Chapter One

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

TOPICS PER SYLLABUS
I.
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
A. Constitutional Provisions

1. Article II, Secs. 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 18, 20.

2. Article III, Secs. 1, 4, 7, 8, 10, 16, 18(2) .
3. Article XIII, Secs. 1, 2, 3, 13, 14.

A.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
I.
ARTICLE II
OF THE CONSTITUTION
1. TWO DIVISIONS OF ARTICLE II.
Article II is divided into two (2) sections, namely: (a) Principles,1 and (b) State Policies.2 All the seven (7)
sections cited in the Syllabus fall under State Policies, the provisions of which are quoted below.
ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
STATE POLICIES
Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure
the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty
through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a
rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.
Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development.
Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights.
Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and
shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-
being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their
involvement in public and civic affairs.
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall
protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector,
encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.
2. ARTICLE II, NOT A SELF-EXECUTING PROVISION.
 By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of principles and state policies. These
provisions are not intended to be self-executing tenets ready for enforcement through the courts. 3 They are used by
the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its
enactment of laws. The disregard of these provisions cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not
embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation. 4 These broad constitutional
principles need legislative enactments to implement them. 5
The reasons for denying a cause of action based on alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles
are sourced from basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade into the uncharted
ocean of social and economic policy-making. 6
3. DISCUSSION OF SELECTED SIGNIFICANT PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE II.
Since most of the provisions under this topic are self-explanatory, only certain provisions will be discussed
herein by reason of their constitutional significance and relevance to labor cases and situations.
a. Section 10 (Social Justice) .
The case of Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, 7 pronounces that equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the
Constitution. The Preamble proclaims equality as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities in
Philippine society. The command to promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, in all phases of national
development, further expounded in Article XIII,8 are clear commands to the State to take affirmative action in the
direction of greater equality. There is thus in the Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for a more
vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of equality.
Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to marginalized
groups of society, including labor. Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate
the interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less privilege in life should have more
in law. And the obligation to afford protection to labor is incumbent not only on the legislative and executive
branches but also on the judiciary to translate this pledge into a living reality. Social justice calls for the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice, in its rational
and objectively secular conception, may at least be approximated. 9
b. Section 18 (Protection-to-Labor Clause) .
Among the provisions afore-quoted, it is Section 18 which is often cited in labor cases. Along with Section
3 of Article XIII, infra, it is often referred to as the protection-to-labor clause in the Constitution. It is often invoked
in resolving doubts or ambiguities in the interpretation of the law, employment contracts, collective bargaining
agreements and appreciation of evidence. The constitutional tenet embodied in this provision is the basis for the
following provisions in the law:
(1) Article 1702of the Civil Code which provides that all labor legislation and labor contracts should be
construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer; and
(2) Article 4of the Labor Code which states that all doubts should be resolved in favor of labor. 10
Thus, when conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice, the
heavier influence of the latter should be counter-balanced by sympathy and compassion the law must accord the
underprivileged worker.11 In interpreting the protection to labor and social justice provisions of the Constitution and
the labor laws or rules and regulations implementing the constitutional mandates, the liberal approach which favors
the exercise of labor rights should always be adopted. 12
The same provision is the constitutional touchstone for the States discharge of its avowed duty of
protecting and promoting the exercise of all the rights granted to workers, such as the right to full employment and
equality of employment opportunities, self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, strike and other
peaceful concerted activities, security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage, including the right
to participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by
law.13
c. Section 18, not meant to oppress employers.
 The constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to oppress
employers. The commitment of the Court to the cause of labor does not prevent it from sustaining the employer
when it is in the right. Certainly, an employer should not be compelled to pay employees for work not actually
performed and in fact abandoned.14
The employer should not be compelled to continue employing a person who is admittedly guilty of
misfeasance or malfeasance and whose continued employment is patently inimical to the employer. The law
protecting the rights of the laborer authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.15
II.
ARTICLE III
OF THE CONSTITUTION
1. SEVEN (7) RELEVANT SECTIONS.
Out of the total of 22 Sections in Article III, only seven (7) are mentioned in the Syllabus, thus:
ARTICLE III
BILL OF RIGHTS
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression,
or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used
as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law. 16
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to
law shall not be abridged.
Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
Section 18. xxx (2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a
punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
Except for Section 1, all the others have relevance and applicability to labor law. Notably, Section 1 has
been declared not the proper basis for the invocation of due process in plant-level termination of employment; nor is
the equal protection clause therein embodied applicable thereto.
(NOTE: See discussion below on this topic entitled V. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS NOT
APPLICABLE TO LABOR CASES)

