THIRDDIVISION

[G.R.No.142261.June29,2000]

GOVERNOR MANUEL M. LAPID, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, FACTFINDING INTELLIGENCE BUREAU (FFIB) of the
Office of the Ombudsman, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT,respondents.

RESOLUTION
GONZAGAREYES,J.:

BeforeusaretheMotionsforReconsiderationfiledbytheNationalBureauofInvestigationand
the Department of the Interior and Local Government, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General,andtheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanofour5April2000Resolution.[1]Inthisresolution,we
ordered the immediate reinstatement of petitioner Manuel Lapid to the position of Governor of
Pampangaastherespondentsfailedtoestablishtheexistenceofalawmandatingtheimmediate
execution of a decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case where the
penaltyimposedissuspensionforoneyear.
Thefactualantecedentsareasfollows:
On the basis of an unsigned letter dated July 20, 1998, allegedly originating from the Mga
MamamayanngLalawiganngPampanga,addressedtotheNationalBureauofInvestigation,the
latterinitiatedanopenprobeontheallegedillegalquarryinginPampanga&exactionofexorbitant
fees purportedly perpetrated by unscrupulous individuals with the connivance of highranking
government officials. The NBI Report was endorsed to the respondent Ombudsman and was
docketedasOMB1982067.
On Oct. 26, 1998, a complaint was filed charging petitioner Gov. Manuel M. Lapid, Vice
Governor Clayton Olalia, Provincial Administrator Enrico Quiambao, Provincial Treasurer Jovito
Sabado,MabalacatMunicipalMayorMarinoMoralesandSeniorPoliceOfficer4NestorTadeowith
allegedDishonesty,GraveMisconductandConductPrejudicialtotheBestInterestoftheService
forallegedlyhavingconspiredbetweenandamongthemselvesindemandingandcollectingfrom
variousquarryingoperatorsinPampangaacontrolfee,controlslip,ormonitoringfeeofP120.00
pertruckloadofsand,gravel,orotherquarrymaterial,withoutadulyenactedprovincialordinance
authorizing the collection thereof and without issuing receipts for its collection. They were also
accused of giving unwarranted benefits to Nestor Tadeo, Rodrigo Rudy Fernandez & Conrado
Pangilinan who are neither officials/employees of the Provincial Government. of Pampanga nor
quarry operators by allowing them to collect the said amount which was over and above the
P40.00prescribedunderthepresentprovincialordinanceandinallowingTadeo,Fernandezand
Pangilinan to sell and deliver to various quarry operators booklets of official receipts which were
prestampedwithSANDFEEP40.00.[2]
TheOmbudsmanissuedanOrderdatedJanuary13,1999preventivelysuspendingpetitioner
Lapid, Olalia, Quiambao, Sabado, Morales and Tadeo for a period of six (6) months without pay
pursuant to Sec. 24 of RA 6770. On Jan. 19, 1999, the Department of the Interior and Local
Government(hereinaftertheDILG)implementedthesuspensionofpetitionerLapid[3].
On November 22, 1999 the Ombudsman rendered a decision[4] in the administrative case
findingthepetitioneradministrativelyliableformisconductthus:
Wherefore,premisesconsidered,respondentManuelM.Lapid,ClaytonA.Olalia,JovitoS.Sabado
andNestorC.Tadeoareherebyfoundguiltyofmisconductforwhichtheyaremetedoutthe
penaltyofone(1)yearsuspensionwithoutpaypursuanttosection25(2)ofR.A.6770
(OmbudsmanActof1989).RespondentMarinoP.Moralesisherebyexoneratedfromthesame
administrativechargeforinsufficiencyofevidence.ThecomplaintagainstrespondentEnricoP.
Quiambao,whoresignedeffectiveJune30,1998wasdismissedonMarch12,1999,without
prejudicetotheoutcomeofthecriminalcase.[5]

