Hidden in Plain Sight Political Opposition and Hegemonic Authoritarianism in Azerbaijan PDF

Post-Soviet Affairs
ISSN: 1060-586X (Print) 1938-2855 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpsa20
Hidden in plain sight: political opposition and

hegemonic authoritarianism in Azerbaijan
Jody LaPorte
To cite this article: Jody LaPorte (2015) Hidden in plain sight: political opposition and
hegemonic authoritarianism in Azerbaijan, Post-Soviet Affairs, 31:4, 339-366, DOI:
10.1080/1060586X.2014.951184
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Download by: [Gadjah Mada University] Date: 04 November 2017, At: 04:24
Post-Soviet Affairs, 2015
Vol. 31, No. 4, 339366, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2014.951184
Hidden in plain sight: political opposition and hegemonic

authoritarianism in Azerbaijan
Jody LaPorte*
Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

(Received 17 March 2014; accepted 14 July 2014)
This paper examines the consolidation and maintenance of hegemonic

authoritarianism in post-Soviet Azerbaijan. Hegemonic regimes are
Downloaded by [Gadjah Mada University] at 04:24 04 November 2017
characterized by their nearly total lack of political competition. Despite the

presence of opposition parties and regular elections, the incumbent in these
cases is reelected with 70% or more of the vote. What does it take to sustain
overwhelming margins of victory in regular elections in the face of
institutionalized opposition? Previous studies have suggested that either
violent repression or institutionalized co-optation of opposition groups is
central to securing long-term hegemonic regime stability. These mechanisms
explain how rulers forestall potential opposition. Upon coming to power in
1993, however, Heydar Aliyev like many post-Soviet leaders inherited a
genuine, existing opposition in the Popular Front movement. I suggest that in
the presence of an intractable opposition, Azerbaijans rulers have taken a
different approach with regard to regime maintenance. Drawing on over 50
original interviews conducted during 6 months of field research, I identify the
mechanisms by which the government has hidden the opposition in plain
sight by making it effectively difficult for existing opposition groups to
function as credible political parties. Since the mid-1990s, the Aliyev regime
has used informal measures to prevent these groups from aggregating and
articulating the diverse interests present in society from visibly competing in
elections and from serving effectively in government to craft and implement
policy. These practices have rendered the opposition technically legal, but
completely ineffective. Besides weakening the opposition, these measures
produce a series of mutually reinforcing effects including noncompetitive
elections by default and a politically disengaged society that sustain long-
term regime stability. The paper concludes by examining this argument in
comparative perspective. Hegemonic regimes have proliferated in the post-
Soviet region, and I suggest that this strategy is an important factor in
sustaining many of these regimes.
Keywords: Azerbaijan; autocratic elections; hegemonic authoritarianism;
opposition; political parties
The leaders of many post-Soviet countries are proving to be suspiciously popular.

Judging by recent election results, citizens of many countries in Eurasia vote for
their incumbent presidents in overwhelming majorities, and they do so repeatedly
*Email: jody.laporte@politics.ox.ac.uk
q 2014 Taylor & Francis

340 J. LaPorte
in successive elections. Perhaps nowhere is this more true than in Azerbaijan.

After Heydar Aliyev assumed power in a military coup in March 1993, he was
elected president later that year with 99% of the vote, and reelected with 78%
support in 1998. In 2003, in the midst of a reelection campaign and in failing
health, the president passed power to his son. Ilham Aliyev took the reins of his
fathers campaign and won office with 78% of the vote. In the 2008 elections,
Ilham Aliyev won 87% of the vote, despite the fact that he declined even to launch
a campaign. By 2013, against a field of nine competitors, Aliyev garnered 85% of
the vote following a campaign period that election monitors characterized as
subdued and appeared to generate limited public interest (OSCE/ODIHR 2013,
11). In short, despite the presence of multiple opposition parties, Azerbaijani
presidential elections have since 1993 been dominated by the incumbent regime.
These dynamics qualify Azerbaijan as a particularly stable case of hegemonic

authoritarianism. In such regimes, opposition parties are allowed to exist both
legally and in practice. They are granted registration with the Ministry of Justice as
political parties, which grants certain rights and privileges that would not be
available under fully closed regimes. But executive elections do not entail
meaningful contention for office. Elections flout democratic standards, generate
overwhelming victories for the incumbent, and, even before the results are
announced, leave few doubts as to who will be declared the victor. These regimes
contain an inherent tension. Opposition groups pose a fundamental threat to the
ruler; allowing such groups to exist and to participate in politics is a potentially
risky endeavor. Yet, as the case of Azerbaijan demonstrates, many rulers do
manage to sustain hegemonic regimes and dominate electoral contests for decades.
They do this even while tolerating the presence and participation of political
opposition parties and without resorting to the suffocating violence characteristic
of fully closed regimes.
How are the presence of organized opposition parties and the domination of
elections both possible? What does it take to sustain these overwhelming margins
of victory in regular elections, even in the face of institutionalized opposition? This
paper draws on a diverse set of sources including over 50 original interviews
conducted during 6 months of field research to identify the methods by which
Azerbaijans rulers have hidden their opponents in plain sight. I argue that
Azerbaijans rulers have marginalized existing opposition parties by making it
effectively impossible for them to perform the functions associated with credible
political parties. Since the mid-1990s, Azerbaijans rulers have used a combination
of formal and informal measures to prevent these parties from aggregating and
articulating the diverse interests present in society from visibly competing in
elections and from serving in government to craft and implement policy. These
practices have rendered the opposition technically legal, but completely
ineffective. These measures contribute to the robustness of uncompetitive politics
even in the absence of harsher forms of repression because the opposition lacks
popular support and political credibility over the long term. As opposition parties
become weaker, noncompetitive elections become easier to orchestrate, facilitating
regime consolidation and stability over time. This argument thus highlights and
Post-Soviet Affairs 341
elucidates a poorly understood mechanism by which autocrats neutralize their

challengers and uphold the dynamics of hegemonic rule.
The article proceeds in five sections. The first section reviews the literature on
hegemonic authoritarianism. Here, I illustrate the limitations of existing models
for understanding Azerbaijans policies toward political opposition. Section two
develops a new model for constraining opposition parties, focusing on how
marginalizing opposition parties can contribute to regime stability. Sections three
and four illustrate this theory using the case study of Azerbaijan. I establish that
marginalization accurately describes the governments treatment of the
opposition; then, I trace the mechanisms by which these policies have contributed
to the persistence of hegemonic rule in Azerbaijan. A fifth section assesses the
prospects for continuing authoritarian stability in Azerbaijan in the face of other
potential sources of opposition. The conclusion places this argument in

comparative perspective, suggesting that exclusionary approaches to opposition
are a key part of hegemonic rule across post-Soviet Eurasia.
Government and opposition in hegemonic regimes

Conceptualizing hegemonic authoritarianism
Hegemonic authoritarian regimes are characterized by their acute lack of political
competition. They are identified by presidential elections in which the incumbent
is reelected with 70% or more of the vote (Howard and Roessler 2006; Levitsky
and Way 2010). Within the broader category of electoral authoritarianism,
hegemonic regimes occupy an intermediate conceptual space between competitive
authoritarianism and fully-closed regimes (Schedler 2006; Morse 2012).
Competitive authoritarian regimes are so named because they hold elections
that are competitive, albeit neither free nor fair. Levitsky and Way (2002, 55 57)
describe competitive authoritarian regimes as those in which elections are bitterly
fought and generate considerable uncertainty; further, legislatures occasion-
ally become focal points of opposition activity and independent media outlets
maintain significant autonomy from the state, thus being not only legal but often
quite influential. None of this is true in hegemonic regimes: elections entail
minimal uncertainty, legislative proceedings rarely include active debate, and
independent media outlets are minimally influential. While hegemonic regimes
entail lower levels of competition than hybrid regimes, they are not fully closed
regimes. In closed regimes, opposition parties are forbidden entirely in law or
practice. In contrast, hegemonic regimes maintain the fac ade of competitive
politics, without jeopardizing the incumbents hold on power.
Strategies for managing opposition

