Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Challenges in adopting
and applying IFRS 10
September 2011
Introduction
In May 2011, the International Accounting Standards IFRS 12 contains all disclosure requirements related to
Board (IASB) issued IFRS 10 Consolidated Financial an entitys interests in subsidiaries, joint arrangements,
Statements and IFRS 12 Disclosure of Interests in Other associates and structured entities, including a number
Entities. These new standards are effective for annual of new disclosures. One of the most significant changes
periods beginning on or after 1 January 2013, and introduced by IFRS 12 is that an entity is required to
must be applied retrospectively. disclose judgements that were made in determining
whether it controls another entity. Even if management
IFRS 10 replaces the portion of IAS 27 Consolidated
concludes that it does not control an entity, the
and Separate Financial Statements that addresses the
information used to make that judgement will be
accounting for consolidated financial statements. It
transparent to users of the financial statements.
also addresses the issues raised in SIC-12 Consolidation
The new disclosures will also assist users of the financial
Special Purpose Entities; therefore, SIC-12 has
statements to make their own assessment of the
been withdrawn. What remains in IAS 27 is limited
financial impact were management to reach a different
to accounting for investments in subsidiaries,joint
conclusion regarding consolidation by providing more
ventures and associates in separate financial
information about certain unconsolidated entities.
statements. IFRS 10 establishes a single control model
IFRS 12 also includes all of the disclosures that were
that applies to all entities, including special purpose
previously included in IAS 27 related to consolidated
entities (structured entities and variable interest
financial statements, as well as the disclosures that were
entities under the new standards and US GAAP,
previously included in IAS 31 Interests in Joint Ventures
respectively).
and IAS 28 Investments in Associates (which has been
The changes introduced by IFRS 10 will require renamed Investments in Associates and Joint Ventures).
management to exercise significant judgement to
This publication describes the requirements of
determine which entities are controlled, compared with
IFRS 10, focussing on those areas that most differ
the requirements that were in IAS 27. The application
from IAS 27. It also explores application issues related to
of IFRS 10 may change which entities are required to
IFRS 10, describes the related disclosure requirements
be consolidated by a parent within a group. The IASB
for subsidiaries (including consolidated structured
made these changes, in part, in response to the financial
entities) and unconsolidated structured entities required
crisis. There was heavy criticism of accounting rules that
by IFRS 12 and provides a brief commentary on the
permitted certain entities to remain off-balance sheet.
possible business impacts of adopting IFRS 10. This
In June 2009, the US Financial Accounting Standards
publication addresses some of the key questions that are
Board (FASB) responded by changing US GAAP to
being asked about implementing IFRS 10, recognising
improve the financial reporting by entities that are
that some aspects of the standard are still unclear.
involved with variable interest entities, and is proposing
Further issues and questions are likely to be raised in
further changes to US GAAP with respect to principal-
the future as entities adopt the new standards. We will
agency situations.
update this publication accordingly.
September 2011
Contents
Introduction
Chapter 1 Overview 4
Chapter 2 Scope 7
2.1 Employee benefit plans and employee share trusts 7
Chapter 10 Disclosures 45
10.1 Principles of IFRS 12 45
10.2 Disclosing judgements 45
10.3 Interests in subsidiaries 46
10.3.1 Non-controlling interests in subsidiaries 46
10.3.2 Summarised financial information for subsidiaries 46
10.3.3 Significant restrictions on subsidiaries 47
10.3.4 Changes in ownership of a subsidiary 47
10.4 Structured entities 47
10.4.1 Consolidated structured entities 47
10.4.2 Unconsolidated structured entities 48
10.4.3 Related party disclosures 50
Conclusion 63
Chapter 1 Overview
IFRS 10 does not change consolidation procedures (i.e., how to
Excerpt from Appendix A to IFRS 12
consolidate an entity) from the requirements that previously
existed in IAS 27. Those requirements have simply been moved [A] structured entity [is] an entity that has been designed
to IFRS 10. Rather, IFRS 10 changes whether an entity is so that voting or similar rights are not the dominant factor
consolidated, by revising the definition of control and adding in deciding who controls the entity, such as when any voting
requirements to consider when making control decisions. rights relate to administrative tasks only and the relevant
activities are directed by means of contractual arrangements.
Excerpt from IFRS 10
6 An investor controls an investee when it is exposed, or The control principle outlined at left applies to all investees,
has rights, to variable returns from its involvement with including structured entities. There are no bright lines to
the investee and has the ability to affect those returns determine whether an investor has an exposure, or has rights, to
through its power over the investee. variable returns from its involvement with a structured entity, or
whether it has the ability to affect the returns of the structured
7 Thus, an investor controls an investee if and only if the entity through its power over the structured entity. Rather, all
investor has all of the following: facts and circumstances are considered when assessing whether
Power over the investee the investor has control over an investee that is a structured
Exposure, or rights, to variable returns from its entity. That is, the process outlined in Diagram 1 is used for
involvement with the investee; and structured entities, although the relevant facts and circumstances
may differ from when voting rights are a more important factor in
The ability to use its power over the investee to affect
determining control.
the amount of the investors returns.
Understanding the purpose and design of an investee is critical
Each of the three control criteria are explored in more detail in when identifying who has control.
Chapters 3, 4 and 5, respectively. Although not a defined term,
IFRS 10 uses the term investor to refer to a reporting entity that Excerpt from IFRS 10
potentially controls one or more other entities, and investee to
B8 An investee may be designed so that voting rights
refer to an entity that is, or may potentially be, the subsidiary of
are not the dominant factor in deciding who controls
a reporting entity. Ownership of a debt or equity interest may
the investee, such as when any voting rights relate to
be a key factor in determining whether an investor has control.
administrative tasks only and the relevant activities are
However, it is also possible for a party to be an investor and
directed by means of contractual arrangements. In such
potentially control an investee, without having an equity or debt
cases, an investors consideration of the purpose and
interest in that investee.
design of the investee shall also include consideration
In many cases, when decision-making is controlled by voting rights of the risks to which the investee was designed to
that also give the holder exposure to variable returns, it is clear be exposed, the risks it was designed to pass on to
that whichever investor holds a majority of those voting rights the parties involved with the investee and whether
controls the investee. However, in other cases (such as when there the investor is exposed to some or all of those risks.
are potential voting rights, or an investor holds less than a Consideration of the risks includes not only the downside
majority of the voting rights), it may not be so clear. In those risk, but also the potential for upside.
instances, further analysis is needed and the criteria need to be
evaluated based on the facts and circumstances (considering the
Application Guidance in IFRS 10), to determine which investor, if
any, controls an investee. Diagram 1 illustrates this assessment.
Evaluate linkage
Identifying power
Understanding the purpose and design of the investee helps In short, understanding the purpose and design of the investee
to determine: helps to understand the goal of each investor; that is, why they
To what risks was the investee designed to be exposed, and are involved with the investee, and what that involvement is.
what are the risks it was designed to pass on to the parties
This publication focuses primarily on helping to identify which
with which it is involved?
entities will be included in consolidated financial statements, that
What are the relevant activities? is, which entities are controlled. For more information on how to
How are decisions about the relevant activities made? consolidate another entity, see International GAAP 20111 (see
Who has the ability to direct the relevant activities? also Chapter 9 of this publication) .
Which parties have exposure to variable returns from When management concludes that an entity does not have
the investee? control, the requirements of IFRS 11 Joint Arrangements and
How do the relevant activities affect returns? IAS 28 must be considered to determine whether it has joint
control or significant influence, respectively, over the investee,
Do the parties that have power, and have exposure
as shown in Diagram 2.
to variable returns have the ability to use that power
to affect returns?
Diagram 2 Interaction between IFRS 10, IFRS 11, IFRS 12 and IAS 28
Yes No
Does the
Consolidation in
investor have
accordance with
joint control over
IFRS 10
an arrangement?
Disclosures in Yes No
accordance with
IFRS 12
Disclosures in Disclosures in
Disclosures in
accordance with accordance with
accordance with
IFRS 12 and other IFRS 12 and other
IFRS 12
relevant IFRS relevant IFRS
2 This would be the case, for example, if an entity has control over (or
simply rights to) assets and obligations for liabilities, but not control
of an entity. In this case, the entity would account for these assets
and obligations in accordance with the relevant IFRS.
Chapter 2 Scope
Consistent with the requirements previously included in IAS 27, 2.1 Employee benefit plans and employee
IFRS 10 requires that a parent (unless exempt) presents share trusts
consolidated financial statements. That is, IFRS 10 requires
IFRS 10 repeats the scope exception that was previously included
financial statements of the group, in which the assets, liabilities,
in SIC-12 for post-employment benefit plans and other long-term
equity, income, expenses and cash flows of the parent and its
employee benefit plans to which IAS 19 Employee Benefits applies.
subsidiaries are presented, as those of a single economic entity.
However, it is not clear whether this means that an employee
A group consists of a parent and its subsidiaries (i.e., entities that
benefit plan that controls an investee is not required to consolidate
the parent controls).
that investee in its financial statements, or whether an investor
Whether an entity is a parent of another entity requires it to assess that controls an employee benefit plan need not consolidate the
whether it (the investor) controls the other entity (the investee). plan itself.
IFRS 10 applies to all types of entities, including corporations,
It seems that the latter was intended: a sponsor of an employee
partnerships, limited liability corporations, trusts, and other types
benefit plan need not evaluate whether it controls that employee
of entities.
benefit plan, and, therefore, need not consolidate it. However, the
However, as discussed in Section 12.2, in August 2011, the IASB employee benefit plan would need to apply IFRS 10 if it is preparing
published an exposure draft proposing that parents that are financial statements under IAS 26 Accounting and Reporting by
investment entities meeting certain criteria do not consolidate Retirement Benefit Plans.
their controlled investments, but measure them at fair value, with
In contrast, employee benefit trusts (or similar entities) established
changes recognised in profit or loss. Whether an investor controls
for employee share option plans, employee share purchase plans
an investee depends on the purpose and design of the investee.
and other share-based payment programmes are not excluded
Consideration must be given to whether all three control criteria
from the scope of IFRS 10. This is because these are outside the
are met (as shown in Diagram 1).
scope of IAS 19. The sponsoring entity of these trusts needs to
IFRS 10 also repeats the exemption, previously in IAS 27, from evaluate whether it controls (and therefore consolidates) the trusts.
providing consolidated financial statements for entities that are
Diagram 3 illustrates what is in scope and out of scope of IFRS 10.
not the ultimate parent, if they meet certain criteria.
