Professional Documents
Culture Documents
(Seoane v. Franco, G.R. No. 7859, February 12, have been presented to the plaintiff's intestate on
1913) the 8th of August, 1911. Nothing has been paid
either of principal or of interest.
FIRST DIVISION We are of the opinion that this case falls within the
provisions of article 1128 of the Civil Code, which
[G.R. No. 7859. February 12, 1913.] reads as follows:
"1128. When the obligation does not fix a term, but
VICTORIA SEOANE, administratrix of The Intestate it can be inferred from its nature and circumstance
Estate of Eduardo Fargas, plaintiff-appellee, vs. that there was an intention of granting it to the
CATALINA FRANCO, administratrix and The Intestate debtor, the courts shall fix the duration of such a
Estate of Manuel Franco, defendant-appellant. term.
"The courts shall also fix the duration of a term when
Ramon Salimus for appellant. it may have been left at the will of the debtor."
The obligation in question seems to leave the
Gibbs, McDonough & Blanco for appellee. duration of the period for the payment thereof to
the will of the debtor. It appears also that it was the
SYLLABUS intention of the instrument to give the debtor time
within which to pay the obligation. In such cases
1. MORTGAGE REDEEMABLE AT THE WILL OF THE this court has held, on several occasions, that the
DEBTOR. A mortgage was executed on the 13th obligation is not due and payable until an action
day of October, 1884, to secure the payment of the has been commenced by the mortgagee against
sum of P4,876.01, the mortgagor agreeing to pay the mortgagor for the purpose of having the court
the sum "little by little." Held: That the obligation was fix the date on and after which the instrument shall
payable at the will of the debtor. be payable and the date of maturity is fixed in
2. ID.; OBLIGATION NOT DUE UNTIL ACTION pursuance thereof. The case of Eleizegui vs. The
BROUGHT AND DATE FIXED BY COURT. Where it is Manila Lawn Tennis Club (2 Phil. Rep., 309), in which
apparent from the nature of the obligation and the the opinion was written by the Chief Justice of the
circumstances of the case that there was an court, is the leading case upon the subject. In that
intention to grant to the debtor a time for payment case the question was over the duration of a lease
and such time has been left to the will of the concerning "a piece of land for a fixed
debtor, the obligation is not due and payable until consideration and to endure at the will of the
an action has been commenced by the creditor lease." In discussing the question the court said (p.
against the debtor for the purpose of having the 310):
court fix the date on and after which the obligation "With respect to the term of the lease the present
is payable and, in pursuance of said action, such question has arisen. In its discussion three theories
date has been fixed. have been presented: One which makes the
3. ID.; ID.; PREMATURE ACTION; DISMISSAL. An duration depend upon the will of the lessor, who,
action to recover upon such an obligation, before upon one month's makes it dependent upon the
a time for payment has been set by the court will of the leasee, as stipulated; and the third, in
pursuant to an action for the purpose, is premature accordance with which the right is reserved to the
and must be dismissed upon the proper court to fix the duration of the term."
representations. The clause on which the case turns is as follows (p.
4. ID.; ID.; STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. An action for 312):
the purpose of having the court set the date of "Mr. Williamson, or whether may succeed him as
maturity of an obligation of the character above secretary of the club, may terminate this lease
described must be brought within ten years from whenever desired without other formality than that
the time when the Code of Civil Procedure went of giving a month's notice. The owners of the land
into effect under section 38 of said Code. undertake to maintain the club as tenant as long as
DECISION the latter shall see fit."
Considering the case the court said (p. 314):
MORELAND, J p: "The Civil Code has made provision for such a case
in all kinds of obligations. In speaking in general of
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of obligations with a term it has supplied the
First Instance of Zamboanga in favor of the plaintiff, deficiency of the former law with respect to the
holding that the right of action upon the mortgage duration of the term when it has been left to the will
debt which was the basis of the claim presented of the debtor,' and provides that in this case the
against the plaintiff's estate had prescribed. term shall be fixed by the courts. (Art. 1128, sec. 2.)
