature. There must, therefore, be
an actual breach of duty committed by the employee which must be
established by substantial evidence.[24]
As a teacher who stands in loco parentis to her pupils,
respondent should have made sure that the children were protected
from all harm while in her company.[25] Respondent should have known
that leaving the pupils in the swimming pool area all by themselves may
result in an accident. A simple reminder not to go to the deepest part of
the pool[26] was insufficient to cast away all the serious dangers that the
situation presented to the children, especially when respondent knew
that Chiara Mae cannot swim.[27] Dismally, respondent created an
unsafe situation which exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned to
real danger. This is a clear violation not only of the trust and confidence
reposed on her by the parents of the pupils but of the school itself.
Finally, we note that based on the criminal complaint filed
by Chiara Maes parents, the Assistant City Prosecutor found probable
cause to indict respondent for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide. The Assistant City Prosecutor held that respondent should
have foreseen the danger lurking in the waters. By leaving her pupils in
the swimming pool, respondent displayed an inexcusable lack of
foresight and precaution.[28] While this finding is not controlling for
purposes of the instant case, this only supports our conclusion that
respondent has indeed been grossly negligent.
All told, there being a clear showing that respondent was
culpable for gross negligence resulting to loss of trust and confidence,
her dismissal was valid and legal. It was error for the Court of Appeals
to reverse and set aside the resolution of the NLRC.

94
Persons 4th Exam Cases
REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA MASAUDING, respondents.
This case concerns a seemingly void marriage and a relationship which
went sour. The innocent victims are two children horn out of the same union.
Upon this Court now falls the not too welcome task of deciding the issue of
who, between the father and mother, is more suitable and better qualified
in helping the children to grow into responsible, well-adjusted, and happy
young adulthood.
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met
sometime in 1976 in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the
National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local
hospital. In 1977, Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse.
She was able to acquire immigrant status sometime later. In 1984,
Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita
then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. On
August 16, 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. On October
7, 1987, while they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo
and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States, their
second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born
on January 12, 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate
sometime in 1990. Teresita blamed Reynaldo for the break-up, stating he
was always nagging her about money matters. Reynaldo, on the other
hand, contended that Teresita was a spendthrift, buying expensive jewelry
and antique furniture instead of attending to household expenses.
Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by
Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to
California. She claims, however, that she spent a lot of money on long
distance telephone calls to keep in constant touch with her children.
Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his
assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his
company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, co-
petitioner Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children because
Reynaldo filed a criminal case for bigamy against her and she was afraid of
being arrested. The judgment of conviction in the bigamy case was actually
rendered only on September 29, 1994. (Per Judge Harriet O. Demetriou,
Branch 70, RTC, Pasig, pp. 210-222, Rollo). Teresita, meanwhile, decided
to return to the Philippines and on December 8, 1992 and filed the petition
for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody
over the children, thus starting the whole proceedings now reaching this
Court.
On June 30, 1993, the trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus.
It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and
declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights
of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the
Court.
On February 16, 1994, the Court of Appeals per Justice Isnani, with Justices
de Pano and Ibay-Somera concurring, reversed the trial court's decision. It
gave custody to Teresita and visitation rights on weekends to Reynaldo.
Petitioners now come to this Court on a petition for review, in the main
contending that the Court of Appeals disregarded the factual findings of the
trial court; that the Court of Appeals further engaged in speculations and
conjectures, resulting in its erroneous conclusion that custody of the
children should be given to respondent Teresita.
We believe that respondent court resolved the question of custody over the
children through an automatic and blind application of the age proviso of
Article 363 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody,
education and property of the children, the latter's
welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be
separated from her child under seven years of age,
unless the court finds compelling reasons for such
measure.
and of Article 213 of the Family Code which in turn provides:
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents parental
authority shall be exercised by the parent designated
by the Court. The Court shall take into account all
relevant considerations, especially the choice of the
child over seven years of age unless the parent chosen
is unfit.
The decision under review is based on the report of the Code Commission
which drafted Article 213 that a child below seven years still needs the
loving, tender care that only a mother can give and which, presumably, a
father cannot give in equal measure. The commentaries of a member of the
Code Commission, former Court of Appeals Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, in a
textbook on the Family Code, were also taken into account. Justice Diy
believes that a child below seven years should still be awarded to her
mother even if the latter is a prostitute or is unfaithful to her husband. This
is on the theory that moral dereliction has no effect on a baby unable to
understand such action. (Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines,
1988 Ed., p. 297.)
The Court of Appeals was unduly swayed by an abstract presumption of
law rather than an appreciation of relevant facts and the law which should
apply to those facts. The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall
be awarded is not a ministerial function to be determined by a simple
determination of the age of a minor child. Whether a child is under or over
seven years of age, the paramount criterion must always be the child's
interests. Discretion is given to the court to decide who can best assure the
welfare of the child, and award the custody on the basis of that
consideration. In Unson III vs. Navarro (101 SCRA 183 [1980]), we laid
down the rule that "in all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the
sole and foremost consideration is the physical, education, social and moral
welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective resources
and social and moral situations of the contending parents", and in Medina
vs. Makabali (27 SCRA 502 [1969]), where custody of the minor was given
to a non-relative as against the mother, then the country's leading civilist,
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained its basis in this manner:
. . . While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the
custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the
basic principle that "in all questions on the care,
custody, education and property of children, the latter's
welfare shall be paramount" (Civil Code of the
Philippines. Art. 363), and that for compelling reasons,
even a child under seven may be ordered separated
from the mother (do). This is as it should be, for in the
continual evolution of legal institutions, the patria
potestas has been transformed from thejus vitae ac
necis (right of life and death) of the Roman law, under
which the offspring was virtually a chattel of his parents
into a radically different institution, due to the influence
of Christian faith and doctrines. The obligational aspect
is now supreme. As pointed out by Puig Pena, now
"there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights (of
parents) but a sum of duties; no sovereignty, but a
sacred trust for the welfare of the minor."
As a result, the right of parents to the company and
custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper
discharge of parental duties to provide the children with
adequate support, education, moral, intellectual and
civic training and development (Civil Code, Art. 356).
(pp. 504-505.)
In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are
mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant
considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that
the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not
conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is over
seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that
choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit and
award custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit
under the circumstances.
In the present case, both Rosalind and Reginald are now over seven years
of age. Rosalind celebrated her seventh birthday on August 16, 1993 while
Reginald reached the same age on January 12, 1995. Both are studying in
reputable schools and appear to be fairly intelligent children, quite capable
of thoughtfully determining the parent with whom they would want to live.
Once the choice has been made, the burden returns to the court to
investigate if the parent thus chosen is unfit to assume parental authority
and custodial responsibility.
Herein lies the error of the Court of Appeals. Instead of scrutinizing the
records to discover the choice of the children and rather than verifying
whether that parent is fit or unfit, respondent court simply followed statutory
presumptions and general propositions applicable to ordinary or common
situations. The seven-year age limit was mechanically treated as an
arbitrary cut off period and not a guide based on a strong presumption.
A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita, or at least,
her counsel are more intent on emphasizing the "torture and agony" of a
mother separated from her children and the humiliation she suffered as a
result of her character being made a key issue in court rather than the
feelings and future, the best interests and welfare of her children. While the
bonds between a mother and her small child are special in nature, either
parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if
deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater than
that of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other
feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount
consideration.
We are inclined to sustain the findings and conclusions of the regional trial
court because it gave greater attention to the choice of Rosalind and
considered in detail all the relevant factors bearing on the issue of custody.
When she was a little over 5 years old, Rosalind was referred to a child
psychologist, Rita Flores Macabulos, to determine the effects of uprooting
her from the Assumption College where she was studying. Four different
tests were administered. The results of the tests are quite revealing. The
responses of Rosalind about her mother were very negative causing the
psychologist to delve deeper into the child's anxiety. Among the things
revealed by Rosalind was an incident where she saw her mother hugging
and kissing a "bad" man who lived in their house and worked for her father.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Rosalind refused to talk to her mother even on the telephone. She tended
to be emotionally emblazed because of constant fears that she may have
to leave school and her aunt's family to go back to the United States to live
with her mother. The 5-1/2 page report deals at length with feelings of
insecurity and anxiety arising from strong conflict with the mother. The child
tried to compensate by having fantasy activities. All of the 8
recommendations of the child psychologist show that Rosalind chooses
petitioners over the private respondent and that her welfare will be best
served by staying with them (pp. 199-205, Rollo).
At about the same time, a social welfare case study was conducted for the
purpose of securing the travel clearance required before minors may go
abroad. Social Welfare Officer Emma D. Estrada Lopez, stated that the child
Rosalind refused to go back to the United States and be reunited with her
mother. She felt unloved and uncared for. Rosalind was more attached to
her Yaya who did everything for her and Reginald. The child was found
suffering from emotional shock caused by her mother's infidelity. The
application for travel clearance was recommended for denial (pp. 206-
209, Rollo).
Respondent Teresita, for her part, argues that the 7-year age reference in
the law applies to the date when the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
filed, not to the date when a decision is rendered. This argument is flawed.
Considerations involving the choice made by a child must be ascertained at
the time that either parent is given custody over the child. The matter of
custody is not permanent and unalterable. If the parent who was given
custody suffers a future character change and becomes unfit, the matter of
custody can always be re-examined and adjusted (Unson III v.
Navarro, supra, at p. 189). To be sure, the welfare, the best interests, the
benefit, and the good of the child must be determined as of the time that
either parent is chosen to be the custodian. At the present time, both
children are over 7 years of age and are thus perfectly capable of making a
fairly intelligent choice.
According to respondent Teresita, she and her children had tearful reunion
in the trial court, with the children crying, grabbing, and embracing her to
prevent the father from taking them away from her. We are more inclined to
believe the father's contention that the children ignored Teresita in court
because such an emotional display as described by Teresita in her
pleadings could not have been missed by the trial court. Unlike the Justices
of the Court of Appeals Fourth Division, Judge Lucas P. Bersamin
personally observed the children and their mother in the courtroom. What
the Judge found is diametrically opposed to the contentions of respondent
Teresita. The Judge had this to say on the matter.
And, lastly, the Court cannot look at petitioner
[Teresita] in similar light, or with more understanding,
especially as her conduct and demeanor in the
courtroom (during most of the proceedings) or
elsewhere (but in the presence of the undersigned
presiding judge) demonstrated her ebulent temper that
tended to corroborate the alleged violence of her
physical punishment of the children (even if only for
ordinary disciplinary purposes) and emotional
instability, typified by her failure (or refusal?) to show
deference and respect to the Court and the other
parties (pp. 12-13, RTC Decision)
Respondent Teresita also questions the competence and impartiality of the
expert witnesses. Respondent court, in turn, states that the trial court should
have considered the fact that Reynaldo and his sister, herein petitioner
Guillerma Layug, hired the two expert witnesses. Actually, this was taken
into account by the trial court which stated that the allegations of bias and
unfairness made by Teresita against the psychologist and social worker
were not substantiated.
The trial court stated that the professional integrity and competence of the
expert witnesses and the objectivity of the interviews were unshaken and
unimpeached. We might add that their testimony remain uncontroverted.
We also note that the examinations made by the experts were conducted in
late 1991, well over a year before the filing by Teresita of the habeas
corpus petition in December, 1992. Thus, the examinations were at that
time not intended to support petitioners' position in litigation, because there
was then not even an impending possibility of one. That they were
subsequently utilized in the case a quo when it did materialize does not
change the tenor in which they were first obtained.
Furthermore, such examinations, when presented to the court must be
construed to have been presented not to sway the court in favor of any of
the parties, but to assist the court in the determination of the issue before it.
The persons who effected such examinations were presented in the
capacity of expert witnesses testifying on matters within their respective
knowledge and expertise. On this matter, this Court had occasion to rule in
the case of Sali vs. Abukakar, et al. (17 SCRA 988 [1966]).
The fact that, in a particular litigation, an NBI expert
examines certain contested documents, at the request,
not of a public officer or agency of the Government, but
of a private litigant, does not necessarily nullify the
examination thus made. Its purpose, presumably, to
assist the court having jurisdiction over said litigation,
in the performance of its duty to settle correctly the
issues relative to said documents. Even a non-expert
private individual may examine the same, if there are
facts within his knowledge which may help, the court in
the determination of said issue. Such examination,
which may properly be undertaken by a non-expert
private individual, does not, certainly become null and
void when the examiner is an expert and/or an officer
of the NBI.
(pp. 991-992.)
In regard to testimony of expert witnesses it was held in Salomon, et
al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. (185 SCRA 352 [1990]):
. . . Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert
testimonies, they may place whatever weight they
choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the
facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of
expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of the
trial court to decide, considering the ability and
character of the witness, his actions upon the witness
stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by
which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias
in favor of the side for whom he testifies, the fact that
he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for study
and observation of the matters about which he testifies,
and any other matters which reserve to illuminate his
statements. The opinion of the expert may not be
arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in
view of all the facts and circumstances in the case and
when common knowledge utterly fails, the expert
opinion may be given controlling effect (20 Am. Jur.,
1056-1058). The problem of the credibility of the expert
witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the
discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is
not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of that
discretion.
(p. 359)
It was in the exercise of this discretion, coupled with the opportunity to
assess the witnesses' character and to observe their respective demeanor
that the trial court opted to rely on their testimony, and we believe that the
trial court was correct in its action.
Under direct examination an February 4, 1993, Social Worker Lopez stated
that Rosalind and her aunt were about to board a plane when they were off-
loaded because there was no required clearance. They were referred to her
office, at which time Reginald was also brought along and interviewed. One
of the regular duties of Social Worker Lopez in her job appears to be the
interview of minors who leave for abroad with their parents or other persons.
The interview was for purposes of foreign travel by a 5-year old child and
had nothing to do with any pending litigation. On cross-examination, Social
Worker Lopez stated that her assessment of the minor's hatred for her
mother was based on the disclosures of the minor. It is inconceivable, much
less presumable that Ms. Lopez would compromise her position, ethics, and
the public trust reposed on a person of her position in the course of doing
her job by falsely testifying just to support the position of any litigant.
The psychologist, Ms. Macabulos, is a B.S. magna cum laude graduate in
Psychology and an M.A. degree holder also in Psychology with her thesis
graded "Excellent". She was a candidate for a doctoral degree at the time
of the interview. Petitioner Reynaldo may have shouldered the cost of the
interview but Ms. Macabulos services were secured because Assumption
College wanted an examination of the child for school purposes and not
because of any litigation. She may have been paid to examine the child and
to render a finding based on her examination, but she was not paid to
fabricate such findings in favor of the party who retained her services. In
this instance it was not even petitioner Reynaldo but the school authorities
who initiated the same. It cannot be presumed that a professional of her
potential and stature would compromise her professional standing.
Teresita questions the findings of the trial court that:
1. Her morality is questionable as shown by her
marrying Reynaldo at the time she had a subsisting
marriage with another man.
2. She is guilty of grave indiscretion in carrying on a
love affair with one of the Reynaldo's fellow NSC
employees.
3. She is incapable of providing the children with
necessities and conveniences commensurate to their
social standing because she does not even own any
home in the Philippines.
4. She is emotionally unstable with ebullient temper.
It is contended that the above findings do not constitute the compelling
reasons under the law which would justify depriving her of custody over the
children; worse, she claims, these findings are non-existent and have not
been proved by clear and convincing evidence.
Public and private respondents give undue weight to the matter of a child
under 7 years of age not to be separated from the mother, without
considering what the law itself denominates as compelling reasons or
relevant considerations to otherwise decree. In the Unson III case, earlier
mentioned, this Court stated that it found no difficulty in not awarding
custody to the mother, it being in the best interest of the child "to be freed
from the obviously unwholesome, not
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to say immoral influence, that the situation where [the mother] had placed mention her conviction for the crime of bigamy, which from the records
herself . . . might create in the moral and social outlook of [the child] who appears to have become final (pp. 210-222, Rollo).
was in her formative and most impressionable stage . . ." Respondent court's finding that the father could not very well perform the
Then too, it must be noted that both Rosalind and Reginald are now over 7 role of a sole parent and substitute mother because his job is in the United
years of age. They understand the difference between right and wrong, States while the children will be left behind with their aunt in the Philippines
ethical behavior and deviant immorality. Their best interests would be better is misplaced. The assignment of Reynaldo in Pittsburgh is or was a
served in an environment characterized by emotional stability and a certain temporary one. He was sent there to oversee the purchase of a steel mill
degree of material sufficiency. There is nothing in the records to show that component and various equipment needed by the National Steel
Reynaldo is an "unfit" person under Article 213 of the Family Code. In fact, Corporation in the Philippines. Once the purchases are completed, there is
he has been trying his best to give the children the kind of attention and nothing to keep him there anymore. In fact, in a letter dated January 30,
care which the mother is not in a position to extend. 1995, Reynaldo informs this Court of the completion of his assignment
The argument that the charges against the mother are false is not supported abroad and of his permanent return to the Philippines (ff.
by the records. The findings of the trial court are based on evidence. p. 263, Rollo).
Teresita does not deny that she was legally married to Roberto Lustado on The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children
December 17, 1984 in California (p. 13, Respondent's Memorandum; p. are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom
238, Rollo; pp. 11, RTC Decision). Less than a year later, she had already they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo
driven across the continental United States to commence living with another is a fit person, thus meeting the two requirements found in the first
man, petitioner Reynaldo, in Pittsburgh. The two were married on October paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption under the
7, 1987. Of course, to dilute this disadvantage on her part, this matter of her second paragraph of said article no longer applies as the children are over
having contracted a bigamous marriage later with Reynaldo, Teresita tried seven years. Assuming that the presumption should have persuasive value
to picture Reynaldo as a rapist, alleging further that she told Reynaldo about for children only one or two years beyond the age of seven years mentioned
her marriage to Lustado on the occasion when she was raped by Reynaldo. in the statute, there are compelling reasons and relevant considerations not
Expectedly, Judge Harriet Demetriou of the Pasig RTC lent no weight to to grant custody to the mother. The children understand the unfortunate
such tale. And even if this story were given credence, it adds to and not shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional
subtracts from the conviction of this Court about Teresita's values. Rape is growth by her behavior.
an insidious crime against privacy. Confiding to one's potential rapist about WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court
a prior marriage is not a very convincing indication that the potential victim of Appeals is reversed and set aside, and the decision of Branch 96 of the
is averse to the act. The implication created is that the act would be Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in
acceptable if not for the prior marriage. Quezon City and presided over by the Honorable Lucas P. Bersamin in its
More likely is Reynaldo's story that he learned of the prior marriage only Civil Case No. Q-92-14206 awarding custody of the minors Rosalind and
much later. In fact, the rape incident itself is unlikely against a woman who Reginald Espiritu to their father, Reynaldo Espiritu, is reinstated. No special
had driven three days and three nights from California, who went straight to pronouncement is made as to costs.
the house of Reynaldo in Pittsburgh and upon arriving went to bed and, who SO ORDERED.
immediately thereafter started to live with him in a relationship which is
marital in nature if not in fact.
Judge Bersamin of the court a quo believed the testimony of the various
witnesses that while married to Reynaldo, Teresita entered into an illicit
relationship with Perdencio Gonzales right there in the house of petitioner
Reynaldo and respondent Teresita. Perdencio had been assigned by the
National Steel Corporation to assist in the project in Pittsburgh and was
staying with Reynaldo, his co-employee, in the latter's house. The record
shows that the daughter Rosalind suffered emotional disturbance caused
by the traumatic effect of seeing her mother hugging and kissing a boarder
in their house. The record also shows that it was Teresita who left the
conjugal home and the children, bound for California. When Perdencio
Gonzales was reassigned to the Philippines, Teresita followed him and was
seen in his company in a Cebu hotel, staying in one room and taking
breakfast together. More significant is that letters and written messages
from Teresita to Perdencio were submitted in evidence (p.12, RTC
Decision).
The argument that moral laxity or the habit of flirting from one man to
another does not fall under "compelling reasons" is neither meritorious nor
applicable in this case. Not only are the children over seven years old and
their clear choice is the father, but the illicit or immoral activities of the
mother had already caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts,
and exposure to conflicting moral values, at least in Rosalind. This is not to