Diagram 3 Understanding scope of IFRS 10 for employee benefit plans and employee share option plans
Relationships inside
dashed boxes are within
the scope of IFRS 10
(considered for control)
In this example, IFRS 10 does not conclude which of these Example 1 illustrates a situation when two different activities that
activities would be deemed the most relevant activity (i.e., the significantly affect an investees returns are directed by different
activity that most significantly affects the investees returns). investors. Thus, it is important to identify the activity that most
If it were concluded that the most relevant activity is: significantly affects returns, as part of assessing which investor,
Developing and obtaining regulatory approval of the medical if any, has power. This differs from joint control, defined as the
product then the investor that has the power to direct that contractually agreed sharing of control of an arrangement, which
activity would have power from the date of entering into the exists only when decisions about the relevant activities require the
arrangement unanimous consent of the parties sharing control. Joint control
Manufacturing and marketing the medical product then the is discussed in more detail in our forthcoming Applying IFRS
investor that has the power to direct that activity would have publication on IFRS 11.
power from the date of entering into the arrangement Example 2 illustrates a structured entity in which there is more
To determine whether either investor controls the arrangement, one activity that affects the investees returns.
the investors would also need to assess whether they have
exposure to variable returns from their involvement with the
investee and the ability to use their power over the investee to
affect the amount of the investors returns. These concepts are
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively.
Factors Examples
Do the holders have the practical ability The more parties necessary to come together to exercise this right, the less likely
to exercise their rights, when exercise that the right is substantive
requires agreement by more than one A mechanism is in place that provides those parties with the practical ability to
investor? exercise their rights collectively if they choose to do so
An independent board of directors may serve as a mechanism for numerous
investors to act collectively in exercising their rights
Would the investor that holds the rights A potential voting right is in-the-money
benefit from their exercise or conversion? An investor would obtain benefits from synergies between the investor and
the investee
Are the rights exercisable when the An investor has rights that are currently exercisable, but has not yet exercised them
decisions about the relevant activities An investor can direct certain activities of an investee when a particular
need to be made? circumstance or event occurs
It is important to remember that the purpose and design of an 3.2.2 Evaluating whether rights are protective
investee is critical when assessing whether a right is substantive. In evaluating whether rights give power over an investee, the
For example, the following should be considered when evaluating investor has to assess whether its rights and rights held by others,
whether an investors rights are substantive: are protective rights. Protective rights are a newly defined concept
Why were the rights granted? under IFRS 10, although many may have considered this concept
What compensation was given (or received) for the right? Does when evaluating control under IAS 27, even though not defined.
that compensation reflect fair value?
Excerpt from Appendix A IFRS 10
Did other investors also receive this right? If not, why?
Protective rights are rights designed to protect the interest of
These questions should be considered both when a right is first the party holding those rights without giving that party power
granted, but also if an existing right is modified. over the entity to which those rights relate.
To be substantive and give power, a right must give the investor
Since power is an essential element of control, protective rights do
the current ability to direct the investees relevant activities.
not give the investor control over the investee. Holding protective
However, current ability does not always mean able to be
rights cannot prevent another investor from having power over
exercised this instant. The concept of current ability is discussed
an investee.
more in the context of potential voting rights, in Section 3.3.3.
Protective rights are typically held to prohibit fundamental Veto rights over operating budgets
changes in the activities of an investee that the holder does not In many cases, a veto right over an annual operating budget or a
agree with and usually apply only in exceptional circumstances veto right over changes to operating and financing policies would
(i.e., upon a contingent event). However, the fact that the right to be considered a substantive right, and not merely a protective
make decisions is contingent upon an event occurring does not right. This assumes that determining the operating budget or
mean that the right is always a protective right. Examples of setting the operating and financing policies is an activity that
protective rights include the right to: significantly affects the investees returns. This is illustrated in
Restrict an investee from undertaking activities that could Example 3.
significantly change the credit risk of the investee to the
detriment of the investor Example 3 Veto right over annual budget protective or not?
Approve an investees capital expenditures (greater than An investor determined that approving the annual operating
the amount spent in the ordinary course of business) budget of an investee is the relevant activity. For example,
this might be the case if the operating budget is detailed and
Approve an investees issuance of equity or debt instruments
management has little latitude to deviate from the budget.
Seize assets if an investee fails to meet specified loan An investor has the right to veto this annual operating budget.
repayment conditions If that investor does veto the budget, management of the
Veto transactions between the investee and a related party investee must re-draft and re-propose the budget, and
re-submit the budget to the investor holding the veto right.
When evaluating whether a right is protective, consideration is
also given to whether the right is substantive (see Section 3.2.1). In this fact pattern, because approving the annual operating
However, assuming that the right is substantive, the likelihood budget is the activity that most significantly affects the
that the holder will exercise a right is not a factor in determining investees returns, then a veto right over the annual operating
whether it is merely a protective right, or is potentially a right budget would be substantive, and is not a protective right.
that gives power. Evaluating whether approving an annual operating budget
is the most relevant activity will depend on facts and
In some cases, a right might be deemed merely protective, such as
circumstances, and requires judgement.
the ability to sell assets of the investee if an investee defaults on a
loan, because default is considered an exceptional circumstance.
Other veto rights
However, if the likelihood of that event occurring were to change
Other veto rights that are common, and are typically protective
such that it would no longer be considered an exceptional event
(because they rarely significantly affect the investees returns),
(e.g., the investee defaults on a loan and files for bankruptcy), the
include veto rights over changes to:
investor holding that right would need to re-assess whether that
right has become a substantive right (rather than a protective Amendments to articles of incorporation
right), based on the change in facts and circumstances. This is Location of investee headquarters
discussed further in Chapter 8. Name of investee
Auditors
Accounting principles for separate reporting of investee
operations
Franchises
Example 4 Rights held by franchisor
Many have questioned how to consider franchise rights, and
A franchisor has certain rights that are designed to protect its
whether they give power (to the franchisor), or whether they
brand when it is being licensed by a franchisee. Activities that
are merely protective rights.
significantly affect the franchisees returns include:
Excerpts from IFRS 10 Determining or changing its operating policies
B30 Generally, franchisors rights do not restrict the ability Setting its prices for selling goods
of parties other than the franchisor to make decisions Selecting suppliers
that have a significant effect on the franchisees Purchasing goods and services
returns. Nor do the rights of the franchisor in franchise
Selecting, acquiring or disposing of equipment
agreements necessarily give the franchisor the current
Appointing, remunerating or terminating the employment of
ability to direct the activities that significantly affect the
key management personnel
franchisees returns.
Financing the franchise
B33 Control over such fundamental decisions as the legal
If certain of the activities above are directed by one investor
form of the franchisee and its funding structure may
(e.g., the owners of the franchisee), and other activities are
be determined by parties other than the franchisor and
directed by another investor (e.g., the franchisor), then the
may significantly affect the returns of the franchisee.
investors will need to determine which activity most
The lower the level of financial support provided by the
significantly affects the franchisees returns, as discussed in
franchisor and the lower the franchisors exposure to
Section 3.1.
variability of returns from the franchisee the more likely
it is that the franchisor has only protective rights.
3.2.3 Incentives to obtain power
There are many incentives to obtain rights that give power;
When analysing whether a franchisor has power over a franchisee,
generally, the more exposure to variable returns (whether
it is necessary to consider the purpose and design of the
positive or negative), the greater that incentive. IFRS 10
franchisee. The assessment of whether a franchisor has power
notes this in two contexts:
hinges on the determination of the relevant activities, and which
investor (the franchisor or owner of the franchisee) has the Excerpts from IFRS 10
current ability to direct that activity through its rights. The rights
held by the franchisor must be evaluated to determine if they are B20 The greater an investors exposure, or rights, to
substantive, or whether they are merely protective rights. A variability of returns from its involvement with an
determination will need to be made in each case, based on the investee, the greater is the incentive for the investor to
specific facts and circumstances. This is illustrated in Example 4. obtain rights sufficient to give it power. Therefore, having
a large exposure to variability of returns is an indicator
that the investor may have power. However, the extent
of the investors exposure does not, in itself, determine
whether an investor has power over the investee.
B54 An investor may have an explicit or implicit commitment
to ensure that an investee continues to operate as
designed. Such a commitment may increase the
investors exposure to variability of returns and thus
increase the incentive for the investor to obtain rights
sufficient to give it power. Therefore, a commitment to
ensure that an investee operates as designed may be
an indicator that the investor has power, but does not,
by itself, give an investor power, nor does it prevent
another party from having power.
Thus, even though there may be an incentive to obtain rights Evaluating voting rights during bankruptcy
that give power when there is an exposure to variable returns, Many jurisdictions have laws that offer protection from creditors
that incentive, by itself, does not give power. Rather, the investor when an entity is in financial difficulty. For example, an investee in
must analyse whether it actually does have power through such a position might be placed in the hands of liquidators,
existing rights, which might be in the form of voting rights, receivers or court-appointed managers under a reorganisation
or rights through a contractual agreement, as discussed in plan. Evaluating whether an investor holding the majority of voting
Sections 3.3 and 3.4, respectively. rights still has power over an investee in such situations requires
the exercise of judgement based on the facts and circumstances.
3.3 Voting rights It also requires assessing whether the holder of the voting rights
Power stems from existing rights. In many cases, assessing continues to have the current ability to direct the activities that
power can be straightforward. This is often the case when, after most significantly affect the investees returns.
understanding the purpose and design of the investee, it is
In this evaluation, it should be determined whether the
determined that power over an investee is obtained directly
shareholders (who hold voting rights) can still direct the operating
and solely from the voting rights that stem from holding shares.
and financial policies of the investee (assuming that this is the
This section deals with these cases. Section 3.4 discusses cases
relevant activity), once the investee enters into bankruptcy
when voting rights are not the right that gives power over an
proceedings. Alternatively, the bankruptcy court (or trustee, or
investee.
administrator) may direct operating and financial policies.
3.3.1 Power with a majority of the voting rights Consideration should be given to the following:
In many cases, the legal environment or corporate structure Who appoints management during the bankruptcy period?
dictate that the relevant activities are directed by the agreement Who directs management (e.g., the shareholders, or a trustee
of shareholders who hold more than half of the voting rights of the for the creditors)?
investee. Alternatively, a Board of Directors might make decisions Does management have to seek approval from parties
regarding the investee and that Board might be appointed besides the shareholders (e.g., for significant and/or unusual
by whoever has the majority of the voting rights to direct an transactions)?
investees relevant activities. In both cases, when one investor has
Who negotiates the plan of reorganisation?
more than half the voting rights, it has power, assuming that no
other facts and circumstances are relevant. These situations are Even if shareholders retain power once the investee enters
common and, in such cases, adopting IFRS 10 will have little bankruptcy (i.e., they retain the current ability to direct the
impact on whether or not an entity is consolidated. relevant activities), this does not mean that a majority
shareholder automatically controls the investee. This is because
However, there may be other facts and circumstances that are
the shareholder may not have any exposure to variable returns
relevant to assessing control (e.g., potential voting rights), which
(see Section 4.5), or the ability to affect its returns through its
are discussed in the remainder of Chapter 3. In addition, there
power (see Chapter 5), which are the other two criteria for
are new disclosure requirements in IFRS 12 that should not be
having control. Depending on the facts and circumstances, a
overlooked. (see Chapter 10).
shareholder might lose power (or control) when the investee files
3.3.2 A majority of voting rights without power for bankruptcy protection, or when the investee exits from
In some cases, voting rights do not give the holder the power to bankruptcy. Determining the appropriate method of accounting
direct the relevant activities. This might be the case, when: for the interest in the investee upon loss of power (or control)
Relevant activities are directed by contract (see Section 3.4) requires careful consideration of the nature of the rights and
interests, such as whether the shareholder has significant
Relevant activities are directed by government, judiciary,
influence over the investee, in which case it would apply the
administrator, receiver, liquidator, or regulator these are
equity method. Alternatively, if the investor does not have
discussed at left
significant influence, it would likely account for its investment in
Voting rights are not substantive (see Section 3.2.2) the investee as a financial instrument.