How do hegemonic regimes consolidate and sustain uncompetitive politics? It is
sometimes assumed that rulers achieve overwhelming victories through vote
fraud. Within any individual election, incumbents can inflate their magnitude of
success by stuffing ballot boxes, manipulating the process of counting and
342 J. LaPorte
tabulating votes, and misreporting the results (Birch 2011; Donno and Roussias
2012). These short-term strategies undoubtedly contribute to noncompetitive
outcomes. However, election fraud is only part of the story. Major vote fraud is
more difficult to execute in the presence of todays ubiquitous elections monitors,
who gain access to all but the most closed regimes (Hyde and OMahony 2010).
Thus, ballot-rigging rarely sways the electoral results by more than a few
percentage points (Domnguez and McCann 1998; Lehoucq and Jimenez 2002;
Lehoucq 2003) and is more often employed just enough to ensure victory in
regimes with real competitors (Donno and Roussias 2012). Crucially, blatantly
stolen elections themselves have triggered the breakdown of such regimes, as
occurred in the color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan (Tucker
2007; Kuntz and Thompson 2009; Bunce and Wolchik 2011). After these
experiences, few regimes would risk an obviously stolen election. A more salient
question concerns the conditions under which incumbent rulers can secure a large
percentage of the vote even before ballot manipulation.
Scholars consequently have begun to examine the longer-term strategies that
rulers employ to prevent political opposition groups from effectively challenging
the regime. Recent institutionalist work highlights the mechanisms of co-optation,
with an eye toward how rulers distribute the spoils of government to goad potential
opposition into supporting the status quo (Pepinsky 2014). The literature on
nominally democratic institutions suggests that rulers use ruling parties,
legislatures, and elections to distribute political and monetary rewards, such as
policy concessions, state salaries, and privileged access to government contracts
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Magaloni 2006;
Gandhi 2008).
Yet, there is scant evidence that Azerbaijans opposition parties have been
co-opted. Azerbaijans booming oil industry has generated windfall profits for the
government.1 Some have suggested that the government draws on this revenue to
purchase support (Kendall-Taylor 2012) and to deter potential defection among
government elites (Radnitz 2012). But these patronage networks are limited to
rewarding loyal supporters and deterring potential opposition. Anyone affiliated
with the actual opposition is pointedly excluded from this largesse. One political
analyst described a prominent opposition party as having
no money. If you go to their office, you will see that they have no money. They do
not receive any money from the government. . . . They have a couple of secretaries
and a couple drivers, but they cant even afford to pay them a salary.2
A journalist suggested that this was part of a larger governmental strategy: The
opposition has been deprived of financial resources. There is no room for private
business without state involvement, and the state does not let the opposition have
businesses.3
A different literature suggests another option for containing political opponents:
full-scale repression (e.g., Bellin 2005; Way and Levitsky 2006; Frantz and
Kendall-Taylor 2014). Azerbaijans rulers might have tried to create a fully closed
regime, as some other Central Asian governments have done. In Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan, for example, there is no political space for even a nominal

opposition. Opposition parties have no de jure status with the state and opposition
activists risk arrest, torture, and death. In Uzbekistan, by the mid-2000s, only five
parties were registered, all of them pro-government (OSCE/ODIHR 2004b).
In Turkmenistan, only one political party was legally permitted until recently.
A new law on political parties was passed in January 2012 that permitted multi-party
competition for the first time; the most significant effect was that the government
founded and registered a second pro-government party (Ayatkov 2012; Gurt 2012).
It is clear that Azerbaijan has not sought to extinguish its opposition in the
same way. Opposition parties in Azerbaijan have been afforded a number of legal
rights. Over 50 parties are registered today with the Ministry of Justice, including a
large range of opposition groups. The list of registered parties spans the range of
moderate opposition parties that regularly criticize specific government policies

but accept the regimes legitimacy. Also registered are a number of more radical
opposition groups, which contest the legitimacy of the current rulers and call for
the overthrow of the Aliyev government (Aliyeva 2012).
A number of factors have prevented the full-scale repression of political
opposition in Azerbaijan. The first obstacle concerned the nature of the opposition
groups themselves. As a result of Azerbaijans brief initial political opening in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, the Aliyev government from the outset faced an
inherited opposition. Todays most prominent opposition leaders emerged as
activists in the late Soviet years under the umbrella of the Popular Front movement.
From this movement emerged nationalist parties, such as the Popular Front Party,
Musavat, and the Azerbaijan National Independence Party, which together formed
the government of 1992 1993. These groups have been in opposition since Heydar
Aliyev seized power from them in 1993. Destroying such long-lasting and
institutionalized parties is more difficult and more costly than preventing a
potential adversary from emerging. While nascent opposition groups can be
preemptively nipped in the bud with little fanfare, inherited opposition parties,
with previous experience in government, have name recognition and the
organizational resources to fight back. Even the most discredited opposition has
some supporters, who may mobilize in protest if the government undertakes harsher
forms of repression. Stronger repression also risks antagonizing a more diffuse
group of citizens (masses and elites alike) who might align themselves in support of
the victimized opposition less out of ideological affinity, and more as a statement
against the governments efforts to narrow the political space or roll back political
reforms (Goodwin 2001). This scenario played out at times when the Aliyev
government tried to engage in higher levels of repression. For example, the
government required all parties to re-register in 1995 in an ultimately failed effort to
eliminate some opponents. The Ministry of Justice initially tried to deny registration
to some opposition parties, but was forced to concede in the face of domestic and
international protests (U.S. Department of State 1996a). The following year, the
government was thwarted in its attempt to imprison political dissidents: local
activists and foreign diplomats intervened in support of the prisoners, forcing the
government to release them (U.S. Department of State 1997).
344 J. LaPorte
Heydar Aliyev also lacked the coercive capacity to follow through on an

aggressive crackdown. When he assumed power in 1993, Aliyev inherited a state
apparatus that was in disarray. The government was composed of competing
warlords, and Aliyev faced a series of coup attempts from rivals both inside and
outside of government. In October 1994, troops loyal to the prime minister staged
an armed revolt; the coup attempt was suppressed and the prime minister
dismissed. Six months later, in March 1995, security forces uncovered a plot by a
deputy minister of internal affairs to assassinate the president. Additional coup
attempts were discovered and foiled through the rest of that year (Swietochowski
1995). In addition, the government was still fighting a war with Armenia over
Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijans rag-tag military had suffered a number of
crushing defeats under the Popular Front government, and Armenia continued to
make significant territorial gains against Azerbaijan in the months after Heydar
Aliyev took power. Although the two countries signed a cease-fire in May 1994
and the overt domestic rebellions subsided after 1995, Aliyevs government
continued to lack the fiscal resources necessary to fund a strong coercive
apparatus. The economy was decimated by the political instability of the early
1990s, with economic production declining 40% between 1990 and 1993 (Cornell
2011, 83). In these conditions, the government was barely able to make its payroll.
Although the economy stabilized in the late 1990s, it was only in 2000 that
measurable economic growth returned. Thus, the first several years of Heydar
Aliyevs rule were marked by political, military, and economic chaos. These
competing priorities made the full elimination of the opposition more difficult.
The final consideration that has prevented more aggressive policies against
opposition parties is the Azerbaijani governments foreign policy objectives.
Maintaining direct ties with the United States and Europe has been crucial to
achieving Azerbaijans foreign policy goals since the mid-1990s. Azerbaijan has
sought to preserve its strategic autonomy by navigating a delicate balance between
the competing powers of the West, Russia, and Iran. As a result, Azerbaijan has
pursued membership and influence within major European organizations
(including the European Union [EU] and Council of Europe) as well as bilateral
ties with the United States, United Kingdom, and other Western countries.
In addition, Western powers have played a key role in mediating negotiations
between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Discussions to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict are ongoing under the
aegis of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
Azerbaijan considers cultivating the respect of the Euro-Atlantic community to be a
means of protecting its interests in these negotiations, as well as balancing against a
resurgent Russia. Yet, to be taken seriously by the West, developing countries are
expected to build democratic institutions and to encourage, at least rhetorically,
political toleration and competition (Levitsky and Way 2005). Full-scale
repression would defy that expectation and could undermine Azerbaijans foreign
policy goals.
These factors not only explain why overt repression was not undertaken in the
early years; they also generate path-dependent mechanisms that shed light on the
lack of aggressive repression in later periods. The early years of instability created
a reluctance to rely on a weak and contested coercive apparatus to conduct harsh
repression. Svolik (2012, 127) points out that all authoritarian regimes face an
inherent risk when relying on the security forces for stability: the more
indispensable soldiers become in the suppression of internal opposition, the
greater their capacity to turn against the regime. The Aliyev government has been
keenly aware of this threat. The multiple rebellions in the early years of Heydar
Aliyevs presidency created a legacy of distrust among government officials and a
wariness of relying on repression to deal with the opposition. Moreover, as
opposition parties persist over time, it becomes increasingly difficult to completely
eradicate such groups. In Azerbaijan, as opposition parties were tolerated through
the 1990s, their leaders continued to deepen their connections to Western
governments and organizations.4 In these circumstances, aggressive repression

