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To cite this Article Rathmell, Andrew(2002) 'Towards postmodern intelligence', Intelligence and National Security, 17: 3,
87 104
To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/02684520412331306560
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684520412331306560
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173int03.qxd 23/10/02 10:12 Page 87
A N D R E W R ATHMELL
Over the past decade, Western intelligence services have had to respond to
a succession of radical environmental changes. Most dramatic was the end
of the Cold War and subsequent revisions of roles and missions. At the same
time, the information revolution has challenged established sources,
methods and institutional structures. In general, intelligence services have
faced the problem of operating in an ever more chaotic and fast-changing
global environment.
The pace of change has left many in the intelligence community
struggling to adapt their practices and world-views, while many in the
intelligence policy and studies communities have struggled to conceptualize
the changes underway and to prescribe solutions to their evident problems.
Intelligence and National Security, Vol.17, No.3 (Autumn 2002), pp.87104
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
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88 I NTELLI GEN C E A N D N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y
90 I NTELLI GEN C E A N D N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y
As they were shaped by the Cold War, so the end of the Cold War led to
pressures for change in the Wests intelligence communities. Although it was
the collapse of the Soviet threat that spurred much of the debate over
intelligence reform, this debate has sometimes referred also to concurrent
developments such as the information revolution and the rise of
transnational, non-state threats.
There has been no shortage of critics calling for radical reform. These
revolutionary theorists emphasize factors such as the expanded range of
security threats that face Western governments since the end of the Cold War
and the information revolution which has supposedly ushered in an
Information Age.15 These observers have argued a range of positions, from
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92 I NTELLI GEN C E A N D N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y
minimal reform of target sets to root and branch overthrow of the intelligence
community.16
Unsurprisingly, actual reforms have been dominated by a spirit of
evolutionary realism that has taken account of the more obvious pressures
for change.17 Reforms have included shifts in the roles and missions of the
intelligence community and the gradual adoption of new practices and
approaches.18 Western intelligence services have shifted some of their
resources to studying issues previously seen as of lesser importance,
including arms proliferation, regional contingencies, terrorism, organized
crime and drugs trafficking, even environmental and humanitarian
problems.19 At the same time, new technologies have been incorporated, as
with the US Intelink and the exploitation of digital open source information.20
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knowledge and the processes of creating knowledge. Those who used the
term in the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s referred mainly to new aspects and
forms of culture and the arts, notably architecture.26 However, Lyotards
1979 survey of the state of the academy crossed disciplinary boundaries and
identified an emerging postmodern state of knowledge and of science.27 For
Lyotard, postmodern approaches to knowledge reject the modernist
legitimacy of meta-narratives and celebrate and emphasize different
perspectives. In relation to the social sciences, postmodernism challenges
the privileging of the objective scientific method, arguing that truth is
contextually dependent and culturally determined.28
The postmodern cultural and epistemological condition did not,
however arise autonomously. A succession of theorists has sought to
identify linkages between the changed cultural forms and intellectual
processes identified by postmodernism and the social and economic
conditions of the contemporary environment. Jameson, for instance, sought
to correlate new forms of practice and social and mental habits with the
new forms of economic production and organization thrown up by the
modification of capitalism in recent years.29
Postmodernity, therefore, refers to an object of study postmodernity
is the study of the temporal and spatial organization, and the complex
interaction, of economic, political and cultural processes in the late
twentieth century.30 Three broad theoretical perspectives emerge from the
literature on postmodernity.
First, critics of the concept of postmodernity argue that there are more
historical continuities than discontinuities in the contemporary era and that
theorists of postmodernity have not explained the dynamic or the nature of
the supposed epochal break between modernity and postmodernity. Rather,
these critics argue, the contemporary era represents a sub-phase in
modernity, which some label high modernity. In this phase, the modern
structures of the bureaucratic state and capitalism are intensified and
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94 I NTELLI GEN C E A N D N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y
putting it as far back as sometime between the 1930s and 1950s for the
United States.33
Whichever perspective one takes, most analysts agree that there are
significant economic and technological changes underway that are
impacting on social structures and on individuals. At the macro level,
industrial-era political and economic systems are fragmenting and
restructuring from capital intensive mass production, urbanized nation
states into knowledge intensive, dispersed and globalized systems. The key
features of this new landscape are:
96 I NTELLI GEN C E A N D N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y
modern period of the mid-twentieth century. Second, since the very essence
of intelligence is the production of knowledge, there is a prima facie case
for it to be more affected than the armed forces by the trends that
postmodernism identifies. As outlined above, these trends are rooted in
transformations both in the nature of knowledge and in the
institutionalization of knowledge activities.
