CroatBosniak War

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CroatBosniak War
Part of the Bosnian War
and Yugoslav Wars
Date 18 October 1992 23 February 1994
(1 year, 4 months and 5 days)
Location Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly Central Bosnia and along the
Neretva river.
Result
Washington Agreement

Creation of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Territorial
changes Territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina controlled by the Croatian Defence
Council drops from 20 percent to 10 percent by the time of the Washington
Agreement.
Belligerents
Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia
Croatia Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Commanders and leaders
Croatia Franjo Tuman
Croatia Gojko uak
Croatia Janko Bobetko
Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia Mate Boban
Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia Milivoj Petkovi
Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia Slobodan Praljak
Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia Ante Roso
Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia Valentin ori Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina Alija Izetbegovi
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Sefer Halilovi
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Rasim Deli
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Enver Hadihasanovi
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Arif Paali
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Mehmed Alagi
Strength
40,00050,000 (1993)[1] 100,000120,000 (1993)[2]
[show] v t e
Bosnian War
[show] v t e
Yugoslav Wars
The CroatBosniak War was a conflict between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and the self-proclaimed Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, supported by Croatia,
that lasted from 18 October 1992 to 23 February 1994. It is often referred to as a
"war within a war" because it was part of the larger Bosnian War. In the beginning,
Bosniaks and Croats both indigenous European South Slavs, the former predominantly
of Muslim faith and the latter predominantly of Roman Catholic religion fought in
an alliance against the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and the Army of Republika
Srpska (VRS). By the end of 1992, however, tensions between Bosniaks and Croats
increased. The first armed incidents between the former South Slavic allies
occurred in October 1992 in central Bosnia between local Croat and Bosniak forces.
Their military alliance held out until early 1993 when their cooperation fell apart
and the two former allies engaged in open conflict.

The CroatBosniak War escalated in central Bosnia and soon spread to Herzegovina,
with most of the fighting taking place in those two regions. The Bosniaks were
organized in the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH), and Croats
in the Croatian Defence Council (HVO). The war generally consisted of sporadic
conflicts with numerous ceasefires signed in the course of it. However, it was not
an all-out war between the Bosniaks and Croats and they remained allied in other
regions. Several peace plans were proposed by the international community during
the war, but each of them failed. On 23 February 1994 a ceasefire was reached and
an agreement ending the hostilities was signed in Washington on 18 March 1994, by
which time the HVO had lost half of its controlled territory. The agreement led to
the establishment of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and joint operations
against the Serb forces which helped alter the military balance and bring the
Bosnian War to an end.

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) indicted a
number of high-ranking Croat and Bosniak officials on war crimes charges. In cases
against Herzeg-Bosnia political and military leaders, the ICTY ruled that Croatia
had overall control over the HVO and that the conflict was international. In a
first instance verdict of the Prli et al. case it found that a joint criminal
enterprise existed that sought to annex or control parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina
in correspondence with the borders of the 1939 Banovina of Croatia while Bosnians
have always looked at Herceg-Bosna as a barrier to the realization of their final
goal, the unitary BiH.

Contents [hide]
1 Background
1.1 Political and military relations
1.2 First incidents
2 Combatants
2.1 Bosniak forces
2.2 Croat forces
2.3 Foreign fighters
3 Chronology
3.1 Confrontations in Prozor and Novi Travnik
3.2 Outbreak of the war
3.3 VanceOwen Peace Plan
3.4 April 1993 in central Bosnia
3.5 War spreads to Herzegovina
3.6 JuneJuly 1993 Offensives
3.7 Contest of Gornji Vakuf
3.8 Operation Neretva
3.9 Vare enclave
3.10 Owen-Stoltenberg plan
3.11 Winter stalemate
3.12 End of the war
4 Wartime propaganda
5 Croatia's role
6 Aftermath
6.1 Casualties
6.2 Destruction of cultural heritage
6.3 Postwar terrorism
6.4 War crimes prosecutions
6.5 Reconciliation
7 Notes
8 References
9 External links
Background[edit]
Main articles: Breakup of Yugoslavia and Bosnian War

Ethnic composition of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991

In November 1990, months after Slovenia and Croatia[3] declared their independence,
the first free elections were held in Bosnia and Herzegovina, putting nationalist
parties into power with three parties. These were the Party of Democratic Action
(SDA), led by Alija Izetbegovi, the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), led by Radovan
Karadi, and the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ BiH),
led by Stjepan Kljui. Izetbegovi was elected as the Chairman of the Presidency of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Jure Pelivan, of the HDZ, was elected as the Chairman of
the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Momilo Krajinik, of the SDS,
was elected as the speaker of Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[4]

In 1990 and 1991, Serbs in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina had proclaimed a
number of "Serbian Autonomous Regions" with the intent of later unifying them to
create a Greater Serbia. Serbs used the well equipped Yugoslav People's Army (JNA)
in defending these territories.[5] As early as September or October 1990, the JNA
had begun arming Bosnian Serbs and organizing them into militias. By March 1991,
the JNA had distributed an estimated 51,900 firearms to Serb paramilitaries and
23,298 firearms to the SDS.[6]

In early 1991, the leaders of the six republics began a series of meetings to solve
the crisis in Yugoslavia. The Serbian leadership favoured a federal solution,
whereas the Croatian and Slovenian leadership favoured an alliance of sovereign
states. Izetbegovi proposed an asymmetrical federation on 22 February, where
Slovenia and Croatia would maintain loose ties with the 4 remaining republics.
Shortly after that, he changed his position and opted for a sovereign Bosnia as a
prerequisite for such a federation.[7] On 25 March 1991, Croatian president Franjo
Tuman met with Serbian president Slobodan Miloevi in Karaorevo, reportedly to
discuss the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[8][9] On 6 June, Izetbegovi and
Macedonian president Kiro Gligorov proposed a weak confederation between Croatia,
Slovenia and a federation of the other four republics, which was rejected by
Miloevi.[10] On 13 July, the government of Netherlands, then the presiding EC
country, suggested to other EC countries that the possibility of agreed changes to
Yugoslav Republics borders could be explored, but the proposal was rejected by
other members.[11] In July 1991, Radovan Karadi, president of the self-proclaimed
Republika Srpska, and Muhamed Filipovi, vice president of the Muslim Bosniak
Organisation (MBO), drafted an agreement between the Serbs and Bosniaks which would
leave Bosnia in a state union with SR Serbia and SR Montenegro. The HDZ BiH and the
Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SDP BiH) denounced the
agreement, calling it an anti-Croat pact and a betrayal. Although initially
welcoming the initiative, Izetbegovi also dismissed the agreement.[12][13]

From July 1991 to January 1992, during the Croatian War of Independence, the JNA
and Serb paramilitaries used Bosnian territory to wage attacks on Croatia.[14] The
Croatian government began arming Croats in the Herzegovina region as early as
October or November 1991,[15] expecting that the Serbs would spread the war into
Bosnia and Herzegovina.[16] It also helped arm the Bosniak community.[14] By late
1991 about 20,000 Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, mostly from the Herzegovina
region, enlisted in the Croatian National Guard.[17] During the war in Croatia,
Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovi gave a televised proclamation of neutrality,
stating that "this is not our war", and the Sarajevo government wasn't taking
defensive measures against a probable attack by the Bosnian Serbs and the JNA.[18]
Izetbegovi agreed to disarm the existing Territorial Defense (TO) forces on the
demand of the JNA. This was defied by Bosnian Croats and Bosniak organizations that
gained control of many facilities and weapons of the TO.[19][20] On 21 September
1991, Ante Paradik, the vice-president of the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP) and
Croat-Bosniak alliance advocate, was killed by Croatian police in mysterious
circumstances.[21]

The 1939 Banovina of Croatia (red) within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (light yellow)
On 12 November 1991, on a meeting chaired by Dario Kordi and Mate Boban, local
party leaders of the HDZ BiH reached an agreement to undertake a policy of
achieving an "age-old dream, a common Croatian State" and decided that the
proclamation of a Croatian banovina in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be the
"initial phase leading towards the final solution of the Croatian question and the
creation of a sovereign Croatia within its ethnic and historical [...]
borders."[22] On the same day, the Croatian Community of Bosnian Posavina was
proclaimed in municipalities of northwest Bosnia. On 18 November, the autonomous
Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia (HZ-HB) was established, it claimed it had no
secessionary goal and that it would serve a "legal basis for local self-
administration". It vowed to respect the Bosnian government under the condition
that Bosnia and Herzegovina was independent of "the former and every kind of future
Yugoslavia."[23] Boban was established as its president.[24] From its inception the
leadership of Herzeg-Bosnia and HVO held close relations to the Croatian government
and the Croatian Army (HV).[25] At a session of the Supreme State Council of
Croatia, Tuman said that the establishment of Herzeg-Bosnia was not a decision to
separate from Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 23 November, the Bosnian government
declared Herzeg-Bosnia unlawful.[26]

The HDZ BiH leadership was split regarding the establishment of the two Croatian
communities. The president of the party, Stjepan Kljui, opposed the move, while
party representatives from Herzegovina, Central Bosnia and Bosnian Posavina
supported it.[27] On 27 December 1991, the leadership of the HDZ of Croatia and of
HDZ BiH held a meeting in Zagreb chaired by Tuman. They discussed Bosnia and
Herzegovina's future, their differences in opinion on it, and the creation of a
Croatian political strategy. Kljui favored that Croats stay within a unified
Bosnia and Herzegovina on the Bosniak line. He was criticized by Tuman for
acceding to Izetbegovis policies.[28] Boban held that, in the event of Bosnia and
Herzegovina's disintegration or if it remained in Yugoslavia, Herzeg-Bosnia should
be proclaimed an independent Croatian territory "which will accede to the State of
Croatia but only at such time as the Croatian leadership [...] should decide."
Kordi, the vice president of Herzeg-Bosnia, claimed that the spirit of Croats in
Herzeg-Bosnia had grown stronger since its declaration and that Croats in the
Travnik region were prepared to become a part of the Croatian State "at all costs
[...] any other option would be considered treason, save the clear demarcation of
Croatian soil in the territory of Herceg-Bosna."[29] On the same meeting, Tuman
said that "from the perspective of sovereignty, Bosnia-Herzegovina has no
prospects" and recommended that Croatian policy should be one of "support for the
sovereignty [of Bosnia and Herzegovina] until such time as it no longer suits
Croatia."[30] He based this on the belief that the Serbs did not accept Bosnia and
Herzegovina and that Bosnian representatives did not believe in it and wished to
remain in Yugoslavia.[28] Tuman declared "it is time that we take the opportunity
to gather the Croatian people inside the widest possible borders".[31]

"Just let me tell you. Many who sit here and who support cantonization of Bosnia
and Herzegovina will live in a Greater Serbia, and I shall depart for Australia."
Stjepan Kljui commenting after his ouster[32]
On 2 January 1992, Gojko uak, the Minister of Defence of Croatia, and JNA General
Andrija Raeta signed an unconditional ceasefire in Sarajevo. The JNA moved
relieved troops from the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) into Bosnia and
Herzegovina, where they were stationed at strategic routes and around major towns.
[33] On 16 January, a rally celebrating Croatian independence was held in Busovaa.
Kordi spoke and declared Croats in Busovaa were part of a united Croatian nation
and that Herzeg-Bosnia, including Busovaa, is "Croatian land and that is how it
will be". HVO commander Ignac Kotroman also spoke, stating "we will be an integral
part of our dear State of Croatia by hook or by crook."[22] On 27 January the
Croatian Community of Central Bosnia was proclaimed.[34]

There was a change in the presidency of the HDZ BiH during winter, probably under
influence of the Croatian leadership.[35] On 2 February, Kljui had resigned.
Tuman commented that "[he] disappeared under Alija Izetbegovi's fez and the HDZ
[BIH] [...] stopped leading an independent Croatian policy".[36] Milenko Brki, who
also supported an integral Bosnia and Herzegovina, became the new president of HDZ
BiH.[35] Bosnian Croat authorities in predominately Croat-populated municipalities
answered more to the HDZ leadership and the Zagreb government than the Bosnian
government.[37] The HDZ held important positions in the Bosnian government
including the premiership and the ministry of defence, but despite this carried out
a separate policy.[38]

On 29 February and 1 March 1992 an independence referendum was held in Bosnia and
Herzegovina[39][40] and asked "are you in favor of a sovereign and independent
Bosnia-Herzegovina, a state of equal citizens and nations of Muslims, Serbs, Croats
and others who live in it?"[41] In the mean time Boban publicly circulated an
alternative referendum version that designated Bosnia and Herzegovina as a "state
community of its constituent and sovereign nations, Croats, Muslims, and Serbs,
living on their national territories."[42] Independence was strongly favored by
Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats, while Bosnian Serbs largely boycotted the referendum.
The majority of voters voted for independence and on 3 March 1992 Alija Izetbegovi
declared independence of the country, which was immediately recognised by Croatia.
[39][40]

Following the declaration of independence, the Bosnian War accelerated. In April

1992, the siege of Sarajevo began, by which time the Bosnian Serb-formed Army of
Republika Srpska (VRS) controlled 70% of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[43][40] On 8
April, Bosnian Croats were organized into the Croatian Defence Council (HVO).[9] A
sizable number of Bosniaks also joined the HVO,[16] constituting between 20 and 30
percent of HVO.[44] Boban said that the HVO was formed because the Bosnian
government did nothing after Croat villages, including Ravno, were destroyed by the
JNA.[18] A number of them joined the Croatian Defence Forces (HOS), a paramilitary
wing of the far-right HSP, led by Bla Kraljevi,[16][45] which "supported Bosnian
territorial integrity much more consistently and sincerely than the HVO".[16]
However, their views on an integral Bosnia and Herzegovina were related to the
legacy of the fascist Independent State of Croatia.[46] On 15 April 1992, the Army
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) was formed, with slightly over
two-thirds of troops consisting of Bosniaks and almost one-third of Croats and
Serbs.[38] The government in Sarajevo struggled to get organized and form an
effective military force against the Serbs. Izetbegovi concentrated all his forces
on retaining control of Sarajevo. In the rest of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
government had to rely on the HVO, that had already formed their defenses, to stop
the Serb advance.[9][47]

Political and military relations[edit]

HVO, ARBiH, and HOS soldiers in Mostar, June 1992.