Voting rights have been delegated to a decision-maker, which
then holds the voting rights as an agent (see Chapter 5)
Voting rights are held as a de facto agent of another investor
(see Chapter 6)
When an investee files for bankruptcy, parties holding other It may be clear, after considering the factors in (a) (c) alone, that
rights with respect to that investee should also consider whether an investor has power over an investee. In other situations, it may
the control assessment has changed. For example, a right that be clear, after considering the factors in (a) (c) alone, that an
was previously deemed protective (such as the right to appoint investor does not have power. In addition, IFRS 10 states that if
an administrator in the event of a bankruptcy a right that is it is not clear that the investor has power, having considered the
frequently held by creditors), becomes a right that gives power, factors at left, then the investor does not control the investee.
because the event that triggers that right is no longer an
Potential voting rights and rights arising from other contractual
exceptional circumstance. Alternatively, the trustee itself
arrangements are discussed in Sections 3.3.4 and 3.3.5,
might have power, thorough its ability to direct the activities
respectively. De facto control is discussed in more detail in the
of the investee in bankruptcy. This is discussed in more detail
remainder of this section.
in Section 8.2.
IFRS 10 includes several examples illustrating how to assess
3.3.3 Power without a majority of voting rights whether an investor has power when it has less than a majority of
(de facto control) voting rights. Some of these are summarised in Examples 5-8.
An investor might have control over an investee even when it has Our variation is introduced in Example 9. In each of the examples,
less than a majority of the voting rights of that investee (a concept it is assumed that, after understanding the purpose and design of
known as de facto control). the investee:
Voting rights give an investor the ability to direct activities that
Excerpt from IFRS 10
significantly affect the investees returns (i.e., voting rights give
B42 When assessing whether an investors voting rights are power)
sufficient to give it power, an investor considers all facts None of the shareholders has arrangements to consult any of
and circumstances, including: the other shareholders or make collective decisions
(a) The size of the investors holding of voting rights Decisions require the approval of a majority of votes cast at
relative to the size and dispersion of holdings of the the shareholders meeting
other vote holders, noting that:
No other facts or circumstances are relevant
(i) the more voting rights an investor holds, the
more likely the investor is to have existing rights Example 5 Less than a majority of voting rights No. 1
that give it the current ability to direct the relevant A holds 48% of the voting rights of B; the remaining 52% of B is
activities; widely held by thousands of shareholders (none of whom holds
(ii) the more voting rights an investor holds relative more than 1% of the voting rights).
to other vote holders, the more likely the investor is
to have existing rights that give it the current ability 52% widely dispersed
to direct the relevant activities;
(iii) the more parties that would need to act
together to outvote the investor, the more likely the
investor is to have existing rights that give it the A B
current ability to direct the relevant activities; 48%
(b) Potential voting rights held by the investor, other
vote holders or other parties; A has power over B, because A has a dominant voting interest
(c) Rights arising from other contractual (based on the absolute size of its holding, and relative to other
arrangements; and shareholders), and a large number of shareholders would have
to agree to outvote A.
(d) Any additional facts and circumstances that
indicate the investor has, or does not have, the
current ability to direct the relevant activities at
the time that decisions need to be made, including
voting patterns at previous shareholders meetings.
G H
35%
Depends on
Evaluation Non-substantive facts and Substantive
circumstances
At market
Deeply-out-of Out-of-the-
Exercise price (fair value)
-the-money money
or in-the-money
Exercisable
Not Currently
Exercise period before decisions
exercisable exercisable
need to be made
Exercise price or conversion price In contrast, it is probably more common that the holder has the
One of the most significant changes between IFRS 10 and IAS 27 financial ability to exercise an option that is out-of-the-money (but
in evaluating whether an option can give power is that the exercise not deeply so) and would consider exercising that option to benefit
price (or conversion price) can and should be considered, because from synergies. This might be the case when the investee has
it might represent a barrier to exercise: strategic importance to the option holder.
Deeply-out-of-the-money Generally, these would be
Exercise period
considered non-substantive
As discussed on page 9, to have power over an investee, an
Out-of-the-money (but not deeply) Judgement will be investor must have existing rights that give the investor the
needed to assess whether the cost of paying more than fair current ability to direct an investees relevant activities. This
value is worth the potential benefits of exercise, including would imply that an option needs be currently exercisable to give
the exposures to variable returns that are associated with power. However, under IFRS 10, an option can give an investor the
exercising that option (see Chapter 4 for examples of exposures current ability to direct an investees relevant activities even when
to variable returns) it is not currently exercisable, unlike in IAS 27. This is because the
Inthe-money (and at market options) Generally, these term current is used more broadly in IFRS 10 than in IAS 27.
would be considered substantive; for an at market option, Although current often means as of today or this instant in
consideration is given as to whether the option conveys rights practice, the IASBs use of the term in IFRS 10 broadly refers to
that differ from those that would be available to third parties in the ability to make decisions about an investees relevant activities
an open market when they need to be made. This is illustrated in Example 11.
When evaluating the exercise price, consideration is given as to
Example 11 Potential voting rights No. 2
whether the nature of the exercise price (e.g., deeply out, out, or
in-the-money) is expected to remain so for the entire exercise An investee holds annual shareholder meetings, at which
period, or whether the nature of the exercise price may change in decisions to direct the relevant activities are made. An investor
the future. That is, the evaluation is not solely based on the options holds an option to acquire the majority of shares in the
nature at inception or as of the end of the reporting period. This is investee, which is not currently exercisable. However, the
because to give power, an option must give an investor the current option is exercisable before the next scheduled shareholder
ability to direct the relevant activities when the decisions need to be meeting, and before the next special shareholder meeting
made. Thus, for example, if an option was deeply-out-of-the-money could be held (based on the investees governance policies).
at the reporting date, but expected to become in-the-money before When considering solely the exercise period, the investors
the relevant activities of the investee need to be directed, then the option would be a substantive right that gives the investor
option may be substantive. This evaluation will require the exercise power (since it would give the holder a majority of shares).
of judgement based on all relevant facts and circumstances. This is because the investor does have the current ability to
direct the investees relevant activities when decisions need to
Financial ability
be made, i.e., at the next scheduled shareholder meeting or
The financial ability of an investor to pay the exercise price should next special shareholder meeting.
be considered when evaluating whether an option is substantive,
because this could be an economic barrier, as contemplated by However, when concluding whether an investor has power over
IFRS 10. This was previously prohibited from being considered the investee in real fact patterns, all relevant facts and
under IAS 27. While financial ability is generally considered to be circumstances would be considered, to evaluate whether the
linked to the exercise price, because an investor should be able to option is substantive, not solely the exercise period.
obtain financing for an in-the-money option, this may not always
be the case. For example, if there is evidence that an investor In contrast, if the next shareholders meeting occurs (or could
cannot obtain financing to exercise an in-the-money option, this be held) before the option is exercisable, that option would not
might indicate that the option is not substantive; however, this is be a right that would give the holder the current ability to
expected to be rare. direct the investees activities (and therefore would not give
the holder power).
3.6 Determining whether sponsoring (designing) An investors involvement in the design of an investee does not,
a structured entity gives power in and of itself, mean that investor necessarily has control, even if
that involvement was significant. Rather, an investor has control
IFRS 10 discusses whether sponsoring (that is, designing) a
of an investee when all three criteria of control are met (see
structured entity gives an investor power over the structured entity.
Chapter 1), considering the purpose and design of the investee.
Excerpt from IFRS 10 Thus, an investors involvement in the design of an investee is part
of the context when concluding if it controls the investee, but is
B51 In assessing the purpose and design of an investee, an not determinative.
investor shall consider the involvement and decisions
There are few structured entities for which there is no substantive
made at the investees inception as part of its design
decision-making. However, if a structured entity truly has no
and evaluate whether the transaction terms and
decision-making and is actually on autopilot, then no investor
features of the involvement provide the investor with
would control that structured entity, even if the investor
rights that are sufficient to give it power. Being involved
sponsored or designed the structured entity. This is because no
in the design of an investee alone is not sufficient
investor has power over the structured entity, that is, no investor
to give an investor control. However, involvement
has the current ability to direct the activities that significantly
in the design may indicate that the investor had the
affect the structured entitys returns.
opportunity to obtain rights that are sufficient to give it
power over the investee.
How we see it
There are few structured entities that have no substantive decision-making. That is, virtually all structured entities have some level of
decision-making and few, if any, are on autopilot. In such cases, if that decision-making can significantly affect the returns of the
structured entity, the investor with the rights to make those decisions would have power. This is because IFRS 10 clarifies that an
investor has power when it has existing rights that give it the current ability to direct the relevant activities, even if those relevant
activities only occur when particular circumstances arise or specific events occur.
However, a structured entity with limited decision-making requires additional scrutiny to determine which investor, if any, has power
(and possibly control) over the structured entity, particularly for the investors that have a potentially significant explicit or implicit
exposure to variable returns. Careful consideration is required regarding the purpose and design of the structured entity.
In addition, the evaluation of power may require an analysis of the decisions made at inception of the structured entity, including a
review of the structured entitys governing documents, because the decisions made at formation may affect which investor, if any,
has power.
