ffT+FfEENFF++I-

YUGos LAV I A

lLnn4rt,i

A decade of apathy on the part of the youth of

Yugosl,avia ended 1n June of chrs year, ,,rhetBelgfade
University studentg rioted and a v,eek-long univer-
,sity sit-i,n followed. Alrhough Farrj. alLy - inspi red
by the exanple of riotinq students tn poland, France,
Czecho6lovakia and other European countries, the Bel-
grade riots were, as Tito admitted on 9 June, larqelv
domastlc Ln orlgin. The regine's slow reactj.on t6 a-
deterlorating economj-c and tocial situation and. its
sluggishness in dealing with youth and educational
problems had been at fault.
High party officials have realrzed for some
tlme that a large portron of yugoslav youth was be-
comrng increasrngly alienated. from the economic and
political system wrthin which it llveal, gensing the
lncreasrng tensionr their spokesman, Veljko Vlaf,ovi-c,
attempted to identify rhe students with the regine,
but probably helped stir them Lo acEion, by remlnd-
!ng. them. nine days before the riot,s, that they must
fLght for ch anges - - " revolution does not toLerate
weeping," ha said, "it demands acLion.',
Ttre student unrest emerged at a time when the
regine is embarked on a difficult reforn meant !o
decentrallze and liberaltze economic and political
Ilfe while retalning control by the party: The pro-
gram haE f,ac€d determlned oppositlon from conserva-
tLves and those who stand to- lose status and income
froft the reforms. Although the regime hopes to use
the students' enthusiasm to speed up its prograrn,
Tito is weII aware that his opponenls may atlempt
to use the riots to stop the regime,s efiorts at
cnaDge .

Siud.enLs Ve?auB the Reoi.ne

The June ri-ots started with a lrrvial clash
bet\,reen young peopie at a muslcal performance on
2 June. The disturbances soon took on a political
character srhen student anger at polrce tactics and
pent-up frustration ove! the lack of job opportun!-
tie6 ]€d to sweeping demands for change. An ad hoc

€eltFl-E++fiFfirf

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

uAtt:
 -fiIFrDENrrxr

student actlon coruni

poi-nt prosi;-;;il'';H:r3euicklv rornurated a rour-
__Remova.i.
of al:
jiJl".':ff 'Sl:ilr'ili,'Eiii.r"-
i;;J';";'.:
- -;$o:";3,i:ff
t:" "?:i"i:ITEl.., iloni:sx;i3, .
__Grenter democ!
p"riii".i"iii;iiiii:::1,.: i::""ff l:i"iH^.
!iiii;'3}* ?$;I:i""':I*i,,?iii iiiii.,r
--lt5:';:::i.l'ii:i-"t Ehe universrtv. t
lli*Fi#:l:ii:,,rlu:iiji:fu:r:i rl""
,r.lnn:!i, ..?lX,""lil:i" j.:- conc_irr a t j on con bine with
i.";:i ::, :i, :l: ff li:., ::;" ;:: j :*, : ;.'; i:,.::'...:;
serbian
"^_- 9:"::ur o
"'
trllill,litt ii{f ffi qi, jfr t'!;ii,Tiii"

j**;g*H**sflffi,
,_ The sit_in at Bel.o
lgl:;;j,il;1,i.:";;x,i::$^iii;":;i,.t.Sjo"l"l.
the econonic,"r","'l*riu!irSi*:l;";",,:il8#T:1F",i:!,
;:*:'I"S' ji;:3liii;r':ir::*oe ari nv'wiIii";;,1ifl o,"o-
;il ;:i,l"
il:'.:l; nr:x"f s:ii:'iilii f ifl . *",::$ i:il""
rorm pr-srams 'rii.'pl!fii;::
-
.
I:;.1"::"";;1.:ii"::_