2. DISCUSSION OF SELECTED SIGNIFICANT PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE III.

a. Section 4 (Freedom of Speech, of Expression and of the Press and Peaceably to Assemble and
Petition the Government for Redress of Grievances) .
This provision is the constitutional basis for the exercise of the right to picket provided in the Labor Code,17
as distinguished from its twin right to strike which finds its constitutional mooring in another provision thereof,
particularly, Section 3 of Article XIII. Broadly speaking, the right to picket is part of the right guaranteed under the
law to engage in concerted activities for purposes of collective bargaining for their mutual benefit and protection 18
but it is principally guaranteed under the freedom of speech principle in the Constitution. 19
 To strike is to withhold or to stop work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or
labor dispute. The work stoppage may be accompanied by picketing by the striking employees outside of the
company compound. While a strike focuses on stoppage of work, picketing focuses on publicizing the labor dispute
and its incidents to inform the public of what is happening in the company struck against. A picket simply means
the marching to and fro in front of the employers premises, usually accompanied by the display of placards and
other signs making known the facts involved in a labor dispute. It is a strike activity separate and different from the
actual stoppage of work.
According to the 2010 case of Phimco Industries, Inc. v. Phimco Industries Labor Association (PILA)
,20 while the right of employees to publicize their dispute falls within the protection of freedom of expression and the
right to peaceably assemble to air grievances, these rights are by no means absolute. Protected picketing does not
extend to blocking ingress to (entrance) and egress from (exit) the company premises. That the picket was moving,
was peaceful and was not attended by actual violence may not free it from taints of illegality if the picket effectively
blocked entry to and exit from the company premises.
b. Section 8 (Right to Organize Unions) .
This provision is the constitutional basis for the exercise of the right to self-organization by workers in both
public21 and private22 sectors. To breathe life to this constitutional tenet, the Labor Code:
(1) protects the right of workers to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of
their own choosing.23
(2) declares as a policy of the State the fostering of a free and voluntary organization of a strong and
united labor movement.24
(3) declares that it shall be unlawful for any person to restrain, coerce, discriminate against or unduly
interfere with employees and workers in their exercise of the right to self-organization, which includes
the right to form, join, or assist labor organizations for the purpose of collective bargaining through
representatives of their own choosing and to engage in lawful concerted activities for the same purpose
or for their mutual aid and protection.25
c. Section 10 (Non-Impairment of Obligation of Contracts) .
A law authorizing interference, when appropriate, in the contractual relations between or among parties is
deemed read into the contract and its implementation cannot successfully be resisted by force of the non-impairment
guarantee. There is, in that instance, no impingement of the non-impairment clause.26
The purpose of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution is to safeguard the integrity of contracts
against unwarranted interference by the State. As a rule, contracts should not be tampered with by subsequent laws
that would change or modify the rights and obligations of the parties. 27 Impairment is anything that diminishes the
efficacy of the contract. There is an impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the
parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the
rights of the parties.28 The non-impairment clause is limited in application to laws that derogate from prioracts or
contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties. 29 Necessarily, the
constitutional proscription would not apply to laws already in effect at the time of contract execution. 30
Anucension v. National Labor Union. 31 - R.A. No. 335032 exempts members of any religious sects, which
prohibit affiliation of their members in any labor organization, from being covered by a union security clause. The
union contends that R.A. No. 3350 is unconstitutional for impairing the obligation of its contract, specifically, the
union security clause embodied in its Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with the company, by virtue of
which membership in the union was required as a condition for employment for all permanent employees and
workers. This agreement was already in existence at the time R.A. No. 3350 was enacted on June 18, 1961, and it
cannot, therefore, be deemed to have been incorporated into the agreement. But by reason of this amendment,
Anucension as well as others similarly situated, could no longer be dismissed from his job even if he should cease to
be a member, or disaffiliate from the union, and the company could continue employing him notwithstanding his
disaffiliation from the union. The Act, therefore, introduced a change into the express terms of the union security
clause; the company was partly absolved by law from the contractual obligation it had with the union of employing
only union members in permanent positions. It cannot be denied, therefore, that there was indeed an impairment of
said union security clause.
 The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not absolute
and unqualified. In spite of the constitutional prohibition, the State continues to possess authority to safeguard the
vital interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to safeguard said interest may modify or abrogate contracts
already in effect. Otherwise, important and valuable reforms may be precluded by the simple device of entering into
contracts for the purpose of doing that which otherwise may be prohibited. It follows that not all legislations which
have the effect of impairing a contract are obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition as to impairment, and a statute
passed in the legitimate exercise of police power, although it incidentally destroys existing contractual rights, must
be upheld by the courts. This has special application to contracts regulating relations between capital and labor
which are not merely ordinary but impressed with public interest and therefore must yield to the common good.
What then was the purpose sought to be achieved by R.A. No. 3350? Its purpose was to insure freedom of
belief and religion, and to promote the general welfare by preventing discrimination against those members of
religious sects which prohibit their members from joining labor unions, confirming thereby their natural, statutory
and constitutional right to work. It cannot be gainsaid that said purpose is legitimate. It may not be amiss to point out
here that the free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter
must, therefore, yield to the former.
In another case where this issue was raised, Abella v. NLRC, 33 petitioner leased a farm land for a period
of ten (10) years, renewable, at her option, for another ten (10) years. During the existence of the lease, she
employed herein private respondents. Upon the expiration of her leasehold rights, petitioner dismissed private
respondents and turned over the hacienda to its owners who continued the management, cultivation and operation of
the farm. In the illegal dismissal case filed by private respondents, petitioner claims that she is not liable to pay
separation pay because the basis for the award thereof is Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 which was enacted only on
August 21, 1981, amending Article 283 of the Labor Code which grants separation pay in case of closure of business
operations. Petitioner contends that this amendatory law violates the constitutional guarantee against impairment of
obligations and contracts because when she leased the hacienda on June 27, 1960, neither she nor the lessor
contemplated the creation of the obligation to pay separation pay to workers at the end of the lease. In debunking
this posture of petitioner, the Supreme Court cited the above case of Anucension34 where this issue has been laid to
rest. The purpose of Article 283, as amended, is obvious - the protection of the workers whose employment is
terminated because of the closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. Without said law, employees like
private respondents in the case at bar will lose the benefits to which they are entitled - for the thirty-three years of
service in the case of Dionele and fourteen years in the case of Quitco. Although they were absorbed by the new
management of the hacienda, in the absence of any showing that the latter has assumed the responsibilities of the
former employer, they will be considered as new employees and the years of service behind them would amount to
nothing. Moreover, to come under the constitutional prohibition, the law must effect a change in the rights of the
parties with reference to each other and not with reference to non-parties. As correctly observed by the Solicitor
General, Article 283 as amended refers to employment benefits to farm hands who were not parties to petitioner's
lease contract with the owner of the hacienda. That contract cannot have the effect of annulling subsequent
legislation designed to protect the interest of the working class.

As held in the 2009 en banc case of Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. :35