To examine the usefulness of postmodernism in understanding
contemporary Western intelligence it is enlightening to match the five
postmodern themes noted above with changes taking place in the
intelligence business:
98 I NTELLI GEN C E A N D N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y
RIDING TH E WAVE
The discussion above has used aspects of postmodern theory to examine and
describe the changing environment and nature of intelligence. The same
perspectives can be used to derive prescriptions of ways in which
intelligence can go with the flow of change in order to ensure that its
institutions, structures and practices are adapted to a new era. The intention
is to enable the intelligence community to ride the wave of change rather
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NOTES
1. The use of the construction postmodern rather than Post-Modern is designed to highlight
the continuities between epochs. Even if we accept that the emerging contemporary epoch is
postmodern in many respects, there will be no clean break. The future emerges out of the
present which in turn emerges from the past; primordial forms persist in later epochs. S.
Connor, Postmodernist Culture: An Introduction to Theories of the Contemporary (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell 1997, 2nd ed.) p.viii.
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10. J.M. Archer, Sovereignty and Intelligence: Spying and Court Culture in the English
Renaissance (Stanford UP 1993); A. Marshall, Intelligence and Espionage in the Reign of
Charles II, 16601685 (Cambridge: CUP 1994).
11. M. Herman, Diplomacy and Intelligence Diplomacy & Statecraft 9/2 (July 1998) pp.122.
12. M. Howard, War in European History (London: Oxford UP 1976), passim; G. Parker, The
Military Revolution (Cambridge: CUP 1996, 2nd ed.) pp.1589.
13. C. Andrew, Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community (London:
Heinemann 1985); H. Barnett, Legislation-based national security services: Australia
Intelligence and National Security 9/2 (April 1994) pp.287300; G.W. Hopple and B. Watson
(eds.) The Military Intelligence Community (Boulder, CO: Westview 1985), Part I; R. Jeffreys-
Jones and C. Andrew (eds.) Eternal Vigilance: 50 Years of the CIA (London and Portland, OR:
Frank Cass 1997); M.M. Lowenthal, U.S. Intelligence: Evolution and Anatomy (Westport, CT:
Praeger 1992, 2nd ed.); J.T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community (Boulder, CO:
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14. Herman (note 11) passim.
15. A. Bergin and R. Hall (eds.) Intelligence and Australian National Security (Canberra:
Australian Defence Force Academy 1994).
16. Intelligence Reform Project, Aspin/Brown Commission Report on US Intelligence Budget at
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1995) pp.3643; US Congress, HPSCI Staff Report, Preparing for the 21st Century: An
Appraisal of US Intelligence at www.access.gpo.gov/int/report.html; B. Berkowitz and A.E.
Goodman, Why spy, and how, in the 1990s? Orbis 36/2 (Spring 1992) pp.26980; D.L.
Boren, The Intelligence Community: How Crucial? Foreign Affairs 71/3 (Summer 1992)
pp.5262; A.S. Farson, D. Stafford and W.K. Wark (eds.) Security and Intelligence in a
Changing World: New Perspectives for the 1990s (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass
1991); A. Goodman and B.D. Berkowitz, [US] Intelligence without the Cold War Intelligence
and National Security 9/2 (April 1994) pp.30119; D. Gries, A New Look for [US]
Intelligence Intelligence and National Security 10/1 (Jan. 1995) pp.17083.
17. J. Adams, The New Spies: Exploring the Frontiers of Espionage (London: Hutchinson 1994)
pp.xiixix.
18. S. Kerr, The Debate on US Post-Cold War Intelligence: One More new Botched Beginning?
Defense Analysis 10/3 (Dec. 1994) pp.32350.
19. H. Smith, Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping Survival 36/3 (Autumn 1994) pp.17492; H.
Sokolski, Fighting Proliferation with Intelligence Orbis 38/2 (Spring 1994) pp.24560; S.A.
Baker, Should Spies be Cops? Foreign Policy No.97 (Winter 199495) pp.3652.
20. R. Steele, Creating a Bare Bones Capability for Open Source Support to Defense
Intelligence Analysts DIA Report 001.1 (Aug. 1997) at www.oss.net/CONCEPT/; J.F.
