provision, we hold that in the present case the term must be understood in its
1. Director of Lands vs. CA
276 SCRA 276
Facts:
Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration
of his title under P. D. No. 1529. However, during the pendency of his
petition, applicant died. Hence his heirs represented by their aunt Josefa
Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as
applicants.
The Land Registration Court in its decision dismissed the petition for want of
jurisdiction. However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-
in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession
of the subject land since 1938. The trial court dismissed the petition for the
reason that the applicants failed to publish the notice of Initial Hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
Private Respondents appealed to CA, which set aside the decision of the trial
court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro
Abistado.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General, brought the case
to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
W/N newspaper publication of the notice of Initial Hearing in an original land
registration case mandatory or directory.
Held:
It is mandatory. The word shall denotes an imperative and thus indicates
the mandatory character of a statute. The law used the term shall in
prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration
upon the latters receipt of the court order setting the time for Initial Hearing.
While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory
construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire
normal mandatory meaning.
Stat Con Principle: When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of
interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if
the law may be harsh or erroneous.
2. Pascual vs. Pascual
[G.R. No. 84240. March 25, 1992]
FACTS:
Don Andres Pascual died intestate (on October 12, 1973) without any issue,
legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children. Petitioners Olivia and
Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late
Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres
Pascual. Petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights and the
Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights. the Regional Trial
Court, presided over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina issued an order, the dispositive
portion of which resolved to deny this motion reiterating their hereditary rights. Their
motion for reconsideration was also denied. Petitioners appealed their case to the
Court of Appeals, but like the ruling of CA, their motion for reconsideration was also
dismissed. In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners contend that they do not
fall squarely within the purview of Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can
be interpreted to exclude recognized (and acknowledged) natural children as their
illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when such children were
under conception.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to
exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.
HELD:
NO. Petition is devoid of merit.
RATIO:
The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, where this
Court ruled that under Art.992 of the Civil Code, there exists a barrier or iron curtain
in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestado between the illegitimate child
and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate
child.
[T]he interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is
also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of
the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the
language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what is says.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children and the
term illegitimate refers to both natural and spurious. It may be said that the law may
be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).
3. People vs. Mario Mapulong
[G.R. No. L-22301. August 30, 1967]
FACTS:
Petitioner was found to be in violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692
of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and
as further amended by Republic Act No. 4. Petitioner willfully and unlawfully have in
his possession and under his custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik),
Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having
secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities.
The lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused of the crime of illegal
possession of firearms The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to
[the Supreme] Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the
provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the
crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
HELD:
NO. The judgment appealed from was affirmed.
The law (Sec. 878 as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code)
is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed:
it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached
parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement
used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of
firearms, or ammunition.
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision was made for a secret agent. The first
and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation
come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them. (Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico, (1913) 24 Phil. 504,
513). The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.
4. People vs Patricio Amigo
GR 116719
Facts:
Accused-Appellant Patricio Amigo was charged and convicted of murder by the
regional trial court, Davao City and was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Issue:
Whether or not that the penalty or reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harsh and
pleads for sympathy.
Held:
The duty of court is to apply the law disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for
the accused.
"Dura lex sed lex".
5. GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPOROTION v. NLRC/SALAZAR
Issue:
Is she illegally dismissed based on the Labor Code and Constitutionalguarantee?
Held:
She was illegally dismissed. The Court pointed out Art 279 of the Labor
Code , which talks about the Security of tenure for regular employees which states
that:
An employee who is unjustly dismissed from workshall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights andother privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive
of allowances,and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent
Corollary to it is the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code
(IRR) stating that employer cannot terminate regular employees without just cause or
authorized by laws and if such employee get illegally dismissed, he or she will be
entitled to be back in his/her position or be reinstated without loss of seniority rights
plus backwages
The priority is clearly leaned towards the employee or to labor. The Court
pointed out the opening paragraph on Labor and the 1973Constitution on Article 2
which enshrines full protection to labor. In the1986 ConCom, they have designed
Social Justice an Human rights to reduce social, economic and political inequalities.
Court held that the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous.Under statcon, if the
law is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, itmust be applied literally [Verba
Legis]
NLRC decision AFFIRMED.
6. Basbacio vs. DOJ
[G.R. No. 109445. November 07, 1994]
FACTS:
Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted
of frustrated murder and of two counts of frustrated murder. Petitioner and his son-in-
law were sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their
bonds had been cancelled. Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. The Court of
Appeals rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on the ground that the prosecution
failed to prove conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. Based on his acquittal,
petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, Sec. 3(a), which provides for the
payment of compensation to any person who was unjustly accused, convicted,
imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal. The claim
was filed with the Board of Claims of the Department of Justice, but the claim was
denied on the ground that while petitioners presence at the scene of the killing was
not sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there
was bad blood between him and the deceased as a result of a land dispute and the
fact that the convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there was basis for finding that he
was probably guilty. Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari as a
special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled of the claim under R.A. No. 7309.
HELD:
NO. Petitioners contention has no merit.
Verba legis non est recedendum from the words of a statute there should
be no departure. To say then that an accused has been unjustly convicted has to
do with the manner of his conviction rather than with his innocence. An accused may
on appeal be acquitted because he did not commit the crime, but that does not
necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for having been the victim of an
unjust conviction. If his conviction was due to an error in the appreciation of the
evidence the conviction while erroneous is not unjust. That is why it is not, on the
other hand, correct to say as does respondent, that under the law liability for
compensation depends entirely on the innocence of the accused.