YugoslavLa
 cGfflBNIIAl-_

go deaL lrith domestJ-c prcb.l.er:s--rndicating that they

would be final, theleby givlng :he students no aI-
ternative accepuance. AlthougL, TJ'to rmplied that
if he and the regi ot the leade:shj.p could not solve
Yugoslavia's probl.ems, they should resign. he gave
no hint that he wouid bow co the siudenrs' ilemand
that thoge responsible fcr police brutality be
sacked.
The economic Auidelines, !n preparation since
20 May, were published five days J"ater. In part an
elaboration of the !hemes in Tirors speech, they
called for economlc .refotm and leorganjzation of the
palty. They also echoed student demanqs for limits
on income acquired in a "nonsocialisL,, vray (leaslng
of villas, for example) and a realuction of d,iffer-
ences in lrages. They allowed for educational re-
form and more student participation in the manage-
ment of the unrversities.
Again there was a note of fLrmness, The !es-
ignation of incompetent officjals was r-mp1ied, but
there was a clear warnJ.ng that "enemy forces, " guch
as antiregime em1gre groups, antireform conserva-
tlves, and ultraliberals, were seekrng to undernine
Yugoslavla. Emphasis was put on usrng and lmproving
the existing Yugoslav system, albej.t h'ith a major
effor! to make roon for more young people. The
guldelines f,eemphasized the pa!!yrs determinatton
to oppose the creatron of the multiparty systen
propo6ed by some libelal intellectuals.
Student unrest had. occurred at a trying time
in the regimers 3-year-oid drive for economj.c re-
form. Although the students exhibited no separalist
tendanci€a, the regj.me in meeting the students' de-
mands must take into account the currently tense
nationality situation, Republj.c econohrc rivalries
have incteased, Many Serba believe that they have
suffered by the reform, while the croacs generally
believe that the process must be speeded up. For
the frrst time rn many years Tito is under pressure
from both the conservative and liberal nings of the
party to go slow and to move ahead iaste! on the
reform, respectively.
Economrc reform has brought lncreasing unemploy-
ment and labor unrest. wreh workers lesorling to
short strik€s to push their grievances, Both the
Belgrade students and many workers are angry at the
high salaries and large bonuses paid factory admin-
Lstrators while wolkers in some enterprises are
poorly paid or paid only afcer Long de1ay.
,: he Ge4e?aticri Cap

The student'6 demand for a job after graduation

reflects more than a narrow-ninded setf-interest.
There is a profound dr-fference in outlook bet\.veen
the young and old and the regine must cope with a
widening generation gap.
The bulk of the Ieadershrp at all levels j.n
Yugoslavia has remained the same for over 20 years.
Despile the purges of cominformists rn the veire
rnunediately following t94g and the ouster oi niitas
(1954) and Tit.o's former heir apparent Rankovii
(1966), the hard core of the party stilL has great
nurnbers of older ex-parti.sans and prewar nrembers.
The upper levels of the party hierarchy are partic-
ularly laden with this older generatlon. ,'Older
generation" here, is rel-ative: Most of theBe ',older,,
people are in thejr fifties, some stiI1 j-n their
late forties. Tito at. 76 is by fa! the oLdest of
the hief,archy.
The legime has attenpted with only lirnited
succeaE since 1953 to enforce a pol-rcy of ,'rot.ation"
in off,ice ]n order to bring up youhger rien. WhiIe the
average age of the party leadership has decLined
slightly, the oLd guard has departed only slo\,rLy
in a Yugoslav version of political musical chairs,
Thus the party reorganizatr.on af October Lg66 re-
sulted in an executive commlttee (politburo) of
relatj"vely younger and less politically infLuential
men, whi).e almost the vrhole old-Line leadershj.p was
shifted into the poticy-making presidium,
What has be6n lrue of the top leadership has
bean even more evident at Ehe lower ievels of the eqonomic
and poljtical l-adder. Many factory djrectors and
lower J.eve} bureaucrats owe therr positions to their
prewar-party and wartlme partisan service. Many
are ill-educated and not equipped to deal with lhe
sophisticased socialist market economy which the