For a structured entity with a limited range of activities, such as certain securitisation entities, power is assessed based on which
activities, if any, significantly affect the structured entitys returns, and if so, which investor, if any, has existing rights that give it the
current ability to direct those activities. The following considerations may also be relevant when determining which investor, if any,
has power (and possibly control):
An investors ability to direct the activities of a structured entity only when specific circumstances arise or events occur may
constitute power if that ability relates to the activities that most significantly affect the structured entitys returns (see Section 3.1.1)
An investor does not have to actively exercise its power to have power over a structured entity (see Diagram 4 in Section 3.2.1)
An investor is more incentivised to obtain power over a structured entity the greater its obligation to absorb losses or its right to
receive benefits from the structured entity (see Section 3.2.3)
It should be emphasised that with respect to this criteria, the B8 An investee may be designed so that voting rights are
focus is on the existence of an exposure to variable returns, not not the dominant factor in deciding who controls the
the amount of the exposure to variable returns. investee, such as when any voting rights relate to
administrative tasks only and the relevant activities
4.1 Exposure to variable returns is an indicator are directed by means of contractual arrangements.
of control In such cases, an investors consideration of the
purpose and design of the investee shall also include
Exposure to variable returns is an indicator of control. This is
consideration of the risks to which the investee was
because the greater an investors exposure to the variability of
designed to be exposed, the risks that it was designed
returns from its involvement with an investee, the greater the
to pass on to the parties involved with the investee and
incentive for the investor to obtain rights that give the investor
whether the investor is exposed to some or all of these
power. However, the magnitude of the exposure to variable returns
risks. Consideration of the risks includes not only the
is not determinative of whether the investor holds power.
downside risk, but also the potential for upside.
When an investors exposure, or rights, to variable returns from its
involvement with the investee are disproportionately greater than
its voting or other similar rights, this might be an indicator of
control. However, an assessment must still be completed to
determine if an investor actually has control (i.e., all three
criteria shown in Diagram 1 must be met).
How we see it
Generally, a derivative that introduces risk to an investee (e.g., a structured entity) would not be considered an exposure to variable
returns under IFRS 10. Only a derivative that exposes a counterparty to risks that the investee was designed to create and pass on
would be considered an exposure to variable returns under IFRS 10.
This view is consistent with the IASBs intentions. In addition, this view would result in convergence with US GAAP (in most cases). The
IASB and FASB have stated that they believe that they have achieved convergence with respect to evaluating control of a structured
entity, and it would be difficult to reach converged solutions on many fact patterns involving derivatives and structured entities if the
alternative view (that all derivatives create an exposure to variable returns) were taken.
An exposure to variable returns generally absorbs or receives the Generally, the focus is on the returns that are generated by the
variability created by the investees assets, liabilities or other investee. However, depending on the purpose and design of the
contracts, and the risks the investee was designed to pass along to arrangements and the investee, when the investor receives
its investors. In contrast, interests that introduce risk to the returns that are not generated by the investee, but stem from
investee are generally not exposures to variable returns in the involvement with the investee, these returns are also considered.
investee.
For example, if an investor would achieve economies of scale or
It follows that if a derivative is entered into to reduce the synergies by combining the operations or assets of the investee
variability of a structured entitys cash flows, it is not a risk that with its own operations or assets, this would give the investor an
the structured entity was designed to be exposed to, nor is it a risk exposure to a variable return.
that the structured entity was designed to pass on to the
counterparty. Instead, the derivative is entered into to align the 4.5 Exposure to variable returns in bankruptcy
cash flows of the assets of the structured entity with those of the filings
investors and so reduce the risks to which the investors in the As discussed in Section 3.3.2, evaluating whether an investor has
structured entity are exposed. Accordingly, the counterparty control when its investee files for bankruptcy requires the exercise
would not have an exposure to a variable return. of judgement based on the facts and circumstances. Part of the
For example, consider a situation in which a structured entity assessment includes an evaluation of whether the investor has an
acquired a portfolio of equity instruments, issued fixed or floating exposure to variable returns from the investee once the investee
rate notes, and hedged the mismatch in cash flows between the files for bankruptcy. For example, based on the requirements for
equity instruments and the notes through writing a total return the particular type of bankruptcy in the relevant jurisdiction:
swap to a counterparty. In this case, the structured entity was not Is the investee restricted from paying dividends to the investors
designed to provide an interest rate exposure to the note holders; upon filing for bankruptcy?
it is clearly designed to give equity risk to the counterparty. Are the investors exposed to a variable return through their
Accordingly, the counterparty would have an exposure to a interests in the investee, notwithstanding the bankruptcy
variable return. (e.g., do shares in the investee retain any value)?
Do the investors have a loan receivable, or other financial
4.4 Exposures to variable returns from involvement
interest in the investee, that is expected to provide a return
with an investee (or is the loan worthless)?
When identifying an exposure to variable returns, in addition to Do the investors have access to other synergies from the
returns generated directly by the investee, other returns that investee?
are received by the investor from that involvement are also
For an investor to have control, it must also have power
considered. IFRS 10 refers to both sets of returns in specifying the
(as discussed in Section 3.3.2 ) and the ability to use its power
criteria to be met when determining if an investor has control over
over the investee to affect the amount of the investors returns
an investee.
(see Chapter 5).
Excerpt from IFRS 10
Example 13 Link between power and returns is essential While principal-agency situations often occur in the asset
for control management and banking industries, they are not limited to those
A structured entity is created and financed by debt instruments industries. Entities in the construction, real estate and extractive
held by a senior lender and a subordinated lender and a industries also frequently delegate powers when carrying out their
minimal equity investment from the sponsor. The subordinated business. This is especially common when an investee is set up
lender transferred receivables to the structured entity. and one of the investors (often the lead investor) is delegated
Managing the receivables in default is the only activity of the powers by the other investors to carry out activities for the
structured entity that causes its returns to vary, and this power investee. Assessing whether the lead investor is making decisions
has been given to the subordinated lender by contract. The as a principal, or simply carrying out the decisions made by all the
subordinated loan is designed to absorb the first losses and to investors (i.e., acting as an agent) will be critical to assessing
receive any residual return from the structured entity. The control (or joint control).
senior lender has exposure to variable returns due to the credit
risk of the structured entity. Excerpts from IFRS 10
When analysing which investor, if any, has control, the first 17 An investor controls an investee if the investor not only
step is to identify the relevant activities. In this example, has power over the investee and exposure or rights to
managing the receivables in default is the only activity of the variable returns from its involvement with the investee,
structured entity that causes its returns to vary. Therefore, it but also has the ability to use its power to affect the
would be the relevant activity. The next step is to determine investors returns from its involvement with the investee.
which investor, if any, has the current ability to direct that 18 Thus, an investor with decision-making rights shall
relevant activity. In this example, the subordinated lender has determine whether it is a principal or an agent. An
the power that it was granted by contract. The subordinated investor that is an agent in accordance with paragraphs
lender is exposed to variable returns from its involvement B58B72 does not control an investee when it exercises
with the structured entity through its subordinated debt. The decision-making rights delegated to it.
subordinated lender has the ability to affect those returns
through its power to manage the receivables in default. Since An agent is a party engaged to act on behalf of another party or
all three elements of control are present, the subordinated parties (the principal(s)), but does not have control over the
lender has control over the structured entity. This evaluation investee. An investor may delegate decision-making authority to
is made in the context of understanding the structured entitys an agent on some specific issues or on all relevant activities, but,
purpose and design. ultimately, the investor as principal retains the power. Accordingly,
While the senior lenders exposure to variable returns is a decision-maker that is not an agent is a principal. However, it
affected by the structured entitys activities, the senior lender should be noted that:
has no power to direct those activities. Thus, the senior lender A decision-maker is not an agent simply because others benefit
does not control the structured entity, because it is missing two from the decisions that it makes
of the elements of control. An obligation to act in the best interest of those who have
delegated the power does not prevent the decision-maker from
being a principal
The terms and conditions of the arrangement are considered to For this reason, it is imperative to understand the purpose and
assess whether an entity is an agent or a principal. The design of the investee, the risks to which it was designed to be
determination of whether a decision-maker is an agent or a exposed and the risk that was designed to pass on to the other
principal is made based on the following: parties involved. Understanding the purpose and design of the
Scope of decision-making authority investee often helps to understand which rights were delegated,
Rights held by other parties (e.g., existence of removal rights) why they were delegated, and which rights have been retained by
other parties, and why those rights were retained.
Remuneration of the decision-maker
Exposure to variability of returns through other interests 5.2.1 Involvement in design and autopilot situations
A decision-makers involvement in the design of an investee does
Each of these factors is discussed in more detail in the remainder
not, in and of itself, mean that decision-maker necessarily is a
of Chapter 5. When reaching a conclusion, each of the factors is
principal, even if that involvement was significant.
weighted according to the facts and circumstances of each case,
which will require judgement. The only situation that is conclusive Excerpt from IFRS 10
by itself is when removal rights are held by a single investor and
the decision-maker can be removed without cause. This is B63 A decision maker shall consider the purpose and
discussed in more detail in Section 5.3. Accordingly, although design of the investee, the risks to which the investee
each of the factors are discussed in isolation, a conclusion should was designed to be exposed, the risks it was designed
be based on all of the factors considered together. to pass on to the parties involved and the level of
involvement the decision maker had in the design of an
investee. For example, if a decision maker is significantly
involved in the design of the investee (including in
determining the scope of decision-making authority),
Principal? Agent? that involvement may indicate that the decision maker
had the opportunity and incentive to obtain rights that
result in the decision maker having the ability to direct
the relevant activities.
Decision-
maker Rather, a decision-maker is a principal if it is determined that it is
using its power for its own benefit. This determination is made
in the context of considering the purpose and design of the
5.2 Scope of decision-making investee, and the other factors listed in this chapter. Thus, a
To assess whether a decision-maker is a principal or an agent, the decision-makers involvement in the design of an investee is part
scope of its authority is evaluated by considering both: of the context when concluding if it is a principal or agent, but is
The activities that the decision-maker is permitted to direct not determinative.
(e.g., by agreement or by law)
The discretion that the decision-maker has when making How we see it
decisions about those activities Similar to the considerations for structured entities discussed
It is implicit in the definition of control that, for a decision-maker in Section 3.6, when a decision-maker sponsors an investee,
to control the entity over which it has been delegated decision- and establishes certain decisions in the governing documents
making authority, the decision-maker must have power. This of the investee, there should be increased scrutiny as to
means that it must have been delegated the rights that give the whether that decision-maker is a principal or an agent with
current ability to direct the relevant activities (the activities that respect to the investee, particularly if the other factors are
significantly affect that investees returns). If a decision-maker has indicative of the decision-maker being a principal. However,
been delegated rights that do not relate to the relevant activities, when there are many parties involved in the design of
it would not control the investee. an investee, the decisions established in the governing
documents might be less relevant.
