1

ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS AND MINOR MARTIN JOSE PROLLAMANTE,
REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE
ANGELA PROLLAMANTE, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:

At issue in this petition for certiorari [1] is whether or not the Court
of Appeals (CA) gravely erred in exercising its discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing a
decision[2] and resolution[3] upholding the resolution and order of
the trial court,[4] which denied petitioners motion to dismiss private
respondents complaint for support and directed the parties to
submit themselves to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) paternity
testing.
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued
Martins alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for
support and support pendente lite before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106.[5]
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in
1992, after which they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel
supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10,
1999. Despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise
and gave birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11,
2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in Quezon City. The babys
birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel
shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused
Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate
financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed
for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.
On January 19, 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old
Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel
sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fes leg. This
incident was reported to the police. In July 2001, Fe was diagnosed
with leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing
chemotherapy. On March 5, 2002, Fe and Martin sued Arnel for
support.[6]
2

In his amended answer, Arnel denied having sired Martin

because his affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly ended in
1998, long before Martins conception. He claimed that Fe had at
least one other secret lover. Arnel admitted that their relationship
started in 1993 but he never really fell in love with (Fe) not only
because (she) had at least one secret lover, a certain Jun, but also
because she proved to be scheming and overly demanding and
possessive. As a result, theirs was a stormy on-and-off affair. What
started as a romantic liaison between two consenting adults
eventually turned out to be a case of fatal attraction where (Fe)
became so obsessed with (Arnel), to the point of even entertaining
the idea of marrying him, that she resorted to various devious ways
and means to alienate (him) from his wife and family. Unable to
bear the prospect of losing his wife and children, Arnel terminated
the affair although he still treated her as a friend such as by
referring potential customers to the car aircon repair shop[7] where
she worked. Later on, Arnel found out that Fe had another erstwhile
secret lover. In May 2000, Arnel and his entire family went to the
United States for a vacation. Upon their return in June 2000, Arnel
learned that Fe was telling people that he had impregnated her.
Arnel refused to acknowledge the child as his because their last
intimacy was sometime in 1998.[8] Exasperated, Fe started calling
Arnels wife and family. On January 19, 2001, Fe followed Arnel to
the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot to demand that
he acknowledge Martin as his child. According to Arnel, he could
not get through Fe and the discussion became so heated that he
had no alternative but to move on but without bumping or hitting
any part of her body.[9] Finally, Arnel claimed that the signature and
the community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him in the
acknowledgment of Martins birth certificate were falsified. The CTC
erroneously reflected his marital status as single when he was
actually married and that his birth year was 1965 when it should
have been 1964.[10]
In his pre-trial brief filed on May 17, 2002, Arnel vehemently
denied having sired Martin but expressed willingness to consider
any proposal to settle the case.[11]
On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an
order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court.[12]
3

Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right

against self-incrimination.[13] He also moved to dismiss the
complaint for lack of cause of action, considering that his signature
on the birth certificate was a forgery and that, under the law, an
illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not recognized by the
putative father.[14] In his motion, Arnel manifested that he had filed
criminal charges for falsification of documents against Fe (I.S. Nos.
02-5723 and 02-7192) and a petition for cancellation of his name
appearing in Martins birth certificate (docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-02-46669). He attached the certification of the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory that his signature in the birth
certificate was forged.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and
ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing
at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court.
Thus, this petition.
In a nutshell, petitioner raises two issues: (1) whether a
complaint for support can be converted to a petition for recognition
and (2) whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a
proceeding for support without violating petitioners constitutional
right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.[15]
The petition is without merit.
First of all, the trial court properly denied the petitioners motion
to dismiss because the private respondents complaint on its face
showed that they had a cause of action against the petitioner. The
elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiffs primary right
and the defendants corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict
or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which the primary
right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is
determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by the facts
alleged.[16]
In the complaint, private respondents alleged that Fe had
amorous relations with the petitioner, as a result of which she gave
birth to Martin out of wedlock. In his answer, petitioner admitted
that he had sexual relations with Fe but denied that he fathered
Martin, claiming that he had ended the relationship long before the
childs conception and birth. It is undisputed and even admitted by
the parties that there existed a sexual relationship between Arnel
4

and Fe. The only remaining question is whether such sexual

relationship produced the child, Martin. If it did, as respondents
have alleged, then Martin should be supported by his father Arnel.
If not, petitioner and Martin are strangers to each other and Martin
has no right to demand and petitioner has no obligation to give
support.
Preliminaries aside, we now tackle the main issues.
Petitioner refuses to recognize Martin as his own child and
denies the genuineness and authenticity of the childs birth
certificate which he purportedly signed as the father. He also
claims that the order and resolution of the trial court, as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, effectively converted the complaint for
support to a petition for recognition, which is supposedly proscribed
by law. According to petitioner, Martin, as an unrecognized child,
has no right to ask for support and must first establish his filiation
in a separate suit under Article 283[17] in relation to Article 265[18] of
the Civil Code and Section 1, Rule 105[19] of the Rules of Court.
The petitioners contentions are without merit.
The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for
support into one for recognition but merely allowed the
respondents to prove their cause of action against petitioner who
had been denying the authenticity of the documentary evidence of
acknowledgement. But even if the assailed resolution and order
effectively integrated an action to compel recognition with an action
for support, such was valid and in accordance with jurisprudence.
In Tayag v. Court of Appeals,[20] we allowed the integration of an
action to compel recognition with an action to claim ones
inheritance:
In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to
support and successional rights from the putative or presumed
parent, must prove his filiation to the latter. We also said that it is
necessary to allege in the complaint that the putative father had
acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child because such
acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to
inherit. There being no allegation of such acknowledgment, the
action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be
brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio
decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of
action for failure of the petitioner to allege the fact of
5

acknowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription of the

action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although
petitioner contends that the complaint filed by herein private
respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an
illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for
inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be
considered as one to compel recognition. Further, that the two
causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to
claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new
in our jurisprudence.
As early as [1922] we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz,
et al. (43 Phil. 763 [1922]) wherein we said:
The question whether a person in the position of the present
plaintiff can in any event maintain a complex action to compel
recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior
relief in the character of heir, is one which in the opinion of this
court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that the
conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action
are present in the particular case. In other words, there is no
absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel
acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted
to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that
same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir.
Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel
acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied
different from that generally applicable in other cases. x x x
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly
formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported
by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases,
and the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a
natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but
who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain
partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance
against his coheirs x x x; and the same person may intervene in
proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased
natural father, or mother x x x. In neither of these situations has it
been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree
compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in
partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who
might take by inheritance are before the court; and the declaration
6

of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings. (Underscoring

supplied)
Although the instant case deals with support rather than
inheritance, as in Tayag, the basis or rationale for integrating them
remains the same. Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled to
support depends completely on the determination of filiation. A
separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits, given how
intimately related the main issues in both cases are. To
paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate
to these proceedings.
On the second issue, petitioner posits that DNA is not
recognized by this Court as a conclusive means of proving
paternity. He also contends that compulsory testing violates his
right to privacy and right against self-incrimination as guaranteed
under the 1987 Constitution. These contentions have no merit.
Given that this is the very first time that the admissibility of DNA
testing as a means for determining paternity has actually been the
focal issue in a controversy, a brief historical sketch of our past
decisions featuring or mentioning DNA testing is called for.
In the 1995 case of People v. Teehankee[21] where the appellant
was convicted of murder on the testimony of three eyewitnesses,
we stated as an obiter dictum that while eyewitness identification
is significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as the scientific
forms of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or
the DNA test result (emphasis supplied).
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so steadfast in
the previous decade. In Pe Lim v. Court of
[22]
Appeals, promulgated in 1997, we cautioned against the use of
DNA because DNA, being a relatively new science, (had) not as
yet been accorded official recognition by our courts. Paternity
(would) still have to be resolved by such conventional evidence as
the relevant incriminating acts, verbal and written, by the putative
father.
In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA
as evidence of parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. Court of
Appeals:[23]
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional
methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available.
Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA
7

test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the

Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing
using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based
on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one
copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from
the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish
parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of
DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the
appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should
apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and
authoritative evidence in Philippine jurisprudence came in 2002
with our en banc decision in People v. Vallejo[24] where the rape
and murder victims DNA samples from the bloodstained clothes of
the accused were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that the
purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an association
exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the reference sample.
The samples collected (were) subjected to various chemical
processes to establish their profile.
A year later, in People v. Janson,[25] we acquitted the accused
charged with rape for lack of evidence because doubts persist(ed)
in our mind as to who (were) the real malefactors. Yes, a complex
offense (had) been perpetrated but who (were) the perpetrators?
How we wish we had DNA or other scientific evidence to still our
doubts!
In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC[26] where the Court en
banc was faced with the issue of filiation of then presidential
candidate Fernando Poe Jr., we stated:
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to
satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing,
which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent
could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or
paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, this Court has
acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing
Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v. Yatar,[27] we
affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape with homicide, the
8

principal evidence for which included DNA test results. We did a

lengthy discussion of DNA, the process of DNA testing and the
reasons for its admissibility in the context of our own Rules of
Evidence:
Deoxyribonucleic Acid, or DNA, is a molecule that encodes the
genetic information in all living organisms. A persons DNA is the
same in each cell and it does not change throughout a persons
lifetime; the DNA in a persons blood is the same as the DNA found
in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax,
mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. Most
importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic
structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable
exception of identical twins.
xxx xxx xxx
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should
consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination
of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
whether proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly
qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or
identification techniques. Based on Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it
was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant
are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. The
blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the
following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP29/10 and
CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken from the
victims vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match exists between the
semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the
appellant in open court during the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in
science and technology in the Philippine criminal justice system,
so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted
waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive
jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions.
Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven
instructive.
9

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow (509 U.S. 579 (1993); 125 L. Ed. 2d 469)
it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid
principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable.
Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which
testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new
kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel
procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly
to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-
existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA
evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis,
and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and
reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles
of human genetics and molecular biology.
Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA
testing and the admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. In
that case, DNA samples from semen recovered from a rape victims
vagina were used to positively identify the accused Joel Kawit
Yatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed that the compulsory extraction of
his blood sample for DNA testing, as well as the testing itself,
violated his right against self-incrimination, as embodied in both
Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution. We addressed
this as follows:
The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against
all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right
against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of
extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does
not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incrimination but as part of object evidence.
Over the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of
object evidence taken from the person of the accused from the
realm of self-incrimination. These include
photographs,[28]hair,[29] and other bodily substances.[30] We have
also declared as constitutional several procedures performed on
the accused such as pregnancy tests for women accused of
adultery,[31]expulsion of morphine from ones mouth[32] and the
tracing of ones foot to determine its identity with bloody
footprints.[33] In Jimenez v. Caizares,[34] we even authorized the
examination of a womans genitalia, in an action for annulment filed
by her husband, to verify his claim that she was impotent, her
10

orifice being too small for his penis. Some of these procedures
were, to be sure, rather invasive and involuntary, but all of them
were constitutionally sound. DNA testing and its results, per our
ruling in Yatar,[35] are now similarly acceptable.
Nor does petitioners invocation of his right to privacy persuade
us. In Ople v. Torres,[36] where we struck down the proposed
national computerized identification system embodied in
Administrative Order No. 308, we said:
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy
does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not
intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that
enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the
right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance
public service and the common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of
searches and seizures,[37] and the infringement of privacy of
communication[38] where the constitutional right to privacy has
been critically at issue. Petitioners case involves neither and, as
already stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination
is in jeopardy holds no water. His hollow invocation of his
constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason
that they are not in any way being violated. If, in a criminal case,
an accused whose very life is at stake can be compelled to submit
to DNA testing, we see no reason why, in this civil case, petitioner
herein who does not face such dire consequences cannot be
ordered to do the same.
DNA paternity testing first came to prominence in the United
States, where it yielded its first official results sometime in 1985. In
the decade that followed, DNA rapidly found widespread general
acceptance.[39] Several cases decided by various State Supreme
Courts reflect the total assimilation of DNA testing into their rules
of procedure and evidence.
The case of Wilson v. Lumb[40] shows that DNA testing is so
commonly accepted that, in some instances, ordering the
procedure has become a ministerial act. The Supreme Court of St.
Lawrence County, New York allowed a party who had already
acknowledged paternity to subsequently challenge his prior
acknowledgment. The Court pointed out that, under the law,
specifically Section 516 of the New York Family Court Act, the
11

Family Court examiner had the duty, upon receipt of the challenge,
to order DNA tests:[41]
516-a. Acknowledgment of paternity. (a) An acknowledgment of
paternity executed pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the
social services law or section four thousand one hundred thirty-
five-b of the public health law shall establish the paternity of and
liability for the support of a child pursuant to this act. Such
acknowledgment must be reduced to writing and filed pursuant to
section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health
law with the registrar of the district in which the birth occurred and
in which the birth certificate has been filed. No further judicial or
administrative proceedings are required to ratify an unchallenged
acknowledgment of paternity.
(b) An acknowledgment of paternity executed pursuant to section
one hundred eleven-k of the social services law or section four
thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law may be
rescinded by either signators filing of a petition with the court to
vacate the acknowledgment within the earlier of sixty days of the
date of signing the acknowledgment or the date of an
administrative or a judicial proceeding (including a proceeding to
establish a support order) relating to the child in which either
signator is a party. For purposes of this section, the "date of an
administrative or a judicial proceeding" shall be the date by which
the respondent is required to answer the petition. After the
expiration of sixty days of the execution of the acknowledgment,
either signator may challenge the acknowledgment of paternity in
court only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact,
with the burden of proof on the party challenging the voluntary
acknowledgment. Upon receiving a partys challenge to an
acknowledgment, the court shall order genetic marker tests
or DNA tests for the determination of the childs paternity and
shall make a finding of paternity, if appropriate, in accordance
with this article. Neither signators legal obligations, including the
obligation for child support arising from the acknowledgment, may
be suspended during the challenge to the acknowledgment except
for good cause as the court may find. If a party petitions to rescind
an acknowledgment and if the court determines that the alleged
father is not the father of the child, or if the court finds that an
acknowledgment is invalid because it was executed on the basis
of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, the court shall vacate
the acknowledgment of paternity and shall immediately provide a
12

copy of the order to the registrar of the district in which the childs
birth certificate is filed and also to the putative father registry
operated by the department of social services pursuant to section
three hundred seventy-two-c of the social services law. In addition,
if the mother of the child who is the subject of the acknowledgment
is in receipt of child support services pursuant to title six-A of article
three of the social services law, the court shall immediately provide
a copy of the order to the child support enforcement unit of the
social services district that provides the mother with such services.
(c) A determination of paternity made by any other state, whether
established through the parents acknowledgment of paternity or
through an administrative or judicial process, must be accorded full
faith and credit, if and only if such acknowledgment meets the
requirements set forth in section 452(a)(7) of the social security act.
(emphasis supplied)
DNA testing also appears elsewhere in the New York Family
Court Act:[42]
532. Genetic marker and DNA tests; admissibility of records or
reports of test results; costs of tests.
a) The court shall advise the parties of their right to one or more
genetic marker tests or DNA tests and, on the courts own motion
or the motion of any party, shall order the mother, her child and the
alleged father to submit to one or more genetic marker or DNA
tests of a type generally acknowledged as reliable by an
accreditation body designated by the secretary of the federal
department of health and human services and performed by a
laboratory approved by such an accreditation body and by the
commissioner of health or by a duly qualified physician to aid in the
determination of whether the alleged father is or is not the father of
the child. No such test shall be ordered, however, upon a
written finding by the court that it is not in the best interests
of the child on the basis of res judicata, equitable estoppel, or
the presumption of legitimacy of a child born to a married
woman. The record or report of the results of any such genetic
marker or DNA test ordered pursuant to this section or pursuant to
section one hundred eleven-k of the social services law shall be
received in evidence by the court pursuant to subdivision (e) of rule
forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules where
no timely objection in writing has been made thereto and that if
such timely objections are not made, they shall be deemed waived
13

and shall not be heard by the court. If the record or report of the
results of any such genetic marker or DNA test or tests
indicate at least a ninety-five percent probability of paternity,
the admission of such record or report shall create a
rebuttable presumption of paternity, and shall establish, if
unrebutted, the paternity of and liability for the support of a
child pursuant to this article and article four of this act.
(b) Whenever the court directs a genetic marker or DNA test
pursuant to this section, a report made as provided in subdivision
(a) of this section may be received in evidence pursuant to rule
forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules if
offered by any party.
(c) The cost of any test ordered pursuant to subdivision (a) of this
section shall be, in the first instance, paid by the moving party. If
the moving party is financially unable to pay such cost, the court
may direct any qualified public health officer to conduct such test,
if practicable; otherwise, the court may direct payment from the
funds of the appropriate local social services district. In its order of
disposition, however, the court may direct that the cost of any such
test be apportioned between the parties according to their
respective abilities to pay or be assessed against the party who
does not prevail on the issue of paternity, unless such party is
financially unable to pay. (emphasis supplied)
In R.E. v. C.E.W.,[43] a decision of the Mississippi Supreme
Court, DNA tests were used to prove that H.W., previously thought
to be an offspring of the marriage between A.C.W. and C.E.W.,
was actually the child of R.E. with whom C.E.W. had, at the time of
conception, maintained an adulterous relationship.
In Erie County Department of Social Services on behalf of
Tiffany M.H. v. Greg G.,[44] the 4th Department of the New York
Supreme Courts Appellate Division allowed G.G., who had been
adjudicated as T.M.H.s father by default, to have the said judgment
vacated, even after six years, once he had shown through a
genetic marker test that he was not the childs father. In this case,
G.G. only requested the tests after the Department of Social
Services, six years after G.G. had been adjudicated as T.M.H.s
father, sought an increase in his support obligation to her.
In Greco v. Coleman,[45] the Michigan Supreme Court while
ruling on the constitutionality of a provision of law allowing non-
modifiable support agreements pointed out that it was because of
14