against the opposition would be unlikely to escape the notice of human rights
monitors or the Euro-Atlantic community.
Under these constraints, Azerbaijans rulers have undertaken a different
approach to dealing with political opposition. Without actually forbidding
opposition parties, authorities use formal and informal means to undermine their
political effectiveness. The next section elaborates the mechanisms by which some
rulers might marginalize opposition parties, and how doing so contributes to
regime stability.
Mechanisms of marginalization
Rulers marginalize opposition parties by tolerating these groups in legal terms,
while excluding them from politics in practice. In short, they strategically hinder
the oppositions capacity to perform the expected functions of credible political
parties.
When they are operating effectively, political parties perform three functions
that are central to their purpose and set them apart from other organizations.
First, they aggregate and articulate the diverse interests present in society into
coherent, comprehensive party programs. They gather the policy preferences of
likely supporters, offer an ideological structure for political debates, craft policy
alternatives, and mobilize voters for ongoing support. Second, they compete in
elections with the goal of gaining seats in government. As Schmitter (2001,
72 73) articulates, parties structure the electoral process by nominating
candidates for office, by recruiting persons to participate actively in campaigns,
and, thereby, by offering to citizens aggregated in territorial constituencies a
choice between alternative sets of leaders. Third, political parties serve in
government to craft and implement policy. They propose legislation and
negotiate with other parties to lobby for the adoption of these policies. They
also staff the government, appointing people to cabinet offices and high-ranking
state posts.
In democracies, the ability to accomplish these three tasks is influenced by
broad structural characteristics, such as societal cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan
346 J. LaPorte
1967; Kitschelt 1992), and electoral institutions (Duverger 1955; Cox 1997).
Factors internal to each party for example, a partys organizational structure
(Panebianco 1988; Levitsky 2003), available resources (Katz and Mair 1995;
Grzymala-Busse 2002), and strategic choices (Downs 1957) also bear on party
success. What these factors have in common is the fact that they are substantially
beyond the manipulation of incumbent parties or state authority.
In authoritarian regimes, however, the dynamics are quite different: incumbent
rulers exert significantly more power over political groups and their activities.
Autocrats can make it difficult or impossible for existing opposition parties to
perform the tasks outlined above and thus to serve as effective intermediaries
between state and society.
In hegemonic authoritarian contexts, regime leaders marginalize opposition
parties by, first, isolating them from society, thereby preventing them from
developing a coherent policy platform. These governments can make it difficult
for opposition parties to meet with citizens to learn of their policy preferences or to
mobilize citizens in support of their cause. Autocrats break the linkages between
opposition parties and society through a range of measures. They place restrictions
on protests, rallies, and public meetings and swiftly break up any attempts to
violate those laws. They also prevent opposition from appearing on mass
broadcast media. While some governments restrict coverage of the opposition to
negative publicity and public criticism, the most successful regimes dictate that
broadcast media ignore opposition groups altogether. They also frequently make it
difficult for opposition parties to maintain professional offices through quotidian
bureaucratic interference. Institutionalized office space provides a place for
opposition to meet and to organize, a physical location for potential supporters to
visit, and a visible marker of the partys official status as a political organization.
Without the opportunities to meet with constituents, opposition parties face
significant challenges aggregating voters interests, cultivating representative
policy proposals, and recruiting members.
Second, rulers prevent opposition parties from effectively competing in
national elections. Even in parliamentary elections, authorities use legalistic and
informal mechanisms to make it difficult for challengers to register as candidates.
These mechanisms include deliberately enacted and selectively enforced criteria
for political candidates such as a requirement that candidates cannot have
resided outside the country in recent years and may not have been convicted of
minor administrative charges. The scrutiny of candidates registration petitions
also is a politicized endeavor; opposition candidates are often denied registration
because of dubious complaints about the validity of their signature lists. When
the opposition does manage to field candidates, they often face hindrances to
active campaigning. Campaign rallies occur under strict regulations, with narrow
limits on the time and spaces for public meetings. They are granted limited
access to the media, especially in comparison to government-sponsored
candidates, and opposition groups are constrained by campaign spending limits.
Within hegemonic regimes, these restrictions result in lackluster election
campaigns.
In the final aspect of marginalization, autocrats restrict the oppositions ability

to serve in government. They most frequently do this by limiting the oppositions
access to the legislature. In some cases, the opposition does not win any seats at
all; in other cases, the opposition is granted a handful seats but not enough to
introduce proposals or influence policymaking. It is common for nondemocratic
regimes to have weak parliaments, with little formal or informal power over the
executive branch (Fish 2005). Successful hegemonic regimes take this one step
further. By maintaining control over an overwhelming proportion of seats in
parliament, they prevent the ineffective legislature from even offering a forum for
political debate. Successful autocrats preclude opposition members from
participating in the public sector including not just high-level appointments
in the executive and judiciary, but also low-level positions in the state
bureaucracy, public sector, and law enforcement. They deny the opposition access
to the legislature while also blocking them from other potential channels for
political influence.
Taken individually, none of these actions are particularly novel. But when they
are undertaken in concert, they produce a cumulative set of effects that contribute
to the persistence of hegemonic rule. Most directly, these policies serve to
discredit the opposition and leave the electorate with few viable alternatives to the
incumbent. Isolating opposition parties from society by preventing them from
maintaining offices, appearing on media, or meeting with citizens renders them
effectively invisible. Over time, as opposition members lose consecutive elections
and are practically blocked from political office, these individuals lose the skills,
resources, and political experience necessary to field viable candidates in
elections. The opposition thus loses popular support and withers away as a viable
political force, even as it maintains the legal right to exist.
These measures facilitate noncompetitive elections. In the absence of a viable
opposition, the incumbent generates wide margins of victory much wider
margins than could be reasonably achieved through vote fraud alone. Equally
important, because the opposition is unpopular, citizens consider it plausible that
the incumbent genuinely won a majority of votes and so are less inclined to protest
the results. Under these circumstances, fraudulent elections are unlikely to act as a
focal point for collective action. Opposition parties do not have the popular
support, social base, nor organizational capacity to capitalize on such events or to
organize citizens against the status quo.
This points to the longer-term effects of marginalizing the opposition: it
discourages citizens from getting involved in party politics. In a political system
where the governments authority is effectively unchallenged, many citizens
become discouraged about their ability to effect change either as voters or as
potential opposition candidates. Marginalizing the existing opposition, especially
in the absence of new types of opposition groups, thus serves to depoliticize
politics and to demobilize citizens.
Moreover, the subtlety of these policies makes them difficult to combat.
Marginalizing the opposition is a case of what Pierson (2003) calls slow-moving
causal processes, the effects of which develop over an extended period of time.
348 J. LaPorte
In the absence of significant government violence or discrete consequences, it is

difficult for the public and, in many cases, human rights monitors and the
opposition groups themselves to foresee the cumulative effects of these policies.
This strategy also presents a dilemma for Western diplomats and international
human rights groups who seek to hold autocratic governments to account.
Marginalizing the opposition entails a complex constellation of policies and
practices, which often are implemented incrementally. While some foreign actors
may issue condemnatory statements, few of these decisions would be dramatic
enough to trigger sanctions or other punitive action. This is particularly true when
the offending country occupies a position of strategic importance for the West
for example, because the country is important for regional stability, provides
military or security assistance to the West or is a major energy exporter.
Case study: political opposition in Azerbaijan