5.2.2 Assessing whether scope of powers is narrow or broad weighting that is placed on the removal right. This is reflected in
When evaluating whether a decision-maker is a principal or an an example provided by IFRS 10, where there is a large number
agent, in considering the scope of its decision-making authority, it of widely dispersed unrelated third party investors. Although the
appears that a relevant factor is whether the scope of powers that decision-maker can be removed, without cause, by a simple
have been delegated (and the discretion allotted) is narrow or majority decision of the other investors, this is given little
broad. In an example in IFRS 10 where a decision-maker (fund weighting in evaluating whether the decision-maker is a principal
manager) establishes, markets and manages a publicly traded, or an agent.
regulated fund according to narrowly defined parameters set out
If an independent Board of Directors (or governing body), which
in the investment mandate, it is stated that this is a factor that
is appointed by the other investors, holds a right to remove
indicates that the fund manager is an agent. In another example,
without cause, that would be an indicator that the decision-
where the decision-maker (fund manager) has wide decision-
maker is an agent. This is the position taken in an example in
making authority, it is implied that the extensive decision-making
IFRS 10 where a fund has a Board of Directors, all of whose
authority of the fund manager would be an indicator that it is a
members are independent of the fund manager and are
principal. This suggests that where the scope of powers is broad,
appointed by the other investors. The Board of Directors
this would be an indicator that the decision-maker is a principal.
appoints the fund manager annually. The example explains that
However, to conclude whether a decision-maker is an agent or a
the Board of Directors provides a mechanism to ensure that the
principal, the scope of power needs to be evaluated with the other
investors can remove the fund manager if they decide to do so.
three factors in totality.
By placing greater emphasis on the substantive removal rights,
the conclusion in the example is that the fund manager is an
5.3 Rights held by other parties agent, and therefore does not control the fund.
The decision-maker may be subject to rights held by other parties
that may affect the decision-makers ability to direct the relevant Diagram 6 Evaluating rights to remove without cause
activities of the investee, such as rights held by those parties to
remove the decision-maker. Rights to remove a decision-maker are Number of parties holding Indicator that a
often referred to as kick-out rights. Substantive removal rights may removal right decision-maker is
indicate that the decision-maker is an agent. Liquidation rights and
redemption rights held by other parties, which may in substance be
similar to removal rights, are discussed in Section 5.3.2. Always an agent
Exercise period
A removal right may not be exercisable until a date in the future.
Exercisable only Exercisable
In such cases, judgement must be exercised to determine whether
for cause without cause
(or when) that right becomes substantive. Similarly, when a
removal right can only be exercised during a narrow period (e.g.,
for one day on the last day of the reporting period), judgement
Significant financial Insignificant financial
will also need to be applied to conclude whether the right is
penalty to exercise penalty to exercise
substantive or not.
Decision-maker is an agent
5.4.1 Evaluating remuneration in the asset management 5.4.2 Evaluating remuneration in other industries
industry IFRS 10 does not include any examples of principal-agency
When evaluating whether a decision-maker is a principal or an evaluations in construction, real estate and extractive industries.
agent, an entity is required to evaluate the magnitude and the
variability of the remuneration relative to the expected returns from How we see it
the investee. In examples related to the asset management industry, In the construction, real estate and extractive industries, it
IFRS 10 describes three common remuneration structures: is more common for the decision-maker to possess unique
1% of net assets under management traits. That might make it more difficult to assess whether the
1% of assets under management and performance-related fees remuneration is commensurate with the skills provided, and
of 10% of profits if the investees profits exceed a specified level includes only market terms.
1% of assets under management and 20% of all the funds
profits if a specified profit level is achieved 5.5 Exposure to variability of returns from
In each case, IFRS 10 concludes that the remuneration is other interests
commensurate with the services provided. In addition, the When an investor has exposure to variable returns from its
remuneration aligns the interests of the decision-maker with involvement with an investee (e.g., a direct financial investment in
those of other investors. However, IFRS 10 concludes for each of that investee, or provides a guarantee), and has been delegated
these cases that remuneration does not create an exposure to decision-making authority by other parties, the investor considers
variable returns that is of such significance that it, in isolation, that exposure to variable returns when assessing whether it has
indicates that the fund manager is a principal. Although IFRS 10 control over that investee. This is illustrated in Example 14.
does not address whether the remuneration only includes
market terms in each of the fact patterns, this would also need Example 14 Illustration of exposure to variability of returns
to be assessed. IFRS 10 does not include any examples of through other interests
remuneration arrangements where it is clear the remuneration is A parent of a fund manager has a 20% direct interest in a fund.
of such significance that it, in isolation, indicates that the fund The other 80% of the fund is held by third party investors, who
manager is a principal. have delegated their rights with respect to the fund to the fund
manager. When evaluating whether the parent controls the
How we see it fund, it assesses whether the fund manager (which the parent
In most asset management scenarios involving retail controls) would use the power that has been delegated to it by
investors, management will be able to conclude that the the third parties holding the 80% interest, to benefit the parent,
remuneration is commensurate with services provided and since the parent has a 20% direct interest in the fund and could
only includes market terms. This is because otherwise, retail benefit from that power.
investors would take their business elsewhere. As shown in
Diagram 8, when both of those criteria are met, the decision-
maker must evaluate whether the magnitude and exposure to Parent
of fund
variable returns received through the remuneration, together manager
with the other factors, indicates that the decision-maker is an
agent or a principal.
Third
party
investors
Fund Delegated
manager
80%
Delegated
80%
Direct 20%
Fund
Remember that being an investor and having an interest in an IFRS 10 states that if a decision-maker has interests in an
investee is not limited to holding equity or debt instruments. As investee, just by virtue of holding those other interests, the
discussed in Chapter 4, a variety of exposures to variable returns decision-maker may be a principal. In the Basis for Conclusions
can represent an interest and any potential controlling party is to IFRS 10, the IASB notes that a decision-maker might use its
referred to as an investor. decision-making authority primarily to affect its exposure to
variable returns from that interest. That is, the decision-maker
Excerpt from IFRS 10 would have power for its own benefit. The IASB also notes in its
B72 In evaluating its exposure to variability of returns from Basis for Conclusions that it would be inappropriate to conclude
other interests in the investee a decision maker shall that every decision-maker that is obliged, by law or contract (i.e.,
consider the following: having any fiduciary responsibility) to act in the best interests of
other parties is always an agent. This is because it would assume
(a) The greater the magnitude of, and variability
that a decision-maker that is legally or contractually obliged to
associated with, its economic interests, considering
act in the best interests of other parties will always do so, even if
its remuneration and other interests in aggregate,
that decision-maker receives the vast majority of the returns
the more likely the decision maker is a principal.
that are influenced by its decision-making. Accordingly, IFRS 10
(b) Whether its exposure to variability of returns is requires an entity to evaluate the magnitude and variability of its
different from that of the other investors and, if other interests when determining if it is a principal or an agent,
so, whether this might influence its actions. For notwithstanding its fiduciary responsibility.
example, this might be the case when a decision
maker holds subordinated interests in, or provides How we see it
other forms of credit enhancement to, an investee.
Since the magnitude and variability of exposure to returns
The decision maker shall evaluate its exposure relative are considered together with the other factors, there is
to the total variability of returns of the investee. This no bright line as to what level of other direct interests, on
evaluation is made primarily on the basis of returns their own, would cause a decision-maker to be a principal
expected from the activities of the investee but shall or an agent. That is, scope of authority, removal rights, and
not ignore the decision makers maximum exposure remuneration also need to be considered. The examples in
to variability of returns of the investee through other IFRS 10 also do not specify the magnitude and variability of
interests that the decision maker holds. the remuneration.
In certain industries, such as private equity, asset
management and insurance, large direct interests are
common and careful evaluation of this criterion will be
needed. The conclusions reached under IFRS 10 may
differ from those reached under IAS 27 and SIC-12. This is
particularly likely when management previously considered
an investee (such as a fund) to be a structured entity and
concluded that because it did not have a majority of risks
and rewards (even though it had a significant interest, such
as 40%), it was not required to consolidate under SIC-12.
B75 The following are examples of such other parties that, Related
De facto parties
by the nature of their relationship, might act as de facto agents
agents for the investor: (IAS 24)
(d) A party that cannot finance its operations without If a party is determined to be a de facto agent, then its rights and
subordinated financial support from the investor. exposures to variable returns are considered together with those
(e) An investee for which the majority of the members of of the investor when evaluating whether an investor has control of
its governing body or for which its key management an investee. Just because one party is a de facto agent of the
personnel are the same as those of the investor. other party, that does not mean that the de facto agent is
(f) A party that has a close business relationship with controlled by the investor. Consolidation procedures in situations
the investor, such as the relationship between when a de facto agent exists are discussed in Section 9.1.
a professional service provider and one of its
significant clients.
6.1 Customer-supplier relationships
Normally, a typical supplier-customer relationship is not expected
However, just because a party falls within the examples above, that to result in one party being a de facto agent of the other. This is
does not mean that it is necessarily a de facto agent for the investor, because in a typical supplier-customer relationship, one party
as shown in Diagram 9. It simply means that management must cannot direct the other party to act on its behalf, because the
carefully evaluate whether that party is a de facto agent for the activities of each are directed by their respective shareholders
investor. Parties that are actually de facto agents are only a sub-set (and Board of Directors and management).
of this list. Therefore, management must determine whether the However, a party with a close business relationship is an example
other party is acting on behalf of the investor because of its of a de facto agent. Accordingly, where a close business relationship
relationship to the investor. IFRS 10 does not provide much exists between a customer and a supplier, consideration needs to be
explanation on how this evaluation is to be made; IFRS 10 only given to whether the supplier is a de facto agent of the customer.
states that the evaluation considers the nature of the relationship For example, this might be the case if:
and how the parties interact with each other.
An entity has only one significant customer
The customer and supplier have common management or
common shareholders
The customer has the ability to direct product design, sales, etc.
The supplier is a service provider (e.g., investment banker,
attorney) that assists in structuring a transaction
Excerpt from IFRS 10 From an investors perspective, adopting IFRS 10 may change
the conclusions reached uner IAS 27 and SIC-12. This is
B77 An investor shall treat a portion of an investee as a because, in some cases, an investor may not have considered
deemed separate entity if and only if the following the concept of whether a silo existed, and if so, whether the
condition is satisfied: investor controlled that silo, since this was not an explicit
Specified assets of the investee (and related credit requirement in IAS 27 and SIC-12. Under IFRS 10, it is clear
enhancements, if any) are the only source of payment that an investor needs to identify and consolidate any silos
for specified liabilities of, or specified other interests in, that it controls. Accordingly, it is crucial to identify silos early
the investee. Parties other than those with the specified in the process (as discussed in Section 7.2).
liability do not have rights or obligations related to the
specified assets or to residual cash flows from those Identifying whether a silo exists, and whether an investor controls
assets. In substance, none of the returns from the a silo, can be complex. However, the same process outlined in
specified assets can be used by the remaining investee Diagram 1 can be used for silos, with one additional step, as
and none of the liabilities of the deemed separate entity shown in Diagram 10. Understanding the purpose and design of
are payable from the assets of the remaining investee. an investee is critical when identifying whether a silo exists, and if
Thus, in substance, all the assets, liabilities and equity so which investor, if any, has control of that silo.
of that deemed separate entity are ring-fenced from the
overall investee. Such a deemed separate entity is often
called a silo.