A Croat-Bosniak alliance was formed in the beginning of the war, but over time
there were notable breakdowns of it due to rising tensions and the lack of mutual
trust,[48] with each of the two sides holding separate discussions with the Serbs,
and soon there were complaints from both sides against the other.[49] In February
1992, in the first of several meetings, Josip Manoli, Tuman's aide and previously
the Croatian Prime Minister, and Radovan Karadi met in Graz, Austria. The
Croatian position was not significantly different from that of the Serbs and held
that Bosnia and Herzegovina should consist of sovereign constituent nations in a
confederal relationship.[42] In mid-April 1992, the HVO proposed a joint military
headquarters for the HVO and the TO, but Izetbegovi ignored the request.[50] The
HVO, on the other hand, refused to be integrated into the ARBiH.[38] On 6 May,
Boban and Karadi met in Graz and formed an agreement for a ceasefire[51] and on
the territorial division of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[52][53] However, the parties
ultimately parted ways and on the following day the JNA and Bosnian Serb forces
mounted an attack on Croat-held positions in Mostar.[51][54] On 15 May, the United
Nations issued resolution 752 which recognized the presence of JNA and HV soldiers
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and demanded that they withdraw.[55] In mid-June, the
combined military efforts of the ARBiH and HVO managed to break the siege of
Mostar[56] and capture the east bank of the Neretva River, that was under control
of the VRS for two months.[57] The deployment of Croat forces to engage the VRS was
one of the key obstacles for a total Serb victory in the early stage of the war.
[58][59]

The Croatian and Herzeg-Bosnia leadership offered Izetbegovi a confederation of

Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Izetbegovi rejected it, whether because he
wanted to prevent Bosnia and Herzegovina from coming under the influence of
Croatia, or because he thought that such a move would give a justification to
Serbian claims, cripple reconciliation between Bosniaks and Serbs and make the
return of Bosniak refugees to eastern Bosnia impossible. His attempts to remain
neutral were met with disfavor in Croatia that at the time had different and
clearer military and strategic objectives.[60] Izetbegovi received an ultimatum
from Boban warning him that if he did not proclaim a confederation with Tuman that
Croatian forces would not help defend Sarajevo from strongholds as close as 40
kilometres (25 mi) away.[61] Boban later blocked the delivery of arms to the ARBiH,
which were secretly bought despite the United Nations embargo.[62] The Croatian
government recommended moving ARBiH headquarters out of Sarajevo and closer to
Croatia and pushed for its reorganization in an effort to heavily add Croatian
influence.[63]

On 3 July 1992, the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia was formally declared, in

an amendment to the original decision from November 1991.[64][60] It claimed power
over its own police, army, currency, and education and included several districts
where Bosniaks were the majority. It only allowed a Croat flag to be used, the only
currency allowed was the Croatian dinar, its official language was Croatian, and a
Croat school curriculum was enacted. Mostar, a town where Bosniaks constituted a
slight majority, was set as the capital.[57] In the preamble it was attested that
"the Croatian people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in these difficult moments of their
history when the last Communist army of Europe, united with the Chetniks, is
endangering the existence of the Croatian people and the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, are deeply aware that their future lies with the future of the entire
Croatian people."[65] In July, Sefer Halilovi became the Chief of the General
Staff of the ARBiH. This move further damaged relations between Zagreb and Sarajevo
as Halilovi was an officer in the JNA during the war in Croatia.[60]

Beginning in June, discussions between Bosniaks and Croats over military

cooperation and possible merger of their armies started to take place.[66] On 21
July, Izetbegovi and Tuman signed the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation
between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia in Zagreb, Croatia.[67] The agreement
allowed them to "cooperate in opposing [the Serb] aggression" and coordinate
military efforts.[68] It placed the HVO under the command of the ARBiH.[69]
Cooperation was inharmonious, but enabled the transportation of weapons to ARBiH
through Croatia in spite of the UN sanctioned arms embargo,[16] reopening channels
blocked by Boban.[63] It established "economic, financial, cultural, educational,
scientific and religious cooperation" between the signatories. It also stipulated
that Bosnian Croats hold dual citizenship for both Bosnia and Herzegovina and for
Croatia. This was criticized as Croatian attempts at "claiming broader political
and territorial rights in the parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina where large numbers
of Croats live". After its signature Boban vowed to Izetbegovi that Herzeg-Bosnia
would remain an integral part of Bosnia and Herzegovina when the war ended.[63] At
a session held on 6 August, the Bosnian Presidency accepted HVO as an integral part
of the Bosnian armed forces.[46]

First incidents[edit]
Disagreements between Croats and Bosniaks first surfaced over the distribution of
arms and ammunition from captured JNA barracks. The first of these disputes
occurred in May in Busovaa over the Kaonik Barracks and in Novi Travnik over an
arms factory and the distribution of supplies from a TO depot. In July, disputes
arose in Vare and in Vitez, where an explosives factory was located, and the HVO
secured the JNA barracks in Kiseljak.[70] The two sides also wanted greater
political power in various municipalities of central Bosnia.[50] The HVO took full
control over Busovaa on 10 May and blockaded the town, following an incident in
which an HVO member was injured. The situation calmed down in the following days
and the blockade was lifted.[71] In Vitez, an attempt to create a joint unit of the
TO and HVO failed and Croats increasingly left the TO forces for the HVO.[50] In
May, HVO Major General Ante Roso declared that the only "legal military force" in
Herzeg-Bosnia was the HVO and that "all orders from the TO [Territorial Defense]
command [of Bosnia and Herzegovina] are invalid, and are to be considered illegal
on this territory".[56] On 19 June 1992, an armed confrontation that lasted for two
hours occurred between local Bosniak and Croat forces in Novi Travnik.[72] In
August, actions by a Muslim gang led by Jusuf Prazina worsened relations with the
local HVO in Sarajevo. The HVO also protested to the ARBiH for launching
uncoordinated attacks on the VRS from Croat-held areas.[73] After Croat-Bosniak
fighting broke out Dobroslav Paraga, leader of the HSP, ordered the HOS not to
cooperate with the HVO and was subsequently arrested on terrorist charges.[74]

"HOS, as a regular army in Bosnia-Herzegovina, will fight for the freedom and
sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina because it is our homeland [and will] not allow
any divisions."
Bla Kraljevi during a ceremony in apljina on 19 July 1992[75]
In the summer of 1992, the HVO started to purge its Bosniak members[76] and many
left for ARBiH seeing that Croats had separatist goals.[77] As the Bosnian
government began to emphasize its Islamic character, Croat members left the ARBiH
to join the HVO or were expelled.[19] At the same time armed incidents started to
occur among Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina between the HVO and the HOS.[78] The
HOS included Croats and Bosniaks in its ranks and initially cooperated with both
the ARBiH and the HVO. The two authorities tolerated these forces, although they
were unpredictable and used problematic fascist insignia.[45] The HOS, however, did
not function integrally throughout the country. In the area of Novi Travnik it was
closer to the HVO, while in the Mostar area there were increasingly tense relations
between the HOS and the HVO.[46] There, the HOS was loyal to the Bosnian government
and accepted subordination to the Staff of the ARBiH of which Kraljevi was
appointed a member.[79] On 9 August, HOS Commander Bla Kraljevi was killed in
unclear circumstances at a police checkpoint in the village of Kruevo,[45]
allegedly because his car didn't stop at the checkpoint.[80] He and eight of his
staff were killed by HVO soldiers under the command of Mladen Naletili,[81] who
supported a split between Croat and Bosniaks.[82] Paraga claimed that the HVO
assassinated Kraljevi because of an alleged capture of Serb-held Trebinje by HOS
forces.[75] The HOS was disbanded, leaving the HVO as the only Croat force.[83]

On 4 September 1992, Croatian officials in Zagreb confiscated a large amount of

weapons and ammunition aboard an Iranian plane that was supposed to transport Red
Crescent humanitarian aid for Bosnia.[84] On 7 September, HVO demanded that the
Bosniak militiamen withdraw from Croatian suburbs of Stup, Bare, Azii, Otes,
Dogladi and parts of Nedzarici in Sarajevo and issued an ultimatum.[85] They denied
that it was a general threat to Bosnian government forces throughout the country
and claimed that Bosniak militiamen killed six of their soldiers, and looted and
torched houses in Stup. The Bosniaks stated that the local Croatian warlord made an
arrangement with Serb commanders to allow Serb and Croat civilians to be evacuated,
often for ransom, but not Bosniaks.[86] On 11 September, at a presidential meeting,
Tuman expressed his desire for a Croatian Banovina.[87] On 14 September, the
Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina declared the proclamation of Herzeg-
Bosnia unconstitutional.[26] At another presidential meeting on 17 September,
Tuman outlined Croatia's position about organizing BiH into three constituent
units, but said that if BiH failed to take into account Croatian interests, he
would support Herzeg-Bosnia's secession.[88][89] In late September, Izetbegovi and
Tuman met again and attempted to create military coordination against the VRS, but
to no avail.[56] By October, the agreement had collapsed and afterwards Croatia
diverted delivery of weaponry to Bosnia and Herzegovina by seizing a significant
amount for itself.[90] Boban had abandoned a Bosnian government alliance.[91] In
November, Izetbegovi replaced Kljuji in the state presidency with Miro Lazi from
HDZ.[92]

On 5 and 26 October 1992, Jadranko Prli, the HVO president and Herzeg-Bosnia prime
minister, Bruno Stoji, the head of HVO and Herzeg-Bosnia department of defense,
Slobodan Praljak, member of the Ministry of Defence of Croatia and commander of the
HVO Main Staff, and Milivoj Petkovi, chief of the HVO Main Staff, acted as a
delegation of Croatia and Herzeg-Bosnia and met with Ratko Mladi, the VRS General,
with the explicit intent of discussing the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At
the meeting Praljak stated: "The goal is Banovina or nothing" and that "it is in
our interest that the Muslims get their own canton so they have somewhere to move
to".[88]

In June 1992 the VRS launched Operation Corridor against HV-HVO forces in Bosnian
Posavina to secure an open road between Belgrade, Banja Luka and Knin.[57] The VRS
captured Modria on 28 June, Derventa on 45 July and Odak on 12 July. The
outnumbered Croat forces were reduced to isolated positions in Bosanski Brod and
Oraje, but were able to repel VRS attacks during August and September. In early
October 1992, VRS managed to break through Croat lines and capture Bosanski Brod.
HV/HVO withdrew their troops north across the Sava River.[93] Croats and Bosniaks
blamed each other for the defeats against the VRS.[94] The Bosnian government
suspected that a Croat-Serb cease-fire was brokered,[95] while the Croats objected
that the ARBiH was not helping them in Croat-majority areas.[96] By late 1992,
Herzeg-Bosnia lost a significant part of its territory to VRS. The territory under
the authority of Herzeg-Bosnia became limited to Croat ethnic areas in around 16%
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[97] The VRS successes in northern Bosnia resulted in
increasing numbers of Bosniak refugees fleeing south towards the HVO-held regions
of central Bosnia. In Bugojno and Travnik, Croats found themselves reduced
practically overnight from around half the local population to a small minority.
[57]