Yugoslavia - 4
 -CT]Nfi'EN.FTAL

reqime hopes to create. Undelstandably, theythey

do
feel
;;e-;rth-i; git. up the income and status
tha! they deserve.
Partly as justtfication for its Privileged
pogition, itt" oia"t generation has exploiled -htartime
lu"iiti"i and glory ior years. The varues of many
;;-;h;;;-"taer-peoile ar-e an admixture of unsoPhlsti-
cotn*""i sm, miaate class aspirations, pride in
".t"a-ttt"y have acconPlished, and in some a residual
*}r"i
local nationali-sm.
Meanwhile universities have been turning out
thousands of beiter educated young technicians'
It"""- impartent t^rith the bungling of their elders
"t. thl barriers to jobs ancl influence whj'ch
""1'*ittr
the latter have created' Tj-to himselfeconomy has Publicly
id",rlt.J-*ttiy ti*." that the Yugoslav badly
nieas thousa;ds of bette! trained men, but that many
enterprises refuse to hire them.

The slogan "Dovrn Wlth the Red Bourgeoisie"

which aPpea!6d at netgrade univelsity 1n June under- lheir
lines thl younger generation's disenchantment' or par-
wish for an end to privilege built on ParEy.
ii"i"-"it"1.". rhii denan6 is not new--it has simPly
Uec"m" foua.r. In the months after the ouster with
of
n.n:.."i" the Yugoslav press burgeoned fotth. and tne ac-
reports of lllegal bullding of -virlas.
cumulatlon of ait treasurel and private wealth by
party functionaries.
The restl€ssness of YugosLav youth reflects
the succeBs of the regime in j-ts liberalizatlon
The curtailnent of the Power of the secret
"iooi.*.
i"ii." roff""j.ng Rankovic's fall, the enhancem€nt
;f parlianen!, mole -controL
oPen elections, and curtailment
oi "alte.t government of the economy--all
nive fosteied a more permissl.ve atmosPhere-' by the
Many
oi'ln"-"t"a"nts' demaids are inspi'red hopes
."""na"i"a bv the llberalized Yugoslav constitution
and b! promises implied rn the currentparty pro-
"i-fse:
o"aa. conve-rie1y, the regime's compromises. in the
i"."'"r-"ppo"itiLi ly coniervatives who still hoLd
in-intr"eiriial positions, and the obje.ctiveseem ln- dif--
fj-culties of the economic reform Probably-
lofJralfe obstacles. when the chief of the Belgrade

Yugoslavra - 5

@
 party organization, Veljko Vlahovic. a leading
ldaoLosue and pre s i d rum -memb;;; -; a;;rit!i-iJ""p"u,r
t.o
-lhe riorrng students last m6nth n"'*J" t,J"f.a
oovtn by the cry of "Enough words__action is needed.,,
Fatheys and San $

-__ It can
officiars
be assurned that sone children of narrt,
were invoLved in ttre iiotl]--;ii"; ;;;:1
ence did nor inhibit the polj.ce, l"t ' :t. -*Jl-f.5ii"""_
plain the regime's forbearance in the face of the
sit-in at the university the release of-ufl
students arrested eartilr and
duri;; ;h;-;i;.;:
*' ttu
?he youth
-O?gqni sqt.ion6
The student unreat revealed the ineffectiveness
of- the tr.i'o main regine-sponsored youth oioanizations
-.-the !'ederarion oi youri: ;i-t;;";i;;;r"iB6lji'.na
the Federation of Students (SSJ'.
- Both
perforn
federations originally were created, to
as "rransmission 6ertsii' f;;-;.;;y;i;ectives
and propaganda. Numerlcalry ar f,east, the SO,J has
been a success--its membergirrp (Z,o:a,si:-ii-iu.u*lu.
1965) i_ncludes about r\,,o thi.rd; ;i'.ti';;;.-"ja"v"
treen 14 and 25" ResenLnent Ue_
over the Federatlon,s
"transmission belt,' rol"e has grown -in.il"
the years, and much of the or9ani.uti"";i ";";;i;;-;;".
rs pro forma, The soJ became-a uv".ia """, -
r..'..illiiJil
and a haven for young party hacks-,