The prohibition [against impairment of the obligation of contracts] is aligned with the
general principle that laws newly enacted have only a prospective operation,36 and cannot
affect acts or contracts already perfected;37 however, as to laws already in existence, their
provisions are read into contracts and deemed a part thereof. 38 Thus, the non-impairment
clause under Section 10, Article III [of the Constitution] is limited in application to laws
about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts by
enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties thereto.39
Thus, in this case, the enactment in 1995 of R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 preceded the execution of the employment contract between petitioner and
respondents in 1998. Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A. No. 8042, particularly the subject clause, 40 impaired the
employment contract of the parties. Rather, when the parties executed their 1998 employment contract, they were
deemed to have incorporated into it all the provisions of R.A. No. 8042.
Police Power vs. Non-Impairment Clause.
 It must be borne in mind that police power is superior to the non-impairment clause.41 The constitutional
guarantee of non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of
public health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the community. 42
Thus, in the same en banc case of Serrano,43 it was further held that even if the Court were to disregard the
timeline when the law was enacted vis--vis the contract, the subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on
the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of
the State to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with
the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed.44
Police power legislations adopted by the State to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety,
and general welfare of the people are generally applicable not only to future contracts but even to those already in
existence, for all private contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to promote
public welfare.45
The Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. v. POEA,46 illustrates this point. The POEA
issuances47 were assailed, inter alia, as being violative of the non-impairment clause in the Constitution as they were
made applicable to any Filipino seafarer already on-board any vessel. In upholding their validity, the Supreme Court
pronounced that the constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is not absolute and is not to
be read with literal exactness. It is restricted to contracts with respect to property or some object of value and which
confer rights that may be asserted in a court of justice; it has no application to statutes relating to public subjects
within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State and involving the public rights and public welfare of
the entire community affected by it. It does not prevent the proper exercise by the State of its police power by
enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals, comfort, or general welfare of the
community, even though contracts may thereby be affected, for such matters cannot be placed by contract beyond
the power of the State to regulate and control. Thus:
Verily, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power
of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such
regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general, well-being of the community
may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity.
And under the Civil Code,48 contracts of labor are explicitly subject to the police power of the State
because they are not ordinary contracts but are impressed with public interest. The challenged resolution
and memorandum circular being valid implementations of E.O. No. 797, 49 which was enacted under the
police power of the State, they cannot be struck down on the ground that they violate the contract clause.
To hold otherwise is to alter long-established constitutional doctrine and to subordinate the police power
to the contract clause.
The stipulations in the contract must be valid.
While the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may
deem convenient, such stipulations should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy.50
Maynilad Water Supervisors Association v. Maynilad Water Services, Inc. 51 - The agreement or
contract between the parties is the formal expression of the parties rights, duties and obligations. It is the best
evidence of the intention of the parties. Thus, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced in writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement between the parties and their successors-in-interest. Time and again, the rule has
been stressed that a contract is the law between the parties, and courts have no choice but to enforce such contract so
long as it is not contrary to law, morals, good customs or public policy. Otherwise, courts would be interfering with
the freedom of contract of the parties. Simply put, courts cannot stipulate for the parties or amend the latters
agreement, for to do so would be to alter the real intention of the contracting parties when the primary function of
courts is to give force and effect to the intention of the parties. 52
d. Section 16 (Speedy Labor Justice) .
Speedy disposition of cases or speedy labor justice is a relative term and a flexible concept. It is
consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances of each case. What the Constitution prohibits are
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.53
Speedy labor justice, in terms of period, is provided under Article 277(i) of the Labor Code, thus:
 (i) To ensure speedy labor justice, the periods provided in this Code within which
decisions or resolutions of labor relations cases or matters should be rendered shall be
mandatory. For this purpose, a case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading or memorandum required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself, or the Labor Arbiter, or the Director of the Bureau of
Labor Relations or Med-Arbiter, or the Regional Director.
In the determination of whether or not the right to a speedy trial has been violated, certain factors may be
considered and balanced against each other. These are the length of delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right
or failure to assert it, and prejudice caused by the delay. The same factors may also be considered in answering the
judicial inquiry as to whether or not a person officially charged with the administration of justice has violated the
speedy disposition of cases.54
While the speedy disposition of labor cases may be the policy of the law, it must be emphasized that speed
alone is not the chief objective of a trial. It is the careful and deliberate consideration for the administration of
justice, a genuine respect for the rights of all parties and the requirements of procedural due process, and an
adherence to the principle that the disposition of cases should always be predicated on the consideration that more
than the mere convenience of the courts and of the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness would be
served. These are more important than a race to end the trial. 55
e. Section 18[2] (Involuntary Servitude) .
Involuntary servitudeis every condition of enforced or compulsory service of one to another, no matter
under what form such servitude may be disguised.56 The 1987 Constitution categorically prohibits involuntary
servitude.57 It is on the basis of this constitutional precept that employees are granted the right to terminate their
employment relationship with their employers under Article 28558 of the Labor Code. This article recognizes the
equality of the parties to an employment relationship. Thus, an employee may resign from employment at any time
he wishes and with or without just cause, subject only to certain minimum conditions imposed by law. 59
Bank of the Philippine islands v. BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter-Federation of Unions in BPI
Unibank,60 involves the merger of BPI with FEBTC, where the Voluntary Arbitrator ruled that, in accordance with
Section 80 of the Corporation Code, the employees of FEBTC form part of the assets and liabilities transferred to
the surviving bank, petitioner BPI, by virtue of the merger. The Supreme Court, however, did not agree to this
postulation. In legal parlance, human beings are never embraced in the term assets and liabilities. It is contrary to
public policy to declare the former FEBTC employees as forming part of the assets or liabilities of FEBTC that were
transferred and absorbed by BPI in the Articles of Merger. Assets and liabilities, in this instance, should be deemed
to refer only to property rights and obligations of FEBTC and do not include the employment contracts of its
personnel. A corporation cannot unilaterally transfer its employees to another employer like chattel. Certainly, if
BPI as an employer had the right to choose who to retain among FEBTCs employees, FEBTC employees had the
concomitant right to choose not to be absorbed by BPI. Even though FEBTC employees had no choice or control
over the merger of their employer with BPI, they had a choice whether or not they would allow themselves to be
absorbed by BPI. Certainly nothing prevented the FEBTCs employees from resigning or retiring and seeking
employment elsewhere instead of going along with the proposed absorption. Employment is a personal consensual
contract and absorption by BPI of a former FEBTC employee without the consent of the employee is in violation of
an individuals freedom to contract. It would have been a different matter if there was an express provision in the
Articles of Merger that as a condition for the merger, BPI was being required to assume all the employment
contracts of all existing FEBTC employees with the conformity of the employees. In the absence of such a provision
in the Articles of Merger, then BPI clearly had the business management decision as to whether or not to employ
FEBTCs employees. FEBTC employees likewise retained the prerogative to allow themselves to be absorbed or
not; otherwise, that would be tantamount to involuntary servitude.
Compulsory fulfillment of military or civic duty.
Article 28661 of the Labor Code which provides for compulsory fulfillment of military or civic duty, may
well be considered as the exception to this constitutional proscription. This is so because the constitutional
prohibition should be subordinated to the right of the government to call upon its citizens to protect their State as
provided under Section 4, Article II of the Constitution. The survival of the State is the paramount justification for
such involuntary servitude.
 III.
ARTICLE XIII
OF THE CONSTITUTION
1. FIVE (5) SECTIONS OF ARTICLE XIII.
Article XIII embodies 19 Sections but only five (5) are included in the Syllabus, to wit:
ARTICLE XIII
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures
that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and
disposition of property and its increments.
Section 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create
economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
LABOR
Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to
strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane
conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by
law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and
employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including
conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial
peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing
the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises
to reasonable returns to investments, and to expansion and growth.
WOMEN
Section 14. The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful
working conditions, taking into account their maternal functions, and such facilities
and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full
potential in the service of the nation.
2. DISCUSSION OF SELECTED SIGNIFICANT PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE XIII.
a. Section 1 (Human Dignity, Inequality and Discrimination) .
This provision speaks of the constitutionally enshrined abhorrence to inequality and discrimination for
which Congress is mandated to prevent by enacting laws that enhance the right of all people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, and political inequalities. "
International School Alliance of Educators [ISAE] v. Quisumbing, 62 illuminates on this principle. The
Supreme Court declared In this case that the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify
the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires is an invalid classification. There is no reasonable
distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of according
higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of the Court.
In so holding, the Court cited Section 1 of Article XIII that public policy abhors inequality and discrimination. Our
Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. Thus, the Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice
and Human Rights, exhorts Congress to give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance
the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities. Moreover, the very
broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
b. Section 3 (Protection-to-Labor Clause) .
The most important provision among the 5 sections above is Section 3 of Article XIII which, along with
Section 18 of Article II, is the principal protection-to-labor clause in the Constitution. The underlined keywords are
worthy to be taken note of considering that they reflect the rights and principles that encompass almost all of the
provisions of the Labor Code and other related laws.
Section 3, Article XIII, not self-executing/actuating nor judicially enforceable.
While all the provisions of the 1987 Constitution are presumed self-executing,63 there are some which the
Court has declared not judicially enforceable, Article XIII being one, 64 particularly Section 3 thereof, the nature of
which the Court, in Agabon v. NLRC, 65 has described to be not self-actuating:
Thus, the constitutional mandates of protection to labor and security of tenure may be deemed as
self-executing in the sense that these are automatically acknowledged and observed without need for
any enabling legislation. However, to declare that the constitutional provisions are enough to guarantee
the full exercise of the rights embodied therein, and the realization of ideals therein expressed, would
be impractical, if not unrealistic. The espousal of such view presents the dangerous tendency of being
overbroad and exaggerated. The guarantees of full protection to labor and security of tenure, when
examined in isolation, are facially unqualified, and the broadest interpretation possible suggests a
blanket shield in favor of labor against any form of removal regardless of circumstance. This
interpretation implies an unimpeachable right to continued employment - a utopian notion, doubtless -
but still hardly within the contemplation of the framers. Subsequent legislation is still needed to define
the parameters of these guaranteed rights to ensure the protection and promotion, not only the rights of
the labor sector, but of the employers' as well. Without specific and pertinent legislation, judicial bodies
will be at a loss, formulating their own conclusion to approximate at least the aims of the Constitution.
Ultimately, therefore, Section 3 of Article XIII cannot, on its own, be a source of a positive
enforceable right to stave off the dismissal of an employee for just cause owing to the failure to serve
proper notice or hearing. As manifested by several framers of the 1987 Constitution, the provisions on
social justice require legislative enactments for their enforceability. 66
Thus, Section 3, Article XIII cannot be treated as a principal source of direct enforceable rights, for the
violation of which the questioned clause may be declared unconstitutional. It may unwittingly risk opening the
floodgates of litigation to every worker or union over every conceivable violation of so broad a concept as social
justice for labor.67 Section 3, Article XIII merely clothes it with the status of a sector for whom the Constitution
urges protection through executive or legislative action and judicial recognition. Its utility is best limited to being
an impetus not just for the executive and legislative departments, but for the judiciary as well, to protect the
welfare of the working class. 68
Interpretation of some principles.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital,
inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.69 Section 3, Article XIII of the
Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work. " These conditions are not
restricted to the physical workplace - the factory, the office or the field - but include as well the manner by which
employers treat their employees.70
The same provision of the Constitution also directs the State to promote equality of employment
opportunities for all. Similarly, the Labor Code 71 provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed. " It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State,
in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to
unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment. 72
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, for
example, prohibits and penalizes73 the payment of lesser compensation to a female employee as against a male
employee for work of equal value. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate
in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
 Last paragraph of Section 3, Article XIII as basis.
It bears noting that unlike all the rights granted thereunder, the last paragraph 74 of Section 3 of Article
XIII has not been implemented by any provision in the Labor Code or in any other laws. It was, however, cited in
the 2013 case of Asia Brewery, Inc. v. Tunay na Pagkakaisa ng mga Manggagawa sa Asia (TPMA) , 75 in
declaring that the DOLE Secretary has gravely abused her discretion when she relied on the unaudited financial
statements of petitioner corporation in determining the wage award because such evidence is self-serving and
inadmissible. Not only did this violate the December 19, 2003 Order of the DOLE Secretary herself to petitioner
corporation to submit its complete audited financial statements, but this may have resulted to a wage award that is
based on an inaccurate and biased picture of petitioner corporation's capacity to pay - one of the more significant
factors in making a wage award. Petitioner corporation has offered no reason why it failed and/or refused to
submit its audited financial statements for the past five years relevant to this case. This only further casts doubt as
to the veracity and accuracy of the unaudited financial statements it submitted to the DOLE Secretary. Verily, this
procedure cannot be countenanced because this could unduly deprive labor of its right to a just share in the
fruits of production76 and provide employers with a means to understate their profitability in order to defeat the
right of labor to a just wage.
b. Section 14 (Protection of Women) .
Theprovision of Section 14 of Article XIII which mandates that the State should accord recognition to the
protection of working women, is also non self-executory like the other provisions in the Constitution as pronounced
in a number of cases.77 It is a mere statement of principles and policies. As such, it is a mere directive addressed to
the executive and the legislative departments. If unheeded, the remedy will not lie with the courts; but rather, the
electorates displeasure may be manifested in their votes. 78
IV.
EXAMPLE OF A LAW WHICH VIOLATES
SEVERAL CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
1. THE SERRANO CASE WHERE THE PROVISION OF THE 5 PARAGRAPH, SECTION 10 OF R.A.
TH