the difficulty of determining paternity before the advent of DNA

testing that such support agreements were necessary:
As a result of DNA testing, the accuracy with which paternity can
be proven has increased significantly since the parties in this
lawsuit entered into their support agreement(current testing
methods can determine the probability of paternity to 99.999999%
accuracy). However, at the time the parties before us entered into
the disputed agreement, proving paternity was a very significant
obstacle to an illegitimate child's access to child support. The first
reported results of modern DNA paternity testing did not occur until
1985. ("In fact, since its first reported results in
1985, DNA matching has progressed to 'general acceptance in
less than a decade'"). Of course, while prior blood-testing methods
could exclude some males from being the possible father of a child,
those methods could not affirmatively pinpoint a particular male as
being the father. Thus, when the settlement agreement between
the present parties was entered in 1980, establishing paternity was
a far more difficult ordeal than at present. Contested paternity
actions at that time were often no more than credibility contests.
Consequently, in every contested paternity action, obtaining child
support depended not merely on whether the putative father was,
in fact, the child's biological father, but rather on whether the
mother could prove to a court of law that she was only sexually
involved with one man--the putative father. Allowing parties the
option of entering into private agreements in lieu of proving
paternity eliminated the risk that the mother would be unable meet
her burden of proof.
It is worth noting that amendments to Michigans Paternity law
have included the use of DNA testing:[46]
722.716 Pretrial proceedings; blood or tissue typing determinations
as to mother, child, and alleged father; court order; refusal to
submit to typing or identification profiling; qualifications of person
conducting typing or identification profiling; compensation of
expert; result of typing or identification profiling; filing summary
report; objection; admissibility; presumption; burden of proof;
summary disposition.
Sec. 6.
(1) In a proceeding under this act before trial, the court, upon
application made by or on behalf of either party, or on its own
motion, shall order that the mother, child, and alleged father
15

submit to blood or tissue typing determinations, which may

include, but are not limited to, determinations of red cell
antigens, red cell isoenzymes, human leukocyte antigens,
serum proteins, or DNAidentification profiling, to determine
whether the alleged father is likely to be, or is not, the father
of the child. If the court orders a blood or tissue typing
or DNA identification profiling to be conducted and a party
refuses to submit to the typing or DNA identification profiling,
in addition to any other remedies available, the court may do
either of the following:
(a) Enter a default judgment at the request of the appropriate
party.
(b) If a trial is held, allow the disclosure of the fact of the
refusal unless good cause is shown for not disclosing the fact
of refusal.
(2) A blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling shall be
conducted by a person accredited for paternity determinations by
a nationally recognized scientific organization, including, but not
limited to, the American association of blood banks.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) If the probability of paternity determined by the qualified
person described in subsection (2) conducting the blood or
tissue typing or DNA identification profiling is 99% or higher,
and the DNA identification profile and summary report are
admissible as provided in subsection (4), paternity is
presumed. If the results of the analysis of genetic testing
material from 2 or more persons indicate a probability of
paternity greater than 99%, the contracting laboratory shall
conduct additional genetic paternity testing until all but 1 of
the putative fathers is eliminated, unless the dispute involves
2 or more putative fathers who have identical DNA.
(6) Upon the establishment of the presumption of paternity as
provided in subsection (5), either party may move for summary
disposition under the court rules. this section does not abrogate the
right of either party to child support from the date of birth of the
child if applicable under section 7. (emphasis supplied)
In Rafferty v. Perkins,[47] the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled
that DNA test results showing paternity were sufficient to overthrow
the presumption of legitimacy of a child born during the course of
a marriage:
16

The presumption of legitimacy having been rebutted by the results

of the blood test eliminating Perkins as Justin's father, even
considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Perkins, we
find that no reasonable jury could find that Easter is not Justin's
father based upon the 99.94% probability of paternity concluded by
the DNA testing.
In S.J.F. and J.C.F. v. R.C.W.,[48] the North Dakota Supreme
Court upheld an order for genetic testing given by the Court of
Appeals, even after trial on the merits had concluded without such
order being given. Significantly, when J.C.F., the mother, first filed
the case for paternity and support with the District Court, neither
party requested genetic testing. It was only upon appeal from
dismissal of the case that the appellate court remanded the case
and ordered the testing, which the North Dakota Supreme Court
upheld.
The case of Kohl v. Amundson,[49] decided by the Supreme
Court of South Dakota, demonstrated that even default judgments
of paternity could be vacated after the adjudicated father had,
through DNA testing, established non-paternity. In this case, Kohl,
having excluded himself as the father of Amundsons child through
DNA testing, was able to have the default judgment against him
vacated. He then obtained a ruling ordering Amundson to
reimburse him for the amounts withheld from his wages for child
support. The Court said (w)hile Amundson may have a remedy
against the father of the child, she submit(ted) no authority that
require(d) Kohl to support her child. Contrary to Amundson's
position, the fact that a default judgment was entered, but
subsequently vacated, (did) not foreclose Kohl from obtaining a
money judgment for the amount withheld from his wages.
In M.A.S. v. Mississippi Dept. of Human Services,[50] another
case decided by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, it was held that
even if paternity was established through an earlier agreed order
of filiation, child support and visitation orders could still be vacated
once DNA testing established someone other than the named
individual to be the biological father. The Mississippi High Court
reiterated this doctrine in Williams v. Williams.[51]
The foregoing considered, we find no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the public respondent for upholding the orders of the
trial court which both denied the petitioners motion to dismiss and
ordered him to submit himself for DNA testing. Under Rule 65 of
17

the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the remedy of certiorari is only

available when any tribunal, board or officer has acted without or
in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal,
nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.[52] In Land Bank of the Philippines v. the Court of
Appeals[53] where we dismissed a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65, we discussed at length the nature of such a petition
and just what was meant by grave abuse of discretion:
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in
other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility,
and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
The raison detre for the rule is when a court exercises its
jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive
it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If
it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its
jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void
judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of justice would
not survive. Hence, where the issue or question involved affects
the wisdom or legal soundness of the decisionnot the jurisdiction
of the court to render said decisionthe same is beyond the province
of a special civil action for certiorari.
The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the
CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court. On the other hand, if the error subject of
the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was
perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or agency with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper
remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the said Rules. (emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way shown any
arbitrariness, passion, prejudice or personal hostility that would
amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals. The respondent court acted entirely within its jurisdiction
18

in promulgating its decision and resolution, and any error made

would have only been an error in judgment. As we have discussed,
however, the decision of the respondent court, being firmly
anchored in law and jurisprudence, was correct.

Epilogue

For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by

fathers who choose to deny their existence. The growing
sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much
needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We
have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have
repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a
perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a
dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We
therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that
DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby
DENIED. The Court of Appeals decision dated January 28, 2004
in CA-G.R. SP No. 80961 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED

AMELIA D. DE MESA, ARACELI ADATO, RODRIGO ALVARAN,

AIDA CASTRO, BALTAZAR ESTRELLES, ANTONIO A.
FERRER, DANILO GARCIA, JULIO M. GONZALES,
MARRIETA A. JOSE, PEPITA JUNTADO, EDUARDO U.
LAGO, NESTOR RODA, JAIME SANCHEZ and JUANITA
SANCHEZ, petitioners, vs. PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS
PHILS., INC. and PEPSICO INC., respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.: Commented [1]:

For review on certiorari is the Order,[1] dated April 18, 2002, of

the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 142 in Civil Cases
Nos. 94-2414 to 94-2421. In the said Order, the RTC granted
19

herein respondents motion to dismiss the complaints filed by

petitioners herein based on the principle of stare decisis.
The instant case arose from the same set of facts as
(1) Mendoza v. Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc., et al., G.R.
No. 153183 promulgated on July 24, 2002[2] affirming the Court of
Appeals Decision, dated April 16, 2002, in CA-G.R. CV No.
53860;[3] and (2) Rodrigo v. Pepsi Cola Products (Phils.), Inc. and
Pepsico, Inc., G.R. No. 149411, dated October 1, 2001, which also
affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision of May 21, 2001 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 62837.[4]
The facts are culled from the aforesaid Decisions of the Court
of Appeals as affirmed by this Court.

Petitioners are holders of soft drink bottle caps bearing the

number 349, allegedly a winning combination in a contest
sponsored by respondents Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc.
(PCPPI) and PEPSICO, Inc. (PI). Commented [2]:

Respondent PCPPI is a domestic corporation engaged in the

production, bottling, and distribution of carbonated drinks, while
respondent PI is a foreign corporation licensed to do business in
the Philippines and is the major stockholder of PCPPI.
D.G. Consultores, a Mexican consulting firm that handled similar
promotions in other countries, was tasked to randomly pre-select
the winning numbers and send to respondents a list of the 60
winning numbers with their corresponding security codes. The
process of selecting the winning numbers was implemented with
the approval of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).
During the initial promotion period, from February 17 to May 8,
1992, respondents seeded 1000 numbers, 60 of which were
winning numbers, 510 non-winning numbers, while the remaining
430 were unused. To ensure that the winning numbers would not
be tampered, the DTI required respondents to submit the list of
winning numbers including their security codes which was then
deposited in a safety deposit box in a bank.[5]
Owing to the promotional campaigns success, respondents
extended the Number Fever by five more weeks, from May 10 to
June 12, 1992. Pepsi again tapped D.G. Consultores to
20

predetermine the 25 additional winning numbers from the list of

unused numbers.
On May 25, 1992, respondents announced 349 as the winning
number for the May 26 draw. Later the same night, Quintin Gomez,
Jr., then PCPPIs Marketing Services Manager called DTI Director
Madarang informing her that due to some security code problems
a mistake had been made in the announcement of number 349 as
the winning number.[6]
Numerous holders of the supposedly winning 349 crowns were
not honored and paid by respondents, which led these rejected
crown holders to file separate complaints for specific performance
and damages.
Civil Case No. 93-68351 was originally filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 16, but the plaintiffs in the said case
withdrew their complaint, leaving Gerson Mendoza as the sole
plaintiff in Gerson M. Mendoza v. Pepsi-Cola Products Phils., Inc.
and Pepsico, Inc.[7] The other plaintiffs re-filed their complaints
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50,
entitled Romulo Rodrigo, et al. v. Pepsi Cola Products Philippines,
Inc., et al., docketed as Civil Case No. 94-71403.[8]
For their part, petitioners herein filed their separate complaints,
docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 94-2414 to 94-2421, before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 142.

In the Mendoza case, the RTC dismissed the complaint filed

against herein respondents for specific performance and damages
in connection with the Number Fever fiasco.[9] Mendoza appealed
to the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 53860, which was
dismissed for lack of merit.[10] Unfazed, Mendoza filed with this
Court a petition for review, which was denied for failure to
sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any
reversible error.[11] Commented [3]:

In the Rodrigo case, the RTC likewise dismissed the complaint

against herein respondents for specific performance and damages
arising from the said promotion.[12] On appeal, docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 62837, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
decision.[13] A petition for review was subsequently filed with this
Court, which was denied for failure to show that a reversible error
21

was committed by the appellate court. The motion for

reconsideration was also denied with finality[14] and entry of
judgment was made.[15]
However, prior to the resolution of
the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases, herein petitioners filed with the
RTC, on December 11, 2000, a motion for leave[16] to (1) adopt the
previous testimonial and documentary evidence in
the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases; or (2) archive the case until final
resolution of the said two cases, which were then pending with the
Court of Appeals. The RTC granted the said motion on January 8,
2001 and the case was accordingly archived.[17]

Meantime, the Rodrigo case became final and executory on

February 5, 2002 in view of our denial of therein petitioners petition
for review on certiorari and motion for reconsideration.
Hence, on February 20, 2002, herein respondents filed with the
RTC a motion to dismiss[18] the complaints filed by petitioners
herein invoking the principle of stare decisis. The RTC, in its
assailed Order,[19] granted the motion to dismiss ratiocinating as
follows: Commented [4]:

The Court finds the instant motion meritorious under the principle
of stare decisis. The said doctrine embodies the legal maxim that
a principle or rule of law which has been established by the
decision of a court of controlling jurisdiction will be followed in other
cases involving similar situation. It is founded on the necessity for
securing certainty and stability in the law and does not require
identity or privy of parties. This is explicitly ordained in Article 8 of
the Civil Code which provides that decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal
system. Such decisions assume the same authority as the statute
itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to
the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control
the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but
also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto
(Kilosbayan, Inc. et al. vs. Manuel Morato, G.R. No. 118910, July
17, 1995).
In the instant cases as well as in Civil Case No. 93-68351 (the
Mendoza case), not only are the legal rights and relations of the
parties substantially the same as those passed upon in Civil Case
22

No. 94-71403 (the Rodrigo case), but the facts, the applicable laws,
the causes of action, the issues, and the testimonial and
documentary evidence are identical such that a ruling in one case,
i.e. the Rodrigo case in Civil Case No. 94-71403, under the rule
of stare decisis, is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same
issue.[20]

Petitioners now come to us in this petition for review claiming

that (1) the principle of res judicata does not apply; and (2) the Commented [5]:
issue
dismissal of the complaint was premature as petitioners motion to
archive the case and the grant thereof was based on the condition
that there be a final resolution in
[21]
the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases.

Simply put, the sole issue is whether the present case is barred
by this Courts ruling in the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases. Commented [6]:

Petitioners contend that res judicata does not apply as there is

no identity of parties to begin with. Moreover, they argue that stare
decisis is not a hard and fast rule. They insist another review
should be taken on the cause of action in this case because the
Court of Appeals, in the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases, erred in
ruling that the security code determines the real winning crowns.
They claim that the trial courts dismissal of their complaint was
premature. Lastly, petitioners posit that there was a breached
contract between the parties; therefore, respondents should be
made to perform their contractual obligation.
For their part, respondents counter that the RTC correctly
dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground of res judicata.
Respondents contend that, like the Mendoza and Rodrigocases,
the civil cases filed by petitioners arose from the conduct of
respondents Number Fever promotion. Petitioners causes of
action, testimonial and documentary evidence, are the same as
those in the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases. Lastly, respondents
point out that the findings of fact in the said two cases are also the
same, i.e.: (i) Respondents did not breach any contract since the
349 crowns with security code L-2560-FQ are not winning crowns;
and (ii) Respondents were not negligent in the conduct of their
promotion and they exerted efforts to ensure the integrity and
23

smooth conduct of the same.

The instant petition must be denied. Commented [7]:

The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere[22] is

entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
It enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires our courts
to follow a rule already established in a final decision of the
Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be
followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine
of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of
law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled
and closed to further argument.[23] Commented [8]:

In the instant case, the legal rights and relations of the parties,
the facts, the applicable laws, the causes of action, the issues, and
the evidence are exactly the same as those in the decided cases
of Mendoza and Rodrigo, supra. Hence, nothing is left to be
argued. The issue has been settled and this Courts final decision
in the said cases must be respected. This Courts hands are now
tied by the finality of the said judgments. We have no recourse but
to deny the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The
assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
142, in Civil Cases Nos. 94-2414 to 94-2421, is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

MARVIN MERCADO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.: Commented [9]:
24

MARVIN MERCADO, together with Rommel Flores, Michael

Cummins, Mark Vasques and Enrile Bertumen, was charged with
and convicted of violation of R.A. 6538 or The Anti-Carnapping Act
of 1972, as amended, for which he and his co-accused were Commented [10]:

sentenced to a prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum.[1]

The case before us concerns only the petition for review of

accused Marvin Mercado where he assails his conviction, and
arguing that the Court of Appeals having increased the penalty
imposed by the court a quo to a prison term of seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years, should have certified
the case to this Court as the penalty of thirty (30) years was
already reclusion perpetua, pursuant to the last paragraph of Sec.
13, Rule 124,[2] of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Commented [11]:

We cannot sustain the petition; we agree instead with the Court

of Appeals.
In denying the prayer of petitioner, the Court of Appeals
correctly held that the provision of Sec. 13, Rule 124, relied upon
by petitioner, was applicable only when the penalty imposed
was reclusion perpetua or higher as a single indivisible penalty,
i.e., the penalty was at least reclusion perpetua. Hence, the
penalty imposed by the appellate court on the accused was clearly
in accordance with Sec. 14 of RA 6538,[3] which is not
considered reclusion perpetua for purposes of Sec. 13, Rule 124.[4]
The Court of Appeals in its assailed resolution relied on People
v. Omotoy[5] where the Regional Trial Court found the accused
guilty of arson and sentenced him to imprisonment ranging from
twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum,
to reclusion perpetua. The case reached this Court on automatic
appeal. In Footnote 16 of the decision, it was observed -
The appeal was taken directly to this Tribunal for the reason no
doubt that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is involved, albeit
joined to prision mayor in its maximum period in accordance with
the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Actually, the appeal should have
gone to the Court of Appeals since strictly speaking, this Court
entertains appeals in criminal cases only where the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher (Sec. 5[2](d), Article VIII,
25

Constitution), i.e., the penalty is at least reclusion perpetua (or life

imprisonment, in special offenses). The lapse will be overlooked so
as not to delay the disposition of the case. It is of slight nature, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua having in fact been imposed on the
accused, and causes no prejudice whatsoever to any party.
Petitioner now asks whether the last paragraph of Sec. 13, Rule
124, of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is applicable to the
instant case considering that the penalty imposed was seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years.
Article 27 of The Revised Penal Code states that the penalty
of reclusion perpetua shall be from twenty (20) years and one (1)
day to forty (40) years. While the thirty (30)-year period falls within
that range, reclusion perpetua nevertheless is a single indivisible
penalty which cannot be divided into different periods. The thirty
(30)-year period for reclusion perpetua is only for purposes of
successive service of sentence under Art. 70 of The Revised Penal
Code.[6]
More importantly, the crime committed by petitioner is one
penalized under RA 6538 or The Anti-Carnapping Act of
1972 which is a special law and not under The Revised Penal
Code. Unless otherwise specified, if the special penal law imposes
such penalty, it is error to designate it with terms provided for
in The Revised Penal Code since those terms apply only to the
penalties imposed by the Penal Code, and not to the penalty in
special penal laws.[7] This is because generally, special laws
provide their own specific penalties for the offenses they punish,
which penalties are not taken from nor refer to those in The
Revised Penal Code.[8]
The penalty of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months under
RA 6538 is essentially within the range of the medium period
of reclusion temporal. However, such technical term under The
Revised Penal Code is not similarly used or applied to the penalty
for carnapping. Also, the penalty for carnapping attended by the
qualifying circumstance of violence against or intimidation of any
person or force upon things, i.e., seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months to thirty (30) years, does not correspond to that in The
Revised Penal Code.[9] But it is different when the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped in the course
of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof, since this is penalized
with reclusion perpetua to death.[10]
26

Hence, it was error for the trial court to impose the penalty of x
x x imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as
minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of
reclusion temporal as maximum.[11] For these reasons the use of
the term reclusion temporal in the decretal portion of its decision is
not proper. Besides, we see no basis for the trial court to set the
minimum penalty at twelve (12) years and one (1) day since RA
6538 sets the minimum penalty for carnapping at fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months.