- The party's decision in 1965 to chanqe j-ts

role from that of an at l-powerf"r ai.""tii-riir"9
organization to one of ideological r"aa.rlnlJ-rea
to confusion about rhe rore oi rh; aoJ:--;;;i 1.ounq
people vranted the Federation ro reflect fhe iriews
and interests of its membershrp, not tiros.-oi-trr"
party. _ The SOJ, hohrever, was nog orqanlzed to
respond to pxessure from bel-ow.
moreove!. was aII over 30 years ofrt""i"iJ"i"tip,
age, rrhich ]ed.
to charges of ove rpro fe s si6nali zatroi
In the aftermath of the fal.l. of Rankovic the
youth federation secretariat '
was di s soi"u a ir,i"""r_
b-er 1966) for r.ncompetence and t.a"y lunAeAn.Js,
'rne tederatron was put into a form of ,,recei
vership,,

Yugoslavla - 6
r,1?1sFiD+r++I*g r
 c.lNEIDENTIAI

in order to plepare fo! its reorganization, wh j- ch

!:?I_plo": over a year larer at ii," righli;'siji co"_
gfress in Sebruary L96g.
__-, .Tito,s speech,opening the Congress offered
l:cn.rng palti cularly new. It was i call for Bore
er Ene rqeo.Loglcal
.
guidance the young had already
cone to.dislike. Indeed, inBteaa of-i""o"utf"",
Tlto pointed with alarm to the need for moie-iaeo_
losicat pottticat lrork by trr" sriJ-imoii iiiJri.._
tualsf among whom he deticted apathy ;;d-;;Ii;n
concepts . "
To restore the SOJ'S effectiveness, a rew
statute. was enacted de centrali zing - uJ*i.,ii Jtrli,-""
presumably to nake the r€qerat,ton more responsive ,
to.It.s membershrp. t0hat emerged ,us u .o*FiJiisu
Derween the o1d strongly. cantrallzed organizatlon
desired by the conser.;atlveg and the loose coordinat_
ll:.1:d-I-:ltled for by the-ultraliber;i;:- i;;
rrmtts ware widened to tncLude 14 to 2?_year_oldi, "eu
a 2?-year-old wag elected presidentl
.^...T!".conaiderably gmaller (11O,ooO members rn
r>oo, !.ecelatton of Students suffers from much the
eame :nalady aB the youth rederation. - i i- 'tiie=-i"9f*"
grants the SS,t the autonomy neceE6ary lo attracr
large nurnbare of actiiis! itudents, tfr" pariv-risf"
1o81ns contror.. rrehr regime conlioil-rl5ii'']i,,
re6urts in further allenalion of tle iuiuie'iiturrf_
gon6j.a and technocrats and an organization
ln apathy . steepea

Reglme control of the studenta through the SO,J

and the ssJ broke do\,rn at the rime ot iire'ieiqraae
riots, when rhe l. -;;p;;;Ei"g,
-
post facto, the drouDs were reauced
itudint a"rnana" -wr,irJ-";;;:;;;."
demonstrations and viotenca. Effective f.ia"i"nip
had passed to the student acrion ."rn flt""J-iit r"
tbe party's sway.
. The,regime's
stldent
concern with the abilj.ty
f,ederation successfutly to ;hil;;i of the
activiry in the face-or iiuaent
!9llii!"t
rs mlrrored in a debate.over ",i"i,-'.i"",p!iilion
the further
of these action corTunittees. Most -"-"., "ii"t""..
^i..
cials are asainsr u.'" 5ilf;"nilii".
""i.ii"".i.i",lr

Yugoslavia - 7
€er+Frps*e*-
 Cj-NFIDT+ITJAJ.