In every contract, as laid down by the authorities,
The mortgage in question was executed on the there is always a creditor who is entitled to demand
13th of October, 1884, to secure the payment of the performance, and a debtor upon whom rests
the sum of P4,876.01, the mortgagor agreeing to the obligation to perform the undertaking. In
pay the sum "little by little." The claim appears to bilateral contracts the contracting parties are
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mutually creditors and debtors. Thus, in this contract "The trial court, therefore, acted in the present case,
of lease, the lessee is the creditor with respect to by law in exercising the said power in the present
the rights enumerated in article 1554, and is the case, by fixing the duration of the period on the
debtor with respect to the obligations imposed by basis that the payment of the debt should be made
articles 1555 and 1561. The term within which at the rate of P200 a month; and we see no abuse
performance of the latter obligation is due is what of judicial discretion in fixing such a rate,
has been left to the will of the debtor. This term it is considering the importance of the obligation and
which must be fixed by the courts. the absence of any stipulation of interest in favor of
"The only action which can be maintained under the creditors."
the terms of the contract is that by which it is sought From these decisions it is clear that the instrument
to obtain from the judge the determination of this sued upon in the case at bar is one which leaves
period, and not the unlawful detainer action which the period of payment at the will of the mortgagor.
has been brought an action which presupposes Such being the case, as action should have been
the expiration of the term and makes it the duty of brought for the purpose of having the court set a
the judge to simply decree an eviction. To maintain date on which the instrument should become due
the latter action it is sufficient to show the expiration and payable. Until such action was prosecuted no
of the term of the contract, whether conventional suit could be instrument. It is, therefore, clear that
or legal; in order to decree the relief to be granted this action is premature. The instrument has been
in the former action it is necessary for the judge to sued upon before it is due. The action must
look into the character and conditions of the accordingly be dismissed.
mutual undertakings with a view to supplying the Ordinarily when an action of this sort is dismissed the
lacking element of a time at which the lease is to plaintiff may at once begin his action for the
expire." purpose of fixing a date upon which the instrument
The case of Barretto vs. The City of Manila (7 Phil. shall become due. From the undisputed facts in this
Rep., 416) dealt with a case where the terms of a case and from the facts and conditions that very
donation did not fix the time of the performance of probably cannot be charged hereafter, it is our
the condition placed upon the donation, and the present opinion that such action is itself prescribed.
court held that the period must be determined by Section 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads
the court in a proper action in accordance with follows:
article 1128 of the Civil Code, saying (p. 420): "SEC. 38. To what this chapter does not apply.
"The contract having fixed no period in which the This chapter shall not apply to actions already
condition should be fulfilled, the provisions of article commenced, or to cases wherein the right of
1128 of the Civil Code are applicable and it is the action has already accrued; but the statutes in
duty of the court to fix a suitable time for its force when the action or right of action accrued
fulfillment. Eleizegui vs. The Manila Lawn Tennis Club shall be applicable to such cases according to the
, 2 Phil. Rep., 309." (11 Phil. Rep., 624. 1 ) subject of the action and without regard to the
In the case of Levy Hermanos vs. Paterno (18 Phil. form; nor shall this chapter apply in the case of a
Rep., 353) the court said (p. 355): continuing and subsisting trust, nor to an action by
"The defendant having bound himself to pay his the vendee of real property in possession thereof to
debt to the plaintiffs in partial payments, as set forth obtain the conveyance of it: Provided,
in the note in question, it is seen that the obligation nevertheless, That all rights of action which have
is one of payment by installments, since its fulfillment already accrued, except those named in the last
cannot be required immediately nor does its preceding paragraph, must be vindicated by the
existence depend upon the happening of any commencement of an action or proceeding to
particular event. But, though the obligation is one of enforce the same within ten years after this Act
payment by installments, nevertheless no fixed day comes into effect."
was specified for its fulfillment, so that the period for
payment is undetermined or was not fixed by the This section evidently covers all rights of action of
parties when they executed the contract. Besides, it whatever kind or nature, except those which have
is evident that the term for payment was granted special limitations and re referred to in subsequent
for the exclusive benefit of the defendant and for sections. A right of action to fix a day for the
his own convenience, as by the language of he determination of the time of payment is included
document, the plaintiffs gained nothing by the fact within the terms of this section. The mortgage in
that the debt was not immediately demandable. question having left the period of payment to the
Nor was any interest stipulated on the debt during will of the mortgagor, an action could have been
the time that it should remain unpaid by the maintained by the mortgagee at any time after its
defendant. For the foregoing reasons, and in execution for the naming of a date on which the
whatever manner this case be considered, it is instrument must be paid in full. That right of action
unquestionable that it falls within the provisions of accrued as soon as the instrument was executed.