97
Persons 4th Exam Cases
LEOUEL SANTOS, SR., petitioner-appellant,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and OFELIA
BEDIA, respondents-appellees.
In this petition for review, we are asked to overturn the decision of the Court of
Appeals1 granting custody of six-year old Leouel Santos, Jr. to his maternal
grandparents and not to his father, Santos, Sr. What is sought is a decision which
should definitively settle the matter of the care, custody and control of the boy.
Happily, unlike King Solomon, we need not merely rely on a "wise and
understanding heart," for there is man's law to guide us and that is, the Family
Code.
The antecedent facts giving rise to the case at bench are as follows:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by
profession, were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child,
Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born July 18, 1987.
From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter,
he had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private
respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel Jr. in the temporary custody of
the latter's parents, the respondent spouses Bedia. The latter alleged that they
paid for all the hospital bills, as well as the subsequent support of the boy
because petitioner could not afford to do so.
The boy's mother, Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the United States in May 1988 to
work. Petitioner alleged that he is not aware of her whereabouts and his efforts
to locate her in the United States proved futile. Private respondents claim that
although abroad, their daughter Julia had been sending financial support to them
for her son.
On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia
household, where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents
contend that through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy
and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.
The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor
Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with
Santos, Sr. as respondent.2
After an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on
the same day awarding custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his
grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.3
Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals.4 In its decision dated April
30, 1992, respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's
order. 5 His motion for reconsideration having been denied,6 petitioner now
brings the instant petition for review for a reversal of the appellate court's
decision.
The Court of Appeals erred, according to petitioner, in awarding custody of the
boy to his grandparents and not to himself. He contends that since private
respondents have failed to show that petitioner is an unfit and unsuitable father,
substitute parental authority granted to the boy's grandparents under Art. 214 of
the Family Code is inappropriate.
Petitioner adds that the reasons relied upon by the private respondents in having
custody over the boy, are flimsy and insufficient to deprive him of his natural and
legal right to have custody.
On the other hand, private respondents aver that they can provide an air-
conditioned room for the boy and that petitioner would not be in a position to take
care of his son since he has to be assigned to different places. They also allege
that the petitioner did not give a single centavo for the boy's support and
maintenance. When the boy was about to be released from the hospital, they
were the ones who paid the fees because their daughter and petitioner had no
money. Besides, Julia Bedia Santos, their daughter, had entrusted the boy to
them before she left for the United States. Furthermore, petitioner's use of
trickery and deceit in abducting the child in 1990, after being hospitably treated
by private respondents, does not speak well of his fitness and suitability as a
parent.
The Bedias argue that although the law recognizes the right of a parent to his
child's custody, ultimately the primary consideration is what is best for the
happiness and welfare of the latter. As maternal grandparents who have amply
demonstrated their love and affection for the boy since his infancy, they claim to
be in the best position to promote the child's welfare.
The issue to be resolved here boils down to who should properly be awarded
custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.
The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental
authority. Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical
institution whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection of their
unemancipated children to the extent required by the latter' s needs.7 It is a mass
of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the
children's physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of
their intellect and the education of their heart and senses.8 As regards parental
authority, "there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties;
no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor."9
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred
or renounced except in cases authorized by law. 10 The right attached to parental
authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority
only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an
orphan institution. 11 When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another,
such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely
temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental
authority. 12 Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the
same. 13
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children,
are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and
company. 14 The child's welfare is always the paramount consideration in all
questions concerning his care and custody. 15
The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons
of their common children. 16 In case of absence or death of either parent, the
parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. 17 Only in case of the
parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be
exercised by the surviving grandparent. 18 The situation obtaining in the case at
bench is one where the mother of the minor Santos, Jr., is working in the United
States while the father, petitioner Santos, Sr., is present. Not only are they
physically apart but are also emotionally separated. There has been no decree
of legal separation and petitioner's attempt to obtain an annulment of the
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of his wife has failed. 19
Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to
award custody of his minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the
ground that under Art. 214 of the Family Code, substitute parental authority of
the grandparents is proper only when both parents are dead, absent or
unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has not been successfully
shown by private respondents.
The Court of Appeals held that although there is no evidence to show that
petitioner (Santos Sr.) is "depraved, a habitual drunkard or poor, he may
nevertheless be considered, as he is in fact so considered, to be unsuitable to
be allowed to have custody of minor Leouel Santos Jr." 20
The respondent appellate court, in affirming the trial court's order of October 8,
1990, adopted as its own the latter's observations, to wit:
From the evidence adduced, this Court is of the opinion
that it is to be (sic) best interest of the minor Leouel Santos,
Jr. that he be placed under the care, custody, and control
of his maternal grandparents the petitioners herein. The
petitioners have amply demonstrated their love and
devotion to their grandson while the natural father,
respondent herein, has shown little interest in his welfare
as reflected by his conduct in the past. Moreover the fact
that petitioners are well-off financially, should be carefully
considered in awarding to them the custody of the minor
herein, lest the breaking of such ties with his maternal
grandparents might deprive the boy of an eventual college
education and other material advantages (Consaul vs.
Consaul, 63 N.Y.S. 688). Respondent had never given any
previous financial support to his son, while, upon the other
hand, the latter receives so much bounty from his maternal
grandparents and his mother as well, who is now gainfully
employed in the United States. Moreover, the fact that
respondent, as a military personnel who has to shuttle from
one assignment to another, and, in these troubled times,
may have pressing and compelling military duties which
may prevent him from attending to his son at times when
the latter needs him most, militates strongly against said
respondent. Additionally, the child is sickly and asthmatic
and needs the loving and tender care of those who can
provide for it. 21
We find the aforementioned considerations insufficient to defeat petitioner's
parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor
Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly since he has not been shown to be an unsuitable
and unfit parent. Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the
boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the
grandparents. 22 The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because
there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in no position to support
the boy. The fact that he was unable to provide financial support for his minor
son from birth up to over three years when he took the boy from his in-laws
without permission, should not be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent
right to the child's custody. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable
and merits only the severest criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment.
His appeal of the unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep his
only child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past
misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond between parent
and son. It would also give the father a chance to prove his love for his son and
for the son to experience the warmth and support which a father can give.
His being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So
many men in uniform who are assigned to different parts of the country in the
service of the nation, are still the natural guardians of their children. It is not just
to deprive our soldiers of authority, care and custody over their children merely
because of the normal consequences of their duties and assignments, such as
temporary separation from their families.
Petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws,
though unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.
Private respondents' attachment to the young boy whom they have reared for
the past three years is understandable. Still and all, the law considers the natural
love of a parent to outweigh that of the grandparents, such that only when the
parent present is shown to be unfit or unsuitable may the grandparents exercise
substitute parental authority, a fact which has not been proven here.
The strong bonds of love and affection possessed by private respondents as
grandparents should not be seen as incompatible with petitioner' right to custody
over the child as a father. Moreover, who is to say whether the petitioner's
financial standing may improve in the future?
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals dated April 30, 1992 as well as its Resolution dated November 13,
1992 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Custody over the minor Leouel
Santos Jr. is awarded to his legitimate father, herein petitioner Leouel Santos,
Sr.
SO ORDERED.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
MARIA PAZ CORDERO-OUYE, respondents.
Children begin by loving their parents. After a time they judge
them. Rarely, if ever, do they forgive them.[1] Indeed, parenthood is a riddle of no
mean proportions except for its mission. Thus, a mothers concern for her childs
custody is undying - such is a mothers love.
The right of the mother to the custody of her daughter is the issue in the
case at bar.
In this petition for review, Teresita Sagala-Eslao seeks the reversal of the
Court of Appeals decision[2] dated March 25, 1994, which affirmed the trial courts
judgment granting the petition of Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye to recover the custody
of her minor daughter from her mother-in-law, Teresita Sagala-Eslao.
As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts of the case are as follows:
From the evidence, it appears that on June 22, 1984, petitioner Maria Paz
Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married;[3] after their marriage, the
couple stayed with respondent Teresita Eslao, mother of the husband, at 1825,
Road 14, Fabie Estate, Paco, Manila; that out of their marriage, two children
were begotten, namely, Leslie Eslao who was born on February 23, 1986 and
Angelica Eslao who was born on April 20, 1987;[4] in the meantime, Leslie was
entrusted to the care and custody of petitioners mother in Sta. Ana, Pampanga,
while Angelica stayed with her parents at respondents house; on August 6, 1990,
petitioners husband Reynaldo Eslao died;[5] petitioner intended to bring Angelica
with her to Pampanga but the respondent prevailed upon her to entrust the
custody of Angelica to her, respondent reasoning out that her son just died and
to assuage her grief therefor, she needed the company of the child to at least
compensate for the loss of her late son. In the meantime, the petitioner returned
to her mothers house in Pampanga where she stayed with Leslie.
Subsequently, petitioner was introduced by her auntie to Dr. James Manabu-
Ouye, a Japanese-American, who is an orthodontist practicing in the United
States; their acquaintance blossomed into a meaningful relationship where on
March 18, 1992, the petitioner and Dr. James Ouye decided to get married; less
than ten months thereafter, or on January 15, 1993, the petitioner migrated to
San Francisco, California, USA, to join her new husband. At present, the
petitioner is a trainee at the Union Bank in San Francisco, while her husband is
a progressive practitioner of his profession who owns three cars, a dental clinic
and earns US$5,000 a month. On June 24, 1993, the petitioner returned to the
Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to the United States;
the petitioner then informed the respondent about her desire to take custody of
Angelica and explained that her present husband, Dr. James Ouye, expressed
his willingness to adopt Leslie and Angelica and to provide for their support and
education; however, respondent resisted the idea by way of explaining that the
child was entrusted to her when she was ten days old and accused the petitioner
of having abandoned Angelica. Because of the adamant attitude of the
respondent, the petitioner then sought the assistance of a lawyer, Atty. Mariano
de Joya, Jr., who wrote a letter to the respondent demanding for the return of the
custody of Angelica to her natural mother[6] and when the demand remain[ed]
unheeded, the petitioner instituted the present action.[7]Missda
After the trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the Court grants the same
and let the corresponding writ issue. As a corollary, respondent Teresita Sagala-
Eslao or anyone acting under her behalf is hereby directed to cause the
immediate transfer of the custody of the minor Angelica Cordero Eslao, to her
natural mother, petitioner Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the respondent court affirmed in full the decision of the trial
court.
Hence, the instant petition by the minors paternal grandmother,
contending that the Court of Appeals erred:
I Angelica; that private respondent never visited Angelica on important occasions,
IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT MARIA PAZ CORDERO-OUYE,
DID NOT ABANDON MINOR, ANGELICA ESLAO, TO THE CARE AND
CUSTODY OF THE PETITIONER TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO.Missdaa
II
IN RULING THAT THERE WAS NO COMPELLING REASON TO SEPARATE
MINOR, ANGELICA ESLAO, FROM PRIVATE RESPONDENT MARIA PAZ
CORDERO-OUYE, IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO.
III
IN NOT FINDING THAT PETITIONER TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO, IS FIT TO
BE GIVEN THE CUSTODY OF MINOR, ANGELICA ESLAO.Sdaadsc
The petition is without merit.
Being interrelated, the issues shall be discussed jointly.
Petitioner argues that she would be deserving to take care of Angelica;
that she had managed to raise 12 children of her own herself; that she has the
financial means to carry out her plans for Angelica; that she maintains a store
which earns a net income of about P500 a day, she gets P900 a month as
pension for the death of her husband, she rents out rooms in her house which
she owns, for which she earns a total of P6,000 a month, and that from her gross
income of roughly P21,000, she spends about P10,000 for the maintenance of
her house.Sdaadsc
Despite the foregoing, however, and petitioners genuine desire to remain
with said child, that would qualify her to have custody of Angelica, the trial courts
disquisition, in consonance with the provision that the childs welfare is always
the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and
custody[8] convinced this Court to decide in favor of private respondent, thus:
On the other hand, the side of the petitioner must also be presented here. In this
case, we see a picture of a real and natural mother who is -
x x x legitimately, anxiously, and desperately trying to get back her child in order
to fill the void in her heart and existence. She wants to make up for what she has
failed to do for her boy during the period when she was financially unable to help
him and when she could not have him in her house because of the objection of
the father. Now that she has her own home and is in a better financial condition,
she wants her child back, and we repeat that she has not and has never given
him up definitely or with any idea of permanence.[9]
The petitioner herein is married to an Orthodontist who has a lucrative practice
of his profession in San Francisco, California, USA. The petitioner and her
present husband have a home of their own and they have three cars. The
petitioners husband is willing to adopt the petitioners children. If the children will
be with their mother, the probability is that they will be afforded a bright
future. Contrast this situation with the one prevailing in the respondents
[grandmothers] house. As admitted by the respondent, four of the rooms in her
house are being rented to other persons with each room occupied by 4 to 5
persons. Added to these persons are the respondents 2 sons, Samuel and
Alfredo, and their respective families (ibid., p. 54) and one can just visualize the
kind of atmosphere pervading thereat. And to aggravate the situation, the house
has only 2 toilets and 3 faucets. Finally, considering that in all controversies
involving the custody of minors, the foremost criterion is the physical and moral
well being of the child taking into account the respective resources and social
and moral situations of the contending parties (Union III vs. Mariano, 101 SCRA
183), the Court is left with no other recourse but to grant the writ prayed for.[10]
Petitioner further contends that the respondent court erred in finding that
there was no abandonment committed by the private respondent; that while
judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case filed for the purpose is
not here obtaining as mandated in Art. 229 of the Family Code because petitioner
failed to resort to such judicial action, it does not ipso facto follow that there was
in fact no abandonment committed by the private respondent.
Petitioner also argues that it has been amply demonstrated during the trial
that private respondent had indeed abandoned Angelica to the care and custody
of the petitioner; that during all the time that Angelica stayed with petitioner, there
were only three instances or occasions wherein the private respondent saw
such as her birthday, and neither did the former give her cards or gifts, not even
a single candy;[11] that while private respondent claims otherwise and that she
visited Angelica "many times" an insists that she visited Angelica as often as four
times a month and gave her remembrances such as candies and clothes, she
would not even remember when the fourth birthday of Angelica was.
We are not persuaded by such averments.
In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 242 SCRA 407,[12] we stated, viz:
xxx [Parental authority] is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants
to parents for the purpose of the childrens physical preservation and
development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their
heart and senses.[13] As regards parental authority, there is no power, but a task;
no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for
the welfare of the minor.[14]
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred
or renounced except in cases authorized by law.[15] The right attached to parental
authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority
only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an
orphan institution.[16] When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another,
such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely
temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental
authority.[17]Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the
same.[18]
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children,
are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and company.[19]
Thus, in the instant petition, when private respondent entrusted the
custody of her minor child to the petitioner, what she gave to the latter was merely
temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of
parental authority. For the right attached to parental authority, being purely
personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan institution which
do not appear in the case at bar.
Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that
the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural
rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public
policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions
of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship.[20]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from dated March 25, 1994
being in accordance with law and the evidence, the same is hereby AFFIRMED
and the petition DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
99
Persons 4th Exam Cases
REYMOND B. LAXAMANA, petitioner, vs. MA. LOURDES* D.
LAXAMANA, respondent.
This is another sad tale of an estranged couples tug-of-war over the
custody of their minor children. Petitioner Reymond B. Laxamana and
respondent Ma. Lourdes D. Laxamana met sometime in 1983.Petitioner,
who came from a well-to-do family, was a graduate of Bachelor of Laws,
while respondent, a holder of a degree in banking and finance, worked in a
bank. After a whirlwind courtship, petitioner, 31 years old and respondent,
33, got married on June 6, 1984.[1] Respondent quit her job and became a
full-time housewife. Petitioner, on the other hand, operated buy and sell,
fishpond, and restaurant businesses for a living. The union was blessed
with three children twin brothers Joseph and Vincent, born on March 15,
1985, and Michael, born on June 19, 1986.[2]
All went well until petitioner became a drug dependent. In October
1991, he was confined at the Estrellas Home Care Clinic in Quezon City. He
underwent psychotherapy and psychopharmacological treatment and was
discharged on November 16, 1991.[3] Upon petition of respondent, the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, ordered petitioners
confinement at the NARCOM-DRC for treatment and rehabilitation.[4] Again,
on October 30, 1996, the trial court granted petitioners voluntary
confinement for treatment and rehabilitation at the National Bureau of
Investigation-TRC.[5]
On April 25, 1997, the court issued an order declaring petitioner
already drug-free and directing him to report to a certain Dr. Casimiro for
out-patient counseling for 6 months to one (1) year.[6]
Despite several confinements, respondent claimed petitioner was not
fully rehabilitated. His drug dependence worsened and it became difficult
for respondent and her children to live with him. Petitioner allegedly became
violent and irritable. On some occasions, he even physically assaulted
respondent. Thus, on June 17, 1999, respondent and her 3 children
abandoned petitioner and transferred to the house of her relatives.
On August 31, 1999, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 107, the instant petition for habeas corpus praying for
custody of his three children.[7] Respondent opposed the petition, citing the
drug dependence of petitioner.[8]
Meanwhile, on September 24, 1999, respondent filed a petition for
annulment of marriage with Branch 102 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City.[9]
On September 27, 1999, petitioner filed in the habeas corpus case, a
motion seeking visitation rights over his children.[10] On December 7, 1999,
after the parties reached an agreement, the court issued an order granting
visitation rights to petitioner and directing the parties to undergo psychiatric
and psychological examination by a psychiatrist of their common
choice. The parties further agreed to submit the case for resolution after the
trial courts receipt of the results of their psychiatric examination. The full text
of said order reads:
The parties appeared with their respective lawyers. A conference was held
in open Court and the parties agreed on the following:
Effective this Saturday and every Saturday thereafter until further order the
petitioner shall fetch the children every Saturday and Sunday at 9:00 oclock
in the morning from the house of the sister of respondent, Mrs. Corazon
Soriano and to be returned at 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of the same days.
That the parties agreed to submit themselves to Dr. Teresito Ocampo for
psychiatric/psychological examination. Dr. Ocampo is hereby advised to go
over the records of this case to enable him to have a thorough background
of the problem. He is hereby ordered to submit his findings directly to this
Court without furnishing the parties copies of his report. And after the receipt
of that report, thereafter, the case shall be deemed submitted for
decision.[11]
On January 6, 2000, Dr. Ocampo submitted the results of his
psychiatric evaluation on the parties and their children. Pertinent portions
thereof state:
SINGLY and COLLECTIVELY, the following information was obtained in the
interview of the 3 children:
(1) THEY were affected psychologically by the drug-related behavior of their
father:
a. they have a difficult time concentrating on their studies.
b. they are envious of their classmates whose families live in peace and
harmony.
c. once, MICHAEL had to quit school temporarily.
(2) THEY witnessed their father when he was under the influence of shabu.
(3) THEY think their father had been angry at their paternal grandmother
and this anger was displaced to their mother.
(4) THEY hope their father will completely and permanently recover from
his drug habit; and their criteria of his full recovery include:
a. he will regain his easy-going attitude.
b. he wont be hot-headed anymore and would not drive their van recklessly.
c. he would not tell unverifiable stories anymore.
d. he would not poke a gun on his own head and ask the
children who they love better, mom or dad.
(5) At one point one of the sons, became very emotional while he was
narrating his story and he cried. I had to stop the interview.
(6) THEIR mother was fearful and terrified when their father quarreled with
her.
(7) THEY hope their visits to their father will not interfere with their school
and academic schedules.
xxxxxxxxx
(3) MARILOU is one of 4 siblings. She graduated from college with a degree
in banking and finance. SHE was a carreer (sic) woman; worked for a bank
for ten years; subsequently quit her job to devote more time to her family.
(4) REYMOND is one of 5 siblings in a well-to-do family. His father was a
physician. During his developmental years, he recalled how his mother
complained incessantly about how bad the father was; only to find later that
the truth was opposite to the complaints of his mother; that his father was
nice, logical and understanding. He recalled how he unselfishly served his
father --- he opened the door when he arrived home; he got his portfolio; he
brought the days newspaper; he removed his shoes; he brought his glass
of beer or his shot of whisky. In short, he served him like a servant. His
father died of stroke in 1990.
REYMOND graduated from college with a degree in LAW in 1984; he did
not pass the bar.
His work history is as follows:
a. 1985 to 1989 he operated fishponds.
b. 1976 to 1991 simultaneously, he operated restaurant.
c. 1991 he engaged in the trading of vegetable, cooking oil, and mangos.
d. HE handled the leasing of a family property to a fast food company.
The findings on the examination of the MENTAL STATUS and MENTAL
PROCESSES OF MARILOU showed a woman who showed the
psychological effects of the trauma she had in the past. She is slightly edgy
and fidgety with any external noise. SHE answered all my questions
coherently. Her emotional state was stable throughout the interview. She is
of average intelligence. She was oriented to person, place and date. Her
memory for recent and remote events was intact. She could process sets
of figures and sets of similarities and differences. Her content of thought
was negative for delusions, hallucinations, paranoia, suicidal and homicidal
ideation. She could process abstract ideas and general information. Her
attention span was adequate. There was no evidence of impaired judgment.
The Rorschach ink blot test gave responses such as man touching a
woman, 2 people on a hi-five , 2 women chatting, beast, stuffed animal, etc.
Her past reflected on her psyche. There is no creative process. There were
no bizarre ideas.
The ZUNG anxiety/depression test highlighted I get tired for no reason; I
feel that I am useful and needed (re, son). There is moderate
depression. However, she could still make competent decisions.
The Social Adaptation Scale scored well in her capacity to adapt to her
situation. There is no evidence of losing control.
The findings on the examination of the MENTAL STATUS and MENTAL
PROCESSES of REYMOND showed an individual who presented himself
in the best situation he could possibly be. He is cool, calm and collected. He
answered all my questions coherently. He is of average intelligence. He
was oriented to person, place and date. His memory for recent and remote
events was intace (sic). His content of thought was negative for delusions,
hallucinations, paranoia, suicidal and homicidal ideation. His attention span
was adequate. He could process abstract ideas, sets of figures, and general
information.
The Rorschach ink blot test gave responses such as distorted chest ,
butterfly with scattered color, cat ran over by a car, nothing 2 people,
monster etc. There is no central theme in his responses. There were no
bizarre ideas.
The Zung anxiety/depression test: My mind is as clear as it used to be (most
of the time). There was no evidence of brain damage. There is no significant
affective response that would affect his rationality.
The Social Adaptive Scale scored well in his capacity to adapt to his
situation. He reached out well to others. He is in very good control of his
emotions.
BASED ON MY FINDINGS I MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS AND
CONCLUSIONS:
I. The CRITERIA for cure in drug addiction consist of:
1. 5-years and 10-years intervals of drug-free periods.
2. change for the better of the maladaptive behaviors of the
addict consisting of telling lies, manipulative behavior,
melodramatic and hysterical actions.
3. constructive and reproductive outlets for the mental and
physical energies of the addict.
4. behavior oriented towards spiritual values and other things.
II BASED on such scientific and observable criteria, I do not yet
consider REYMOND LAXAMANA completely cured even though his
drug urine test at Medical City for shabu was negative. (Emphasis
supplied)
III I DO NOT DETECT any evidence that the paternal visits of the sons
would be harmful or they would be in any danger. The academic schedules
of the sons has be taken into account in determining the length and
frequency of their visits.
x x x x x x x x x.[12]
On January 14, 2000, the trial court rendered the assailed decision
awarding the custody of the three children to respondent and giving
visitation rights to petitioner. The dispositive portion thereof states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. The children, Joseph, Michael and Vincent all surnamed Laxamana are
hereby ordered to remain under the custody of the respondent.
100
Persons 4th Exam Cases
2. The visitation arrangement as per Order of December 7, 1999 is hereby
incorporated and forms part of this Decision. The parties are enjoined to
comply with the terms stated therein.
3. The petitioner is hereby ordered to undergo urine drug screen for shabu
for three times (3x) per month every ten (10) days, with the Dangerous
Drugs Board. The said Board is hereby ordered to submit the results of all
tests immediately as directed to this Court.
4. The petitioner is hereby referred to undergo regular counseling at the
Free-Clinic at the East Avenue Medical Center, Department of Health Out
Patient Psychiatry Department until further order. For this purpose, it is
suggested that he should see Dr. Teresito P. Ocampo to make
arrangements for said counseling.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Dangerous Drugs Board and
the Free-Clinic, Out Patient Psychiatry Department, East Avenue Medical
Center, Department of Health for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, based on the following:
I dependent.[18] There is no showing that the court ascertained the categorical
THE COURT A QUO HAS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND
USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS WHEN IT RESOLVED
THE ISSUE OF CUSTODY WITHOUT CONDUCTING A TRIAL TO
DETERMINE FACTUAL ISSUES.
II
THE COURT A QUO HAS RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF CUSTODY IN A
MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT WHEN IT
RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF CUSTODY WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE
PARAMOUNT INTEREST AND WELFARE OF HEREIN PARTIES THREE
(3) MINOR CHILDREN.
III
THE ASSAILED DECISION IS NULL AND VOID AS IT DOES NOT
COMPLY WITH SECTION 14 ARTICLE VIII OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.[14]
The core issue for resolution in the instant petition is whether or not
the trial court considered the paramount interest and welfare of the children
in awarding their custody to respondent.
In controversies involving the care, custody and control of their minor
children, the contending parents stand on equal footing before the court who
shall make the selection according to the best interest of the child. The child
if over seven years of age may be permitted to choose which parent he/she
prefers to live with, but the court is not bound by such choice if the parent
so chosen is unfit. In all cases, the sole and foremost consideration is the
physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child concerned,
taking into account the respective resources as well as social and moral
situations of the opposing parents.[15]
In Medina v. Makabali,[16] we stressed that this is as it should be, for
in the continual evolution of legal institutions, the patria potestas has been
transformed from the jus vitae ac necis (right of life and death) of the Roman
law, under which the offspring was virtually a chattel of his parents, into a
radically different institution, due to the influence of Christian faith and
doctrines. The obligational aspect is now supreme. There is no power, but
a task; no complex rights of parents but a sum of duties; no sovereignty, but
a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.
Mindful of the nature of the case at bar, the court a quo should have
conducted a trial notwithstanding the agreement of the parties to submit the
case for resolution on the basis, inter alia, of the psychiatric report of Dr.
Teresito. Thus, petitioner is not estopped from questioning the absence of
a trial considering that said psychiatric report, which was the courts primary
basis in awarding custody to respondent, is insufficient to justify the
decision. The fundamental policy of the State to promote and protect the
welfare of children shall not be disregarded by mere technicality in resolving
disputes which involve the family and the youth.[17] While petitioner may
have a history of drug dependence, the records are inadequate as to his
moral, financial and social well-being. The results of the psychiatric
evaluation showing that he is not yet completely cured may render him unfit
to take custody of the children, but there is no evidence to show that
respondent is unfit to provide the children with adequate support, education,
as well as moral and intellectual training and development. Moreover, the
children in this case were 14 and 15 years old at the time of the
promulgation of the decision, yet the court did not ascertain their choice as
to which parent they want to live with. In its September 8, 1999 order, the
trial court merely stated that: The children were asked as to whether they
would like to be with petitioner but there are indications that they entertain
fears in their hearts and want to be sure that their father is no longer a drug
choice of the children. These inadequacies could have been remedied by
an exhaustive trial probing into the accuracy of Dr. Ocampos report and the
capacity of both parties to raise their children. The trial court was remiss in
the fulfillment of its duties when it approved the agreement of the parties to
submit the case for decision on the basis of sketchy findings of facts.
In Lacson v. Lacson,[19] the case was remanded to the trial court with
respect to the issue of custody. In the said case, the court a quo resolved
the question of the childrens custody based on the amicable settlement of
the spouses. Stressing the need for presentation of evidence and a
thorough proceedings, we explained
It is clear that every child [has] rights which are not and should not be
dependent solely on the wishes, much less the whims and caprices, of his
parents. His welfare should not be subject to the parents' say-so or mutual
agreement alone. Where, as in this case, the parents are already separated
in fact, the courts must step in to determine in whose custody the child can
better be assured the rights granted to him by law. The need, therefore, to
present evidence regarding this matter, becomes imperative. A careful
scrutiny of the records reveals that no such evidence was introduced in the
CFI. This latter court relied merely on the mutual agreement of the spouses-
parents. To be sure, this was not sufficient basis to determine the fitness of
each parent to be the custodian of the children.
Besides, at least one of the children Enrique, the eldest is now eleven years
of age and should be given the choice of the parent he wishes to live with.
x x x.
In the instant case, the proceedings before the trial court leave much
to be desired. While a remand of this case would mean further delay, the
childrens paramount interest demand that further proceedings be
conducted to determine the fitness of both petitioner and respondent to
assume custody of their minor children.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant case is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107, for