The case of Azerbaijan highlights these dynamics. Without actually forbidding
opposition parties, authorities harass them and make their life quite difficult in
order to undermine their practical effectiveness. This section illustrates the
methods by which they have accomplished this goal, focusing in turn on the ways
that they have isolated the opposition from society, excluded them from
parliamentary elections, and prevented them from serving in the state.
Isolated from society

Azerbaijans government has developed a number of measures to prevent
opposition parties from interacting with society. First, the government evicted
opposition parties from their professional offices. In the 1990s, under state
pressure, some parties closed their regional offices. The governments campaign
intensified in the early 2000s, when numerous opposition parties were evicted
from their headquarters in the capital city. Since then, opposition parties have had
serious difficulties renting office space, with some parties operating out of their
leaders apartments reportedly because landlords were afraid to rent office space to
them due to official pressure (U.S. Department of State 2009). Today, opposition
parties have no visible presence in Bakus downtown. In the absence of office
space, these groups have limited capacity to receive citizens and nowhere to hold
organizational meetings.
Second, increasingly strict laws have been put in place that in practice preclude
opposition parties from organizing rallies, protests, and public meetings.
Organizers are required to apply for permission to hold a public protest, and the
law gives municipal officials wide latitude to reject their applications. Local
authorities have used these provisions to deny most requests. The list of spaces
approved for rallies grew more restrictive over time, especially in Baku. In the
1990s, when the regime was still consolidating, permission was regularly granted
for assemblies in the area that one opposition leader described as the second
zone of Baku.5 These sites were located several kilometers from the citys
government buildings and commercial centers, but were still in heavily populated
areas and easily accessible by public transportation. Today, informal restrictions
make protesting so inconvenient as to be impossible. As another opposition party
leader complained,
With meetings now, they are allowed only at Bibi Heyat, which is at the beach. It is
far away, difficult to get to. The people in power even laugh at the opposition, saying
that we can organize a meeting and a picnic.6
Third, the government has ensured that there are few media outlets available to the
opposition. State radio and television the primary source of information for most
citizens is almost entirely dedicated to coverage of government activity. The
development of independent media outlets also has been limited. Many independent
radio and television channels have had trouble obtaining and retaining broadcast
permits. In other cases, the government has revoked the registration of media outlets
that gave air time to opposition leaders. For example, in October 1999, government
security forces shut the independent company Sara Radio/TV after it broadcast an
interview with Nizami Suleymanov, chairman of the Independent Azerbaijan Party.
The station was raided by security forces the following day and ordered to cease
broadcasting; it was liquidated 4 months later.7 With regard to print media, the
larger opposition parties publish their own newspapers, but as one journalist
explained, no one buys [these] newspapers; few get sold.8 Their print operations
are constantly under threat. Especially in the late 1990s and early 2000s, prosecutors
regularly pursued criminal libel suits against opposition journalists, while
government officials filed frequent civil defamation suits against various
opposition-owned papers with the goal of forcing them into bankruptcy. Reporters
working for these papers have also suffered physical violence, arrest, and
intimidation often while attempting to cover opposition protests.9
Taken together, these measures serve to make opposition parties invisible to
the public eye. Lacking political offices, unable to organize public meetings, and
without access to the media, these parties find it difficult to mobilize voters for
ongoing support. This point was emphasized in several of my interviews.
An opposition politician conceded that the regular opposition here is only
supported by people on the fringes of society who are really unsatisfied.10
An analyst confirmed, They have no social base.11
Excluded from elections

Azerbaijans government has also manipulated electoral proceedings to
discriminate against opposition parties, especially during parliamentary elections.
While opposition candidates are legally permitted to field candidates for elected
office, the government employs a number of informal and legalistic measures that
make it difficult to do so in practice. For example, opposition candidates have been
refused registration at a significantly higher rate than pro-government politicians.
Until 2002, the 125 seats in Azerbaijans legislature were elected in a mixed
system, with 100 seats allocated to candidates in single-member districts (SMD)
and 25 seats allocated proportionally according to party list (PR). Under these
350 J. LaPorte
rules, candidates contesting the SMD seats were required to procure 2,000
signatures to register. Political parties seeking to register a candidate list for the PR
portion needed 500,000 valid signatures. In both portions, the Central Election
Commission regularly ruled that a large number of the oppositions signatures
were invalid, thus disqualifying those candidates and parties. In 1995, 63% of the
candidates and one-third of the parties who tried to enter the race were disqualified
(OSCE/UN 1996). In 2000, the election commission rejected 50% of the individual
candidates and 62% of the parties (OSCE/ODIHR 2001b). Electoral reforms in
2002 abolished the proportional component; the number of signatures necessary
for registration also has been reduced. But the process continues to be politicized.
Registration for the 2005 parliamentary elections was inclusive, with 96% of
candidates registered (OSCE/ODIHR 2006, 9). However, in 2010, again more than
half of the opposition-nominated candidates were rejected. In contrast, 100% of the

ruling partys candidates were registered (OSCE/ODIHR 2011).
Those opposition parties and candidates that do secure registration find it
challenging to conduct active campaigns. In an extension of the governments
efforts to isolate these groups from society, opposition candidates have been denied
equal access to the media during campaigns, even as the government adhered to the
letter of the campaign laws. For example, in the 2000 elections, the state broadcaster
observed the legal provisions for the allocation of free airtime on state media.
However, outside of the free air time, the channel showed strong bias in favor of the
party in government, offering them some 90 percent of the election program
coverage. By contrast, only 1% of air time was granted to the opposition and most
of their coverage was negative. Monitors thus concluded that the state media
consistently failed to comply with the spirit of Article 52.1 of the Election Law,
which prohibits State media from campaigning for or against election contestants
(OSCE/ODIHR 2001b, 9). These patterns were repeated in the 2005 election.
Monitors again reported that the state broadcaster respected the legally required
allocation of free air time, but otherwise devoted 97% of its political coverage to the
President and ruling party, and largely ignored opposition candidates (OSCE/
ODIHR 2006, 16). In 2010, both public and private stations devoted the bulk of their
coverage to the government and ruling partys activities, though overall minimal
attention was paid to the campaigns (OSCE/ODIHR 2011, 14).
As mentioned above, opposition parties also face an uphill battle to secure
space for public meetings and campaign rallies. Authorities have been accused of
helping to arrange meetings for favored candidates while hampering others
(OSCE/UN 1996, 12), changing the date and location of opposition rallies at the
last minute (OSCE/ODIHR 2001b), and of harass[ment] during the course of
their campaign activities, for example, while meeting with voters, displaying
posters or distributing leaflets (OSCE/ODIHR 2006, 12).
These hindrances cumulatively hurt the oppositions ability to fulfill the
electoral function of political parties. Rather than structuring political competition,
these measures eliminate political alternatives. As a result of the difficulties that
opposition parties face in registering and campaigning for elections, citizens
effectively are left with few choices at the ballot box.
Excluded from governance