Holden-Rhodes, Sharing the Secrets: Open Source Intelligence and the War on Drugs
(Westport, CT: Praeger 1997); F. Thomas Martin, Top Secret Intranet: The Story of Intelink
How US Intelligence Built the Worlds Largest, Most Secure Network (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall 1998).
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21. A. Hulnick, Intelligence Co-operation in the Post-Cold War Era: A New Game Plan?
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 5/4 (Winter 1991/1992) pp.45566.
22. P.M. Rosenau, Postmodernism and the Social Sciences: Insights, Inroads and Intrusions
(Princeton UP 1992) p.3.
23. J. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans F. Lawrence, (Cambridge &
Oxford: Polity Press and Basil Blackwell 1987) pp.144.
24. P. Anderson, The Origins of Postmodernity (London: Verso 1998); A. Huyssen, After the Great
Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture and Postmodernism (Bloomington: Indiana UP 1986)
pp.viixii.
25. T. Docherty, Postmodernism: an Introduction in T. Docherty (ed.) Postmodernism: A Reader
(London: Harvester Wheatsheaf 1993) pp.131.
26. R. Venturi, D.S. Brown and S. Izenour, Learning from Las Vegas: The Forgotten Symbolism of
Architectural Form (London: The MIT Press 1993, revised ed.).
27. J-F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans G. Bennington and B.
Massumi (Manchester UP 1984).
28. S. Seidman and D.G. Wagner (eds.) Postmodernism & Social Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell
1992) pp.58.
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29. F. Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: Verso 1991)
p.xiv.
30. R. Kitchin, Cyberspace: The World in the Wires (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons 1998) p.62.
31. C. Calhoun, Postmodernism as Pseudohistory in M. Waters, S. Crook and J. Pakulski (eds.)
Postmodernization: Change in Advanced Society (London: Sage 1992) pp.188206.
32. R. Robertson, Mapping the Global Condition: Globalization as the Central Concept in Waters
et al. (note 31) pp.397410.
33. P. Drucker, Landmarks of Tomorrow: A Report on the New Post-Modern World (London:
Transaction Publishers 1996, 2nd ed.).
34. D. Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society (NY: Basic Books 1999).
35. A. Toffler, Powershift: Knowledge, Wealth and Violence in the 21st Century (London: Bantam
1991).
36. M. Walters (ed.) Modernity: Critical Concepts, Vol.IV: After Modernity (London: Routledge
1999) pp.34; S. Toulmin, Return to Cosmology: Postmodern Science and the Theology of
Nature (Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press 1982) pp.23754.
37. B. Bone, A Tribe among Tribes: Postmodern Militaries and Civil-Military Relations?, paper
prepared for XIVth World Congress of the International Sociological Association, Montreal, 26
July 1 Aug. 1998, p.1.
38. B. Booth and D.R. Segal, Are Post-Cold War Militaries Postmodern?, paper prepared for
XIVth World Congress of the International Sociological Association, Montreal, 26 July 1
Aug. 1998, p.2.
39. J.S. Nye, Peering into the Future Foreign Affairs 73/4 (July/Aug. 1994) pp.8293.
40. C. Jonscher, WiredLife: Who are We in the Digital Age? (London: Bantam Press 1999)
pp.12353.
41. J.T. Richelson and D. Ball, The Ties that Bind: Intelligence Cooperation between the UKUSA
Countries the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New
Zealand (Boston: Allen & Unwin 1985).
42. Toffler (note 35). For a critical perspective, see: R.W. McChesney, E. Meiksins Wood and J.B.
Foster (eds.) Capitalism and the Information Age: The Political Economy of the Global
Communication Revolution (NY: Monthly Review Press 1998).
43. S.A. Katsikides, The Societal Impact of Technology (Aldershot: Ashgate 1998) pp.3749 and
7384.
44. L. Scott Johnson, Towards a Functional Model of Information Warfare, available at: www.
infowar.com/mil_c4i/mil_c4i_101497a.html-ssi.
45. White House, Executive Order on the National Infrastructure Assurance Council, 14 July 1999.
46. D. Alberts and T.J.Czerwinski (eds.) Complexity, Global Politics and National Security
(Washington DC: National Defense University 1997).
47. DERA, Strategic Assessment Methodology, private presentation.
48. D. Dearth, New Directions for Intelligence in Dearth and Goodden (note 5) pp.385400.
49. C. Leadbeater, Living on Thin Air (London: Viking 1999) p.viii.
50. Lyotard (note 27) pp.36.