We see no error by the appellate court in relying on

a Footnote in Omotoy[12] to affirm the conviction of the accused.
The substance of the Footnote may not be the ratio decidendi of
the case, but it still constitutes an important part of the decision
since it enunciates a fundamental procedural rule in the conduct of
appeals. That this rule is stated in a Footnote to a decision is of no
consequence as it is merely a matter of style. Commented [12]:

It may be argued that Omotoy is not on all fours with the instant
case since the former involves an appeal
from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court while the
case at bar is an appeal from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme
Court. As enunciated in Omotoy, the Supreme Court entertains
appeals in criminal cases only where the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua or higher. The basis for this doctrine is the
Constitution itself which empowers this Court to review, revise,
reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments of lower courts in all criminal
cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher.[13] Commented [13]:

Where the Court of Appeals finds that the imposable penalty in

a criminal case brought to it on appeal is at least reclusion
perpetua, death or life imprisonment, then it should impose such
penalty, refrain from entering judgment thereon, certify the case
and elevate the entire records to this Court for review.[14] This will
obviate the unnecessary, pointless and time-wasting shuttling of
criminal cases between this Court and the Court of Appeals, for by
then this Court will acquire jurisdiction over the case from the very
inception and can, without bothering the Court of Appeals which
27

has fully completed the exercise of its jurisdiction, do justice in the

case.[15]

On the other hand, where the Court of Appeals imposes a

penalty less than reclusion perpetua, a review of the case may be
had only by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45[16] where
only errors or questions of law may be raised. Commented [14]:

Petitioner, in his Reply, also brings to fore the issue of whether

there was indeed a violation of The Anti-Carnapping Act. This
issue is factual, as we shall find hereunder.
In the evening of 26 May 1996 Leonardo Bhagwani parked the
subject Isuzu Trooper in front of his house at No. 7015-B Biac-na-
Bato St., Makati City, Metro Manila. The vehicle was owned by
Augustus Zamora but was used by Bhagwani as a service vehicle
in their joint venture. The following day the Isuzu Trooper was
nowhere to be found prompting Bhagwani to report its
disappearance to the Makati Police Station and the Anti-
Carnapping (ANCAR) Division which immediately issued an Alarm
Sheet.[17]
On 31 May 1996 Bhagwanis neighbor, fireman Avelino Alvarez,
disclosed that he learned from his daughter, a common-law wife of
accused Michael Cummins, that the accused Rommel Flores, Mark
Vasques, Enrile Bertumen and Michael Cummins himself stole the
Isuzu Trooper. Alvarezs daughter however refused to issue any
statement regarding the incident.[18]
In the evening of 31 May 1996 SPO3 Miling Flores brought to
his house Michael Cummins, Mark Vasques, Enrile Bertumen,
Rommel Flores, and complaining witness Bhagwani. In that
meeting, Cummins, Vasques, Bertumen and Flores admitted that
they took the vehicle and used it in going to Laguna, La Union and
Baguio.[19] They claimed however that it was with the knowledge
and consent of Bhagwani. They alleged that on the night they took
the vehicle, they invited Bhagwani to join them in their outing to
Laguna. But when Bhagwani declined, they asked him instead if
they could borrow the Isuzu Trooper. Bhagwani allegedly agreed
and even turned over the keys to them.[20]
28

Petitioner Marvin Mercado was absent during that confrontasi in

the house of SPO3 Miling Flores but his co-accused narrated his
participation in the crime.[21]
The Court of Appeals affirmed their conviction but increased the
penalty imposed on the four (4) accused from a prison term
of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years.[22]
Petitioner insists that the accused were more motivated by fun
rather than theft in taking the Isuzu Trooper, and that they merely
took the vehicle for a joyride with no intention of stealing it. If they
were really thieves, according to petitioner, they would have sold
the vehicle outright instead of simply abandoning it in Baguio.[23]
Petitioner apparently overlooks the fact that this is a petition for
review on certiorari where only questions of law, and not questions
of fact, may be raised. The issue before us being factual, a
reevaluation of the facts and the evidence may not be entertained
in this appeal. Besides, findings of fact of the trial court, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon the Supreme
Court.[24] This rule may be disregarded only when the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings and
conclusions of the trial court, or are not supported by the evidence
on record. But there is no ground to apply this exception to the
instant case. This Court will not assess all over again the evidence
adduced by the parties particularly where as in this case the
findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals completely
coincide.[25]
However, we disagree with the Court of Appeals on its
imposition of the penalty. Republic Act No. 6538 imposes the
penalty of imprisonment for seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months to thirty (30) years when the carnapping is committed by
means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force
upon things. The evidence in this case shows that the accused
broke a quarter window of the Isuzu Trooper to gain access to it,
thus demonstrating that force was used upon the vehicle;
nonetheless, we believe that this does not merit the imposition of
the full penalty. With the application of The Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed may be reduced to an
indeterminate prison term of seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months to twenty-two (22) years.
29

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals

denying the Motion and Manifestation of petitioner Marvin Mercado
dated 19 January 2001 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the penalty imposed is reduced to an indeterminate prison
term of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to twenty-two
(22) years. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, JR., petitioner, vs. THE HON.

COURT OF APPEALS and ROQUE
VILLADORES, respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.: Commented [15]:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of

the Court of Appeals dated April 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 50235
reversing the two (2) Orders dated August 27, 1998[2] and
December 4, 1998[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
41, in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-138744-45 which denied
respondent Roque Villadoress motion for disqualification of Rico
and Associates as private prosecutor for petitioner Francisco N.
Villanueva, Jr., and the motion for reconsideration thereof,
respectively.
Respondent Villadores is one of the accused in the amended
informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-138744 and 94-138745
entitled, People of the Philippines v. Atty. Tomas Bernardo, Roque
Villadores, Alberto Adriano and Rolando Advincula, for
Falsification of Public Document before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 41.

It appears that petitioner Villanueva, Jr. filed a complaint for

illegal dismissal against several parties, among them, IBC 13.
When the labor arbiter[4] ruled in favor of petitioner Villanueva, Jr.,
IBC 13 appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission Commented [16]:

(NLRC).[5] As an appeal bond, IBC 13 filed Surety Bond No. G (16)

00136 issued by BF General Insurance Company, Inc. (BF) with
30

the Confirmation Letter dated September 20, 1993 supposedly

issued by BFs Vice-President. However, both documents were
subsequently found to be falsified.
Thus, the two (2) complaints for falsification of public document
were filed before the Manila City Prosecutors Office. The charges
against respondent Villadores and Atty. Eulalio Diaz III were
dismissed by the City Prosecutors Office which, however, found
probable cause against the other respondents. Nonetheless, on a
petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), the
latter affirmed the dismissal against Diaz but ordered the inclusion
of respondent Villadores as an accused in the two (2) criminal
cases. Accordingly, the original informations were amended to
include respondent Villadores among those charged.

Following the arraignment of respondent Villadores, the private

prosecutor, Rico and Associates, filed anew a Motion to Admit
Amended Informations alleging damages sustained by private
complainant, herein petitioner Villanueva, Jr., as a result of the
crimes committed by the accused. The incident was referred to the Commented [17]:

City Prosecutors Office by the trial court. In compliance, the fiscals

office submitted a Motion to Admit Amended Informations with the
following amendment: to the prejudice of Francisco N. Villanueva,
Jr., and of public interest and in violation of public faith and
destruction of truth as therein proclaimed.
The Motion was granted by the trial court and the amended
informations were admitted in an Order dated October 10, 1997.
Respondent Villadores subsequently filed a Manifestation and/or
Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied in an Order
dated October 24, 1997.
Thus, respondent Villadores interposed on November 26, 1997
a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Said petition,
which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 46103, sought to annul
the Order of the trial court dated October 10, 1997 which admitted
the second amended informations, as well as the Order dated
October 24, 1997 denying his motion for reconsideration thereof.[6]
In a Decision dated June 22, 1998, the appellate court, acting
thru its Eleventh Division, found that the trial court committed no
grave abuse of discretion in admitting the amended informations
and dismissed the petition of respondent Villadores.[7] The decision
31

in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103 became final and executory on July 18,

1998.[8]
Subsequently, before Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, respondent Villadores moved for the disqualification of
Rico and Associates as private prosecutor for petitioner Villanueva,
Jr.,[9] in line with the following pronouncement of the appellate court
in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103, to wit:[10]
Incidentally, We are one with the petitioner when it argued that
Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr. is not the offended party in these
cases. It must be underscored that it was IBC 13 who secured the
falsified surety bond for the purpose of the appeal it had taken from
an adverse judgment of the labor case filed by Francisco N.
Villanueva, Jr. himself and wherein the latter prevailed. We see no
reason how Villanueva could have sustained damages as a result
of the falsification of the surety appeal bond and its confirmation
letter when it could have even redounded to his own benefit if the
appeal would be dismissed as a result of the forgery. If there be
anyone who was prejudiced, it was IBC 13 when it purchased a
fake surety bond.
Rico and Associates opposed said motion on the ground that the
above-quoted pronouncement of the appellate court is a
mere obiter dictum.[11]
In an Order[12] dated August 27, 1998 the trial court denied the
motion for disqualification ratiocinating, thus:
A reading of the aforecited decision of the Court of Appeals clearly
shows that the aforecited reason for the motion is a mere obiter
dictum. As held by the Supreme Court, an obiter dictum lacks force
of adjudication. It is merely an expression of an opinion with no
binding force for purposes of res judicata (City of Manila vs. Entote,
June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA, 508-509). What is controlling is the
dispositive portion of the subject decision of the Court of Appeals
which denied due course and ordered dismissed the petition of the
movant questioning the Order of this Court granting the Motion to
Admit Informations and admitting the Amended Informations that
include the name of Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr. as the private
offended party, which in effect upheld and/or affirmed the
questioned Order of this Court admitting the amended
informations.
32

Reconsideration[13] was sought by respondent Villadores but the

same was denied by the trial court in its Order dated December 4,
1998.[14]

Thus, on January 7, 1999, respondent Villadores filed a petition

for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-
G.R. SP No. 50235, seeking the annulment of the trial courts Order
dated August 27, 1998 denying the Motion for Disqualification as
well as its subsequent Order dated December 4, 1998 denying
reconsideration.[15] Commented [18]:

On April 12, 2000, the appellate court rendered its now

challenged decision which reversed and set aside the two (2)
Orders of the trial court dated August 27, 1998 and December 4,
1998. The appellate court directed that the name of petitioner
Villanueva, Jr., appearing as the offended party in Criminal Cases
Nos. 94-138744-45 be stricken out from the records.[16]
Hence, this petition anchored on the following grounds:[17]
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
ENJOINING RICO & ASSOCIATES FROM APPEARING AS
PRIVATE PROSECUTOR AND/OR AS COUNSEL FOR
FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, JR., IN CRIMINAL CASE NOS. 94-
138744-45.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
FAILING TO APPRECIATE THAT THE MATTER OF WHETHER
OR NOT FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, JR. IS AN OFFENDED
PARTY IN CRIMINAL CASE NOS. 94-138744-45 HAD BEEN
RESOLVED WITH FINALITY IN THE AFFIRMATIVE IN CA-G.R.
SP NO. 46103 WHERE THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
UPHELD THE AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATIONS IN SAID
CASES TO STATE THAT THE CRIMES WERE COMMITTED TO
THE PREJUDICE OF FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, JR., AND
PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA, THE
SAME COULD NO LONGER BE RELITIGATED IN CA-G.R. SP
NO. 50235.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
FAILING TO CONSIDER THE PRONOUNCEMENT IN CA-G.R.
SP NO. 46103 THAT FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, JR. IS NOT
AN OFFENDED PARTY, AS A MERE OBITER DICTUM.
33

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN

FAILING TO APPRECIATE THAT FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA,
JR., WAS IN FACT AN AGGRIEVED PARTY.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
ORDERING THE NAME OF FRANCISCO N. VILLANUVEVA, JR.,
APPEARING AS THE OFFENDED PARTY BE STRICKEN FROM
THE RECORDS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IN CA-G.R. SP NO.
46103, IT UPHELD THE AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATIONS
SO AS TO STATE THAT THE CRIMES CHARGED WERE
COMMITTED TO THE PREJUDICE OF FRANCISCO N.
VILLANUEVA, JR.

All the foregoing issues boil down to the issue of whether or not
the pronouncement of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103
to the effect that petitioner Villanueva, Jr. is not an offended party
in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-138744-45 is obiter dictum. Commented [19]:

An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion expressed by

a court upon some question of law which is not necessary to the
decision of the case before it. It is a remark made, or opinion
expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, by the way,
that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the
question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the
determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or
analogy or argument. Such are not binding as precedent.[18] Commented [20]:

Based on the foregoing, the pronouncement of the appellate

court in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103 is not an obiter dictum as it touched
upon a matter clearly raised by respondent Villadores in his petition
assailing the admission of the Amended Informations. Among the
issues upon which the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
46103 was anchored, was whether Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr. is
the offended party.[19] Argument on whether petitioner Villanueva,
Jr. was the offended party was, thus, clearly raised by respondent
Villadores. The body of the decision contains discussion on that
point and it clearly mentioned certain principles of law. Commented [21]:

It has been held that an adjudication on any point within the

issues presented by the case cannot be considered as obiter
dictum, and this rule applies to all pertinent questions, although
34

only incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the

regular course of the consideration of the case, and led up to the
final conclusion, and to any statement as to matter on which the
decision is predicated. Accordingly, a point expressly decided does
not lose its value as a precedent because the disposition of the
case is, or might have been, made on some other ground, or even
though, by reason of other points in the case, the result reached
might have been the same if the court had held, on the particular
point, otherwise than it did. A decision which the case could have
turned on is not regarded as obiter dictummerely because, owing
to the disposal of the contention, it was necessary to consider
another question, nor can an additional reason in a decision,
brought forward after the case has been disposed of on one
ground, be regarded as dicta. So, also, where a case presents two
(2) or more points, any one of which is sufficient to determine the
ultimate issue, but the court actually decides all such points, the
case as an authoritative precedent as to every point decided, and
none of such points can be regarded as having the status of
a dictum, and one point should not be denied authority merely
because another point was more dwelt on and more fully argued
and considered, nor does a decision on one proposition make
statements of the court regarding other propositions dicta.[20]
The decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103
allegedly show a conflict between the pronouncements in the body
of the decision and the dispositive portion thereof. However, when
that decision is carefully and thoroughly read, such conflict is
revealed to be more illusory than real. In denying the petition
for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103, the appellate court had this
to say:
At the centerfold of this controversy is Section 14 of Rule 110, 1st
paragraph, which is quoted hereunder:
SEC. 14. Amendment. - The information or complaint may be
amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused pleads, and thereafter and during the trial as to
all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when
the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the
accused.
Needless to state, amendment of a criminal charge sheet depends
much on the time when the change is requested. If before
arraignment it is a matter of right, no leave of court is necessary
35

and the prosecution is free to do so even in matters of substance

and in form. On the other hand, the more complicated situation
involves an amendment sought after the accused had already been
arraigned. This time amendment can only be made by a prior leave
and at the discretion of the court, only as to matters of form when
the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused
[Draculan vs. Donato; 140 SCRA 425 (1985); Teehankee vs.
Madayag, 207 SCRA 134 (1992)].
Relative to the second instance, the primary consideration is
whether the intended amendment is only as to matter of form and
same could be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused.
Substantial amendment as a consequence is proscribed. In
essence, substantial matters in the complaint or information is the
recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative
of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form
[Almeda vs. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38 (1975); Teehankee vs.
Madayag, supra].
In other words, even if the amendment is only as to matter of form,
one other criteria must accompany it for its admission, which is,
that it should not be prejudicial to the accused. Conformably, the
test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the
amendment of a complaint or information is, when a defense under
the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer
be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence
the accused might have, would no longer be available after the
amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might
have, would be inapplicable to the complaint or information as
amended [People vs. Montenegro, 159 SCRA 236 (1988);
Teehankee vs. Madayag, supra].
Given the above aphorisms, the inclusion of the name of Francisco
N. Villanueva, Jr. as the prejudiced complainant in the cases
appears to be not substantial. It did not change, alter or modify the
crime charged nor any possible defense. Likewise, any evidence
the accused might have under his defense in the original
informations is still very much available to him and applicable to
the amended informations. In sum, accused petitioner is not in any
way prejudiced in his rights with such amendment which, in Our
considered opinion, is only a matter of form under the standards
laid down in the cases above-cited.
What seems to be more crucial here is the fact that the crime
charged in the two informations is falsification of public document
36

committed by a private individual defined and penalized under

Article 172, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly,
the evil sought to be punished and sanctioned by the offense of
falsification of public document is the violation of the public faith
and the destruction of the trust as therein solemnly proclaimed
[People vs. Pacana, 47 Phil 48, citing Decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain of December 23, 1886; People vs. Mateo, 25 Phil.
324, Po Giok To, 96 Phil. 913; see Revised Penal Code, Luis B.
Reyes, 13th Division, p. 211 and Aquino, 1976 ed., Vol. 2, p. 984].
Apropos, the crime of falsification of public document does not
require for its essential elements damage or intent to cause
damage. In the final analysis. the inclusion of the name of
Francisco N. Villanueva. Jr. would then be merely a superfluity in
the information, a meaningless surplusage therein. In fact. it is
even highly doubted if civil damages may be awarded in such
transgression of the law.
Viewed from the above ratiocinations, We find no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the lower court in admitting the second
amended informations albeit such amendment is totally irrelevant
and unnecessary to the crime charged. The mere fact that the court
decides the question wrongly is utterly immaterial to the question
of jurisdiction [Estrada vs. Sto Domingo, 28 SCRA 891 (1969)].
And writs of certiorari are issued only for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction. It cannot be legally used for any other
purpose [Silverio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 527 (1986)].
Incidentally, We are in one with the petitioner when it argued that
Francisco N. Villanueva, Jr. is not the offended party in these
cases. It must be underscored that it was IBC 13 who secured the
falsified surety bond for the purpose of the appeal it had taken from
an adverse judgment of the labor case filed by Francisco N.
Villanueva, Jr. himself and wherein the latter prevailed. We see no
reason how Villanueva could have sustained damages as a result
of the falsification of the surety appeal bond and its confirmation
letter when it could have even redounded to his own benefit if the
appeal would be dismissed as a result of the forgery. If there be
anyone who was prejudiced, it was IBC 13 when it purchased a
fake surety bond.[21]
Clearly then, while the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103
admitted that the addition of petitioner Villanueva, Jr. as an
offended party is not necessary, it held that the admission of the
37

amended informations due to the amendment to include petitioner

Villanueva, Jr. did not by itself amount to grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Otherwise stated, there
is an error of judgment but such did not amount to an error of
jurisdiction.
The special civil action for certiorari, which was availed of
respondent Villadores, is a remedy designed for the correction of
errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. When a court
exercised its jurisdiction an error committed while so engaged does
not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is
committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive
it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void
judgment. Thus, an error of judgment that the court may commit in
the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through the original
special civil action of certiorari.[22] In effect, the appellate court in
CA-G.R. SP No. 46103 merely held that respondent Villadores
chose the wrong remedy.
It is significant to mention that the intervention of petitioner
Villanueva, Jr. in the criminal cases as an offended party is
apparently predicated[23] on the reduction by the NLRC, in IBCs
appeal of the illegal dismissal case, of the monetary award to which
he is entitled, despite finding the appeal as not perfected due to the
posting of the spurious appeal bond.[24] However, such alleged
error should have been brought by petitioner Villanueva, Jr. to the
appropriate forum,[25] and not raised in criminal cases before the
trial court as a ground for his inclusion as a prejudiced party.
In view of all the foregoing, the instant petition, being devoid of
merit, must fail.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, and the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 12, 2000 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 50235 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 161629 November 8, 2005

ATTY. RONALDO P. LEDESMA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in
38

his capacity as Ombudsman, HON. ABELARDO L.