Finally, those few opposition politicians who do win public office find themselves
excluded from policymaking. In the legislature, the ruling party uses its
supermajority to frame debate away from opposition concerns, thus in practice
silencing the opposition further. The parliament is extremely weak in Azerbaijan
(Fish and Kroenig 2009). However, even within parliaments limited mandate, the
opposition never holds enough seats to influence the direction of debate. Since
1995, the opposition has held no more than 10% of seats in the 125-seat Milli Majlis.
In the 1995 2000 Milli Majlis, opposition parties held a total of 12 seats: 4 to the
Popular Front of Azerbaijan Party, 4 to the Azerbaijan National Independence
Party, 2 to the Democratic Independence Party, and 1 each to the Citizens
Solidarity Party and Musavat. The 2000 parliamentary elections returned a
parliament with 13 seats for the opposition: 3 to Civic Solidarity, 2 to the Azerbaijan
National Independence Party, 6 to the Popular Front of Azerbaijan Party, and 2 to
Musavat. In the 2010 elections, only one clear opposition candidate was elected,
Igbal Agazade of the Umid (Hope) Party. In contrast, throughout this period, at least
90% of parliament has been composed of MPs who support the government. The
ruling New Azerbaijan Party held a controlling faction in parliament, with a total of
54 seats (1995 2000), 75 seats (2001 2005), 65 seats (2006 2010), and 72 seats
(2011 present). The rest was composed of individuals who were nominally
independent, but in practice were strongly allied with the president.
With so few seats, the oppositions role in the legislature has been limited to
window dressing on parliamentary procedures. Parliament routinely refuses to
debate legislation proposed by opposition parties, and the opposition never wins
policy concessions. In theory, all deputies have the right of legislative initiative.
In practice, the ruling party decides which initiatives will be heard. Moreover, to be
passed, bills must be approved by a majority of 63 votes, except those concerning
presidential or parliamentary elections, the status of members of parliament, or
referenda, which require passage by 83 votes (Azerbaycan Republikasiya
Konstitusiya [Constitution] 2009, art. 94, 96). The governments supermajority in
parliament has been used to keep opposition resolutions off the legislative agenda.
For example, on at least two occasions through the mid-2000s, opposition parties
proposed reforms to the Law on Political Parties in order to strengthen their legal
protections. Parliament refused to consider either proposal, instead debating and
ultimately passing the ruling New Azerbaijan Partys bill that increases the number
of signatures necessary to register a party and restricts private funding for parties
(Ismayilova 2010; Aliyev 2012).
Opposition supporters are also banned from serving in any other branches of
government. Loyalty to the president has been paramount for selection to (and
retention of) appointed positions in the state or government. Many opposition
figures lost their jobs when Heydar Aliyev came to power and have been informally
barred from government employment ever since. As early as 1995, President
Heydar Aliyev issued a decree that all highly placed government officials, as well
as regional and municipal government officials and other employees must join his
352 J. LaPorte
New Azerbaijan Party (U.S. Department of State 1996a). Observers have noted
that, much like in the Soviet Union, membership in the ruling YAP party has been a
requirement for employment in the state bureaucracy (International Crisis Group
2004, 10). A former opposition member explained, from the time Heydar Aliyev
took power, he put big pressure on Musavat Party. Musavat members were fired
from their jobs. They werent given jobs, businesses wouldnt work with them, and
pressure was even put on their relatives.12
The end result has been that opposition figures are unable to participate in
making or implementing public policy, regardless of their official job title. Being
excluded from the policymaking realm becomes self-reinforcing, as it prevents
opposition politicians from cultivating the political experience i.e., the portable
skills and political accomplishments necessary to attract voters confidence
(e.g., Grzymala-Busse 2002). As one person summarized:

So many people from the [former] government are now unemployed. But the current
government is happy with this and uses it against them, saying look they havent
even been doing anything, this guy isnt qualified to be in politics, he has been
unemployed for 15 years.
He illustrated the no-win situation facing the opposition: Of course, if [an
opposition politician] had chosen to be a taxi driver to make money, the government
would use that against them too.13 Furthermore, opposition parties no longer
serve as a vehicle for the recruitment and advancement of political elites. Aspiring
politicians are well aware of these informal restrictions. As a result, young,
politically-minded people are more likely to go abroad or to seek employment
with international organizations, embassies, or multi-national companies than to
join the organized opposition.14
Effects of exclusion
These measures have created a constellation of mutually reinforcing effects.
Weakening of the opposition

In Azerbaijan, opposition parties have been so weakened that they no longer pose a
credible challenge to the government. While they exist legally and on paper, they
have been hollowed out as political entities. As one political analyst explained,
The opposition used to be stronger in Azerbaijan. Their weakening is the result of
the governments fight against them, as well as the fact that people have gotten
tired of them. The government has been constantly working to weaken the
opposition.15
By the late 2000s, opposition parties had become genuinely unpopular. One expert
noted the opposition has essentially disappeared.16 Another remarked, The
opposition today is destroyed, ineffective, powerless, divided, smashed. It has the
least influence it ever has.17
Others pointed out the reputational effects caused by so many years of electoral
and political failure. They have been doing this for 17 years and they havent won
yet. People are really starting to doubt their ability for change.18 Or, as another
person summarized, they have been labeled as losers and are getting that
reputation.19 Survey results support this view. In a national survey conducted in
2005, Azerbaijani citizens were asked to identify the party that best represents the
interests and aspirations of people like them. Only 8% named an opposition party
(Sharma 2006).20 In contrast, 39% percent named the ruling New Azerbaijan
Party. Interestingly, 42% said that none of the parties (including the ruling party)
represented the aspirations of people like them. In more colorful language, a
political analyst concluded with regard to the opposition, You can see the trend:
The patient is dead!21
The opposition is allowed to exist and nominally to participate in politics. As a
result, citizens are more likely to see the oppositions ineffectiveness as its own
fault. In the absence of overt repression, the opposition is seen as a group of

political has-beens, rather than sympathetic victims of governmental repression.
Together, these policies have created Kafkaesque challenges for the opposition.
Bunce and Wolchik (2010, 60 61) suggest that these policies present oppositions
with unusually diverse, difficult, and, therefore, inherently divisive strategic
choices wherein the opposition is often considered unworthy of support.
Confronting the opposition with these strategic dilemmas helps to shift the blame
from the government to the opposition themselves.
Absence of political alternatives