In the latter half of 1992, foreign Mujahideen hailing mainly from North Africa and
the Middle East began to arrive in central Bosnia and set up camps for combatant
training with the intent of helping their "Muslim brothers" against the Serbs.[98]
These foreign volunteers were primarily organized into an umbrella detachment of
the 7th Muslim Brigade (made up of native Bosniaks) of the ARBiH in Zenica.[99]
Initially, the Mujahideen gave basic necessities including food to local Muslims.
[98] When the CroatBosniak conflict began they joined the ARBiH in battles against
the HVO.[98]

Combatants[edit]
Bosniak forces[edit]
The Sarajevo government was slow in the organization of an effective military
force. Initially they were organized in the Territorial Defence (TO), which had
been a separate part of the armed forces of Yugoslavia, and in various paramilitary
groups such as the Patriotic League, Green Berets and Black Swans. The Bosniaks had
the upper hand in manpower, but were lacking an effective supply of arms and heavy
weaponry. The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was formed in April
1992. Its structure was based on the Yugoslav TO organization. It included 13
infantry brigades, 12 separate platoons, one military police battalion, one
engineer battalion, and a presidential escort company.[100]

In August 1992, five ARBiH Corps were established: 1st Corps in Sarajevo, 2nd Corps
in Tuzla, 3rd Corps in Zenica, 4th Corps in Mostar and 5th Corps in Biha. In the
second half of 1993 two additional corps were created, the 6th Corps headquartered
in Konjic and 7th Corps headquartered in Travnik. The main tactical unit of the
ARBiH was a brigade which had three to four subordinate infantry battalions and
supporting forces.[101] The size of a brigade varied, it could have as many as 4-
5,000 men or fewer than 1,000.[102]

By 1993, the ARBiH had around 20 main battle tanks, including T-55 tanks, 30 APCs
and some heavy artillery pieces. In mid 1993, the 3rd ARBiH Corps had 100 120-mm
mortars; 10 105-mm, 122-mm, and 155-mm howitzers; 8-10 antiaircraft guns; 25-30
antiaircraft machine guns; two or three tanks; and two or three ZIS 76-mm armored
weapons. The Bosniak forces also had 128-mm multiple-barrel rocket launchers, but
lacked necessary ammunition.[103] According to a July 1993 estimate by CIA, the
ARBiH had 100,000-120,000 men, 25 tanks and less than 200 artillery pieces and
heavy mortars. The army had problems with ammunition and rifle shortages and scarce
medical supplies.[2]

The ARBiH had logistics centres in Zagreb and Rijeka for the recruitment of men and
received weapons and ammunition from Croatia despite the UN arms embargo.[84][104]
This practice lasted until at most April 1993. According to Izetbegovi, by mid
1993 the ARBiH had brought in 30,000 riffles and machine-guns, 20 million bullets,
37,000 mines, and 46,000 anti-tank missiles.[104]

Croat forces[edit]
The Croatian Defence Council (HVO) was formed on 8 April 1992 and was the official
military of Herzeg-Bosnia, although the organization and arming of Bosnian Croat
military forces began in late 1991. Each district of Herzeg-Bosnia was responsible
for its own defence until the formation of four Operative Zones with headquarters
in Mostar, Tomislavgrad, Vitez and Oraje. However, there were always problems in
coordinating the Operative Zones.[105] The backbone of the HVO were its brigades
formed in late 1992 and early 1993. Their organization and military equipment was
relatively good, but could only conduct limited and local offensive action. The
brigades usually had three or four subordinate infantry battalions with light
artillery, mortars, antitank and support platoons. A brigade numbered between few
hundred to several thousand men, but most had 2-3,000.[106][107] In early 1993 the
HVO Home Guard was formed in order to provide support for the brigades.[108] The
HVO forces became better organized as time passed by, but they started creating
guards brigades, mobile units of professional soldiers, only in early 1994.[109]

The European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) estimated the strength of the HVO
in the beginning of 1993 at 45,00055,000. In February 1993, the HVO Main Staff
estimated the strength of the HVO at 34,080 officers and men, including 6,000 in
Operative Zone Southeast Herzegovina, 8,700 in Operative Zone Northwest
Herzegovina, 8,750 in Operative Zone Central Bosnia, and 10,630 in other locations.
[110] The HVO headquarters in Mostar declared full mobilization on 10 June 1993.
According to The Military Balance 1993-1994 edition, the HVO had around 50 main
battle tanks, mainly T-34 and T-55, and 500 various artillery weapons, most of
which belonged to HVO Herzegovina.[111] In July 1993, CIA estimated the HVO forces
at 40,000 to 50,000 men.[1]

When a ceasefire was signed in Croatia in January 1992, the Croatian government
allowed Bosnian Croats in the Croatian Army (HV) to demobilize and join the HVO. HV
General Janko Bobetko reorganized the HVO in April 1992 and several HV officers
moved to the HVO, including Milivoj Petkovi.[15] The Zagreb government deployed HV
units and Ministry of the Interior (MUP RH) special forces into Posavina and
Herzegovina in 1992 to conduct operations against the Serbs together with the HVO.
[56][112] The HV and the HVO had the same uniforms and very similar insignia.[113]

During the Croat-Bosniak conflict, HV units were deployed on the frontlines against
the VRS in eastern Herzegovina. Volunteers born in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who were
former HV members, were sent to the HVO. A unit of deserters was formed in late
1993.[114] Sent units were told to replace their HV insignia with that of the HVO.
[115] Most officers in the HVO were actually HV officers.[116] According to a
report by the UN Secretary General in February 1994, there were 3,000-5,000 HV
soldiers in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[117] The Bosnian government claimed there were
20,000 HV soldiers in BiH in early 1994,[118] while Herzeg-Bosnia officials said
only volunteers from BiH, former members of HV, were present.[119] According to The
Washington Post, at its peak the amount of money from Croatia that funded the HVO
surpassed $500,000 per day.[30] The HVO relied on the HV for equipment and
logistical support. Croatian officials acknowledged arming the HVO,[1] but direct
involvement of HV forces in the Croat-Bosniak conflict was denied by the Croatian
government.[120]

The Croatian Defence Forces (HOS), the paramilitary wing of the Croatian Party of
Rights, had its headquarters in Ljubuki. In the beginning of the war they fought
against the Serb forces together with the HVO and ARBiH. Relations between the HVO
and HOS eventually worsened, resulting in the killing of HOS Commander Bla
Kraljevi and the disarmament of the HOS. On 23 August 1992 HVO and HOS leaders in
Herzegovina agreed to incorporate the HOS into the HVO. The remaining HOS forces
were later recognized by the Sarajevo government as part of the ARBiH. The HOS
forces in central Bosnia merged with the HVO in April 1993.[45] Most of the
Bosniaks that were members of the HOS joined the Muslim Armed Forces (MOS).[121]

Foreign fighters[edit]
Main article: Foreign fighters in the Bosnian War
Muslim volunteers from different countries started coming to Bosnia and Herzegovina
in the second half of 1992.[122] They formed mujahideen fighting groups that were
known as El Mudahid (El Mujahid) that were joined by local radical Bosnian
Muslims. The first foreign group to arrive was led by Abu Abdul Al-Aziz from Saudi
Arabia.[123][124] Izetbegovi and the SDA initially claimed that they had no
knowledge of mujahideen units in the region.[125] The mujahideen received financial
support from Iran and Saudi Arabia. The El Mudahid detachment was incorporated
into the ARBiH in August 1993. Their strength was estimated at up to 4,000
fighters.[123] These fighters became notorious for the atrocities committed against
the Croat population in central Bosnia.[126]

Foreign fighters for Croats included British volunteers as well as other numerous
individuals from the cultural area of Western Christianity, both Catholics and
Protestants fought as volunteers for the Croats. Dutch, American, Irish, Polish,
Australian, New Zealand, French, Swedish, German, Hungarian, Norwegian, Canadian
and Finnish volunteers were organized into the Croatian 103rd (International)
Infantry Brigade. There was also a special Italian unit, the Garibaldi battalion.
[127] and one for the French, the groupe Jacques Doriot.[128] Volunteers from
Germany and Austria were also present, fighting for the HOS paramilitary group.

Swedish Jackie Arklv fought in Bosnia and was later charged with war crimes upon
his return to Sweden. Later he confessed he committed war crimes on Bosniak
civilians in the Croatian camps Heliodrom and Dretelj as a member of Croat forces.
[129]

Chronology[edit]
See also: Timeline of the CroatBosniak War
Confrontations in Prozor and Novi Travnik[edit]
The strained relations led to numerous local confrontations of smaller scale in
late October. These confrontations mostly started in order to gain control over
military supplies, key facilities and communication lines, or to test the
capability of the other side.[130] First of them was an armed clash in Novi Travnik
on 18 October. It started as a dispute over a gas station that was shared by both
armies. Verbal conflict escalated into an armed one in which an ARBiH soldier was
killed. Fighting soon broke out in the entire town. Both the ARBiH and HVO
mobilized their units in the area and erected roadblocks. Low-scale conflicts
spread quickly in the region.[131][132] The situation worsened on 20 October after
HVO Commander Ivica Stojak from Travnik was murdered,[131] for which the HVO
accused the 7th Muslim brigade.[133]

The two forces engaged each other along the supply route to Jajce on 21 October,
[134] as a result of an ARBiH roadblock at Ahmii set up the previous day on
authority of the "Coordinating Committee for the Protection of Muslims" rather than
the ARBiH command. ARBiH forces on the roadblock refused to let the HVO go through
towards Jajce and the ensuing confrontation resulted in one killed ARBiH soldier.
Two days later the roadblock was dismantled.[130] A new skirmish occurred in the
town of Vitez the following day.[73] These conflicts lasted for several days until
a ceasefire was negotiated by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).[130]

On 23 October another conflict broke out in, this time in Prozor, a town in
Northern Herzegovina, in a municipality of around 12,000 Croats and 7,000 Bosniaks.
However, the exact circumstances that caused the outbreak are not known.[73] Most
of Prozor was soon under control of the HVO, apart from the eastern parts of the
municipality.[135] The HVO brought in reinforcements from Tomislavgrad that
provided artillery support.[73] By 25 October they took full control of the Prozor
municipality. Many Bosniaks fled from Prozor when the fighting started, but they
began to return gradually a few days or weeks after the fighting had stopped.[136]
After the battle many Bosniak houses were burned.[137] According to a HVO report
after the battle, the HVO had 5 killed and 18 wounded soldiers. Initial reports
ARBiH Municipal Defence indicated that several hundred Bosniaks were killed, but
subsequent reports by the ARBiH made in November 1992 indicated eleven soldiers and
three civilians were killed. Another ARBiH report, prepared in March 1993, revised
the numbers saying eight civilians and three ARBiH soldiers were killed, while 13
troops and 10 civilians were wounded.[138]

On 29 October, the VRS captured Jajce due to the inability of ARBiH and HVO forces
to construct a cooperative defense,[139] against the VRS which held the advantage
in troop size and firepower, staff work and planning was significantly superior to
the defenders of Jajce.[140] Croat refugees from Jajce fled to Herzegovina and
Croatia, while around 20,000 Muslim refugees remained in Travnik, Novi Travnik,
Vitez, Busovaa, and villages near Zenica.[141]

By November 1992, the HVO controlled about 20 percent of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
[56] By December 1992, much of Central Bosnia was in the hands of the Croats. The
Croat forces had taken control of the municipalities of the Lava Valley and had
only met significant opposition in Novi Travnik and Ahmii[142] Bosniak authorities
forbade Croats from leaving towns such as Bugojno and Zenica, and would
periodically organise exchanges of local Croats for Muslims.[99] On 18 December,
the HVO took over power in areas that it controlled: it dissolved legal municipal
assemblies, sacked mayors and local government members that were against
confrontation with Bosniaks, and disarmed remaining Bosniak soldiers except for
those in Posavina.[143]

Outbreak of the war[edit]

"I will watch them destroy each other and then I will push them both into the sea."
Ratko Mladi, commander-in-chief of the VRS, commenting on the Croat-Bosniak war.
[144]
Despite the October confrontation in Travnik and Prozor, and with each side blaming
the other for the fall of Jajce, there were no large-scale clashes and a general
military alliance was still in effect.[145] A period of rising tensions, followed
by the fall of Jajce, reached its peak in early 1993 in central Bosnia.[146] The
HVO and ARBiH clashed on 11 January in Gornji Vakuf, a town that had about 10,000
Croats and 14,000 Bosniaks, with conflicting reports as to how the fighting started
and what caused it. The HVO had around 300 forces in the town and 2,000 in the
surrounding area, while the ARBiH deployed several brigades of its 3rd Corps. A
front line was established through the center of town. HVO artillery fired from
positions on the hills to the southeast on ARBiH forces in Gornji Vakuf after their
demands for surrender were rejected. Fighting also took place in nearby villages,
particularly in Dua where a HVO artillery shell killed 7 civilians, including
three children. A temporary ceasefire was soon arranged.[147][148]

