Non-Registrable Property
1945 (he died in 1962) filed with the Bureau of
SANTULAN v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
GR No. L-28021, 1977-12-15
Facts:
This case is about the lease of a parcel of
foreshore land of the public domain with an area
of about four and one-half hectares located at
Barrio Kaigin, Kawit, Cavite abutting on
Bacoor Bay and the Ankaw
Creek.
Santulan claimed that that foreshore land is an
extension of his land, Lot 986 of the Kawit
cadastre, with an area of 17,301 square meters,
registered in his name in 1937 under Original
Certificate of Title No. 6 which was issued by
virtue of a free... patent.
The said foreshore land was allegedly formed by
soil deposits accumulated by the alluvial action
of the sea.
Santulan caused the said land to be surveyed.
Seven years later, or on December 22, 1949,
Santulan filed with the Bureau of Fisheries an
application for an ordinary fishpond permit or
lease, of the said foreshore land (Special Use
Permit, Fp. A. No. 5114, Exh. H).
At the instance of the Director of Fisheries, the
Director of Forestry investigated the condition of
the said foreshore land.
The latter in his first indorsement dated June 19,
1950 found that it was swampy "and not an
improved... fishpond as alleged by Antonio
Lusin" and that it is within the disposable areas
for agricultural purposes under the jurisdiction
of the Bureau of Lands (Exh. L-1).
On January 12, 1951 an attorney, acting for the
Director of Lands wrote the following letter to
Lusin advising him to vacate the disputed land
and maintain the status quo:
Santulan declared the said foreshore land in his
name for tax purposes.
On the other hand, Antonio Lusin in 1942 and
Lands applications for a revocable permit and
lease of a foreshore land, respectively, for the
purpose of producing salt on the said land.
He allegedly converted two hectares of the said
land into a fishpond.
The 1942 foreshore lease applications of
Santulan and Lusin gave rise to Bureau of Lands
Conflict No. 8 (N).
The Director ruled that the disputed foreshore
land was subject "to riparian rights which may
be invoked by Santulan as owner of the upland
in accordance with section 32 of Lands
Administrative Order No. 7-1" (Exh. K).
Lusin... filed a motion for reconsideration.
The Director in his order of October 19, 1951
denied that motion.
Lusin appealed to the Acting Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources who in his
decision of October 13, 1952 dismissed the
appeal and affirmed the Director's 1951 decision
(Exh. M made a part hereof for reference as
Annex
C).
Lusin asked for a reinvestigation of the
case. His request was granted. The Department
ordered a reinvestigation on May 12, 1953.
After receipt of the report of reinvestigation, the
Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, by authority of the Secretary, in his
order of December 14, 1954, reaffirmed the
rejection of Lusin's revocable permit and
foreshore lease applications but... ordered
Santulan to reimburse to Lusin the appraised
value of his improvements (Exh. O made a part
hereof for reference as Annex E).
Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo, by authority
of the President, held in his decision of April 10,
1958 that section 32 of Lands Administrative
Order No. 7-1 (promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources on April 30,
1936 pursuant to Acts
Nos. 2874 and 3038) was "rendered obsolete" by
section 67 of the Public Land Law which took
effect on December 1, 1936 (Exh. P made a part
hereof for reference as Annex G).
On the basis of the foregoing ruling and since
the record is silent as to whether or not the land
in question has been declared by the President as
not necessary for the public service and as open
to disposition (Sec. 61, Public Land Law), the
Executive Secretary sustained
Lusin's appeal and reversed the orders of the
Director of Lands and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources in favor of
Santulan.
Santulan's motion for reconsideration was
denied in the letter of the Acting Executive
Secretary dated August 20, 1959 (Exh. W).
Santulan filed in the Court of First Instance of
Cavite a petition for certiorari wherein he
alleged that the Executive Secretary committed a
grave abuse of discretion in misinterpreting
certain provisions of Act No. 2874,... Com-
monwealth Act No. 141, and Lands
Administrative Order No. 7-1.
It... should... further be underscored that the
regulations give him a preferential right to lease
the land as a riparian owner.
Issues:
Now, then, is there any justification for giving to
the littoral owner the preferential right to lease
the foreshore land abutting on his land?
Ruling:
The Executive Secretary concluded that, because
the preferential right of the applicant to lease
foreshore land was immaterial under section 67
of the present Public Land Law, paragraph 32 of
Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, which
gives such preference, had become "idle... and
useless".
That conclusion is wrong because it is based on
the erroneous hypothesis that section 64 of the
1919 Public Land Act is different from section
67 of the 1936 Public Land Law.
They are not different. The truth is that section
64 was... amended by Act No. 3517 which took
effect on February 4, 1929 (24 Public Laws
416).
