ERMITA MANILA HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS VS CITY OF MANILA

Police Power Due Process Clause

On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal Board enacted Ord 4760 and the same was approved by then
acting mayor Astorga. Ord 4760 sought to regulate hotels and motels. It classified them into 1st class
(taxed at 6k/yr) and 2nd class (taxed at 4.5k/yr). It also compelled hotels/motels to get the demographics
of anyone who checks in to their rooms. It compelled hotels/motels to have wide open spaces so as not
to conceal the identity of their patrons. Ermita-Malate impugned the validity of the law averring that such
is oppressive, arbitrary and against due process. The lower court as well as the appellate court ruled in
favor of Ermita-Malate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws enacted by Congress (in this
case Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity, the presumption stays. As in
this case, there was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot prevail over the presumption. Further, the
ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was
precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize prostitution.
The increase in taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but also
increases the revenue of the lgu concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power as well. The
due process contention is likewise untenable, due process has no exact definition but has reason as a
standard. In this case, the precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was to curb down prostitution
in the city which is reason enough and cannot be defeated by mere singling out of the provisions of the
said ordinance alleged to be vague.

TAXICAB OPERATORS V. BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION

Police Power

Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of
taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the
City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic.

On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42
which reads:

SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis

On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to
nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and
subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out,
provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.

ISSUES:
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the manner
required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners constitutional right to
procedural due process?

B. Granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements imposed by
Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum
circulars violate the petitioners constitutional rights to.

(1) Equal protection of the law;

(2) Substantive due process; and

(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?

HELD

As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is
the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State,
in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good
order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and
welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority
to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.

INCHONG VS HERNANDEZ

Constitutional Law Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police Power

Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities
herein abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese
businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed
the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right
to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground
that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal
protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business
here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal
opportunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict
at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law
clause does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced; and, that the equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute
then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being
inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can
no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

LIM VS. PACQUING [G.R. NO. 115044. JANUARY 27, 1995]

Ponente: PADILLA, J.

FACTS:

The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949 (R.A. No. 409).

On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate jai-alais from
local government to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB).

On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila nonetheless passed Ordinance No. 7065
entitled An Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The Associated Development
Corporation To Establish, Maintain And Operate A Jai-Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And
Conditions And For Other Purposes.

On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then President Marcos. The decree, entitled
Revoking All Powers and Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License or Permit And
Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On Horse And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other
Forms Of Gambling, in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits issued by
local governments.

In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to operate a Jai-Alai. The government
through Games and Amusement Board intervened and invoked Presidential Decree No. 771 which
expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling facilities (including
Jai-Alai) by local governments. ADC assails the constitutionality of P.D. No. 771.

ISSUE:

Whether or not P.D. No. 771 is violative of the equal protection and non-impairment clauses of the
Constitution.

HELD:

NO. P.D. No. 771 is valid and constitutional.

RATIO:

Presumption against unconstitutionality. There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No.
771 has been repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the
executive still exercised legislative powers).

Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence of ADCs franchise by reason of
the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of the Courts First
Division in said case, aside from not being final, cannot have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as
unconstitutional, since only the Court En Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the
Constitution.

And on the question of whether or not the government is estopped from contesting ADCs possession of
a valid franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors,
if any, of its officials or agents. (Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)

LUTZ VS. ARANETA [DECEMBER 22, 1955, (98 PHIL 148)]

Facts:

Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as Sugar Adjustment Act was promulgated in 1940 to
stabilize the sugar industry so as to prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of its preferential position in
the United States market and the imposition of export taxes. Plaintiff, Walter Lutz, in his capacity as
Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from the
Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the estate as taxes, under Sec.3 of the Act,
alleging that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid and support of the sugar
industry exclusively, which in plaintiffs opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax may be
constitutionally levied. The action has been dismissed by the Court of First Instance.

Issue:

Whether or not the tax imposed is constitutional.

Held:

Yes. The act is primarily an exercise of the police power. It is shown in the Act that the tax is levied with a
regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar
industry.

It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been
repeatedly held that inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or
exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.

The funds raised under the Act should be exclusively spent in aid of the sugar industry, since it is that very
enterprise that is being protected. It may be that other industries are also in need of similar protection;
but the legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of all or none.