the purpose of receiving evidence to determine the fitness of petitioner and
respondent to take custody of their children. Pending the final disposition of
this case, custody shall remain with respondent but subject to petitioners
visitation rights in accordance with the December 7, 1999 order of the trial
court.
SO ORDERED.
101
Persons 4th Exam Cases
JOYCELYN PABLO-GUALBERTO, petitioner, vs. CRISANTO
RAFAELITO GUALBERTO V, respondent.
When love is lost between spouses and the marriage inevitably
results in separation, the bitterest tussle is often over the custody of their
children. The Court is now tasked to settle the opposing claims of the
parents for custody pendente lite of their child who is less than seven years
of age. There being no sufficient proof of any compelling reason to separate
the minor from his mother, custody should remain with her.
The Case
Before us are two consolidated petitions. The first is a Petition for
Review[1] filed by Joycelyn Pablo-Gualberto under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the August 30, 2002 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-GR SP No. 70878. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is
hereby GRANTED. The assailed Order of May 17, 2002 is hereby SET
ASIDE and ANNULLED. The custody of the child is hereby ordered
returned to [Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V].
The [respondent] court/Judge is hereby directed to consider, hear and
resolve [petitioners] motion to lift the award of custody pendente lite of the
child to [respondent].[3]
The second is a Petition for Certiorari[4] filed by Crisanto Rafaelito
Gualberto V under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, charging the appellate
court with grave abuse of discretion for denying his Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the August 30, 2002 Decision. The denial was contained
in the CAs November 27, 2002 Resolution, which we quote:
We could not find any cogent reason why the [last part of the dispositive
portion of our Decision of August 30, 2002] should be deleted, hence,
subject motion is hereby DENIED.[5]
The Facts
The CA narrated the antecedents as follows:
x x x [O]n March 12, 2002, [Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V] filed before
[the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City] a petition for declaration of nullity
of his marriage to x x x Joycelyn D. Pablo Gualberto, with an ancillary prayer
for custody pendente lite of their almost 4-year-old son, minor Rafaello (the
child, for brevity), whom [Joycelyn] allegedly took away with her from the
conjugal home and his school (Infant Toddlers Discovery Center in
Paraaque City) when [she] decided to abandon [Crisanto] sometime in early
February 2002[.] x x x [O]n April 2, 2002, [RTC Judge Helen B. Ricafort]
heard the ancillary prayer of [Crisanto] for custody pendente lite. x x x
[B]ecause [Joycelyn] allegedly failed to appear despite notice, [Crisanto], a
certain Col. Renato Santos, and Ms. Cherry Batistel, testified before the x x
x Judge; x x x documentary evidence [was] also presented[.] x x x [O]n April
3, 2002, x x x [the] Judge awarded custody pendente lite of the child to
[Crisanto.] [T]he Order partly read x x x:
x x x Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto V testified. He stated that [Joycelyn] took
their minor child with her to Caminawit, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. At
that time, the minor was enrolled at B.F. Homes, Paraaque City. Despite
effort[s] exerted by him, he has failed to see his child. [Joycelyn] and the
child are at present staying with the formers step-father at the latters
[residence] at Caminawit, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro.
Renato Santos, President of United Security Logistic testified that he was
commissioned by [Crisanto] to conduct surveillance on [Joycelyn] and came
up with the conclusion that [she] is having lesbian relations with one Noreen
Gay Cuidadano in Cebu City.
The findings of Renato Santos [were] corroborated by Cherry Batistel, a
house helper of the spouses who stated that [the mother] does not care for
the child as she very often goes out of the house and on one occasion, she
saw [Joycelyn] slapping the child.
Art. 211 of the Family Code provides as follows:
The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their children. In the case of disagreement, the fathers decision
shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
The authority of the father and mother over their children is exercised jointly.
This recognition, however, does not place her in exactly the same place as
the father; her authority is subordinated to that of the father.
In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the sole and foremost
consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the
child, taking into account the respective resources and social and moral
situations of the contending parties.
The Court believes that [Joycelyn] had no reason to take the child with her.
Moreover, per Sheriff returns, she is not with him at Caminawit, San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro.
WHEREFORE, pendente lite, the Court hereby awards custody of the
minor, Crisanto Rafaello P. Gualberto X to his father, Crisanto Rafaelito G.
Gualberto V.
x x x [O]n April 16, 2002, the hearing of [Joycelyns] motion to lift the award
of custody pendente lite of the child to [Crisanto] was set but the former did
not allegedly present any evidence to support her motion. However, on May
17, 2002, [the] Judge allegedly issued the assailed Order reversing her
Order of April 3, 2002 and this time awarding custody of the child to
[Joycelyn]. [T]he entire text of the Order [is] herein reproduced, to wit:
Submitted is [Crisantos] Motion to Resolve Prayer for Custody Pendente
Lite and [Joycelyns] Motion to Dismiss and the respective Oppositions
thereto.
[Joycelyn], in her Motion to Dismiss, makes issue of the fact that the person
referred to in the caption of the Petition is one JOCELYN Pablo Gualberto
and not Joycelyn Pablo Gualberto. [Joycelyn] knows she is the person
referred to in the Complaint. As a matter of fact, the body of the Complaint
states her name correct[ly]. The law is intended to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice, not to hinder or delay it. Litigation should be
practicable and convenient. The error in the name of Joycelyn does not
involve public policy and has not prejudiced [her].
This case was filed on March 12, 2002. Several attempts were made to
serve summons on [Joycelyn] as shown by the Sheriffs returns. It appears
that on the 4th attempt on March 21, 2002, both Ma. Daisy and x x x Ronnie
Nolasco, [Joycelyns mother and stepfather, respectively,] read the contents
of the documents presented after which they returned the same.
The Court believes that on that day, summons was duly served and this
Court acquired jurisdiction over [Joycelyn].
The filing of [Joycelyns annulment] case on March 26, 2002 was an after
thought, perforce the Motion to [D]ismiss should be denied.
The child subject of this Petition, Crisanto Rafaello P. Gualberto is barely
four years old. Under Article 213 of the Family Code, he shall not be
separated from his mother unless the Court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise. The Court finds the reason stated by [Crisanto] not [to] be
compelling reasons. The father should however be entitled to spend time
with the minor. These do not appear compelling reasons to deprive him of
the company of his child.
When [Joycelyn] appeared before this Court, she stated that she has no
objection to the father visiting the child even everyday provided it is in
Mindoro.
The Court hereby grants the mother, [Joycelyn], the custody of Crisanto
Rafaello P. Gualberto, with [the] right of [Crisanto] to have the child with him
every other weekend.
WHEREFORE:
1. The [M]otion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED;
2. Custody pendente lite is hereby given to the
mother Joycelyn Pablo Gualberto with
the right of the father, x x x [Crisanto],
to have him every other week-end.
3. Parties are admonished not to use any other
agencies of the government like the
CIDG to interfere in this case and to
harass the parties.[6]
In a Petition for Certiorari[7] before the CA, Crisanto charged the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 260) of Paraaque City with grave abuse of
discretion for issuing its aforequoted May 17, 2002 Order. He alleged that
this Order superseded, without any factual or legal basis, the still valid and
subsisting April 3, 2002 Order awarding him custody pendente lite of his
minor son; and that it violated Section 14 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Partly in Crisantos favor, the CA ruled that grave abuse of discretion
had been committed by the trial court in reversing the latter courts previous
Order dated April 3, 2002, by issuing the assailed May 17, 2002 Order. The
appellate court explained that the only incident to resolve was Joycelyns
Motion to Dismiss, not the issuance of the earlier Order. According to the
CA, the prior Order awarding provisional custody to the father should
prevail, not only because it was issued after a hearing, but also because the
trial court did not resolve the correct incident in the later Order.
Nonetheless, the CA stressed that the trial court judge was not
precluded from considering and resolving Joycelyns Motion to lift the award
of custody pendente lite to Crisanto, as that Motion had yet to be properly
considered and ruled upon. However, it directed that the child be turned
over to him until the issue was resolved.
Hence, these Petitions.[8]
Issues
In GR No. 154994, Petitioner Joycelyn submits these issues for our
consideration:
1. Whether or not the Respondent Court of Appeals, when it awarded the
custody of the child to the father, violated Art. 213 of the Family Code, which
mandates that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from
the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
2. Is it Article 213 or Article 211 which applies in this case involving four-
year old Rafaello?[9]
On the other hand, Crisanto raises the following issues:
A. Did Respondent Court commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to or
in excess of jurisdiction when, in its August 30, 2002 Decision, it ordered
respondent court/Judge to consider, hear and resolve the motion to lift
award of custody pendente lite of the child to petitioner and x x x denied the
motion for reconsideration thereof in its November 27, 2002 Resolution,
considering that: (1) there is no such motion ever, then or now pending, with
the court a quo; (2) the November 27, 2002 Resolution is unconstitutional;
and (3) the April 3, 2002 Order of respondent Judge, the validity of which
has been upheld in the August 30, 2002 Decision of the respondent Court,
has become final and executory; and
B. Ought not the ancillary remedies [o]f habeas corpus, because the
whereabouts, physical and mental condition of the illegally detained Minor
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Rafaello is now unknown to petitioner and preliminary mandatory injunction
with urgent prayer for immediate issuance of preliminary [injunction],
petitioner having a clear and settled right to custody of Minor Rafaello which
has been violated and still is being continuously violated by [petitioner
Joycelyn], be granted by this Honorable Court?[10]
Being interrelated, the procedural challenges and the substantive
issues in the two Petitions will be addressed jointly.
The Courts Ruling
There is merit in the Petition in GR No. 154994, but not in GR No.
156254.
Preliminary Issue:
The Alleged Prematurity
of the Petition in GR No. 154994
Before going into the merits of the present controversy, the Court
shall first dispose of a threshold issue. In GR No. 154994, therein
Respondent Crisanto contends that the Petition for Review was filed beyond
the deadline (October 24, 2002) allowed by the Rules of Court and by this
Court. He claims that Registry Bill No. 88 shows that the Petition was sent
by speed mail, only on November 4, 2002. Furthermore, he assails the
Petition for its prematurity, since his Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
the August 30, 2002 CA Decision was still pending before the appellate
court. Thus, he argues that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over
Joycelyns Petition.
Timeliness of the Petition
The manner of filing and service Joycelyns Petition by mail is
governed by Sections 3 and 7 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, which we
quote:
SEC. 3. Manner of filing. The filing of pleadings, appearances, motions,
notices, orders, judgments and all other papers shall be made by presenting
the original copies thereof, plainly indicated as such personally to the clerk
of court or by sending them by registered mail. xxx In the second case, the
date of mailing of motions, pleadings and other papers or payments or
deposits, as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry
receipt, shall be considered as the date of their filing, payment, or deposit
in court. The envelope shall be attached to the records of the case.
xxxxxxxxx
SEC. 7. Service by mail. Service by registered mail shall be made by
depositing the copy in the office, in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to
the party or his counsel at his office, if known, otherwise at his residence, if
known, with postage fully pre-paid, and with instructions to the postmaster
to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if undelivered. If no
registry service is available in the locality of either the sender of the
addressee, service may be done by ordinary mail. (Italics supplied)
The records disclose that Joycelyn received the CAs August 30, 2002
Decision on September 9, 2002. On September 17, she filed before this
Court a Motion for a 30-day extension of time to file a petition for review on
certiorari. This Motion was granted,[11] and the deadline was thus extended
until October 24, 2002.
A further perusal of the records reveals that copies of the Petition
were sent to this Court and to the parties by registered mail[12] at the Bian,
Laguna Post Office on October 24, 2002. This is the date clearly stamped
on the face of the envelope[13] and attested to in the Affidavit of
Service[14] accompanying the Petition. Petitioner Joycelyn explained that
the filing and the service had been made by registered mail due to the
volume of delivery assignments and the lack of a regular messenger.[15]
The Petition is, therefore, considered to have been filed on October
24, 2002, its mailing date as shown by the post office stamp on the
envelope. The last sentence of Section 3 of Rule 13 of the Rules provides
that the date of filing may be shown either by the post office stamp on the
envelope or by the registry receipt. Proof of its filing, on the other hand, is
shown by the existence of the petition in the record, pursuant to Section 12
of Rule 13.[16]
The postmaster satisfactorily clarifies that Registry Bill No. 88, which
shows the date November 2, 2002, merely discloses when the mail matters
received by the Bian Post Office on October 24, 2002, were dispatched or
sent to the Central Mail Exchange for distribution to their final
destinations.[17] The Registry Bill does not reflect the actual mailing date.
Instead, it is the postal Registration Book[18] that shows the list of mail
matters that have been registered for mailing on a particular day, along with
the names of the senders and the addressees. That book shows that
Registry Receipt Nos. 2832-A and 2832-B, pertaining to the mailed matters
for the Supreme Court, were issued on October 24, 2002.
Prematurity of the Petition
As to the alleged prematurity of the Petition of Joycelyn, Crisanto
points out that his Urgent Motion for Partial Reconsideration[19] was still
awaiting resolution by the CA when she filed her Petition before this Court
on October 24, 2002. The CA ruled on the Motion only on November 27,
2002.
The records show, however, that the Motion of Crisanto
was mailed only on September 12, 2002. Thus, on September 17, 2002,
when Joycelyn filed her Motion for Extension of Time to file her Petition for
Review, she might have still been unaware that he had moved for a partial
reconsideration of the August 20, 2002 CA Decision. Nevertheless, upon
being notified of the filing of his Motion, she should have manifested that
fact to this Court.
With the CAs final denial of Crisantos Motion for Reconsideration,
Joycelyns lapse may be excused in the interest of resolving the substantive
issues raised by the parties.
First Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
In GR No. 156254, Crisanto submits that the CA gravely abused its
discretion when it ordered the trial court judge to consider, hear and resolve
the motion to lift the award of custody pendente lite without any proper
motion by Joycelyn and after the April 3, 2002 Order of the trial court had
become final and executory. The CA is also charged with grave abuse of
discretion for denying his Motion for Partial Reconsideration without stating
the reasons for the denial, allegedly in contravention of Section 1 of Rule
36 of the Rules of Court.
The Order to Hear the Motion
to Lift the Award of Custody
Pendente Lite Proper
To begin with, grave abuse of discretion is committed when an act is
1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence; [20] or 2)
executed whimsically or arbitrarily in a manner so patent and so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined.[21] What constitutes grave abuse of discretion is such
capricious and arbitrary exercise of judgment as that which is equivalent, in
the eyes of the law, to lack of jurisdiction.[22]
On the basis of these criteria, we hold that the CA did not commit
grave abuse of discretion.
First, there can be no question that a court of competent jurisdiction
is vested with the authority to resolve even unassigned issues. It can do so
when such a step is indispensable or necessary to a just resolution of issues
raised in a particular pleading or when the unassigned issues are
inextricably linked or germane to those that have been pleaded.[23] This
truism applies with more force when the relief granted has been specifically
prayed for, as in this case.
Explicit in the Motion to Dismiss[24] filed by Joycelyn before the RTC
is her ancillary prayer for the court to lift and set aside its April 3, 2002 Order
awarding to Crisanto custody pendente lite of their minor son. Indeed, the
necessary consequence of granting her Motion to Dismiss would have been
the setting aside of the Order awarding Crisanto provisional custody of the
child. Besides, even if the Motion to Dismiss was denied -- as indeed it was
-- the trial court, in its discretion and if warranted, could still have granted
the ancillary prayer as an alternative relief.
Parenthetically, Joycelyns Motion need not have been verified
because of the provisional nature of the April 3, 2002 Order. Under Rule
[25]
38 of the Rules of Court, verification is required only when relief is sought
from a final and executory Order. Accordingly, the court may set aside its
own orders even without a proper motion, whenever such action is
warranted by the Rules and to prevent a miscarriage of justice.[26]
Denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration Proper
Second, the requirement in Section 1 of Rule 36 (for judges to state
clearly and distinctly the reasons for their dispositions) refers only to
decisions and final orders on the merits, not to those resolving incidental
matters.[27] The provision reads:
SECTION 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. A judgment or final
order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and
directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of court.
(Italics supplied)
Here, the declaration of the nullity of marriage is the subject of the
main case, in which the issue of custody pendente lite is an incident. That
custody and support of common children may be ruled upon by the court
while the action is pending is provided in Article 49 of the Family Code,
which we quote :
Art. 49. During the pendency of the action[28] and in the absence of adequate
provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall
provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their
common children. x x x.
Clearly then, the requirement cited by Crisanto is inapplicable. In any
event, in its questioned Resolution, the CA clearly stated that it could not
find any cogent reason to reconsider and set aside the assailed portion of
its August 30, 2002 Decision.
The April 3, 2002 Order Not
Final and Executory
Third, the award of temporary custody, as the term implies, is
provisional and subject to change as circumstances may warrant. In this
connection, there is no need for a lengthy discussion of the alleged finality
of the April 3, 2002 RTC Order granting Crisanto temporary custody of his
son. For that matter, even the award of child custody after a judgment on a
marriage annulment is not permanent; it may be reexamined and adjusted
if and when the parent who was given custody becomes unfit.[29]
Second Issue:
Custody of a Minor Child
When love is lost between spouses and the marriage inevitably
results in separation, the bitterest tussle is often over the custody of their
children. The Court is now tasked to settle the opposing claims of the
parents for custody pendente lite of their child who is less than seven years
old.[30] On the one hand, the mother insists that, based on Article 213 of the
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Family Code, her minor child cannot be separated from her. On the other
hand, the father argues that she is unfit to take care of their son; hence, for
compelling reasons, he must be awarded custody of the child.
Article 213 of the Family Code[31] provides:
ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be
exercised by the parent designated by the court. The court shall take into
account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over
seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother,
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
This Court has held that when the parents are separated, legally or
otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of their
child.[32] Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code,
which reads:
Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of
children, the latters welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be
separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds
compelling reasons for such measure.(Italics supplied)
The general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be
separated from their mother finds its raison detre in the basic need of minor
children for their mothers loving care.[33] In explaining the rationale for Article
363 of the Civil Code, the Code Commission stressed thus:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid a tragedy where a
mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep
sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The
exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling reasons for the good
of the child: those cases must indeed be rare, if the mothers heart is not to
be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of
imprisonment and the (relative) divorce decree will ordinarily be sufficient
punishment for her. Moreover, her moral dereliction will not have any effect
upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand the situation. (Report of
the Code Commission, p. 12)
A similar provision is embodied in Article 8 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603).[34] Article 17 of the same Code
is even more explicit in providing for the childs custody under various
circumstances, specifically in case the parents are separated. It clearly
mandates that no child under five years of age shall be separated from his
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to do so. The provision
is reproduced in its entirety as follows:
Art. 17. Joint Parental Authority. The father and the mother shall exercise
jointly just and reasonable parental authority and responsibility over their
legitimate or adopted children. In case of disagreement, the fathers decision
shall prevail unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
In case of the absence or death of either parent, the present or surviving
parent shall continue to exercise parental authority over such children,
unless in case of the surviving parents remarriage, the court for justifiable
reasons, appoints another person as guardian.
In case of separation of his parents, no child under five years of age shall
be separated from his mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to
do so. (Italics supplied)
The above mandates reverberate in Articles 211, 212 and 213 of the
Family Code. It is unmistakable from the language of these provisions that
Article 211[35] was derived from the first sentence of the aforequoted Article
17; Article 212,[36] from the second sentence; and Article 213,[37] save for a
few additions, from the third sentence. It should be noted that the Family
Code has reverted to the Civil Code provision mandating that a child
below seven years should not be separated from the mother.[38]
Mandatory Character
of Article 213 of the Family Code
In Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson,[39] the Court held that the use of shall
in Article 363 of the Civil Code and the observations made by the Code
Commission underscore the mandatory character of the word.[40]Holding in
that case that it was a mistake to deprive the mother of custody of her two
children, both then below the age of seven, the Court stressed:
[Article 363] prohibits in no uncertain terms the separation of a mother and
her child below seven years, unless such a separation is grounded upon
compelling reasons as determined by a court.[41]
In like manner, the word shall in Article 213 of the Family Code and
Section 6[42] of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court has been held to connote a
mandatory character.[43] Article 213 and Rule 99 similarly contemplate a
situation in which the parents of the minor are married to each other, but
are separated by virtue of either a decree of legal separation or a de facto
separation.[44] In the present case, the parents are living separately as a
matter of fact.
The Best Interest of the Child
a Primary Consideration
The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that [i]n all actions
concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies,
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.[45]
The principle of best interest of the child pervades Philippine cases
involving adoption, guardianship, support, personal status, minors in conflict
with the law, and child custody. In these cases, it has long been recognized
that in choosing the parent to whom custody is given, the welfare of the
minors should always be the paramount consideration.[46] Courts are
mandated to take into account all relevant circumstances that would have
a bearing on the childrens well-being and development. Aside from the
material resources and the moral and social situations of each parent, other
factors may also be considered to ascertain which one has the capability to
attend to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the
children.[47] Among these factors are the previous care and devotion shown
by each of the parents; their religious background, moral uprightness, home
environment and time availability; as well as the childrens emotional and
educational needs
Tender-Age
Presumption
As pointed out earlier, there is express statutory recognition that, as
a general rule, a mother is to be preferred in awarding custody of children
under the age of seven. The caveat in Article 213 of the Family Code cannot
be ignored, except when the court finds cause to order otherwise. [48]
The so-called tender-age presumption under Article 213 of the Family
Code may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mothers
unfitness. The mother has been declared unsuitable to have custody of her
children in one or more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment,
unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable
disease.[49]
Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the
compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of custody. It has indeed been held
that under certain circumstances, the mothers immoral conduct may
constitute a compelling reason to deprive her of custody.[50]
But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental
neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is a prostitute or
has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have custody
of her minor child.[51] To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must
clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the
welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising
proper parental care.[52]
To this effect did the Court rule in Unson III v. Navarro,[53] wherein the
mother was openly living with her brother-in-law, the childs uncle. Under
that circumstance, the Court deemed it in the nine-year-old childs best
interest to free her from the obviously unwholesome, not to say immoral
influence, that the situation in which the mother ha[d] placed herself might
create in [the childs] moral and social outlook.[54]
In Espiritu v. CA,[55] the Court took into account psychological and
case study reports on the child, whose feelings of insecurity and anxiety had
been traced to strong conflicts with the mother. To the psychologist the child
revealed, among other things, that the latter was disturbed upon seeing her
mother hugging and kissing a bad man who lived in their house and worked
for her father. The Court held that the illicit or immoral activities of the mother
had already caused the child emotional disturbances, personality conflicts,
and exposure to conflicting moral values x x x.
Based on the above jurisprudence, it is therefore not enough for
Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn was a lesbian. He must also
demonstrate that she carried on her purported relationship with a person of
the same sex in the presence of their son or under circumstances not
conducive to the childs proper moral development. Such a fact has not been
shown here. There is no evidence that the son was exposed to the mothers
alleged sexual proclivities or that his proper moral and psychological
development suffered as a result.
Moreover, it is worthy to note that the trial court judge, Helen Bautista-
Ricafort, ruled in her May 17, 2002 Order that she had found the reason
stated by [Crisanto] not to be compelling[56] as to suffice as a ground for
separating the child from his mother. The judge made this conclusion after
personally observing the two of them, both in the courtroom and in her
chambers on April 16, 2002, and after a chance to talk to the boy and to
observe him firsthand. This assessment, based on her unique opportunity
to witness the childs behavior in the presence of each parent, should carry
more weight than a mere reliance on the records. All told, no compelling
reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the mothers custody.
No Grant of Habeas Corpus
and Preliminary Injunction
As we have ruled that Joycelyn has the right to keep her minor son in
her custody, the writ of habeas corpus and the preliminary mandatory
injunction prayed for by Crisanto have no leg to stand on. A writ of habeas
corpus may be issued only when the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto,[57] a situation that does not apply
here.
On the other hand, the ancillary remedy of preliminary mandatory
injunction cannot be granted, because Crisantos right to custody has not
been proven to be clear and unmistakable.[58] Unlike an ordinary preliminary
injunction, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is more cautiously
regarded, since the latter requires the performance of a particular act that
tends to go beyond the maintenance of the status quo.[59] Besides, such an
injunction would serve no purpose, now that the case has been decided on
its merits.[60]
WHEREFORE, the Petition in GR No. 154994 is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and the
May 17, 2002 Regional Trial Court Order REINSTATED. The Petition in GR
No. 156254 is DISMISSED. Costs against Petitioner Crisanto Rafaelito
Gualberto V. SO ORDERED.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
MARIE ANTONETTE ABIGAIL C. SALIENTES, ORLANDO B.
SALIENTES, and ROSARIO C. SALIENTES,
Petitioners,
- versus
LORAN S.D. ABANILLA, HONORABLE JUDGE PEDRO
SABUNDAYO, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 203,
MUNTINLUPA CITY, Respondents.
The instant petition assails the Decision[1] dated November
10, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75680, which
dismissed the petition for certiorari against the orders of the Regional
Trial Court in Special Proceedings No. 03-004. Likewise assailed is
the Court of Appeals Resolution[2] dated March 19, 2004 denying
reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner
Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes are the parents of the minor
Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived with
Marie Antonettesparents, petitioners Orlando B. Salientes and
Rosario C. Salientes. Due to in-laws problems, private respondent
suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own house, but
Marie Antonette refused.So, he alone left the house of
the Salientes. Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing his son.
Later, Loran S.D. Abanilla in his personal capacity and as
the representative of his son, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus and
Custody,[3] docketed as Special Proceedings No. 03-004 before
the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. On January 23, 2003, the
trial court issued the following order:
Upon verified Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus by Petitioners, the Respondents
Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes, Orlando
B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes are hereby
directed to produce and bring before this Court the
body of minor Lorenzo
Emmanuel Salientes Abanilla on January 31, 2003
at 1:00 oclock in the afternoon and to show cause
why the said child should not be discharged from
restraint.
Let this Writ be served by the Sheriff or
any authorized representative of this Court, who is
directed to immediately make a return.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Petitioners moved for reconsideration which the
court denied.
Consequently, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed on November 10,
2003. The appellate court affirmed the February 24, 2003 Order of the
trial court holding that its January 23, 2003 Order did not award the
custody of the 2-year-old child to any one but was simply the standard
order issued for the production of restrained persons. The appellate
court held that the trial court was still about to conduct a full inquiry, in
a summary proceeding, on the cause of the minors detention and the
matter of his custody. The Court of Appeals ruled thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was denied
on March 19, 2004.
Hence, petitioners interposed this appeal by certiorari
anchored on the following grounds:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in not
pronouncing the respondent judge
gravely abused his discretion, amounting
to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in
issuing an order for the petitioner-mother
to first show cause why her own three-
year old child in her custody should not
be discharged from a so-called restraint
despite no evidence at all of restraint and
no evidence of compelling reasons of
maternal unfitness to deprive the
petitioner-mother of her minor son of
tender years. The assailed orders,
resolutions and decisions of the lower
court and the Court of Appeals are
clearly void;
2. The Court of Appeals erred in not
pronouncing that the respondent judge
gravely abused his discretion in issuing a
writ of habeas corpus which clearly is not
warranted considering that there is no
unlawful restraint by the mother and
considering further that the law presumes
the fitness of the mother, thereby
negating any notion of such mother
illegally restraining or confining her very
own son of tender years. The petition is
not even sufficient in substance to
warrant the writ. The assailed orders are
clearly void.
3. Contrary to the Court of Appeals
decision, the Sombong vs. CA case
supports rather than negates the position
of the petitioners.
4. Contrary to the Court of Appeals
decision, summary proceeding does
violence to the tender-years-rule
5. The Court of Appeals failed to
consider that the private respondent
failed to present prima facie proof of any
compelling reason of the unfitness of the
petitioner-mother;
6. The Court of Appeals failed to see
that the New Rules on Custody
SUFFICES AS REMEDY.[6]
Plainly put, the issue is: Did the Court of Appeals err when it
dismissed the petition for certiorari against the trial courts orders
dated January 23, 2003 and February 24, 2003?
Petitioners contend that the order is contrary to Article
213[7] of the Family Code, which provides that no child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise. They maintain that herein
respondent Loran had the burden of showing any compelling reason
but failed to present even a prima facie proof thereof.
Petitioners posit that even assuming that there were
compelling reasons, the proper remedy for private respondent was
simply an action for custody, but not habeas corpus. Petitioners
assert that habeas corpus is unavailable against the mother who,
under the law, has the right of custody of the minor. They insist there
was no illegal or involuntary restraint of the minor by his own
mother. There was no need for the mother to show cause and explain
the custody of her very own child.
Private respondent counters that petitioners argument
based on Article 213 of the Family Code applies only to the second
part of his petition regarding the custody of his son. It does not
address the first part, which pertains to his right as the father to see
his son. He asserts that the writ of habeas corpus is available against
any person who restrains the minors right to see his father and vice
versa. He avers that the instant petition is merely filed for delay, for
had petitioners really intended to bring the child before the court in
accordance with the new rules on custody of minors, they would have
done so on the dates specified in the January 23, 2003 and
the February 24, 2003 orders of the trial court.
Private respondent maintains that, under the law, he and
petitioner Marie Antonette have shared custody and parental authority
over their son. He alleges that at times when petitioner
Marie Antonette is out of the country as required of her job as an
international flight stewardess, he, the father, should have custody of
their son and not the maternal grandparents.
As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the
assailed January 23, 2003 Order of the trial court did not grant
custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed
petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why they are
restraining his liberty. The assailed order was an interlocutory order
precedent to the trial courts full inquiry into the issue of custody, which
was still pending before it.
Under Rule 41, Section 1[8] of the Rules of Court, an
interlocutory order is not appealable but the aggrieved party may file
an appropriate special action under Rule 65. The aggrieved party
must show that the court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
interlocutory order. In the present case, it is incumbent upon
105
Persons 4th Exam Cases