In other words, article 4 recognizes the
preferential right of the littoral owner (riparian
according to paragraph 32) to the foreshore land
formed by accretions or alluvial deposits due to
the action of the sea
In view of the foregoing considerations, the trial
court's decision and the decision of the
Executive Secretary dated April 10, 1958 are
reversed and set aside
Principles:
32
Preference of Riparian Owner.- The owner of
the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshy
lands or lands covered with water bordering
upon shores or banks of navigable lakes or
rivers, shall be given preference to apply for
such... lands adjoining his property as may not
be needed for the public service, subject to the
laws and regulations governing lands of this
nature, provided that he applies therefor within
sixty (60) days from the date he receives a
communication from the Director... of Lands
advising him of his preferential right.
REPUBLIC v. CA, GR No. L-39473, 1979-04-
30
Facts:
Private respondent, Isabel Lastimado, filed on
September 11, 1967, in the Court of First
Instance of Bataan, Branch I, a Petition for the
reopening of cadastral proceedings over a
portion of Lot No. 626 of the Mariveles
Cadastre,... In the absence of any opposition,
whether from the Government or from private
individuals, private... respondent was allowed to
present her evidence ex-parte.
On October 14, 1967, the trial Court rendered a
Decision granting the Petition and adjudicating
the land in favor of private respondent.
Private respondent thereafter subdivided the land
into ten lots, and the corresponding titles
On June 3, 1968, or within one year from the
entry of the decree of registration, petitioner
filed a Petition for Review pursuant to Sec. 38,
Act No. 496, on the ground of fraud alleging that
during the period of alleged adverse possession
by private respondent, said parcel... of land was
part of the U.S. Military Reservation in
Bataan,... and, therefore, not... subject to
disposition or acquisition under the Public Land
Law.
On September 30, 1974, the Court of Appeals
upheld the trial Court's dismissal of the Petition
for Review stating
Issues:
The Lower Court as well as the Court of
Appeals erred in finding that there can be
possession, even for the purpose of claiming
title, of land which at the time of possession is
subject to a military reservation
resolution the Opposition to the Petition for
Review, which was treated as a motion to
dismiss,
the trial Court, in the exercise of sound judicial
discretion, should not... have dismissed the
Petition outright but should have afforded
petitioner an opportunity to present evidence in
support of the facts alleged to constitute actual
and extrinsic fraud committed by private
respondent.
If the allegation of petitioner that the land in
question was inside the military reservation at
the time it was claimed is true, then, it cannot be
the object of any cadastral proceeding nor can it
The Lower Court as well as the Court of
Appeals erred in finding that such land which is
subject to a government reservation, may
appropriately be the subject of cadastral
proceedings, and hence, also of a petition to
reopen... cadastral proceedings.
The Lower Court as well as the Court of
Appeals erred in finding that a parcel of land
which is part of the public forest is susceptible
of occupation and registration in favor of private
individual.
The Lower Court as well as the Court of
Appeals erred in not finding that the Republic of
the Philippines is not estopped from questioning
the decree of registration and the title issued
pursuant thereto in favor... of respondent
Lastimado over the parcel of land in question.
Ruling:
The essential elements for the allowance of the
reopening or review of a decree are: a) that the
petitioner has a real and dominical right; b) that
he has been deprived thereof; c) through fraud;
d) that the petition is filed within one year from
the... issuance of the decree; and e) that the
property has not as yet been transferred to an
innocent purchaser.
We find reversible error. Although there was an
agreement by the parties to submit for
be the object of reopening under Republic Act
No. 931.
Similarly, if the land in question, indeed, forms
part of the public forest, then, possession
thereof, however long, cannot convert it into
private property as it is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and
beyond the power and... jurisdiction of the
cadastral Court to register under the Torrens
System.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals... are hereby set aside and the records of
this case hereby remanded to the latter Court for
further proceedings to enable petitioner to
present evidence in support of its Petition for
Review.
Principles:
Section 38. Decree of registration, and remedies
after entry of decree.
If the court after hearing finds that the applicant
or adverse claimant has title as stated in his
application or adverse claim and proper for
registration, a decree of confirmation and
registration shall be entered. Every decree of
registration... shall bind the land, and quiet title
thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in
the following section. It shall be conclusive
upon and against all persons, including the
Insular Government and all the branches thereof,
whether mentioned by name in the... application,
notice or citation, or included in the general
description 'To all whom it may concern'. Such
decree shall not be opened by reason of the
absence, infancy, or other disability of any
person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding
in any court for... reversing judgments or
decrees; subject, however, to the right of any
person deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein by decree of registration obtained
by fraud to file in the competent Court of First
Instance a petition for review within one year
after entry of... the decree provided no innocent
purchaser for value has acquired an interest. x x
x."
Chavez vs public estates authority
The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central
implementing agency tasked to undertake
reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the
leasing and selling functions of the DENR
(Department of Environmental and Natural
Resources) insofar as reclaimed or about to be
reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay
and Development Corporation, a private
corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of
the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have
290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila
Bay to Amari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed
lands of the public domain to be transferred to
Amari as private lands will sanction a gross
violation of the constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84
hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the
Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of
title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the
public domain. The 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas of Manila Bay remain
inalienable natural resources of the public
domain. The transfer (as embodied in a joint
venture agreement) to AMARI, a private
corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the
Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary to
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA
also seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of
290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of
Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of
natural resources other than agricultural lands of
the public domain.