The copy of the said decision was received by counsel for the petitioner on November 25,
1999 and a motion for reconsideration was filed on November 29, 1999. The Office of the
Ombudsman,inanOrder[6]dated12January2000,deniedthemotionforreconsideration.
PetitionerthenfiledapetitionforreviewwiththeCourtofAppealsonJanuary18,2000praying
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the Ombudsman from enforcing the
questioneddecision.ThetemporaryrestrainingorderwasissuedbytheappellatecourtonJanuary
19,2000.[7]
Whenthe60daylifetimeofthetemporaryrestrainingorderlapsedonMarch19,2000without
the Court of Appeals resolving the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, a
petition[8]forcertiorari,prohibitionandmandamuswasfiledwiththisCourtonMarch20,2000.The
petition asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the respondents from
enforcing the assailed decision of the Ombudsman and prayed that after due proceedings,
judgment be rendered reversing and setting aside the questioned decision (of the Ombudsman)
datedNovember22,1999andtheorderdatedJanuary12,2000.[9]
On March 22, 2000 the Third Division of this Court issued a Resolution requiring the
respondents to comment on the petition. That same day, the Court of Appeals issued a
resolution[10]denyingthepetitionersprayerforinjunctiverelief.Thefollowingday,oronMarch23,
2000, the DILG implemented the assailed decision of the Ombudsman and the highest ranking
ProvincialBoardMemberofPampanga,EdnaDavid,tookheroathofofficeasO.I.C.Governorof
theProvinceofPampanga.
On March 24, 2000 a Motion for Leave to File Supplement to the Petition for Certiorari,
ProhibitionandMandamus[11]andtheSupplementtothePetition[12]itselfwerefiledinviewofthe
resolution of the Court of Appeals denying the petitioners prayer for preliminary injunction. In
addition to the arguments raised in the main petition, the petitioner likewise raised in issue the
apparentprejudgmentofthecaseonthemeritsbytheCourtofAppealsinitsresolutiondenying
the prayer for preliminary injunction. In so doing, petitioner argued that the respondent court
exceeded the bounds of its jurisdiction. Proceeding from the premise that the decision of the
Ombudsman had not yet become final, the petitioner argued that the writs of prohibition and
mandamusmaybeissuedagainsttherespondentDILGforprematurelyimplementingtheassailed
decision.Finally,thepetitionerprayedforthesettingasideoftheresolutionissuedbytheCourtof
AppealsdatedMarch22,2000andfortheissuanceofanewoneenjoiningtherespondentsfrom
enforcingthesaiddecisionor,ifithasalreadybeenimplemented,towithdrawanyactionalready
taken until the issue of whether or not the said decision of the Ombudsman is immediately
executoryhasbeensettled.
TheSolicitorGeneralandtheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanfiledtheirrespectivecomments[13]to
thepetitionprayingforthedismissalthereof.Regardingtheissueoftheimmediateenforcementof
thedecisionoftheOmbudsman,theSolicitorGeneralmaintainsthatthesaiddecisionisgoverned
bySection12,Rule43oftheRulesofCourtandistherefore,immediatelyexecutory.Foritspart,
theOfficeoftheOmbudsmanmaintainsthattheOmbudsmanLawanditsimplementingrulesare
silentastotheexecutionofdecisionsrenderedbytheOmbudsmanconsideringthattheportionof
the said law cited by petitioner pertains to the finality of the decision but not to its enforcement
pending appeal. The Office of the Ombudsman also stated that it has uniformly adopted the
provisionsintheLocalGovernmentCodeandAdministrativeCodethatdecisionsinadministrative
disciplinarycasesareimmediatelyexecutory.
 The SolicitorGeneral filed an additional comment[14] alleging that the petitioner did not
questiontheexecutorycharacterofthedecisionoftheOmbudsmanandthatheispresentingthis
argument for the first time before the Supreme Court. The appellate court should be given an
opportunitytoreviewthecasefromthisstandpointbeforeaskingtheSupremeCourttoreviewthe
resolutionsoftheCourtofAppeals.ThepetitionerfiledaconsolidatedReply[15]totheComments
oftherespondents.
AfteroralargumentsbeforetheThirdDivisionofthisCourton5April2000,theResolution[16]
subjectoftheinstantMotionsforReconsiderationwasissued.TheResolutionprovidesasfollows:

FromthepleadingsfiledbythepartiesandafteroralargumentsheldonApril5,2000,the
petitionerrepresentedbyAtty.AugustoG.Panlilio,therespondentOmbudsmanrepresentedbyits
ChiefLegalCounsel,andtheNationalBureauofInvestigationandtheDepartmentoftheInterior
andLocalGovernmentrepresentedbytheSolicitorGeneral,andafterduedeliberation,theCourt
findsthattherespondentsfailedtoestablishtheexistenceofalawmandatingtheimmediate
executionofadecisionoftheOmbudsmaninanadministrativecasewherethepenaltyimposedis
suspensionforoneyear.TheimmediateimplementationofthedecisionoftheOmbudsman
againstpetitioneristhuspremature.

WHEREFORE,therespondentsareorderedtoreinstateeffectiveimmediatelythepetitionertothe
positionofGovernoroftheProvinceofPampanga.ThiscaseisherebyremandedtotheCourtof
AppealsforresolutionoftheappealinCAGR.SPNo.564744onthemerits.Saidcourtishereby
directedtoresolvethesamewithutmostdeliberatedispatch.

Thisiswithoutprejudicetothepromulgationofanextendeddecision.

From this 5April 2000 Resolution, the Offices of the SolicitorGeneral and the Ombudsman
filedtheinstantmotionsforreconsideration.
Thesoleissueaddressedbyour5April2000Resolutioniswhetherornotthedecisionofthe
Office of the Ombudsman finding herein petitioner administratively liable for misconduct and
imposing upon him a penalty of one (1) year suspension without pay is immediately executory
pendingappeal.
PetitionerwasadministrativelychargedformisconductundertheprovisionsofR.A.6770,the
OmbudsmanActof1989.Section27ofthesaidActprovidesasfollows:

Section27.EffectivityandFinalityofDecisions.AllprovisionaryordersoftheOfficeofthe
Ombudsmanareimmediatelyeffectiveandexecutory.

Amotionforreconsiderationofanyorder,directiveordecisionoftheOfficeoftheOmbudsman
mustbefiledwithinfive(5)daysafterreceiptofwrittennoticeandshallbeentertainedonlyonthe
followinggrounds:

XXX

FindingsoffactoftheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanwhensupportedbysubstantialevidenceare
conclusive.Anyorder,directiveordecisionimposingthepenaltyofpubliccensureorreprimand,
suspensionofnotmorethanonemonthssalaryshallbefinalandunappealable.

Inalladministrativedisciplinarycases,orders,directivesordecisionsoftheOfficeofthe
OmbudsmanmaybeappealedtotheSupremeCourtbyfilingapetitionforcertiorariwithinten(10)
daysfromreceiptofthewrittennoticeoftheorder,directiveordecisionordenialofthemotionfor
reconsiderationinaccordancewithRule45oftheRulesofCourt.

The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman[17] likewise contain a similar
provision.Section7,RuleIIIofthesaidRulesprovidesasfollows:

Sec.7.FinalityofDecisionwheretherespondentisabsolvedofthechargeandincaseof
convictionwherethepenaltyimposedispubliccensureorreprimand,suspensionofnotmorethan
onemonth,orafinenotequivalenttoonemonthsalary,thedecisionshallbefinaland
unappealable.Inallothercases,thedecisionshallbecomefinalaftertheexpirationoften(10)
daysfromreceiptthereofbytherespondent,unlessamotionforreconsiderationorpetitionfor
certiorari,shallhavebeenfiledbyhimasprescribedinSection27ofR.A.6770.