petitioners to show that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the order.

Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful

custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto. [9] Under Article
211[10] of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner
Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and
consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is
separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by
the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent,
both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the
present case, private respondents cause of action is the deprivation of
his right to see his child as alleged in his petition. [11] Hence, the
remedy of habeas corpus is available to him.

In a petition for habeas corpus, the childs welfare is the

supreme consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare
Code[12] unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the
care and custody, among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the
paramount consideration.[13]

Again, it bears stressing that the order did not grant custody
of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to
produce the minor in court and explain why private respondent is
prevented from seeing his child. This is in line with the directive in
Section 9[14] of A.M. 03-04-04-SC[15] that within fifteen days after the
filing of the answer or the expiration of the period to file answer, the
court shall issue an order requiring the respondent (herein petitioners)
to present the minor before the court. This was exactly what the court
did.

Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the

judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the
proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a
counter argument for private respondents petition for custody. But it is
not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in
the said provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child
under seven years of age.

In sum, the trial court did not err in issuing the orders
dated January 23, 2003 and February 24, 2003. Hence, the Court of
Appeals properly dismissed the petition for certiorari against the said
orders of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition
is DENIED. The Decision dated November 10, 2003 and the
Resolution dated March 19, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 75680 are AFFIRMED.Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

106
Persons 4th Exam Cases
AGNES GAMBOA-HIRSCH
Petitioner,
- versus -
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANKLIN HARVEY HIRSCH,
Respondents.
This is a petition for certiorari[1] under Rule 65 which seeks to set aside
the June 8, 2006 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 94329, which granted private respondent Franklin Harvey
Hirsch (Franklin) joint custody with petitioner Agnes Gamboa-Hirsch
(Agnes) of their minor daughter Simone Noelle Hirsch (Simone); and
the August 3, 2006 CA Resolution[3]denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit. Petitioner also prays for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order/injunction preventing the execution
and implementation of the assailed June 8, 2006 CA Decision.
Franklin and Agnes were married on December 23, 2000 in the City
of Bacolod, and established their conjugal dwelling in
Diniwid, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan. On December 21, 2002, a child
was born to them and was named Simone. In 2005, the couple started
to have marital problems as Agnes wanted to stay in Makati City,
while Franklin insisted that they stay in Boracay Island. On March 23,
2006, Agnes came to their conjugal home in Boracay, and asked for
money and for Franklins permission for her to bring their daughter
to Makati City for a brief vacation. Franklin readily agreed, but soon
thereafter discovered that neither Agnes nor their daughter Simone
would be coming back to Boracay.
Franklin then filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA for Agnes
to produce Simone in court. On May 19, 2006, the CA issued a
Resolution which ordered that a writ of habeas corpus be issued
ordering that Simone be brought before said court on May 26, 2006.
After a series of hearings and presentation of evidence, the CA,
on June 8, 2006, promulgated the assailed Decision
granting Franklin joint custody with Agnes of their minor child. Agnes
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision, which was denied
in the CAs August 3, 2006 Resolution for lack of merit.
Petitioner now comes before this Court praying that we set aside
the June 8, 2006 Decision and August 3, 2006 Resolution of the CA,
and that we issue a temporary restraining order/injunction on the
execution and implementation of the assailed rulings of the CA based
on the following grounds:
(A)
The Court of Appeals seriously erred and acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it ruled upon, granted,
and decided the matter of custody x x x during the
May 26, 2006 hearing conducted on the petition for
writ of habeas corpus in relation to and with custody
of a minor under A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC, C.A.-GR
SP. No. 94329, as no reception of evidence to
support said decision was had thereon, and the
honorable court merely based its decision on mere
conjectures and presumptions.
unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for her minor child. All told, no
(B) compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the
The Court of Appeals seriously erred and acted with mothers custody.
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it denied the motion for WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GIVEN
reconsideration filed by [petitioner Agnes] and only DUE COURSE. The June 8, 2006 Decision and August 3,
made addendums thereon appertaining to the 2006 Resolution of the CA are hereby SET ASIDE. Sole custody over
custody aspect in its Decision that the same is Simone Noelle Hirsch is hereby AWARDED to the mother, petitioner
deemed necessary for the protection of the interest Agnes Gamboa-Hirsch.
of the child and a mere temporary arrangement SO ORDERED.
while the case involving the herein parties are
pending before the Regional Trial Court x x x quite
contrary to its pronouncements during the May 26,
2006 hearing when the matter of custody was
insisted upon by [respondent Franklin].
(C)
The Court of Appeals seriously erred and acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it granted joint custody
in utter disregard of the provisions of the Family
Code, as to minors seven (7) years of age and
below, in relation to the jurisprudence and
pronouncements laid down by the Honorable
Supreme Court on the matter of the said provision. [4]
Acting on the petition, this Court issued its October 2,
2006 Resolution denying petitioners prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order. Petitioner then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of this Resolution, and on April 11, 2007, this Court
granted petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, issued a temporary
restraining order, and awarded the sole custody of the minor, Simone,
to petitioner.
This petition has merit.
The CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint
custody of the minor child to both parents.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that in all
actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child
shall be a primary consideration (emphasis supplied).[5] The Child
and Youth Welfare Code, in the same way, unequivocally provides that
in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the
child, his/her welfare shall be the paramount consideration. [6]
The so-called tender-age presumption under Article 213 of
the Family Code may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the
mothers unfitness. The mother is declared unsuitable to havecustody
of her children in one or more of the following instances: neglect,
abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction with a
communicable disease.[7] Here, the mother was not shown to be
107
Persons 4th Exam Cases
HERALD BLACK DACASIN,
Petitioner,
- versus -
SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN,
Respondent.
The Case
For review[1]is a dismissal[2]of a suit to enforce a post-foreign divorce child
custody agreement for lack of jurisdiction.
The Facts
Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent Sharon
Del Mundo Dacasin (respondent), Filipino, were married in Manila in April
1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie, born on 21 September 1995. In
June 1999, respondent sought and obtained from the Circuit Court,
19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree
against petitioner.[3] In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of
petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of
Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.
On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a
contract (Agreement[4]) for the joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose
Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the
Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order
relinquishing jurisdiction to Philippine courts.
In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 60 (trial court) to enforce the Agreement. Petitioner alleged that
in violation of the Agreement, respondent exercised sole custody over
Stephanie.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack
of jurisdiction because of the Illinois courts retention of jurisdiction to enforce
the divorce decree.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Order dated 1 March 2005, the trial court sustained respondents
motion and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court held
that: (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over the suit considering the
Illinois courts retention of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including
its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to respondent; (2) the divorce
decree is binding on petitioner following the nationality rule prevailing in this
jurisdiction;[5]and (3) the Agreement is void for contravening Article 2035,
paragraph 5 of the Civil Code[6]prohibiting compromise agreements
on jurisdiction.[7]
Petitioner sought reconsideration, raising the new argument that the divorce
decree obtained by respondent is void. Thus, the divorce decree is no bar
to the trial courts exercise of jurisdiction over the case.
In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the trial court denied reconsideration,
holding that unlike in the case of respondent, the divorce decree is binding
on petitioner under the laws of his nationality.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner submits the following alternative theories for the validity of the
Agreement to justify its enforcement by the trial court: (1) the Agreement
novated the valid divorce decree, modifying the terms of child custody from
sole (maternal) to joint;[8]or (2) the Agreement is independent of the divorce
decree obtained by respondent.
The Issue
The question is whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of
petitioners suit and enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties
child.
The Ruling of the Court
The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioners suit but not to enforce
the Agreement which is void. However, factual and equity considerations
militate against the dismissal of petitioners suit and call for the remand of
the case to settle the question of Stephanies custody.
Regional Trial Courts Vested With Jurisdiction
to Enforce Contracts
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time
petitioner filed his suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial
Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of
pecuniary estimation.[9]An action for specific performance, such as
petitioners suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to
this species of actions.[10]Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right
court.
Indeed, the trial courts refusal to entertain petitioners suit was
grounded not on its lack of power to do so but on its thinking that the Illinois
courts divorce decree stripped it of jurisdiction. This conclusion is
unfounded. What the Illinois court retained was jurisdiction x x x for the
purpose of enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of [its]
Judgment for Dissolution.[11]Petitioners suit seeks the enforcement not of
the various provisions of the divorce decree but of the post-divorce
Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of
the Illinois courts so-called retained jurisdiction.
Petitioners Suit Lacks Cause of Action
The foregoing notwithstanding, the trial court cannot enforce the Agreement
which is contrary to law.
In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to stipulate the
terms of agreement subject to the minimum ban on stipulations contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.[12]Otherwise, the
contract is denied legal existence, deemed inexistent and void from the
beginning.[13]For lack of relevant stipulation in the Agreement, these and
other ancillary Philippine substantive law serve as default parameters to
test the validity of the Agreements joint child custody stipulations.[14]
At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28 January 2002, two
facts are undisputed: (1) Stephanie was under seven years old (having
been born on 21 September 1995); and (2) petitioner and respondent were
no longer married under the laws of the United States because of the
divorce decree. The relevant Philippine law on child custody for spouses
separated in fact or in law[15] (under the second paragraph of Article 213 of
the Family Code) is also undisputed: no child under seven years of age shall
be separated from the mother x x x.[16] (This statutory awarding of sole
parental custody[17]to the mother is mandatory,[18]grounded on sound policy
consideration,[19]subject only to a narrow exception not alleged to obtain
here.[20]) Clearly then, the Agreements object to establish a post-divorce
joint custody regime between respondent and petitioner over their child
under seven years old contravenes Philippine law.
The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law,
it has also been repudiated by the mother when she refused to allow joint
custody by the father. The Agreement would be valid if the spouses have
not divorced or separated because the law provides for joint parental
authority when spouses live together.[21]However, upon separation of the
spouses, the mother takes sole custody under the law if the child is below
seven years old and any agreement to the contrary is void. Thus, the law
suspends the joint custody regime for (1) children under seven of (2)
separated or divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within this age
bracket (and for commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the
separated or divorced parents how best to take care of the child and that is
to give custody to the separated mother. Indeed, the separated parents
cannot contract away the provision in the Family Code on the maternal
custody of children below seven years anymore than they can privately
agree that a mother who is unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug
addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable disease will have sole
custody of a child under seven as these are reasons deemed compelling
to preclude the application of the exclusive maternal custody regime under
the second paragraph of Article 213.[22]
It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of Article 213 of
the Family Code applies only to judicial custodial agreements based on its
text that No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. To
limit this provisions enforceability to court sanctioned agreements while
placing private agreements beyond its reach is to sanction a double
standard in custody regulation of children under seven years old of
separated parents. This effectively empowers separated parents, by the
simple expedient of avoiding the courts, to subvert a legislative policy
vesting to the separated mother sole custody of her children under seven
years of age to avoid a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn
away from her.[23]This ignores the legislative basis that [n]o man can sound
the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. [24]
It could very well be that Article 213s bias favoring one separated
parent (mother) over the other (father) encourages paternal neglect,
presumes incapacity for joint parental custody, robs the parents of custodial
options, or hijacks decision-making between the separated
parents.[25]However, these are objections which question the laws wisdom
not its validity or uniform enforceability. The forum to air and remedy these
grievances is the legislature, not this Court. At any rate, the rules seeming
harshness or undesirability is tempered by ancillary agreements the
separated parents may wish to enter such as granting the father visitation
and other privileges. These arrangements are not inconsistent with the
regime of sole maternal custody under the second paragraph of Article 213
108
Persons 4th Exam Cases

which merely grants to the mother final authority on the care and custody
of the minor under seven years of age, in case of disagreements.
Further, the imposed custodial regime under the second paragraph of
Article 213 is limited in duration, lasting only until the childs seventh year.
From the eighth year until the childs emancipation, the law gives the
separated parents freedom, subject to the usual contractual limitations, to
agree on custody regimes they see fit to adopt. Lastly, even supposing that
petitioner and respondent are not barred from entering into the Agreement
for the joint custody of Stephanie, respondent repudiated the Agreement by
asserting sole custody over Stephanie. Respondents act effectively brought
the parties back to ambit of the default custodial regime in the second
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code vesting on respondent sole
custody of Stephanie.
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decrees alleged invalidity -
not because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce decree
violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino
spouse[26]- to support the Agreements enforceability. The argument that
foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is
hardly novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo[27]settled the matter by holding that an
alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained
abroad.[28]There, we dismissed the alien divorcees Philippine suit for
accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his
submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not
valid in this jurisdiction in this wise:
We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera[29]to dismiss criminal
complaints for adultery filed by the alien divorcee (who obtained the foreign
divorce decree) against his former Filipino spouse because he no longer
qualified as offended spouse entitled to file the complaints under Philippine
procedural rules. Thus, it should be clear by now that a foreign divorce
decree carries as much validity against the alien divorcee in this
jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the aliens nationality, irrespective
of who obtained the divorce.
The Facts of the Case and Nature of Proceeding
Justify Remand
Instead of ordering the dismissal of petitioners suit, the logical end to its lack
of cause of action, we remand the case for the trial court to settle the
question of Stephanies custody. Stephanie is now nearly 15 years old, thus
removing the case outside of the ambit of the mandatory maternal custody
regime under Article 213 and bringing it within coverage of the default
standard on child custody proceedings the best interest of the child. [30]As
the question of custody is already before the trial court and the childs
parents, by executing the Agreement, initially showed inclination to share
custody, it is in the interest of swift and efficient rendition of justice to allow
the parties to take advantage of the courts jurisdiction, submit evidence on
the custodial arrangement best serving Stephanies interest, and let the trial
court render judgment. This disposition is consistent with the settled
doctrine that in child custody proceedings, equity may be invoked to serve
the childs best interest.[31]

There can be no question as to the WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Orders dated 1 March 2005 and 23 June
validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60. The case
of the United States. The decree is binding on is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this ruling.
private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as SO ORDERED.
her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is
contending in this case is that the divorce is not
valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same
being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the

Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada
released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

xxxx

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the

husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below
as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As
he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate,
he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting
his right over the alleged conjugal property. (Emphasis supplied)

109
Persons 4th Exam Cases
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS (Twentieth Division), HON.
PRESIDING JUDGE FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, RTC-BR.
35 and APOLINARIA MALINAO JOMOC, respondents.
In In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee
Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc, Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc, petitioner, the
Ormoc City, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, by Order of September
29, 1999,[1] granted the petition on the basis of the Commissioners
Report[2] and accordingly declared the absentee spouse, who had left
his petitioner-wife nine years earlier, presumptively dead.
In granting the petition, the trial judge, Judge Fortunito L.
Madrona, cited Article 41, par. 2 of the Family Code. Said article
provides that for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a previous marriage where the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse present
must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the
effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought
to appeal the trial courts order by filing a Notice of Appeal. [3]
By Order of November 22, 1999s,[4] the trial court, noting that no
record of appeal was filed and served as required by and pursuant to
Sec. 2(a), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the present
case being a special proceeding, disapproved the Notice of Appeal.
The Republics Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts order
of disapproval having been denied by Order of January 13, 2000,[5] it
filed a Petition for Certiorari[6] before the Court of Appeals, it contending
that the declaration of presumptive death of a person under Article 41
of the Family Code is not a special proceeding or a case of multiple or
separate appeals requiring a record on appeal.
By Decision of May 5, 2004,[7] the Court of Appeals denied the
Republics petition on procedural and substantive grounds in this wise:
At the outset, it must be stressed that the petition is not sufficient in
form. It failed to attach to its petition a certified true copy of the assailed
Order dated January 13, 2000 [denying its Motion for Reconsideration
of the November 22, 1999 Order disapproving its Notice of Appeal].
Moreover, the petition questioned the [trial courts] Order dated August
15, 1999, which declared Clemente Jomoc presumptively dead,
likewise for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, yet, not even a copy could be found in
the records. On this score alone, the petition should have been
dismissed outright in accordance with Sec. 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of
Court.
However, despite the procedural lapses, the Court resolves to delve
deeper into the substantive issue of the validity/nullity of the assailed
order.
The principal issue in this case is whether a petition for
declaration of the presumptive death of a person is in the nature
of a special proceeding. If it is, the period to appeal is 30 days and
the party appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the
trial court a record on appeal to perfect its appeal. Otherwise, if the
petition is an ordinary action, the period to appeal is 15 days from notice
or decision or final order appealed from and the appeal is perfected by
filing a notice of appeal (Section 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court).
As defined in Section 3(a), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, a civil action is
one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of
a right, or the prevention of redress of a wrong while a special
proceeding under Section 3(c) of the same rule is defined as a remedy
by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular
fact (Heirs of Yaptinchay, et al. v. Del Rosario, et al., G.R. No. 124320,
March 2, 1999).
Considering the aforementioned distinction, this Court finds that the
instant petition is in the nature of a special proceeding and not an
ordinary action. The petition merely seeks for a declaration by the trial
court of the presumptive death of absentee spouse Clemente Jomoc.
It does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the
prevention or redress of a wrong. Neither does it involve a demand of
right or a cause of action that can be enforced against any person.
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the subject Order dated
January 13, 2000 denying OSGs Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order dated November 22, 1999 disapproving its Notice of Appeal was
correctly issued. The instant petition, being in the nature of a
special proceeding, OSG should have filed, in addition to its
Notice of Appeal, a record on appeal in accordance with Section 19
of the Interim Rules and Guidelines to Implement BP Blg. 129 and
Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court . . . (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The Republic (petitioner) insists that the declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not a special
proceeding involving multiple or separate appeals where a record on
appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
Petitioner cites Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court which
enumerates the cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed and a
record on appeal is required for an appeal to be perfected. The petition
for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse not being
included in the enumeration, petitioner contends that a mere notice of
appeal suffices.
By Resolution of December 15, 2004,[8] this Court, noting that
copy of the September 27, 2004 Resolution[9] requiring respondent to
file her comment on the petition was returned unserved with
postmasters notation Party refused, Resolved to consider that copy
deemed served upon her.
The pertinent provisions on the General Provisions on Special
Proceedings, Part II of the Revised Rules of Court entitled SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS, read:
RULE 72
SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY
OF GENERAL RULES
Section 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. Rules of special
proceedings are provided for in the following:
(a) Settlement of estate of deceased persons;
(b) Escheat;
(c) Guardianship and custody of children;
(d) Trustees;
(e) Adoption;
(f) Rescission and revocation of adoption;
(g) Hospitalization of insane persons;
(h) Habeas corpus;
(i) Change of name;
(j) Voluntary dissolution of corporations;
(k) Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor
natural children;
(l) Constitution of family home;
(m) Declaration of absence and death;
(n) Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. In the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable in special proceedings. (Underscoring supplied)
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code on presumption of death
provides:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or
not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all
purposes, except for those of succession.
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Upon the other hand, Article 41 of the Family Code, upon which
the trial court anchored its grant of the petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse, provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of
a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouses had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-
founded belief that the absent spouses was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence
of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose pf contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouses present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a
reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, on Modes of
Appeal, invoked by the trial court in disapproving petitioners Notice of
Appeal, provides:
Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. -
(a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving
a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be
required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple
or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In
such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like
manner. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
xxx
By the trial courts citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is
gathered that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent
spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her desire to
contract a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that
110
Persons 4th Exam Cases

purpose is a summary proceeding, following above-quoted Art. 41,

paragraph 2 of the Family Code.
Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW, contains the following
provision, inter alia:
xxx
Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules
in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Codes
requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be
decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical
rules. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
x x x,
there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is,
therefore, a summary proceeding under the Family Code, not a special
proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls for
the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary
proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial courts order
sufficed.
That the Family Code provision on repeal, Art. 254, provides as
follows:
Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I of Republic
Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as
amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and 42
of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, as amended, and all laws, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations rules and regulations, or parts
thereof, inconsistent therewith are hereby repealed, (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied),
seals the case in petitioners favor.
Finally, on the alleged procedural flaw in petitioners petition
before the appellate court. Petitioners failure to attach to his petition
before the appellate court a copy of the trial courts order denying its
motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of its Notice of Appeal is
not necessarily fatal, for the rules of procedure are not to be applied in
a technical sense. Given the issue raised before it by petitioner, what
the appellate court should have done was to direct petitioner to comply
with the rule.
As for petitioners failure to submit copy of the trial courts order
granting the petition for declaration of presumptive death, contrary to
the appellate courts observation that petitioner was also assailing it,
petitioners 8-page petition[10] filed in said court does not so reflect, it
merely having assailed the order disapproving the Notice of Appeal.
WHEREFORE, the assailed May 5, 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be
REMANDED to it for appropriate action in light of the foregoing
discussion.
SO ORDERED.