Chavez v. National Housing Authority
FACTS:
On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General
Francisco Chavez, filed an instant petition
raising constitutional issues on the JVA entered
by National Housing Authority and R-II
Builders, Inc.
On March 1, 1988, then-President Cory Aquino
issued Memorandum order No. (MO) 161
approving and directing implementation of the
Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan
Manila Waste Management Plan. During this
time, Smokey Mountain, a wasteland in Tondo,
Manila, are being made residence of many
Filipinos living in a subhuman state.
As presented in MO 161, NHA prepared
feasibility studies to turn the dumpsite into low-
cost housing project, thus, Smokey Mountain
Development and Reclamation Project
(SMDRP), came into place. RA 6957 (Build-
Operate-Transfer Law) was passed on July 1990
declaring the importance of private sectors as
contractors in government projects. Thereafter,
Aquino proclaimed MO 415 applying RA 6957
to SMDRP, among others. The same MO also
established EXECOM and TECHCOM in the
execution and evaluation of the plan,
respectively, to be assisted by the Public Estates
Authority (PEA).
Notices of public bidding to become NHAs
venture partner for SMDRP were published in
newspapers in 1992, from which R-II Builders,
Inc. (RBI) won the bidding process. Then-
President Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a
Joint Venture Agreement with RBI.
Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing
of Smokey Mountain for eventual development
into a low cost housing complex and
industrial/commercial site. RBI is expected to
fully finance the development of Smokey
Mountain and reclaim 40 hectares of the land at
the Manila Bay Area. The latter together with
the commercial area to be built on Smokey
Mountain will be owned by RBI as enabling
components. If the project is revoked or
terminated by the Government through no fault
of RBI or by mutual agreement, the Government
shall compensate RBI for its actual expenses
incurred in the Project plus a reasonable rate of
return not exceeding that stated in the feasibility
study and in the contract as of the date of such
revocation, cancellation, or termination on a
schedule to be agreed upon by both parties.
To summarize, the SMDRP shall consist of
Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of the project
involves clearing, levelling-off the dumpsite,
and construction of temporary housing units for
the current residents on the cleared and levelled
site. Phase II involves the construction of a
fenced incineration area for the on-site disposal
of the garbage at the dumpsite.
Due to the recommendations done by the DENR
after evaluations done, the JVA was amended
and restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the
design changes and additional work to be done
to successfully implement the project. The
original 3,500 units of temporary housing were
decreased to 2,992. The reclaimed land as
enabling component was increased from 40
hectares to 79 hectares, which was supported by
the issuance of Proclamation No. 465 by
President Ramos. The revision also provided for
the 119-hectare land as an enabling component
for Phase II of the project.
Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by
the legislature which made the establishment of
an incinerator illegal, making the off-site
dumpsite at Smokey Mountain necessary. On
August 1, 1998, the project was suspended, to be
later reconstituted by President Estrada in MO
No. 33.
On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed
a Memorandum of Agreement whereby both
parties agreed to terminate the JVA and
subsequent agreements. During this time, NHA
reported that 34 temporary housing structures
and 21 permanent housing structures had been
turned over by RBI.
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondents NHA and RBI
have been granted the power and
authority to reclaim lands of the public
domain as this power is vested
 exclusively in PEA as claimed by
petitioner
2. Whether respondents NHA and RBI
were given the power and authority by
DENR to reclaim foreshore and
submerged lands
3. Whether respondent RBI can acquire
reclaimed foreshore and submerged
lands considered as alienable and
outside the commerce of man
4. Whether respondent RBI can acquire
reclaimed lands when there was no
declaration that said lands are no longer
needed for public use
5. Whether there is a law authorizing sale
of reclaimed lands
6. Whether the transfer of reclaimed lands
to RBI was done by public bidding
7. Whether RBI, being a private
corporation, is barred by the
Constitution to acquire lands of public
domain
8. Whether respondents can be compelled
to disclose all information related to the
SMDRP
9. Whether the operative fact doctrine
applies to the instant position
HELD:
1. Executive Order 525 reads that the PEA
shall be primarily responsible for
integrating, directing, and coordinating
all reclamation projects for and on
behalf of the National
Government. This does not mean that it
shall be responsible for all. The
requisites for a valid and legal
reclamation project are approval by the
President (which were provided for by
MOs), favourable recommendation of
PEA (which were seen as a part of its
recommendations to the EXECOM), and
undertaken either by PEA or entity
under contract of PEA or by the
National Government Agency (NHA is
a government agency whose authority to
reclaim lands under consultation with
PEA is derived under PD 727 and RA
7279).
2. Notwithstanding the need for DENR
permission, the DENR is deemed to
have granted the authority to reclaim in
the Smokey Mountain Project for the
DENR is one of the members of the
EXECOM which provides reviews for
the project. ECCs and Special Patent
Orders were given by the DENR which
are exercises of its power of supervision
over the project. Furthermore, it was the
President via the abovementioned MOs
that originally authorized the
reclamation. It must be noted that the
reclamation of lands of public domain is
reposed first in the Philippine President.