By marginalizing the opposition, the government has created an image of
uncontested authority. As one analyst summarized, The current regimes policy is
to present themselves as the only alternative. In other words, to make the
opposition seem like they are not a credible alternative.22 Another commentator
made a similar point:
Why doesnt [the president] let them hold meetings, campaigns, etc? Because even
if it is no real threat to him when the opposition holds these events/activities, it
creates a need for the government to answer the questions raised by the opposition.
In other words, if the opposition raises a campaign on a certain topic, it requires the
government to justify its policy. Ilhams regime has no intention of doing that, so
they dont even give space for these topics to be raised.23
This leaves voters with few other options at election time. One political
consultant who described himself as part of the passive opposition admitted that
even he had voted to reelect Ilham Aliyev.
I voted for Ilham Aliyev in October 2008. Why? Because he is the only capable
candidate, as far as I can see. The other people were puppets of the government and
were either bought off, are pro-government, or would support government policies.
. . . I dont see anything changing for at least five years. Maybe in five, ten, twenty
years something might change.24
An international observer suggested that many other citizens feel similarly:
Anecdotally, most people now express that there is nothing to be done. There is
really no alternative to the current leaders.25
354 J. LaPorte
Disengaged citizens
Over time, what emerges is a politically disengaged society. The phrase political
apathy was emphasized in many of my interviews when describing contemporary
politics. For example, in describing citizens attitudes, one opposition politician
lamented, There is general apathy.26 Another attributed this to the governments
policies: with higher repression has come disengagement, fear, political apathy
from the population.27
The lack of political competition suggests that there is no point for citizens to
get involved in politics. Instead, it sends a clear signal that politics is not the
business of regular people. One analyst suggested,
This all serves to put politics as something above the average person, removed from
normal people. There is a hierarchy of power and knowledge. People see politics as
something that only elite people get involved with. If you are not part of the elite,
you could never get involved in politics or win power.28
He added that this outcome was a direct result of the governments strategy:
The current system is at a crossroads. If it democratizes any further, the government
will lose control and things will collapse like a house of cards. Everything is so
interlinked that you cant possibly allow further openness in any sector without
revealing problems or requiring democratization in other sectors.
The respondent continued, the governments main strategy to maintain this
stability then is to depoliticize the people.
Most people I interviewed agreed that citizens felt they lacked efficacy and
were unlikely to effect change. As one analyst pointed out: The government
makes sure that their voices are not heard. They get discouraged.29 A politician
elaborated, People have seen elections falsified, they vote for one guy and the
other guy wins . . . they are just sick of it and see no point. The same person noted
a contrast with the past:
In the past, political activism was higher. It was the highest in the first half of the
1990s. In the second half of the 1990s it was also high . . . After 2000, there has been
a decrease in the activism of the population.30
Another opposition politician concurred: In the 1990s, people believed that
democracy was possible. They wanted democracy. . . . people lost hope.31 Others
agreed that citizens had not always been so disengaged. One former opposition
politician lamented,
There is a disconnect between politics and daily life for people. It has happened
little by little. Civil society was active here in the late 1990s and early 2000s,
but has gone away. Things used to be vibrant, now theyre not. Before, people
used to go to rallies, even when they were on the outside of town. Now they
dont.32
A journalist noted a similar trend: Politics have become not interesting in
Azerbaijan. This has happened gradually over time. In the early 1990s, politics
were interesting. This deteriorated under Heydar Aliyev. But it is worse under
Ilham Aliyev.33
Noncompetitive executive elections by design

In the face of a discredited opposition and a demobilized population, Azerbaijans
rulers have been able to ensure reelection by noncompetitive elections. None of
Azerbaijans presidential elections have been competitive. But the 1998 and 2003
presidential elections were actively contested. In 1998, despite the boycott of some
opposition parties, all sides engaged in campaigning. The incumbent and the
opposition candidates held rallies and public meetings; the boycotting opposition
also held demonstrations to highlight why they were choosing not to participate in
the elections. After the results were announced, Etibar Mamedov (the most
prominent opposition candidate) filed an official complaint with the Supreme Court
to nullify the election results, arguing that the election law had been violated in
numerous instances. Although dismissed by the Supreme Court, these complaints
suggest an active political debate. In the 2003 election, international monitors

reported that the political campaign was heated, and the political atmosphere was
sharply polarized. Moreover, the field of eight candidates did provide the potential
for a real choice for voters (OSCE/ODIHR 2003, 1, 6, 12). This election is one of
the few instances in Azerbaijan when government-opposition relations degenerated
into violence. On election night, riots broke out, followed by a pro-opposition rally
the following day. Authorities quickly quelled the disturbances, though in the
process, hundreds of protesters were detained and several people killed.
Electoral dynamics evolved as the demobilizing effects of marginalizing the
opposition accumulated. Presidential elections have remained uncompetitive, but
in more recent elections, the opposition has failed to put up credible competition.
Even the government acknowledged this difference, with one high-ranking
government official admitting, If you compare elections of 2008 against those
in 1998, for example, they are different . . . . In 1998, there was a fight.34
An Azerbaijani academic noted that by 2008, everyone who ran was either pro-
government or unknown to most of the population.35 One foreign diplomat
suggested, the difference between 2003 and today is that in past elections the
opposition was much stronger. In 2003, there was actual competition for the
presidency.36 Another person noted that in 2008 there [was] a formal nature to
these elections. Peopleboth regular citizens and opposition leadersdont
believe in the possibility of success this year.37 These dynamics continued in the
2013 election, which were contested by 10 candidates. None of the older generation
of opposition leaders chose to run. The official campaign period for that election
was shortened to 22 days, which limited [challengers] access to media and gave
the incumbent President a disproportional advantage (OSCE/ODIHR 2013, 10
11). International observers concluded that overall the campaign was subdued and
appeared to generate limited public interest . . . [it] lacked substantive debate
(OSCE/ODIHR 2013, 11). Ilham Aliyev was declared the winner with 85% of votes
cast; the inauguration took place just 10 days later, just hours after the final election
results were announced.
By 2008, the cumulative effects of a marginalized opposition had materialized.
In addition to the wide margin of victory, the 2008 and 2013 election results were
356 J. LaPorte
received without significant controversy. After the 2008 election, none of the
losing candidates questioned the outcome of the election. The only complaint
registered was by Mr. Hajiyev, who claimed he had come in second in the
election, rather than last (OSCE/ODIHR 2008, 24). On the public side, there were
no protests. The 2013 elections were particularly instructive in this regard. The
election made headlines around the world even before voting had started. One day
prior to Election Day, Azerbaijans election authorities released an official
smartphone app that showed Aliyev winning by 72.76% of the vote. These
reports were officially denied by the Central Election Commission, who said it was
a technical glitch that was made public erroneously. Yet the oppositions response
to this turn of events was muted. If anything, protests from international journalists
and foreign diplomats seemed louder than those from the home-grown opposition
(Grove 2013).
Prospects for regime stability in Azerbaijan

