Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1
The Court's Rulings The Court is inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of attempted,
not frustrated, homicide. In Palaganas v. People, 11 we ruled that when the
One. Arnel claims that Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attacked him first
accused intended to kill his victim, as shown by his use of a deadly weapon and
and that he merely acted in self-defense when he hit Rufino back with a stone. the wounds he inflicted, but the victim did not die because of timely medical
When the accused invokes self-defense, he bears the burden of assistance, the crime is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide. If the victim's
showing that he was legally justified in killing the victim or inflicting injury to him. wounds are not fatal, the crime is only attempted murder or attempted homicide.
The accused must establish the elements of self-defense by clear and convincing Thus, the prosecution must establish with certainty the nature, extent,
evidence. When successful, the otherwise felonious deed would be excused, depth, and severity of the victim's wounds. While Dr. Belleza testified that "head
mainly predicated on the lack of criminal intent of the accused. 4 ADCETI
injuries are always very serious," 12 he could not categorically say that Rufino's
In homicide, whether consummated, frustrated, or attempted, self- wounds in this case were "fatal." Thus:
defense requires (1) that the person whom the offender killed or injured Q: Doctor, all the injuries in the head are fatal?
committed unlawful aggression; (2) that the offender employed means that is
reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) that A: No, all traumatic injuries are potentially treated.
the person defending himself did not act with sufficient provocation. 5
Q: But in the case of the victim when you treated him the wounds
If the victim did not commit unlawful aggression against the accused, actually are not fatal on that very day?
the latter has nothing to prevent or repel and the other two requisites of self-
defense would have no basis for being appreciated. Unlawful aggression A: I could not say, with the treatment we did, prevent from becoming
fatal. But on that case the patient preferred to go home at
contemplates an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or an imminent danger
that time.
of such attack. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not enough. The
victim must attack the accused with actual physical force or with a weapon. 6 Q: The findings also indicated in the medical certificate only refers
to the length of the wound not the depth of the wound?
Here, the lower courts found that Arnel failed to prove the element of
unlawful aggression. He alone testified that Jesus and Ananias rained fist blows A: When you say lacerated wound, the entire length of the layer of
on him and that Rufino and Ananias tried to stab him. No one corroborated scalp.
Arnel's testimony that it was Rufino who started it. Arnel's only other witness,
Diomedes, merely testified that he saw those involved having a heated argument Q: So you could not find out any abrasion?
in the middle of the street. Arnel did not submit any medical certificate to prove
A: It is different laceration and abrasion so once the skin is broken
his point that he suffered injuries in the hands of Rufino and his companions. 7 up the label of the frontal lo[b]e, we always call it lacerated
In contrast, the three witnesses Jesus, Paciano, and Ananias wound, but in that kind of wound, we did not measure the
depth. 13
testified that Arnel was the aggressor. Although their versions were mottled with
ADCTac
inconsistencies, these do not detract from their core story. The witnesses were Indeed, Rufino had two lacerations on his forehead but there was no indication that
one in what Arnel did and when and how he did it. Compared to Arnel's his skull incurred fracture or that he bled internally as a result of the pounding of his
testimony, the prosecution's version is more believable and consistent with head. The wounds were not so deep, they merely required suturing, and were
reality, hence deserving credence. 8 estimated to heal in seven or eight days. Dr. Belleza further testified:
Two. But given that Arnel, the accused, was indeed the aggressor,
Q: So, in the medical certificate the wounds will not require
would he be liable for frustrated homicide when the wounds he inflicted on surgery?
Rufino, his victim, were not fatal and could not have resulted in death as in fact it
did not? A: Yes, Madam.