3. The reclaimed lands were classified
alienable and disposable via MO 415
issued by President Aquino and
Proclamation Nos. 39 and 465 by
President Ramos.
4. Despite not having an explicit
declaration, the lands have been deemed
to be no longer needed for public use as
stated in Proclamation No. 39 that these
are to be disposed to qualified
beneficiaries. Furthermore, these lands
have already been necessarily
reclassified as alienable and disposable
lands under the BOT law.
5. Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearly
states that the NHA can acquire property
rights and interests and encumber or
otherwise dispose of them as it may
deem appropriate.
6. There is no doubt that respondent NHA
conducted a public bidding of the right
to become its joint venture partner in the
 Smokey Mountain Project. It was noted
that notices were published in national
newspapers. The bidding proper was
done by the Bids and Awards
Committee on May 18, 1992.
7. RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718
explicitly states that a contractor can be
paid a portion as percentage of the
reclaimed land subject to the
constitutional requirement that only
Filipino citizens or corporation with at
least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the
same. In addition, when the lands were
transferred to the NHA, these were
considered Patrimonial lands of the
state, by which it has the power to sell
the same to any qualified person.
8. This relief must be granted. It is the
right of the Filipino people to
information on matters of public
concerned as stated in Article II, Sec.
28, and Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987
Constitution.
9. When the petitioner filed the case, the
JVA had already been terminated by
virtue of MOA between RBI and
NHA. The properties and rights in
question after the passage of around 10
years from the start of the projects
implementation cannot be disturbed or
questioned. The petitioner, being the
Solicitor General at the time SMDRP
was formulated, had ample opportunity
to question the said project, but did not
do so. The moment to challenge has
passed.
VII REMEDIES
Remedies available in a registration
Motion for new trial or reconsideration (rule
31, rules of court) Consolidation or Severance
Section 1. Consolidation. When actions
involving a common question of law or fact are
pending before the court, it may order a joint
hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue
in the actions; it may order all the actions
consolidated, and it may make such orders
concerning proceedings therein as may tend to
avoid unnecessary costs or delay. (1)
Section 2. Separate trials. The court, in
furtherance of convenience or to avoid
prejudice, may order a separate trial of any
claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party
complaint, or of any separate issue or of any
number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims,
third-party complaints or issues. (2a)
Petition for relief of judgement (rule 38, Rules
of court)
Section 1. Petition for relief from
judgment, order, or other proceedings.
When a judgment or final order is entered, or
any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a
party in any court through fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a
petition in such court and in the same case
praying that the judgment, order or proceeding
be set aside
Appeal
Remedies Available in a Registration
Petition for review of decree
Section 32. Review of decree of registration;
Innocent purchaser for value. The decree of
registration shall not be reopened or revised by
reason of absence, minority, or other disability
of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by
any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments, subject, however, to the right of any
person, including the government and the
branches thereof, deprived of land or of any
estate or interest therein by such adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to
file in the proper Court of First Instance a
petition for reopening and review of the decree
of registration not later than one year from and
after the date of the entry of such decree of
registration, but in no case shall such petition be
entertained by the court where an innocent
purchaser for value has acquired the land or an
interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced.
Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for
value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this
Decree, it shall be deemed to include an
innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other
encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year,
the decree of registration and the certificate of
title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any
person aggrieved by such decree of registration
in any case may pursue his remedy by action for
damages against the applicant or any other
persons responsible for the fraud
Cases:
Rebublic v. Ca (no digest)
Eland Philippines, Inc vs Garcia (no digest)
Enriquito Serna vs. Court of Appeals,
Santiago Fontanilla Rasing,, 308 SCRA 527
Facts:
The petitioner spouses and respondent spouses
are first cousins in dispute of land ownership.
Apparently, their grandfather owns a
12,508 sq.m. land that was surveyed by Turner
Land Surveying Co. for him which he promised
to pay for after the approval of Bureau of Lands.
He failed to pay for the costs and to elude
foreclosure of the land he sold said land to his
daughter Rosa who assumed payment for the
property tax. Rosa subsequently sold the land to
her nephew Santiago Fontanilla, herein
respondent, under a notarized deed of sale that
was not registered to the Register of
Deeds. Fontanillaconstructed a house and lived
there. In 1978 they went to the US to visit their
daughter. While out of the country, petitioners
Enriquito Serna applied a land registration of
said lot which was successfully registered in
their name on Jan. 10, 1980. On May 27, 1981,
respondents filed an action for reconveyance and
damages against petitioners. Petitioners contend
that when their grandfather failed to pay the
surveying company they took the property in
question but it was redeemed later on and sold to
their father but they could not produce evidence.
The court ruled in favor to the respondents as
true owners of the said lot hence this petition to
the S.C.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in
rendering its decision and appreciation of facts
and application of law?