Marginalizing existing rivals is a key step in securing stability within hegemonic
authoritarian regimes. These practices produce effects that extend beyond a
discredited opposition. They strengthen the governments authority by creating an
absence of credible alternatives, by demobilizing society, and thus make it easier
to orchestrate noncompetitive electoral outcomes. Despite the formal presence of
opposition parties, the government can sustain overwhelming electoral victories
without fear of domestic backlash, potentially for decades on end. However,
regime stability rests on more than constraining the inherited opposition. Equally
important is the preemption of potential political opponents. Azerbaijans
government has proven quite effective at this task.
The prospects for regime stability thus are high in the short to medium term. The
inherited opposition in Azerbaijan is unlikely to pose a credible challenge to the
government. At the same time, the government has worked to ensure that there is an
absence of major new opposition movements. Across the post-Soviet region, one of
the strongest sources of new opposition has been government insiders who defect to
form their own opposition parties (Karatnycky 2006; Junisbai 2010; Radnitz 2010).
But, as discussed above, the concentration of Azerbaijans economic resources in
the ruling elite especially in the context of high corruption and extensive resource
rents provides an incentive for elites to remain loyal to the government. This
strategy has proved highly effective. Since the mid-1990s, Azerbaijans
government has remained remarkably cohesive, even during the delicate transfer
of power from Heydar to Ilham Aliyev in 2003 (Hale 2005).
Authorities also have been quick to squelch any sign of political dissent among
young people. Cross-nationally, large numbers of frustrated youth, confronted
with rising education levels and a lack of economic opportunity, is seen as a risk
factor for protest, rebellion, and political violence (e.g., Goldstone 1991; Urdal
2006). University-educated youth activists played a key role in organizing the
anti-government protests that brought down autocrats in Georgia, Ukraine, and
Kyrgyzstan (Bunce and Wolchik 2006; Khamidov 2006; Kuzio 2006).
Disenchanted young people also were an important constituency driving the Arab
Spring protests in the Middle East in 2011 2012 (Sayre and Constant 2011;
Wright 2011). Yet, this scenario seems unlikely in Azerbaijan, where the younger
generation tends to be less educated and more financially stable compared to other
post-Soviet countries. Strikingly, few young people in Azerbaijan pursue higher
education. Only 19.3% of young people are enrolled in tertiary education, a rate on
par with Tajikistan. Across the post-Soviet region, only Uzbekistan has lower rates
of university enrollment, at 9%. Azerbaijans youth also are not lacking for
economic opportunity. Youth unemployment stands at 15%, significantly lower
than the regional average of 22.1% (UNDP 2013).38 By contrast, 54.7% of
Armenias youth are unemployed. Demographically, Azerbaijan does not have the
sort of highly educated, economically frustrated youth cohort that might instigate
political unrest.
Many Western-educated young people of the sort who drove the Color
Revolutions have been co-opted into the government over the past decade, through
the myriad employment opportunities offered by the sprawling bureaucracy.39
Authorities also have cracked down on student activists and online critics. For
example, in May 2009 youth activists staged a silent, peaceful protest against the
governments decision not to declare a national day of mourning in response to a
school shooting that had left 13 dead. The protest was immediately dispersed and
50 people were arrested. Although they were released subsequently, protest
participants and their families faced ongoing harassment by local authorities in the
ensuing weeks (Krikorian 2009). Later that year, in a case that drew international
attention, two activists associated with the youth group OL! were jailed in 2009 for
posting a satirical video online mocking the governments use of oil profits to
import expensive donkeys (Satire 2009; Allnutt 2010). In 2013, state prosecutors
shut down OL!s Free Thought University (AFU) project, which was set up to
provide a platform for democratic discussion and to raise awareness about human
rights. Authorities arrived at the AFU without warning, sealed the door and
closed the office, citing an investigation into registration status and submission of
funding reports (Muradova 2013).
In the longer run, the chances for Azerbaijans regime are less clear.
Azerbaijans current youth cohort is only marginally bigger than the regional
average. Youth aged 15 24 comprise 17.5% of the population in Azerbaijan,
compared with 15.9% region-wide (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 2013).40
Tellingly, though, birth rates in Azerbaijan are robust, suggesting the potential for
a sizeable youth cohort and significant population growth overall in the coming
decades. Indeed, the World Bank (2011, 3) estimates that the countrys population
will expand from 8.9 million in 2010 to 10.6 million by 2050, an increase of 20%.
Ultimately, political stability likely will depend on whether Azerbaijans economy
expands proportionally with population growth. Continued rises in oil prices may
help to sustain elite cohesion and generate economic development. At the same
time, the government would need to diversify its economy, through investment in
the non-resource sectors in order to maintain low unemployment even in the face
of population growth.
358 J. LaPorte
Nonetheless, these measures have combined to produce a notably stable

hegemonic authoritarian regime in Azerbaijan. By simultaneously marginalizing
the older opposition and forestalling the organization of younger activists,
authorities have effectively eliminated alternative viewpoints and insulated
themselves thus far from new political challengers.
Conclusion
As Gandhi (2008, xvii) argues, a dictators first problem of governance is to
contain his political opponents: as rulers who hold power without the legitimacy
of having been chosen by their citizens, they must prevent attempts to undermine
their legitimacy and usurp power. In other words, they must thwart challenges to
their rule. This paper suggests a new mechanism for how this goal can be
accomplished. In successful hegemonic regimes, existing opposition parties are
disadvantaged by more than just the unlevel playing field typical of competitive
authoritarian regimes. Rather, the opposition is shut out from effective
contestation altogether, without being brutally suppressed. Rulers marginalize
the opposition through a targeted and consistent set of practices that, in turn,
allows them to create the illusion of an absence of viable political alternatives.
On the basis of this illusion, hegemonic regimes can consolidate and sustain
themselves, without needing to resort to more violent forms of repression.
This argument provides insight into regime dynamics beyond the single case of
Azerbaijan. Post-Soviet Eurasia has proved a breeding ground for hegemonic
authoritarian regimes. In 8 of the 15 countries of post-Soviet Eurasia, an
incumbent was reelected with 70% or more of the vote at least once. In addition to
Azerbaijan, hegemonic regime dynamics have appeared in Belarus (under
Lukashenka), Georgia (under Shevardnadze), Kazakhstan (under Nazarbayev),
Kyrgyzstan (twice under Akayev, and again under Bakiyev), Russia (under
Putin), and Tajikistan (under Rahmon). Some of these regimes have proven more
enduring than others. While the hegemonic regimes in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Belarus, and Tajikistan have sustained noncompetitive politics for two decades,
those in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan collapsed in the face of mass protests organized
by the opposition. The proximate causes of the color revolutions are well known
(e.g., McFaul 2005; Beissinger 2007; Bunce and Wolchik 2010). However, the
regimes in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan had an underlying fragility that can be traced
back to their approach to handling opposition parties. While opposition parties and
their supporters faced ongoing harassment and uneven access to financial and
administrative resources, the government failed to effectively sideline the
opposition.
The cases of Lukashenkas Belarus and Shevardnadzes Georgia illustrate this
divergence. Belaruss government has followed series of policies similar to
Azerbaijans. President Lukashenka inherited a vibrant set of opposition parties
from perestroyka and the early post-independence period. Since the mid-1990s,
authorities have effectively banned political protests, while also exercising tight
control over the media (Silitski 2005). Authorities also informally prohibit
opposition candidates from participating in elections, often using an overly

stringent review of financial documents as a means of disqualification. Candidates
are required to submit extensive financial and property declarations; some have
been refused registration for financial discrepancies less than a dollar (OSCE/
ODIHR 2001a, 2004a). Opposition politicians have not held any seats in the
Belarusian House of Representatives since 2004.
By contrast, in Georgia, where President Shevardnadze also inherited a
panoply of opponents, authorities found themselves unable to suffocate the
opposition into obsolescence. Instead, opposition parties maintained ties to society
and influence within the state. Under pressure from the opposition, freedom of
assembly provisions were liberalized such that, by 1997, protesters only needed to
notify local officials of their plans. Most events were allowed to proceed without
interruption.41 Shevardnadzes government allowed its opponents access to mass

media outlets. When opposition parties complained that they lacked sufficient
access to state television, government broadcasters introduced programming
designed to air opposition viewpoints (U.S. Department of State 1996b).
Moreover, the governments monopoly on broadcast media was broken in 1998,
when the independent television network Rustavi-2 went on the air. Rustavi-2
became an important venue for opposition viewpoints. Opposition parties also
maintained more leeway to participate in elections. Georgias parliamentary
elections suffered from violations of civil rights and skewed access to campaign
resources. However, these deficiencies were not strong enough to preclude
opposition parties from accessing voters, actively campaigning, or getting out
their message. The results of these elections are striking. Opposition parties held
30% of parliamentary seats in 1995 1999, and 26% of seats in 1999 2003 and
parliament became a nexus of opposition activity. The opposition also was given
other opportunities to influence policymaking. Local-level elections were
introduced in 1998. In 2002, for example, future president Mikhail Saakashvili
was elected Chairman of the Tbilisi city council. As a result of this constellation of
policies, the Shevardnadze government managed to engineer one noncompetitive
re-election, but had already sowed the seeds of its own demise by granting the
opposition meaningful political space.
Recent studies suggest that these tactics have worked to stabilize hegemonic
regimes in other parts of the world as well. Across the Middle East and Africa,
some of the most enduring regimes managed to marginalize significant segments
of the opposition. In Egypt, President Hosni Mubarak presided over a stable
hegemonic regime for nearly three decades, in which the more intractable anti-
systemic opposition groups were deliberately cast to the fringes of political life
(Lust-Okar 2006; Brown 2012). Mubarak was re-elected five times with
overwhelming support.42 At the same time, his government marginalized
challengers by obfuscating such organizations right to exist, limiting their access
to the media and other public space, and restricting opportunities to field
candidates or win seats in the legislature. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood
was officially banned as a political movement, but the government never
attempted to destroy the Brothers organizational structure and capabilities
360 J. LaPorte
(Albrecht 2005, 386). Other anti-systemic opposition forces were allowed to