Silos
Determine whether a deemed separate entity (a silo) exists. Consider:
Are the specified assets of the investee (and related credit enhancements, if any) the only source of payment for specified
liabilities of, or specified other interests in, the investee?
Do parties other than those with the specified liability have rights or obligations related to the specified assets or to residual cash
flows from those assets?
In substance, can any of the the returns from the specified assets be used by the remaining investee and are any of the the
liabilities of the deemed separate entity payable from the assets of the remaining investee?
Evaluate linkage
Identifying power
7.1 Identifying a silo they potentially control the investee, notwithstanding their lack of
When identifying a silo, it is important to meet the condition equity investment. In addition, there are other investors who have
specified in IFRS 10 (as stated on page 35). Silos are considered equity interests in the investee. In each of these examples, if silos
in three different industries: real estate, banking and insurance in are identified, the investors would need to evaluate if they control
the remainder of this section. the silos, which is discussed in Section 7.2.
7.1.1 Identifying silos in the real estate industry Example 15 Identifying silos in the real estate industry No. 1
Investors should evaluate whether real estate properties that are Each lessee provides a residual value guarantee on the building
collateralised by debt would be considered silos under IFRS 10. it leases, and the investee has debt that is cross-collateralised
The answer will depend on the facts and circumstances of the by the three buildings (i.e., all three of the buildings support
particular case, and may vary depending on how they are funded repayment of the debt).
or collateralised, and what other guarantees are given.
No silos exist. None of the assets is individually the only source
Examples 15-17 illustrate the evaluation of whether silos exist. In of payment for the debt (all three buildings are). In addition,
each example, A, B and C each lease separate buildings (buildings other investors have exposures to variable returns from
A, B and C, respectively) that are owned by an investee (the host/ increases in the value of the buildings.
lessor). A, B and C, are considered investors in the sense that
The investees balance sheet is as follows (recorded on a fair value basis, in CU):
A silo exists for Building A. The lender is the only investor with an exposure to variable returns created by a decrease in the value of
Building A, because it has been wholly financed with nonrecourse debt (i.e., none of the liabilities of the silo are payable from the
other assets of the investee). Furthermore, A is the only investor with an exposure to variable returns created by an increase in the
value of Building A, because of the fixed price purchase option (i.e., if Building A appreciates in value, A, and not other investors, will
receive this benefit).
No silo exists for Building B or C. Although there is debt that is recourse only to the building, the debt is only 50% of the fair value of
Buildings B and C. The remaining fair value is supported by equity that also supports the investees other assets. In addition, other
investors have exposures to variable returns resulting from an increase in the value of Building B and C, because there are no fixed
price purchase options related to these buildings.
No silos exist. Although the lease agreements each contain a residual value guarantee and fixed price purchase option that result in
each lessee having an exposure to variable returns, none of the assets is individually the only source of payment for the debt (the
debt is cross-collateralised by all three buildings).
The terms and conditions of the contractual agreement between the lenders and the structured entity (and the relevant jurisdictional
law) specify that the cash flows from the receivables can only be transferred back to the lender that transferred the receivables into
the structured entity, and cannot be used for any other purpose, even if other receivables are in default.
There is a silo with respect to each group of receivables transferred by each subordinated lender. This is because each group of
transferred receivables, and the cash flows from those receivables, can only be transferred back to the subordinated lender from
which they originated. Other parties (such as the senior lender and equity investors) do not have rights or obligations related to the
transferred receivables or to cash flows from those transferred receivables. In substance, none of the returns from the transferred
receivables can be used by the structured entity and none of the liabilities to the structured entity are payable from the other assets
of the structured entity. Thus, in substance, all the assets, liabilities and equity of the silo (for each group of transferred receivables)
are ring-fenced from the structured entity.
Each lender would then need to evaluate whether it controls that silo (as described in Section 7.2).
7.1.3 Identifying silos in the insurance industry 7.2 Evaluating control of a silo
Insurers should evaluate whether investments made on behalf If a silo exists, the next step is to identify the relevant activities
of insurance contract holders (policyholders) or multi-cell (the activities that most significantly affect the silos returns). Only
reinsurance vehicles would be considered silos under IFRS 10. the relevant activity of that silo would be considered, even if other
The evaluation will depend on the facts and circumstances of the activities affect the returns from other portions of the host.
particular case, and may vary by jurisdiction and by policy, given
the differences in regulatory environments and types of policies The next step is then to identify which rights give an investor the
offered by insurance entities. ability to direct the relevant activity, and which investor, if any,
holds those rights (i.e., who has the power over the silo).
When determining whether policies held are ring-fenced (whether Only rights that affect the relevant activity of the silo would be
a silo exists), relevant facts and circumstances, including local laws considered. Rights that affect relevant activities of other portions
and contractual agreements with the contract holder, must be of the host entity would not be considered.
assessed, some of which are highlighted in Diagram 11. While
listed in isolation, all of the relevant facts and circumstances would To conclude whether an investor has control over the silo, the
need to be considered against the definition of a silo, when investor also evaluates whether the investor has exposure to
determining if a silo exists. As discussed in Section 7.2, if a silo variable returns from that silo, and whether the investor can use
exists, control is evaluated for each silo. However, if a silo does its power over the silo to affect the amount of the investors
not exist, this simply means that the control evaluation is made returns. Only exposure to variable returns from that silo would be
for each entity. considered; exposures to variable returns from other portions of
the host would be excluded.
Diagram 11 Identifying a silo in the insurance industry
7.3 Consolidating a silo
Indicator that Indicator that If an investor concludes that it controls a silo, it consolidates only
silo exists no silo exists the silo. That investor does not consolidate the remaining portions
Who selects the Contract Insurer of the host entity.
investments? holder Similarly, if an investor concludes that it controls a host entity, but
Would other funds beyond No Yes not a silo within that entity, it would only consolidate the host
the specified assets be entity, but exclude the silo.
necessary to fulfil the
obligation to the
policyholder in certain
situations for example,
payment of a death
benefit or annuity
payments?
8.2 Bankruptcy filings and troubled debt Example 24 Troubled debt restructuring
restructurings Consider the same facts as Example 23, except that A and B
Filing for bankruptcy or restructuring a debt will usually trigger agree to restructure the loan, rather than B filing for
re-assessment as to which investor, if any, controls the investee. bankruptcy. During the restructuring, A determines which
While control should be re-assessed at such triggering points, assets will be sold to repay the loan, with management and the
it does not necessarily mean the conclusion as to which entity equity investors agreeing to this plan. In addition, management
consolidates will change. Examples 23 and 24 illustrate agreed to an incentive scheme under which payments are
situations when the control conclusion might change, and result based on asset sale and loan repayment targets.
in a bank consolidating an entity that it had previously concluded
Upon restructuring the loan, A would need to evaluate
it did not control.
whether determining which assets should be sold to repay the
Example 23 Bankruptcy filing loan gives A power. This might be the case if voting rights do
not give power over B, because management is required to
A made a loan to B. Because of As position as a senior creditor,
comply with the asset sale plan mandated by A.
if B defaults on the loan, A has the right to direct B to sell
certain assets to repay the loan to A. In its initial assessment of Before concluding which investors, if any, control B,
control, A concluded that this right was a protective right, consideration would also be given to what rights the equity
because it concluded that defaulting on the loan would be an investors have, if any, to direct the relevant activities of B, and
exceptional circumstance. Consequently, this right did not give also to whether A and the equity investors have exposure to
A power over B, and therefore, A did not control B. A concluded variable returns from B.
that the voting rights, which are held by the equity investors,
give the equity investors power over B. In some jurisdictions, it is possible that a trustee or court
administrator may have power (and possibly control) over an
B later defaults on the loan and files for bankruptcy, giving A investee that files for bankruptcy. In such situations,
the right to direct B to sell certain assets to repay the loan to consideration needs to be given not only to whether the trustee
A. Upon B filing for bankruptcy, A would need to evaluate has power, but also whether it has an exposure to variable returns
whether having this right, which was previously protective, from the investee, and if so, whether it has the ability to use that
gives A power. This would be the case if As right to direct B to power to affect its exposure to variable returns. In many cases, a
sell its assets is the activity that most significantly affects As trustee or court administrator might have power, but this power is
returns. A may delegate this right to another party, such as a held as an agent (see Chapter 5), and thus it would not control the
trustee or an administrator, who might be acting as As agent. investee. However, a determination will need to be made whether
Before concluding which investors, if any, control B once it the trustee or court administrator is an agent for a specific lender,
files for bankruptcy, consideration would also be given to what or for the creditors as a group. This will depend on individual facts
rights the equity investors have, if any, to direct the relevant and circumstances for the jurisdiction.
activities of B, and also to whether A and the equity investors In the situations in Examples 23 and 24, it might be determined
have exposure to variable returns from B. that the lender obtained control over the investee. In this case,
judgement will also be needed to determine the date at which the
lender obtained control over the investee. Is it the date that the
investee filed for bankruptcy or restructured the debt? Or, did the
lender obtain control over the investee before the actual filing, or
restructuring, when it became evident that the investee would
likely have to file for bankruptcy or restructure the debt?
8.3 Control re-assessment as a result of action While the situation in Example 25 might be uncommon,
by others management should consider what systems and processes are
needed to monitor external events for changes that could trigger
An investor may gain or lose power over an investee as a result re-assessment (see Section 13.2 ). Without knowledge of such
of action by others (i.e., without direct involvement in the events, and a process for gathering this information, it may be
change in circumstances). IFRS 10 gives the example of a difficult to determine the date when the other voters became
substantive decision-making right held by an investor that sufficiently dispersed or disorganised to conclude that the
lapses. In such cases, it might be more difficult to determine investor had control. Depending on the facts and circumstances
whether an event has happened that would cause an investor to (particularly in the case of de facto control), there could be a lag
re-assesses control, because the information might not be in the period between when the facts and circumstances actually
publicly available. Consider the situation in Example 25. change, and when management is able to conclude that the
investor has control.
A
48% B A B
48%
A holds 48% of the voting rights of B, with the remaining 52% Over time, some of the shareholders begin to consolidate their
being widely dispersed. In its initial assessment, A concludes interests, such that eventually, the 52% is held by a much smaller
that the absolute size of its holding, relative to the other group of shareholders. Depending on the regulatory environment,
shareholdings, gives it power over B. and rights held by A regarding the right to receive information
when shareholders acquire other interests in B, it is possible,
although perhaps unlikely, that A would not be aware of this
occurrence. Nonetheless, it would seem that IFRS 10 would
require A to re-evaluate whether it has control over B, because the
other shareholders are no longer widely dispersed, and thus A may
not have the current ability to direct the relevant activities of B.
Chapter 10 Disclosures
IFRS 12 combines the disclosure requirements for an entitys When complying with the disclosure requirements of IFRS 12, an
interests in subsidiaries, joint arrangements, associates and entity may aggregate the disclosures for interests in similar
structured entities into one comprehensive disclosure standard. entities if that would be consistent with meeting the objective of
Many of the disclosure requirements were previously included in the disclosures and would not obscure the information provided.