LUTZ v. ARANETA
GR No. L-7859, December 22, 1955
98 PHIL 148

FACTS:
Plaintiff Walter Lutz, in his capacity as judicial administrator of the intestate estate of Antionio Ledesma,
sought to recover from the CIR the sum of P14, 666.40 paid by the estate as taxes, under section 3 of the
CA567 or the Sugar Adjustment Act thereby assailing its constitutionality, for it provided for an increase
of the existing tax on the manufacture of sugar, alleging that such enactment is not being levied for a
public purpose but solely and exclusively for the aid and support of the sugar industry thus making it void
and unconstitutional. The sugar industry situation at the time of the enactment was in an imminent threat
of loss and needed to be stabilized by imposition of emergency measures.

ISSUE:
Is CA 567 constitutional, despite its being allegedly violative of the equal protection clause, the purpose
of which is not for the benefit of the general public but for the rehabilitation only of the sugar industry?

HELD:
Yes. The protection and promotion of the sugar industry is a matter of public concern, it follows that the
Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and expedient
for its promotion. Here, the legislative discretion must be allowed to fully play, subject only to the test of
reasonableness; and it is not contended that the means provided in the law bear no relation to the
objective pursued or are oppressive in character. If objective and methods are alike constitutionally valid,
no reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment.
Taxation may be made the implement of the state's police power.
Facts: The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a corporation created directly by
P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, this
Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the entity to the national
economy as the third highest revenue-earner in the government.

MAGTAJAS VS PRYCE PROPERTIES, INC. [234 SCRA 255]

Facts:

The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a corporation created directly by P.D.
1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, this
Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the entity to the national
economy as the third highest revenue-earner in the government.

PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City by leasing a portion of a building
belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation Inc. for its casino.

On December 7, 1992, Sangguniang Panlungsod of CDO enacted ordinance 3353, prohibiting the issuance
of business permit and cancelling existing business permit to any establishment for the using and allowing
to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of a casino.

On January 4, 1993, it enacted Ordinance 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of casino and providing
penalty for violation therefore.

Pryce assailed the ordinances before the CA, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor.
The Court found the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. CDO
City and its mayor filed a petition for review under Rules of Court with the Supreme Court.

Issue:

WON the Sangguniang Panlungsod can prohibit the establishment of casino operated by PAGCOR through
an ordinance or resolution.

Held:

No. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people,
there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter,
even mentioning it at all. In the exercise of its own discretion, the Congress may prohibit gambling
altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for
whatever reasons it may consider sufficient.

Under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or
suppress, among others, gambling and other prohibited games of chance.

Ordinances should not contravene a statue as municipal governments are only agents of the national
government. Local councils exercise only delegated powers conferred on them by Congress as the national
lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those
of the latter.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that to be valid, an
ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:

1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.

2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.

3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.

4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.

5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.

6) It must not be unreasonable.

POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD (PAB) VS. CA [G.R. NO. 93891 MARCH 11, 1991]

Facts:
Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation is involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with
untreated wastewater which were being discharged directly into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-
Tinejeros River. On September 22, 1988, petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board issued an ex parte Order
based on 2 findings made on Solar Textile Finishing Corportions plant, directing Solar immediately to
cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations as they were clearly in
violation of Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 984 (Pollution Control Law) and Section 103 of its
Implementing Rules and Regulations and the 1982 Effluent Regulations.
Solar then filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by the Pollution Adjudication Board for a
temporary operation. However, Solar went to the RTC for certiorari and preliminary injunction against the
Board but the same was dismissed. On appeal, the CA reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court
and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte orders
to suspend the operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment
is discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible
standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board). Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board's
own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate
threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life" and argued that there were no
findings that Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Pollution Adjudication Board has legal authority to issue the Order and Writ of
Execution against Solar Textile Finishing Corporation. YES.

RULING:
Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders under
the following circumstances:
(a) Public Hearing. . . . Provided, That whenever the Commission finds prima facie evidence that the
discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal
or plant life, or exceeds the allowable standards set by the Commission, the Commissioner may issue an
ex-parte order directing the discontinuance of the same or the temporary suspension or cessation of
operation of the establishment or person generating such sewage or wastes without the necessity of a
prior public hearing. The said ex-parte order shall be immediately executory and shall remain in force until
said establishment or person prevents or abates the said pollution within the allowable standards or
modified or nullified by a competent court.
The Court found that the Order and Writ of Execution issued by petitioner Board were entirely within its
lawful authority Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like in
this case. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and
promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general
welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated
as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due
process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the
exercise of police power. Hence, the trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari.
It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of Appeals, as Solar did
in fact appeal. The Court gave due course on the Petition for Review and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals and its Resolution were set aside. The Order of petitioner Board and the Writ of Execution, as
well as the decision of the trial court were reinstated, without prejudice to the right of Solar to contest
the correctness of the basis of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing before the
Board.