The main element of attempted or frustrated homicide is the accused's Q: The injuries are slight?
intent to take his victim's life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and
convincingly to exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal intent. 9 And A: 7 to 8 days long, what we are looking is not much, we give
the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other things, the means the antibiotics and antit[e]tanus the problem the contusion
offender used and the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his that occurred in the brain.
victim. 10cEaCAH
2
Q: For how many days did he stay in the hospital? conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to
the trial court's judgment even if this has been found in error. And, worse,
A: Head injury at least be observed within 24 hours, but some of
Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial court's erroneous judgment with
them would rather go home and then come back.
the forfeiture of his right to apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang
Q: So the patient did not stay 24 hours in the hospital? hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is
justice there? AEDCHc
But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted certainly could not have both appeal and probation.
homicide and holds that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be
The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an
lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two
accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of
years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum. With this new
probation. This requirement "outlaws the element of speculation on the part of
penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon
the accused to wager on the result of his appeal that when his conviction is
remand of the case to the RTC.
finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service
Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere of his sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an 'escape hatch' thus
privilege granted by the state only to qualified convicted offenders. Section 4 of rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction." 17
theprobation law (PD 968) provides: "That no application for probation shall be
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the
allowed him to apply for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and
judgment of conviction." 15 Since Arnel appealed his conviction for frustrated
probation. He was not in a position to say, "By taking this appeal, I choose not to
homicide, he should be deemed permanently disqualified from applying for
apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied
probation.
him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation
But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is under this Court's greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling
not that Arnel has the right to such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he inFrancisco. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction,
has is the right to apply for that privilege. The Court finds that his maximum jail when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that
term should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the Court allows him to apply for privilege.
probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide
Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of
whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into account the full
the penalty imposed on him. He claimed that the evidence at best warranted his
circumstances of his case.
conviction only for attempted, not frustrated, homicide, which crime called for a
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who probationable penalty. In a way, therefore, Arnel sought from the beginning to
appeals "from the judgment of conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of bring down the penalty to the level where the law would allow him to apply for
the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have probation.
been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional
In a real sense, the Court's finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated
trial court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the
homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the
Supreme Court.
first time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion's hard position, it from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed
will apply the probation law on Arnel based on the trial court's annulled judgment on him the right penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would have
against him. He will not be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation. aTEADI
that such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Court's judgment of
3
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to
probation through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of
liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and
stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. 18 As Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law must not be
regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only where it clearly
appears he comes within its letter; to do so would be to disregard the teaching in
many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the accused not
because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose. 19
One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing
Arnel to apply for probation after he appealed from the trial court's judgment of
conviction would not be consistent with the provision of Section 2 that
the probation law should be interpreted to "provide an opportunity for the
reformation of a penitent offender." An accused like Arnel who appeals from a
judgment convicting him, it is claimed, shows no penitence.
This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment
of conviction. Here, however, it convicted Arnel of the wrong crime, frustrated
homicide, that carried a penalty in excess of 6 years. How can the Court expect
him to feel penitent over a crime, which as the Court now finds, he did not
commit? He only committed attempted homicide with its maximum penalty of 2
years and 4 months.
Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under
the reduced penalty, it would be sending him straight behind bars. It would be
robbing him of the chance to instead undergo reformation as a penitent offender,
defeating the very purpose of the probation law.
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and
imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two years and four months maximum, he
would have had the right to apply for probation. No one could say with certainty
that he would have availed himself of the right had the RTC done right by him.
The idea may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got
was not probationable.
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny
Arnel the right to apply for probation when the new penalty that the Court
imposes on him is, unlike the one erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject
to probation?
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the
petition, MODIFIES the Decision dated July 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR 29639, FINDSpetitioner Arnel Colinares GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of attempted homicide, and SENTENCES him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty from four months ofarresto mayor, as minimum, to two
years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay Rufino P.
Buena the amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages, without prejudice to
petitioner applying for probation within 15 days from notice that the record of the
case has been remanded for execution to the Regional Trial Court of San Jose,
Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213. HSEcTC
SO ORDERED.
||| (Colinares v. People, G.R. No. 182748, [December 13, 2011], 678 PHIL 482-512)