APORTADERA, in his capacity as Assistant Ombudsman, and
Ombudsmans Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau, Director
AGAPITO ROSALES, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Commented [22]:

For resolution is petitioners motion for reconsideration of the July

29, 2005 Decision which affirmed the August 28, 2003 Decision of
the Court of Appeals and its January 15, 2004 Resolution finding
him guilty of conduct prejudicial to the service and suspending him
from the service for six months and one day without pay. Commented [23]:

Petitioner, as Chairman of the First Division of the Board of Special

Inquiry (BSI) of the Bureau of Immigration (BID), was found remiss
in the performance of his duty of evaluating applications for
extension of Temporary Resident Visas (TRVs) of certain foreign
nationals whose papers were questionable and in transmitting the
same to the Board of Commissioners (BOC) of the BID. We noted Commented [24]:

that BSI not only transmits the applications for TRV extensions and
its supporting documents, but more importantly, it interviews the
applicants and evaluates their papers before making a
recommendation to the BOC. The BSI reviews the applications and
when it finds them in order, it executes a Memorandum of
Transmittal to the BOC certifying to the regularity and propriety of
the applications. Petitioner is principally accountable for certifying
the regularity and propriety of the applications which he knew were
defective.
In this motion for reconsideration, petitioner submits that it is the
BSI that interviews applicants and evaluates their papers before
making a recommendation to the BOC, but argues that such
recommendation is not binding on the BOC. He asserts that the
final decision on whether to approve or disapprove the applications
rests with the BOC acting as a collegial body. He insists that by
approving the applications notwithstanding alleged defects thereof,
the BOC had implicitly determined them as inconsequential and
had effectively sanctioned petitioners actions.
A review of petitioners arguments persuade us that indeed, while
it is BSI which screens the applicants and evaluates their papers,
it is the BOC which ultimately reviews and approves the
39

applications for extension of TRVs. The BOC makes its own

independent evaluation and determination although the BSIs
recommendation has persuasive effect. Review is a
reconsideration or re-examination for purposes of correction. The
power of review is exercised to determine whether it is necessary
to correct the acts of the subordinate and to see to it that he
performs his duties in accordance with law.1 By approving the
applications for TRV extensions transmitted by petitioner, the BOC
found no impropriety or had effectively waived or renounced the
deficiencies in the TRV applications.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, we caution petitioner to be more
circumspect in the exercise of his duties. Petitioner must remember
that the slightest semblance of irregularity or impropriety stirs
ripples of suspicion and distrust. Public service requires utmost
integrity and strictest discipline.2
WHEREFORE, the July 29, 2005 Decision is MODIFIED. Instead
of suspension from the service for six (6) months and one (1) day
without pay, Atty. Ronaldo P. Ledesma is
hereby ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance
of his duties and to avoid acts that would cloud the credibility and
integrity of his office.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-19650 September 29, 1966

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER
GENERAL, respondent-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent and appellant.
Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner and appellee.

CASTRO, J.:
In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred
to as Caltex) conceived and laid the groundwork for a promotional
scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products.
Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", it calls for
participants therein to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded
gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified
40

period. Employees of the Caltex (Philippines) Inc., its dealers and

its advertising agency, and their immediate families excepted,
participation is to be open indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle
owners and/or licensed drivers". For the privilege to participate, no
fee or consideration is required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex
products required to be made. Entry forms are to be made
available upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can
will be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.
A three-staged winner selection system is envisioned. At the
station level, called "Dealer Contest", the contestant whose
estimate is closest to the actual number of liters dispensed by the
hooded pump thereat is to be awarded the first prize; the next
closest, the second; and the next, the third. Prizes at this level
consist of a 3-burner kerosene stove for first; a thermos bottle and
a Ray-O-Vac hunter lantern for second; and an Everready Magnet-
lite flashlight with batteries and a screwdriver set for third. The first-
prize winner in each station will then be qualified to join in the
"Regional Contest" in seven different regions. The winning stubs of
the qualified contestants in each region will be deposited in a
sealed can from which the first-prize, second-prize and third-prize
winners of that region will be drawn. The regional first-prize winners
will be entitled to make a three-day all-expenses-paid round trip to
Manila, accompanied by their respective Caltex dealers, in order to
take part in the "National Contest". The regional second-prize and
third-prize winners will receive cash prizes of P500 and P300,
respectively. At the national level, the stubs of the seven regional
first-prize winners will be placed inside a sealed can from which the
drawing for the final first-prize, second-prize and third-prize
winners will be made. Cash prizes in store for winners at this final
stage are: P3,000 for first; P2,000 for second; Pl,500 for third; and
P650 as consolation prize for each of the remaining four
participants.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the
media for publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of
communications relative thereto, representations were made by
Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in
advance for mailing, having in view sections 1954(a), 1982 and
1983 of the Revised Administrative Code, the pertinent provisions
of which read as follows:
SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. No matter
belonging to any of the following classes, whether sealed as
41

first-class matter or not, shall be imported into the Philippines

through the mails, or to be deposited in or carried by the mails
of the Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any
officer or employee of the Bureau of Posts:
Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing,
or in any manner pertaining to, or conveying or purporting to
convey any information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise,
or similar scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot or
chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any
money or property of any kind by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises.
"SECTION 1982. Fraud orders.Upon satisfactory evidence
that any person or company is engaged in conducting any
lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money,
or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing
of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any
scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property
of any kind through the mails by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, the Director of Posts
may instruct any postmaster or other officer or employee of
the Bureau to return to the person, depositing the same in the
mails, with the word "fraudulent" plainly written or stamped
upon the outside cover thereof, any mail matter of whatever
class mailed by or addressed to such person or company or
the representative or agent of such person or company.
SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use of money order system
and telegraphic transfer service.The Director of Posts may,
upon evidence satisfactory to him that any person or company
is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise or scheme
for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal
property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any
person or company is conducting any scheme, device, or
enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through
the mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promise, forbid the issue or payment by
any postmaster of any postal money order or telegraphic
transfer to said person or company or to the agent of any such
person or company, whether such agent is acting as an
individual or as a firm, bank, corporation, or association of any
kind, and may provide by regulation for the return to the
remitters of the sums named in money orders or telegraphic
42

transfers drawn in favor of such person or company or its

agent.
The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster
General, dated October 31, 1960, in which the Caltex, thru counsel,
enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its
position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions
of the Postal Law. Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster
General opined that the scheme falls within the purview of the
provisions aforesaid and declined to grant the requested
clearance. In its counsel's letter of December 7, 1960, Caltex
sought a reconsideration of the foregoing stand, stressing that
there being involved no consideration in the part of any contestant,
the contest was not, under controlling authorities, condemnable as
a lottery. Relying, however, on an opinion rendered by the
Secretary of Justice on an unrelated case seven years before
(Opinion 217, Series of 1953), the Postmaster General maintained
his view that the contest involves consideration, or that, if it does
not, it is nevertheless a "gift enterprise" which is equally banned by
the Postal Law, and in his letter of December 10, 1960 not only
denied the use of the mails for purposes of the proposed contest
but as well threatened that if the contest was conducted, "a fraud
order will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and all its
representatives".
Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the present
petition for declaratory relief against Postmaster General Enrico
Palomar, praying "that judgment be rendered declaring its 'Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest' not to be violative of the Postal Law, and
ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring
the contest to the attention of the public". After issues were joined
and upon the respective memoranda of the parties, the trial court
rendered judgment as follows:
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court holds that
the proposed 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' announced to be
conducted by the petitioner under the rules marked as Annex
B of the petitioner does not violate the Postal Law and the
respondent has no right to bar the public distribution of said
rules by the mails.
The respondent appealed.
The parties are now before us, arrayed against each other upon
two basic issues: first, whether the petition states a sufficient cause
43

of action for declaratory relief; and second, whether the proposed

"Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the Postal Law. We shall
take these up in seriatim.
1. By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of
Court, which was the applicable legal basis for the remedy at the
time it was invoked, declaratory relief is available to any person
"whose rights are affected by a statute . . . to determine any
question of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute and
for a declaration of his rights thereunder" (now section 1, Rule 64,
Revised Rules of Court). In amplification, this Court, conformably
to established jurisprudence on the matter, laid down certain
conditions sine qua non therefor, to wit: (1) there must be a
justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between
persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking
declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and
(4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination
(Tolentino vs. The Board of Accountancy, et al., G.R. No. L-3062,
September 28, 1951; Delumen, et al. vs. Republic of the
Philippines, 50 O.G., No. 2, pp. 576, 578-579; Edades vs.
Edades, et al., G.R. No. L-8964, July 31, 1956). The gravamen of
the appellant's stand being that the petition herein states no
sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, our duty is to assay
the factual bases thereof upon the foregoing crucible.
As we look in retrospect at the incidents that generated the present
controversy, a number of significant points stand out in bold relief.
The appellee (Caltex), as a business enterprise of some
consequence, concededly has the unquestioned right to exploit
every legitimate means, and to avail of all appropriate media to
advertise and stimulate increased patronage for its products. In
contrast, the appellant, as the authority charged with the
enforcement of the Postal Law, admittedly has the power and the
duty to suppress transgressions thereof particularly thru the
issuance of fraud orders, under Sections 1982 and 1983 of the
Revised Administrative Code, against legally non-mailable
schemes. Obviously pursuing its right aforesaid, the appellee laid
out plans for the sales promotion scheme hereinbefore detailed. To
forestall possible difficulties in the dissemination of information
thereon thru the mails, amongst other media, it was found
expedient to request the appellant for an advance clearance
therefor. However, likewise by virtue of his jurisdiction in the
premises and construing the pertinent provisions of the Postal Law,
44

the appellant saw a violation thereof in the proposed scheme and

accordingly declined the request. A point of difference as to the
correct construction to be given to the applicable statute was thus
reached. Communications in which the parties expounded on their
respective theories were exchanged. The confidence with which
the appellee insisted upon its position was matched only by the
obstinacy with which the appellant stood his ground. And this
impasse was climaxed by the appellant's open warning to the
appellee that if the proposed contest was "conducted, a fraud order
will have to be issued against it and all its representatives."
Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the remedy
prayed for. The appellee's insistent assertion of its claim to the use
of the mails for its proposed contest, and the challenge thereto and
consequent denial by the appellant of the privilege demanded,
undoubtedly spawned a live controversy. The justiciability of the
dispute cannot be gainsaid. There is an active antagonistic
assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the
other, concerning a real not a mere theoretical question or
issue. The contenders are as real as their interests are substantial.
To the appellee, the uncertainty occasioned by the divergence of
views on the issue of construction hampers or disturbs its freedom
to enhance its business. To the appellant, the suppression of the
appellee's proposed contest believed to transgress a law he has
sworn to uphold and enforce is an unavoidable duty. With the
appellee's bent to hold the contest and the appellant's threat to
issue a fraud order therefor if carried out, the contenders are
confronted by the ominous shadow of an imminent and inevitable
litigation unless their differences are settled and stabilized by a
tranquilizing declaration (Pablo y Sen, et al. vs. Republic of the
Philippines, G.R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955). And, contrary to the
insinuation of the appellant, the time is long past when it can rightly
be said that merely the appellee's "desires are thwarted by its own
doubts, or by the fears of others" which admittedly does not
confer a cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into
a justiciable controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was
translated into a positive claim of right which is actually contested
(III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132-
133, citing: Woodward vs. Fox West Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251,
284 Pac. 350).
We cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's pretense that there
is here no question of construction because the said appellant
45

"simply applied the clear provisions of the law to a given set of facts
as embodied in the rules of the contest", hence, there is no room
for declaratory relief. The infirmity of this pose lies in the fact that it
proceeds from the assumption that, if the circumstances here
presented, the construction of the legal provisions can be divorced
from the matter of their application to the appellee's contest. This
is not feasible. Construction, verily, is the art or process of
discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the
authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case,
where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by
reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for
in the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). This is precisely the
case here. Whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee is
within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law
inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the
words used therein. To our mind, this is as much a question of
construction or interpretation as any other.
Nor is it accurate to say, as the appellant intimates, that a
pronouncement on the matter at hand can amount to nothing more
than an advisory opinion the handing down of which is anathema
to a declaratory relief action. Of course, no breach of the Postal
Law has as yet been committed. Yet, the disagreement over the
construction thereof is no longer nebulous or contingent. It has
taken a fixed and final shape, presenting clearly defined legal
issues susceptible of immediate resolution. With the battle lines
drawn, in a manner of speaking, the propriety nay, the necessity
of setting the dispute at rest before it accumulates the asperity
distemper, animosity, passion and violence of a full-blown battle
which looms ahead (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
1963 ed., p. 132 and cases cited), cannot but be conceded.
Paraphrasing the language in Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh 59 Cal., 2d.,
901, 31 Cal. Rptr., 800, 383 P. 2d., 152, cited in 22 Am. Jur., 2d.,
p. 869, to deny declaratory relief to the appellee in the situation into
which it has been cast, would be to force it to choose between
undesirable alternatives. If it cannot obtain a final and definitive
pronouncement as to whether the anti-lottery provisions of the
Postal Law apply to its proposed contest, it would be faced with
these choices: If it launches the contest and uses the mails for
purposes thereof, it not only incurs the risk, but is also actually
threatened with the certain imposition, of a fraud order with its
concomitant stigma which may attach even if the appellee will
46

eventually be vindicated; if it abandons the contest, it becomes a

self-appointed censor, or permits the appellant to put into effect a
virtual fiat of previous censorship which is constitutionally
unwarranted. As we weigh these considerations in one equation
and in the spirit of liberality with which the Rules of Court are to be
interpreted in order to promote their object (section 1, Rule 1,
Revised Rules of Court) which, in the instant case, is to settle,
and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to,
rights and duties under a law we can see in the present case
any imposition upon our jurisdiction or any futility or prematurity in
our intervention.
The appellant, we apprehend, underrates the force and binding
effect of the ruling we hand down in this case if he believes that it
will not have the final and pacifying function that a declaratory
judgment is calculated to subserve. At the very least, the appellant
will be bound. But more than this, he obviously overlooks that in
this jurisdiction, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law
shall form a part of the legal system" (Article 8, Civil Code of the
Philippines). In effect, judicial decisions assume the same authority
as the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned,
necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the
criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called
upon to abide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce
obedience thereto. Accordingly, we entertain no misgivings that
our resolution of this case will terminate the controversy at hand.
It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we
have herein just reached is not without precedent. In Liberty
Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a
corporation engaged in promotional advertising was advised by the
county prosecutor that its proposed sales promotion plan had the
characteristics of a lottery, and that if such sales promotion were
conducted, the corporation would be subject to criminal
prosecution, it was held that the corporation was entitled to
maintain a declaratory relief action against the county prosecutor
to determine the legality of its sales promotion plan. In pari materia,
see also: Bunis vs. Conway, 17 App. Div. 2d., 207, 234 N.Y.S. 2d.,
435; Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh, supra; Thrillo, Inc. vs. Scott, 15 N.J.
Super. 124, 82 A. 2d., 903.
In fine, we hold that the appellee has made out a case for
declaratory relief.
47