111
Persons 4th Exam Cases
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. GLORIA BERMUDEZ-
LORINO, respondent.
Via this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), seeks the reversal and setting aside of the decision
dated September 23, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73884,
which affirmed on appeal an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at
San Mateo, Rizal in a summary judicial proceeding thereat commenced by the
herein respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino for the declaration of the presumptive
death of her absent spouse, Francisco Lorino, Jr., based on the provisions of
Article 41 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage.
The facts may be summarized, as follows:
Respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino (Gloria for brevity), and her husband
were married on June 12, 1987. Out of this marriage, she begot three (3)
children, namely: Francis Jeno, Fria Lou and Fatima.
Before they got married in 1987, Gloria was unaware that her husband
was a habitual drinker, possessed with violent character/attitude, and had the
propensity to go out with friends to the extent of being unable to engage in any
gainful work.
Because of her husbands violent character, Gloria found it safer to leave
him behind and decided to go back to her parents together with her three (3)
children. In order to support the children, Gloria was compelled to work abroad.
From the time of her physical separation from her husband in 1991, Gloria
has not heard of him at all. She had absolutely no communications with him, or
with any of his relatives.
On August 14, 2000, nine (9) years after she left her husband, Gloria filed
a verified petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at San Mateo, Rizal under
the rules on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law provided for in the
Family Code, which petition was docketed in the same court as Special
Proceeding No. 325-00 SM.
On August 28, 2000, the RTC issued an order directing, inter alia, the
publication of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation, thus:
A verified petition was filed by herein petitioner through counsel alleging that she
married Francisco Lorino, Jr. on June 12, 1987 but because of the violent
character of his husband, she decided to go back to her parents and lived
separately from her husband. After nine (9) years, there was absolutely no news
about him and she believes that he is already dead and is now seeking through
this petition for a Court declaration that her husband is judicially presumed dead
for the purpose of remarriage.
Finding the said petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the same is
hereby set for hearing before this Court on September 18, 2000 at 8:30 oclock
in the morning at which place, date and time, any or all persons who may claim
any interest thereto may appear and show cause why the same should not be
granted.
Let a copy of this Order be published in a newspaper of general circulation in this
province once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks and be posted in the
bulletin boards of the Hall of Justice and the Municipal Hall, San Mateo, Rizal, all
at the expense of the petitioner.
Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General a copy of this Order together with a
copy of the petition. Further, send a copy of this Order to the last known address
of Francisco Lorino, Jr. at 719 Burgos St., Sta. Elena, Marikina City.
SO ORDERED[1]
The evidence in support of the summary judicial proceeding are: the order
of publication dated August 28, 2000 (Exhibit A); affidavit of publication dated
September 16, 2000 (Exhibit B)[2]; copies of the newspapers where the order
appeared (Exhibits C to E-1)[3]; a deposition dated September 4, 2000 of Gloria
taken in Hong Kong (Exhibit G)[4]; Glorias affidavit dated October 21, 1999, also
executed in Hong Kong (Exhibit G-1)[5]; and a certification by Department of
Foreign Affairs Authentication Officer, Catalina C. Gonzalez, dated November 3,
1999, therein certifying that the signature of Vice Consul Adriane Bernie C.
Candolada, appearing below the jurat in Glorias affidavit of October 21, 1999, is
authentic (Exhibit G-2)[6].
In a decision dated November 7, 2001, the RTC, finding merit in the
summary petition, rendered judgment granting the same, to wit:
WHEREFORE, this Court in view of the facts and circumstances obtaining, finds
the petition with merit and hereby grants its imprimatur to the petition. Judgment
is hereby rendered declaring the presumptive death/absence of Francisco
Lorino, Jr. pursuant to Art. 41 of the New Family Code but subject to all
restrictions and conditions provided therein.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Despite the judgment being immediately final and executory under the
provisions of Article 247 of the Family Code, thus:
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory,
the Office of the Solicitor General, for the Republic of the Philippines,
nevertheless filed a Notice of Appeal.[8] Acting thereon, the RTC had the records
elevated to the Court of Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No.
73884.
In a decision dated September 23, 2003, the Court of Appeals, treating
the case as an ordinary appealed case under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules on
Civil Procedure, denied the Republics appeal and accordingly affirmed the
appealed RTC decision:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is DENIED.
Accordingly, the appealed November 7, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of San Mateo, Rizal in Spec. Proc. No. 325-00 SM is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Without filing any motion for reconsideration, petitioner Republic directly
went to this Court via the instant recourse under Rule 45, maintaining that the
petition raises a pure question of law that does not require prior filing of a motion
for reconsideration.
The foregoing factual antecedents present to this Court the following
issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS DULY ACQUIRED
JURISDICTION OVER THE APPEAL ON A FINAL AND EXECUTORY
JUDGMENT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT; and
WHETHER OR NOT THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASES FOR A
JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH UNDER
ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE WERE DULY ESTABLISHED IN
THIS CASE.
The Court rules against petitioner Republic.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, sets the tenor for cases covered by
these rules, to wit:
Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title
shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court
proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without
regard to technical rules.
Judge Elizabeth Balquin-Reyes of RTC, Branch 75, San Mateo, Rizal duly
complied with the above-cited provision by expeditiously rendering judgment
within ninety (90) days after the formal offer of evidence by therein petitioner,
Gloria Bermudez-Lorino.
The problem came about when the judge gave due course to the
Republics appeal upon the filing of a Notice of Appeal, and had the entire records
of the case elevated to the Court of Appeals, stating in her order of December
18, 2001, as follows:
Notice of Appeal having been filed through registered mail on November 22,
2001 by the Office of the Solicitor General who received a copy of the Decision
in this case on November 14, 2001, within the reglementary period fixed by the
Rules, let the entire records of this case be transmitted to the Court of Appeals
for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.[10]
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no
reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because
judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family
Code, supra, are immediately final and executory. It was erroneous, therefore,
on the part of the RTC to give due course to the Republics appeal and order the
transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by
express provision of law, is immediately final and executory. As we have said in
Veloria vs. Comelec,[11] the right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of
due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege. Since, by express mandate of
Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial
proceedings in Family Law are immediately final and executory, the right to
appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein. The Republic of the
Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive death,
should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of
November 7, 2001.
It was fortunate, though, that the Court of Appeals, acting through its
Special Fourth Division, with Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion as Acting Chairman
and ponente, denied the Republics appeal and affirmed without modification the
final and executory judgment of the lower court. For, as we have held in Nacuray
vs. NLRC:[12]
Nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and
executory it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and whether made by
the highest court of the land (citing Nunal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94005,
6 April 1993, 221 SCRA 26).
But, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the
bench and the bar, let it be stated that the RTCs decision dated November 7,
2001, was immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was
erroneous for the OSG to file a notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due
course thereto. The Court of Appeals acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and
should have dismissed the appeal outright on that ground.
This judgment of denial was elevated to this Court via a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. Although the result of the Court of Appeals denial of
the appeal would apparently be the same, there is a big difference between
having the supposed appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by virtue of the fact
that the RTC decision sought to be appealed is immediately final and executory,
and the denial of the appeal for lack of merit. In the former, the supposed
appellee can immediately ask for the issuance of an Entry of Judgment in the
RTC, whereas, in the latter, the appellant can still raise the matter to this Court
on petition for review and the RTC judgment cannot be executed until this Court
makes the final pronouncement.
The Court, therefore, finds in this case grave error on the part of both the
RTC and the Court of Appeals. To stress, the Court of Appeals should have
dismissed the appeal on ground of lack of jurisdiction, and reiterated the fact that
the RTC decision of November 7, 2001 was immediately final and executory. As
it were, the Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error when it failed to
dismiss the erroneous appeal of the Republic on ground of lack of jurisdiction
because, by express provision of law, the judgment was not appealable.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
112
Persons 4th Exam Cases
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
- versus -
FERVENTINO U. TANGO,
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision[1] dated November 28, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
76387 which denied the Republics appeal from the Order[2]dated July 23,
2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ligao City, Branch 11 in Special
Proceeding No. 357. The trial court had declared the wife of respondent
Ferventino U. Tango (Ferventino), Maria Jose Villarba (Maria), presumptively
dead under Article 41[3] of the Family Code.
The present controversy arose from the following facts:
On March 9, 1987, Ferventino and Maria were married[4] in civil rites
before then Mayor Ignacio Bunye of Muntinlupa City. None of Marias relatives
witnessed the ceremony as they were opposed to her relationship with
Ferventino. The two had only spent a night together and had been intimate once when
Maria told Ferventino that she and her family will soon be leaving for the United States
of America (USA). Maria assured Ferventino, however, that she will file a petition so
he can live with her in the USA. In the event that said petition is denied, she promised
to return to the Philippines to live with him. On March 13, 1987, Maria and her family
flew to Seattle, USA.
Ferventino alleges that Maria kept in touch for a year before she
stopped responding to his letters. Out of resentment, he burned all the letters
Maria wrote him. He claims to have forgotten her address since.
Ferventino recounts the efforts he made to find Maria. Upon inquiry
from the latters uncle, Antonio Ledesma, in Las Pias, Ferventino learned that
even Marias relatives were unaware of her whereabouts. He also solicited the
assistance of a friend in Texas, Capt. Luis Aris of the U.S. Air Force, but to no
avail. Finally, he sought the aid of his parents Antonio and Eusebia in Los
Angeles, and his aunt Anita Castro-Mayor in Seattle. Like, Ledesma though,
their attempts to find Maria proved fruitless. The next 14 years went by without
any news of Maria.
On the belief that his wife had died, Ferventino filed a verified
petition[5] dated October 1, 2001 before the Ligao City RTC for the declaration of
presumptive death of Maria within the contemplation of Article 41 of the Family
Code.
When the case was called for initial hearing on January 8, 2002,
nobody entered any opposition. On July 22, 2002, Ferventino presented
evidence ex parte and testified in court about the details of his search. On July
23, 2002, Branch 11 of the Ligao City RTC issued an Order, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered,
declaring MARIA JOSE V. VILLARBA, wife of
FERVENTINO U. TANGO, presumptively dead within the
meaning of Article 41 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED. [6]
This prompted the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the
Republic, to file a Notice of Appeal.[7] Acting thereon, Presiding Judge Romulo
SG. Villanueva of the Ligao City RTC had the records of the case transmitted to
the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, treating the case as an ordinary appealed case
under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, affirmed the RTCs Order. It held that Marias
absence for 14 years without information about her location despite diligent
search by Ferventino was sufficient to support a well-founded belief of her
death. The appellate court observed that neither the OSG nor the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor objected to the evidence which Ferventino presented on
trial. It noted, in particular, that the OSG did not dispute the adequacy of
Ferventinos basis to engender a well-founded belief that Maria is dead. Hence,
in a Decision dated November 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals denied the
Republics appeal in this tenor:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED.
Accordingly, the July 23, 2002 Order of
the Regional Trial Court of Ligao City, Branch 11 in Spec.
Proc. No. 357 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Before us, petitioner anchors this petition for review on certiorari on
the following two grounds:
I.
THE TESTIMONY OF RESPONDENT ON THE ALLEGED
EFFORTS MADE BY HIS FRIEND AND RELATIVES IN
LOCATING HIS MISSING WIFE IN SEATTLE, UNITED
STATES, IS HEARSAY AND DEVOID OF PROBATIVE
VALUE[; AND]
II.
EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE AFORESAID TESTIMONY
MAY BE CONSIDERED IN EVIDENCE, THE ALLEGED
EFFORTS OF RESPONDENTS FRIEND AND
RELATIVES IN LOCATING HIS MISSING WIFE IN
SEATTLE, UNITED STATES, DO NOT SUFFICIENTLY
SUPPORT A WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF THAT
RESPONDENTS ABSENT SPOUSE IS PROBABLY
DEAD.[9]
Unadorned, the issues for our determination are: (1) whether the
testimony of respondent Ferventino is hearsay; and (2) whether respondent
Ferventino has established a basis to form a well-founded belief that his absent
spouse is already dead.
The Republic, through the OSG, contests the appellate courts holding
that the absence of respondents wife Maria for 14 years provides sufficient basis
to entertain a well-founded belief that she is dead. The OSG discounts
respondents testimony, on the steps he took to find Maria, as hearsay because
none of the persons who purportedly helped in his search testified in
court. Notably, the OSG observes that only Capt. Aris gave a detailed account
of his efforts to track down Maria. According to Capt. Aris, he went over
the Seattle phone directory for Marias name and inquired about her from the
registrars office in Seattle, but both efforts proved to be in vain.
The OSG belittles its failure to object to the admissibility of
respondents testimony during trial. Instead, it invokes Constitutional provisions
that advocate the state policy of preserving marital institutions.
On March 16, 2007, respondents counsel, Atty. Richie R. Regala,
manifested to this Court his intent to withdraw as counsel for
respondent. According to Atty. Regala, he received a letter by which respondent
expressed a desire to withdraw from the proceeding.[10] In view of this, the Court
issued a Resolution[11] on April 21, 2008 which deemed as waived the filing of
respondents comment on the petition. Previously, the Court of Appeals had also
issued a Resolution[12] dated October 15, 2003 submitting the case for decision
and ordering its re-raffling for respondents failure to file an appellees brief. In
other words, apart from the verified petition for the declaration of presumptive
death of Maria dated October 1, 2001, which respondent filed before the Ligao
City RTC, he has not submitted any other pleading in connection with the petition.
Respondents apparent lack of desire to pursue the proceedings
notwithstanding, the Court is inclined to rule against the Republic.
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal
of judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code and
accordingly, refine our previous decisions thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern
summary court proceedings in the Family Code:
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court,
the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases
provided for in this Code requiring summary court
proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an
expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by
the rules in chapters two and three of the same title. It states:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in
Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary
proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124
and 217, insofar as they are applicable. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
ART 247. The judgment of the court shall be
immediately final and executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary
proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it
follows that no appeal can be had of the trial courts judgment in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under
Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved
party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in
accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Courts
original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the
Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.[13] From the decision of the Court of
Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which
the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment
which are the proper subject of an appeal.[14]
In the case before us, petitioner committed a serious procedural lapse
when it filed a notice of appeal in the Court of Appeals instead of a petition
for certiorari. The RTC equally erred in giving due course to said appeal and
ordering the transmittal of the records of the case to the appellate court. By no
means did the Court of Appeals acquire jurisdiction to review the judgment of the
RTC which, by express provision of law, was immediately final and executory.
Adding to the confusion, the Court of Appeals entertained the appeal
and treated the same as an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court. As it were, the Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error when it
failed to dismiss the erroneous appeal of the Republic on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction because, by express provision of the law, the judgment was not
appealable.[15]
Before us, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. But, even if petitioner used the correct mode of appeal
at this level, the hands of the Court are tied. Without a doubt, the decision of the
trial court had long become final.
Deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence is the principle that a decision that
has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. As such, it may no longer
be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or
by the highest court of the land.[16] In light of the foregoing, it would be unnecessary,
if not useless, to discuss the issues raised by petitioner.
The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental
principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error,
the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become
final on some definite date fixed by law. The only exceptions to the general rule
are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which
cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances
transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution unjust and
inequitable.[17] None of the exceptions obtains here to merit the review sought.
WHEREFORE the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
113
Persons 4th Exam Cases
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and CYNTHIA VICENCIO, respondents.
This is an appeal interposed by the Republic of the Philippines as
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), assailing the
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals promulgated on April 28, 1989, which
affirmed the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52,
dated, August 31, 1987. The appealed decision granted private respondent
Cynthia Vicencios petition for change of surname, from Vicencio to Yu.
As found by the trial court, hereunder are the facts and circumstances
of the case:
Petitioners evidence is to the effect that she was born on 19 January 1971
at the Capitol Medical Center, Quezon City, to the spouses Pablo Castro
Vicencio and Fe Esperanza de Vega Leabres (Exh. C, also marked Annex
A of Petition); that on 10 January 1972, after a marital spat, Pablo Vicencio
left their conjugal abode then situated at Meycauayan, Bulacan; that since
then Pablo Vicencio never reappeared nor sent support to his family and it
was Ernesto Yu who had come to the aid of Fe Esperanza Labres (sic) and
her children; that on 29 June 1976, Fe Esperanza Leabres filed a petition in
the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila for dissolution of
their conjugal partnership, Civil Case No. E-02009, which was granted in a
decision rendered by the Hon. Regina C. Ordoez Benitez on 11 July 1977
(Exhs. D, D-1 to D-3); that sometime in 1983, petitioners mother filed
another petition for change of name, Sp. Proc. No. 83-16346, that is to drop
the surname of her husband therefrom, and after hearing a decision was
rendered on 5 July 1983 by the Hon. Emeterio C. Cui of Branch XXV of this
Court approving the petition (Exh. E); that in 1984, petitioners mother again
filed another petition with this Court, Sp. Proc. No. 84-22605, for the
declaration of Pablo Vicencio as an absentee, and which petition was
granted on 26 April 1984 in a decision rendered by the Hon. Corona Ibay-
Somera (Exh. F & F-1); that on 15 April 1986, petitioners mother and
Ernesto Yu were joined in matrimony in a ceremony solemnized by Mayor
Benjamin S. Abalos of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila (Exh. G).
It was also established that evern (sic) since her childhood, petitioner had
not known much less remembered her real father Pablo Vicencio, and her
known father had been and still is Ernesto Yu; that despite of which she had
been using the family name Vicencio in her school and other related
activities therein; that in view of such situation, confusion arose as to her
parentage and she had been subjected to inquiries why she is using
Vicencio as her family name, both by her classmates and their neighbors,
causing her extreme embarrassment; that on two (2) occassions when she
ran as a beauty contestant in a Lions Club affair and in a Manila Red Cross
pageant, her name was entered as Cynthia L. Yu; that her step-father had
been priorly consulted about this petition and had given his consent thereto;
that in fact Ernesto Yu testified for petitioner and confirmed his consent to
the petition as he had always treated petitioner as his own daughter ever
since.[3]
At the hearing of the petition for change of name by the trial court, the
OSG manifested that it was opposing the petition. It participated in the
proceedings by cross-examining the private respondent Cynthia Vicencio,
(petitioner a quo) and her witnesses.
Disregarding the OSGs contention, the trial court ruled that there is
no valid cause for denying the petition. Further, the trial court stated that it
could not compel private respondents step-father to adopt her, as adoption
is a voluntary act; but failure to resort to adoption should not be a cause for
disallowing private respondent to legally change her name. [4] Hence, it
granted the change of surname of private respondent from Vicencio to Yu.
The decision of the trial court was affirmed by the appellate court,
which held that it is for the best interest of petitioner that her surname be
changed. The appellate court took into account the testimonies of private
respondent and her witnesses that allowing the change of surname would
give her an opportunity to improve her personality and welfare.[5] It likewise
noted that the discrepancy between her original surname, taken from her
biological father; and the surname of her step-father, who has been socially
recognized as her father, caused her embarrassment and inferiority
complex.[6]
The main issue before us is whether the appellate court erred in
affirming the trial courts decision allowing the change of private respondents
surname to that of her step-fathers surname.
In Republic vs. Hernandez[7], we have recognized inter alia, the
following as sufficient grounds to warrant a change of name: (a) when the
name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(b) when the change is a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c)
when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used
and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of
alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt
a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name
was for a fraudulent purpose, or that the change of name would prejudice
public interest.
Private respondent asserts that her case falls under one of the
justifiable grounds aforecited. She says that confusion has arisen as to her
parentage because ever since childhood, Ernesto Yu has acted as her
father, assuming duties of rearing, caring and supporting her. Since she is
known in society as the daughter of Ernesto Yu, she claims that she has
been subjected to inquiries regarding her use of a different
surname, causing her much humiliation and embarrassment. However, it is
not denied that private respondent has used Vicencio as her surname in her
school records and related documents. But she had used the surname of
her step-father, Yu, when she participated in public functions, such as
entering beauty contests, namely, with the Lions Club and the Manila Red
Cross, and when she celebrated her debut at the Manila Hotel.[8]
The Solicitor General however argues that there is no proper and
reasonable cause to warrant private respondents change of surname. Such
change might even cause confusion and give rise to legal complications due
to the fact that private respondents step-father has two (2) children with her
mother. In the event of her step-fathers death, it is possible that private
respondent may even claim inheritance rights as a legitimate daughter. In
his memorandum, the Solicitor General, opines that Ernesto Yu has no
intention of making Cynthia as an heir because despite the suggestion
made before the petition for change of name was heard by the trial court
that the change of family name to Yu could very easily be achieved by
adoption, he has not opted for such a remedy.[9]
We find merit in the Solicitor Generals contention.
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there
be proper and reasonable cause for which the change is
sought.[10] The assailed decision as affirmed by the appellate court does not
persuade us to depart from the applicability of the general rule on the use
of surnames[11], specifically the law which requires that legitimate children
shall principally use the surname of their father[12].
Private respondent Cynthia Vicencio is the legitimate offspring of Fe
Leabres and Pablo Vicencio. As previously stated, a legitimate child
generally bears the surname of his or her father. It must be stressed that a
change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound
discretion of the court, which has the duty to consider carefully the
consequences of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty
reasons are shown.[13]
Confusion indeed might arise with regard to private respondents
parentage because of her surname. But even, more confusion with grave
legal consequences could arise if we allow private respondent to bear her
step-fathers surname, even if she is not legally adopted by him. While
previous decisions have allowed children to bear the surname of their
respective step-fathers even without the benefit of adoption, these
instances should be distinguished from the present case. In Calderon vs.
Republic,[14] and Llaneta vs. Agrava,[15] this Court allowed the concerned
child to adopt the surname of the step-father, but unlike the situation in the
present case where private respondent is a legitimate child, in those cases
the children were not of legitimate parentage. In Moore vs.
Republic,[16] where the circumstances appears to be similar to the present
case before us, the Court upheld the Republics position:
We find tenable this observation of governments counsel. Indeed, if a child
born out of a lawful wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the second
husband of the mother, should the first husband die or be separated by a
decree of divorce, there may result a confusion as to his real paternity. In
the long run the change may redound to the prejudice of the child in the
community.
While the purpose which may have animated petitioner is plausible and may
run along the feeling of cordiality and spiritual relationship that pervades
among the members of the Moore family, our hand is deferred by a legal
barrier which we cannot at present overlook or brush aside. [17]
Similarly in Padilla vs. Republic,[18] the Court ruled that:
To allow said minors to adopt the surname of their mothers second
husband, who is not their father, could result in confusion in their paternity. It
could also create the suspicion that said minors, who were born during the
coverture of their mother with her first husband, were in fact sired by Edward
Padilla, thus bringing their legitimate status into discredit.[19]
Private respondent, might sincerely wish to be in a position similar to
that of her step-fathers legitimate children, a plausible reason the petition
for change of name was filed in the first place. Moreover, it is laudable that
Ernesto Yu has treated Cynthia as his very own daughter, providing for all
her needs as a father would his own flesh and blood. However, legal
constraints lead us to reject private respondents desire to use her
stepfathers surname. Further, there is no assurance the end result would
not be even more detrimental to her person, for instead of bringing a stop
to questions, the very change of name, if granted, could trigger much
deeper inquiries regarding her parentage.
Lastly, when this case was decided by the appellate court, private
respondent was already 18 years old but still considered a minor
because Republic Act 6809,[20] lowering the age of majority, was then in
effect. However, regardless of private respondents age, our conclusion
remains considering the circumstances before us and the lack of any legally
justifiable cause for allowing the change of her surname.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the instant petition is
hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR
CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF
JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN WANG,
to be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG,
duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG, petitioner,
vs. CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar
OSCAR B. MOLO, respondent.
I will not blot out his name out of the book of life.
Revelation 3:5
On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a
minor, represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19
September 2002 for change of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry
in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop
his middle name and have his registered name changed from Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.
The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 11458
CEB and raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57.
The RTC established the following facts:
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to
parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet
married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married on
September 22, 1998, ...they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so
that the childs name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang.
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a
long time because they will let him study there together with his sister
named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore. Since in Singapore
middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a
persons name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be
discriminated against because of his current registered name which carries
a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they are
brother and sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds
funny in Singapores Mandarin language since they do not have the letter R
but if there is, they pronounce it as L. It is for these reasons that the name
of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin
Wang.[1]
On 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision denying the
petition.[2] The trial court found that the reason given for the change of name
sought in the petitionthat is, that petitioner Julian may be discriminated
against when studies in Singapore because of his middle namedid not fall
within the grounds recognized by law. The trial court ruled that the change
sought is merely for the convenience of the child. Since the State has an
interest in the name of a person, names cannot be changed to suit the
convenience of the bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code,
legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the
mother, and there is no reason why this right should now be taken from
petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a minor. The trial court added
that when petitioner Julian reaches the age of majority, he could then decide
whether he will change his name by dropping his middle name.[3]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this
was denied in a resolution dated 20 May 2004.[4] The trial court maintained
that the Singaporean practice of not carrying a middle name does not justify
the dropping of the middle name of a legitimate Filipino child who intends to
study there. The dropping of the middle name would be tantamount to giving
due recognition to or application of the laws of Singapore instead of
Philippine law which is controlling. That the change of name would not
prejudice public interest or would not be for a fraudulent purpose would not
suffice to grant the petition if the reason for the change of name is itself not
reasonable.[5]
Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule
45)[6] arguing that the trial court has decided a question of substance not
theretofore determined by the Court, that is: whether or not dropping the
middle name of a minor child is contrary to Article 174[7] of the Family Code.
Petitioner contends that [W]ith globalization and mixed marriages, there is
a need for the Supreme Court to rule on the matter of dropping of family
name for a child to adjust to his new environment, for consistency and
harmony among siblings, taking into consideration the best interest of the
child.[8] It is argued that convenience of the child is a valid reason for
changing the name as long as it will not prejudice the State and others.
Petitioner points out that the middle name Carulasan will cause him undue
embarrassment and the difficulty in writing or pronouncing it will be an
obstacle to his social acceptance and integration in the Singaporean
community. Petitioner also alleges that it is error for the trial court to have