fhe conunitteeE, however, have ins.isted that thev

wi}l continue to operate. Speakirg before the Lpea-
ing segsion of the yugoslav tlade union congress on
26 ,June, Tito undoubtedly had the acrion coirn.irc."s
in mind when he sai.d there was no room for the qrea-
tion of a special movemeni wlthin the universities.
Iouth and the pa*ty
The alienation of youth from the league of
codununlsts of yugoslavia (Lcy) has been viewed by
i,ts leadorship with gro\ring a1arm. Ilis torl. cal Iy-,
the partyrs large and effective youth component
contributed such Leaders as Djil;s and na-nkovic,
Recently, holrevar, the nutnber of those 25 or under
in the,party has dropped from 23.6 percent in L95B
to 11 .5 psrcent in 1965, Compared !o the 1951 fiq-
ure of 38.5 percent, the decline has been precipiious.
The decline has occurred over the s arne period
that ha8 a€en overall party membership top ti:e mi1-
lton mark. In Lhe proceBs, the composition of the
party ltaB been altered signlficantly. Accordi-ng
te Yugoslav figures, the ner,r menberl are rnainlv
whlte collar administrators, factory directorsl
bureaucrats. The percentage of workers, women, and and
peasants in the rcy also has declined. Manv of the
younger generation probably regard this tre-nd as a
further sign of the partyrs enbourg e ai sement ,
Public opinior eurveys in the last tr.ro or three
years have pointed out that nany young people lrould
not join the party if askea, and many l-ca1 party
organlzations have admltted practically no young
members in recent yeats.
The legime,s answer to its accel.erated aging
process has been a driva to recruit young peopLe.
So far no figures are availabLe on the success of
this effort. However, many liberals evidently are
hoping that a successful r-crui.tlng drive vril-l he.l-p
consolldate the leformists' hold on the partv and
the party congress in December 1968,
fhe Studente a.nd the SohooLe
!ar1y in 1968 the youth periodical Mladost re-
vealed that out of .f.3 nillion employee s -ii--YE-gos lavi. a,
about 200 r000 have had no schooling, over 1..2 mlllion

Yugoslavia - B

EE}IFIDELLI]IrA.L
have never finrshed the er-ght-year elementary school'
and onl.y SOO,OOO have an efementary school educatlon'
tii" ai"i-out :ate for el'ementary schools is about
so perc-ent. The illrceracy rate remains high, about
20 iercent, wrth about 50 Percent of the rlflterates
undlr 50 years of age.
In Part, the problem stems from timi'ted financial
r""ooi..i, Under iegislation passed rn 1966, local
conmunltj.es are responsible foi financing most basic
education. Local enterPrises are encourageo-to
loans and scholarships' Decentralized
financing has resulted !n uneven quality in areas
"otrtaiUota the Pri-
marv and secondary school systems' Poorer
nati:rally have rnlerior schools, particularly in
the vill;ges. ?easant youth are at a-dieadvantage
if they wish to pursue university stu'lies'
university education is tuition free' cost
of living granls are availabLe and manyperiod students
ie"elv" ioitt", tep.yubLe :.n a ten-year after
craduation. ine aeut is reduced for those with
io"a icaaemic records and those !,ho finish their
itudies ear1y. Although university entrance exam-
inations werE institut;d for the 1966/67 school
u"ii, ' ituv will be abolj-shed infinanciar septen$ex 1958'
problems
irooi ptepit.tion and personal
;;;;Jit" are theearn rnain- reasons so manv students take
extra Years to a degree '
The increased cost of living since 1965 has
been another factor barring the way to higher educa- In
liott f"t the children of workers and Peasants' at
1965 the average -
stipend for students Zagreb
University, in compai ative Iy wealthy croatia, vtas
15,000 ol-d dinars 1OD) per month' At the
-currenf
.iift.ttq. rate of 1r250 old di'nars to one dolfar'
this aiounts to $12. Lrvlnq exPenses, however,
reached the level of 29.000 oD (about $23)' rn
the past three years stLpends have not kept pace
*iln" tn" cost oi rrvrng. The average worker's
waqe (not includinq seif-employed peasants1966 the
rural populatron) in January '. was
l"ix the
Sz,Ool"r oo (about $46). Moreover, ihe highest average
Eaiaries were !n the more developed northern repub-
Ilcs. This economic rnequality rs transforming
Vugoslavia's unl-versiLies j-nto preserves tor tne