organize, but were relegated to a minimal role in public and political life. Such
figures suffered from low public support and with their decisively confrontational
stance towards the regime . . . [were] excluded from co-optation (Albrecht 2005,
387). The Mubarak regime collapsed under the regional contagion of the Arab
Spring in 2011, but until that point the government used a number of tools to
maintain stability; co-optation and outright repression are by themselves
insufficient for understanding the nature of Egyptian authoritarianism. Similar
dynamics have emerged in Algeria, where President Bouteflika has been elected in
four consecutive noncompetitive elections since 1999. At the same time,
legislation restricts the oppositions ability to interact with the public and holds a
marginal percentage of seats in the rubber-stamp parliament (Algeria Votes 2012;
Tamlali 2014). Hegemonic regimes also abound across Africa, where restrictions
on political opposition, noncompetitive presidential elections, and loyal
legislatures have sustained hegemonic rule in Cameroon, Zimbabwe, Gabon,
and Congo-Brazzaville (Rakner and van de Walle 2009; LeBas 2011).
The existence of this subtle strategy for neutralizing political opponents
suggests the importance of moving beyond the coercion versus co-optation
dichotomy that often dominates scholarly debates about government-opposition
interactions in authoritarian regimes. Autocrats employ a wide catalogue of
options when seeking to constrain the opposition. Attention to fine-grained
empirical data can move these discussions forward by elucidating the varied
mechanisms in hegemonic authoritarian regimes.
Acknowledgments
This work was supported by a fellowship from the International Dissertation Research
Fellowship Program of the Social Science Research Council. For helpful comments on
previous versions of this paper, I am grateful to Margaret Hanson, Danielle Lussier, Neil
MacFarlane, Ben Noble, Dann Nasseemullah, and Jessica Rich.
Notes
1. Azerbaijan is among the top 20 oil exporters in the world; by 2012, the government
held an estimated $33 billion in the state oil fund (U.S. Energy Information
Administration 2013).
2. Authors interview with political analyst (Respondent 6905), February 2009, Baku,
Azerbaijan.
3. Authors interview with journalist (Respondent 1641), February 2009, Baku,
Azerbaijan.
4. Authors interviews with country directors of international nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) (Respondents 5277 and 8995), October 2008, Baku,
Azerbaijan.
5. Authors interview with opposition party leader (Respondent 2861), April 2009,
Baku, Azerbaijan.
6. Authors interview with opposition party leader (Respondent 8189), March 2009,
Baku, Azerbaijan.
7. See, for example, annual Attacks on the Press reports for Azerbaijan from the
Committee to Protect Journalists, available at www.cpj.org.

Azerbaijan.
9. The individual cases are too numerous to document here. For an overview, see
Freedom Houses Freedom of the Press reports (www.freedomhouse.org), the
Committee to Protect Journalists (www.cpj.org), and Reporters without Borders
(www.rsf.org).
10. Authors interview with opposition politician (Respondent 4511), December 2008,
Baku, Azerbaijan.
11. Authors interview with political analyst (Respondent 9706), December 2008, Baku,
Azerbaijan.
12. Authors interview with political analyst (Respondent 6905), February 2009, Baku,
Azerbaijan.
13. Authors interview with country director of international NGO (Respondent 6107),
October 2008, Baku, Azerbaijan.
February 2009, Baku, Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan.
16. Authors interview with political analyst (Respondent 9706), December 2008,
Baku, Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan.
18. Authors interview with political analyst (Respondent 6498), October 2008,
Baku, Azerbaijan.
19. Authors interview with political analyst (Respondent 5158), November 2008, Baku,
Azerbaijan.
20. More specifically, 5.9% of respondents said that the Musavat Party represented their
interests, 1.7% mentioned the Popular Front Party, and 0.8% identified with the
Azerbaijan Democratic Party. The same question was asked in the 2004 and 2006
iterations of the survey, with nearly identical results.
21. Authors interview with political analyst (Respondent 6905), October 2008, Baku,
Azerbaijan.
22. Authors interview with political analyst (Respondent 7642), October 2008,
Baku, Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan.
24. Authors interview with political consultant (Respondent 8480), February 2009,
Baku, Azerbaijan.
Baku, Azerbaijan.
27. Authors interview with opposition politician (Respondent 9035), November 2008,
Baku, Azerbaijan.
Baku, Azerbaijan.
Baku, Azerbaijan.
362 J. LaPorte
32. Authors interview with Azerbaijani academic (Respondent 5546), February 2009,
Baku, Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan.
34. Authors interview with government official (Respondent 2247), February 2009,
Baku, Azerbaijan.
35. Authors interview with Azerbaijani academic (Respondent 5506), February 2008,
Baku, Azerbaijan.
36. Authors interview with foreign diplomat (Respondent 7056), October 2008, Baku,
Azerbaijan.
37. Authors interview with Azerbaijani academic (Respondent 7943), October 2008,
Baku, Azerbaijan.
38. Region here refers to the non-Baltic post-Soviet countries.

40. The average for non-Baltic post-Soviet countries is 15.9%. The largest youth cohorts
(aged 15 24) in the region are found in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan,
where youth compose slightly over 20% of the population (U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency 2013).
41. These laws were further refined in 2002, when Georgias Constitutional Court
annulled the portion of this law that allowed local government to reject a notification.
42. Mubarak was elected with 99% support in 1981 after President Anwar Sadats
assassination. He was re-elected through referendum in 1987, 1991, 1999, and 1999,
each time winning over 90% of the votes cast. In 2005, he was re-elected with 81%
of the vote in a multicandidate election.
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Post-Soviet Affairs

ISSN: 1060-586X (Print) 1938-2855 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpsa20

Hidden in plain sight: political opposition and

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2014.951184

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Hidden in plain sight: political opposition and hegemonic

Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

This paper examines the consolidation and maintenance of hegemonic

characterized by their nearly total lack of political competition. Despite the

The leaders of many post-Soviet countries are proving to be suspiciously popular.

q 2014 Taylor & Francis

in successive elections. Perhaps nowhere is this more true than in Azerbaijan.

These dynamics qualify Azerbaijan as a particularly stable case of hegemonic

elucidates a poorly understood mechanism by which autocrats neutralize their

potential sources of opposition. The conclusion places this argument in

Government and opposition in hegemonic regimes

Strategies for managing opposition

Turkmenistan, for example, there is no political space for even a nominal

moderate opposition parties that regularly criticize specific government policies

Heydar Aliyev also lacked the coercive capacity to follow through on an

governments and organizations.4 In these circumstances, aggressive repression

In the final aspect of marginalization, autocrats restrict the oppositions ability

In the absence of significant government violence or discrete consequences, it is

Case study: political opposition in Azerbaijan

Isolated from society

Excluded from elections

half of the opposition-nominated candidates were rejected. In contrast, 100% of the

Excluded from governance

(e.g., Grzymala-Busse 2002). As one person summarized:

Weakening of the opposition

fault. In the absence of overt repression, the opposition is seen as a group of

Absence of political alternatives

Noncompetitive executive elections by design

suggest an active political debate. In the 2003 election, international monitors

Prospects for regime stability in Azerbaijan

Nonetheless, these measures have combined to produce a notably stable

opposition candidates from participating in elections, often using an overly

interruption.41 Shevardnadzes government allowed its opponents access to mass

(Albrecht 2005, 386). Other anti-systemic opposition forces were allowed to

8. Authors interview with journalist (Respondent 8900), February 2009, Baku,

February 2009, Baku, Azerbaijan.

Misconduct on Party Systems. Comparative Political Studies 45 (5): 575 605.

Politics & Society 20 (1): 7 50.

OSCE/ODIHR. 2001b. Election Observation Mission Final Report: Republic of

Azerbaijan, Parliamentary Elections, 7 November 2010. Warsaw: OSCE.

Swietochowski, Tadeusz. 1995. Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition.

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