denied the petition for change of name until he had reached the age of
majority for him to decide the name to use, contrary to previous
cases[9] decided by this Court that allowed a minor to petition for change of
name.[10]
The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to
comment on the petition. The OSG filed its Comment[11] positing that the
trial court correctly denied the petition for change of name. The OSG argues
that under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right
to bear the surnames of their father and mother, and such right cannot be
denied by the mere expedient of dropping the same. According to the OSG,
there is also no showing that the dropping of the middle name Carulasan is
in the best interest of petitioner, since mere convenience is not sufficient to
support a petition for change of name and/or cancellation of entry.[12] The
OSG also adds that the petitioner has not shown any compelling reason to
justify the change of name or the dropping of the middle name, for that
matter. Petitioners allegation that the continued use of the middle name may
result in confusion and difficulty is allegedly more imaginary than real. The
OSG reiterates its argument raised before the trial court that the dropping
of the childs middle name could only trigger much deeper inquiries
regarding the true parentage of petitioner. Hence, while petitioner Julian has
a sister named Jasmine Wei Wang, there is no confusion since both use
the surname of their father, Wang. Even assuming that it is customary in
Singapore to drop the middle name, it has also not been shown that the use
of such middle name is actually proscribed by Singaporean law.[13]
We affirm the decision of the trial court. The petition should be denied.
The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has
an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so
that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either
in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable
cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise,
the request should be denied.[14]
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be
proper and reasonable cause for which the change is sought.[15] To justify a
request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or
compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use
of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which
have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a
legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid
confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage,
all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname
causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of
name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest.[16]
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of
proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The
evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the
best evidence available. What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance
or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency
and propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the
consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for
making such determination being lodged in the courts.[17]
The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as
it does not simply seek to change the name of the minor petitioner and adopt
another, but instead seeks to drop the middle name altogether. Decided
cases in this jurisdiction involving petitions for change of name usually deal
with requests for change of surname. There are only a handful of cases
involving requests for change of the given name[18] and none on requests
for changing or dropping of the middle name. Does the law allow one to
drop the middle name from his registered name? We have to answer in the
negative.
A discussion on the legal significance of a persons name is relevant
at this point. We quote, thus:
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by
which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best
known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person
is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation
which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or
in speaking of or dealing with him. Names are used merely as one method
of indicating the identity of persons; they are descriptive of persons for
identification, since, the identity is the essential thing and it has frequently
been held that, when identity is certain, a variance in, or misspelling of, the
name is immaterial.
The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper
name, and the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that
which is given to the individual at birth or baptism, to distinguish him from
other individuals. The name or family name is that which identifies the family
to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name
may be freely selected by the parents for the child; but the surname to which
the child is entitled is fixed by law.
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute,
intended to protect the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is
obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is
fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may be
changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside
the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by
act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.[19]
This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this
does not mean that middle names have no practical or legal significance.
Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person
as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given
name and surname as he has.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated
children shall principally use the surname of the father.[20] The Family Code
115
Persons 4th Exam Cases
gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the
mother,[21] while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother,
unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the
fathers surname.[22]
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not
recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mothers surname,
and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized
illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the
illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or
acknowledged by the father in a public document or private handwritten
instrument that he bears both his mothers surname as his middle name and
his fathers surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated
child or an acknowledged illegitimate child.
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such
individuals requires that the middle name be indicated in the certificate. The
registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child
thus contains a given or proper name, a middle name, and a surname.
Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his
middle name as this would help him to adjust more easily to and integrate
himself into Singaporean society. In support, he cites Oshita v.
Republic[23] and Calderon v. Republic,[24] which, however, are not apropos
both.
In Oshita, the petitioner therein, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino
mother, Buena Bartolome, and a Japanese father, Kishimatsu Oshita,
sought to change her name from Antonina B. Oshita to Antonina Bartolome.
The Court granted her petition based on the following considerations: she
had elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; her
other siblings who had also elected Philippine citizenship have been using
their mothers surname; she was embarrassed to bear a Japanese surname
there still being ill feeling against the Japanese due to the last World War;
and there was no showing that the change of name was motivated by a
fraudulent purpose or that it will prejudice public interest.
In Calderon, the Court allowed petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del
Prado, an illegitimate minor child acting through her mother who filed the
petition in her behalf, to change her name to Gertudes Josefina Calderon,
taking the surname of her stepfather, Romeo C. Calderon, her mothers
husband. The Court held that a petition for change of name of an infant
should be granted where to do is clearly for the best interest of the child.
The Court took into consideration the opportunity provided for the minor
petitioner to eliminate the stigma of illegitimacy which she would carry if she
continued to use the surname of her illegitimate father. The Court
pronounced that justice dictates that every person be allowed to avail of any
opportunity to improve his social standing as long as doing so he does not
cause prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of other people.
Petitioner cites Alfon v. Republic,[25] in arguing that although Article
174 of the Family Code gives the legitimate child the right to use the
surnames of the father and the mother, it is not mandatory such that the
child could use only one family name, even the family name of the mother.
In Alfon, the petitioner therein, the legitimate daughter of Filomeno Duterte
and Estrella Alfon, sought to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica
Primitiva Duterte (her name as registered in the Local Civil Registry) to
Estrella S. Alfon (the name she had been using since childhood, in her
school records and in her voters registration). The trial court denied her
petition but this Court overturned the denial, ruling that while Article 364 of
the Civil Code states that she, as a legitimate child, should principally use
the surname of her father, there is no legal obstacle for her to choose to use
the surname of herm other to which she is entitled. In addition, the Court
found that there was ample justification to grant her petition, i.e., to avoid
confusion.
Weighing petitioners reason of convenience for the change of his
name against the standards set in the cases he cites to support his
contention would show that his justification is amorphous, to say the least,
and could not warrant favorable action on his petition.
The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases
are not at all analogous to the case at bar. The instant case is clearly
distinguishable from the cases of Oshita and Alfon, where the petitioners
were already of age when they filed their petitions for change of name.
Being of age, they are considered to have exercised their discretion and
judgment, fully knowing the effects of their decision to change their
surnames. It can also be unmistakably observed that the reason for the
grant of the petitions for change of name in these two cases was the
presence of reasonable or compelling grounds therefore. The Court,
in Oshita, recognized the tangible animosity most Filipinos had during that
time against the Japanese as a result of World War II, in addition to the fact
of therein petitioners election of Philippine citizenship. In Alfon, the Court
granted the petition since the petitioner had been known since childhood by
a name different from her registered name and she had not used her
registered name in her school records and voters registration records; thus,
denying the petition would only result to confusion.
Calderon, on the other hand, granted the petition for change of name
filed by a mother in behalf of her illegitimate minor child. Petitioner cites this
case to buttress his argument that he does not have to reach the age of
majority to petition for change of name. However, it is manifest
in Calderon that the Court, in granting the petition for change of name, gave
paramount consideration to the best interests of the minor petitioner therein.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the
dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of
name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and
convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle
name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and
reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous
foundation on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that
the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when
he reaches the age of majority.[26] As he is of tender age, he may not yet
understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and
granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under
our laws.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on
Certiorari is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
116
Persons 4th Exam Cases
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY
ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue
raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a
petition[1] to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June
26, 1994;[2] that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has
been using her mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies
middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that
her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
On March 23, 2001,[3] the trial court rendered the assailed Decision
granting the adoption, thus:
After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner,
and in the absence of any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the
petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualification
provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified
to maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted; that the grant of
this petition would redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that the petitioners
care and custody of the child since her birth up to the present constitute
more than enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of
Presidential Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same
is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed
from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her
natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioners
legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of
the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY
CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil
Registrar concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for
record purposes.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration[5] praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the
surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.
On May 28, 2001,[6] the trial court denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an
adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle
name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate
child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is
subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of
a middle name as a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law
prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only
one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as middle
name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of
the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the
adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be
violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name Garcia (her
mothers surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her
continued use of Garcia as her middle name is not opposed by either the
Catindig or Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her
middle name, the surname of her natural mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with
her natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she
remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion
and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that
relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not
prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which
is ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized
by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees
agreed that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede
the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the
surname of the mother.[7]
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation
by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is
best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a
person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or
appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him.[8] It is both of personal
as well as public interest that every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper
name and (2) the surname or family name. The given or proper name is
that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him
from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies
the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The
given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the
surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.[9]
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive
rules which regulate the use of surname[10] of an individual whatever may
be his status in life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an
adopted child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or a widow,
thus:
Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use
the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable
marriage shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname,
or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his
wife, such as Mrs.
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party,
she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent
spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she
may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue
using her name and surname employed before the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he
were still living, in accordance with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person
shall be obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid
confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants
and descendants, the word Junior can be used only by a son. Grandsons
and other direct male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
xxx
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the
use of a middle name. Even Article 176[11] of the Family Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as An Act Allowing Illegitimate
Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father, is silent as to what middle
name a child may use.
The middle name or the mothers surname is only considered in Article
375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames
between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or
the mothers surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an
adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that an
adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. Also, Article 189 of the
Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on
the matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate
child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and
obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including
the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
xxx
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the
Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family
Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the
childs mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of
the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members approved the
suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father, thus
Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by
the wife of the surname and that of the child because the fathers surname
indicates the family to which he belongs, for which reason he would
insist on the use of the fathers surname by the child but that, if he
wants to, the child may also use the surname of the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname
of the mother, how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it
is up to him but that his point is that it should be mandatory that the child
uses the surname of the father and permissive in the case of the
surname of the mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioas point is covered by the
present Article 364, which reads:
117
Persons 4th Exam Cases
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the
person himself precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited
the following example: Alfonso Ponce Enriles correct surname is Ponce
since the mothers surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile.
Justice Jose Gutierrez Davids family name is Gutierrez and his mothers
surname is David but they all call him Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified
to the effect that it shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname
of the father but he may use the surname of the mother by way of an
initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this for
inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed Article
(10) they are just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the
details can be covered in the appropriate chapter.
xxx
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by
Justice Caguioa that the surname of the father should always be last
because there are so many traditions like the American tradition where they
like to use their second given name and the Latin tradition, which is also
followed by the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.
xxx
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter
on the Use of Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the
mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that
the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother.
Prof. Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The Committee
approved the suggestion.[12] (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that the adopted
shall bear the surname of the adopters.[13] Again, it is silent whether he can
use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and
obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon
issuance of the decree of adoption.[14]
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related
or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate
child.[15] It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two
persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity
and filiation.[16] The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an
act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act
which endows the child with a legitimate status.[17] This was, indeed,
confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the
Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations,
accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with social and
moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor
the adopted child.[18] Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as
the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,[19] secures these rights and privileges
for the adopted.[20]
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article
189[21] of the Family Code and Section 17[22] Article V of RA 8552.[23]
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate
child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the
surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is
consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family
Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the
initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname
of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanies continued
use of her mothers surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her
maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and
Section 18[24], Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the
adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence,
Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural
mother in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living
together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose,
Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely
attached to both her mother and father. She calls them Mama and Papa.
Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use
her mothers surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued
loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her
illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Adoption
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary,
should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of
adoption.[25] The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary
and paramount consideration,[26] hence, every reasonable intendment
should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.[27]
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
This provision, according to the Code Commission, is necessary so
that it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful
or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an
injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting
the law.[28]
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted
by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers
surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is
partly MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her
mothers surname GARCIA as her middle name.
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be
entered in the decree of adoption.
SO ORDERED.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE, Respondent.
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA)
decision2 dated January 13, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66128, which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23 of San Juan, Southern
Leyte dated September 14, 1999 granting a petition for change of name.
Respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote filed a petition for change of name of her ward
from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores on September 9, 1998. In
Special Proceeding No. R-481,3 Capote as Giovannis guardian ad
litem averred:
xxx xxx xxx
1. [Respondent] is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, married, while minor
GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO, is also a Filipino citizen, sixteen (16)
years old and both are residents of San Juan, Southern Leyte where
they can be served with summons and other court processes;
2. [Respondent] was appointed guardian [ad litem] of minor Giovanni
N. Gallamaso by virtue of a court order in Special [Proc.] No. R-459,
dated [August 18, 1998] xxx xxx authorizing her to file in court a
petition for change of name of said minor in accordance with the
desire of his mother [who is residing and working abroad];
3. Both [respondent] and minor have permanently resided in San
Juan, Southern Leyte, Philippines for more than fifteen (15) years
prior to the filing of this instant petition, the former since 1970 while
the latter since his birth [in 1982];
4. The minor was left under the care of [respondent] since he was yet
nine (9) years old up to the present;
5. Minor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO is the illegitimate natural child
of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso. [He] was born on
July 9, 1982 [,] prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code and as
such, his mother used the surname of the natural father despite the
absence of marriage between them; and [Giovanni] has been known
by that name since birth [as per his birth certificate registered at the
Local Civil Register of San Juan, Southern Leyte];
6. The father, Diosdado Gallamaso, from the time [Giovanni] was born
and up to the present, failed to take up his responsibilities [to him] on
matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns.
[Giovannis pleas] for attention along that line [fell] on deaf ears xxx
xxx xxx;
7. [Giovanni] is now fully aware of how he stands with his father and
he desires to have his surname changed to that of his mothers
surname;
8. [Giovannis] mother might eventually petition [him] to join her in the
United States and [his] continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the
surname of his natural father, may complicate [his] status as natural
child; and
9. The change of name [from] GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO to
GIOVANNI NADORES will be for the benefit of the minor.
xxx xxx xxx4
Respondent prayed for an order directing the local civil registrar to effect the
change of name on Giovannis birth certificate. Having found respondents
petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave due course to the
petition.5 Publication of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province of Southern Leyte once a week for three consecutive weeks was
likewise ordered.6 The trial court also directed that the local civil registrar be
notified and that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) be sent a copy of the
petition and order.7
Since there was no opposition to the petition, respondent moved for leave of
court to present her evidence ex partebefore a court-appointed commissioner.
The OSG, acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the
lower court granted the motion.
After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the
change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores.8
From this decision, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed
an appeal with a lone assignment of error: the court a quo erred in granting the
petition in a summary proceeding.
Ruling that the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as required,
the CA affirmed the RTC decision ordering the change of name.9
In this petition, the Republic contends that the CA erred in affirming the trial
courts decision which granted the petition for change of name despite the non-
joinder of indispensable parties.10 Petitioner cites Republic of the Philippines v.
Labrador11 and claims that the purported parents and all other persons who may
be adversely affected by the childs change of name should have been made
respondents to make the proceeding adversarial.12
We deny the petition.
"The subject of rights must have a fixed symbol for individualization which serves
to distinguish him from all others; this symbol is his name."13 Understandably,
therefore, no person can change his name or surname without judicial
authority.14 This is a reasonable requirement for those seeking such change
because a persons name necessarily affects his identity, interests and
interactions. The State must be involved in the process and decision to change
the name of any of its citizens.
The Rules of Court provides the requirements and procedure for change of
name. Here, the appropriate remedy is covered by Rule 103,15 a separate and
distinct proceeding from Rule 108 on mere cancellation and correction of entries
in the civil registry (usually dealing only with innocuous or clerical errors
thereon).16
The issue of non-joinder of alleged indispensable parties in the action before the
court a quo is intertwined with the nature of the proceedings there. The point is
whether the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial.
Summary proceedings do not extensively address the issues of a case since the
reason for their conduct is expediency. This, according to petitioner, is not
sufficient to deal with substantial or contentious issues allegedly resulting from a
change of name, meaning, legitimacy as well as successional rights.17 Such
issues are ventilated only in adversarial proceedings wherein all interested
parties are impleaded and due process is observed.18
When Giovanni was born in 1982 (prior to the enactment and effectivity of the
Family Code of the Philippines),19 the pertinent provision of the Civil Code then
as regards his use of a surname, read:
Art. 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the
surname of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child
shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent. (emphasis ours)
Based on this provision, Giovanni should have carried his mothers surname from
birth. The records do not reveal any act or intention on the part of Giovannis
putative father to actually recognize him. Meanwhile, according to the Family
Code which repealed, among others, Article 366 of the Civil Code:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity
with this Code. xxx xxx xxx (emphasis ours)
Our ruling in the recent case of In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or
Correction/Cancellation of Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang20 is enlightening:
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children
shall principally use the surname of the father. The Family Code gives legitimate
children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, while
illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father
recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers surname.
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized
by the father bears only a given name and his mother surname, and does
not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child
therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the
father in a public document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both
his mothers surname as his middle name and his fathers surname as his
surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged
child.1awphi1.net21
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a persons
name to his identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional
rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure, these matters should not be
taken lightly as to deprive those who may, in any way, be affected by the right to
present evidence in favor of or against such change.
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni availed of
the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial
court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during
the hearing of Giovannis petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of
the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never
recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as her child.
A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his
father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mothers intended petition
to have him join her in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of
the reunification of mother and son.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the cases cited by petitioner22 in support of its
position deal with cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry, a
proceeding separate and distinct from the special proceedings for change of
name. Those cases deal with the application and interpretation of Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court while this case was correctly filed under Rule 103. Thus, the
cases cited by petitioner are irrelevant and have no bearing on respondents
case. While the OSG is correct in its stance that the proceedings for change of
name should be adversarial, the OSG cannot void the proceedings in the trial
court on account of its own failure to participate therein. As the CA correctly ruled:
The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must be heard
in an adversarial proceeding. Unlike petitions for the cancellation or correction of
clerical errors in entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,
a petition for change of name under Rule 103 cannot be decided through a
summary proceeding. There is no doubt that this petition does not fall under Rule
108 for it is not alleged that the entry in the civil registry suffers from clerical or
typographical errors. The relief sought clearly goes beyond correcting erroneous
entries in the civil registry, although by granting the petition, the result is the same
in that a corresponding change in the entry is also required to reflect the change
in name. In this regard, [appellee] Capote complied with the requirement for
an adversarial proceeding by posting in a newspaper of general circulation
notice of the filing of the petition. The lower court also furnished the OSG
a copy thereof. Despite the notice, no one came forward to oppose the
petition including the OSG. The fact that no one opposed the petition did
not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make
the proceeding less adversarial in nature. The lower court is still expected to
exercise its judgment to determine whether the petition is meritorious or not and
not merely accept as true the arguments propounded. Considering that the OSG
neither opposed the petition nor the motion to present its evidence ex parte when
it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in
the lower court were not adversarial enough.23 (emphasis supplied)
A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal
warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest
it.24 Respondent gave notice of the petition through publication as required by
the rules.25 With this, all interested parties were deemed notified and the whole
world considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial court gave
due notice to the OSG by serving a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the
requirements to make a proceeding adversarial were satisfied when all
interested parties, including petitioner as represented by the OSG, were afforded
the opportunity to contest the petition.
119
Persons 4th Exam Cases