2. The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code,

using almost identical terminology in sections 1954(a), 1982 and
1983 thereof, supra, condemns as absolutely non-mailable, and
empowers the Postmaster General to issue fraud orders against,
or otherwise deny the use of the facilities of the postal service to,
any information concerning "any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme
for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by
lot, chance, or drawing of any kind". Upon these words hinges the
resolution of the second issue posed in this appeal.
Happily, this is not an altogether untrodden judicial path. As early
as in 1922, in "El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, 44 Phil., 278, 283-284,
which significantly dwelt on the power of the postal authorities
under the abovementioned provisions of the Postal Law, this Court
declared that
While countless definitions of lottery have been attempted, the
authoritative one for this jurisdiction is that of the United States
Supreme Court, in analogous cases having to do with the
power of the United States Postmaster General, viz.: The term
"lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by
chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts,
raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three
essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration;
second, prize; and third, chance. (Horner vs. States [1892],
147 U.S. 449; Public Clearing House vs. Coyne [1903], 194
U.S., 497; U.S. vs. Filart and Singson [1915], 30 Phil., 80; U.S.
vs. Olsen and Marker [1917], 36 Phil., 395; U.S. vs. Baguio
[1919], 39 Phil., 962; Valhalla Hotel Construction Company
vs. Carmona, p. 233, ante.)
Unanimity there is in all quarters, and we agree, that the elements
of prize and chance are too obvious in the disputed scheme to be
the subject of contention. Consequently as the appellant himself
concedes, the field of inquiry is narrowed down to the existence of
the element of consideration therein. Respecting this matter, our
task is considerably lightened inasmuch as in the same case just
cited, this Court has laid down a definitive yard-stick in the following
terms
In respect to the last element of consideration, the law does
not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by chance,
if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the
party receiving the chance, but does condemn as criminal
48

schemes in which a valuable consideration of some kind is

paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.
Reverting to the rules of the proposed contest, we are struck by the
clarity of the language in which the invitation to participate therein
is couched. Thus
No puzzles, no rhymes? You don't need wrappers, labels or
boxtops? You don't have to buy anything? Simply estimate the
actual number of liter the Caltex gas pump with the hood at
your favorite Caltex dealer will dispense from to , and win
valuable prizes . . . ." .
Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee be paid,
any merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or any value
whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. A prospective
contestant has but to go to a Caltex station, request for the entry
form which is available on demand, and accomplish and submit the
same for the drawing of the winner. Viewed from all angles or
turned inside out, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible
consideration which would brand it as a lottery. Indeed, even as we
head the stern injunction, "look beyond the fair exterior, to the
substance, in order to unmask the real element and pernicious
tendencies which the law is seeking to prevent" ("El Debate", Inc.
vs. Topacio, supra, p. 291), we find none. In our appraisal, the
scheme does not only appear to be, but actually is, a gratuitous
distribution of property by chance.
There is no point to the appellant's insistence that non-Caltex
customers who may buy Caltex products simply to win a prize
would actually be indirectly paying a consideration for the privilege
to join the contest. Perhaps this would be tenable if the purchase
of any Caltex product or the use of any Caltex service were a pre-
requisite to participation. But it is not. A contestant, it hardly needs
reiterating, does not have to buy anything or to give anything of
value.1awphl.nt
Off-tangent, too, is the suggestion that the scheme, being
admittedly for sales promotion, would naturally benefit the sponsor
in the way of increased patronage by those who will be encouraged
to prefer Caltex products "if only to get the chance to draw a prize
by securing entry blanks". The required element of consideration
does not consist of the benefit derived by the proponent of the
contest. The true test, as laid down in People vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d.,
99, 137 Cal. App. (Supp.) 788, is whether the participant pays a
49

valuable consideration for the chance, and not whether those

conducting the enterprise receive something of value in return for
the distribution of the prize. Perspective properly oriented, the
standpoint of the contestant is all that matters, not that of the
sponsor. The following, culled from Corpus Juris Secundum,
should set the matter at rest:
The fact that the holder of the drawing expects thereby to
receive, or in fact does receive, some benefit in the way of
patronage or otherwise, as a result of the drawing; does not
supply the element of consideration. Griffith Amusement Co.
vs. Morgan, Tex. Civ. App., 98 S.W., 2d., 844" (54 C.J.S., p.
849).
Thus enlightened, we join the trial court in declaring that the "Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest" proposed by the appellee is not a lottery
that may be administratively and adversely dealt with under the
Postal Law.
But it may be asked: Is it not at least a "gift enterprise, or scheme
for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by
lot, chance, or drawing of any kind", which is equally prescribed?
Incidentally, while the appellant's brief appears to have
concentrated on the issue of consideration, this aspect of the case
cannot be avoided if the remedy here invoked is to achieve its
tranquilizing effect as an instrument of both curative and preventive
justice. Recalling that the appellant's action was predicated,
amongst other bases, upon Opinion 217, Series 1953, of the
Secretary of Justice, which opined in effect that a scheme, though
not a lottery for want of consideration, may nevertheless be a gift
enterprise in which that element is not essential, the determination
of whether or not the proposed contest wanting in consideration
as we have found it to be is a prohibited gift enterprise, cannot
be passed over sub silencio.
While an all-embracing concept of the term "gift enterprise" is yet
to be spelled out in explicit words, there appears to be a consensus
among lexicographers and standard authorities that the term is
commonly applied to a sporting artifice of under which goods are
sold for their market value but by way of inducement each
purchaser is given a chance to win a prize (54 C.J.S., 850; 34 Am.
Jur., 654; Black, Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 817; Ballantine, Law
Dictionary with Pronunciations, 2nd ed., p. 55; Retail Section of
Chamber of Commerce of Plattsmouth vs. Kieck, 257 N.W., 493,
128 Neb. 13; Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 56 Ga. App., 705;
50

Bell vs. State, 37 Tenn. 507, 509, 5 Sneed, 507, 509). As thus
conceived, the term clearly cannot embrace the scheme at bar. As
already noted, there is no sale of anything to which the chance
offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest
is open to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not
they buy the appellee's products.
Going a step farther, however, and assuming that the appellee's
contest can be encompassed within the broadest sweep that the
term "gift enterprise" is capable of being extended, we think that
the appellant's pose will gain no added comfort. As stated in the
opinion relied upon, rulings there are indeed holding that a gift
enterprise involving an award by chance, even in default of the
element of consideration necessary to constitute a lottery, is
prohibited (E.g.: Crimes vs. States, 235 Ala 192, 178 So. 73;
Russell vs. Equitable Loan & Sec. Co., 129 Ga. 154, 58 S.E., 88;
State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, 132
P. 2d., 689, 694, 698, 114 Mont. 52). But this is only one side of
the coin. Equally impressive authorities declare that, like a lottery,
a gift enterprise comes within the prohibitive statutes only if it
exhibits the tripartite elements of prize, chance and consideration
(E.g.: Bills vs. People, 157 P. 2d., 139, 142, 113 Colo., 326; D'Orio
vs. Jacobs, 275 P. 563, 565, 151 Wash., 297; People vs. Psallis,
12 N.Y.S., 2d., 796; City and County of Denver vs. Frueauff, 88 P.,
389, 394, 39 Colo., 20, 7 L.R.A., N.S., 1131, 12 Ann. Cas., 521; 54
C.J.S., 851, citing: Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 607, 56 Ga.
App., 705; 18 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., pp. 590-594). The
apparent conflict of opinions is explained by the fact that the
specific statutory provisions relied upon are not identical. In some
cases, as pointed out in 54 C.J.S., 851, the terms "lottery" and "gift
enterprise" are used interchangeably (Bills vs. People, supra); in
others, the necessity for the element of consideration or chance
has been specifically eliminated by statute. (54 C.J.S., 351-352,
citing Barker vs. State, supra; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great
Falls Theater Corporation, supra). The lesson that we derive from
this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is, therefore, that every
case must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the
applicable statutory provision.
Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question
is used in association with the word "lottery". With the meaning of
lottery settled, and consonant to the well-known principle of legal
hermeneutics noscitur a sociis which Opinion 217 aforesaid
51

also relied upon although only insofar as the element of chance is

concerned it is only logical that the term under a construction
should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent
with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery
is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the
term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in
the law the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element
of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included.
This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be
remedied by the law, resort to the determination thereof being an
accepted extrinsic aid in statutory construction. Mail fraud orders,
it is axiomatic, are designed to prevent the use of the mails as a
medium for disseminating printed matters which on grounds of
public policy are declared non-mailable. As applied to lotteries, gift
enterprises and similar schemes, justification lies in the recognized
necessity to suppress their tendency to inflame the gambling spirit
and to corrupt public morals (Com. vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839, 143
Pa. Super. 208). Since in gambling it is inherent that something of
value be hazarded for a chance to gain a larger amount, it follows
ineluctably that where no consideration is paid by the contestant to
participate, the reason behind the law can hardly be said to obtain.
If, as it has been held
Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not
constitute "lottery", if it is not resorted to as a device to evade
the law and no consideration is derived, directly or indirectly,
from the party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being
cultivated or stimulated thereby. City of Roswell vs. Jones, 67
P. 2d., 286, 41 N.M., 258." (25 Words and Phrases, perm. ed.,
p. 695, emphasis supplied).
we find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift enterprise.
In the end, we are persuaded to hold that, under the prohibitive
provisions of the Postal Law which we have heretofore examined,
gift enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated are
condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of
consideration. Finding none in the contest here in question, we rule
that the appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for
purposes thereof.
Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient
cause of action for declaratory relief, and that the "Caltex Hooded
Pump Contest" as described in the rules submitted by the appellee
does not transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.
52

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No

costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala,
Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-29906 January 30, 1976

RODOLFO GENERAL and CARMEN GONTANG, petitioners,
vs.
LEONCIO BARRAMEDA, respondent.
Augusto A. Pardalis for petitioners.
E.V. Guevarra for respondent.

ESGUERRA, J.:
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals
(Second Division) in CA-G.R. No. 38363-R, entitled "Leoncio
Barrameda, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Development Bank of the
Philippines (Naga Branch, Naga City), Rodolfo General and
Carmen Gontang, defendants-appellees," which reversed the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur in its Civil
Case No. 5697, "dismissing the complaint with costs against
plaintiff".
Appellate Court's decision has the following dispositive portion:
We therefore find that the appealed judgment should be
reversed and set aside and another one entered
declaring (1) null and void the sale executed on
September 3, 1963, by defendant Development Bank of
the Philippines in favor of its defendants Rodolfo General
and Carmen Gontang, (2) T.C.T. No. 5003 cancelled and
(3) the mortgaged property redeemed; and ordering the
Clerk of the lower court to deliver the amount of
P7,271.22 deposited to defendants Rodolfo General and
Carmen Gontang and the Register of Deeds to issue a
new Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of plaintiff in
lieu of T.C.T. No. 5003 upon payment by him of
corresponding fees; with costs against the defendants in
both instances.
Undisputed facts are:
53

Plaintiff seeks to redeem the land formerly embraced in Commented [25]:

Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1418, containing an area

of 59.4687 hectares, situated in barrio Taban, Minalabac
Camarines Sur; to annul any and all contracts affecting
said property between the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) and Rodolfo General and Carmen
Gontang and to recover damages, attorney's fees and
costs.

The land in dispute was mortgaged by plaintiff to the DBP Commented [26]:

to secure a loan of P22,000.00. For failure of the

mortgagor to pay in full the installments as they fall due,
the mortgagee foreclosed extrajudicially pursuant to the Commented [27]:

provisions of Act 3135. On April 23, 1962, the provincial

sheriff conducted an auction sale in which the Commented [28]:

mortgagee, as the highest bidder, bought the mortgaged

property for P7,271.22. On May 13, 1963, the sheriff
executed a final deed of sale in favor of the DBP (Exhibit
2) and the DBP executed an affidavit of consolidation of
ownership (Exhibit 3). Upon registration of the sale and
affidavit on September 2, 1963 (Exhibit 1), TCT No. 1418
in the name of plaintiff was cancelled and TCT No. 5003
issued to the DBP (Exhibit-5) in its stead. On September
3, 1963, defendants Rodolfo General and Carmen
Gontang purchased the land from their codefendant. The
sale in their favor was annotated on TCT No. 5003
on November 26, 1963 only. Commented [29]:

Prior to the date last mentioned, or on November 20,

1963, plaintiff offered to redeem the land. In view of the
refusal of the DBP to allow the redemption, plaintiff
commenced this suit. The original complaint was filed in Commented [30]:

court on November 23, 1963. On August 12, 1964,

plaintiff deposited with the clerk of court the sum of
P7,271.22, representing the repurchase price of the land.
The trial court held that the one-year period of
redemption began to run on April 23, 1962, when the sale
at public auction was held, and ended on April 24, 1963;
that the plaintiff's offer to redeem on November 20, 1963
and the deposit of the redemption price on August 12,
1964 were made beyond the redemption period; and that
54

defendants Rodolfo General and Carmen Gontang 'are

legitimate purchasers for value.
Two principal issues raised are:
(1) In the interpretation and application of Section 31,
Commonwealth Act 459 (Law that created the
Agricultural and Industrial Bank, now Development Bank
of the Philippines) which provides:
The Mortgagor or debtor to the Agricultural and
Industrial Bank whose real property was sold at
public auction, judicially or extra- judicially, for
the full or partial payment of an obligation to
said bank shall, within one year from the date
of' the auction sale, have the right to redeem
the real property ... (Emphasis supplied),
shall the period of redemption start from the date of
auction sale or the date of the registration of the sale in
the register of deeds as the respondent Appellate Court
held?
(2) Were petitioners under obligation to look beyond what
appeared in the certificate of title of their vendor the
Development Bank of the Philippines and investigate the
validity of its title before they could be classified as
purchasers in good faith?
Petitioners' principal contentions are: that Section 31 of
Commonwealth Act No. 459 which created the Agricultural and
Industrial Bank, predecessor of the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation and the Development Bank of the Philippines, clearly
provides that the right to redeem the real property sold at public
auction judicially or extra-judicially may only be exercised "within
one year from the date of the auction sale"; that there is no Commented [31]:

provision in Commonwealth Act No. 459 expressly stating that the

redemption period of one year shall start from the registration of
the certificate of sale in the register of deeds; that Sec. 31 of C. A.
459 is a specific provision of law which governs redemption of real
property foreclosed by the Agricultural and Industrial Bank (now
the Development Bank of the Philippines), and prescribes the
redemption period for both judicial and extra-judicial foreclosures
of mortgage; that insofar as foreclosures of mortgage by banking
and financial institutions are concerned, the period of redemption
applicable must be the one prescribed in their respective charters
55

as, in the case at bar, Section 31, C.A. No. 459; that the ruling in
the case of Agbulos vs. Alberto, G.R. No. L-17483, July 31, 1962,
cited by respondent Appellate Court as a basis for its decision, is
not applicable to the case at bar because this Court based its
Agbulos ruling on Section 26 (now Sec. 90) of Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court, wherein it is not clear when the period of redemption
should start (date when execution sale was conducted, or when
the certificate of sale was executed by sheriff, or when the
certificate of sale was registered in the registry of deeds), and this
Court ruled that as the land involved in that case is registered under
the Torrens system, the date of redemption should begin to run
from the date of registration, unlike in the case at bar where Section
31 of Commonwealth Act 459 specifically and clearly provides that
the running of the redemption period shall start from the date of the
auction sale; and that the ruling of this Court in Gonzales vs.
P.N.B., 48 Phil. 824, also invoked by respondent Appellate Court
as a basis for its decision, is likewise not applicable to the case at
bar because the provisions on the matter of the P.N.B. Charter, Act
No. 2938, are different from that of Commonwealth Act 459.
Section 32 of Act 2938, which is now Section 20 of R.A. No. 1300
(PNB Charter) provides that the mortgagor shall have the right to
redeem within one year the sale of the real estate. This is Identical
to the provision appearing in Sec. 26, now Sec. 30, Rule 39, Rules
of Court, while under Sec. 31 of Commonwealth Act 459,
the period of redemption should star, on the date of the auction
sale, and the latter provision is applicable specifically and
expressly to the case at bar.
It is also petitioners' principal argument that the ruling in
Metropolitan Insurance Company, substituted by spouses Loreto
Z. Marcaida and Miguel de Marcaida vs. Pigtain 101 Phil. 1111,
1115-1116, wherein this Court, in construing Sec. 6 of Act No.
3135, categorically stated that the one year redemption period
55shall start from the date of sale and not from the report of the
sale or the registration of the sale certificate in the office of the
Register of Deeds, is more applicable to the present case. The
pertinent portion of the decision in the Marcaida case follows:
But again the appellants claim that in this particular
case, the statutory redemption period of one year should
begin from December 17, 1954, when the auction sale
was actually recorded in the office of the Register of
Deeds of Manila and not from December 15, 1953, when
56

the sale at public auction of the properties in question

took place. We find its contention to be also untenable in
view of the clear provision of the aforesaid Section 6 of
Act No. 3135 to the effect that the right of redemption
should be exercised within one year from the date of the
sale. It should not be overlooked that the extrajudicial
sale in question was for foreclosure of a mortgage and
was not by virtue of an ordinary writ of execution in a civil
case. ... And since the appeallants had failed to redeem
the land in question within the time allowed by Section 6
of Act 3135, the appellee has perfect right to require the
cancellation of the attachment lien in question.
(Emphasis supplied)
Notwithstanding the impressive arguments presented by
petitioners, the crucial issue to determine is the choice of what rule
to apply in determining the start of the one year redemption period,
whether from the date of the auction sale or from that of the
registration of the sale with the registry of deeds. In other words it Commented [32]:

is whether a literal interpretation of the provision of Section 31 of

Commonwealth Act 459 that the period of redemption shall start
from the date of the auction sale shall govern, or whether the
words, "auction sale" shall be considered in their ordinary meaning
or in the same sense that site is used in the texts of Section 26,
now 30, of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, and Section 26 of Act
2938, now Section 20, R.A. 1300 (Charter of PNB). Stated
differently, should the word "sale" used in the above indicated
provisions of the Rules of Court and the PNB Charter, under
whichWe ruled that the redemption period shall start from the
registration of the sale in the registry of deeds be applied to
foreclosure sales for the DBP and give to the words auction sale"
in its charter the same meaning of "sale" as used in connection with
registered land?