YNOT VS. IAC

Police Power Not Validly Exercised

There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the
law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but
as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from
Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional
for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO
626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court
ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare
so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A created a
presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the
other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend
himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found
that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to
be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ

146 SCRA 323 Commercial Law Negotiable Instruments Law Constitutionality of BP 22

This case is a consolidation of 8 cases regarding violations of the Bouncing Checks Law or Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 (enacted April 3, 1979). In one of the eight cases, Judge David Nitafan of RTC Manila declared the
law unconstitutional. Among the arguments against the constitutionality of the law are a.) it is violative
of the constitutional provision on non-imprisonment due to debt, and b.) it impairs freedom of contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional.

HELD: Yes, BP 22 is constitutional.

The Supreme Court first discussed the history of the law. The SC explained how the law on estafa was not
sufficient to cover all acts involving the issuance of worthless checks; that in estafa, it only punishes the
fraudulent issuance of worthless checks to cover prior or simultaneous obligations but not pre-existing
obligations.

BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are worthless, i.e. checks
that end up being rejected or dishonored for payment. The practice is proscribed by the state because of
the injury it causes to public interests.

BP 22 is not violative of the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. The debt
contemplated by the constitution are those arising from contracts (ex contractu). No one is going to prison
for non-payment of contractual debts.
However, non-payment of debts arising from crimes (ex delicto) is punishable. This is precisely why the
mala prohibita crime of issuing worthless checks as defined in BP 22 was enacted by Congress. It is a valid
exercise of police power.

Due to the insufficiency of the Revised Penal Code, BP 22 was enacted to punish the following acts:

any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and
issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the
check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason
it is dishonored by the drawee bank.

And

any person who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said
check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.

Congress was able to determine at that time that the issuance of worthless checks was a huge problem.
The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making
and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal
sanctions.

Checks are widely used due to the convenience it brings in commercial transactions and confidence is the
primary basis why merchants rely on it for their various commercial undertakings. If such confidence is
shaken, the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nil.
Any practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of
worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking community. Thus, the Congress,
through their exercise of police power, declared that the making and issuance of a worthless check is
deemed a public nuisance which can be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.

The Supreme Court however also explained that (regardless of their previous explanation on ex delicto
debts) the non-payment of a debt is not the gravamen of the violations of BP 22. The gravamen of the
offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored
upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The
law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit,
under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of
its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the
act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.
 MMDA v Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.
GR 135962, March 27, 2000

FACTS:
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting the former to open its
private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day,
respondent was apprised that the perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be
demolished.
Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the issuance of a TRO and
preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the
perimeter wall.

ISSUE:
WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as an agent of the state endowed
with police power.

HELD:
A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has
substantial control of local affairs. It is a body politic and corporate one endowed with powers as a
political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants
of its territory (LGC of 1991).

Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC of 1991. It empowers the
sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality] and its inhabitants
pursuant to Sec.16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the [LGUs corporate powers] provided under
the Code.

There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Unlike the
legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is no grant of authority in RA 7924 that allows the MMDA to enact
ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is
merely a development authority and not a political unit of government since it is neither an LGU nor a
public corporation endowed with legislative power. The MMDA Chairman is not an elective official, but is
merely appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member.

In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the LGUs,
acting through their respective legislative councils that possess legislative power and police power.
EMINENT DOMAIN CASES

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM

Equal Protection

These are 3 cases consolidated questioning the constitutionality of the Agrarian Reform Act. Article XIII
on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform
program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers
and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case
of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code,
had already been enacted by Congress on August 8, 1963. This was substantially superseded almost a
decade later by PD 27, which was promulgated on Oct 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the
compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum
retention limits for landowners. On July 17, 1987, Cory issued EO 228, declaring full land ownership in
favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the
decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by PP 131, instituting
a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and EO 229, providing the mechanics for its
implementation. Afterwhich is the enactment of RA 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988,
which Cory signed on June 10. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments,
nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.

In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the
petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also
violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of
agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties.

The petitioners maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under PD 27 to be the owners of the lands
occupied by them, EO 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure
would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the
retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

In his comment the Sol-Gen asserted that the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar
planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be differently treated. The
Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and
scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for
prohibition would be premature.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.

HELD: The SC ruled affirming the Sol-Gen. The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied
equal protection because of the absence of retention limits has also become academic under Sec 6 of RA
6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint that
they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar
planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of their own.
However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have
been violated.
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the
following requirements:

(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;

(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.