NO. 8042 WAS DECLARED VIOLATIVE OF SEVERAL CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATES.

Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. ,79 is illustrative of a case where a single provision of law has
been declared violative of several provisions of the Constitution. Here, the following underlined clause of the 5 th

paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 has been declared unconstitutional for transgressing three (3) provisions
of the Constitution, to wit: (1) Section 1, Article III; (2) Section 18, Article II; and (3) Section 3, Article XIII, in
relation to labor as a protected sector:
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as
defined by law or contract, or any unauthorized deductions from the migrant worker's salary, the
worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee and the deductions made with
interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever
is less.
Petitioner worked as Second Officer for respondent recruitment agency and its foreign principal, Marlow
Navigation Co. , Ltd. (herein respondents) , under a POEA-approved Contract of Employment with a fixed term of
12 months. At the time of his repatriation, he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract,
leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days. Petitioners dismissal was declared
illegal and he was awarded, under the rule then prevailing, US$8,770.00, representing his salary for three (3) months
of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of employment, his contract being for one year, in accordance with
the afore-quoted provision of R.A. No. 8042. Petitioner claims that he is entitled to all his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his contract and not just to 3 months of the unexpired portion thereof. He further questioned the
constitutionality of said clause in Section 10 contending, inter alia, that:
(1) it unduly impairs the freedom of OFWs to negotiate for and stipulate in their overseas employment contracts
a determinate employment period and a fixed salary package;
(2) It impinges on the equal protection clause, for it treats OFWs differently from local Filipino workers (local
workers) by putting a cap on the amount of lump-sum salary to which OFWs are entitled in case of illegal
 dismissal, while setting no limit to the same monetary award for local workers when their dismissal is
declared illegal;
(3) The disparate treatment is not reasonable as there is no substantial distinction between the two groups; and
that it defeats Section 18, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees the protection of the rights and
welfare of all Filipino workers, whether deployed locally or overseas.
In upholding petitioner, the Supreme Court cited the following ratiocinations:
(1) The subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at three levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs with employment contracts
of one year or more; Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and Third,
OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment.
On the first, the illegally dismissed OFW with employment contract of less than one year will be paid all
his salaries for the unexpired portion thereof; while the OFW with employment contract of at least one
year (like that of herein petitioner) or more will only be awarded whichever is less between three months
salary for every year of the unexpired term or the salary for the unexpired portion thereof.
On the second, the subject clause creates a sub-layer of discrimination among OFWs whose contract
periods are for more than one year: those who are illegally dismissed with less than one year left in their
contracts shall be entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion thereof, while those who are
illegally dismissed with one year or more remaining in their contracts shall be covered by the subject
clause, and their monetary benefits limited to their salaries for three months only.
On the third,prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who were
illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of their money claims; they were
uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the
enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with
an unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment contract have since been differently treated
in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local
workers with fixed-term employment.
(2) The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of
the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on
the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims
of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one
classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.
There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the Constitution, the Court,
after subjecting the classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, has determined that there is no compelling
state interest80 that the subject clause may possibly serve. In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its
burden of proving the existence of a compelling state interest that would justify the perpetuation of the
discrimination against OFWs under the subject clause. Thus, the subject clause is violative of the right of
petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.
(3) The declaration of the unconstitutionality of the subject clause cannot be approached from the lone
perspective that the clause directly violates state policy on labor under Section 3, Article XIII of the
Constitution. This is so because this provision is not self-executing. Article XIII should be applied in
conjunction with the equal protection clause. Article XIII, by itself, without the application of the equal
protection clause, has no life or force of its own.
(4) The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that precise
reason that the clause violates not just petitioner's right to equal protection, but also his right to substantive
due process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, for it deprives him of property, consisting of
monetary benefits, without any existing valid governmental purpose.
V.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
NOT APPLICABLE TO LABOR CASES
1. INAPPLICABILITY PER JURISPRUDENCE.
Certain constitutional rights and precepts may NOT be invoked in labor cases, particularly in company-
level administrative investigations leading to the termination of employment because they can only be asserted
against the government or the state but not against a private party like an employer. More particularly, the following
rights, per well-entrenched jurisprudence, generally find no application in company-level administrative proceedings
by the employer against an erring employee:
(a) Right to due process;
(b) Right to equal protection of the laws;
(c) Right against self-incrimination;
(d) Right to counsel and to remain silent; and
(e) Right against unreasonable searches and seizures and to privacy of communication and
correspondence.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS.
a. The Serrano case.
In the en banc decision in the 2000 case of Serrano v. NLRC, 81 the Supreme Court distinguished denial of
due process by the State and denial of due process by the employer. It thus concluded that the violation by the
employer of the notice requirement cannot be considered a denial of due process as would result in the nullity of the
employees dismissal or layoff. The following reasons were cited:
1. The Due Process Clause of the Constitution is a limitation on governmental powers. It does not apply to
the exercise of private power, such as the termination of employment under the Labor Code.
2. The notice and hearing required under the Due Process Clause applies before the powers of organized
society are brought to bear upon the individual. This is obviously not the case of termination of
employment under Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code because the employee is not faced with an
aspect of the adversary system. The purpose for the requirement of notice and hearing is not to comply
with the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. The time for notice and hearing is at the trial stage.
Then that is the time we speak of notice and hearing as the essence of procedural due process. Thus,
compliance by the employer with the notice requirement before he dismisses an employee does not
foreclose the right of the latter to question the legality of his dismissal.
3. The notice requirement under Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code cannot be considered a
requirement of the Due Process Clause since the employer cannot really be expected to be entirely an
impartial judge of his own cause.
b. The Agabon case.
In the en banc decision in the 2004 case of Agabon v. NLRC,82 the Supreme Court further expounded on
the doctrine laid down in Serrano by making a distinction between constitutional due process and statutory due
process. Thus:
Constitutional due process protects the individual from the government and
assures him of his rights in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; while statutory
due process found in the Labor Code and Implementing Rules protects employees from
being unjustly terminated without just cause after notice and hearing.
Resultantly, where there is just cause for dismissal but due process has not been observed properly by an
employer, it would not be right to order either the reinstatement of the dismissed employee or the payment of
backwages to him. In failing, however, to comply with the procedure prescribed by law (Article 277[b] of the Labor
Code) in terminating the services of the employee, the employer must be deemed to have opted or, in any case,
should be made liable, for the payment of separation pay. It might be pointed out that the notice to be given and the
hearing to be conducted generally constitute the two-part due process requirement of law to be accorded to the
employee by the employer. Nevertheless, peculiar circumstances might obtain in certain situations where to
undertake the above steps would be no more than a useless formality and where, accordingly, it would not be
imprudent to apply the res ipsa loquitur rule and award, in lieu of separation pay, nominal damages to the employee.
 c. The Abbott Laboratories case.
A new doctrine on contractual due process, as distinguished from statutory due process, has been
enunciated in the 2013 en banc decision in Abbott Laboratories, Philippines v. Pearlie Ann F. Alcaraz. 83 Thus,
in a situation where there is an existing company policy enunciating the procedural due process that must be
observed in termination of employment, compliance alone with the statutorily-prescribed procedural due process,84
would not suffice. Additionally, there must be compliance too with the company-prescribed due process procedure
or the so-called contractual due process. Otherwise, the same consequence as in Agabon will ensue, that is, the
termination shall be considered legal and valid but for lack of contractual due process, the employer will be
penalized with indemnity in the form of nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.00.
In this case, it was found that respondent Alcaraz,85 who was hired as a probationary managerial employee,
was afforded both substantive and statutory procedural due process, when she was terminated86 for failure to qualify
as a regular employee. Nonetheless, despite the existence of a sufficient ground to terminate Alcarazs employment
and Abbotts compliance with the Labor Code termination procedure, it was found that petitioner Abbott breached
its contractual obligation to Alcaraz when it failed to abide by its own procedure prescribed in its company rules in
evaluating the performance of a probationary employee.
Veritably, a company policy partakes of the nature of an implied contract between the employer and
employee. Hence, given such nature, company personnel policies create an obligation on the part of both the
employee and the employer to abide by the same. While it is Abbotts management prerogative to promulgate its
own company rules and even subsequently amend them, this right equally demands that when it does create its own
policies and thereafter notify its employee of the same, it accords upon itself the obligation to faithfully implement
them. Indeed, a contrary interpretation would entail a disharmonious relationship in the work place for the laborer
should never be mired by the uncertainty of flimsy rules in which the latters labor rights and duties would, to some
extent, depend.
d. The only relevant aspect of Section 1, Article III, to labor cases.
The doctrine that labor is considered a property within the constitutional guarantees remains constant
to this day. Despite the changes in the concept of due process introduced by Serrano and Agabon, the Supreme
Court continues to recognize to this day that labor is property falling within the ambit and protection of the due
process clause in the Constitution.87 In other words, even if it is not the constitutional due process that is violated if
an employee is dismissed sans due process, the legal notion that labor or employment is property under the
Constitution continues to be adhered to and respected. Thus, it was emphasized in Sagales:88 Labor is property, and
as such merits protection. The right to make it available is next in importance to the rights of life and liberty. It lies
to a large extent at the foundation of most other forms of property, and of all solid individual and national
prosperity, and in Polsotin:89 A worker cannot be deprived of his job, a property right, without satisfying the
requirements of due process. As enshrined in our bill of rights, no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law. Most recently, this principle was again reiterated almost verbatim in Opinaldo.90
e. Constitutional due process, when necessary.
Observance of the constitutional due process becomes necessary in proceedings before Labor Arbiters, the
Commission (NLRC) and other labor tribunals. As distinguished from employers company-level due process, the
government is now involved; hence, any deprivation of due process of either party to the labor suit by such labor
officials/tribunals would constitute a violation of the constitutional due process under Section 1 of Article III of the
Constitution.
3. RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
It is a settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause91 are addressed only to the state or
those acting under the color of its authority. The equal protection clause erects no shield against merely private
conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful it may have been.
Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWO v. Glaxo Welcome Philippines, Inc. 92 - The employers
policy prohibiting its employees from any personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies
was held not violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution and not unreasonable under the
circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. Significantly, the
company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply therewith. Indeed, the
application of the said policy was made in an impartial and even-handed manner with due regard for the lot of the
employee. In any event, from the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its employee handbook, it
is clear that the company does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships between its employees and
those of competitor companies. Its employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their own
choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employees and the company
that may arise out of such relationships.
Yrasuegui v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. 93 - Petitioner was dismissed because of his failure to measure up to
the weight standards set by respondent. His termination due to obesity was held legal and not violative of the equal
protection clause in the Constitution. The High Court observed that the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting
the Fourteenth Amendment which is the source of the equal protection guarantee in the 1987 Constitution, is
consistent in saying that the equal protection clause erects no shield against private conduct, however discriminatory
or wrongful it may be. Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal protection guarantee.
4. RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION.
It is enshrined in the Constitution that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. 94
This right against self-incrimination is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under
compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. 95
a. The right gives option of refusal to answer questions but not a prohibition of inquiry.
The precept on the right against self-incrimination has a settled meaning.96 It prescribes an option of
refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry. 97 It simply secures to a witness,
whether he be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e. , one the
answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only when
the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other
time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time
appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required,
take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed to him, the
answer to which may incriminate him for some offense, that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the
constitutional guaranty.98
b. Only an accused in a criminal case and by way of exception, a respondent in an administrative case
that partakes of the nature of, or analogous to, a criminal proceeding can refuse to testify.
But as distinguished from a mere witness, the accused in a criminal case or a respondent in an
administrative case that partakes of the nature of, or analogous to, a criminal proceeding, can refuse to testify
altogether. As held in Rosete v. Lim,99 it is clear that only an accused in a criminal case can refuse to take the
witness stand. The right to refuse to take the stand does not generally apply to parties in administrative cases or
proceedings. The parties thereto can only refuse to answer if incriminating questions are propounded. The
Supreme Court applied the exception a party who is not an accused in a criminal case is allowed not to take the
witness stand in administrative cases/proceedings that partook of the nature of a criminal proceeding or
analogous to a criminal proceeding.100
c. No obligation on the part of the employer to advise respondent employee or a witness of his right
against self-incrimination.
The Constitution101 does not impose on the judge, or other officer presiding over a trial, hearing or
investigation, any affirmative obligation to advise a witness of his right against self-incrimination. It is a right that a
witness knows or should know, in accordance with the well-known axiom that everyone is presumed to know the
law and that ignorance of the law excuses no one. Furthermore, in the very nature of things, neither the judge nor
the witness can be expected to know in advance the character or effect of a question to be put to the latter.102
d. The right should be claimed; otherwise it is deemed waived.
The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed. If
not claimed by, or in behalf of, the witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows that the right may be
waived, expressly or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time.103
5. RIGHTS TO COUNSEL AND TO REMAIN SILENT.
 a. Rights to counsel and to remain silent may be asserted only in custodial interrogation;
Distinguished from right against self-incrimination.
The rights to remain silent and to counsel apply to persons under investigation for the commission of an
offense, i.e. , suspects under investigation by police authorities; and this is what makes these rights different from
the right against self-incrimination which, as aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any person testifying in any
proceeding, civil, criminal, or administrative.104
b. Invocation of right to counsel in an administrative proceeding.
The right to counsel cannot be invoked in an administrative proceeding such as the company-level
investigation conducted for the purpose of determining whether the respondent employee should be dismissed or
not.
This principle has been recognized in Manuel v. N. C. Construction Supply. 105 In this case, petitioners
were positively identified as being involved in a series of thefts at respondent company. They were thus invited to
the Pasig police station for investigation regarding their alleged involvement in the offense. At the police station, it
was not the police but the private respondents counsel who conducted the investigation regarding petitioners'
involvement in the theft. He interrogated the petitioners on their alleged participation in the series of thefts
committed at respondent company. Petitioners initially denied the charge. However, after being positively identified
by a witness, petitioners admitted their guilt and offered to resign in exchange for the withdrawal of any criminal
charge against them. The company lawyer accepted their resignation.
In the illegal dismissal case they filed against private respondents, petitioners argued that their admission
made at the Pasig police station regarding their involvement in the theft as well as their resignation were not
voluntary but were obtained by private respondents lawyer by means of threat and intimidation. They contended
that the admission is inadmissible as evidence against them under Section 12, Article III [Bill of Rights] of the 1987
Constitution. In rejecting this argument and upholding the validity of their dismissal, the Supreme Court emphasized
that the right to counsel under the said constitutional provision is meant to protect a suspect in a criminal case who is
under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who has been taken into
custody by the police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is
that point when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The right to counsel attaches only upon the start
of such investigation.106 Therefore, the exclusionary rule under said provision of the Bill of Rights applies only to
admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.
In the case at bar, the admission was made by petitioners during the course of the investigation conducted
by private respondents' counsel to determine whether there is sufficient ground to terminate their employment.
Petitioners were not under custodial investigation as they were not yet accused by the police of committing a crime.
The investigation was merely an administrative investigation conducted by the employer, not a criminal
investigation. The questions were propounded by the employer's lawyer, not by police officers. The fact that the
investigation was conducted at the police station did not necessarily put petitioners under custodial
investigation as the venue of the investigation was merely incidental. Hence, the admissions made by petitioners
during such investigation may be used as evidence to justify their dismissal.
c. Effect of failure of employer to inform employee of his right to counsel.
But would the failure of the employer to inform the employee who is undergoing administrative
investigation of his right to counsel amount to deprivation of due process?
This was answered in the affirmative in Punzal v. ETSI Technologies, Inc. ,107 where petitioners
contention that she was denied due process was upheld because the records do not show that she was informed of
her right to be represented by counsel during the conference with her employer. The protestations of respondent-
employer that the right to be informed of the right to counsel does not apply to investigations before administrative
bodies and that law and jurisprudence merely give the employee the option to secure the services of counsel in a
hearing or conference, fall in the light of the clear provision of Article 277(b) of the Labor Code that the employer
xxx shall afford [the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated] ample opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself, with the assistance of his representatives, if he so desires, in accordance with company rules and
regulations pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment, and the Supreme Courts
explicit pronouncement that [a]mple opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord
the employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense, including legal representation. Consequently,
the petitioner was awarded nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for violation of her right to statutory due
process.
In the 2011 case of Lopez v. Alturas Group of Companies,108 the NLRC, citing Salaw v. NLRC ,109 held
that petitioner should have been afforded or at least advised of the right to counsel. It thus held that any evaluation
which was based only on the explanation to the show-cause letter and any so-called investigation but without
confrontation of the vital witnesses, do not suffice. In reversing this ruling, the Supreme Court pronounced that:
Parenthetically, the Court finds that it was error for the NLRC to opine that petitioner
should have been afforded counsel or advised of the right to counsel. The right to counsel and
the assistance of one in investigations involving termination cases is neither
indispensable nor mandatory, except when the employee himself requests for one or that
he manifests that he wants a formal hearing on the charges against him. In petitioners
case, there is no showing that he requested for a formal hearing to be conducted or that he
be assisted by counsel. Verily, since he was furnished a second notice informing him of his
dismissal and the grounds therefor, the twin-notice requirement had been complied with to call for
a deletion of the appellate courts award of nominal damages to petitioner. 110
6. RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES AND RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF
COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE.
The question of whether the right against unreasonable searches and seizures 111 and right to privacy of
communication and correspondence112 guaranteed under the Constitution may be invoked by an employee against
his employer has been answered in the case of Waterous Drug Corporation v. NLRC and Antonia Melodia
Catolico. 113 In this case, private respondent Catolico was a pharmacist at petitioner company. She was charged and
investigated for an irregularity involving her and a supplier, Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (YSP) , consisting in
the overpricing of certain medicines. Catolico received a check issued in her name corresponding to the amount of
the refund for the overprice. The check was placed in an envelope which, when received by Catolico, was already
open. Catolico asked Saldaa. the pharmacy clerk who received the envelope, if she opened it to which the clerk
answered talagang ganyan, bukas. Because Catolico pocketed the amount of the refund for the overprice which
was covered by the check, she was asked to explain her side and was placed under preventive suspension. In
Catolicos reply, she protested Saldaas invasion of her privacy when Saldaa opened the envelope addressed to
her. She further explained, through her counsel, that the check she received from YSP was a Christmas gift and not a
refund of overprice. Consequently, she was terminated on the ground of dishonesty.
The Labor Arbiter declared her dismissal and preventive suspension illegal because petitioners failed to
prove what [they] alleged as complainants dishonesty, and to show that any investigation was conducted. On
appeal, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that petitioners were not able to prove a
just cause for Catolicos dismissal. It found that petitioners evidence consisted only of the check for P640.00 drawn
by YSP in favor of private respondent, which Saldaa, her co-employee, saw when the latter opened the envelope.
But, it declared that the check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2114 and 3115 of Article III of the
Constitution. The NLRC thus concluded: With the smoking gun evidence of respondents 116 being rendered
inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainant, 117 respondents case falls apart as it is
bereft of evidence which cannot be used as a legal basis for complainants dismissal.
While the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the NLRC that Catolicos dismissal was illegal, it
disagreed with the NLRCs reason for upholding the Labor Arbiters decision, viz. , that the evidence against private
respondent was inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of her constitutional rights of privacy of
communication and against unreasonable searches and seizures. It reasoned: As regards the constitutional violation
upon which the NLRC anchored its decision, we find no reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People v. Andre
Marti,118 that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by
private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such
assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.