article 1128 of the Civil Code. . . . Such action, therefore, falls within the provisions of
"The obligation being manifestly defective with section 38, and not having been commenced
regard to the duration of the period granted to the within the ten years next following the 1st day of
debtor, that is, to the defendant, that defect which October, 1901, such action cannot, under the facts
shall determine the said duration, under the power as they now appear, be maintained.
expressly granted them for such purpose by the While the expression of an opinion as to the
legal provisions just above transcribed. prescription of the action to fix a date for the
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maturity of the obligation in question is unnecessary donation, providing a special period of five years
for a complete resolution of the case before us, still for the revocation by the subsequent birth of
we do not hesitate to express that opinion for the children (art. 646, Civil Code), and one year for the
reasons which we have heretofore given in one or revocation by reason of ingratitude. If no special
two other cases, particularly that of Lichauco vs. period is provided for the prescription of the action
Limjuco (19 Phil. Rep., 12). That case went off upon for revocation for noncompliance of the conditions
the finding of the court that the action could not of the donation (art. 647, Civil Code), it is because,
be maintained by the plaintiff, Lichauco, on behalf in this respect, the donation is considered onerous
of his brothers and sisters and upon that finding the and is governed by the law or contracts and the
complaint was dismissed. While the merits in that general rules of prescription. Under the laws in force
case were not necessarily before us, we (sec. 43, Code of Civ. Proc.) the period of
nevertheless took up the facts as they appeared prescription of this class; of action is ten years.
and expressed our opinion of what the result of the DECISION
case would be upon the merits if its subsequently
came before us upon the same facts. In that case AVANCEA, C.J p:
we said (p. 17):
"We believe, however, that, for the information of On October 18, 1910, Concepcion Cirer and James
the parties interested in the subject matter of this Hill, the owners of parcel of land No. 2 referred to in
action and to the end that unnecessary litigation the complaint, donated it perpetually to the
may be avoided, the opinion of the court should be municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, under
given upon the facts presented in this case. certain conditions specified in the public document
Knowing what our opinion is upon these facts it is in which they made this donation. The donation
probable that the heirs will not care to pursue the was accepted by Mr. Santiago de Jesus in the
litigation further unless, which is somewhat unlikely, same document on behalf of the municipal council
they are able to present new facts. We, therefore, of Tarlac of which he was the municipal president.
proceed to a consideration of the case upon the The parcel thus donated was later registered in the
merits as presented by the record." name of the donee, the municipality of Tarlac. On
The judgment is affirmed, with cost against the January 15, 1921, Concepcion Cirer and James Hill
appellant. So ordered. sold this parcel to the herein plaintiff George L.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, and Trent, JJ., concur. Parks. On August 24, 1923, the municipality of Tarlac
transferred the parcel to the Province of Tarlac
(Parks v. Prov. of Tarlac, G.R. No. 24190, July 13, which, by reason of this transfer, applied for and
1926) obtained the registration thereof in its name, the
corresponding certificate of title having been
EN BANC issued to it.
[G.R. No. 24190. July 13, 1926.] The plaintiff, George L. Parks, alleging that the
conditions of the donation had not been complied
GEORGE L. PARKS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. TARLAC, with and invoking the sale of this parcel of land
MUNICIPALITY OF TARLAC, CONCEPCION CIRER, made by Concepcion Cirer and James Hill in his
and JAMES HILL, her husband, defendants- favor, brought this action against the Province of
appellees. Tarlac, the municipality of Tarlac, Concepcion Cirer
and James Hill and prayed that he be declared the
Jos. N. Wolfson for appellant. absolute owner entitled to the possession of this
parcel, that the transfer of the same by the
Provincial Fiscal Lopez de Jesus for the Province municipality of Tarlac to the Province of Tarlac be
and Municipality of Tarlac. annulled, and the transfer certificate issued to the
Province of Tarlac cancelled.
SYLLABUS The lower court dismissed the complaint.