We are of the view that a correct solution to the foregoing issue

must entail not merely trying to determine the meaning of the words
auction sale" and "sale" in different legislative enactments, but,
more importantly, a determination of the legislative intent which is
quite a task to achieve as it depends more on a determination of
the purpose and objective of the law in giving mortgagors a period
of redemptiom of their foreclosed properties. Mortgagors whose Commented [33]:

properties are foreclosed and are purchased by the mortgagee as

57

highest bidder at the auction sale are decidedly at a great

disadvatage because almost invariably mortgagors forfeit their
properties at a great loss as they are purchased at nominal costs
by the mortgagee himself who ordinarily bids in no more than his
credit or the balance threof at the auction sale. That is the reason
why the law gives them a chance to redeem their properties within
a fixed period. It cannot be denied that in all foreclosures of
mortgages and sale of property pursuan to execution, whether
judicial or extrajudicial in nature, under different legislative
enactments, a public auction sale is a indispensable pre-requisite
to the valid disposal of properties used as collateral for the
obligation. So that whether the legislators in different laws used as
collateral for the obligation. So that whether the legislators in
different laws used the term "sale" or "auction sale" is of no
moment, since the presumption is that when they used those words
"sale" and "auction sale" interchangeable in different laws they
really referred to only one act the sale at public
auction indispensably necessary in the disposition of mortgaged
properties and those levied upon to pay civil obligations of their
owners.
In the case of Ernesto Salazar, et al. vs. Flor De Lis Meneses, et
al.,G.R. No.
L-15378, promulgated July 31, 1963, this Court stated:
The issue decisive of this appeal is the one raised by
appellants in their third assignment of error, which is to
this effect: that the lower court erred in not holding that
the period of redemption in this case, as far as appellants
are concerned, started only on May 26, 1956,
registered. Should We rule to this effect, it is clear that
hen appellants attempted to exercise their right to
redeem, as judgment creditors of the deceased
mortgagor by judgment subsequent to the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale, and when they initiated the present
action on October 1, 1956, the period of redemption had
not yer expired.
We find appellants' contention to be meritorious. In the
case of Agbulos vs. Alberto, G.R. No. L-17483,
promulgated on July 31, 1962, We held:
The property involved in the present case is
registered land. It is the law in this jurisdiction
that when property brought under the operation
58

of the Land Registration Act sold, the operative

act is the registration of the deed of
conveyance. The deed of sale does not take
effect this a conveyance or bind the land it is
registered. (Section 50, Act 496; Tuason vs.
Raymundo, 28 Phil. 635; Sikatuna vs. Guevara,
43 Phil. 371; Worcester vs. Ocampo, 34 Phil.
646) (Emphasis supplied)
We find no compelling reason to deviate from the aforequoted
ruling and not apply the same to the present case. To Us
petitioners' main contention that there is a great deal of difference
in legislative intent in the use of the words 94 auction sale" in Sec.
31 of Commonwealth Act 459 and the word "sale" in See. 32 of Act
2938, and See. 30 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, pales into
insignificance in the light of Our stand that those words used
interchangeably refer to one thing, and that is the public auction
sale required by law in the disposition of properties foreclosed or
levied upon. Our stand in the Salazar case and in those mentioned
therein (Garcia vs. Ocampo, G.R. No. L-13029, June 30, 1959;
Gonzales et al. vs. Philippine National Bank et al. 48 Phil. 824) is
firmly planted on the premise that registration of the deed of
conveyance for properties brought under the Torrens System is the
operative act to transfer title to the property and registration is also
the notice to the whole world that a transaction involving the same
had taken place.
To affirm the previous stand this Court has taken on the question
of when the one year period of redemption should start (from the
time of registration of the sale) would better serve the ends of
justice and equity especially in this case, since to rule otherwise
would result in preventing the respondent-mortgagor from
redeeming his 59.4687 hectares of land which was acquired by the
Development Bank of the Philippines as the highest bidder at the
auction sale for the low price of only P7,271.22 which was simply
the unpaid balance of the mortgage debt of P22,000.00 after the
respondent-mortgagor had paid the sum of P14,728.78. As it is,
affirmance of the Appellate Court's decision would not result in any
loss to petitioners since the amount of P7,271.22 they paid to the
Bank will be returned to 'them. What further strengthen's Our stand
is the fact found by the respondent Appellate Court that respondent
Barrameda has always been in possession of the disputed land.
59

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, We find it no longer

necessary to determine whether the petitioners are purchasers in
good faith of the land involved, since the respondent Barrameda
redeemed the mortgaged property within the legal period of
redemption and, consequently the sale of the property executed on
September 3, 1963, by the Development Bank of the Philippine in
favor of the petitioners is null and void.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Appellate Court is
affirmed, with costs against petitioners.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ.,
affirmed.

G.R. No. L-11988 April 4, 1918

JACINTO MOLINA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JAMES J.
RAFFERTY, Collector of Internal Revenue, Defendant-
Appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellant.
Araneta & Zaragoza for appellee.
FISHER, J.:
After the publication of the decision announced under the date of
February 1st., 1918, 1counsel for appellee presented a petition for
a rehearing. This petition was granted and oral argument of the
motion was permitted. Two of the members of the court, as
constituted at the time of the argument on the motion for a
rehearing, were not present when the case was first submitted and
did not participate in the original
decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Upon the facts, as correctly stated in the original majority decision,
a majority of the members of the court as now constituted is in favor
of setting aside the original decision and affirming the judgment of
the trial court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Plaintiff contends that the fish produced by him are to be regarded
as an "agricultural product" within the meaning of that term as used
in paragraph ( c) of section 41 of Act No. 2339 (now section 1460
of the Administrative Code of 1917), in forced when the disputed
tax was levied, and that he is therefore exempt from the percentage
tax on merchants' sales established by section 40 of Act No. 2339,
60

as amended.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law

library
The provision upon which the plaintiff relies reads as follows:
In computing the tax above imposed transactions in the following
commodities shall be excluded: . . . ( c) Agricultural products when
sold by the producer or owner of the land where grown, whether in
their original state or not. (Act No. 2339, sec. 41.)
The same exemption, with a slight change in wording, is now
embodied in section 1460 of the Administrative Code, of
1917.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The question of law presented by this appeal, as we view, is not
whether fish in general constitute an agricultural products, but
whether fish produced as were those upon which the tax in
question was levied are an agricultural
product.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As stated by judged Cooley in his great work on taxation:
The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the
legislature should be sought in the words employed to express it,
and that when found it should be made to govern, . . . . If the words
of the law seem to be of doubtful import, it may then perhaps
become necessary to look beyond them in order to ascertain what
was in the legislative mind at the time the law was enacted; what
the circumstances were, under which the action was taken; what
evil, if any, was meant to be redressed; . . . . And where the law
has contemporaneously been put into operation, and in doing so a
construction has necessarily been put upon it, this construction,
especially if followed for some considerable period, is entitled to
great respect, as being very probably a true expression of the
legislative purpose, and is not lightly to be overruled, although it is
not conclusive. (Cooley on Taxation [Vol. 1] 3d. Ed., p. 450.)
The first inquiry, therefore, must relate to the purpose of the
Legislative had in mind in establishing the exemption contained in
the clause now under consideration. It seems reasonable to
assume that it was due to the belief on the part of the law making
body that by exempting agricultural products from this tax the
farming industry would be favored and the development of the
resources of the country encouraged. It is a fact, of which we take
judicial cognizance, that there are immense tracts of public land in
this country, at present wholly unproductive, which might be made
fruitful by cultivation, and that large sums of money go abroad
61

every year for the purchase of food substances which might be

grown here. Every dollar's worth of food which the farmer produces
and sells in these Islands adds directly to the wealth of the country.
On the other hand, in the process of distribution of commodities to
the ultimate consumer, no direct increase in value results solely
from their transfer from one person to another in the course of
commercial transactions. It is fairly to be inferred from the statute
that the object and purpose of the Legislature was, in general
terms, to levy the tax in question, significantly termed the
"merchant's tax," upon all persons engaged in making a profit upon
goods produced by others, but to exempt from the tax all persons
directly producing goods from the land. In order to accomplish this
purpose the Legislature, instead of attempting an enumeration of
exempted products, has grouped them all under the general
designation of "agricultural products."chanrobles virtual law library
It seems to require no argument to demonstrate that it is just as
much to the public interest to encourage the artificial propagation
and growth of fish as of corn, pork, milk or any other food
substance. If the artificial production of fish is held not to be
included within the exemption of the statute this conclusion must
be based upon the inadequacy of the language used by the
Legislature to express its purpose, rather than the assumption that
it was actually intended to exclude producers of artificially grown
fish from the benefits conferred upon producers of other
substances brought into the store of national wealth by the arts of
husbandry and animal
industry.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
While we have no doubt that the land occupied by the ponds in
which the fish in question are grown is agricultural land within the
meaning of the Acts of Congress and of the Philippine Commission
under consideration in the case of Map vs. Insular Government (10
Phil. Rep., 175) and others cited in the original majority opinion, it
does not seem to us that this conclusion solves the problem. A man
might cultivate the surface of a tract of land patented to him under
the mining law, but the products of such soil would not for that
reason, we apprehend, be any the less "agricultural products."
Conversely, the admission that the land upon which these
fishponds are constructed is not to be classified as mineral or forest
land, does not lead of necessity to the conclusion that everything
produced upon them is for that reason alone to be deemed an
"agricultural product" within the meaning of the statute under
62

consideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law

library
"Agriculture" is an English word made upon of Latin words " ager,"
a field, and " cultura," cultivation. It is defined by Webster's New
International Dictionary as meaning in its broader sense, "The
science and art of the production of plants and animal useful to
man . . ."chanrobles virtual law library
In Dillard vs. Webb (55 Ala., 468) it is held that the words
"agriculture" includes "the rearing, feeding and managing of live
stock." The same view was expressed in the case of
Binzel vs. Grogan (67 Wis.,
147).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Webster defines "product" to be "anything that is produced,
whether as the result of generation, growth, labor, or thought ... ,"
while "grow" is defined in the Century Dictionary as meaning "to
cause to grow; cultivate; produce, raise . . .."chanrobles virtual law
library
While it is true that in a narrow and restricted sense agricultural
products are limited to vegetable substances directly resulting from
the tillage of the soil, it is evident from the definitions quoted that
the term also includes animal which derived their sustenance from
vegetable growths, and are therefore indirectly the product of the
land. Thus it has been held that "The product of the dairy and the
product of the poultry yard, while it does not come directly out of
the soil is necessarily connected with the soil . . . and is therefore
farm produce. (District of Columbia vs. Oyster, 15 D. C.,
285.)chanrobles virtual law library
In the case of Mayor vs. Davis (6 Watts & Sergeant [Penn. Rep.],
269) the court said:
Swine horses, meat cattle, sheep, manure, cordwood, hay,
vegetables, fruits, eggs, milk, butter, lard . . . are strictly produce of
the farm . . .
Without attempting to further multiply examples, we think it may
safely be asserted that courts and lexicographers are in accord in
holding that the term "agricultural products" is not limited in its
meaning to vegetable growth, but includes everything which serves
to satisfy human needs which is grown upon the land, whether it
pertain to the vegetable kingdom, or to the animal kingdom. It is
true that there is no decision which as yet has held that the fish
grown in ponds are an agricultural product, but that is no reason
63

why we should not so hold if we find that such fish fall within the
scope of the meaning of the term. Of necessity, the products of
land tend constantly to multiply in number and variety, as
population increases and new demands spring up. In California
there are farms devoted to the growth of frogs for the market. In
many places in North America foxes and other animals usually
found wild are reared in confinement for their fur. In Japan land is
devoted to the culture of the silkworm and the growth of the plants
necessary for the food of those insects. Bees are everywhere kept
for the wax and honey into which the land is made to produce by
those engaged in these occupations are "agricultural products" in
the same sense in which poultry, eggs, and butter have been held
to be agricultural products.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Now, if the purpose of agriculture, in the broader sense of the term,
is to obtain from the land the products to which it is best adapted
and through which it will yield the greatest return upon the
expenditure of a given amount of labor and capital, can it not be
said that it is just as much an agricultural process to enclose a
given area of land with dykes, flood it with water, grow aquatic
plants in it, and feed fish with the plants so produced as to fence in
it and allow poultry to feed upon the plants naturally or artificially
grown upon the surface? In the last analysis the result is the same
- a given area of land produces a certain amount of food. In the one
case it is the flesh of poultry, in the other the flesh of fish. It has
been agreed between the parties that an important article of diet
consumed by fish grown in a pond consists of certain marine plants
which grow from roots which affix themselves to the bottom of the
pond. In a real sense, therefore, the fish are just as truly a product
of the land as are poultry or swine, living upon its vegetable
growths, aquatic or terrestrial. Thus, land may truly be said to
produce fish, although it is true that the producer is not a fisherman.
Neither is one who grows foxes for their pelts a hunter. As
contended by counsel, the inquiry is not whether fish in general
constitute an agricultural product, but whether fish artificially grown
and fed in confinement are to be so regarded. Honey produced by
one who devotes his land to apiculture might be so regarded, even
if we were to admit that wild honey gathered in the forest is not.
Pigeons kept in domestication and fed by the owner would fall
within the definition. Wild pigeons obtained by a hunter would not.
Firewood gathered in a natural forest is not an agricultural product,
64

but firewood cut from bacauan trees planted for that purpose has
been held to be such a product, and its producer exempt from the
merchant's tax. (Mercado vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 32
Phil. Rep., 271.) Other comparisons might be made, many of which
will be found in the opinion in which two of the members of the court
expressed their dissent from the original majority opinion, but
enough have been given to make our position
clear.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
During the many hears that the statute before us has been in
existence, since it first appeared, substantially in its present form,
in section 142 of Act No. 1189, passed in 1904, no attempt has
been made, until this case arose, to construe it as not applying to
fish grown in ponds, and much weight should be given to this long
continued administrative interpretation. The opinion of the
Attorney-General, cited by Justice Malcolm, will be found on
examination to have no bearing upon the present inquiry, as in that
case question was, not whether fish grown and fed in ponds were
agricultural products, but whether ". . . fishermen, shell and pearl
gatherers . . ." were liable to the occupation tax. There is nothing
in the opinion to indicate that the word "fishermen" was used to
mean men growing fish in ponds, and it must, therefore, be
assumed that it was used in its proper grammatical sense to
designate persons engaged in catching fish not artificially
produced.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The decision in the case of The United States vs. Laxa (36 Phil.
Rep., 670) is not controlling, as the reasoning upon which it is
based was not concurred in by four members of the court.
Furthermore, the Laxa case might be distinguished from the one
now under consideration, were it necessary to do so, in that it has
been stipulated in this case that fish cultivated in ponds subsist
largely upon aquatic plants which grow from roots which attach
themselves to the bottom of the pond, and are therefore in a real
sense a product of the land, while in the Laxa case the evidence
was that they subsisted solely upon free floating
algae.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We are therefore of the opinion, and so hold, that the decision
heretofore rendered herein must be set aside, and the judgment of
the lower court affirmed. So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Johnson, JJ., concur.
Araullo, J., dissents.
65

G.R. No. L-6355-56 August 31, 1953

PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-
appellees,
vs.
SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal
Revenue, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor
Jose P. Alejandro for appellant.
Manuel O. Chan for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Manila declaring section 13 of Republic Act No. 590
unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as
Collector of Internal Revenue to re-fund to Justice Pastor M.
Endencia the sum of P1,744.45, representing the income tax
collected on his salary as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals
in 1951, and to Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46,
representing the income tax collected on his salary from January
1,1950 to October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals, and from October 20, 1950 to December 31,1950, as
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
Because of the similarity of the two cases, involving as they do the
same question of law, they were jointly submitted for determination
in the lower court. Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg presiding, in a rather
exhaustive and well considered decision found and held that under
the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs.
Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from the salaries
of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their
compensation and therefore was in violation of the Constitution of
the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes.
We see no profit and necessity in again discussing and considering
the proposition and the arguments pro and cons involved in the
case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, which are raised, brought up and
presented here. In that case, we have held despite the ruling
enunciated by the United States Federal Supreme Court in the
66

case of O 'Malley vs. Woodrought 307 U. S., 277, that taxing the
salary of a judicial officer in the Philippines is a diminution of such
salary and so violates the Constitution. We shall now confine our-
selves to a discussion and determination of the remaining question
of whether or not Republic Act No. 590, particularly section 13, can
justify and legalize the collection of income tax on the salary of
judicial officers.
According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant
Collector of Internal Revenue, our decision in the case of Perfecto
vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress, because
immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act
No. 590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduced
what he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower House of
House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.
For purposes of reference, we are reproducing section 9, Article
VIII of our Constitution:.
SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of
inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior, until they
reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. They shall receive such
compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office. Until the
Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of
sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen
thousand pesos.
As already stated construing and applying the above constitutional
provision, we held in the Perfecto case that judicial officers are
exempt from the payment of income tax on their salaries, because
the collection thereof by the Government was a decrease or
diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office, a thing
which is expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Thereafter,
according to the Solicitor General, because Congress did not
favorably receive the decision in the Perfecto case, Congress
promulgated Republic Act No. 590, if not to counteract the ruling in
that decision, at least now to authorize and legalize the collection
of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers. We quote section
13 of Republic Act No. 590:
SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of
the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt
67

from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not

to be dimunition of his compensation fixed by the Constitution
or by law.
So we have this situation. The Supreme Court in a decision
interpreting the Constitution, particularly section 9, Article VIII, has
held that judicial officers are exempt from payment of income tax
on their salaries, because the collection thereof was a diminution
of such salaries, specifically prohibited by the Constitution. Now
comes the Legislature and in section 13, Republic Act No. 590,
says that "no salary wherever received by any public officer of the
Republic (naturally including a judicial officer) shall be considered
as exempt from the income tax," and proceeds to declare that
payment of said income tax is not a diminution of his
compensation. Can the Legislature validly do this? May the
Legislature lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the
salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease
of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided
otherwise? To determine this question, we shall have to go back to
the fundamental principles regarding separation of powers.
Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative
department is assigned the power to make and enact laws. The
Executive department is charged with the execution of carrying out
of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application
of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this
authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution.
Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or
not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of
said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order
to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if
there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared
invalid and unconstitutional.
Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the
legislative branch may not limit or restrict the power granted
to the courts by the Constitution. (Bandy vs. Mickelson et al.,
44N. W., 2nd 341, 342.)
When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority
vested in the legislature by the Constitution, it is the duty of
the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because they
cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of office. This
duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the
fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing; and,
68

as Chief Justice Marshall said, whenever a statute is in

violation of the fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge
and thereby give effect to the Constitution. Any other course
would lead to the destruction of the Constitution. Since the
question as to the constitutionality of a statute is a judicial
matter, the courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction
upon the suggestion that action might be taken by political
agencies in disregard of the judgment of the judicial tribunals.
(11 Am. Jur., 714-715.)
Under the American system of constitutional government,
among the most important functions in trusted to the judiciary
are the interpreting of Constitutions and, as a closely
connected power, the determination of whether laws and acts
of the legislature are or are not contrary to the provisions of
the Federal and State Constitutions. (11 Am. Jur., 905.).
By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act NO.
590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not
a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of
interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which
shall not be diminished during their continuance in office," found in
section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of
judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part
thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and
established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot
pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law
was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight
with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a
statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere;
otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function
in defining a term. (11 Am. Jur., 914, emphasis supplied)
The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a
constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack
thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so
construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition. (11
Am. Jur., 919, emphasis supplied)
We have already said that the Legislature under our form of
government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact
laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the
interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within
69