In the said Marti case, the following principles were emphasized:

(1) In all the cases where the rights against unreasonable searches and seizures and to privacy of
communication and correspondence were affirmed, the evidence obtained were invariably procured by the State
acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other authorized government agencies. On the other hand, the case
at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained
by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities.
Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of
appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State? The answer is in the negative. In the absence of
governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
(2) That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the
fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection. But protection against whom? Commissioner
Joaquin Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself posed, as
follows:
First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties is the essence of
constitutional democracy. Protection against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights
governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between
individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare
some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder.119
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be
invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
(3) Corollarily, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the
State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of
a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in
serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution. Similarly, the admissibility of the
evidence procured by an individual effected through private seizure equally applies, in pari passu,120 to the alleged
violation, non-governmental as it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and communication.

Endnotes:

1 Covering Sections 1 to 6 thereof.

2 Covering Sections 7 to 28 thereof.

3 Taada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997, citing Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines: A
Commentary, Vol. II, 1988 Ed. , p. 2. In the very recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156,
Feb. 3, 1997, it was held that A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. See also Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v. CA,
G.R. No. 167324, July 17, 2007 (En Banc) .

4 As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, G.R. No. 118910, July 17, 1995 246 SCRA 540,
564. See also Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455 and consolidated cases, Aug. 25, 1995.

5 Basco vs. Pagcor, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 52, 68.

6 Taada v. Angara, supra; See also Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. , G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792, 817.
7 G.R. No. 148208, Dec. 15, 2004.

8 Entitled Social Justice and Human Rights.

9 Calalang vs. Williams, G.R. No. 47800, Dec. 2, 1940, 70 Phil. 726.

10 Wesleyan University-Philippines v. Wesleyan University-Philippines Faculty and Staff Association, G.R. No.
181806, March 12, 2014; Holy Cross of Davao College, Inc. v. Holy Cross of Davao Faculty Union KAMAPI, G.R.
No. 156098, June 27, 2005; Plastic Town Center Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 81176, April 19, 1989.

11 Marcopper Mining Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 103525, March 29, 1996; Zurbano, Sr. v. NLRC, G.R. No.
103679, Dec. 17, 1993, 228 SCRA 556; Holiday Inn Manila v. NLRC, G.R. No. 109114, Sept. 14, 1993, 226 SCRA
417.