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the January 13, 2003
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66128 AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.

120
Persons 4th Exam Cases
MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO,
Petitioner,
-versus-
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Respondent.
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review[1] of the 27 May 2005 Decision[2] and 2
August 2005 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87710. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Office of the President, which in
turn affirmed the decision of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs denying petitioners
request to revert to the use of her maiden name in her replacement passport.
The Facts
Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine
passport was then expiring on 27 October 2000. Petitioner being married to
Francisco R. Rallonza, the following entries appear in her passport: Rallonza as
her surname, Maria Virginia as her given name, and Remo as her middle name.
Prior to the expiry of the validity of her passport, petitioner, whose marriage still
subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her
maiden name and surname in the replacement passport.
Petitioners request having been denied, Atty. Manuel Joseph R. Bretana III,
representing petitioner, wrote then Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo Siason
expressing a similar request.
On 28 August 2000, the DFA, through Assistant Secretary Belen F. Anota,
denied the request, stating thus:
This has reference to your letter dated 17 August 2000
regarding one Ms. Maria Virginia V. Remo who is applying
for renewal of her passport using her maiden name.
This Office is cognizant of the provision in the law that it is not obligatory for a
married woman to use her husbands name. Use of maiden name is allowed in
passport application only if the married name has not been used in
previous application. The Implementing Rules and Regulations for Philippine
Passport Act of 1996 clearly defines the conditions when a woman applicant may
revert to her maiden name, that is, only in cases of annulment of marriage,
divorce and death of the husband. Ms. Remos case does not meet any of these
conditions.[4] (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the above-letter resolution was denied
in a letter dated 13 October 2000.[5]
On 15 November 2000, petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of the President.
On 27 July 2004, the Office of the President dismissed the appeal[6] and ruled
that Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 8239 (RA 8239) or the Philippine Passport
Act of 1996 offers no leeway for any other interpretation than that only in case of
divorce, annulment, or declaration [of nullity] of marriage may a married woman
revert to her maiden name for passport purposes. The Office of the President
further held that in case of conflict between a general and special law, the latter
will control the former regardless of the respective dates of passage. Since the
Civil Code is a general law, it should yield to RA 8239.
On 28 October 2004, the Office of the President denied the motion for
reconsideration.[7]
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure.
In its Decision of 27 May 2005, the Court of Appeals denied the petition and
affirmed the ruling of the Office of the President. The dispositive portion of the
Court of Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
DENIED, and the resolution dated July 27, 2004, and the
order dated October 28, 2004 of the Office of the President
in O.P. Case No. 001-A-9344 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied in its
Resolution dated 2 August 2005.
Hence, this petition.
The Court of Appeals Ruling
The Court of Appeals found no conflict between Article 370 of the Civil
Code[9] and Section 5(d) of RA 8239.[10] The Court of Appeals held that for
passport application and issuance purposes, RA 8239 limits the instances when
a married woman applicant may exercise the option to revert to the use of her
maiden name such as in a case of a divorce decree, annulment or declaration of
nullity of marriage. Since there was no showing that petitioner's marriage to
Francisco Rallonza has been annulled, declared void or a divorce decree has
been granted to them, petitioner cannot simply revert to her maiden name in the
replacement passport after she had adopted her husbands surname in her old
passport. Hence, according to the Court of Appeals, respondent was justified in
refusing the request of petitioner to revert to her maiden name in the replacement
passport.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether petitioner, who originally used her
husbands surname in her expired passport, can revert to the use of her maiden
name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
Title XIII of the Civil Code governs the use of surnames. In the case of a
married woman, Article 370 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) HER MAIDEN FIRST NAME AND SURNAME AND
ADD HER HUSBANDS SURNAME, OR
(2) HER MAIDEN FIRST NAME AND HER HUSBAND'S
SURNAME, OR
(3) HER HUSBANDS FULL NAME, BUT
PREFIXING A WORD INDICATING THAT
SHE IS HIS WIFE, SUCH AS MRS.
We agree with petitioner that the use of the word may in the above provision
indicates that the use of the husbands surname by the wife is permissive rather
than obligatory. This has been settled in the case of Yasin v. Honorable Judge
Sharia District Court.[11]
In Yasin,[12] petitioner therein filed with the Sharia District Court a Petition to
resume the use of maiden name in view of the dissolution of her marriage by
divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after
marriage of her former husband to another woman. In ruling in favor of petitioner
therein, the Court explained that:
When a woman marries a man, she need not apply
and/or seek judicial authority to use her
husbands name by prefixing the word Mrs. before her
husbands full name or by adding her husbands
surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her
such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the
marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the
case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized
by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not
seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil
status in order to revert to her maiden name as use of
her former husbands is optional and not obligatory for
her (Tolentino, Civil Code, p. 725, 1983 ed.; Art. 373,
Civil Code). When petitioner married her husband, she
did not change her but only her civil status. Neither
was she required to secure judicial authority to use the
surname of her husband after the marriage as no law
requires it. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, a married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the surname of
the husband in any of the ways provided by Article 370 of the Civil Code.[13] She
is therefore allowed to use not only any of the three names provided in Article
370, but also her maiden name upon marriage. She is not prohibited from
continuously using her maiden name once she is married because when a
woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status. Further,
this interpretation is in consonance with the principle that surnames indicate
descent.[14]
In the present case, petitioner, whose marriage is still subsisting and who opted
to use her husbands surname in her old passport, requested to resume her
maiden name in the replacement passport arguing that no law prohibits her from
using her maiden name. Petitioner cites Yasin as the applicable
precedent. However, Yasin is not squarely in point with this case. Unlike
in Yasin, which involved a Muslim divorcee whose former husband is already
married to another woman, petitioners marriage remains subsisting. Another
point, Yasin did not involve a request to resume ones maiden name in a
replacement passport, but a petition to resume ones maiden name in view of the
dissolution of ones marriage.
The law governing passport issuance is RA 8239 and the applicable provision in
this case is Section 5(d), which states:
Sec. 5. Requirements for the Issuance of Passport. No
passport shall be issued to an applicant unless the
Secretary or his duly authorized representative is satisfied
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

that the applicant is a Filipino citizen who has complied GOVERNMENT. THE HOLDER IS MERELY A POSSESSOR OF THE
with the following requirements: x x x In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her PASSPORT AS LONG AS IT IS VALID AND THE SAME MAY NOT BE
husbands surname or continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to SURRENDERED TO ANY PERSON OR ENTITY OTHER THAN THE
(D) IN CASE OF A WOMAN WHO IS adopt her husbands surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally requires GOVERNMENT OR ITS REPRESENTATIVE.[24]
MARRIED, SEPARATED, DIVORCED the submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage certificate. Otherwise,
OR WIDOWED OR WHOSE MARRIAGE if she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA As the OSG correctly pointed out:
HAS BEEN ANNULLED OR DECLARED will not prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name.[17]
BY COURT AS VOID, A COPY OF THE [T]he issuance of passports is impressed with public
CERTIFICATE OF MARRIAGE, COURT HOWEVER, ONCE A MARRIED WOMAN OPTED TO ADOPT HER interest. A passport is an official document of identity and
DECREE OF SEPARATION, DIVORCE HUSBANDS SURNAME IN HER PASSPORT, SHE MAY NOT REVERT TO nationality issued to a person intending to travel or
OR ANNULMENT OR CERTIFICATE OF THE USE OF HER MAIDEN NAME, EXCEPT IN THE CASES ENUMERATED sojourn in foreign countries. It is issued by the Philippine
DEATH OF THE DECEASED SPOUSE IN SECTION 5(D) OF RA 8239. THESE INSTANCES ARE: (1) DEATH OF government to its citizens requesting other governments
DULY ISSUED AND AUTHENTICATED HUSBAND, (2) DIVORCE, (3) ANNULMENT, OR (4) NULLITY OF MARRIAGE. to allow its holder to pass safely and freely, and in case
BY THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL SINCE PETITIONERS MARRIAGE TO HER HUSBAND SUBSISTS, SHE MAY of need, to give him/her aid and protection. x x x
REGISTRAR GENERAL: PROVIDED, NOT RESUME HER MAIDEN NAME IN THE REPLACEMENT PASSPORT.
THAT IN CASE OF A DIVORCE OTHERWISE STATED, A MARRIED WOMAN'S REVERSION TO THE USE OF Viewed in the light of the foregoing, it is within respondents competence to
DECREE, ANNULMENT OR HER MAIDEN NAME MUST BE BASED ONLY ON THE SEVERANCE OF THE regulate any amendments intended to be made therein, including the denial of
DECLARATION OF MARRIAGE AS MARRIAGE. unreasonable and whimsical requests for amendments such as in the instant
VOID, THE WOMAN APPLICANT MAY case.[25]
REVERT TO THE USE OF HER MAIDEN EVEN ASSUMING RA 8239 CONFLICTS WITH THE CIVIL CODE, THE
NAME: PROVIDED, FURTHER, THAT PROVISIONS OF RA 8239 WHICH IS A SPECIAL LAW SPECIFICALLY
SUCH DIVORCE IS RECOGNIZED DEALING WITH PASSPORT ISSUANCEMUST PREVAIL OVER THE WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 27 May 2005 Decision
UNDER EXISTING LAWS OF THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE XIII OF THE CIVIL CODE WHICH IS THE GENERAL and 2 August 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87710.
PHILIPPINES; X X X (EMPHASIS LAW ON THE USE OF SURNAMES. A BASIC TENET IN STATUTORY
SUPPLIED) CONSTRUCTION IS THAT A SPECIAL LAW PREVAILS OVER A GENERAL SO ORDERED.
LAW,[18] THUS:

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, argues that the highlighted proviso in Section 5(d) of RA 8239 limits the
instances when a married woman may be allowed to revert to the use of her
maiden name in her passport. These instances are death of husband, divorce
decree, annulment or nullity of marriage. Significantly, Section 1, Article 12 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 8239 provides:
[I]t is a familiar rule of statutory construction that to
the extent of any necessary repugnancy between a
general and a special law or provision, the latter will
control the former without regard to the respective
dates of passage.[19]

The passport can be amended only in the following
cases:
A) AMENDMENT OF WOMANS NAME DUE TO MARRIAGE;
B) AMENDMENT OF WOMANS NAME DUE TO DEATH OF SPOUSE,
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE OR DIVORCE INITIATED BY A FOREIGN
SPOUSE; OR
C) CHANGE OF SURNAME OF A CHILD WHO IS
LEGITIMATED BY VIRTUE OF A SUBSEQUENT
MARRIAGE OF HIS PARENTS.
Since petitioners marriage to her husband subsists, placing her case outside of
the purview of Section 5(d) of RA 8239 (as to the instances when a married
woman may revert to the use of her maiden name), she may not resume her
maiden name in the replacement passport.[15] This prohibition, according to
petitioner, conflicts with and, thus, operates as an implied repeal of Article 370
of the Civil Code.
PETITIONER IS MISTAKEN. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ARTICLE 370 OF
THE CIVIL CODE AND SECTION 5(D) OF RA 8239 IS MORE IMAGINED THAN
REAL. RA 8239, INCLUDING ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS, DOES NOT PROHIBIT A MARRIED WOMAN FROM USING
HER MAIDEN NAME IN HER PASSPORT. IN FACT, IN RECOGNITION OF
THIS RIGHT, THE DFA ALLOWS A MARRIED WOMAN WHO APPLIES FOR A
PASSPORT FOR THE FIRST TIME TO USE HER MAIDEN NAME. SUCH AN
APPLICANT IS NOT REQUIRED TO ADOPT HER HUSBAND'S SURNAME.[16]
Moreover, petitioners theory of implied repeal must fail. Well-entrenched is the
rule that an implied repeal is disfavored. T he apparently conflicting provisions of
a law or two laws should be harmonized as much as possible, so that each shall
be effective.[20] For a law to operate to repeal another law, the two laws must
actually be inconsistent. The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconcilable
with the latter act.[21] This petitioner failed to establish.
The Court notes that petitioner would not have encountered any problems in the
replacement passport had she opted to continuously and consistently use her
maiden name from the moment she was married and from the time she first
applied for a Philippine passport. However, petitioner consciously chose to use
her husbands surname before, in her previous passport application, and now
desires to resume her maiden name. If we allow petitioners present request,
definitely nothing prevents her in the future from requesting to revert to the use
of her husbands surname. Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity
in a passport, which is considered superior to all other official
documents,[22] cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, undue confusion and
inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise. Thus, for passport
issuance purposes, a married woman, such as petitioner, whose marriage
subsists, may not change her family name at will.
THE ACQUISITION OF A PHILIPPINE PASSPORT IS A PRIVILEGE. THE LAW
RECOGNIZES THE PASSPORT APPLICANTS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
TRAVEL. HOWEVER, THE STATE IS ALSO MANDATED TO PROTECT AND
MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY AND CREDIBILITY OF THE PASSPORT AND
TRAVEL DOCUMENTS PROCEEDING FROM IT[23] AS APHILIPPINE
PASSPORT REMAINS AT ALL TIMES THE PROPERTY OF THE
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner,
vs.
PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent.
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45,
assailing the July 24, 2012 Decision1 and March 5, 2013 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406.
As culled from the records, the facts of this case are:
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio
(Antonio) for a period of time lived together as husband and wife, although
Antonio was at that time already married to someone else.3 Out of this illicit
relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis (on February 8, 1998) and
Jerard Patrick (on October 13, 1999).4 The children were not expressly
recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children
in the Civil Registry. The parties relationship, however, eventually turned
sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two children in May
2007. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial
Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental
Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC), appending a notarized Deed of
Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.5
On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein
respondent Antonio, ruling that "[t]he evidence at hand is overwhelming that
the best interest of the children can be promoted if they are under the sole
parental authority and physical custody of [respondent Antonio]."6 Thus, the
court a quo decreed the following:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby grants
[Antonios] prayer for recognition and the same is hereby judicially
approved. x x x Consequently, the Court forthwith issues the following Order
granting the other reliefs sought in the Petition, to wit:
a. Ordering the Office of the City Registrar of the City of Makati
to cause the entry of the name of [Antonio] as the father of the
aforementioned minors in their respective Certificate of Live Birth
and causing the correction/change and/or annotation of the
surnames of said minors in their Certificate of Live Birth from
Grande to Antonio;
b. Granting [Antonio] the right to jointly exercise Parental
Authority with [Grande] over the persons of their minor children,
Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande;
c. Granting [Antonio] primary right and immediate custody over
the parties minor children Andre Lewis Grandre and Jerard
Patrick Grande who shall stay with [Antonios] residence in the
Philippines from Monday until Friday evening and to [Grandes]
custody from Saturday to Sunday evening;
d. Ordering [Grande] to immediately surrender the persons and
custody of minors Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick
Grande unto [Antonio] for the days covered by the Order;
e. Ordering parties to cease and desist from bringing the
aforenamed minors outside of the country, without the written
consent of the other and permission from the court.
f. Ordering parties to give and share the support of the minor
children Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande in the
amount of 30,000 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and
30% for [Grande].7(Emphasis supplied.)
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her
motion was denied by the trial court in its Resolution dated November 22,
20108 for being pro forma and for lack of merit.
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on
the part of the RTC for allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence
respecting the grant of sole custody to the mother over her illegitimate
children.9 In resolving the appeal, the appellate court modified in part the
Decision of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed
Decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc.
Case No. 11-4492 is MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as
follows:
a. The Offices of the Civil Registrar General and the City Civil
Registrar of Makati City are DIRECTED to enter the surname
Antonio as the surname of Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis, in
their respective certificates of live birth, and record the same in
the Register of Births;
b. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard
Patrick and Andre Lewis to the custody of their mother herein
appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue hereof is hereby awarded
the full or sole custody of these minor children;
c. [Antonio] shall have visitorial rights at least twice a week, and
may only take the children out upon the written consent of
[Grande]; and
d. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the
minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of
30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30%
for [Grande]. (Emphasis supplied.)
In ruling thus, the appellate court ratiocinated that notwithstanding the
fathers recognition of his children, the mother cannot be deprived of her
sole parental custody over them absent the most compelling of
reasons.10 Since respondent Antonio failed to prove that petitioner Grande
committed any act that adversely affected the welfare of the children or
rendered her unsuitable to raise the minors, she cannot be deprived of her
sole parental custody over their children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the
recognition made by respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors,
taken in conjunction with the universally protected "best-interest-of-the-
child" clause, compels the use by the children of the surname "ANTONIO."11
As to the issue of support, the CA held that the grant is legally in order
considering that not only did Antonio express his willingness to give support,
it is also a consequence of his acknowledging the paternity of the minor
children.12Lastly, the CA ruled that there is no reason to deprive respondent
Antonio of his visitorial right especially in view of the constitutionally inherent
and natural right of parents over their children.13
Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial
motion for reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar
as it decreed the change of the minors surname to "Antonio." When her
motion was denied, petitioner came to this Court via the present petition. In
it, she posits that Article 176 of the Family Codeas amended by Republic
Act No. (RA) 9255, couched as it is in permissive languagemay not be
invoked by a father to compel the use by his illegitimate children of his
surname without the consent of their mother.
We find the present petition impressed with merit.
The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his
surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation.
Central to the core issue is the application of Art. 176 of the Family Code,
originally phrased as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with
this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of
the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other
provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in
force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 925514 which
now reads:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under
the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by
their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when
an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is
made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action
before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The
legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of
a legitimate child. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an
illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception
provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized
by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or
when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument
is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the
surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of
recognition of the filiation of the two children with the prayer for the
correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio
when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec.
19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court15 is enough to establish the paternity of
his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority,
parental custody, and an official declaration of his childrens surname as
Antonio.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother;
hence, respondents prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority
is given to the mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the
mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.
Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children.
Is there a legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of the surname
to that of respondent?
Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the
explicit and unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as
amended by RA 9255.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the
surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the
mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the
surname of their illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from
ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its
literal meaning free from any interpretation.16 Respondents position that the
court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there
is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in
the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under
no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may"
123
Persons 4th Exam Cases
is permissive and operates to confer discretion17 upon the illegitimate
children.
It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies
affecting children are to be measured is their best interest. On the matter of
childrens surnames, this Court has, time and again, rebuffed the idea that
the use of the fathers surname serves the best interest of the minor child.
In Alfon v. Republic,18 for instance, this Court allowed even a legitimate child
to continue using the surname of her mother rather than that of her
legitimate father as it serves her best interest and there is no legal obstacle
to prevent her from using the surname of her mother to which she is entitled.
In fact, in Calderon v. Republic,19 this Court, upholding the best interest of
the child concerned, even allowed the use of a surname different from the
surnames of the childs father or mother. Indeed, the rule regarding the use
of a childs surname is second only to the rule requiring that the child be
placed in the best possible situation considering his circumstances.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote,20 We gave due deference to the
choice of an illegitimate minor to use the surname of his mother as it would
best serve his interest, thus:
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a
persons name to his identity, his status in relation to his parents and his
successional rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure, these
matters should not be taken lightly as to deprive those who may, in any way,
be affected by the right to present evidence in favor of or against such
change.
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni availed
of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. After
hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the
evidence presented during the hearing of Giovannis petition sufficiently
established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to
change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother
has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the
impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best
interest as it will facilitate his mothers intended petition to have him join her
in the United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification
of mother and son. (Emphasis supplied.)
An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of
the fathers surname upon his recognition of his illegitimate children, citing
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255,21 which states:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public
document is executed by the father, either at the back of the Certificate of
Live Birth or in a separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private instrument, the
child shall use the surname of the father, provided the registration is
supported by the following documents:
xxxx
7.2. For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
7.2.1 If filiation has been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall
use the surname of the father upon the submission of the accomplished
AUSF [Affidavit of Use of the Surname of the Father].
7.2.2 If filiation has not been expressly recognized by the father, the child
shall use the surname of the father upon submission of a public document
or a private handwritten instrument supported by the documents listed in
Rule 7.1.2.
7.3 Except in Item 7.2.1, the consent of the illegitimate child is required if
he/she has reached the age of majority. The consent may be contained in
a separate instrument duly notarized.
xxxx
Rule 8. Effects of Recognition
8.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
8.1.1 The surname of the father shall be entered as the last name of the
child in the Certificate of Live Birth. The Certificate of Live Birth shall be
recorded in the Register of Births.
xxxx
8.2 For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
8.2.1 If admission of paternity was made either at the back of the Certificate
of Live Birth or in a separate public document or in a private handwritten
document, the public document or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register
of Live Birth and the Register of Births as follows:
"The surname of the child is hereby changed from (original surname) to
(new surname) pursuant to RA 9255."
The original surname of the child appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth
and Register of Births shall not be changed or deleted.
8.2.2 If filiation was not expressly recognized at the time of registration, the
public document or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of Legal
Instruments. Proper annotation shall be made in the Certificate of Live Birth
and the Register of Births as follows:
"Acknowledged by (name of father) on (date). The surname of the child is
hereby changed from (original surname) on (date) pursuant to RA 9255."
(Emphasis supplied.)
Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot
amend a legislative act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corp. v. Ssangyong
Corporation,22 We held:
After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the
legislative enactment itself. The implementing rules and regulations of a law
cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or
repeal a statute is vested in the Legislature. Thus, if a discrepancy occurs
between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the
former that prevails, because the law cannot be broadened by a mere
administrative issuance an administrative agency certainly cannot
amend an act of Congress.
Thus, We can disregard contemporaneous construction where there is no
ambiguity in law and/or the construction is clearly erroneous.23 What is
more, this Court has the constitutional prerogative and authority to strike
down and declare as void the rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies24 when found contrary to statutes and/or the
Constitution.25 Section 5(5), Art. VIII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the above-quoted provisions of the
IRR of RA 9255 insofar as it provides the mandatory use by illegitimate
children of their fathers surname upon the latters recognition of his
paternity.
To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no
moment. The clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176
rendering the use of an illegitimate fathers surname discretionary controls,
and illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames by which they
will be known.
At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the children, now
aged thirteen (13) and fifteen (15) years old, to this Court declaring their
opposition to have their names changed to "Antonio."26 However, since
these letters were not offered before and evaluated by the trial court, they
do not provide any evidentiary weight to sway this Court to rule for or against
petitioner.27 A proper inquiry into, and evaluation of the evidence of, the
children's choice of surname by the trial court is necessary.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 24,
2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406 is
MODIFIED, the dispositive portion of which shall read:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly. the appealed
Decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc.
Case No. 11-4492 is MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as
follows:
a. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard
Patrick and Andre Lewis to the custody of their mother herein
appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue hereof is hereby awarded
the full or sole custody of these minor children;
b. [Antonio] shall have visitation rights28 at least twice a week, and
may only take the children out upon the written consent of
[Grande]:
c. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the
minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of
30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30%
for [Grande]; and
d. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8
of Aparri, Cagayan for the sole purpose of determining the
surname to be chosen by the children Jerard Patrick and Andre
Lewis.
Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil Registrar General Administrative
Order No. 1, Series of 2004 are DISAPPROVED and hereby declared NULL
and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He
created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she
heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North
Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once,
then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out
came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female.
Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman
"Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the
law recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and
counseling with regard to a persons sex? May a person successfully petition for
a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result
of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition
for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-
105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the
spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His
name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of
live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but
feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with
girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a mans body, he consulted several
doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone
treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a
"woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment
surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino
Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who
issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone
the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married.
He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel
Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the Peoples Journal
Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three
consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established.
No opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz,
Jr. and his American fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its
relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment
or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the
purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief
asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be
more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his
sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and
acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female.
Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his own
doing and should not be in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be
caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the
contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited
happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fianc] and the
realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to
deny the present petition despite due notice and publication thereof.
Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any
[o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition
and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries
appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for
petitioners first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and
petitioners gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG,
filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no
law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex
alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the
Republic. It ruled that the trial courts decision lacked legal basis. There is no law
allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground
of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the
Republics petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it
was denied.9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth
certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and
108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change
of name and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment
or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the
purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present
sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female,
he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a
right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.13 In this
connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In
particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and
Change of First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall
be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can
be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this
Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority
to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar
or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over
applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to
exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of
Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is
first filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding
venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be
allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The
petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any
of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous,
tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known
by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex
reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he
thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of
name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status. 18 RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than
avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose may
only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition,
he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he
might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of
petitioners first name was not within that courts primary jurisdiction as the
petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming
it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy
was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the
wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila
where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use
of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons,
the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners petition in so far as the
change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On
the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal
issue and the court must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of
the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA
9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or
change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings
and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108
now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following
terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake
committed in the performance of clerical work in writing,
copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register
that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name
or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to
the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be
125
Persons 4th Exam Cases
corrected or changed only by reference to other existing
record or records: Provided, however, That no correction
must involve the change of nationality, age, status
or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is
not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil
Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status
of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from
the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments
of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation;
(15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil
Code include even those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable
interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the
correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error
from" while to change means "to replace something with something else of the
same kind or with something that serves as a substitute."26 The birth certificate
of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding
to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of
certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and
naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths)
and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage,
declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of
citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of
name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that
touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects
are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among
those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even
mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum
total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and
his family membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive
term status include such matters as the beginning and end of legal
personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its
various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation,
marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis
supplied)
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part
of a persons legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the
Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status
shall be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment
and its effects. This is fatal to petitioners cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of
the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default
thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be women which could be substantially affected if petitioners petition were to be
sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such granted.
declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall
sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of
by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation.
parent of the newborn child. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so,
following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex
infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important
father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name
required in the regulations to be issued. and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied) filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person
as they existed at the time of birth.29Thus, the sex of a person is determined at who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex
birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the
the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a
birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31 person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However,
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else.
ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret
"male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness,
common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The
this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not
function that distinguish a male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that,
and female."33Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks
is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not
the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include persons by the courts.
who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have Costs against petitioner.
been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary."36 Since the SO ORDERED.
statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and
remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is
something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative
male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the
change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no
legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth
certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be
Changed on the Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause
no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and
public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition
was but petitioners first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fianc.
However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its essential
requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and
a female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will
allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment
(a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws
which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and
the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules
of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to
126
Persons 4th Exam Cases
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
- versus -
JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,
Respondent.
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising
purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision[1] dated January 12,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which
granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B.
Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in Cagandahans birth
certificate: (1) the name Jennifer Cagandahan changed to Jeff Cagandahan and
(2) gender from female to male.
The facts are as follows.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate[2] before the RTC, Branch 33
of Siniloan, Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13,
1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while
growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed
to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where
persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further
alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years
and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has
small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had
minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual
development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as
in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her
birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to
male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for
three (3) consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff
of the court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony
of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of
the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical
certificate stating that respondents condition is known as CAH. He explained that
genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones,
her female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs female
and male. He testified that this condition is very rare, that respondents uterus is
not fully developed because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no
monthly period. He further testified that respondents condition is permanent and
recommended the change of gender because respondent has made up her
mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be
advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision dated January
12, 2005 which reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has
satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the reliefs prayed
[for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court very
clear and convincing proofs for the granting of his
petition. It was medically proven that petitioners body
produces male hormones, and first his body as well as his
action and feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to
be male. He is a normal person and wants to be
acknowledged and identified as a male.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil
Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to make the
following corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer
Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:
a) By changing the name from
Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN;
and
b) By changing the gender from
female to MALE.
It is likewise ordered that petitioners school
records, voters registry, baptismal certificate, and other
pertinent records are hereby amended to conform with the
foregoing corrected data.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking
a reversal of the abovementioned ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE
RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH;
AND,
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT
ALLOW CHANGE OF SEX OR GENDER IN THE BIRTH
CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENTS MEDICAL
CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL
HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A MALE.[4]
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the
correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or
gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as
CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules
of Court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-
compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the local
civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or correction
of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondents petition
before the court a quo did not implead the local civil registrar.[5] The OSG further
contends respondents petition is fatally defective since it failed to state that
respondent is a bona fide resident of the province where the petition was filed for
at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing as mandated under Section
2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.[6] The OSG argues that Rule 108 does not
allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondents claimed
medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male.[7]
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil
Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a party in the Petition for
Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was
furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and
all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings,[8] respondent
is actually a male person and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to
reflect his true sex/gender,[9] change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule
108,[10] and respondent substantially complied with the requirements of Rules
103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.[11]
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
SECTION 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name
shall present the petition to the Regional Trial Court of the
province in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change of name
shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his
name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and
shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona
fide resident of the province where the petition
is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the
date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the
petitioner's name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
SEC. 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient
in form and substance, the court, by an order reciting the
purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the
hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be
published before the hearing at least once a week for three
(3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general
circulation published in the province, as the court shall
deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within
thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4)
months after the last publication of the notice.
SEC. 4. Hearing. Any interested person may appear at the
hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor General or
the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of
the Government of the Republic.
SEC. 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court
on the date fixed in the order that such order has been
published as directed and that the allegations of the
petition are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable
cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner,
adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with
the prayer of the petition.
SEC. 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders
rendered in connection with this rule shall be furnished the
civil registrar of the municipality or city where the court
issuing the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the
same in the civil register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested
in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil
status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction.
Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the
civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments
of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship;
(l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n)
voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of
name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the
petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place
for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition.
The court shall also cause the order to be published once
a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person
having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of
publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the
proceedings is brought may make orders expediting the
proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for
the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss
the petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or
correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the
judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned
who shall annotate the same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-
compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because respondents
petition did not implead the local civil registrar.Section 3, Rule 108 provides that
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local
civil registrar is required to be made a party in a proceeding for the correction of
name in the civil registry. He is an indispensable party without whom no final
determination of the case can be had.[12]Unless all possible indispensable parties
were duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling
much too short of the requirements of the rules.[13] The corresponding petition
should also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other persons who
may have or may claim to have any interest that would be affected
thereby.[14] Respondent, however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of
Court which states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their
objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition
of the matters brought before it. We agree that there is substantial compliance
with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil
registrar.
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate
is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article
412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was
amended by Republic Act No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical or typographical errors
are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect,
Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the
correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register.[18]
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving
the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial
change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.[19]
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408
of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning
the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil
register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil
register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations;
(5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8)
adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship;
(13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation;
(15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes
of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of
the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.[20]
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early
or inappropriate appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent,
with this condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn
who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris
with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing
more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive
tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older,
some features start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair,
and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are
born with CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy.
During the twentieth century, medicine adopted the term intersexuality to apply
to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female.[22] The term
is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality is the state of a
living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or
secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor
female. An organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both
male and female sexes.
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different
cultures. In most societies, intersex individuals have been expected to conform
to either a male or female gender role.[23] Since the rise of modern medical
science in Western societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external
genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or
female genitals.[24]More commonly, an intersex individual is considered as
suffering from a disorder which is almost always recommended to be treated,
whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to mold the
individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male or female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for
recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be
subject to outright denial. It has been suggested that there is some middle
ground between the sexes, a no-mans land for those individuals who are neither
truly male nor truly female.[25] The current state of Philippine statutes apparently
compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court
is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates
such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then
there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we
determine, based on medical testimony and scientific development
showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the
subjects birth certificate entry is in order.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither
consistently and categorically female nor consistently and categorically male)
composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However,
respondents body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones
(androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic
features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or
naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be
what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with
good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male
and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen)
there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being
male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such
persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not
taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And
accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could
have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication,[26] to
force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not
to do so.Nature has instead taken its due course in respondents development to
reveal more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on
respondent concerning a matter so innately private as ones sexuality and
lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment
to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent
as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or
remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment
and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly
currently knows this gender of the human species.Respondent is the one who
has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the
pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial
choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development
and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an
incompetent[27] and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying
respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally
entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the
respondents position and his personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of
nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other
words, we respect respondents congenital condition and his mature decision to
be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect
how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life
easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has
held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be
exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will
follow.[28] The trial courts grant of respondents change of name from Jennifer to
Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the
consequence that respondents change of name merely recognizes his preferred
gender, we find merit in respondents change of name. Such a change will
conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.
WHEREFORE, the Republics petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
128
Persons 4th Exam Cases
GERBERT R. CORPUZ,
Petitioner,
- versus -
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL,
Respondents.
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision[1] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition
for review on certiorari[2] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present
petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who
acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29,
[3]
2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto.
Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.[4] Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned
to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was
shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another
man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition
for divorce. The Superior Court of
Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce
on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later,
on January 8, 2006.[5]
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found
another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in
the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and
registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the
National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage
between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be
enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized
by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of
1982.[6]
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition)
with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive
pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial
court. She offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged
her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and
personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a
party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC denied Gerberts
petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to
institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as
he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse
can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code,[8] in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine
law.[9] Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside
the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent
behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;[10] the
provision was enacted to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.[11]
THE PETITION
From the RTCs ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the present petition.[13]
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for
declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for
a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision
applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC
ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to
file the petition only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims to be
contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal
interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be
prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the Philippines
since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil
Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their
respective Comments,[14] both support Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition
a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien
spouse can
claim no
right under
the second
paragraph
of Article 26
of the
Family Code
as the
substantive
right it
establishes
is in favor of
the Filipino
spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and
intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages
void[15] and voidable[16] marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage
exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand,
contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the
marriage.[17] Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between
Filipino citizens.[18]
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages
between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the
exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution,[19] enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26
of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside
the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227
effectively incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.[20] and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[21] In both cases, the Court
refused to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a
foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court,
thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital
bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v.
Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino
spouse] has to be considered still married to [the
alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's
obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino
spouse] should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the
alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one
of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against
in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.[22]
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law
to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to
129
Persons 4th Exam Cases
the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.[23] The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by
the divorce decree.Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to
have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry.[24] Without the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree
of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or
as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the
Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of
severing the marital bond;[25] Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the
policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in
Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and
serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the
Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If
the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the
courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to
contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make
a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already
established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally
governed by his national law.[26]
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the
purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC
was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can
claim no right under this provision.
The foreign
divorce
decree is
presumptive
evidence of
a right that
clothes the
party with
legal
interest to
petition for
its
recognition
in this
jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the
complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to
dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability
of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself,
after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been
duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive
evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This
Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final
orders.The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final
order upon a specific thing, the
judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title of the
thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final
order against a person, the
judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right
as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order
may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment
is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action
before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce
situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien
abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid
according to his or her national law.[27]
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment
is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, no sovereign
is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a
tribunal of another country.[28] This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together
with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on
the alien himself or herself.[29] The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party
invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce,
purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by
(1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal
custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in
the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of
the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its
authenticity,[30] but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
divorce.[31] Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the
petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more
appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the
divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action,
given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes
(Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same
time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and
overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure
conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign
judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata[32] between
the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.[33]
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the
practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations,
the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the
deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien
spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not
obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerati
ons beyond
the
recognition
of the
foreign
divorce
decree
As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that
the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce
decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the
mere presentation of the decree.[34] We consider the recording to be
legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar
to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil
register. The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees
that produce legal consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity
and status, i.e., those affecting all his personal qualities and relations, more
or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such
as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not.[35]
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one,
affecting a persons legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact,
Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the
registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
130
Persons 4th Exam Cases