the sphere of the Legislative department. If the Legislature may

declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the
Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case
ascertain its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision,
this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial
processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final court
determination of a case based on a judicial interpretation of the law
of the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a
subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the
Constitution by the Legislative department. That would be neither
wise nor desirable, besides being clearly violative of the
fundamental, principles of our constitutional system of government,
particularly those governing the separation of powers.
So much for the constitutional aspect of the case. Considering the
practical side thereof, we believe that the collection of income tax
on a salary is an actual and evident diminution thereof. Under the
old system where the in-come tax was paid at the end of the year
or sometime thereafter, the decrease may not be so apparent and
clear. All that the official who had previously received his full salary
was called upon to do, was to fulfill his obligation and to exercise
his privilege of paying his income tax on his salary. His salary fixed
by law was received by him in the amount of said tax comes from
his other sources of income, he may not fully realize the fact that
his salary had been decreased in the amount of said income tax.
But under the present system of withholding the income tax at the
source, where the full amount of the income tax corresponding to
his salary is computed in advance and divided into equal portions
corresponding to the number of pay-days during the year and
actually deducted from his salary corresponding to each payday,
said official actually does not receive his salary in full, because the
income tax is deducted therefrom every payday, that is to say,
twice a month. Let us take the case of Justice Endencia. As
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, his salary is fixed at
p12,000 a year, that is to say, he should receive P1,000 a month
or P500 every payday, fifteenth and end of month. In the present
case, the amount collected by the Collector of Internal Revenue on
said salary is P1,744.45 for one year. Divided by twelve (months)
we shall have P145.37 a month. And further dividing it by two
paydays will bring it down to P72.685, which is the income tax
deducted form the collected on his salary each half month. So, if
Justice Endencia's salary as a judicial officer were not exempt from
70

payment of the income tax, instead of receiving P500 every

payday, he would be actually receiving P427.31 only, and instead
of receiving P12,000 a year, he would be receiving but P10,255.55.
Is it not therefor clear that every payday, his salary is actually
decreased by P72.685 and every year is decreased by P1,744.45?
Reading the discussion in the lower House in connection with
House Bill No. 1127, which became Republic Act No. 590, it would
seem that one of the main reasons behind the enactment of the
law was the feeling among certain legislators that members of the
Supreme Court should not enjoy any exemption and that as
citizens, out of patriotism and love for their country, they should pay
income tax on their salaries. It might be stated in this connection
that the exemption is not enjoyed by the members of the Supreme
Court alone but also by all judicial officers including Justices of the
Court of Appeals and judges of inferior courts. The exemption also
extends to other constitutional officers, like the President of the
Republic, the Auditor General, the members of the Commission on
Elections, and possibly members of the Board of Tax Appeals,
commissioners of the Public Service Commission, and judges of
the Court of Industrial Relations. Compares to the number of all
these officials, that of the Supreme Court Justices is relatively
insignificant. There are more than 990 other judicial officers
enjoying the exemption, including 15 Justices of the Court of
Appeals, about 107 Judges of First Instance, 38 Municipal Judges
and about 830 Justices of the Peace. The reason behind the
exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by the United States
Federal Supreme Court and this Court, is to preserve the
independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal but of
the other courts, whose present membership number more than
990 judicial officials.
The exemption was not primarily intended to benefit judicial
officers, but was grounded on public policy. As said by Justice Van
Devanter of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Evans
vs. Gore (253 U. S., 245):
The primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was
not to benefit the judges, but, like the clause in respect of
tenure, to attract good and competent men to the bench and
to promote that independence of action and judgment which
is essential to the maintenance of the guaranties, limitations
and pervading principles of the Constitution and to the
administration of justice without respect to person and with
71

equal concern for the poor and the rich. Such being its
purpose, it is to be construed, not as a private grant, but as a
limitation imposed in the public interest; in other words, not
restrictively, but in accord with its spirit and the principle on
which it proceeds.
Having in mind the limited number of judicial officers in the
Philippines enjoying this exemption, especially when the great bulk
thereof are justices of the peace, many of them receiving as low as
P200 a month, and considering further the other exemptions
allowed by the income tax law, such as P3,000 for a married
person and P600 for each dependent, the amount of national
revenue to be derived from income tax on the salaries of judicial
officers, were if not for the constitutional exemption, could not be
large or substantial. But even if it were otherwise, it should not
affect, much less outweigh the purpose and the considerations that
prompted the establishment of the constitutional exemption. In the
same case of Evans vs. Gore, supra, the Federal Supreme Court
declared "that they (fathers of the Constitution) regarded the
independence of the judges as far as greater importance than any
revenue that could come from taxing their salaries.
When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly ask for
exemption from payment of income tax on his salary, as a privilege
. It is already attached to his office, provided and secured by the
fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but based on public
interest, to secure and preserve his independence of judicial
thought and action. When we come to the members of the
Supreme Court, this excemption to them is relatively of short
duration. Because of the limited membership in this High Tribunal,
eleven, and due to the high standards of experience, practice and
training required, one generally enters its portals and comes to join
its membership quite late in life, on the aver-age, around his sixtieth
year, and being required to retire at seventy, assuming that he
does not die or become incapacitated earlier, naturally he is not in
a position to receive the benefit of exemption for long. It is rather
to the justices of the peace that the exemption can give more
benefit. They are relatively more numerous, and because of the
meager salary they receive, they can less afford to pay the income
tax on it and its diminution by the amount of the income tax if paid
would be real, substantial and onerous.
Considering exemption in the abstract, there is nothing unusual or
abhorrent in it, as long as it is based on public policy or public
72

interest. While all other citizens are subject to arrest when charged
with the commission of a crime, members of the Senate and House
of Representatives except in cases of treason, felony and breach
of the peace are exempt from arrest, during their attendance in the
session of the Legislature; and while all other citizens are generally
liable for any speech, remark or statement, oral or written, tending
to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical
person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead, Senators and
Congressmen in making such statements during their sessions are
extended immunity and exemption.
And as to tax exemption, there are not a few citizens who enjoy
this exemption. Persons, natural and juridical, are exempt from
taxes on their lands, buildings and improvements thereon when
used exclusively for educational purposes, even if they derive
income therefrom. (Art. VI, Sec. 22 [3].) Holders of government
bonds are exempted from the payment of taxes on the income or
interest they receive therefrom (sec. 29 (b) [4], National Internal
Revenue Code as amended by Republic Act No. 566). Payments
or income received by any person residing in the Philippines under
the laws of the United States administered by the United States
Veterans Administration are exempt from taxation. (Republic Act
No. 360). Funds received by officers and enlisted men of the
Philippine Army who served in the Armed Forces of the United
States, allowances earned by virtue of such services
corresponding to the taxable years 1942 to 1945, inclusive, are
exempted from income tax. (Republic Act No. 210). The payment
of wages and allowances of officers and enlisted men of the Army
Forces of the Philippines sent to Korea are also exempted from
taxation. (Republic Act No. 35). In other words, for reasons of
public policy and public interest, a citizen may justifiably by
constitutional provision or statute be exempted from his ordinary
obligation of paying taxes on his income. Under the same public
policy and perhaps for the same it not higher considerations, the
framers of the Constitution deemed it wise and necessary to
exempt judicial officers from paying taxes on their salaries so as
not to decrease their compensation, thereby insuring the
independence of the Judiciary.
In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case
of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the collection of
income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof
and so violates the Constitution. We further hold that the
73

interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is

within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial
department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not
legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it
may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands
of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, specially
when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs
counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the
highest court of the land.
In the views of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed
from is hereby affirmed, with no pronouncement as to costs.
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, and Labrador,
JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL
CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR,respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent Electoral
Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner,
Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain
and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents,
from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua,
another respondent, against the election of said petitioner as
member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of
the Province of Tayabas.
The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted
by the respondents are as follows:
(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner,
Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel
Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the
74

position of member of the National Assembly for the first

district of the Province of Tayabas;
(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of
canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the
National Assembly for the said district, for having received the
most number of votes;
(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of
office;
(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in
session assembled, passed the following resolution:
[No. 8]
RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE
AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRA QUIENES NO
SE HA PRESENTADO PROTESTA.
Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los
Diputados contra quienes no se hubiere presentado
debidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion de
la presente resolucion sean, como por la presente,
son aprobadas y confirmadas.
Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.
(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro
Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of
Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A.
Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of
Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-
things, that said respondent be declared elected member of
the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that
the election of said position be nullified;
(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission
adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which provides:
6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no
se haya presentado en o antes de este dia.
(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A.
Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed
before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the
Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the
Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National
Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which
75

protests against the election of its members should be

presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object,
and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period;
and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the
prescribed period;
(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro
Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" alleging
that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the
presentation of a protest against the election of a member of
the National Assembly after confirmation;
(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A.
Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid "Answer to the Motion
of Dismissal";
(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral
Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936,
denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."
The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for
the issuance of the writ prayed for:
(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon
the electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of
contested elections to the National Assembly;
(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the
power to regulate the proceedings of said election contests,
which power has been reserved to the Legislative Department
of the Government or the National Assembly;
(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in
pursuance of the Constitution, whose exclusive jurisdiction
relates solely to deciding the merits of controversies submitted
to them for decision and to matters involving their internal
organization, the Electoral Commission can regulate its
proceedings only if the National Assembly has not availed of
its primary power to so regulate such proceedings;
(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is,
therefore, valid and should be respected and obeyed;
(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance
appended to the Constitution and paragraph 6 of article 7 of
the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of
the United States) as well as under section 1 and 3 (should be
sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the Constitution, this
76

Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental

question herein raised because it involves an interpretation of
the Constitution of the Philippines.
On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an
answer in behalf of the respondent Electoral Commission
interposing the following special defenses:
(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the
Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative
Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly"; that in adopting its
resolution of December 9, 1935, fixing this date as the last day
for the presentation of protests against the election of any
member of the National Assembly, it acted within its
jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied powers
granted it by the Constitution to adopt the rules and
regulations essential to carry out the power and functions
conferred upon the same by the fundamental law; that in
adopting its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the
motion of the petitioner to dismiss the election protest in
question, and declaring itself with jurisdiction to take
cognizance of said protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise
of its quasi-judicial functions a an instrumentality of the
Legislative Department of the Commonwealth Government,
and hence said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control
of the Supreme Court;
(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December
3, 1935, confirming the election of the members of the
National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been
filed, could not and did not deprive the electoral Commission
of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election protests filed
within the time that might be set by its own rules:
(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with
quasi-judicial functions, created by the Constitution as an
instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not an
"inferior tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person" within the
purview of section 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
against which prohibition would lie.
77

The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an

answer in his own behalf on March 2, 1936, setting forth the
following as his special defense:
(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral
Commission on December 9, 1935, there was no existing law
fixing the period within which protests against the election of
members of the National Assembly should be filed; that in
fixing December 9, 1935, as the last day for the filing of
protests against the election of members of the National
Assembly, the Electoral Commission was exercising a power
impliedly conferred upon it by the Constitution, by reason of
its quasi-judicial attributes;
(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest
before the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, the
last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral
Commission;
(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired
jurisdiction over the protest filed by said respondent and over
the parties thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral
Commission of January 23, 1936, denying petitioner's motion
to dismiss said protest was an act within the jurisdiction of the
said commission, and is not reviewable by means of a writ of
prohibition;
(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires
confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of its
members, and that such confirmation does not operate to limit
the period within which protests should be filed as to deprive
the Electoral Commission of jurisdiction over protest filed
subsequent thereto;
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity
created by the Constitution, endowed with quasi-judicial
functions, whose decision are final and unappealable;
( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional
creation, is not an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or
person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code
of Civil Procedure; and that neither under the provisions of
sections 1 and 2 of article II (should be article VIII) of the
Constitution and paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance
appended thereto could it be subject in the exercise of its
78

quasi-judicial functions to a writ of prohibition from the

Supreme Court;
(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law
(No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the united States) has no
application to the case at bar.
The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was
submitted for decision, the petitioner prayed for the issuance of a
preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent Electoral
Commission which petition was denied "without passing upon the
merits of the case" by resolution of this court of March 21, 1936.
There was no appearance for the other respondents.

The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the

following two principal propositions:
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon
the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the
protest filed the election of the herein petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by
resolution of the National Assembly? Commented [34]:

We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon

the merits of the controversy. However, the question of jurisdiction
having been presented, we do not feel justified in evading the
issue. Being a case prim impressionis, it would hardly be
consistent with our sense of duty to overlook the broader aspect of
the question and leave it undecided. Neither would we be doing
justice to the industry and vehemence of counsel were we not to
pass upon the question of jurisdiction squarely presented to our
consideration.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system

of government. It obtains not through express provision but by
actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate
and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
79

unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has Commented [35]:

provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure

coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. For example, the Chief Executive under our
Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that
this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is
subject to the further check that a bill may become a law
notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote
of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National
Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the
Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other
hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive
in the sense that its consent through its Commission on
Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers;
and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to
the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine
what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to
define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support,
the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain
extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying
impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court
as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes
and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative
and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping
and interlacing of functions and duties between the several
departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where
the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social
disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking
perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power
of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that
instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however
limited, has established a republican government intended to
80

operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of

checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and
restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets
forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon
governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and
limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the
Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct
the course of government along constitutional channels, for then
the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights
mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitation and
restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be
in any living constitution. In the United States where no express
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of
this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical
origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular
acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries.
In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by
clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who
is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify
or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn
and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and
to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which
that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all
that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even
then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by
the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised
or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could
only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in
this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord
the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not
81

only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the

Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of
actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice
of the people as expressed through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of the governments of the
government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power
provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered
that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the
chief palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the people who are
authors of this blessing must also be its guardians . . . their eyes
must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . .
aggression on the authority of their constitution." In the Last and
ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our government in the
unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds
and hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers.
In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8)
of December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of the herein
petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral
Commission has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed
said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the
National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner,
the resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off
the power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935, then the resolution
of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere
surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the
respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole power of
regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National
Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the
Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing
protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly, should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a
conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National
Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the
other. From the very nature of the republican government
established in our country in the light of American experience and
82

of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and
inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we shall
have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created
for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its
authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the
constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not
subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is Commented [36]:

not a separate department of the government, and even if it were,

conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between
department powers and agencies of the government are
necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and
appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other
European types of constitutional government, the framers of our
constitution adopted the American type where the written
constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial
department. In some countries which have declined to follow the
American example, provisions have been inserted in their
constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to
interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what
otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition
courts are bound to assume what is logically their function. For
instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides
that courts shall have no power to examine the validity of statutes
(art. 81, chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a
similar declaration. In countries whose constitutions are silent in
this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true in
Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in
Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to constitutional
Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and
Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of
1931) especial constitutional courts are established to pass upon
the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present
controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to
determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created
by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the
controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict
were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus
created in our constitutional system which may be in the long run
83

prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions

is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid
exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and
authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts
of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject mater of the present controversy for
the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly." Commented [37]:

Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now

proceed to pass upon the second proposition and determine
whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935,
and in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the
election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation thereof by the National Assembly on December 3,
1935. As able counsel for the petitioner has pointed out, the issue
hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of the
Constitution which provides:
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of
three Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief
Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly,
three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest
number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest
number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission
shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." It is
imperative, therefore, that we delve into the origin and history of
this constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its
framers and the people who adopted it so that we may properly
appreciate its full meaning, import and significance.
The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress
of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the rule that "the
assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of its members", was taken from clause 1 of section
5, Article I of the Constitution of the United States providing that
"Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and
Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of
84

August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the
insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and House
of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members . . ."
apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive the Legislative over
the particular case s therein specified. This court has had occasion
to characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate and
House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and
complete" (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar
[1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)
The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for
the purpose of deciding contested elections to the legislature was
taken by the sub-committee of five appointed by the Committee on
Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional Convention, which
sub-committee submitted a report on August 30, 1934,
recommending the creation of a Tribunal of Constitutional Security
empowered to hear legislature but also against the election of
executive officers for whose election the vote of the whole nation
is required, as well as to initiate impeachment proceedings against
specified executive and judicial officer. For the purpose of hearing
legislative protests, the tribunal was to be composed of three
justices designated by the Supreme Court and six members of the
house of the legislature to which the contest corresponds, three
members to be designed by the majority party and three by the
minority, to be presided over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief
Justice is also a member in which case the latter shall preside. The
foregoing proposal was submitted by the Committee on
Constitutional Guarantees to the Convention on September 15,
1934, with slight modifications consisting in the reduction of the
legislative representation to four members, that is, two senators to
be designated one each from the two major parties in the Senate
and two representatives to be designated one each from the two
major parties in the House of Representatives, and in awarding
representation to the executive department in the persons of two
representatives to be designated by the President.
Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also
preparing its report. As submitted to the Convention on September
24, 1934 subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the
Legislative Department, reads as follows:
The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of
either house and all cases contesting the election of any of
85

their members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission,

constituted, as to each House, by three members elected by
the members of the party having the largest number of votes
therein, three elected by the members of the party having the
second largest number of votes, and as to its Chairman, one
Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice.
The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with
comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed by the Committee on
Constitutional Guarantees which was probably inspired by the
Spanish plan (art. 121, Constitution of the Spanish Republic of
1931), was soon abandoned in favor of the proposition of the
Committee on Legislative Power to create a similar body with
reduced powers and with specific and limited jurisdiction, to be
designated as a Electoral Commission. The Sponsorship
Committee modified the proposal of the Committee on Legislative
Power with respect to the composition of the Electoral Commission
and made further changes in phraseology to suit the project of
adopting a unicameral instead of a bicameral legislature. The draft
as finally submitted to the Convention on October 26, 1934, reads
as follows:
(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of
the National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of
any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral
Commission, composed of three members elected by the
party having the largest number of votes in the National
Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having
the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the
Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the
Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.
During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates
Labrador, Abordo, and others, proposing to strike out the whole
subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the
following: "The National Assembly shall be the soled and exclusive
judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of the Members",
the following illuminating remarks were made on the floor of the
Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as to the scope of
the said draft:
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the
scope of the meaning of the first four lines, paragraph 6, page
86

11 of the draft, reading: "The elections, returns and

qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and
all cases contesting the election of any of its Members shall
be judged by an Electoral Commission, . . ." I should like to
ask from the gentleman from Capiz whether the election and
qualification of the member whose elections is not contested
shall also be judged by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the
members, there is nothing to be judged; that is why the word
"judge" is used to indicate a controversy. If there is no
question about the election of a member, there is nothing to
be submitted to the Electoral Commission and there is nothing
to be determined.
Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the
Electoral Commission shall confirm also the election of those
whose election is not contested?
Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the
gentleman knows, the action of the House of Representatives
confirming the election of its members is just a matter of the
rules of the assembly. It is not constitutional. It is not
necessary. After a man files his credentials that he has been
elected, that is sufficient, unless his election is contested.
Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as
we have observed that for purposes of the auditor, in the
matter of election of a member to a legislative body, because
he will not authorize his pay.
Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the
municipal president who is elected? What happens with
regards to the councilors of a municipality? Does anybody
confirm their election? The municipal council does this: it
makes a canvass and proclaims in this case the municipal
council proclaims who has been elected, and it ends there,
unless there is a contest. It is the same case; there is no need
on the part of the Electoral Commission unless there is a
contest. The first clause refers to the case referred to by the
gentleman from Cavite where one person tries to be elected
in place of another who was declared elected. From example,
in a case when the residence of the man who has been
elected is in question, or in case the citizenship of the man
who has been elected is in question.
87

However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the

commission, it may do so by certain maneuvers upon its first
meeting when the returns are submitted to the assembly. The
purpose is to give to the Electoral Commission all the powers
exercised by the assembly referring to the elections, returns
and qualifications of the members. When there is no contest,
there is nothing to be judged.
Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.
Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate.
Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that
propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos Norte when I arose
a while ago. However I want to ask more questions from the
delegate from Capiz. This paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft
cites cases contesting the election as separate from the first
part of the sections which refers to elections, returns and
qualifications.
Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the
cases of contested elections are already included in the
phrase "the elections, returns and qualifications." This phrase
"and contested elections" was inserted merely for the sake of
clarity.
Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral
Commission, at its own instance, refuse to confirm the
elections of the members."
Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.
Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield?
THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires.
Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.
Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe
that unless this power is granted to the assembly, the
assembly on its own motion does not have the right to contest
the election and qualification of its members?
Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If
this draft is retained as it is, even if two-thirds of the assembly
believe that a member has not the qualifications provided by
law, they cannot remove him for that reason.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be
retained by the Electoral Commission.
88

Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.

Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications of
the members.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the
assembly has the right to question the eligibility of its
members?
Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he
must go to the Electoral Commission and make the question
before the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall
decide whether the election is contested or not contested.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.
Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the
Electoral Commission has power and authority to pass upon
the qualifications of the members of the National Assembly
even though that question has not been raised.
Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because
they can only judge.
In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading
"The election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly and" was eliminated by the Sponsorship
Committee in response to an amendment introduced by Delegates
Francisco, Ventura, Vinzons, Rafols, Lim, Mumar and others. In
explaining the difference between the original draft and the draft as
amended, Delegate Roxas speaking for the Sponsorship
Committee said:
xxx xxx xxx
Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, seor Presidente, consiste
solamente en obviar la objecion apuntada por varios
Delegados al efecto de que la primera clausula del draft que
dice: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the members
of the National Assembly" parece que da a la Comision
Electoral la facultad de determinar tambien la eleccion de los
miembros que no ha sido protestados y para obviar esa
dificultad, creemos que la enmienda tien razon en ese
sentido, si enmendamos el draft, de tal modo que se lea como
sigue: "All cases contesting the election", de modo que los
jueces de la Comision Electoral se limitaran solamente a los
89

casos en que haya habido protesta contra las actas." Before

the amendment of Delegate Labrador was voted upon the
following interpellation also took place:
El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera
El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?
El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres
miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria y tres a la
Corte Suprema, no cree Su Seoria que esto equivale
practicamente a dejar el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal
Supremo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la
Commission esta constituido en esa forma, tanto los
miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los
miembros de la Corte Suprema consideraran la cuestion
sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no
es suficiente para dar el triunfo.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Seoria que en un caso como
ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria como los
de la minoria prescindieran del partidismo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria
el triunfo.
xxx xxx xxx
The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and
others seeking to restore the power to decide contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly to the National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote
of ninety-eight (98) against fifty-six (56).
In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.)
sought to amend the draft by reducing the representation of the
minority party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission
to two members each, so as to accord more representation to the
majority party. The Convention rejected this amendment by a vote
of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-
partisan character of the commission.
As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as
follows:
90

(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and

qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly shall
be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three
members elected by the party having the largest number of
votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the members
of the party having the second largest number of votes, and
three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief
Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said
justices.
The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as
follows:
SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of
three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief
Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National
Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party
having the largest number of votes, and three by the party
having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior
Justice in the Commission shall be its chairman. The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of the election, returns,
and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly.
When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February
8, 1935, the Style Committee, through President Recto, to
effectuate the original intention of the Convention, agreed to insert
the phrase "All contests relating to" between the phrase "judge of"
and the words "the elections", which was accordingly accepted by
the Convention.
The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the legislature long lodged in the
legislative body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan
tribunal, is by no means a mere experiment in the science of
government.
Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth
edition, chapter VI, pages 57, 58), gives a vivid account of the
"scandalously notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties in
the disposition of contests by the House of Commons in the
following passages which are partly quoted by the petitioner in his
printed memorandum of March 14, 1936:
153. From the time when the commons established their right
to be the exclusive judges of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their members, until the year 1770, two
91

modes of proceeding prevailed, in the determination of

controverted elections, and rights of membership. One of the
standing committees appointed at the commencement of
each session, was denominated the committee of privileges
and elections, whose functions was to hear and investigate all
questions of this description which might be referred to them,
and to report their proceedings, with their opinion thereupon,
to the house, from time to time. When an election petition was
referred to this committee they heard the parties and their
witnesses and other evidence, and made a report of all the
evidence, together with their opinion thereupon, in the form of
resolutions, which were considered and agreed or disagreed
to by the house. The other mode of proceeding was by a
hearing at the bar of the house itself. When this court was
adopted, the case was heard and decided by the house, in
substantially the same manner as by a committee. The
committee of privileges and elections although a select
committee. The committee of privileges and elections
although a select committee was usually what is called an
open one; that is to say, in order to constitute the committee,
a quorum of the members named was required to be present,
but all the members of the house were at liberty to attend the
committee and vote if they pleased.
154. With the growth of political parties in parliament
questions relating to the right of membership gradually
assumed a political character; so that for many years previous
to the year 1770, controverted elections had been tried and
determined by the house of commons, as mere party
questions, upon which the strength of contending factions
might be tested. Thus, for Example, in 1741, Sir Robert
Walpole, after repeated attacks upon his government,
resigned his office in consequence of an adverse vote upon
the Chippenham election. Mr. Hatsell remarks, of the trial of
election cases, as conducted under this system, that "Every
principle of decency and justice were notoriously and openly
prostituted, from whence the younger part of the house were
insensibly, but too successfully, induced to adopt the same
licentious conduct in more serious matters, and in questions
of higher importance to the public welfare." Mr. George
Grenville, a distinguished member of the house of commons,
undertook to propose a remedy for the evil, and, on the 7th of
92

March, 1770, obtained the unanimous leave of the house to

bring in a bill, "to regulate the trial of controverted elections, or
returns of members to serve in parliament." In his speech to
explain his plan, on the motion for leave, Mr. Grenville alluded
to the existing practice in the following terms: "Instead of
trusting to the merits of their respective causes, the principal
dependence of both parties is their private interest among us;
and it is scandalously notorious that we are as earnestly
canvassed to attend in favor of the opposite sides, as if we
were wholly self-elective, and not bound to act by the
principles of justice, but by the discretionary impulse of our
own inclinations; nay, it is well known, that in every contested
election, many members of this house, who are ultimately to
judge in a kind of judicial capacity between the competitors,
enlist themselves as parties in the contention, and take upon
themselves the partial management of the very business,
upon which they should determine with the strictest
impartiality."
155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that
Mr. Grenville brought in a bill which met with the approbation
of both houses, and received the royal assent on the 12th of
April, 1770. This was the celebrated law since known by the
name of the Grenville Act; of which Mr. Hatsell declares, that
it "was one of the nobles works, for the honor of the house of
commons, and the security of the constitution, that was ever
devised by any minister or statesman." It is probable, that the
magnitude of the evil, or the apparent success of the remedy,
may have led many of the contemporaries of the measure to
the information of a judgement, which was not acquiesced in
by some of the leading statesmen of the day, and has not
been entirely confirmed by subsequent experience. The bill
was objected to by Lord North, Mr. De Grey, afterwards chief
justice of the common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson, who had
been clerk of the house, and Mr. Charles James Fox, chiefly
on the ground, that the introduction of the new system was an
essential alteration of the constitution of parliament, and a
total abrogation of one of the most important rights and
jurisdictions of the house of commons.
As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the
problem of insuring the non-partisan settlement of the controverted
elections of its members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges
93

of the King's Bench of the High Court of Justice selected from a

rota in accordance with rules of court made for the purpose. Having
proved successful, the practice has become imbedded in English
jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c.
125] as amended by Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt
Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2; Corrupt and Illegal
Practices Preventions Act, 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70;
Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws
of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of
Canada, election contests which were originally heard by the
Committee of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the
courts. Likewise, in the Commonwealth of Australia, election
contests which were originally determined by each house, are
since 1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law
provides that all protests against the election of members of the
Upper House of the Diet are to be resolved by the Supreme
Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The
Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the
Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10)
vest the authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or
National Assembly in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of
deciding legislative contests, the Constitution of the German Reich
of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of the Czechoslovak
Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the
Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927 (art. 43), all provide for an
Electoral Commission.
The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is
recruited both from the legislature and the judiciary is by no means
unknown in the United States. In the presidential elections of 1876
there was a dispute as to the number of electoral votes received
by each of the two opposing candidates. As the Constitution made
no adequate provision for such a contingency, Congress passed a
law on January 29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19,
chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral Commission
composed of five members elected by the Senate, five members
elected by the House of Representatives, and five justices of the
Supreme Court, the fifth justice to be selected by the four
designated in the Act. The decision of the commission was to be
binding unless rejected by the two houses voting separately.
Although there is not much of a moral lesson to be derived from
the experience of America in this regard, judging from the
94

observations of Justice Field, who was a member of that body on

the part of the Supreme Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court of
the United States and its Appellate Power under the Constitution
[Albany, 1913] Relentless Partisanship of Electoral
Commission, p. 25 et seq.), the experiment has at least abiding
historical interest.
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our
fundamental law were in their majority men mature in years and
experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history
and political development of other countries of the world. When ,
therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission
as a constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive function
of passing upon and determining the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must
have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also
having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the
world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to
remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were
cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some
members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as
hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98
against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of
the constitutional the creation of the Electoral Commission is the
expression of the wisdom and "ultimate justice of the people".
(Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident
that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers
previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to
contested elections of its members, to an independent and
impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and
appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however,
as the long-felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of
partisan considerations which prompted the people, acting through
their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known
as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite
body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally
represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was
created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in
its membership three justices of the Supreme Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested
with the necessary authority in the performance and execution of
95

the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution.

Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it
is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its
authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the
legislative department than to any other. The location of the
provision (section 4) creating the Electoral Commission under
Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is
very indicative. Its compositions is also significant in that it is
constituted by a majority of members of the legislature. But it is a
body separate from and independent of the legislature.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature.
The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is
an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National
Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative
power as an express prohibition in the Constitution (Ex
parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs.Whisman, 36 S.D.,
260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). If we concede the power claimed in behalf
of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the
proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of
the commission to lay down the period within which protests should
be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective.
The Electoral Commission in such case would be invested with the
power to determine contested cases involving the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but
subject at all times to the regulative power of the National
Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our
Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative
body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the
resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad
spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission
retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred
to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that
authority effective whenever and whenever the National Assembly
has chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be
remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate
on the part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will
inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire
proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to
96

the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that

this result should not be permitted.
We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned
counsel for the petitioner regarding the importance and necessity
of respecting the dignity and independence of the national
Assembly as a coordinate department of the government and of
according validity to its acts, to avoid what he characterized would
be practically an unlimited power of the commission in the
admission of protests against members of the National Assembly.
But as we have pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the
Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power
regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted
to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction
that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every
particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the
performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any
further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be
followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission,
therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary
for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication
to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the
petitioner, the Electoral Commission may abuse its regulative
authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the
disturbance of the tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of
the National Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is not argument
against the concession of the power as there is no power that is
not susceptible of abuse. In the second place, if any mistake has
been committed in the creation of an Electoral Commission and in
investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial, and must be sought
through the ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible
abuses of the government are not intended to be corrected by the
judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in creating the
Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in this body in
the exclusive determination of the specified cases assigned to it,
as they have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases
97

entrusted to it for decision. All the agencies of the government were

designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and
each constitutional organ working within its own particular sphere
of discretionary action must be deemed to be animated with the
same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for which
they were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of
these constitutional agencies might leave much to be desired in
given instances, is inherent in the perfection of human institutions.
In the third place, from the fact that the Electoral Commission may
not be interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate power, it does
not follow that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not
be challenge in appropriate cases over which the courts may
exercise jurisdiction.
But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the
present case, there are considerations of equitable character that
should not be overlooked in the appreciation of the intrinsic merits
of the controversy. The Commonwealth Government was
inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on which date the
Constitution, except as to the provisions mentioned in section 6 of
Article XV thereof, went into effect. The new National Assembly
convened on November 25th of that year, and the resolution
confirming the election of the petitioner, Jose A. Angara was
approved by that body on December 3, 1935. The protest by the
herein respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the
petitioner was filed on December 9 of the same year. The
pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was
formally organized but it does appear that on December 9, 1935,
the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a
resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election
protest. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its
resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the
petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had
not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been
organized. As a mater of fact, according to certified copies of
official records on file in the archives division of the National
Assembly attached to the record of this case upon the petition of
the petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme Court the six
members of the National Assembly constituting the Electoral
Commission were respectively designated only on December 4
and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly
confirming non-protested elections of members of the National
98

Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for the
presentation of protests, the result would be that the National
Assembly on the hypothesis that it still retained the incidental
power of regulation in such cases had already barred the
presentation of protests before the Electoral Commission had had
time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and method to
be followed in a matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the
Constitution. This result was not and could not have been
contemplated, and should be avoided.
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly
confirming the election of members against whom no protests had
been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not
be construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of
election contests. While there might have been good reason for the
legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of
the legislature at the time when the power to decide election
contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by
the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral
Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to
be "the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the
time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the
National Assembly of the returns of its members against whose
election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes,
unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral Commission in its
resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein
petitioner to dismiss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro
Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member is not required
by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as such
member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial
board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat
in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in
said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted
December 6, 1935).
Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of
Commons and in the Congress of the United States, confirmation
is neither necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to take his
seat. The return of the proper election officers is sufficient, and the
member-elect presenting such return begins to enjoy the privileges
of a member from the time that he takes his oath of office (Laws of
England, vol. 12, pp. 331. 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A.,
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Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in cases of

contested elections where the decision is adverse to the claims of
the protestant. In England, the judges' decision or report in
controverted elections is certified to the Speaker of the House of
Commons, and the House, upon being informed of such certificate
or report by the Speaker, is required to enter the same upon the
Journals, and to give such directions for confirming or altering the
return, or for the issue of a writ for a new election, or for carrying
into execution the determination as circumstances may require (31
& 32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed, the
order or decision of the particular house itself is generally regarded
as sufficient, without any actual alternation or amendment of the
return (Cushing, Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th
ed., sec. 166).
Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force,
each house of the Philippine Legislature fixed the time when
protests against the election of any of its members should be filed.
This was expressly authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law
making each house the sole judge of the election, return and
qualifications of its members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No.
3387) empowering each house to respectively prescribe by
resolution the time and manner of filing contest in the election of
member of said bodies. As a matter of formality, after the time fixed
by its rules for the filing of protests had already expired, each house
passed a resolution confirming or approving the returns of such
members against whose election no protests had been filed within
the prescribed time. This was interpreted as cutting off the filing of
further protests against the election of those members not
theretofore contested (Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela], Second
Philippine Legislature, Record First Period, p. 89;
Urguello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine
Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon], Sixth Philippine
Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 637-640;
Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine
Legislature, Record First Period, pp. 1121, 1122;
Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature,
Record First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The
Constitution has repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No.
3387, section 478, must be deemed to have been impliedly
abrogated also, for the reason that with the power to determine all
contest relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
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members of the National Assembly, is inseparably linked the

authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of that power.
There was thus no law nor constitutional provisions which
authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have
fixed on December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests
against the election of its members. And what the National
Assembly could not do directly, it could not do by indirection
through the medium of confirmation.
Summarizing, we conclude:
(a) That the government established by the Constitution
follows fundamentally the theory of separation of power into
the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the
overlapping of functions and duties often makes difficult the
delimitation of the powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments
and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional
mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate
constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review
in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the
power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the
government transcends the Constitution, which is the source
of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent
constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to
execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to
the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the
governments.
(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present
Constitution went into effect, each house of the legislature was
respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their elective members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the
powers previously exercised by the legislature with respect to
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contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of

its members, to the Electoral Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the
Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and
carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to
prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner
of filing protests.
( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral
Commission was to have an independent constitutional organ
pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of
partisan influence or consideration, which object would be
frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to
prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of
conducting said contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not
only section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the
Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the
elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members,
but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house
to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing
contests against the election of its members, the time and
manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to
be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of
contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election
is contested or not, is not essential before such member-elect
may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a
member of the National Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election
of any member against whom no protest had been filed prior
to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral
Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within
which protests against the election of any member of the
National Assembly should be filed.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting
within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent
Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A.
Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of
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December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing
protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a
protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission
might prescribe.
In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of
the Electoral Commission as a constitutional creation and as to the
scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the present
controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the
Electoral Commission is an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or
person within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral
Commission is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So
ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Diaz, Concepcion, and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.