The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and
discriminatory.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as
to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a
different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also
owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be
rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible
except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress
is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and
respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of
Rights.

PPI vs COMELEC, GR L-119694 (En Banc) 22 May 1995

FACTS: COMELEC issued resolution 2772 directing newspapers to provide provide free print space of not
less than one half (1/2) page for use as Comelec Space which shall be allocated by the Commission, free
of charge, among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is
circulated to enable the candidates to make known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and
their platforms and programs of government. Philippine Press Institute, a non-stock, non-profit
organization of newspaper and magazine publishers asks the Court to declare said resolution
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon
the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation.

The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of Comelec alleged that the resolution does not impose upon
the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers. It merely established
guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of Comelec space. And if it is viewed as
mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State- a
permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication
and information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure
a fair, impartial and credible election.

ISSUE: Whether the resolution was a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain?
HELD: No. The court held that the resolution does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain. To compel print media companies to donate Comelec-space amounts to taking of private
personal property for public use or purposes without the requisite just compensation. The extent of the
taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint
upon the use of private property. The monetary value of the compulsory donation, measured by the
advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may
be very substantial indeed.

The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use are the necessity for the
taking and the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been
shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell
print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance
of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the problem. Similarly, it has not been suggested, let
alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain either by the
Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the
enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be
assumed.

The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without
payment of just compensation (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying
compensation for Comelec space is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 146587. JULY 2, 2002
Facts:
Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings on 19 September 1969 before the
Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Bulacan, docketed Civil Cases No. 3839-M, No. 3840-M, No. 3841-M and
No. 3842-M, covering a total of 544,980 square meters of contiguous land situated along MacArthur
Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio
transmitter facilities for the Voice of the Philippines project. Petitioner, through the Philippine
Information Agency (PIA), took over the premises after the previous lessee, the Voice of America, had
ceased its operations thereat. Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as
being the reasonable value of the property. On 26 February 1979, or more than nine years after the
institution of the expropriation proceedings, the trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendants the
just compensation for said property which is the fair market value of the land condemned, computed at
the rate of six pesos (P6.00) per square meter, with legal rate of interest from September 19, 1969, until
fully paid.
The bone of contention in the instant controversy is the 76,589-square meter property
previously owned by Luis Santos, predecessor-in-interest of herein respondents, which forms part of the
expropriated area.
It would appear that the national government failed to pay to herein respondents the
compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision, such that a little over five years later, or on 09 May
1984, respondents filed a manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the expropriated property.
On 07 June 1984, the Bulacan RTC, after ascertaining that the heirs remained unpaid in the sum of
P1,058,655.05, issued a writ of execution served on the plaintiff, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, for the implementation thereof. When the order was not complied with, respondents again filed
a motion urging the trial court to direct the provincial treasurer of Bulacan to release to them the amount
of P72,683.55, a portion of the sum deposited by petitioner at the inception of the expropriation
proceedings in 1969, corresponding to their share of the deposit. The trial court, in its order of 10 July
1984, granted the motion.
In the meantime, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Proclamation No. 22,
transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated property to the Bulacan State University for the expansion of
its facilities and another 5 hectares to be used exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine carabao.
The remaining portion was retained by the PIA. Santos heirs remained unpaid, and no action was taken
on their case until 16 September 1999 when petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the
deposit in court of the amount of P4,664,000.00 by way of just compensation for the expropriated
property of the late Luis Santos subject to such final computation as might be approved by the court. This
time, the Santos heirs, opposing the manifestation and motion, submitted a counter-motion to adjust the
compensation from P6.00 per square meter previously fixed in the 1979 decision to its current zonal
valuation pegged at P5,000.00 per square meter or, in the alternative, to cause the return to them of the
expropriated property. On 01 March 2000, the Bulacan RTC ruled in favor of respondents ordering the
return of the expropriated property of the late defendant Luis Santos to his heirs conformably with the
ruling of the Supreme Court in Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. De Villaroya.
Assailing the finding of prescription by the trial court, petitioner here posited that a
motion which respondents had filed on 17 February 1984, followed up by other motions subsequent
thereto, was made within the reglementary period that thereby interrupted the 5-year prescriptive period
within which to enforce the 1979 judgment. Furthermore, petitioner claimed, the receipt by respondents
of partial compensation in the sum of P72,683.55 on 23 July 1984 constituted partial compliance on the
part of petitioners and effectively estopped respondents from invoking prescription expressed in Section
6, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court.
In opposing the petition, respondents advanced the view that pursuant to Section 6, Rule
39, of the Rules of Court, the failure of petitioner to execute the judgment, dated 26 February 1979, within
five years after it had become final and executory, rendered it unenforceable by mere motion. The motion
for payment, dated 09 May 1984, as well as the subsequent disbursement to them of the sum of
P72,683.55 by the provincial treasurer of Bulacan, could not be considered as having interrupted the five-
year period, since a motion, to be considered otherwise, should instead be made by the prevailing party,
in this case by petitioner. Respondents maintained that the P72,683.55 paid to them by the provincial
treasurer of Bulacan pursuant to the 1984 order of the trial court was part of the initial deposit made by
petitioner when it first entered possession of the property in 1969 and should not be so regarded as a
partial payment. Respondents further questioned the right of PIA to transfer ownership of a portion of
the property to the Bulacan State University even while the just compensation due the heirs had yet to
be finally settled.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court of Bulacan erred in issuing its order, dated 01 March 2000