12 Adamson & Adamson, Inc. v. CIR, G.R. No. L-35120, Jan. 31, 1984, 127 SCRA 268.

13 See Section 3, Article XIII of the Constitution and Article 3 of the Labor Code. See also Philippine National Bank v.
Padao, G.R. Nos. 180849 and 187143, Nov. 16, 2011; Spic N Span Services Corporation v. Paje, G.R. No.
174084, Aug. 25, 2010, 629 SCRA 261, 269-270; Bank of the Philippine islands v. BPI Employees Union-Davao
Chapter-Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank, G.R. No. 164301, Aug. 10, 2010; GSIS v. CA, G.R. No. 132648,
March 4, 1999.

14 Agabon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158693, Nov. 17, 2004, citing Capili v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117378, March 26, 1997, 270
SCRA 488, 495.

15 Id. , citing Filipro, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-70546, Oct. 16, 1986, 145 SCRA 123.

16 The Freedom of Information (FOI) Bill which sought to promote and implement this Constitutional right, has yet to
be passed into law. Its version in the Senate, Senate Bill No. 1733, otherwise known as the Peoples Freedom of
Information (FOI) Act of 2013, was passed with 21 affirmative votes from all senators present on March 10, 2014.
Its counterpart version in the House of Representatives, House Bill No. 3237, otherwise known as An Act to
Strengthen the Right of Citizens to Information held by the Government has yet to be approved as of this writing
(May 03, 2014) .

17 Article 264, Labor Code.

18 Malayang Manggagawa sa Esso v. Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. , G.R. No. L-24224, July 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 801.

19 De Leon v. National Labor Union, G.R. No. L-7586, Jan. 30, 1957, 100 Phil. 789; The Insular Life Assurance Co. ,
Ltd. Employees Association - NATU v. The Insular Life Assurance Co. , Ltd. , G.R. No. L-25291, Jan. 30, 1971, 37
SCRA 244.

20 G.R. No. 170830, Aug. 11, 2010.

21 See Executive Order No. 180, Series of 1987 which provides the guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize
of government employees.

22 The Labor Code is the governing law on the exercise of the right to self-organization in the private sector.
23 Articles 3 and 243, Labor Code.

24 Article 211(A) (c) , Labor Code.

25 Article 246, Labor Code.

26 Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. PARC, G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011.

27 Goldenway Merchandising Corporation v. Equitable PCI Bank, G.R. No. 195540, March 13, 2013, citing Siska
Development Corporation v. Office of the President of the Philippines, G.R. No. 93176, April 22, 1994, 231 SCRA
674, 680.

28 Goldenway Merchandising Corporation v. Equitable PCI Bank, supra; Siska Development Corporation v. Office of
the President of the Philippines, citing Clemons v. Nolting, G.R. No. 17959. Jan. 24, 1922, 42 Phil. 702, 717. See
also Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) v. The Bureau of Internal Revenue, G.R. No.
172087, March 15, 2011.

29 Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party-List v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 177508, Aug. 7, 2009, citing Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. , G.R. No. 167614,
March 24, 2009.

30 Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. PARC, G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011.

31 G.R. No. L-26097, Nov. 29, 1977.

32 Enacted on June 18, 1961, amending Section 4 (a) , paragraph 4 of R.A. No. 875, thus: (4) Provided, That nothing
in this Act or in any Act or statute of the Republic of the Philippines shall preclude an employer from making an
agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees as provided in Section twelve, but such agreement shall not
cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization.

33 G.R. No. 71813, July 20, 1987.

34 Anucension v. National Labor Union, G.R. No. L-26097, Nov. 29, 1977.

35 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. , G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009.

36 Ortigas & Co. , Ltd. v. CA, G.R. No. 126102, De.c 4, 2000, 346 SCRA 748.

37 Picop Resources, Inc. v. Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation, G.R. No. 163509, Dec. 6, 2006, 510 SCRA
400.

38 Walker v. Whitehead, 83 U.S. 314 (1873) ; Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362, 370 (1941) ; Intrata-Assurance
Corporation v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 156571, July 9, 2008; Smart Communications, Inc. v. City of
Davao, G.R. No. 155491, Sept. 16, 2008.

39 Underscoring supplied.
40 The subject clause is the last clause in the 5 paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, to wit: Sec. 10. Money
th

Claims. - xxx In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by
law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve
percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less. xxx (Emphasis and underscoring supplied in the
original text of the decision) . This clause was declared unconstitutional in this case.

41 Philippine National Bank v. Remigio, G.R. No. 78508, 21 March 1994, 231 SCRA 362; Anglo-Fil
Trading Corporation v. Lazaro, G.R. No. L-54958, Sept. 2, 1983, 209 Phil. 400 (1983) ; Ortigas & Co. ,
Ltd. Partnership v. Feati Bank and Trust Co. , G.R. No. L-24670, Dec. 14, 1979. , 183 Phil. 176 1979.

42 Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party-List v. Commission on
Elections,

43 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. , G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009.

44 See Executive Secretary v. CA, G.R. No. 131719, May 25, 2004, 429 SCRA 81, citing JMM Promotion and
Management, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 120095, Aug. 5, 1996, 260 SCRA 319.

45 Ortigas & Co. , Ltd. v. CA, G.R. No. 126102, Dec. 4, 2000, 346 SCRA 748.

46 G.R. No. 114714, April 21, 1995.

47 POEA Governing Board Resolution No. 01, Series of 1994, issued on 14 Jan. 1994 and POEA Memorandum
Circular No. 05, Series of 1994, issued on 19 Jan. 1994 which adjusted the rates of compensation and other
benefits in Part II, Section C. paragraph 1; Section L, paragraphs 1 and 2; and Appendix 1-A of the POEA Standard
Employment Contracts for Seafarers, which adjustments took effect on 20 March 1994.

48 Article 1700 thereof expressly provides: Art. 1700. The relations between capital and labor are not merely
contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts lust yield to the common good.
Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and
lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.

49 Entitled Reorganizing the Ministry of Labor and Employment, Creating the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, and for Other Purposes.

50 Article 1306, Civil Code.

51 G.R. No. 198935, Nov. 27, 2013.

52 Norton Resources and Development Corporation v. All Asia Bank Corporation, G.R. No. 162523, Nov. 25, 2009,
605 SCRA 370, 380.

53 Cadalin v. POEA, NLRC, G.R. Nos. 104776, 104911-14 and 105029 -32, Dec. 05, 1994.

54 Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr. , 153 SCRA 153 [1987; Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298.

55 Habana v. NLRC, G.R. No. 129418, Sept. 10, 1999.

56 Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, G.R. No. L-14078. March 7, 1919, 39 Phil. 660.

57 Section 18 [2], Article III [Bill of Rights], 1987 Constitution.

58 Entitled Termination by Employee. This is commonly known as resignation.

59 Such as when an employee resigns or terminates without just cause the employee-employer relationship by
serving a written notice on the employer at least one (1) month in advance (See Article 285, Labor Code) .

60 G.R. No. 164301, Aug. 10, 2010.

61 Entitled When Employment Not Deemed Terminated. Under this article, employees may be called to fulfill certain
military or civic duty but such shall not terminate employment.

62 G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000. .

63 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. , G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009, citing Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,
G.R. No. 122156, Feb. 3, 1997, 267 SCRA 408.

64 Id. , citing Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 52.

65 G.R. No. 158693, Nov. 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 573. This quotation was lifted from the Separate Opinion of Justice
Dante Tinga in Agabon v. NLRC.

66 Emphasis added in the original decision in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. which quoted this portion of
the Separate Opinion of Justice Dante Tinga in Agabon v. NLRC, supra.

67 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. , G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009.

68 Id.

69 International School Alliance of Educators [ISAE] v. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000.

70 Id.

71 In Article 3 thereof.

72 International School Alliance of Educators [ISAE] v. Quisumbing, supra; E.g. , Article 135 of the Labor Code
declares it unlawful for the employer to require, not only as a condition of employment, but also as a condition for
the continuation of employment, that a woman shall not get married.