Held:
The S.C. upholds the lower courts ruling
declaring that the respondents are the rightful
owners of the said lot. Petitioners claim
ownership based on a deed of sale executed
between their grandfather and father which they
could not produce. This is a question of facts
that the SC cannot review on appeal.
Respondents however have been paying taxes
and enjoying continuous possession of the land
for over 60 years tacking the possession of its
predecessor grandfather and Aunt Rosa. These
are circumstances and period sufficient for
prescription. They also filed the action
for reconveyance within the prescribed 10 years
period from the issuance of Torrens title to the
property for the petitioners.
Action for reconveyance
Section 53. Presentation of owner's duplicate
upon entry of new certificate. No voluntary
instrument shall be registered by the Register of
Deeds, unless the owner's duplicate certificate is
presented with such instrument, except in cases
expressly provided for in this Decree or upon
order of the court, for cause shown.
The production of the owner's duplicate
certificate, whenever any voluntary instrument is
presented for registration, shall be conclusive
authority from the registered owner to the
Register of Deeds to enter a new certificate or to
make a memorandum of registration in
accordance with such instrument, and the new
certificate or memorandum shall be binding
upon the registered owner and upon all persons
claiming under him, in favor of every purchaser
for value and in good faith.
In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the
owner may pursue all his legal and equitable
remedies against the parties to such fraud
without prejudice, however, to the rights of any
innocent holder for value of a certificate of title.
After the entry of the decree of registration on
the original petition or application, any
subsequent registration procured by the
presentation of a forged duplicate certificate of
title, or a forged deed or other instrument, shall
be null and void.
Section 96. Against whom action filed. If such
action is brought to recover for loss or damage
or for deprivation of land or of any estate or
interest therein arising wholly through fraud,
negligence, omission, mistake or misfeasance of
the court personnel, Register of Deeds, his
deputy, or other employees of the Registry in the
performance of their respective duties, the action
shall be brought against the Register of Deeds of
the province or city where the land is situated
and the National Treasurer as defendants. But if
such action is brought to recover for loss or
damage or for deprivation of land or of any
interest therein arising through fraud,
negligence, omission, mistake or misfeasance of
person other than court personnel, the Register
of Deeds, his deputy or other employees of the
Registry, such action shall be brought against the
Register of Deeds, the National Treasurer and
other person or persons, as co-defendants. It
shall be the duty of the Solicitor General in
person or by representative to appear and to
defend all such suits with the aid of the fiscal of
the province or city where the land lies:
Provided, however, that nothing in this Decree
shall be construed to deprive the plaintiff of any
right of action which he may have against any
person for such loss or damage or deprivation
without joining the National Treasurer as party
defendant. In every action filed against the
Assurance Fund, the court shall consider the
report of the Commissioner of Land
Registration.
Cases:
Spouses Roque vs. Aguado Digest
G.R. No. 193787 : April 7, 2014
FACTS:
The property subject of this case is a parcel of
land with an area of 20,862 square meters (sq.
m.), located in Sitio Tagpos, Barangay
Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal, known as Lot
18089.
On July 21, 1977, petitioners-spouses Jose C.
Roque and Beatriz dela Cruz Roque (Sps.
Roque) and the original owners of the then
unregistered Lot 18089 namely, Velia R. Rivero
(Rivero), Magdalena Aguilar, Angela Gonzales,
Herminia R. Bernardo, Antonio Rivero, Araceli
R. Victa, Leonor R. Topacio, and Augusto
Rivero (Rivero, et al.) executed a Deed of
Conditional Sale of Real Property (1977 Deed of
Conditional Sale) over a 1,231-sq. m. portion of
Lot 18089 (subject portion) for a consideration
of 30,775.00. The parties agreed that Sps. Roque
shall make an initial payment of 15,387.50 upon
signing, while the remaining balance of the
purchase price shall be payable upon the
registration of Lot 18089, as well as the
segregation and the concomitant issuance of a
separate title over the subject portion in their
names. After the deeds execution, Sps. Roque
took possession and introduced improvements
on the subject portion which they utilized as a
balut factory.
On August 12, 1991, Fructuoso Sabug, Jr.
(Sabug, Jr.), former Treasurer of the National
Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP),
applied for a free patent over the entire Lot
18089 and was eventually issued Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. M-59558 in his
name on October 21, 1991. On June 24, 1993,
Sabug, Jr. and Rivero, in her personal capacity
and in representation of Rivero, et al., executed a
Joint Affidavit (1993 Joint Affidavit),
acknowledging that the subject portion belongs
to Sps. Roque and expressed their willingness to
segregate the same from the entire area of Lot
18089.
On December 8, 1999, however, Sabug, Jr.,
through a Deed of Absolute Sale (1999 Deed of
Absolute Sale), sold Lot 18089 to one Ma.
Pamela P. Aguado (Aguado) for 2,500,000.00,
who, in turn, caused the cancellation of OCT
No. M-5955 and the issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. M-96692 dated
December 17, 199911 in her name.