7. JMM Promotions and Management Inc. vs. NLRC and Delos Santos
[G.R. No. 109835. November 22, 1993]
FACTS:
Petitioners appeal was dismissed by the respondent National Labor Relations
Commission citing the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code as
amended and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as
amended. The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in applying these rules to decisions rendered by the POEA. It insists that
the appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for overseas
employment because they are already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of
the POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to post a cash
bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000. In addition, the petitioner claims it
has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000 with the Philippine National Bank in
compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, to primarily answer for
valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or
money claims. The Solicitor General sustained the appeal bond and commented that
appeals from decisions of the POEA were governed by Section 5 and 6, Rule V,
Book VII of the POEA Rules.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its
appeal from a decision of the POEA to the NLRC?
HELD:
YES. Petitioners contention has no merit.
Statutes should be read as a whole. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat
that the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed.
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as
in this case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the
theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of
conflicting provisions. Under the petitioners interpretation, the appeal bond required
by Section 6 of the POEA Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier bonds
and escrow money it has posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a
superfluity but there is no such redundancy. On the contrary, Section 6 complements
Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is that a construction that would render a
provision inoperative should be avoided. Instead, apparently inconsistent provisions
should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious
whole.
8. Radiola Toshiba Philippines Inc. vs. The Intermediate Apellate Court
G.R. No. 75222, July 18, 1991
Facts:
The petitioner obtained a levy on the attachment against the properties of
Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan un Civil case o. 35946 for collection of
sum of money before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro
Manila. A few months later three creditors filed another petition against Gatmaytan
and Teresita Gatmaytan for involuntary insolvency, docketed as special proceedings
No. 1548 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga and Angeles city.
 A favorable judgment was obtained of by the petitioner in Civil case No.
35946. The court ordered for the consolidation of ownership of petitioner over said
property but respondent sheriff of Angeles City refused to issue a final certificate of
sale because of the pending insolvency proceedings.
Court of First Instance of Angeles City and Intermediate Appellate Court rules
against petitioner
Issue:
W/N the levy on attachment dissolved the insolvency proceedings against
the respondent spouses even though it commenced four months after said
attachment.
.Held:
No. Sec. 32 of the Insolvency Law is clear that there is a cut off period -one
month in attachment cases and thirty days in judgments entered in actions
commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings. Also, there is no conflict between
Sec. 32 and Sec. 79. Where a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation,
the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction that will render
the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other.
9. Manuel T. De Guia vs Commission on Elections
GR No. 104712, May 6, 1992
Statutory Rule: A construction that gives to the language in a statute meaningthat
does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted shouldbe
rejected.
Facts:
Petitioner Manuel De Guia is a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality of Paranaque. He contends that under par(d) of Sec. 3 of Ra7166,
members of the Sangguaniang Panglungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shallbe
elected at large in the May 1992 elections.
Issue:
W/N par(d) Sec. 3 of RA 7166 should be interpreted to mean that elective
officials of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and SB shall be elected at large
Held:
No. Par (d) Sec. 3 of RA 7166 refers only to elective officials of
theSangguniang Panlungsod which are single district cities and Sangguniang Bayan
for municipalities outside Metro Manila. The law specifically stated that provinces with
only one legislative district should be divided into two and therefore should
necessarily be elected by districts. Par (d) should be interpreted in line with the rest
of the statute and to follow the interpretation of the petitioner would make the act of
the statute in singling out the single district provinces as useless or meaningless. The
key to open the door to what the legislature intended in the language of a state is its
purpose or reason which induced it to enact the statute. Statutes should then be
construed in light of the object to be achieved. A construction should be rejected that
gives the language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the
purpose for which the statute was enacted.
10. ELENA SALENILLAS AND BERNARDINO SALENILLAS vs.Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 78687 January 31, 1989
FACTS:
The petitioner Elena Salenillas acquired properties after purchasing them from her
parents, the Enciso spouses. The petitioners mortgaged the property twice, the
latest done on December4, 1975 in favor of the Philippine National Bank Branch,
Daet, Camarines Norte as security for a loan of P2,500.00. Petitioners failed to pay
and so the property was extrajudicially foreclosed and was then sold in the public
auction on February 27, 1981. A Sheriffs Final Deed was issued on July 12, 1983.
RTC of Camarines Norte issued motions for writ of possession, which the petitioners
opposed. Petitioners sought for reconsideration, which was later on denied. The
Court of appeals made a similar decision. On November 17, 1983 and on on August
31, 1984,Petitioners wished to repurchase the property and maintained that they had
the right to do so as provided for under Section 119 of the Public Land Act. The
Respondent state argued that the Petitioners were disqualified from being legal heirs
of the subject property since petitioners acquired the said property through
inheritance but by sale.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners had the right to repurchase the contested property under
Section 119 of the Public Land Act.

HELD:
Petitioner Elena Salenillas, being a child of the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of
the latter. As such, and even on this score alone, she may therefore validly
repurchase. This must be so because Section 119 of the Public Land Act, in
speaking of "legal heirs," makes no distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos.
Invoking the provision made under Section 119 of the Public Land Act, the
petitioners, being legal heirs, had the right to repurchase the said property as long as
the 5-year period had not yet proscribed. The Court held that when the petitioners
expressed their desire to repurchase the property in 1984, it was evident that the 5-
year period had not yet proscribed, the public auction having been in 1981 and the
issuance of the Final deed in 1983.