IAS 27, IAS 31 and IAS 28, while others are new. IFRS 12 states that when determining whether to aggregate
information, quantitative and qualitative information about the
In the remainder of Chapter 10, we describe the disclosure
different risk and return characteristics and the significance of
requirements of IFRS 12 with respect to subsidiaries (controlled
each investee to the investor are both considered.
investees), including structured entities that are consolidated,
and unconsolidated structured entities. Disclosure requirements At a minimum, IFRS 12 notes that an investor must separately
in IFRS 12 related to joint arrangements and associates are present information for interests in:
discussed in our forthcoming Applying IFRS publication on Subsidiaries
IFRS 11. Joint ventures
IFRS 12 will be adopted retrospectively in accordance with IAS 8, Joint operations
which means that disclosures for the comparative periods are also Associates
required upon adoption. An entity is encouraged to voluntarily
Unconsolidated structured entities
disclose any of the information that would be required by IFRS 12
prior to adopting IFRS 12, if such information would be An investor is also required to disclose how it aggregated its
meaningful to users of its financial statements. interests in similar entities.
The effects of those interests on its financial position, financial The requirement in IFRS 12 is more expansive than the
performance, and cash flows requirement in IAS 27, which only required entities to disclose
circumstances when: (1) a subsidiary was consolidated and the
Excerpts from IFRS 12 parent owned less than a majority of voting rights; and (2) an
investee was not consolidated, and the investor owned more
3 If the disclosures required by this IFRS, together with
than a majority of voting rights. This change in the disclosure
disclosures required by other IFRSs, do not meet
requirements reflects the degree of judgement that is required
the objective in paragraph 1, an entity shall disclose
to determine whether an entity is controlled, and therefore,
whatever additional information is necessary to meet
consolidated. For example, an entity is required to disclose how it
that objective.
evaluated potential voting rights (e.g., options) and whether it is a
4 An entity shall consider the level of detail necessary to principal or an agent.
satisfy the disclosure objective and how much emphasis
to place on each of the requirements in this IFRS. It shall
aggregate or disaggregate disclosures so that useful
information is not obscured by either the inclusion of a
large amount of insignificant detail or the aggregation of
items that have different characteristics.
24 An entity shall disclose information that enables users of its financial statements:
(a) To understand the nature and extent of its interests in unconsolidated structured entities; and
(b) To evaluate the nature of, and changes in, the risks associated with its interests in unconsolidated structured entities.
25 The information required by paragraph 24(b) includes information about an entitys exposure to risk from involvement that
it had with unconsolidated structured entities in previous periods (eg sponsoring the structured entity), even if the entity no
longer has any contractual involvement with the structured entity at the reporting date.
26 An entity shall disclose qualitative and quantitative information about its interests in unconsolidated structured entities, including,
but not limited to, the nature, purpose, size and activities of the structured entity and how the structured entity is financed.
27 If an entity has sponsored an unconsolidated structured entity for which it does not provide information required by
paragraph 29 (eg because it does not have an interest in the entity at the reporting date), the entity shall disclose:
(a) How it has determined which structured entities it has sponsored;
(b) Income from those structured entities during the reporting period, including a description of the types of income
presented; and
(c) The carrying amount (at the time of transfer) of all assets transferred to those structured entities during the reporting period.
28 An entity shall present the information in paragraph 27(b) and (c) in tabular format, unless another format is more appropriate,
and classify its sponsoring activities into relevant categories.
An example of the disclosures required by paragraphs 27(b) and (c) of IFRS 12 is shown in Example 27.
Example 27 Disclosures for unconsolidated structured entities for which the entity does not have an interest at the
reporting date
Total income for the year ended
Type of asset in unconsolidated entity 20X3 20X2 20X1
CU million CU million CU million
Collateralised debt obligations 1,025 820 697
Residential mortgage-backed securities 6,055 4,844 4,117
Commercial mortgage-backed securities 878 703 597
Assets under lease 332 265 226
Credit card receivables 189 151 128
Total 8,479 6,783 5,765
Income from a structured entity includes, but is not limited to, When evaluating whether an entity has an interest in a structured
recurring and non-recurring: entity (to determine if the information required by paragraph 27
Fees of IFRS 12 is required or not), an interest refers to any
Interest contractual or non-contractual involvement that exposes it to
variability of returns from the performance of the structured
Dividends
entity (see Chapter 4). For example, it includes:
Gains or losses on the remeasurement or derecognition of an Equity or debt instruments
interest in a structured entity
Provision of funding, liquidity support, credit enhancement and
Gains or losses from the transfer of assets and liabilities to a guarantees
structured entity
Any means by which an entity has control, joint control, or
significant influence over another entity
However, a typical customer/supplier relationship would generally
not be considered an interest in another entity.
29 An entity shall disclose in tabular format, unless another format is more appropriate, a summary of:
(a) The carrying amounts of the assets and liabilities recognised in its financial statements relating to its interests in
unconsolidated structured entities.
(b) The line items in the statement of financial position in which those assets and liabilities are recognised.
(c) The amount that best represents the entitys maximum exposure to loss from its interests in unconsolidated structured
entities, including how the maximum exposure to loss is determined. If an entity cannot quantify its maximum exposure to
loss from its interests in unconsolidated structured entities it shall disclose that fact and the reasons.
(d) A comparison of the carrying amounts of the assets and liabilities of the entity that relate to its interests in unconsolidated
structured entities and the entitys maximum exposure to loss from those entities.
30 If during the reporting period an entity has, without having a contractual obligation to do so, provided financial or other
support to an unconsolidated structured entity in which it previously had or currently has an interest (for example, purchasing
assets of or instruments issued by the structured entity), the entity shall disclose:
(a) The type and amount of support provided, including situations in which the entity assisted the structured entity in
obtaining financial support; and
(b) The reasons for providing the support.
31 An entity shall disclose any current intentions to provide financial or other support to an unconsolidated structured entity,
including intentions to assist the structured entity in obtaining financial support.
Example 28 illustrates how an entity might provide the quantitative information required by paragraphs 29(a) and (c). However, an entity
also needs to disclose the qualitative information required by IFRS 12, as well as comparative information.
Example 28 Quantitative disclosures for structured entities in which there is still an interest at the end of the reporting period
At 31 December 20X3
Maximum exposure to loss in unconsolidated structured entities
Chapter 11 Transition
IFRS 10, IFRS 11, IFRS 12 and the consequential amendments to For example, if an entity is consolidating an investee that it
IAS 27 and IAS 28 are effective for annual periods beginning on obtained control of in 2008 (as determined under IFRS 10), it
or after 1 January 2013. The new standards may be adopted generally would apply IFRS 3 (before the 2008 revisions),
early, but must be adopted as a package. That is, the new because IFRS 3 (2008) was effective prospectively for business
standards must all be adopted as of the same date, except that an combinations occurring on or after 1 January 2010, for
entity may early adopt the disclosure provisions for IFRS 12 calendar year-end entities. One exception might be if an entity
without adopting the other new standards. These new standards had no other acquisitions in any of the periods presented, and
are applied on a retrospective basis, although certain practical therefore, had never previously applied IFRS 3 (before the 2008
exceptions are given, as described in more detail in the remainder revisions). In contrast, if an entity is consolidating an investee
of Chapter 11. that it obtained control of in 2010 (as determined under IFRS
10), it would apply IFRS 3 (2008), using the same logic.
As a reminder, IAS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements requires
entities to present a third balance sheet (as of the beginning of the 11.1.2 Investee is not a business
earliest comparative period) when an entity adopts a new If an investee does not meet the definition of a business,
accounting standard retrospectively, which is the case for IFRS 10. as defined in IFRS 3, then the investor measures the assets,
liabilities and non-controlling interests in that previously
11.1 Newly consolidating an investee unconsolidated investee applying the acquisition method as
If, upon adopting IFRS 10, an investor determines that it controls described in IFRS 3. For example, this means that the assets
an investee that was previously not consolidated, the investor and liabilities of the investee are recognised at fair value
applies acquisition accounting as of the date on which it obtained (except as specified in IFRS 3).
control. In addition to following the applicable accounting
This method differs from the measurement method that is
described in the sections below, the investor provides comparative
typically used for acquisitions of assets, or a group of assets that
information and disclosures in accordance with IAS 8.
is not a business. When an investor typically acquires assets or a
11.1.1 Investee is a business group of assets that are not a business (i.e., outside of transition
If the investee is a business, the investor uses IFRS 3 to to IFRS 10), paragraph 2(b) of IFRS 3 requires the investor to
consolidate the investee (recognising its assets and liabilities recognise assets acquired based on their relative fair value of
on a fair value basis) as if it had been consolidated (acquired) the total cost. In such cases, IFRS 10 states that although the
on the date when the investor obtained control. However, if acquisition method in IFRS 3 is applied, the investor does not
it is impracticable (as defined in IAS 8) to apply IFRS 10 on a recognise any goodwill. Rather, any difference between the
retrospective basis, consolidation of the controlled investee and, amount of assets, liabilities and non-controlling interests
therefore, acquisition accounting is required from the earliest date recognised and the previous carrying amount of the investors
practicable, which may be the current period. Practical issues with involvement with the investee is recognised in equity.
retrospective consolidation are addressed in Section 11.3. IFRS 10 does not specify how transaction costs, contingent
In both cases, the investor recognises any difference between consideration and tax effects of the consolidation are treated
the amount of assets (including goodwill), liabilities and non- when the investee does not meet the definition of a business.
controlling interests recognised at the deemed acquisition date Given that the transition specified in IFRS 10 is a hybrid of the
and any previously recognised amounts from its involvement as normal IFRS 3 acquisition method and the normal method applied
an adjustment to equity. for non-business acquisitions, it is not entirely clear which
treatment applies. It seems that transaction costs, contingent
IFRS 10 does not specify which version of IFRS 3 is required to consideration, and taxes would be recognised using the normal
be used (IFRS 3 was amended in January 2008, and became methodology applied for non-business acquisitions (e.g.,
effective for business combinations in annual periods beginning transaction costs could be capitalised in the cost of the asset).
on or after 1 July 2009). However, IAS 8 requires that an
entity apply consistent accounting policies. This implies that Similar to the transition provisions when an investee is a business,
an entity would generally apply the version of IFRS 3 to a if it is impracticable (as defined in IAS 8) to apply IFRS 10 on a
newly-consolidated investee that was appropriate for the period. retrospective basis, consolidation of the controlled investee
(and acquisition accounting) is required from the earliest date
practicable. This might be as of the current period.