Thereafter, Aguado obtained an 8,000,000.00
loan from the Land Bank of the Philippines
(Land Bank) secured by a mortgage over Lot
18089. When she failed to pay her loan
obligation, Land Bank commenced extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings and eventually tendered
the highest bid in the auction sale. Upon
Aguados failure to redeem the subject property,
Land Bank consolidated its ownership, and TCT
No. M-11589513 was issued in its name on July
21, 2003.
On June 16, 2003, Sps. Roque filed a complaint
for reconveyance, annulment of sale, deed of
real estate mortgage, foreclosure, and certificate
of sale, and damages before the RTC, docketed
as Civil Case No. 03-022, against Aguado,
Sabug, Jr., NCCP, Land Bank, the Register of
Deeds of Morong, Rizal, and Sheriff Cecilio U.
Pulan, seeking to be declared as the true owners
of the subject portion which had been
erroneously included in the sale between
Aguado and Sabug, Jr., and, subsequently, the
mortgage to Land Bank, both covering Lot
18089 in its entirety.
In defense, NCCP and Sabug, Jr. denied any
knowledge of the 1977 Deed of Conditional Sale
through which the subject portion had been
purportedly conveyed to Sps. Roque.
For her part, Aguado raised the defense of an
innocent purchaser for value as she allegedly
derived her title (through the 1999 Deed of
Absolute Sale) from Sabug, Jr., the registered
owner in OCT No. M-5955, covering Lot 18089,
which certificate of title at the time of sale was
free from any lien and/or encumbrances. She
also claimed that Sps. Roques cause of action
had already prescribed because their adverse
claim was made only on April 21, 2003, or four
(4) years from the date OCT No. M-5955 was
issued in Sabug, Jr.s name on December 17,
1999.
On the other hand, Land Bank averred that it had
no knowledge of Sps. Roques claim relative to
the subject portion, considering that at the time
the loan was taken out, Lot 18089 in its entirety
was registered in Aguados name and no lien
and/or encumbrance was annotated on her
certificate of title.
Meanwhile, on January 18, 2005, NCCP filed a
separate complaint also for declaration of nullity
of documents and certificates of title and
damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 05-003. It
claimed to be the real owner of Lot 18089 which
it supposedly acquired from Sabug, Jr. through
an oral contract of sale in the early part of 1998,
followed by the execution of a Deed of Absolute
Sale on December 2, 1998 (1998 Deed of
Absolute Sale). NCCP also alleged that in
October of the same year, it entered into a Joint
Venture Agreement (JVA) with Pilipinas Norin
Construction Development Corporation
(PNCDC), a company owned by Aguados
parents, for the development of its real
properties, including Lot 18089, into a
subdivision project, and as such, turned over its
copy of OCT No. M-5955 to PNCDC. Upon
knowledge of the purported sale of Lot 18089 to
Aguado, Sabug, Jr. denied the transaction and
alleged forgery. Claiming that the Aguados and
PNCDC conspired to defraud NCCP, it prayed
that PNCDCs corporate veil be pierced and that
the Aguados be ordered to pay the amount of
.38,092,002.00 representing the unrealized profit
from the JVA. Moreover, NCCP averred that
Land Bank failed to exercise the diligence
required to ascertain the true owners of Lot
18089.
In its answer, Land Bank reiterated its stance
that Lot 18089 was used as collateral for the
8,000,000.00 loan obtained by the Countryside
Rural Bank, Aguado, and one Bella Palasaga.
There being no lien and/ or encumbrance
annotated on its certificate of title, i.e., TCT No.
M-115895, it cannot be held liable for NCCPs
claims. Thus, it prayed for the dismissal of
NCCPs complaint.
On September 7, 2005, Civil Case Nos. 02-022
and 05-003 were ordered consolidated.
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a
Decision dated July 8, 2008, dismissing the
complaints of Sps. Roque and NCCP. With
respect to Sps. Roques complaint, the RTC
found that the latter failed to establish their
ownership over the subject portion.
On the other hand, regarding NCCPs complaint,
the RTC observed that while it anchored its
claim of ownership over Lot 18089 on the 1998
Deed of Absolute Sale, the said deed was not
annotated on OCT No. M5955. The RTC denied
the parties respective claims for damages.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed
the foregoing RTC findings in a Decision34
dated May 12, 2010. While Land Bank was not
regarded as a mortgagee/purchaser in good faith
with respect to the subject portion considering
Sps. Roques possession thereof. As regards
NCCP, the CA found that it failed to establish its
right over Lot 18089.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in not
ordering the reconveyance of the subject portion
in Sps. Roques favor.