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition

Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself,
established for recording the civil status of authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for
persons, in which shall be entered: recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding,
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the
(a) births; civil registry.
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages; Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil
(d) annulments of marriages; register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of
(e) divorces; Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for
(f) legitimations; a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be
(g) adoptions; judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail
(h) acknowledgment of natural children; the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with
(i) naturalization; and before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be
(j) changes of name. annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the
verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
xxxx corresponding civil registry is located;[38] that the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars proceedings;[39] and that the time and place for hearing must be published
shall keep and preserve in their offices the following in a newspaper of general circulation.[40] As these basic jurisdictional
books, in which they shall, respectively make the requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider
proper entries concerning the civil status of persons: the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
(1) Birth and death register;
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce
entered not only the marriages decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and
solemnized but also divorces and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules
dissolved marriages. of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a
Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or
adoption, change of name and right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
naturalization register. can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding[41] by which the
applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms
of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, clear mistake of law or fact.
the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso
facto authorize the decrees registration. The law should be read in relation WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari,
with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of
it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February
judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for
Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this
of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General.No costs.
Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree
presented by Gerbert. SO ORDERED.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the
requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of
1982,[36] and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982[37] both
of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a
foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil
registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being
contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the
requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal
effect.

131
Persons 4th Exam Cases
YASUO IWASAWA, PETITIONER,
vs.
FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN1 (A.K.A FELISA GANGAN ARAMBULO,
AND FELISA GANGAN IWASAWA) AND THE LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF PASAY CITY, RESPONDENTS.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the September 4, 2012
Decision2 and October 16, 2012 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 43, of Manila in Civil Case No. 11-126203. The RTC denied the
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa
with private respondent Felisa Custodio Gangan due to insufficient
evidence.
The antecedents follow:
Petitioner, a Japanese national, met private respondent sometime in 2002
in one of his visits to the Philippines. Private respondent introduced herself
as "single" and "has never married before." Since then, the two became
close to each other. Later that year, petitioner came back to the Philippines
and married private respondent on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City. After
the wedding, the couple resided in Japan.4
In July 2009, petitioner noticed his wife become depressed. Suspecting that
something might have happened in the Philippines, he confronted his wife
about it. To his shock, private respondent confessed to him that she
received news that her previous husband passed away.5
Petitioner sought to confirm the truth of his wifes confession and discovered
that indeed, she was married to one Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo and that
their marriage took place on June 20, 1994.6 This prompted petitioner to file
a petition7 for the declaration of his marriage to private respondent as null
and void on the ground that their marriage is a bigamous one, based on
Article 35(4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
During trial, aside from his testimony, petitioner also offered the following
pieces of documentary evidence issued by the National Statistics Office
(NSO):
(1)
Certificate of Marriage8 between petitioner and private
respondent marked as Exhibit "A" to prove the fact of marriage
between the parties on November 28, 2002;
(2)
Certificate of Marriage9 between private respondent and
Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo marked as Exhibit "B" to prove the
fact of marriage between the parties on June 20, 1994;
(3)
Certificate of Death10 of Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo marked
as Exhibits "C" and "C-1" to prove the fact of the latters death on
July 14, 2009; and
(4)
Certification11 from the NSO to the effect that there are two
entries of marriage recorded by the office pertaining to private
respondent marked as Exhibit "D" to prove that private
respondent in fact contracted two marriages, the first one was to
a Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo on June 20, 1994, and second,
to petitioner on November 28, 2002.
The prosecutor appearing on behalf of the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) admitted the authenticity and due execution of the above
documentary exhibits during pre-trial.12
On September 4, 2012, the RTC rendered the assailed decision. It ruled
that there was insufficient evidence to prove private respondents prior
existing valid marriage to another man. It held that while petitioner offered
the certificate of marriage of private respondent to Arambulo, it was only
petitioner who testified about said marriage. The RTC ruled that petitioners
testimony is unreliable because he has no personal knowledge of private
respondents prior marriage nor of Arambulos death which makes him a
complete stranger to the marriage certificate between private respondent
and Arambulo and the latters death certificate. It further ruled that
petitioners testimony about the NSO certification is likewise unreliable
since he is a stranger to the preparation of said document.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by
the RTC in an Order dated October 16, 2012.
Hence this petition raising the sole legal issue of whether the testimony of
the NSO records custodian certifying the authenticity and due execution of
the public documents issued by said office was necessary before they could
be accorded evidentiary weight.
Petitioner argues that the documentary evidence he presented are public
documents which are considered self-authenticating and thus it was
unnecessary to call the NSO Records Custodian as witness. He cites Article
410 of the Civil Code which provides that books making up the civil register
and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents
and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Moreover, the
trial prosecutor himself also admitted the authenticity of said documents.
The OSG, in its Comment,13 submits that the findings of the RTC are not in
accord with law and established jurisprudence. It contends that both
Republic Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the Law on Registry of Civil
Status, and the Civil Code elaborated on the character of documents arising
from records and entries made by the civil registrar and categorically
declared them as public documents. Being public documents, said
documents are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their
due execution and genuineness and consequently, there was no need for
the court to require petitioner to present the records custodian or officer from
the NSO to testify on them. The OSG further contends that public
documents have probative value since they are prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein as provided in the above-quoted provision of the Civil
Code. Thus, the OSG submits that the public documents presented by
petitioner, considered together, completely establish the facts in issue.
In her letter14 dated March 19, 2013 to this Court, private respondent
indicated that she is not against her husbands petition to have their
marriage declared null and void. She likewise admitted therein that she
contracted marriage with Arambulo on June 20, 1994 and contracted a
second marriage with petitioner on November 28, 2002. She further
admitted that it was due to poverty and joblessness that she married
petitioner without telling the latter that she was previously married. Private
respondent also confirmed that it was when she found out that Arambulo
passed away on July 14, 2009 that she had the guts to confess to petitioner
about her previous marriage. Thereafter, she and petitioner have
separated.
We grant the petition.
There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner
are all public documents.1wphi1 As provided in the Civil Code:
ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating
thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie
evidence of the facts therein contained.
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further
proof of their due execution and genuineness.15 Thus, the RTC erred when
it disregarded said documents on the sole ground that the petitioner did not
present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify on
their authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and due
execution was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said
documents admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight
because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since
neither the private respondent nor the public prosecutor presented evidence
to the contrary.
This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is
required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else,
what transpires is a bigamous marriage,16 which is void from the beginning
as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines. And this
is what transpired in the instant case.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the documentary exhibits taken
together concretely establish the nullity of the marriage of petitioner to
private respondent on the ground that their marriage is bigamous. The
exhibits directly prove the following facts: (1) that private respondent
married Arambulo on June 20, 1994 in the City of Manila; (2) that private
respondent contracted a second marriage this time with petitioner on
November 28, 2002 in Pasay City; (3) that there was no judicial declaration
of nullity of the marriage of private respondent with Arambulo at the time
she married petitioner; (3) that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009 and that it
was only on said date that private respondents marriage with Arambulo
was deemed to have been dissolved; and (4) that the second marriage of
private respondent to petitioner is bigamous, hence null and void, since the
first marriage was still valid and subsisting when the second marriage was
contracted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
September 4, 2012 Decision and October 16, 2012 Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 11-126203 are hereby
SET ASIDE. The marriage of petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa and private
respondent Felisa Custodio Gangan is declared NULL and VOID.
The Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City and the National Statistics Office are
hereby ORDERED to make proper entries into the records of the
abovementioned parties in accordance with this Decision.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
132
Persons 4th Exam Cases
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court are the Regional Trial Court1(RTC) Decision2 dated May
5, 2009 and Order3 dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-
CEB. The assailed decision granted respondent Merlinda L. Olaybar's
petition for cancellation of entries in the latter's marriage contract; while
the assailed order denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG).
The facts of the case are as follows:
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a
Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for
her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she
discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a
Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied having
contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged
husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that
the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. 4 She,
thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract,
especially the entries in the wife portion thereof. 5 Respondent
impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged
husband, as parties to the case.
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she
could not have appeared before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the
supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was allegedly
celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a medical
distributor in Hansao Pharma. She completely denied having known
the supposed husband, but she revealed that she recognized the
named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was
working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension House. She believed that
her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel
agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to
obtain a passport.6 Respondent also presented as witness a certain
Eufrocina Natinga, an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed
that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their office,
but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not
respondent.7 Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature
appearing in the marriage contract was forged. 8
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in
favor of the petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar. The Local Civil Registrar of
Cebu City is directed to cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of the
alleged marriage contract of the petitioner and respondent Ye Son
Sune.
SO ORDERED.9
Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract
was not that of respondent, the court found basis in granting the latters
prayer to straighten her record and rectify the terrible mistake. 10
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed
Decision on the grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling,
typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it
to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2)
granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the
alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab
initio.11
In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration couched in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by the Republic of the Philippines. Furnish copies of this order to
the Office of the Solicitor General, the petitioners counsel, and all
concerned government agencies.
SO ORDERED.12
Contrary to petitioners stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to
take cognizance of cases for correction of entries even on substantial
errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the appropriate
adversary proceeding required. Considering that respondents identity
was used by an unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean
national, it would not be feasible for respondent to institute an action
for declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void
marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code. 13
Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of
the assailed RTC Decision and Order based on the following grounds:
I.
RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY
WHEN THERE ARE ERRORS IN THE ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE
CANCELLED OR CORRECTED.
II.
GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE
WIFE PORTION OF THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN
EFFECT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO.14
Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be
cancelled or corrected, because the entries made in the certificate of
marriage are the ones provided by the person who appeared and
represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar and are, in fact, the latters
personal circumstances.15 In directing the cancellation of the entries in
the wife portion of the certificate of marriage, the RTC, in effect,
declared the marriage null and void ab initio. 16Thus, the petition
instituted by respondent is actually a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding. 17
We deny the petition.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court
from the decisions and final orders of the RTC may be taken where only
questions of law are raised or involved. There is a question of law when
the doubt arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which
does not call for the examination of the probative value of the evidence
of the parties.18 Here, the issue raised by petitioner is whether or not
the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect,
nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Verily, petitioner raised a pure question of law.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any
act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of
persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file
a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any
entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon
good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil
register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of
annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages
void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k)
election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction;
(m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry
in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of the
petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for
the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof
to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court
shall also cause the order to be published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person
having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of
publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the
proceedings is brought may make orders expediting the
proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss
the petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or
correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the
judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned
who shall annotate the same in his record.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation
or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either
be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the
procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil
status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and
the procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of
Republic v. Valencia19 in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that
"even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a
petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the
parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate
adversarial proceeding."20 An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding
is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all
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relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing
counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite partys
case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered.21
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing
may be dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere
application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always
summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary
proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates
the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which
would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the
civil registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition, if any;
and it states that although the court may make orders expediting the
proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the
petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the
procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate
adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in
entries of the civil register.22
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of
marriage are admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent.
The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she was
not the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In
other words, she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if
there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It must
be recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the
NSO, it appeared that she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She
then sought the cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the
marriage certificate.
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent
made the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged
husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is likewise
undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were
complied with. The Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified
of the petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor
to participate in the proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted
where respondent herself, the stenographer of the court where the
alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a document examiner,
testified. Several documents were also considered as evidence. With
the testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court found that
the signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was different
from respondents signature appearing in some of her government
issued identification cards.23 The court thus made a categorical
conclusion that respondents signature in the marriage certificate was
not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as
she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated.
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru
Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar
General of the National Statistics Office24 that:
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the
civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A
direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive
and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are
the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses
and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A
direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also
necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family
Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369),
as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil
registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his
marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in
the civil registry.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented
to show the existence of marriage.1wphi1 Rather, respondent showed
by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that
she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and
documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of
marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we
maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of
marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where
all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations
of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of
the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent
indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no
marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage
to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in
allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by
cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way,
declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The Regional Trial Court Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order
dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
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