11.2 Requirements for comparative periods In C4-C6 of IFRS 10, references are made to the date of initial
IFRS 10 will be adopted retrospectively, which means that application. A question was posed to the IFRS Interpretations
IFRS 10 is also applied in the comparative period (assuming it Committee as to whether the date of initial application in
is not impracticable to do so). When applying IFRS 10 in the IFRS 10 means:
comparative period, consider the following fact pattern: The beginning of the first reporting period in which the
Under IAS 27/SIC-12, an investee is not consolidated as of entity adopts the standard (i.e., the current period)
1 January 2012 Or
If IFRS 10 had been applied as of 1 January 2012, the investee The beginning of the earliest period presented in the first
would have been consolidated financial statements in which the entity adopts IFRS 10
During 2012, the investor sells the interest in the investee (or In its September 2011 meeting, the IFRS Interpretations
re-negotiates the terms of its arrangements), such that as of Committee tentatively decided that the latter was meant.
1 January 2013, when applying IFRS 10, the investee is not
controlled by the investor How we see it
IFRS 10 is adopted as of 1 January 2013 (the mandatory In the fact pattern at left, this means that the comparative
effective date in IFRS 10) financial statements should be restated to show the investee
When publishing its 2013 financial statements (with 2012 as being consolidated on 1 January 2012, and then de-
comparatives), is the investee consolidated on 1 January 2012, and consolidated as of the date that the investor no longer had
then de-consolidated whenever the interest was sold or terms were control, which would likely be the date that the interest was
renegotiated? Or are the 2012 financial statements unchanged? sold or the terms were renegotiated. In the fact pattern
at left, the facts and circumstances are evaluated as they
Excerpt from IFRS 10 existed at 1 January 2012, and then re-assessed thereafter
when facts and circumstances indicate that one of the three
C2 An entity shall apply this IFRS retrospectively, in
elements of control have changed.
accordance with IAS 8 Accounting Policies, Changes in
Accounting Estimates and Errors, except as specified in
If an investee was consolidated under IAS 27 or SIC-12, and
paragraphs C3C6.
remains consolidated under IFRS 10, no changes to the
C3 When applying this IFRS for the first time, an entity is
accounting for that investee are needed. This means, for
not required to make adjustments to the accounting for
example, that an investor is not required to apply IFRS 3 (2008)
its involvement with either:
to businesses that were consolidated before it adopted IFRS 3
(a) Entities that were previously consolidated in (2008), since IFRS 3 (2008) was effective prospectively to
accordance with IAS 27 Consolidated and Separate business combinations on or after 1 January 2010 for calendar
Financial Statements and SIC-12 Consolidation year-end entities.
Special Purpose Entities and, in accordance with
this IFRS, continue to be consolidated; or Similarly, if an investee was consolidated under IAS 27 or
SIC-12, and remains consolidated under IFRS 10, the
(b) Entities that were previously unconsolidated
prospective amendments to IAS 27 (2008) continue to be
in accordance with IAS 27 and SIC-12 and, in
accounted for prospectively from the date the amendments
accordance with this IFRS, continue not to be
were originally adopted. The IAS 27 (2008) amendments
consolidated.
changed how an entity allocates profit or loss to a controlling
interest and a non-controlling interest. The amendments also
changed the accounting for transactions with a non-controlling
interest (e.g., acquisition of a minority interest), and the
accounting upon loss of control of a subsidiary.
11.3 Practical issues with retrospective If it is determined that the investor obtained control over the
consolidation investee at the same date as was used for the purchase price
allocation of the associate or jointly controlled entity, the investor
When determining whether it is practicable to adopt IFRS 10
would generally use the same purchase price allocation for
retrospectively, or whether to use a later date, which may be the
consolidation upon adoption of IFRS 10.
current period, as permitted by IFRS 10 (see Section 11.1.1), there
are several practical issues to consider, which are discussed in the However, in practice, the nature of such purchase price allocations
remainder of Section 11.3. might have varied, depending on the materiality of the associate or
jointly controlled entity to the group. That is, it is not uncommon to
When retrospectively adopting IFRS 10, care should be taken to
perform a very high-level purchase price allocation when the
avoid using hindsight; rather, judgements and estimates should be
interest was deemed immaterial to the financial statements.
based on facts and circumstances that existed at the time.
How we see it
11.3.1 Purchase price allocations
If an investee is determined to be controlled under IFRS 10, then it Whether the purchase price allocation that was originally
will need to be consolidated, as described in Chapter 9, and a performed continues to be adequate, based on the revised
purchase price allocation under IFRS 3 will be needed as of the materiality of that investee to the group, is a matter of
date that control was obtained. judgement. In addition, a new purchase price allocation may
need to be obtained if the dates of gaining control differ
The investor may have previously accounted for the investee as
from the date that the interest in the associate or jointly
an associate under the equity method or jointly controlled entity
controlled entity was obtained.
under the equity method or using proportionate consolidation. In
this case, the investor would typically have performed a purchase
price allocation and recognised its share of the net fair value of 11.3.2 Goodwill impairment
the associates (or jointly controlled entitys) identifiable assets When changing the accounting for an investee from the equity
and liabilities based on valuations obtained as of that date. method to consolidation, the goodwill impairment issues in
Diagram 12 may arise.
When to test for IAS 28 requires the equity- Goodwill and the acquired assets If goodwill is now being
impairment accounted investment to be are recognised as separate recognised, an investor will
tested for impairment when assets under IFRS 3. Goodwill is have to test goodwill for
there are indicators that the tested for impairment at least impairment when consolidating
investment is impaired (as listed annually, and other assets are for the first time, even if no
in IAS 39), measured in tested when indicators exist, in indicators existed.
accordance with IAS 36.4 accordance with IAS 36.
What is tested The entire equity-accounted Only the assets for which there Each CGUs impairment analysis
investment is tested for are indicators, or cash-generating and the allocation of impairment
impairment. units (CGUs) containing goodwill losses may be affected.
are tested for impairment.
Reversal of Because the embedded goodwill Goodwill impairment cannot be Any impairment that was
impairment is considered an element of the reversed. Impairments of other reversed might not be permitted
equity method investee, an acquired assets can be reversed, when consolidated.
impairment can be reversed if certain criteria are met.
(if certain criteria are met).
As a part of the deliberations ultimately leading to the issuance Accordingly, perhaps consideration should be given to
of IFRS 10, the IASB received many letters noting that for providing an accounting policy choice to entities that meet the
investment entities, rather than enhancing decision-useful criteria to be an investment entity, but who have determined,
information, consolidating the controlled investment actually based on an assessment of their facts and circumstances, that
obscures such information. This feedback was persuasive, and consolidation would provide more decision-useful information
together, the IASB and the FASB (the Boards) developed a about their controlled entities.
proposal for a converged definition of an investment entity,
which is based on the definition under current US GAAP and However, a parent of an investment entity would consolidate all
other non-authoritative guidance. If finalised, this ED would entities it controls, including those controlled through a subsidiary
amend IFRS 10 to require investment entities to measure all that is an investment entity, unless the parent itself is an
controlled investments at fair value. Coupled with the FASBs investment entity (see Diagram 14). This is expected to be the
expected proposed modifications to US GAAPs definition of an main difference between the FASB and IASB proposals. The FASBs
investment entity (an investment company under US GAAP) this expected proposal would continue to allow the parent to retain the
proposal represents a significant step towards converging IFRS investment entitys fair value accounting, even if the parent is not
and current US GAAP for investment entities. an investment entity. Under both proposals, the investment entity
(e.g., a fund) would account for its controlled investments at fair
12.2.1 Key principles for an investment entity value in its own financial statements.
The ED proposes that an investment entity would be required to
In its Basis for Conclusions to the ED, the IASB raised concern that
measure all investments at fair value through profit or loss.
a parent not meeting the criteria to be an investment entity would
use the exemption, even though its controlled entities are integral
to the groups business as a whole. For this reason, the IASB
proposed the accounting described above to prevent abuse.
Parent entity
(not an Under the proposal in the ED, the parent entity
investment entity) consolidates the fund in accordance with IFRS 10.
60%
Non-controlling Fund
interest (investment Under the proposal in the ED, the fund accounts
40% entity) for the controlled investment on a fair value basis.
100%
Investment
in an entity
How we see it
If the criteria to be an investment entity are properly defined, some would consider it appropriate that the parent of an
investment entity that is not an investment entity should be able to retain the fair value accounting applied by its subsidiary
qualifying as an investment entity in the parents consolidated financial statements (consistent with the expected FASB proposal).
Proponents of this view generally believe that if fair value provides the most decision-useful information in the financial
statements of the investment entity, it also provides the most decision-useful information in the groups financial statements.
Furthermore, proponents of the expected FASB proposal generally believe that it would be unlikely that a conglomerate and its
subsidiaries would be an investment entity. Additionally, proponents of the FASB approach also believe that the FASB and IASB
should converge on this point.
Criteria Description in ED
Nature of investment activity The entitys only substantive activities are investing in multiple investments for capital
appreciation, distributions (such as dividends) or interest, or any combination of all
three.
Business purpose The entity makes an explicit commitment to a group of investors that the purpose of the
entity is investing to provide returns from capital appreciation, distributions (such as
dividends) or interest, or any combination of all three. To meet this criterion, an entity
would need to have an exit strategy (to realise any benefits from capital appreciation).
Unit ownership Ownership in the entity is represented by units of investments, such as ordinary shares
or partnership interests, to which proportionate shares of net assets are attributed.
Pooling of funds The funds of the entitys investors are pooled to avail the investors of professional
investment management. The entity has investors who are unrelated to the investment
entitys parent (if any), and in the aggregate hold a significant ownership interests in the
entity.
Fair value management Substantially all of the investments of the entity are managed, and their performance
evaluated, on a fair value basis.
IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement defines fair value and describes how to measure
fair value.
Provides financial information The entity provides financial information about its investment activities to its investors.
The entity can be, but does not need to be, a legal entity.
How we see it
How we see it
Conclusion
Some investors will control investees that they did not consolidate Even though the effective date of IFRS 10 is not until 1 January
under IAS 27 and SIC-12. Other investors will not consolidate 2013, current activities with respect to merger and acquisitions
investees that were consolidated under IAS 27 and SIC-12. and with respect to creating new entities could have a lasting
Whether an investor will consolidate more or fewer investees impact on the financial statements. Structured entities continue to
under IFRS 10, as compared to IAS 27 and SIC-12, will depend on increase in many industries, not just in banking and capital
the nature of its interests in its investees. The method of assessing markets, as entities look to monetise investments and distribute
whether an investee is consolidated under IFRS 10 will be the risk. Management should consider the impact of IFRS 10 when
same, regardless of whether the relevant activities of that investee negotiating new arrangements or modifying existing ones.
are directed by voting rights, or not, that is, regardless of whether An early analysis will help avoid surprises and ease transition.
the investee is a structured entity.
5 Not a defined term in IFRS 10, IFRS 11 or IFRS 12, but rather inferred from the standards.