Held:
The trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order, dated 01 March 2000, vacating its decision of 26 February
1979 has acted beyond its lawful cognizance, the only authority left to it being to order its execution.
Verily, private respondents, although not entitled to the return of the expropriated property, deserve to
be paid promptly on the yet unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by final judgment of the
Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6.00 per square meter, with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum
computed from the date of "taking" of the property, i.e., 19 September 1969, until the due amount shall
have been fully paid.
The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to
appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY VS ERICTA

Police Power Not Validly Exercised

Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT,

MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN
THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF. The law
basically provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set
aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for
at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. QC justified the law
by invoking police power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid.

HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable relation between
the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial
grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general
welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a
private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or
maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

City of Manila vs Chinese Community of Manila, GR 14355 (1D), 31 October 1919

FACTS: Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a petition praying that certain lands be expropriated for the
purpose of constructing a public improvement namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila and claiming
that such expropriation was necessary.

Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and (b)
that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for many years, and was covered
with sepulchres and monuments, and that the same should not be converted into a street for public
purposes.

The lower court ruled that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in
question.

Petitioner therefore assails the decision of the lower court claiming that it (petitioner) has the authority
to expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain
the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the
advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the
courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the
land is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its
value.

ISSUE: W/N the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the expropriation?
HELD: Yes. The courts have the power to restrict the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable
necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. When the municipal corporation or
entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying
such authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the
right of eminent domain is, without question, within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the
municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed
by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire into.

Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes

Facts: The Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints with the Court of First Instance of Cebu City for
the expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in barangay Alubog and Babag, Cebu City,
under PTAs express authority to acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings
any private land within and without the tourist zones for the purposes indicated in Section 5, paragraph
B(2), of its Revised Charter (PD564). The heirs of Juancho Ardona et. Al, ) filed their oppositions, and had
a common allegation in that the taking is allegedly not impressed with public use under the Constitution;
alleging that there is no specific constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private property for
tourism purposes; that assuming that PTA has such power, the intended use cannot be paramount to the
determination of the land as a land reform area; that limiting the amount of compensation by legislative
fiat is constitutionally repugnant; and that since the land is under the land reform program, it is the Court
of Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First Instance (CFI), that has jurisdiction over the expropriation
cases. The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with the Philippine National Bank, Cebu City
Branch, an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
1533, the lower court issued separate orders authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of the
premises and directing the issuance of writs of possession. The Heirs of Ardona, et. al. then filed a petition
for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the expropriation of parcels of land for the purpose of constructing a sports complex by
the Philippine Tourism Authority be considered taking for public use.

Held: The states power of eminent domain extends to the expropriation of land for tourism purposes
although this specific objective is not expressed in the constitution. The policy objectives of the framers
can be expressed only in general terms such as social justice, local autonomy, conservation and
development of the national patrimony public interest, and general welfare, among others. The programs
to achieve these objectives vary from time to time and according to place. To freeze specific programs like
tourism into express provisions would make the constitution more prolix than bulky code and require of
the framers a prescience beyond Delphic proportions. The particular mention in the constitution of
agrarian reform and transfer of utilities and other private enterprises to public ownership merely
underscores the magnitude of the problems sought to be remedied by this programs. They do not
preclude nor limit the exercise of the power of eminent domain for the purposes like tourism and other
development program.
 SMI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH through the NATIONAL CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL
G.R. No. 137537 January 28, 2000