73 In relation to Articles 288 and 289 of the same Code.

74 It provides: The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to
its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to investments, and to
expansion and growth.
75 G.R. Nos. 171594-96, Sept. 18, 2013.
76 Article XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution states in part: xxx The State shall regulate the relations between workers and

employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to
reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth.
77 Such as the cases of Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991,
197 SCRA 52. and Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455 and consolidated cases, Aug. 25, 1995.

78 Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v. CA, G.R. No. 167324, July 17, 2007 (En Banc) .

79 G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009.

80 What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution
and calibrated by history. It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must
give way, such as the public interest in safeguarding health or maintaining medical standards, or in maintaining
access to information on matters of public concern.

81 G.R. No. 117040, Jan. 27, 2000.

82 G.R. No. 158693, Nov. 17, 2004.
83 G.R. No. 192571, July 23, 2013.

84 As provided in Article 277(b) of the Labor Code and as interpreted in the case of King of Kings Transport, Inc. v.
Mamac, G.R. No. 166208, June 29, 2007.

85 Respondent Alcaraz was hired as Medical and Regulatory Affairs Manager (Regulatory Affairs Manager) of
petitioner, subject to a 6-month probationary employment. Upon being terminated, she filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and damages claiming that she should have already been considered as a regular and not a probationary
employee given Abbotts failure to inform her of the reasonable standards for her regularization upon her
engagement as required under Article 296 [281] of the Labor Code. In this relation, she contended that while her
employment contract stated that she was to be engaged on a probationary status, the same did not indicate the
standards on which her regularization would be based. She further averred that the individual petitioners
maliciously connived to illegally dismiss her when: (a) they threatened her with termination; (b) she was ordered not
to enter company premises even if she was still an employee thereof; and (c) they publicly announced that she
already resigned in order to humiliate her. On the contrary, petitioners maintained that Alcaraz was validly
terminated from her probationary employment given her failure to satisfy the prescribed standards for her
regularization which were made known to her at the time of her engagement.

86 As the records show, Alcaraz's dismissal was effected through a letter dated May 19, 2005 which she received on
May 23, 2005 and again on May 27, 2005. Stated therein were the reasons for her termination, i.e. , that after
proper evaluation, Abbott determined that she failed to meet the reasonable standards for her regularization
considering her lack of time and people management and decision-making skills, which are necessary in the
performance of her functions as Regulatory Affairs Manager. Undeniably, this written notice sufficiently meets the
criteria set forth above, thereby legitimizing the cause and manner of Alcarazs dismissal as a probationary
employee under the parameters set by the Labor Code.

87 Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights partly provides: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law xxx; See Sagales v. Rustans Commercial Corp. , G.R. No. 166554, Nov. 27, 2008,
citing Philippine Movie Pictures Workers Association v. Premiere Productions, Inc. , G.R. No. L-5621, March 25,
1953, 92 Phil. 843; Rance v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-68147, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 279; Asia World Recruitment,
Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113363, Aug. 24, 1999, 313 SCRA 1; Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc. v.
 NLRC, G.R. No. 95449, Aug. 18, 1997, 277 SCRA 506; Tolentino v. NLRC, G.R No. L-75380, July 31, 1987, 152
SCRA 717; See also Opinaldo v. Ravina, G.R. No. 196573, Oct. 16, 2013; Polsotin v. De Guia Enterprises, Inc. ,
G.R. No. 172624, Dec. 5, 2011.

88 Per Sagales v. Rustans Commercial Corp. , supra, citing Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. (83 US) 36, 127.

89 Polsotin v. De Guia Enterprises, Inc. , G.R. No. 172624, Dec. 5, 2011.

90 Opinaldo v. Ravina, G.R. No. 196573, Oct. 16, 2013, citing Polsotin v. De Guia Enterprises, Inc. , supra, and
Sagales v. Rustans Commercial Corp. , supra.

91 Also found in Section 1, Articlde III of the Constitution, thus: Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

92 G.R. No. 162994, Sept. 17, 2004.

93 G.R. No. 168081, Oct. 17, 2008.

94 Section 17, Article III [Bill of Rights], 1987 Constitution. This was similarly provided in Section 20 of the 1973
Constitution and Section 18, Article III of the 1935 Constitution. This is similar to that accorded by the Fifth
Amendment of the American Constitution. (See Tanada & Fernando, Constitution of the Phil. , Annotated, 2d ed. ,
pp. 378-379) .

95 People of the Philippines v. Hon. Ruben Ayson, G.R. No. 85215, July 7, 1989. This case was decided under the
regime of the 1973 Constitution where the right against self-incrimination was provided under the first sentence of
Section 20, Article IV thereof. See also Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Phil. 483; Gonzales v. Secretary of Labor, 94 Phil.
325; Suarez v. Tengco, 2 SCRA 71; Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, G.R. No. L-25018, May 26, 1969,
28 SCRA 344; 138 Phil. 361; Cabal v. Hon. Kapunan, Jr. , G.R. No. L-19052, Dec. 29, 1962, 116 Phil. 1361.

96 People of the Philippines v. Hon. Ruben Ayson, supra, citing Chavez v. C.A. , 24 SCRA 663; Suarez v. Tengco,
supra, 2 SCRA 71; Gonzales v. Secretary of Labor, supra, 94 Phil. 325, citing Jones on Evidence, Vol. 6, pp. 4926-
7.

97 Suarez v. Tengco, supra, at p. 73.

98 People of the Philippines v. Hon. Ruben Ayson, supra.

99 Rosete v. Lim, G.R. No. 136051, June 8, 2006. This is a civil case.

100 Citing Cabal v. Hon. Kapunan, Jr. , supra, 116 Phil. 1361, 1367-1368; Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners,
supra 28 SCRA 344; 138 Phil. 361, 363.

101 See first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution and now Section 17, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.

102 See Cruz, Isagani A. , Constitutional Law, 1987 ed. , p. 275.

103 People of the Philippines v. Hon. Ruben Ayson, supra, citing United States v. Molina, 317 U.S. , 424; U.S. v.
Binayoh, 35 Phil. 23; See also Tanada & Fernando, op. cit. , p. 379.
104 People of the Philippines v. Hon. Ruben Ayson, supra.

105 G.R. No. 127553, Nov. 28, 1997, 282 SCRA 326.

106People v. Bandula, G.R. No. 89223, May 27, 1994, 232 SCRA 566, citing Gamboa v. Hon. Cruz, G.R. No. L-
56291, June 27, 1988, 162 SCRA 642; See also People v. Evangelista, G.R. Nos. 84332-33, May 8, 1996, 256
SCRA 611.
107 G.R. Nos. 170384-85, March 9, 2007.

108 G.R. No. 191008, April 11, 2011, 647 SCRA 568.

109 G.R. No. 90786, Sept. 27, 1991, 202 SCRA 7.

110 Emphasis supplied.

111 Section 2 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution provides: Section 2. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

112 Section 3 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution provides: Section 3. (1) The privacy of
communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety
or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

113 G.R. No. 113271, Oct. 16, 1997, 280 SCRA 735.

114 See Section 2 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution, supra.

115 See Section 3 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution, supra.

116 Petitioners in this case.

117 Private respondent in this case.

118 G.R. No. 81561, Jan. 18, 1991, 193 SCRA 57. In this case, accused-appellant Andre Marti sent through the
Manila Packing and Export Forwarders four (4) gift wrapped packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita
Reyes, the proprietress of the company, asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages.
Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were
gifts to his friend in Zurich. Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr.
Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes) , following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes
for final inspection and found marijuana therein. He reported it to the NBI and requested a laboratory examination
thereof. Fortwith, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office at Ermita,
Manila and upon inspection of the box, found dried marijuana leaves contained inside the cellophane wrappers.
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt"
acknowledging custody of the said effects.
119 Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas, Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17,
1986; Emphasis supplied.

120 Pari passu is a Latin phrase that literally means with equal pace or progress; side by side or without partiality,
equably or fairly. See dictionary.com at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/pari+passu. Last accessed: May 06, 2014.