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
CIVIL LAW: contract to sell
Examining its provisions, the Court finds that
the stipulation above-highlighted shows that the
1977 Deed of Conditional Sale is actually in the
nature of a contract to sell and not one of sale
contrary to Sps. Roques belief. In this relation, it
has been consistently ruled that where the seller
promises to execute a deed of absolute sale upon
the completion by the buyer of the payment of
the purchase price, the contract is only a contract
to sell even if their agreement is denominated as
a Deed of Conditional Sale, as in this case. This
treatment stems from the legal characterization
of a contract to sell, that is, a bilateral contract
whereby the prospective seller, while expressly
reserving the ownership of the subject property
despite delivery thereof to the prospective buyer,
binds himself to sell the subject property
exclusively to the prospective buyer upon
fulfillment of the condition agreed upon, such
as, the full payment of the purchase price.
Elsewise stated, in a contract to sell, ownership
is retained by the vendor and is not to pass to the
vendee until full payment of the purchase price.
Explaining the subject matter further, the Court,
in Ursal v. CA, held that:
In contracts to sell the obligation of the seller to
sell becomes demandable only upon the
happening of the suspensive condition, that is,
the full payment of the purchase price by the
buyer. It is only upon the existence of the
contract of sale that the seller becomes obligated
to transfer the ownership of the thing sold to the
buyer. Prior to the existence of the contract of
sale, the seller is not obligated to transfer the
ownership to the buyer, even if there is a
contract to sell between them.
Here, it is undisputed that Sps. Roque have not
paid the final installment of the purchase price.
As such, the condition which would have
triggered the parties obligation to enter into and
thereby perfect a contract of sale in order to
effectively transfer the ownership of the subject
portion from the sellers (i.e., Rivero et al.) to the
buyers (Sps. Roque) cannot be deemed to have
been fulfilled. Consequently, the latter cannot
validly claim ownership over the subject portion
even if they had made an initial payment and
even took possession of the same.
The Court further notes that Sps. Roque did not
even take any active steps to protect their claim
over the disputed portion. This remains evident
from the following circumstances appearing on
record: (a) the 1977 Deed of Conditional Sale
was never registered; (b) they did not seek the
actual/physical segregation of the disputed
portion despite their knowledge of the fact that,
as early as 1993, the entire Lot 18089 was
registered in Sabug, Jr.s name under OCT No.
M-5955; and (c) while they signified their
willingness to pay the balance of the purchase
price, Sps. Roque neither compelled Rivero et
al., and/or Sabug, Jr. to accept the same nor did
they consign any amount to the court, the proper
application of which would have effectively
fulfilled their obligation to pay the purchase
price. Instead, Sps. Roque waited 26 years,
reckoned from the execution of the 1977 Deed
of Conditional Sale, to institute an action for
reconveyance (in 2003), and only after Lot
18089 was sold to Land Bank in the foreclosure
sale and title thereto was consolidated in its
name. Thus, in view of the foregoing, Sabug, Jr.
as the registered owner of Lot 18089 borne by
the grant of his free patent application could
validly convey said property in its entirety to
Aguado who, in turn, mortgaged the same to
Land Bank. Besides, as aptly observed by the
RTC, Sps. Roque failed to establish that the
parties who sold the property to them, i.e.,
Rivero, et al., were indeed its true and lawful
owners. In fine, Sps. Roque failed to establish
any superior right over the subject portion as
against the registered owner of Lot 18089, i.e.,
Land Bank, thereby warranting the dismissal of
their reconveyance action, without prejudice to
their right to seek damages against the vendors,
i.e., Rivero et al.
As applied in the case of Coronel v. CA:
It is essential to distinguish between a contract to
sell and a conditional contract of sale specially
in cases where the subject property is sold by the
owner not to the party the seller contracted with,
but to a third person, as in the case at bench. In a
contract to sell, there being no previous sale of
the property, a third person buying such property
despite the fulfilment of the suspensive
condition such as the full payment of the
purchase price, for instance, cannot be deemed a
buyer in bad faith and the prospective buyer
cannot seek the relief of reconveyance of the
property. There is no double sale in such case.
Title to the property will transfer to the buyer
after registration because there is no defect in the
owner-sellers title per se, but the latter, of
course, may be sued for damages by the
intending buyer.
CIVIL LAW: double sales
On the matter of double sales, suffice it to state
that Sps. Roques reliance on Article 154465 of
the Civil Code has been misplaced since the
contract they base their claim of ownership on
is, as earlier stated, a contract to sell, and not one
of sale. In Cheng v. Genato, the Court stated the
circumstances which must concur in order to
determine the applicability of Article 1544, none
of which are obtaining in this case:
(a) The two (or more) sales transactions in issue
must pertain to exactly the same subject matter,
and must be valid sales transactions;
(b) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the
rightful ownership of the subject matter must
each represent conflicting interests; and
(c) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the
rightful ownership of the subject matter must
each have bought from the same seller.
CIVIL LAW: acquisitive prescription
Finally, regarding Sps. Roques claims of
acquisitive prescription and reimbursement for
the value of the improvements they have
introduced on the subject property, it is keenly
observed that none of the arguments therefor
were raised before the trial court or the CA.
Accordingly, the Court applies the well-settled
rule that litigants cannot raise an issue for the
first time on appeal as this would contravene the
basic rules of fair play and justice. In any event,
such claims appear to involve questions of fact
which are generally prohibited under a Rule 45
petition.