It is clear from the above provisions that the punishment imposed upon petitioner, i.e.
suspensionwithoutpayforoneyear,isnotamongthoselistedasfinalandunappealable,hence,
immediately executory. Section 27 states that all provisionary orders of the Office of the
Ombudsmanareimmediatelyeffectiveandexecutoryandthatanyorder,directiveordecisionof
thesaidOfficeimposingthepenaltyofcensureorreprimandorsuspensionofnotmorethanone
months salary is final and unappealable. As such the legal maxim inclusion unius est exclusio
alterusfindsapplication.The express mention of the things included excludes those that are not
included. The clear import of these statements taken together is that all other decisions of the
OfficeoftheOmbudsmanwhichimposepenaltiesthatarenotenumeratedinthesaidsection27
arenotfinal,unappealableandimmediatelyexecutory.Anappealtimelyfiled,suchastheonefiled
intheinstantcase,willstaytheimmediateimplementationofthedecision.Thisfindssupportinthe
Rules of Procedure issued by the Ombudsman itself which states that (I)n all other cases, the
decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the
respondent,unlessamotionforreconsiderationorpetitionforcertiorari(shouldnowbepetitionfor
reviewunderRule43)shallhavebeenfiledbyhimasprescribedinSection27ofR.A.6770.
TheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralinsistshoweverthatthecaseofFabianvs.Desierto[18]has
voidedSection27ofR.A.6770andSection7,RuleIIIofAdministrativeOrderNo.07.Assuch,the
reviewofdecisionsoftheOmbudsmaninadministrativecasesisnowgovernedbyRule43ofthe
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which mandates, under Section 12[19] thereof, the immediately
executorycharacterofthedecisionororderappealedfrom.
ThecontentionoftheSolicitorGeneralisnotwelltaken.OurrulinginthecaseofFabianvs.
DesiertoinvalidatedSection27ofRepublicActNo.6770andSection7,RuleIIIofAdministrative
Order No.07 and any other provision of law implementing the aforesaid Act only insofar as they
provideforappealsinadministrativedisciplinarycasesfromtheOfficeoftheOmbudsmantothe
SupremeCourt.TheonlyprovisionaffectedbytheFabianrulingisthedesignationoftheCourtof
AppealsastheproperforumandofRule43oftheRulesofCourtasthepropermodeofappeal.
Allothermattersincludedinsaidsection27,includingthefinalityornonfinalityofdecisions,are
notaffectedandstillstand.
Neither can respondents find support in Section 12, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedurewhichprovidesasfollows:

Section12.EffectofAppeal.Theappealshallnotstaytheaward,judgment,finalorderor
resolutionsoughttobereviewedunlesstheCourtofAppealsshalldirectotherwiseuponsuch
termsasitmaydeemjust.

Onthispoint,respondentscontendthatconsideringthesilenceoftheOmbudsmanActonthe
matter of execution pending appeal, the abovequoted provision of the Rules of Court, which
allegedlymandatestheimmediateexecutionofalldecisionsrenderedbyadministrativeandquasi
judicial agencies, should apply suppletorily to the provisions of the Ombudsman Act. We do not
agree.
A judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law.[20] Section 27 of the
Ombudsman Act provides that any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman
imposing a penalty of public censure or reprimand, or suspension of not more than one months
salaryshallbefinalandunappealable.In allothercases, the respondent therein has the right to
appealtotheCourtofAppealswithinten(10)daysfromreceiptofthewrittennoticeoftheorder,
directiveordecision.Inalltheseothercasestherefore,thejudgmentimposedthereinwillbecome
finalafterthelapseofthereglementaryperiodofappealifnoappealisperfected[21]or,anappeal
therefrom having been taken, the judgment in the appellate tribunal becomes final.It is this final
judgmentwhichisthencorrectlycategorizedasafinalandexecutoryjudgmentinrespecttowhich
execution shall issue as a matter of right.[22] In other words, the fact that the Ombudsman Act
givespartiestherighttoappealfromitsdecisionsshouldgenerallycarrywithitthestayofthese
decisionspendingappeal.Otherwise,theessentialnatureofthesejudgmentsasbeingappealable
wouldberenderednugatory.
Thegeneralruleisthatjudgmentsbylowercourtsortribunalsbecomeexecutoryonlyafterit
hasbecomefinalandexecutory,[23]executionpendingappealbeinganexceptiontothisgeneral
rule. It is the contention of respondents however that with respect to decisions of quasijudicial
agencies and administrative bodies, the opposite is true. It is argued that the general rule with
respect to quasijudicial and administrative agencies is that the decisions of such bodies are
immediatelyexecutoryevenpendingappeal.
Thecontentionofrespondentsismisplaced.Thereisnogenerallegalprinciplethatmandates
thatalldecisionsofquasijudicialagenciesareimmediatelyexecutory.Decisionsrenderedbythe
SecuritiesandExchangeCommission[24]andtheCivilAeronauticsBoard,[25]forexample,arenot
immediatelyexecutoryandarestayedwhenanappealisfiledbeforetheCourtofAppeals.Onthe
otherhand,thedecisionsoftheCivilServiceCommission,undertheAdministrativeCode[26],and
the Office of the President under the Local Government Code[27], which respondents cite, are
immediatelyexecutoryevenpendingappealbecausethepertinentlawsunderwhichthedecisions
wererenderedmandatethemtobeso.Theprovisionsofthelasttwocitedlawsexpresslyprovide
for theexecutionpending appeal of their final orders or decisions.The Local Government Code,
underSection68thereofprovidesasfollows:

Section68.ExecutionPendingAppeal.Anappealshallnotpreventadecisionfrombecomingfinal
andexecutory.Therespondentshallbeconsideredashavingbeenplacedunderpreventive
suspensionduringthependencyofanappealintheeventhewinssuchappeal.Intheeventthe
appealresultsinanexoneration,heshallbepaidhissalaryandsuchotheremolumentsduringthe
pendencyoftheappeal.

Similarly,BookV,TitleI,SubtitleA,Chapter6,Section47,par.(4)oftheAdministrativeCodeof
1987provides:

(4)Anappealshallnotstopthedecisionfrombeingexecutory,andincasethepenaltyis
suspensionorremoval,therespondentshallbeconsideredashavingbeenunderpreventive
suspensionduringthependencyoftheappealintheeventhewinsanappeal.

Where the legislature has seen fit to declare that the decision of the quasijudicial agency is
immediatelyfinalandexecutorypendingappeal,thelawexpresslysoprovides.
Section 12 of Rule 43 should therefore be interpreted as mandating that the appeal will not
staytheaward,judgment,finalorderorresolutionunlessthelawdirectsotherwise.
PetitionerwaschargedadministrativelybeforetheOmbudsmanandaccordinglytheprovisions
oftheOmbudsmanActshouldapplyinhiscase.Section68oftheLocalGovernmentCodeonly
applies to administrative decisions rendered by the Office of the President or the appropriate
Sanggunianagainstelectivelocalgovernmentofficials.Similarly,theprovisionintheAdministrative
Codeof1987mandatingexecutionpendingreviewappliesspecificallytoadministrativedecisions
oftheCivilServiceCommissioninvolvingmembersoftheCivilService.
There is no basis in law for the proposition that the provisions of the Administrative Code of
1987andtheLocalGovernmentCodeonexecutionpendingreviewshouldbeappliedsuppletorily
totheprovisionsoftheOmbudsmanActasthereisnothingintheOmbudsmanActwhichprovides
forsuchsuppletoryapplication.Courtsmaynot,intheguiseofinterpretation,enlargethescopeof
astatuteandincludethereinsituationsnotprovidedorintendedbythelawmakers.Anomissionat
thetimeofenactment,whethercarelessorcalculated,cannotbejudiciallysuppliedhoweverlater
wisdommayrecommendtheinclusion.[28]
Andwhileinonerespect,theOmbudsmanLaw,theAdministrativeCodeof1987andtheLocal
GovernmentCodeareinparimateriainsofarasthethreelawsrelateordealwithpublicofficers,
thesimilarityendsthere.Itisaprincipleinstatutoryconstructionthatwheretherearetwostatutes
that apply to a particular case, that which was specially designed for the said case must prevail
overtheother.[29]Intheinstantcase,theactsattributedtopetitionercouldhavebeenthesubject
of administrative disciplinary proceedings before the Office of the President under the Local
Government Code or before the Office of the Ombudsman under the Ombudsman Act.
Consideringhowever,thatpetitionerwaschargedundertheOmbudsmanAct,itisthislawalone
whichshouldgovernhiscase.
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that the ruling against
execution pending review of the Ombudsmans decision grants a onesided protection to the
offenderfoundguiltyofmisconductinofficeandnothingatalltothegovernmentastheaggrieved