As the situation calmed in Gornji Vakuf, conflict escalated in Busovaa, the HVOs
military headquarters in central Bosnia.[149] On 24 January 1993, the ARBiH
ambushed and killed two HVO soldiers outside of the town in the village of Kauni.
[147] On 26 January, six Croats and a Serb civilian were executed by the ARBiH in
the village of Dusina near Zenica, north of Busovaa.[150] The following day HVO
forces blocked all roads in central Bosnia and thus stopped the transports of arms
to the ARBiH. Intense fighting continued in the Busovaa area, where the HVO
attacked the Kadia Strana part of the town, in which numerous Bosniak civilians
were expelled or killed,[151] until a truce was signed on 30 January.[152]

The HVO had 8,750 men in its Operative Zone Central Bosnia. The ARBiH 3rd Corps,
which was based in central Bosnia, reported that during this period it had roughly
26,000 officers and men.[110] The 3:1 ratio in central Bosnia was a result of an
expansion in Bosniak forces throughout 1993, which was reflected in increased arms
transfers, the influx of refugees from Jajce, military-age refugees from eastern
Bosnia and the arrival of fundamentalist mujahideen fighters from abroad.[153][154]
By early 1993 the ARBiH also had an armaments advantage over the HVO central
Bosnia.[155] This made it possible for the ARBiH to conduct offensive action on a
large scale for the first time.[154] The increase in the relative power of the
Bosniak side led to a change in relationship between Croats and Bosniaks in central
Bosnia.[153] Despite the growing tensions, the transfer of weapons from Croatia to
BiH continued throughout March and April.[156]

VanceOwen Peace Plan[edit]

First version of the Vance-Owen plan, which would have established 10 provinces
Bosniak province
Croat province
Serb province
Sarajevo district
Dayton Agreement border
The UN, the United States, and the European Community (EC) supported a series of
peace plans for Bosnia and Herzegovina.[47] The most notable of them was a peace
proposal drafted by the UN Special Envoy Cyrus Vance and by EC representative Lord
Owen. The first draft of the plan was presented in October 1992, taking into
account the aspirations of all three sides.[157] The VanceOwen Peace Plan (VOPP)
proposed to divide Bosnia into ten ethnically based autonomous provinces or
cantons, three of which would be Serb, three Bosniak, three would be Croat, and
Sarajevo would be a separate province.[149][158]

The final draft was presented in Geneva in January 1993, but it created an
impression that the borders were not yet definite.[159] Bosnian Croat
representatives supported the peace proposal as it gave them autonomy. Only a few
Croat enclaves were outside the three Croat provinces and it was more favourable to
them than the previous plans.[160] Tuman was unofficially the head of the Croat
delegation as Boban required his approval before acting.[161] On 2 January, Bosnian
Croat authorities agreed to the plan in its entirety.[162] On 15 January the HVO
declared that it would implement the plan unilaterally even without the signature
of Bosniak authorities.[163] On the same day, Prli ordered ARBiH units in
provinces designated as Croat under the plan to subordinate themselves to HVO, and
HVO units in Bosniak designated provinces to subordinate to the ARBiH.[162] Stoji
and Petkovi sent similar orders.[164]
On 16 January, Halilovi reminded ARBiH troops that peace talks were still ongoing
and were ordered to not subordinate to the HVO.[165] On the same day, Boo Raji, a
Croat and Minister of Defence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, issued an
identical order to that of the HVO to Serb, Croat, and Bosniak forces as well as
UNPROFOR and ECMM. Owen says this was premature and that the ARBiH wasn't required
to be subordinate to the HVO.[166] On 19 January, Izetbegovi voided Raji's order
and on 21 January, Raji suspended his own order until peace talks were finished.
[165] At the same time, HVO-ARBiH clashes broke out in many municipalities.[165] A
mutual order to halt hostilities was issued by Boban and Izetbegovi on 27 January
though it went unenforced.[167]

Izetbegovi had rejected the plan as he pressed for a unitary state and said that
the plan would "legitimise Serb ethnic cleansing". Bosnian Serbs also rejected it
because they would have to withdraw from more than 20% of the territory of BiH they
controlled and split their state into three parts,[158] though Karadi refused to
give a direct answer immediately.[168] The Croat leadership tried to implement the
plan unilaterally, despite that the Bosniak and Serb parties did not sign it yet.
[169]

EC representatives wanted to sort out the Croat-Bosniak tensions, but the

collective Presidency fell apart, with the Croat side objecting that decisions of
the government were made arbitrarily by Izetbegovi and his close associates.[170]
The US then put pressure on Izetbegovi to sign it, hoping that if the Bosniaks
agreed on it, Russia would persuade the Bosnian Serbs to also accept the plan.[171]
A Bosniak revision of the proposal was published in an SDA magazine with a map
allocating province 10 municipalities of Travnik, Novi Travnik, Vitez, Busovaa,
Bugojno and Gornji Vakuf to a Bosniak province, areas in which the Croat-Bosniak
conflict soon erupted.[168]

Izetbegovi eventually accepted the plan on 25 March after several amendments[172]

and on 11 May, the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina passed a
decision in support of the plan and with assurance of government enforcement.[173]
Although initially Karadi rejected the plan, he signed it on 30 April, but it was
rejected by the National Assembly of Republika Srpska on 6 May, and subsequently
rejected on a referendum.[174]

Many thought that this plan contributed to the escalation of the Croat-Bosniak war,
encouraging the struggle for territory between Croat and Bosniak forces in parts of
central Bosnia that were ethnically mixed.[159] In May, the UN Special Rapporteur
on the Situation of Human Rights Tadeusz Mazowiecki said that the Vance-Owen plan
was encouraging ethnic cleansing.[145] Owen later defended his plan against such
claims, saying that those who connect ethnic cleansing and a civil war between the
Croats and Bosniaks to the Vance-Owen Peace Plan are wrong as their alliance was
breaking apart throughout 1992.[175] On 20 May, Tuman claimed that the "Croats
surely cannot agree to lose some areas that used to be a part of the
Banovina."[176]

April 1993 in central Bosnia[edit]

On 28 March Tuman and Izetbegovi announced an agreement to establish a joint
Croat-Bosniak military in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The HVO and ARBiH were to be
placed under joint command. However, in the following month the war further
escalated in central Bosnia.[152] The Croats attributed the escalation to the
increased Islamic policy of the Sarajevo Government, while Bosniaks accused the
Croat side of separatism.[177] The escalation was condemned by both the Islamic
Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Catholic Church. They held the SDA and
HDZ leadership responsible for it.[178] In April, the Reis ul-ulema in the Islamic
Community, Jakub Selimoski, who opposed political Islam, was deposed and replaced
with Mustafa Ceri, a more radical imam that had close ties with the SDA
leadership.[178][179] In central Bosnia, there was a large scale effort by the HVO
to transfer the Croat population into Herzegovina.[180]

The thin ARBiH-HVO alliance broke after the HVO issued an ultimatum for ARBiH units
in Croat-majority cantons, designated by the null Vance-Owen Plan, to surrender
their arms or move to a Bosniak-majority canton by 15 April.[152] In early April
armed clashes started in Travnik when a Bosniak soldier fired on HVO soldiers
erecting a Croat flag. On 13 April, four members of the HVO were kidnapped by the
mujahideen outside Novi Travnik.[181] In the morning of 15 April, HVO commander
ivko Toti was kidnapped in Zenica and his escort was killed by the mujahideen.
The ARBiH representatives denied any involvement in this and a joint ARBiH-HVO
commission was formed to investigate the case.[182][152] They were subsequently
exchanged in May for eleven mujahideen and two Muslim drivers arrested by the HVO.
[183] On the following morning shooting broke out in Zenica where the outnumbered
HVO was forced out of the city.[184] Most of the Croat population in Zenica was
expelled and became refugees.[185] Captured soldiers and civilians were detained in
a music school.[186]

UN peacekeepers collecting corpses after the massacre in Ahmii.

Clashes spread down the Lava Valley in central Bosnia. The HVO wanted to link up
the towns of Kreevo, Kiseljak, Vitez, Busovaa and Novi Travnik, which would have
created a corridor across central Bosnia.[187] An offensive was launched in which
the HVO Commander Dario Kordi implemented an ethnic cleansing strategy in the
Lava Valley to expel the Bosniak population.[184][151] The massacre in Ahmii on
16 April 1993 was the culmination of the Lava Valley ethnic cleansing. The village
of Ahmii was attacked by surprise in the morning with mortar rounds and sniper
fire. The attack resulted in mass killing of at least 103 Bosniak civilians. The
main mosque was burned and its minaret demolished.[184][188] The attack was
preplanned and resulted in a "deliberate massacre of unarmed, unwarned civilians:
HVO troops systematically set out to find and execute the entire population."
Afterwards a cleanup operation was carried out to disguise what had occurred.[184]

Bodies of people killed in April 1993 around Vitez.

On 18 April, a truck bomb was detonated near the mosque in Stari Vitez, resulting
in the destruction of the War Presidency office, the deaths of at least six people
and injury to 50 people. The ICTY determined this was an act of "pure terrorism"
carried out by elements within the HVO, but did not link the attack to the HVO
leadership.[189] The HVO encircled Stari Vitez where the ARBiH deployed in trenches
and shelters with around 350 fighters. Bosniak forces tried to break through from
the north and reinforce the ARBiH positions in Stari Vitez.[190] The HVO took
control of several villages around Vitez, but the lack of resources slowed their
advance and the plan of linking the Vitez enclave with Kiseljak. The ARBiH was
numerically superior and its several hundred soldiers remained in Vitez.[191] The
explosives factory located in Vitez remained under HVO control.[192] The siege on
Stari Vitez continued from April 1993 to February 1994.[189] On 24 April,
mujahideen forces attacked the village of Miletii near Travnik, north of Vitez.
Upon taking it they mutilated four captured Croat civilians and took the rest to
the Poljanice camp.[150]

Fierce fighting occurred in the Kiseljak area. HVO attacked and gained control of
several Bosniak villages in the vicinity by the end of April. Bosniak civilians
were detained or forced to leave and the villages sustained significant damage.
[191] In Busovaa, the ARBiH opened artillery and mortar fire on the town and
attacked it on 19 April. Intense combat continued for three days.[193] Bosniaks
were expelled from several villages near the town. The HVO also launched attacks on
Gornji Vakuf, Prozor and Jablanica, while the ARBiH attacked HVO positions east of
Prozor.[191]
HVO HQ said that their losses were 145 soldiers and 270 civilians killed by 24
April, and ARBiH casualties were probably at least as high. In the following period
the HVO in central Bosnia assumed a defensive position against the 3rd ARBiH Corps.
[191] The HVO overestimated their power and the ability of securing the Croat
enclaves, while the ARBiH leaders thought that Bosniak survival depended on seizing
territory in central Bosnia rather than in a direct confrontation with the stronger
VRS around Sarajevo.[94] Within two months the ARBiH fully controlled Central
Bosnia except for Vitez, Kiseljak, and Prozor.[194]

War spreads to Herzegovina[edit]

By the end of the April the Croat-Bosniak war fully broke out. On 21 April, uak
met with Lord Owen in Zagreb, where he expressed his anger at the behavior of
Bosniaks and said that two Croat villages in eastern Herzegovina have put
themselves into Serb hands rather than risking coming under Bosniak control.[195]
uak, himself a Bosnian Croat,[139] was one of the chief supporters of Herzeg-
Bosnia in the government[196][83] and according to historian Marko Attila Hoare
acted as a "conduit" of Croatian support for Bosnian Croat separatism.[139]

The war had spread to northern Herzegovina, firstly to the Konjic and Jablanica
municipalities. The Bosniak forces in the region were organized in three brigades
of the 4th Crops and could field around 5,000 soldiers. The HVO had fewer soldiers
and a single brigade, headquartered in Konjic. Although there was no conflict in
Konjic and Jablanica during the Croat-Bosniak clashes in central Bosnia, the
situation was tense with sporadic armed incidents. The conflict started on 14 April
with an ARBiH attack on a HVO-held village outside of Konjic. The HVO responded
with capturing three villages northeast of Jablanica.[197] On 16 April in the
village of Trusina, north of Jablanica, 15 Croat civilians and 7 POWs were killed
by an ARBiH unit called the Zulfikar upon taking the village.[198] On the following
day the HVO attacked the villages of Doljani and Sovii east of Jablanica. After
taking control of the villages around 400 Bosniak civilians were detained until 3
May.[199] The HVO and ARBiH fought in the area until May with only several days of
truce, with the ARBiH taking full control of both the towns of Konjic and Jablanica
and smaller nearby villages.[197]