The plaintiff has no right of action. If he has any, it is
1. IMMOVABLE PROPERTY; CONDITIONAL only by virtue of the sale of this parcel made by
DONATION, CONDITION PRECEDENT. The Concepcion Cirer and James Hill in his favor on
characteristic of condition. precedent is that the January 15, 1921, but that sale cannot have any
acquisition of the right is not effected while said effect. This parcel having been donated by
condition is not complied with or is not deemed Concepcion Cirer and James Hill to the
complied with. Meanwhile nothing is acquired and municipality of Tarlac, which donation was
there is only an expectancy of right. Consequently, accepted by the latter, the title to the property was
when a condition is imposed, the compliance of transferred to the municipality of Tarlac. It is true
which cannot be effected except when the right is that the donation might have been revoked for the
deemed acquired, such condition cannot be a causes, if any provided by the law, but the fact is
condition precedent. that it was not revoked when Concepcion Cirer
2. ID.; ID.; ACTION FOR REVOCATION; PRESCRIPTION. and James Hill made the sale of this parcel to the
The action for the revocation of a donation is not plaintiff. Even supposing that causes existed for the
excluded from the statute of limitations And not revocation of this donation, still, it was necessary, in
only this, the law itself recognizes the order to consider it revoked, either that the
prescriptibility of the action for the revocation of a revocation had been consented to by the donee,
3|OBLICON_Chapter 3_Pure Obligations
the municipality of Tarlac, or that it had been prescription of this class of action is ten years. The
judicially decreed. None of these circumstances action for the revocation of the donation for this
existed when Concepcion Cirer and James Hill sold cause arose on April 19, 1911, that is, six months
this parcel to the plaintiff. Consequently, when the after the ratification of the instrument of donation of
sale was made Concepcion Cirer and James Hill October 18, 1910. The complaint in this action was
were no longer the owners of this parcel and could presented July 5, 1924, more than ten years after
dot have sold it to the plaintiff, nor could the latter this cause accrued.
have acquired it from them. By virtue of the foregoing, the judgment appealed
But the appellant contends that a condition from is affirmed with the costs against the
precedent having been imposed in the donation appellant. So ordered.
and the same not having been complied with, the Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and
donation never became effective. We find no merit Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
in this contention. The appellant refers to the
condition imposed that one of the parcels donated
was to be used absolutely and exclusively for the
erection of a central school and the other for a
public park, the work to commence in both cases
within the period of six months from the date of the
ratification by the parties of the document
evidencing the donation. It is true that this condition
has not been complied with. The allegation,
however, that it is a condition precedent is
erroneous. The characteristic of a condition
precedent is that the acquisition of the right is not
effected while said condition is not complied with
or is not deemed complied with. Meanwhile
nothing is acquired and there is only an
expectancy of right. Consequently, when a
condition is imposed, the compliance of which
cannot be effected except then the right is
deemed acquired, such condition cannot a
condition precedent. In the present case the
condition that a public school be erected and a
public park made of the donated land, work on the
same to commence within six months from the date
of the ratification of the donation by the parties,
could not be complied with except after giving
effect to the donation. The donee could not do
any work on the donated land if the donation had
not really been effected, because it would be an
invasion of another's title, for the land would have
continued to belong to the donor so long as the
condition imposed was not complied with.
The appellant also contends that, in any event, the
condition not having been complied with, even
supposing that it was not a condition precedent
but subsequent, the non-compliance thereof is
sufficient cause for the revocation of the donation.
This is correct. But the period for bringing an action
for the revocation of the donation has prescribed.
That this action is prescriptible, there is no doubt.
There is no legal provision which excludes this class
of action from the statute of limitations. And not
only this, the law itself recognizes the
prescriptibility of the action for the revocation of a
donation, providing a special period of five years
for the revocation by the subsequent birth of
children (art. 646, Civil Code), and one year for their
revocation by reason of ingratitude. If no special
period is provided for the prescription of the action
for revocation for noncompliance of the conditions
of the donation (art. 647, Civil Code), it is because
in this respect the donation is considered onerous
and is governed by the law of contracts and the
general rules of prescription. Under the laws in force
(sec. 43, Code of Civ. Proc.), the period of
4|OBLICON_Chapter 3_Pure Obligations