Requirements for expropriation

1. Necessity for the exercise 2. Private Property 3. Public Use 4. Just Compensation
Who may exercise Power of Eminent Domain
1. The Congress 2. Chief Executive 3. Various Local legislative Bodies 4. Certain Public Corporations
(Land Authority, National Housing Authority) 5. Quasi-Public Corporations (PNR, PLDT, MERALCO)
essentially public (as in services rendered) although private owned or controlled.
Requisites of Taking in Eminent Domain
1. The expropriator must enter a private property
2. The entry must be more than a momentary period
3. The entry must be under warrant or color or legal authority
4. The property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be in such ways to oust the owner and deprive
him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

Facts:
On September 20, 1996, RP represented by DOH thru National Children Hospital filed a complaint for
eminent domain against SMI Development Corporation for the purpose of expropriating 3 parcels of land
(1,158 sq.m.). The defendant (SMI DevCorp) alleged that the complaint lacked or had insufficient cause of
action;
That the taking of the property would not serve the purpose for which it was intended;
The plaintiff (RP) failed to negotiate with it for the purchase of the property which reflects against
the urgency and necessity of the plaintiffs need of property and implies lack of intention to pay its true
and fair market value;
The necessity to expropriate the property was negated by the fact that less than a kilometer from
the plaintiff premises was the Quezon Institute which is presently not put to its optimum use and is a
better place of putting up frontline services for which the property is needed with less costs and less
prejudice to private rights.

Issue/s:
Whether or not the theres sufficient cause of action on the expropriation of property of SMI Corporation.

Ruling:
Yes. The court holds that the complaint stated a cause of action for eminent domain. The necessity for
taking petitioners property for public use upon payment of just compensation was alleged in the said
complaint. The allegation stressing that the property would be used to improve the delivery of health
services satisfied the requirements of necessity and public use.
 LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F.
SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

I. FACTS

In this agrarian dispute, it is once more imperative that the aforestated principles be applied in its
resolution. Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
and Land Bank of the following the adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals. Private respondents are
landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified
beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment
of compensation for their land, they sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary
administrative proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and the
Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited
in trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same.
DAR and Land Bank filed for petitions but it was dismissed and they filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
II. ISSUES

Whether or not the opening of "trust accounts" is within the coverage of term "deposit.
III. HELD

The provision is very clear and unambiguous, foreclosing any doubt as to allow an expanded construction
that would include the opening of "trust accounts" within the coverage of term "deposit. Accordingly,
we must adhere to the well-settled rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there
is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application. The validity of constituting trust
accounts for the benefit of the rejecting landowners and withholding immediate payment to them is
further premised on the latter's refusal to accept the offered compensation thereby making it necessary
that the amount remains in the custody of the LBP for safekeeping and in trust for eventual payment to
the landowners. As an exercise of police power, the expropriation of private property under the CARP
puts the landowner, and not the government, in a situation where the odds are already stacked against
his favor. He has no recourse but to allow it. His only consolation is that he can negotiate for the amount
of compensation to be paid for the expropriated property. Unduly burdening the property owners from
the resulting flaws in the implementation of the CARP which was supposed to have been a carefully
crafted legislation is plainly unfair and unacceptable.

Facts: Petitioner filed an action to acquire a right of way over the land of Respondents for the construction
of transmission lines. Petitioner was adjudged to pay the full market value of land traversed by the
transmission lines. Petitioner argued that it was only asking for a right of way.

Issue: Whether or Not the acquisition of the right of way constitutes "taking" and such the case will be
entitled just compensation.

Held: The acquisition of the right of way constitutes taking. It perpetually deprives Respondents of their
proprietary rights. No plant higher than three meters is allowed below the transmission lines. Because of
high tension current conveyed through the transmission lines, danger to life and limbs cannot be
discounted. The owner of the property is entitled to just compensation.
 NAPOCOR VS. GUTIERREZ

Facts: Petitioner filed an action to acquire a right of way over the land of Respondents for the construction
of transmission lines. Petitioner was adjudged to pay the full market value of land traversed by the
transmission lines. Petitioner argued that it was only asking for a right of way.

Issue: Whether or Not the acquisition of the right of way constitutes "taking" and such the case will be
entitled just compensation.

Held: The acquisition of the right of way constitutes taking. It perpetually deprives Respondents of their
proprietary rights. No plant higher than three meters is allowed below the transmission lines. Because of
high tension current conveyed through the transmission lines, danger to life and limbs cannot be
discounted. The owner of the property is entitled to just compensation.