party.Theoffender,accordingtorespondents,canjustletthecasedragonuntiltheexpirationof
his office or his reelection as by then, the case against him shall become academic and his
offense,obliterated.Assuch,respondentsconclude,thegovernmentisleftwithoutfurtherremedy
andislefthelplessinitsownfightagainstgraftandcorruption.
We find this argument much too speculative to warrant serious consideration. If it perceived
thatthefightagainstgraftandcorruptionishamperedbytheinadequacyoftheprovisionsofthe
OmbudsmanAct,theremedyliesnotwiththisCourtbutbylegislativeamendment.
AsregardsthecontentionoftheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanthatunderSec.13(8),ArticleXIof
the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is empowered to (p)romulgate its rules of
procedureandexercisesuchotherpowersorperformsuchfunctionsordutiesasmaybeprovided
by law, suffice it to note that the Ombudsman rules of procedure, Administrative Order No. 07,
mandatethatdecisionsoftheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanwherethepenaltyimposedisotherthan
publiccensureorreprimand,suspensionofnotmorethanonemonthsalaryorfineequivalentto
onemonthsalaryarestillappealableandhence,notfinalandexecutory.Undertheserules,which
wereadmittedlypromulgatedbyvirtueoftherulemakingpoweroftheOfficeoftheOmbudsman,
the decision imposing a penalty of one year suspension without pay on petitioner Lapid is not
immediatelyexecutory.
WHEREFORE,theMotionsforReconsiderationfiledbytheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneraland
theOfficeoftheOmbudsmanareherebyDENIEDforlackofmerit.
SOORDERED.
Melo,(Chairman),Vitug,Panganiban,andPurisima,JJ.,concur.

[1]Rollo,pp.354355.

[2]Rollo,pp.1112.

[3]Rollo,p.12.

[4]Rollo,pp.5373.

[5]Rollo,p.71.

[6]Rollo,pp.7582.

[7]Rollo,p.18.

[8]Rollo,pp.535.

[9]Rollo,p.32.

[10]Rollo,pp.121131.

[11]Rollo,pp.117120.

[12]Rollo,pp.94116.

[13]Rollo,pp.138184andpp.265287,respectively.

[14]Rollo,pp.288314.
[15]Rollo,pp.319340.

[16]Rollo,pp.354355.

[17]AdministrativeOrderNo.07dated10April1990.

[18]295SCRA470.

[19]

[20]CityofManilavs.CourtofAppeals,204SCRA362.

[21]Ibid.

[22]Investments,Inc.vs.CourtofAppeals,147SCRA1072.

[23]Eudelavs.CourtofAppeals,July17,1992.

[24]Under P.D. 902A, as amended, there is no provision which states the immediate execution of decisions rendered by the
SecuritiesandExchangeCommission.Section6thereofonlyprovidesasfollows:
XXX
Theaggrievedpartymayappealtheorder,decision,orrulingoftheCommissionsittingenbanctotheSupremeCourtbypetition
forreviewinaccordancewiththepertinentprovisionsoftheRulesofCourt.
[25]RepublicActNo.776.Section48.Decisions,ordersand/orrulingsoftheBoardshallbecomefinalandconclusiveafter
fifteendaysfromthedatethereofunlessappealedwithinsaidperiodtotheSupremeCourtbycertiorari.
[26]ExecutiveOrderNo.292.

[27]RepublicActNo.7160.

[28]Moralesvs.Subido,26SCRA150.

[29]WilWilhelmsen,Inc.,etalvs.Baluyut,83SCRA38.