On 25 April, Izetbegovi and Boban signed a joint statement ordering a ceasefire

between the ARBiH and the HVO.[200] It declared a joint HVO-ARBiH command was
created and to be led by General Halilovi and General Petkovi with headquarters
in Travnik. On the same day, however, the HVO and the HDZ BiH adopted a statement
in itluk claiming Izetbegovi was not the legitimate president of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, that he represented only Bosniaks, and that the ARBiH was a Bosniak
military force.[201]

There were areas of the country where the HVO and ARBiH continued to fight side by
side against the VRS. Although the armed confrontation in Herzegovina and central
Bosnia strained the relationship between them, it did not result in violence and
the Croat-Bosniak alliance held, particularly in places in which both were heavily
outmatched by Serb forces. These exceptions were the Biha pocket, Bosnian Posavina
and the Teanj area. Despite some animosity, an HVO brigade of around 1,500
soldiers also fought along with the ARBiH in Sarajevo.[202][203] In other areas
where the alliance collapsed, the VRS, still the strongest force, occasionally
cooperated with both the HVO and ARBiH, pursuing a local balancing policy and
allying with the weaker side.[204]

Siege of Mostar[edit]
Main article: Siege of Mostar

Damaged buildings from the fighting on the Croatian side of Mostar

Meanwhile, tensions between Croats and Bosniaks increased in Mostar. By mid-April
1993, it had become a divided city with the western part dominated by HVO forces
and the eastern part where the ARBiH was largely concentrated. While the ARBiH
outnumbered the HVO in central Bosnia, the Croats held the clear military advantage
in Herzegovina. The HVO headquarters was in western Mostar.[205] The 4th Corps of
the ARBiH was based in eastern Mostar and under the command of Arif Paali.[206]
The HVO Southeast Herzegovina, which had an estimated 6,000 men in early 1993, was
under the command of Miljenko Lasi.[130] The conflict in Mostar started in the
early hours of 9 May 1993 when both the east and west side of Mostar came under
artillery fire. As in the case of Central Bosnia, there exist competing narratives
as to how the conflict broke out in Mostar.[205] Combat mainly took place around
the ARBiH headquarters in Vranica building in western Mostar and the HVO-held
Tihomir Mii barracks (Sjeverni logor) in eastern Mostar. After the successful HVO
attack on Vranica, 10 Bosniak POWs from the building were later killed.[207] The
situation in Mostar calmed down by 21 May and the two sides remained deployed on
the frontlines.[208] The HVO expelled the Bosniak population from western Mostar,
while thousands of men were taken to improvised prison camps in Dretelj and
Heliodrom.[209] The ARBiH held Croat prisoners in detention facilities in the
village of Potoci, north of Mostar, and at the Fourth elementary school camp in
Mostar.[210]

On 30 June the ARBiH captured the Tihomir Mii barracks on the east bank of the
Neretva, a hydroelectric dam on the river and the main northern approaches to the
city. The ARBiH also took control over the Vrapii neighborhood in northeastern
Mostar. Thus they secured the entire eastern part of the city. On 13 July the ARBiH
mounted another offensive and captured Buna and Blagaj, south of Mostar. Two days
later fierce fighting took place across the frontlines for control over northern
and southern approaches to Mostar. The HVO launched a counterattack and recaptured
Buna.[206] Both sides settled down and turned to shelling and sniping at each
other, though the HVO superior heavy weaponry caused severe damage to eastern
Mostar.[209] In the broader Mostar area the Serbs provided military support for the
Bosniak side and hired out tanks and heavy artillery to the ARBiH. The VRS
artillery shelled HVO positions on the hills overlooking Mostar.[211][178] In July
1993, Bosnian Vice President Ejup Gani said that the biggest Bosniak mistake was a
military alliance with the Croats at the beginning of the war, adding that Bosniaks
were culturally closer to the Serbs.[212]

Before the war, the Mostar municipality had a population of 43,037 Croats, 43,856
Bosniaks, 23,846 Serbs and 12,768 Yugoslavs.[213] According to 1997 data, the
municipalities of Mostar that in 1991 had a Croat relative majority became all
Croat and municipalities that had a Bosniak majority became all Bosniak.[214]
Around 60 to 75 percent of buildings in the eastern part of the city were destroyed
or very badly damaged, while in the larger western part around 20 percent of
buildings had been severely damaged or destroyed.[215]

JuneJuly 1993 Offensives[edit]

Contest of Travnik and Kakanj[edit]

The front lines in the Lava Valley in 1993 between the ARBiH and the HVO,
including Novi Travnik, Vitez and Busovaa
In central Bosnia, the situation between Bosniaks and Croats remained relatively
calm during May. The Sarajevo government used that time to reorganize its army,
naming Rasim Deli as Commander of the ARBiH, and to prepare an offensive against
the HVO in the Bila Valley, where the city of Travnik was located, and in the
Kakanj municipality. By April, the ARBiH in the Travnik area had around
8,00010,000 men commanded by Mehmed Alagi. The HVO had some 2,500-3,000 soldiers,
most of them on the defence lines against the VRS. The HVO had its headquarters in
Travnik, but the city was controlled by the ARBiH.[216]

On 4 June the ARBiH attacked HVO positions in Travnik and its surroundings. The HVO
units holding the front lines were struck from the rear and the headquarters in
Travnik was surrounded. After a few days of street fighting the outnumbered HVO
forces were defeated. Thousands of civilians and HVO soldiers fled to nearby Serb-
held territory as they were cut off from HVO held positions.[217][218] On 8 June
the village of Maline near Travnik was captured by the mujahideen. More than 200
Croat civilians and soldiers were imprisoned. At least 24 Croat civilians and POWs
were subsequently killed by mujahideen forces near the village of Bikoi northeast
of Travnik.[219] The seizure of Travnik and its surrounding villages triggered a
large exodus of Croats from the area.[209] Captured civilians and POWs were
detained by the ARBiH in a cellar of the JNA barracks in Travnik.[220]

The ARBiH continued its offensive to the east of the city and secured a corridor
from Zenica to Travnik. The HVO was pushed to Novi Travnik and Vitez.[217][218] On
10 June the ARBiH shelled Vitez, during which eight children had been killed in a
playground by an artillery shell.[126] Due to the advancement of Bosniak forces,
the HVO headquarters in Mostar declared full mobilization on the territory of
Herzeg-Bosnia.[221]

In early June a convoy of aid supplies known as the Convoy of Joy was heading for
Tuzla. It was stopped on June 10 by Croat refugees from Travnik when around 50
women blocked the road north of Novi Travnik. The convoy was then looted and eight
drivers were killed. The following morning the convoy moved on, but incidents
continued to happen. In one of them the UNPROFOR escort returned fire and killed
two HVO soldiers in the shootout.[222] This incident was extensively reported in
the Western media and caused immense bad publicity for the HVO.[209]

The ARBiH moved on towards Kakanj with an attack on villages to the southeast of
the city. As the ARBiH approached the city, thousands of Croats began to flee, and
the outnumbered HVO directed its forces to protect an escape route to Vare, east
of Kakanj. The key villages on the route were captured on 15 June and on the
following day the ARBiH entered Kakanj.[223] The HVO responded with attacks in the
Kiseljak area. After taking the village of Tulica south of the town, HVO forces
killed 12 Bosniak civilians and POWs and burned several houses. In the Han Ploa
and Grahovci villages north of Tulica, 64 people were killed during the attack or
in custody.[224]

Tuman came under intense pressure both from the EC for giving aid to the HVO and
from the Herzeg-Bosnia leaders that asked for more military support. The HV
eventually assumed control of the entire confrontation line with the VRS in
southern Herzegovina, north of Dubrovnik, which enabled the HVO to direct more if
its troops against the ARBiH.[225] The HV remained there in defensive positions
until the signing of the Dayton agreement.[15] Martin pegelj, former Minister of
Defence, later said that he was asked to help "rescue the situation" in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, but refused it. He believed that if the Croatian Army remained in an
alliance with the ARBiH then the war against the Serbs would have been concluded by
the end of 1992.[226][115]

Battle of epe[edit]
Main article: Battle of epe

Frontlines near epe, Maglaj and Teanj in northern Bosnia, 1993

In the town of epe, 45 kilometers northeast of Zenica, Croats and Bosniaks had
two parallel governments. The town of 20,000 residents was equally divided and
coexistence between Croats and Bosniaks had been retained. The ARBiH and HVO
maintained separate headquarters a kilometer apart.[227]

HVO troops in the region numbered 7,000 men, of which 2,000 were in the immediate
epe area. The ARBiH had two local brigades in epe and Zavidovii with around
5,000-6,000 men. The ARBiH also had several brigades in Teanj and Maglaj, north of
epe. Both armies were positioned on the frontlines against the VRS, but their
cooperation broke down on 24 June, with both sides accusing each other for the
conflict outbreak. The ARBiH deployed 12,500 men south of epe, advancing in two
columns. These units occupied the high ground east, south, and west of epe, while
bitter street fighting took place in the town between the HVO and local Bosniak
forces. Each side controlled about half of epe and used artillery for heavy
bombardment. An undisguised Croat-Serb alliance existed with the UN confirming that
VRS tanks helped the HVO in the epe-Zavidovii area. Local VRS forces in Maglaj
provided decisive support for the HVO, succeeding where the HVO failed in crippling
ARBiH defense. The battle of epe lasted until 30 June when the 305th and 319th
ARBiH Brigades surrendered. The ARBiH troops secured Zavidovii, but the Bosniak-
held area around Teanj and Maglaj was completely cut off.[227][228]

As a result of VRS assistance the HVO gained the upper hand by early July. The UN
confirmed that Maglaj was completely surrounded.[229] Around 4,000-5,000 Bosniak
POWs and civilians were detained by the HVO after the end of the battle and held in
warehouses for several days until their release. Captured ARBiH soldiers received
harsh treatment.[230] The area of epe, Maglaj and Teanj became a three-sided
war. In the epe-Zavidovii area the VRS assisted the HVO against the ARBiH,
Maglaj was surrounded by the HVO on three sides and the VRS on one side, and in
Teanj the HVO and ARBiH cooperated against the VRS.[229]

Battle of Bugojno[edit]
In early morning of 18 July the ARBiH attacked HVO forces in and around Bugojno,
where an ammunition factory was located. Previously, the two armies' commanders
allowed free movement of the troops in the town, but this agreement was shaken by
incidents that happened throughout the year.[231] The ARBiH had the upperhand in
the battle of Bugojno. The HVO had several hundred soldiers in the town, whereas
the ARBiH deployed three times as many soldiers.[225][232][231] The HVO's Eugen
Kvaternik brigade, disorganized and surprised, was quickly surrounded in three
separate places. After heavy street fighting, the ARBiH captured HVO's barracks on
21 July and by 25 July it seized control of the town,[231] triggering the flight of
around 15,000 Croats.[209] HVO soldiers and non-Bosniak civilians were transferred
to prison camps, mostly to the Iskra Stadium Camp where they were held for months
in deplorable conditions.[233][234] In the fighting several dozens of soldiers died
on both sides while 350 HVO soldiers were captured.[231] From July, the HVO's
Operative Zone Central Bosnia was completely cut off from HVO Herzegovina and could
not receive any significant amounts of military supplies.[235]

Kiseljak enclave[edit]

Croatian enclave in Lepenica Valley, including Kiseljak and Kreevo

Following the capture of Bugojno, the ARBiH was tightening its grip on Kiseljak and
Busovaa and pushed closer towards Vitez and Novi Travnik.[236] Due to its location
on the outskirts of the besieged Sarajevo, the Kiseljak enclave was an important
distribution center of smuggled supplies on the route to Sarajevo.[237] Bosniaks
and Croats both wanted control over it. Until the summer, most of the fighting took
place in the northern area of the enclave and west of the town of Kiseljak. During
the April escalation, the HVO gained control over villages in that area. Another
round of fighting started in mid June when the ARBiH attacked HVO-held Kreevo,
south of Kiseljak.[238] The attack started from the south of the town and was
followed by a strike on villages north and northeast of Kiseljak. The ARBiH
deployed parts of its 3rd and 6th Corps, about 6-8,000 soldiers versus around 2,500
HVO soldiers in the enclave.[239] The attack on Kreevo was repelled after heavy
fighting and the HVO stabilized its defence lines outside the town. The next target
of the ARBiH was Fojnica, a town west of Kiseljak. The attack began on 2 July with
artillery and mortar attacks, just days after the UNPROFOR Commander called the
town "an island of peace". Fojnica was captured in the following days.[238]
Contest of Gornji Vakuf[edit]
Following the successful capture of Bugojno, the ARBiH was preparing an offensive
on Gornji Vakuf, where both sides held certain parts of the town. The ARBiH
launched its attack on 1 August and won control over most of the town by the
following day. The HVO retained control over a Croat neighborhood in the southwest
and the ARBiH, lacking necessary reinforcements, couldn't continue its offensive.
The name of the Croat-held part was later changed to Uskoplje. The HVO attempted a
counterattack from its positions to the southwest of the town on 5 August, but the
ARBiH was able to repel the attack. Another attack by the HVO started in September,
reinforced with tanks and heavy artillery, but it was also unsuccessful.[240]