With the conclusions herein reached, the Court
need not belabor on the other points raised by
the parties, and ultimately finds it proper to
proceed with the denial of the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
emma ver reyes vs montemayor G.R. No.
166516 (no digest)
Gasataya v. Mabasa (no digest)
4 year period and 10 year period to file action
Cases:
Amerol v Bagumbayan (no digest)
Amerol v Bagumbayan (no digest)
Action for Damages
Recovery From Assurance Fund
Section 95. Action for compensation from
funds. A person who, without negligence on his
part, sustains loss or damage, or is deprived of
land or any estate or interest therein in
consequence of the bringing of the land under
the operation of the Torrens system of arising
after original registration of land, through fraud
or in consequence of any error, omission,
mistake or misdescription in any certificate of
title or in any entry or memorandum in the
registration book, and who by the provisions of
this Decree is barred or otherwise precluded
under the provision of any law from bringing an
action for the recovery of such land or the estate
or interest therein, may bring an action in any
court of competent jurisdiction for the recovery
of damages to be paid out of the Assurance
Fund.
Cases:
development bank vs bautista (no digest)
Other remedies Available
Action for Cancellation or reversion
Section 101. All the proofs, affidavits, and oaths
of any kind required or necessary under this Act
may be made before the justice of the peace or
the municipality in which the land lies, or before
the judge or clerk of the Court of First Instance
of the province in which the land lies, or before
any justice of the peace or notary public of the
province in which the land lies, or before any
officer or employee of the Bureau of Lands
authorized by law to administer oaths.
The fees for the taking of final evidence before
any of the officials hereinbefore mentioned shall
be as follows:
For each affidavit, fifty centavos.
For each deposition of the applicant or the
witnesses, fifty centavos
cawis v cerilles (no digest)
Republic v. CA and alpuerto (no digest)
Annulment of judgements
Annulment of Judgments of Final Orders and
Resolutions
Section 1. Coverage. This Rule shall govern
the annulment by the Court of Appeals of
judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil
actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition
for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the
petitioner. (n)
Section 2. Grounds for annulment. The
annulment may be based only on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it
was availed of, or could have been availed of, in
a motion for new trial or petition for relief. (n)
Section 3. Period for filing action. If based
on extrinsic fraud, the action must be filed
within four (4) years from its discovery; and if
based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred
by laches or estoppel. (n)
Section 4. Filing and contents of petition.
The action shall be commenced by filing a
verified petition alleging therein with
particularity the facts and the law relied upon for
annulment, as well as those supporting the
petitioner's good and substantial cause of action
or defense, as the case may be.
The petition shall be filed in seven (7) clearly
legible copies, together with sufficient copies
corresponding to the number of respondents. A
certified true copy of the judgment or final order
or resolution shall be attached to the original
copy of the petition intended for the court and
indicated as such by the petitioner.
The petitioner shall also submit together with the
petition affidavits of witnesses or documents
supporting the cause of action or defense and a
sworn certification that he has not theretofore
commenced any other action involving the same
issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any
other tribunal or agency if there is such other
action or proceeding, he must state the status of
the same, and if he should thereafter learn that a
similar action or proceeding has been filed or is
pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any
other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to
promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other
tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days
therefrom. (n)
Section 5. Action by the court. Should the
court find no substantial merit in the petition, the
same may be dismissed outright with specific
reasons for such dismissal.
Should prima facie merit be found in the
petition, the same shall be given due course and
summons shall be served on the respondent. (n)
Section 6. Procedure. The procedure in
ordinary civil cases shall be observed. Should
trial be necessary, the reception of the evidence
may be referred to a member of the court or a
judge of a Regional Trial Court. (n)
Section 7. Effect of judgment. A judgment of
annulment shall set aside the questioned
judgment or final order or resolution and render
the same null and void, without prejudice to the
original action being refiled in the proper court.
However, where the judgment or final order or
resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic
fraud, the court may on motion order the trial
court to try the case as if a timely motion for
new trial had been granted therein. (n)
Section 8. Suspension prescriptive period.
The prescriptive period for the refiling of the
aforesaid original action shall be deemed
suspended from the filing of such original action
until the finality of the judgment of annulment.
However, the prescriptive period shall not be
suspended where the extrinsic-fraud is
attributable to the plaintiff in the original action.
(n)
Section 9. Relief available. The judgment of
annulment may include the award of damages,
attorney's fees and other relief.
If the questioned judgment or final order or
resolution had already been executed the court
may issue such orders of restitution or other
relief as justice and equity may warrant under
the circumstances. (n)
Section 10. Annulment of judgments or final
orders of Municipal Trial Courts. An action
to annul a judgment or final order of a Municipal
Trial Court shall be filed in the Regional Trial
Court having jurisdiction over the former. It
shall be treated as an ordinary civil action and
sections 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of this Rule shall be
applicable thereto. (n)
yujuico vs republic (no digest)
Criminal Action For perjury