Yugos i-avia - 9
CONEIDEITFFFFF
 ;i:iij. lf i. ::il ii;ii" id"iilii:":; :.iirj ;.,iitf i I -
;*;" j ;: ::"ii.:j, i::';l;,:i::,::.f; L:n::iil' i
* ,
d u

. . Studrln L dls,:on re
ili,':jiii:"::rii*:;=:,:';:"1;; ii;"n;;;.;1";;o oo
t":l"ji!i:il, :"o
i ve r - un
iiii;:::i; : if iii: i:l:!*;:".;
ffiiJ ff ?,::'::-,;",:h,i f il=,:li1x:ti:m,f,*5"rijl,," .

*.:ll:itui"'i''::.;:;.i:l jrr j r.r

35::i ::Hr"."olr. ",
i;;;"i'::'ii. l;"i: ; ;i:i-$:::*:';." "'
: ";io il.f i"i,ll

:::;j jj*.::,:I;,jllj,,1!'rncvic,
:iiTi:::':";^::ilj:;:;,
wtrs elected rec-
::t :f.tiinrjo"'i.ildsrsa j'lliiloloS?..".,
ll;,i:iiij.i;:*j
to manase e.,er mcire,.li:::"il.l"ilol'ln
;";;i;;'i":i":j,, :li::;:i"I:.*;=
Ii, !li.'l' 3ll:"T.:l;':::i*, ;*:;,*", Iii3iol, .".

rm,iili!:i:"ii ;i "Tti!r!i".ii ..ili..ii, 3ii ij iij._

;#it:iiffl;',ifi"lli.'::tT::'',. puifi'nil"uuun
ffT:'.:'. iii:;
the parry, *iil::,
i"i:ii$i:!i,'l;:""xl;";i;
i.-iJ-""iJil..:"ut| tf,. teadins role of
ff ,xit, j;;::l :, j:.i:$^iii:: ii: i:l fi i'il:;:":::'
;;
;. t..1:
: ; l: : n i j :'i :. : :. ? :' lu I i i ?:' :.'" :. ;l .;
n.1
g ; : ir
i.
t-U--!tis-98__SLthe s t.ud.e r! r, neuot t
,, Although the revo.
j:;:: ri:"iii:.::.,ij:il"ii!li3
":l
;:i{.:::,"i:*.:i:_
*,i" ;;.::i, i!.i::fl:{:;f ;,ii,r'ii,i*,i'
lxii'ii' =ti: l:'T;::
=ii, ;n! ":i.,x:i iii:1,;lill"ifi"i:.1;:=

Yugos.lavl a
 POLICE IIATTLE STUDENTS, JUn"E l96ti

students--among them the children of the elite--

a signi-fi-cant political force
made themsel\,"es into
which demanded that the regime live up co its prom-
ises. They are unlikely to be rnollified by token

Tito faces the difficult decision of further

alienating many conservatj-ves and centralists by
fulfilling the students I demands, or a possible
further student violence if reforns are not forth-
coming by fa1l, He is neII a\,rare that antireforrn-
ists may try to make use of the student demands to
stem the tide of the regime xeforns. Despite their
socialist humanist character, some of the student
demands, such as lrrage .Lirnitation, full employment,
and reduction of material incentives run counter to
rhe methods of the economic reform. Given the un-
rest among the poorly paid workers, a student-worker
coalition against the econorric reform would be a
conservative's dream and a liberal's nightmare. For
many conservatives j.t would be proof of the failure
of the re form drj-ve and proof that rel"axation of
party control of society leads to rejection of paxty
leadership and economic chaos.

Yugoslavia - 11
e-or.+{+DJi}tltai<
 Nout
"'1:;'i,-ry''