Operation Neretva[edit]
Main article: Operation Neretva '93

The front lines in northern and central Herzegovina in December 1993

The standstill of August ended with the beginning of September when the ARBiH
launched an operation known as Operation Neretva '93 against the HVO on a 200 km
long front from Gornji Vakuf to south of Mostar, one of its largest of the year.
The ARBiH launched coordinated attacks on Croat enclaves in Lava Valley,
particularly in the Vitez area.[241] The village of Zabilje north of Vitez was the
first target in order to cut the main road through the Lava Valley. Repeated
attacks followed from northwest and southwest. The HVO launched a counterattack on
8 September against ARBiH positions northwest of Vitez. They seized the high ground
on the strategically important Bila hill, but the Bosniak forces soon resumed their
offensive.[242][243]

During the night of 8/9 September, the ARBiH attacked the village of Grabovica,
near Jablanica. At least 13,[244] and as many as 35[245] Croat civilians were
killed in the Grabovica massacre. The victims included elderly people, women, and a
four year old child.[244] A few days later the ARBiH mounted an offensive east of
Prozor. During this offensive the Uzdol massacre occurred in the village of Uzdol.
In the morning of 14 September, 70-100 ARBiH forces infiltrated past the HVO
defence lines and reached the village. After capturing the HVO command post the
troops went on a killing spree.[246] 29 Croat civilians were killed by the Prozor
Independent Battalion and members of the local police force.[244][246]

On 18 September another ARBiH attack started in the Vitez area in order to split
the Croat enclave into two parts.[247] Combat renewed in other areas as well, in
Gornji Vakuf, Travnik, Fojnica and Mostar.[243] Fighting shifted to the Busovaa
area on 23 September where the ARBiH used 120-mm mortar rounds to shell the town.
Vitez was again struck on 27 September, when its hospital was hit by ARBiH mortars,
killing two people. During a simultaneous attack from the north and south, at one
point the ARBiH broke through HVO lines in Vitez, but were ultimately forced back
after heavy fighting.[247][241]

In Herzegovina, the main focus of the ARBiH attack was the HVO stronghold in the
village of Vrdi, an important location for the control of northern and western
approaches to Mostar. The first attack started on 19 September with artillery
bombardment of the village. It included the struggle for nearby mountains to the
west, but the attack was repelled by the HVO. There was no fixed frontline from
Vrdi to Mostar and forces from both sides battled on the hills. In Mostar, there
were clashes in the suburbs of the city and mutual artillery shelling until a
ceasefire was agreed on 3 October.[248]

Vare enclave[edit]
The town of Vare held 12,000 residents with a small Croat majority. It had been
relatively free of ethnic tensions even after the summer of 1993. In the town
leaders of both sides remained moderate and the Bosniak and Croat communities
carried on coexisting. Issues first started in mid-June when an ARBiH
counteroffensive pushed the Croat population of Kakanj out with around 12,000-
15,000 Croat refugees coming to Vare and nearby villages, effectively doubling
Vare's population. The Croats, having more people than houses, responded by
forcing Bosniaks from their homes in three villages outside Kakanj on 23 June and
demanded that nearby villages surrender their arms to the HVO, a demand that
appeared to be ignored. The HVO had military control of Vare and was pressured by
the ARBiH to resubordinate from the HVO's Central Bosnia Operational Zone to the
ARBiH 2nd Corps. The Croats in Vare attempted to balance their relationship with
the Bosniaks and Herzeg-Bosnia.[249]

Ivica Raji, commander of the HVO Central Bosnia Operational Zone's Second
Operational Group, traveling through friendly Serb territory had reached Vare on
or before 20 October and changed the situation greatly. In Vare he and an armed
extremist group carried out a local coup, jailing and replacing the mayor and
police chief. The municipality's large Bosniak population was then harassed,
robbed, and systemically forced from their houses. Within days the majority of the
Bosniak population had relocated south to the village of Dabravina. Raji
established a hardliner government while the ARBiH was preparing to attack Vare.
The ARBiH began with the town of Ratanj between Kakanj and Vare and moved on to
the predominately Croat village of Kopjari where three HVO soldiers were killed and
the town's population was forced to flee. The attack infuriated Raji and ordered
that the HVO assault a Bosniak village in retaliation.[249]

On the morning of 23 October 1993, HVO infantry, likely with mortar and artillery
support, attacked the village of Stupni Do in Vare which was guarded by an ARBiH
platoon with 39 soldiers. In the process HVO soldiers destroyed the village,
dynamited and looted buildings, and killed any resident that didn't manage to flee
in time.[250][251] The ICTY determined that the HVO massacred 36 people, including
three children, and that three women were raped.[251] The HVO denied the massacre
and prevented UN peacekeepers from investigating by planting mines and threatening
them with anti-tank weapons. By the time peacekeepers gained access on 26 October
the HVO had cleaned up the town, removing and destroying evidence of the massacre.
[250]

By the end of October, Vare was completely cleansed of its Bosniak inhabitants
with its Croat residents looting abandoned Bosniak homes and businesses. On 3
November the ARBiH captured an empty Vare with no bloodshed and afterwards a
number of drunk and disorderly ARBiH soldiers looted what Croats had left behind.
Previously ejected Bosniaks returned to their houses while those belonging to
Croats were occupied by Bosniaks that were ethnically cleansed from other places of
Bosnia due to the Croat-Bosniak war.[249] The HVO had hoped the attack in Stupni Do
would provoke an ARBiH counterattack that would push the Croat population out in
order for the HDZ leadership to resettle it in "Croat territory" elsewhere.[252]
Most of Vare's Croat population had fled to Kiseljak. Within weeks the
demographics of Vare had gone from being ethnically-mixed, to exclusively Croat,
and then to majority Bosniak.[249]

Owen-Stoltenberg plan[edit]
See also: Peace plans proposed before and during the Bosnian War

The Owen-Stoltenberg plan would have created a union of three republics Republika
Srpska Bosnian Muslim Republic Herzeg-Bosnia Special status
In late July 1993 the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan was proposed by U.N. mediators Thorvald
Stoltenberg and David Owen that would organize Bosnia and Herzegovina into a union
of three ethnic republics.[253] Serbs would receive 53 percent of territory,
Bosniaks would receive 30 percent, and Croats 17 percent. The Croats accepted the
proposal, although they had some objections regarding the proposed borders. The
Serbs also accepted the proposal, while the Bosniak side rejected the plan,
demanding access to the Sava River and territories in eastern and western Bosnia
from the Serbs and access to the Adriatic Sea from the Croats. On 28 August, in
accordance with the Owen-Stoltenberg peace proposal, the Croatian Republic of
Herzeg-Bosnia was proclaimed in Grude as a "republic of the Croats in Bosnia and
Herzegovina".[254][117] However, it was not recognised by the Bosnian government.
[255]

On 7 September 1993 the Parliament of Croatia recognized Herzeg-Bosnia as a

possible form of sovereignty for Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[256] On 14
September, Tuman and Izetbegovi signed a joint declaration to stop all
hostilities between the ARBiH and HVO.[257] A few days after the Tuman-Izetbegovi
declaration, Izetbegovi and Momilo Krajinik agreed to stop all hostilities
between the VRS and ARBiH and negotiate their territorial disputes. A provision was
included in their declaration that after agreeing on the borders, each republic
could organize a referendum on independence.[257] Talks between all three parties
continued on 20 September on HMS Invincible.[258] Although Izetbegovi was in
favour of a peace agreement, the military leaders wanted to continue the war,
particularly against the Croats.[259] The September attempt at reconciliation of
the Croat and Bosniak sides was thus sunk as the ARBiH leaders thought that they
could defeat the Croats in central Bosnia, and fighting in central Bosnia and
Mostar continued.[117][260] On 22 October, Tuman instructed uak and Bobetko to
continue to support Herzeg-Bosnia, believing that "the future borders of the
Croatian state are being resolved there."[30] On 28 November, Tuman told Boban and
uak that "if we get borders Novi Travnik, Busovaa, Biha and if we cleanse
Baranja, we can give up majority of areas around Sava."[261]

Winter stalemate[edit]
See also: Operation Tvigi 94

Memorial to the people killed in Krianevo Selo

The confrontation lines have mostly been stabilized by late September with fighting
taking place over secondary locations.[262] In central Bosnia, the HVO defeats by
the ARBiH, the isolation of Croat enclaves, and the boost in smuggling activity led
to the gradual disintegration of the HVO. In November 1993, the HV intervened and
installed Ante Roso as lead of the HVO to reorganize it.[263] The HVO set three
lines of defence in the Lava Valley. The two armies remained dug in trenches by
the end of 1993.[264] The situation escalated in early November when the ARBiH
captured a settlement southwest of Vitez. On 8 December the ARBiH launched an
unsuccessful attack on Vitez with an objective to capture the explosives factory.
[265] Then the ARBiH prepared for a last winter offensive, bringing the 7th Muslim
Brigade and two additional brigades to the Fojnica area. Additional 3-4,000 troops
were brought to the area. On 22 December an attack started on HVO held parts of the
Lava Valley from six directions. Bosniak forces advanced about 300 meters east of
Travnik and took the nearby high ground.[266] The ARBiH mounted another attack on
Vitez and captured the village of Krianevo near the town. Dozens of Croat
soldiers and civilians were killed in a surprise ARBiH attack.[267]

A short ceasefire came into effect on Christmas, but the ARBiH offensive on the
Vitez enclave resumed in the early morning of 9 January. An attack from the north
before dawn surprised HVO forces. ARBiH troops also struck from the south. On 11
January the ARBiH broke through the HVO defenses and came close to cutting the
Vitez enclave into two pockets, reaching the village of antii on the Vitez-
Busovaa road, but HVO forces were able to hold on the road. The most contested
location was the village of Buhine Kue. In the first three days Croat losses were
at least 36 soldiers and civilians. The HVO counterattacked on 24 January from
Prozor in two directions, towards the area of Gornji Vakuf and Jablanica. In an
operation codenamed Operation Tvigi, the HVO Rama brigade gained control over the
village of Here, east of Prozor. In early February, the ARBiH regrouped and
reinforcements arrived from Sarajevo and Zenica. An ARBiH attack on the village of
antii failed on 8 February and the HVO widened the Vitez Pocket. On 14 February,
the HVO took back full control of the village.[268][269]

End of the war[edit]

Main article: Washington Agreement

Franjo Tuman and Alija Izetbegovi signing the Washington Agreement in 1994
Beginning in 1994, the HVO was in a defensive stalemate against a progressively
more organized ARBiH.[270] In January 1994, Izetbegovi provided Tuman with two
different partition plans for Bosnia and Herzegovina and both were rejected.[30] In
the same month, Tuman threatened in a speech to send more HV troops into Bosnia
and Herzegovina to back the HVO.[271] By February 1994, the Secretary-General of
the UN reported that between 3,000 and 5,000 Croatian regular troops were in Bosnia
and Herzegovina and the UN Security Council condemned Croatia, warning that if it
didn't end "all forms of interference" there would be "serious measures" taken.
[117][272]

"HVO has been eliminated from the areas of Jablanica, Konjic, Fojnica, Kakanj,
Zenica, Travnik and Bugojno. Meaning, a complete one province as in the Vance-Owen
plan with a capital in Travnik."
Rasim Deli, Supreme Commander of the ARBiH, in February 1994.[156]
In February 1994, Boban and HVO hardliners were removed from power[117] while
"criminal elements" were dismissed from ARBiH.[273] On 26 February talks began in
Washington, D.C. between the Bosnian government leaders and Mate Grani, Croatian
Minister of Foreign Affairs to discuss the possibilities of a permanent ceasefire
and a confederation of Bosniak and Croat regions.[274] By this time the amount of
territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina controlled by the HVO had dropped from 20
percent to 10 percent.[275][276] Under strong American pressure,[117] a provisional
agreement on a Croat-Bosniak Federation was reached in Washington on 1 March. On 18
March, at a ceremony hosted by US President Bill Clinton, Bosnian Prime Minister
Haris Silajdi, Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Grani and President of Herzeg-
Bosnia Kreimir Zubak signed the ceasefire agreement. The agreement was also signed
by Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovi and Croatian President Franjo Tuman. Under
this agreement, the combined territory held by the Croat and Bosnian government
forces was divided into ten autonomous cantons. It effectively ended the
CroatBosniak War.[274] According to Tuman, Croatian support came only on the
condition of American assurance of Croatia's territorial integrity, an
international loan for reconstruction, membership into NATO's Partnership for Peace
program, and membership into the Council of Europe. According to Western media,
Tuman received intense American pressure, including a threat of sanctions and
isolation.[277]

Following the cessation of hostilities between Croats and Bosniaks, in late 1994,
the HV intervened several times in Bosnia and Herzegovina against the VRS: from
November 13, in Operation Cincar near Kupres,[278] and on November 29 December
24 in the Winter '94 operation near Dinara and Livno.[279][280] These operations
were undertaken to detract from the siege of the Biha region and to approach the
RSK capital of Knin from the north, isolating it on three sides.[281] By 1995, the
balance of power had shifted significantly. Serb forces in Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina were capable of fielding an estimated 130,000 troops while the ARBiH,
HV, and HVO together had around 250,000 soldiers and 570 tanks.[282]

Wartime propaganda[edit]
During the war, a nationalist environment dominated the media and propaganda was
widely used by both sides.[283] Once the Croat-Bosniak conflict escalated, media
began to use derogatory terms for the opponent. Croat media started referring to
the Bosniaks as "balije", and the Bosniak media began referring to the Croats as
"Ustae". Actions of one side were compared to those of the Serbs in the earlier
stages of the war.[177] The Sarajevo government had a propaganda campaign to label
their rivals as war criminals and themselves as the innocent victims.[284] In June
1993, Sarajevo's Deputy Minister of information said that 200,000 people were
killed by then in the course of the war, almost all of them Muslims, which was
unquestionably accepted and propagated by the government.[285] Bosniak press tried
to deny Bosniak war crimes, and when that was no longer possible, it described them
as a "retaliation by the victims".[126] A later US intelligence analysis reported
that much of the media reports from Sarajevo during the war were little more than
Bosniak propaganda.[286]

Croatian war propaganda, even at the peak of the Croat-Bosniak war, still held the
Serbs as the primary enemy.[287] Nonetheless news stories were fabricated to incite
hatred[288] and state controlled television and radio pushed anti-Bosniak
propaganda, escalating tensions between Bosniaks and Croats in Croatia.[289]
Croatian propagandists accused Muslims of attempting to take over Balkans and
Europe.[290] Croatian TV referred to Izetbegovi as a "Muslim leader" and the ARBiH
as "Muslim forces, mujahedin, jihad warriors" and "the aggressor" while portraying
the HVO as "heroic defenders".[291] Editors admitted in an official statement that
they censored Izetbegovi's interviews after he said that he was "in favor of a
confederation with Croatia and also with others, including even Serbia."[292]
Critics of Croatian policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina were dismissed as "Yugo-
nostalgics" or "spiritual fifth-columnists".[287]

In late 1992 official Croatian media concentrated mostly on alleged Bosniak

collaboration with the Yugoslav counterintelligence and by extension the Serbs.
[290] Later propaganda moved to specific attacks on Islam, regularly decrying the
danger of fundamentalist extremism. By early November 1992, uak, attempting to
gain Israeli military support, stirred up fears and claimed there was an Islamic
conspiracy, stating that there were 11,000 Bosniaks studying in Cairo alone.[290]
Tuman justified intervening in Bosnia and Herzegovina by claiming the Bosnian
government was going to "set up an Islamic state in Europe, which was part of a
conflict between the Islamic and Catholic worlds, and of a confrontation between
the Islamic world and the West."[293] Croatian writers used similar unsubstantiated
fears to legitimize the establishment of Herzeg-Bosnia.[293] The HVO used forgeries
as proof that the Bosnian government had formulated plans to slaughter Croats.[294]

The Croatian state-owned daily newspaper Vjesnik shifted blame of the HVO's
destruction of the Stari Most bridge in Mostar at "the world that didn't do
anything to stop the war" while the Croatian Radiotelevision blamed the Bosniaks.
Reporting on the Stupni Do massacre, Vjesnik denied the HVO's responsibility,
claimed no Bosniaks were in the village, and stated Bosniak forces attempted to
push though Croat lines by attacking Stupni Do.[295] Boban, criticizing Bosniak
refugees in Croatia as ungrateful, stated "Croats are given a knife soaked in Croat
blood, a knife in the hands of mad husbands and fathers, whose wives and children
found a safe refuge in Croatian towns and hotels on the Croatian coast." Following
this, Boban's words inspired Croatian news reports with calls for violence against
Bosniaks.[296] Attacks against and harassment of Bosniak refugees escalated in
1993.[289] After the Washington agreement the Croat press continued to claim that
Bosniaks would destroy their national distinctiveness with multinational
federalism.[293]

Croatia's role[edit]
See also: Bosnia and HerzegovinaCroatia relations
There were three phases of the engagement of regular Croatian forces in the Bosnian
war. In the first phase, that lasted from spring to autumn 1992, the Croatian Army
was engaged in southern Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Bosnian Posavina, where they
fought against Serb forces. This phase lasted until October 1992. The second phase
was between April 1993 and May 1994, when the Croat-Bosniak conflict took place.
The role of Croatia during that period remains controversial.[297] Croatia
supported the Bosnian independence referendum and recognised Bosnia and Herzegovina
in April 1992. It also helped arm the Bosniak forces when the Bosnian war began.
However, there are different views on these moves. Croatian historian Dunja Meli
pointed out that if Croats boycotted the referendum, like the Bosnian Serbs did,
Bosnia and Herzegovina would not have been recognised by the international
community and become a sovereign state, and that Bosniak forces would have almost
no weapons without Croatian aid.[298] Another view is that the Croatian government
played up the recognition and its role in helping create the new republic while
quietly Tuman and uak helped Bosnian Croats reinforce and expand their autonomy.
[299] American academic Sabrina P. Ramet considers that the Croatian government
played a "double game" in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[30] British historian Marko
Attila Hoare wrote that "a military solution required Bosnia as an ally, but a
diplomatic solution required Bosnia as a victim".[300] Regarding the alleged
intervention of the Croatian Army (HV), American historian Charles R. Shrader said
that the actual presence of HV forces and its participation in the Croat-Bosniak
conflict remains unproved.[301]

Among the explanations of the Croat-Bosniak war[302] is that the Croatian policy
towards Bosnia and Herzegovina was dictated by Tuman's personal views and his
close associates, in particular the Defence Minister Gojko uak and the so-called
Herzegovina lobby,[37] an interpretation that Croatian-American historian James J.
Sadkovich described as a "classic conspiracy theory".[303] In May 1990, Tuman said
that Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina "form a geographic and political whole, and
in the course of history they were generally in a single united state", but
suggested that its citizens should "decide their own fate through a referendum". He
doubted that Bosnia and Herzegovina could survive the dissolution of Yugoslavia,
but supported its integrity if it remained outside a Yugoslav federation and
Serbian influence.[304] In his official statements, Tuman advocated for an
integral Bosnia and Herzegovina.[60] According to Sabrina P. Ramet, it was done in
an effort to confuse foreign audiences of his intents[305] and placate the
international community.[306] Tuman supported Croatia's territorial integrity, but
held that the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina were open to negotiation.[307] His
stance was emboldened by the unclear and confusing policy of the international
community regarding the Bosnian war and the Serb held areas in Croatia.[308]
British historian Mark Almond wrote that "almost all respectable international
opinion [...] doubted the viability and legitimacy of an integral Bosnia and
Herzegovina."[309] Interpretations of Tuman's actions go from statements that he
behaved as a rational opportunist,[60] to claims that he had from the outset a
collaborationist policy with the Serbs on the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
[139] with an aim of ethnic cleansing, whereas others call that an assumption with
no convincing evidence,[284][310] arguing that if Croats and Serbs had been jointly
waging a war against Bosniaks, there would have been no Bosnia and Herzegovina.
[311]

In May 2013, in a first instance verdict against six Herzeg-Bosnia leaders, the
ICTY determined that the Croat-Bosniak war was of an "international character" and
found, by a majority, that "troops of the Croatian Army fought alongside the HVO
against the ABiH and that the Republic of Croatia had overall control over the
armed forces and the civilian authorities of the Croatian Community (and later
Republic) of Herzeg-Bosna. [...] A joint criminal enterprise (JCE) existed and had
as its ultimate goal the establishment of a Croatian territorial entity with part
of the borders of the Croatian Banovina of 1939 to enable a reunification of the
Croatian people. This Croatian territorial entity in BiH was either to be united
with Croatia following the prospective dissolution of BiH, or become an independent
state within BiH with direct ties to Croatia."[251] It found that Tuman, uak,
Boban, and others had "joined, participated in and contributed to the JCE".[312]
Judge Jean-Claude Antonetti, the presiding judge in the trial, issued a separate
opinion in which he contested the notion of a joint criminal enterprise. He
characterized the war as a conflict of an internal nature between the Bosnian
Croats and the Bosniaks and said that Tuman's plans regarding Bosnia and
Herzegovina were not in contradiction with the stance of the international
community.[313] On 19 July 2016, the Appeals Chamber determined "that findings of
criminal responsibility made in a case before the Tribunal are binding only on the
accused in a specific case" and concluded that the "Trial Chamber made no explicit
findings concerning [Tudjman's, uak's and Bobetko's] participation in the JCE and
did not find [them] guilty of any crimes."[314]

Aftermath[edit]
"Gentlemen, weve succeeded, weve succeeded in getting not just Herzeg-Bosnia,
which is what we had. Weve [now] gotwe can say this among ourselveshalf of
Bosnia, if were good at governing it, if we govern cleverly."
Franjo Tuman, 24 November 1995, at a meeting with Herzeg-Bosnia representatives.
[315]
In November 1995 the Dayton Agreement was signed by presidents of Croatia, Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Serbia that ended the Bosnian war. The Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina was defined as one of the two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
comprised 51% of the territory. The Republika Srpska comprised the other 49%.
However, there were problems with its implementation due to different
interpretations of the agreement.[316] An Army of the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina was to be created by merging units from the ARBiH and the HVO, though
this process was largely ineffective.[317] The Federation was divided into 10
cantons. Croats were a majority in three of them and Bosniaks in five. Two cantons
were ethnically mixed, and in municipalities that were divided during the war
parallel local administrations remained. The return of refugees was to begin in
those cantons.[318] The agreement stipulated that Herzeg-Bosnia be abolished within
two weeks.[319]

The Federation acted only on paper and failed to function as a working government,
despite the pressure from Washington and with presidents Tuman and Izetbegovi
assuring that Croat and Bosniak politicians would join together in the new
government. The Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia was formally abolished on 17
December 1996, but on 27 January 1997, a new Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia
was set up as a replacement.[319] Herzeg-Bosnia structures continued to function
and a parallel government acted to expand the independence of its financial
institutions. HDZ leaders claimed that "the Herzeg-Bosnia side could not accept a
common financial system, because such a system did not allow the Bosnian Croats to
finance their own army and to follow up on their own social obligations in the long
term."[320] Parallel Herzeg-Bosnia budgetary systems collect revenue from Croat-
controlled cantons. The Herzeg-Bosnia payments bureau controls Croat economic
activity and there are separate Croat public utilities, social services, social
insurance funds, and forestry administrations. A segregated education system with a
Herzeg-Bosnia curriculum and textbooks from Croatia is maintained.[321] Herzeg-
Bosnia continued receiving financial support from Croatia, particularly the
Ministry of Defence. The pension and education systems and the salaries of Croat
politicians and military officers are subsidized by the Croatian government.[322]
An Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) report two years
after the end of the war concluded that Herzeg-Bosnia became "in every respect,
from military and security matters to business ties, part of Croatia."[323][324]

During the talks at Dayton, it was agreed to carry out exchanges of displaced
people in Jajce, Stolac, Bugojno and Travnik, but authorities in all four
municipalities hampered the process.[325] The return of Croat refugees in the
Travnik municipality was obstructed by local officials. During 1997, five returnees
were killed in the villages around Travnik. Cardinal Vinko Pulji said that a
campaign by the Government and the media was conducted to make Serbs and Croats
feel as they do not belong to Bosnia and Herzegovina.[326] The SDA obstructed
returns of refugees to Travnik, Bugojno and Gornji Vakuf.[327]

In February 1997, during the Kurban Bajram holiday, an incident occurred in Mostar
between Croat policemen and a group of several hundred Bosniaks that were marching
to Liska Street cemetery. During the march, a brawl and shooting took place in
which one Bosniak was killed and 24 were injured. The chief of Mostar police was
indicted at the County Court of Mostar on charges of a deliberate attack. The
defence argued that the crowd threw stones at the police first and that several
policemen suffered stab wounds, while the procession was not announced in advance.
The trial is still in progress.[328][329]

In August 1997, Bosniak returnees to Jajce were attacked by mobs, involving HVO
militia, upon the instigation of local political leaders, including Dario Kordi,
former Vice-President of Herzeg-Bosnia. About 500 returning Bosniaks fled, house
fires were started, and one returnee was killed.[330] HDZ hardliners holding
offices in Drvar and Stolac that hampered the return of refugees were removed from
their positions by the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1998.[320]

The Dayton peace accords required the departure of all foreign fighters from Bosnia
and Herzegovina.[331] In 1995, Izetbegovi invited the jihadists to leave the
country, leading to his denouncement from other Islamists.[332] French and British
military intelligence estimated that as many as 2,000 mujahideen remained in Bosnia
in late 1995, while some diplomats said there were twice as many of them left. On
16 December, a clash between the mujahideen and Croat police occurred at a
roadblock near epe. Five mujahideen were killed in a shootout and two Croat
policemen were injured.[331] In 1996, the US put pressure on the Bosniak leadership
to close its remaining ties with Islamist groups and remove Hasan engi, who was
involved in Iranian arms shipments to the country, from his position of Deputy
Minister of Defence.[333] In 2007, Bosnia's government revoked the citizenships of
hundreds of former mujahideen.[334]

The Dayton Agreement didn't give the Croats a territorial unit that they could
govern autonomously and within the Federation of BiH they were often outvoted.[335]
In their view, the institutional structure created with the Dayton had marginalized
them.[336] They have called for the creation of a third entity that would have a
Croat majority, which the then High Representative Carlos Westendorp called
"unacceptable" in 1999.[337]

In 2000, British Channel 4 television broadcast a report about the tape recordings
of Franjo Tuman in which he allegedly spoke about the partition of Bosnia and
Herzegovina with the Serbs after the Dayton Agreement. They claimed that the then
Croatian President Stjepan Mesi gave them access to 17,000 transcripts.[338] Mesi
and his Office denied giving any transcripts to British journalists and called the
report a "sensationalistic story that has nothing to do with the truth".[339]

Casualties[edit]
There are no precise statistics dealing with the casualties of the Croat-Bosniak
conflict along ethnic lines. The Sarajevo-based Research and Documentation Center's
(RDC) data from 2007 on human losses in the regions caught in the Croat-Bosniak
conflict, however, can serve as a rough approximation. According to this data, in
Central Bosnia there were 5,149 casualties in 1993, of which 2,893 were Bosniaks,
1,951 were Croats, 289 were Serbs, and 16 were other ethnicities. In the region of
Neretva river, encompassing Herzegovina, out of 2,764 casualties in 1993, 1,760
were Bosniaks, 779 were Croats, 205 were Serbs, and 20 were other ethnicities. Out
of 16 municipalities in the Vrbas region, two municipalities were affected by the
Croat-Bosniak conflict: Bugojno and Gornji Vakuf-Uskoplje. There were 1,908
casualties in the entire region in 1993, of which 946 were Bosniaks, 524 were
Croats, 431 were Serbs, and 7 were other ethnicities.[340]

According to a report by Polish demographer Ewa Tabeau, a minimum of 539 persons

died in East Mostar from May 1993 until the end of the conflict. That number
doesn't include 484 deaths that had an unknown place of death, but occurred during
the siege. Of the 539 deaths, 49.5% were of civilians and 50.5% were of combatants.
[341]

Destruction of cultural heritage[edit]

Destroyed mosque in Ahmii, April 1993.

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The ethnic cleansing of Bosniaks by the HVO was accompanied by the wide-scale
destruction of Ottoman and Islamic religious and cultural heritage.[342] The HVO
engaged in the deliberate destruction of Muslim buildings with no intent on
investigating those responsible.[343] In total Croat extremists damaged or
destroyed 201 mosques in the war.[344] In contrast the ARBiH generally had
respectful attitudes/policies toward the religious property of Christian
communities, investigated such attacks, and attempted to keep co-existence
possible.[343] There was no Bosnian government policy to destroy Catholic (or Serb
Orthodox) churches and the majority remained intact throughout the war in areas
controlled by the ARBiH.[345]

Postwar terrorism[edit]
Main articles: Mostar car bombing and 1995 Rijeka bombing
Terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina following the Dayton Agreement mostly consisted
of murders and bombings of specific people, primarily Croats.[dubious discuss]
The mujahideen that stayed in the country created a climate of fear in central
Bosnia, where they conducted regular shootings at and blowing up of Croat houses
and carried frequent attacks on Croat returnees.[346][347] In the summer of 1997
and 1998, two Croat policemen were killed by mujahideen veterans that received
protection from the local police.[346]

On 18 September 1997 a terrorist attack was carried out in Mostar. A car bomb
exploded in front of a police station in the western part of the city, injuring 29
people. The attack was done by Islamic extremists connected to the al-Qaeda.[348]
[347]

A terrorist attack was also conducted in Croatia. On 20 October 1995, a terrorist

from the al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya Islamic group attempted to destroy a police station
in Rijeka by driving a car with a bomb into the wall of the building. The attack
resulted in 29 injured people and the death of the terrorist. The motive for the
attack was the capture of Talaat Fouad Qasim by the HVO, an important member of the
Islamic group.[349] There have been no cases since.[350]

War crimes prosecutions[edit]

The Croat leadership (Jadranko Prli, Bruno Stoji, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj
Petkovi, Valentin ori and Berislav Pui) were convicted by ICTY in first-
instance judgement to 111 years of prison on May 29, 2013. The charges included
crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva conventions and violations of
the laws and customs of war. Franjo Tuman was also designated as a part of joint
criminal enterprise against Bosniak population and Bosnian and Herzegovina.[351] An
appeal was heard in 2017 whereby Slobodan Praljak, upon hearing the guilty verdict
upheld, supposedly drank poison,[352] and died shortly thereafter.[353][354]

Ivo Josipovi and Mustafa Ceri commemorating the Ahmii massacre.

Dario Kordi, political leader of Croats in Central Bosnia was convicted of the
crimes against humanity in Central Bosnia i.e. ethnic cleansing and sentenced to 25
years in prison.[355]

ARBiH Brigadier General Enver Hadihasanovi along with former brigade Chief of
Staff and commander Amir Kubura was convicted for failing to take necessary and
reasonable measures to prevent or punish several crimes committed by forces under
their command in central Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1993 and the beginning of 1994.
General Hadihasanovi was sentenced to three years and six months of imprisonment
on 22 April 2008 by the Appeals Chamber. Kubura was sentenced to two and a half
years in prison. [356][357]

Bosnian commander Sefer Halilovi was charged with one count of violation of the
laws and customs of war on the basis of superior criminal responsibility of the
incidents during Operation Neretva '93 and found not guilty.[358] General Mehmed
Alagi was indicted by the ICTY but died in 2003.[359]

Reconciliation[edit]
In January 1994, the Croat National Council was established in Sarajevo, with a
plan for Bosniak-Croat reconciliation and cooperation.[360]

In April 2010, Croatia's president Ivo Josipovi made an official visit to Bosnia
and Herzegovina during which he expressed a "deep regret" for Croatia's
contribution in the "suffering of people and division" that still exists in the
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Josipovi alongside Islamic and Catholic religious leaders
paid tribute to victims in Ahmii and Krianevo selo. He was highly criticized
domestically and was accused by Jadranka Kosor, the Croatian Prime Minister and HDZ
member, of breaching the Croatian constitution and damaging the reputation of the
state.[361]

Notes[edit]
^ Jump up to: a b c CIA 1993, p. 28.
^ Jump up to: a b CIA 1993, p. 25.
Jump up ^ Burg & Shoup 2000, p. 56.
Jump up ^ Lukic & Lynch 1996, p. 202.
Jump up ^ Lukic & Lynch 1996, p. 203.
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Jump up ^ Ramet 2006, p. 386.
Jump up ^ Ramet 2010, p. 263.
^ Jump up to: a b c Tanner 2001, p. 286.
Jump up ^ Tanner 2001, p. 248.
Jump up ^ Owen 1996, p. 32-34.
Jump up ^ Ramet 2006, p. 426.
Jump up ^ Schindler 2007, p. 71.
^ Jump up to: a b Lukic & Lynch 1996, p. 206.
^ Jump up to: a b c CIA 2002b, p. 294.
^ Jump up to: a b c d e Goldstein 1999, p. 243.
Jump up ^ Hockenos 2003, p. 91-2.
^ Jump up to: a b Shrader 2003, p. 25.
^ Jump up to: a b Shrader 2003, p. 33.
Jump up ^ Malcolm 1995, p. 306.
Jump up ^ Maga & ani 2001, p. 355.
^ Jump up to: a b Kordi & erkez Judgement 2001, p. 141.
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^ Jump up to: a b Prlic et al. judgement 2013, p. 150.
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^ Jump up to: a b Krito 2011, p. 47.
Jump up ^ Kordi & erkez Judgement 2001, p. 142.
^ Jump up to: a b c d e Ramet 2010, p. 265.
Jump up ^ Prlic et al. judgement 2013, p. 151-2.
Jump up ^ Burg & Shoup 1999, p. 107.
Jump up ^ Maga & ani 2001, p. 358.
Jump up ^ Mulaj 2008, p. 52.
^ Jump up to: a b Almond 2003, p. 203.
Jump up ^ Prlic et al. judgement 2013, p. 152.
^ Jump up to: a b CIA 2002b, p. 293.
^ Jump up to: a b c Hoare 2010, p. 127.
^ Jump up to: a b Delic judgement 2008, p. 23.
^ Jump up to: a b c Tanner 2001, p. 285.
Jump up ^ Velikonja 2003, p. 237.
^ Jump up to: a b Burg & Shoup 2000, p. 107.
Jump up ^ Hoare 2010, p. 126.
Jump up ^ Mulaj 2008, p. 53.
^ Jump up to: a b c d Shrader 2003, p. 46.
^ Jump up to: a b c Marijan 2004, p. 270.
^ Jump up to: a b Shrader 2003, p. 13.
Jump up ^ Christia 2012, p. 154.
Jump up ^ Marijan 2004, p. 269.
^ Jump up to: a b c Shrader 2003, p. 66.
^ Jump up to: a b CIA 2002, p. 156.
Jump up ^ Williams & 9 May 1992.
Jump up ^ Lukic & Lynch 1996, p. 210212.
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Jump up ^ Maga & ani 2001, p. 170.
^ Jump up to: a b c d e Ramet 2006, p. 436.
^ Jump up to: a b c d Tanner 2001, p. 287.
Jump up ^ CIA 2002, p. 160.
Jump up ^ Malcolm 1995, p. 317.
^ Jump up to: a b c d e Malcolm 1995, p. 318.
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Jump up ^ Nizich 1992, p. 31.
^ Jump up to: a b c Burns & 26 July 1992.
Jump up ^ Dyker & Vejvoda 2014, p. 103.
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Jump up ^ CIA 2002, p. 158.
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^ Jump up to: a b c d CIA 2002, p. 159.
Jump up ^ Bellamy 2003, p. 78.
^ Jump up to: a b Hoare 2004, p. 83.
Jump up ^ Lukic & Lynch 1996, p. 212.
Jump up ^ Mojzes 2011, p. 168.
Jump up ^ Lukic & Lynch 1996, p. 215.
Jump up ^ Hoare 2004, p. 86.
Jump up ^ Maga & ani 2001, p. 175.
Jump up ^ Ramet 2006, p. 343.
Jump up ^ Zrcher 2003, p. 51.
^ Jump up to: a b Goldstein 1999, p. 245.
^ Jump up to: a b Shrader 2003, p. 60.
Jump up ^ Sudetic & 7 September 1992.
Jump up ^ Sudetic & 8 September 1992.
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^ Jump up to: a b Prlic et al. judgement vol.4 2013, p. 7.
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^ Jump up to: a b Almond 1994, p. 285.
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^ Jump up to: a b c International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
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^ Jump up to: a b Mazowiecki, Tadeusz (17 November 1993). "Fifth periodic report on
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^ Jump up to: a b Marijan 2004, p. 266-267.
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Jump up ^ Shrader 2003, p. 30.
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Jump up ^ Shrader 2003, p. 29.
^ Jump up to: a b Shrader 2003, p. 22.
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^ Jump up to: a b Maga & ani 2001, p. 107.
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^ Jump up to: a b Shrader 2003, p. 68.
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^ Jump up to: a b Malcolm 1995, p. 327.
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^ Jump up to: a b CIA 2002, p. 190-191.
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^ Jump up to: a b Tanner 2001, p. 288.
^ Jump up to: a b Hadzihasanovic & Kubura Judgement Summary 2006, p. 5.
^ Jump up to: a b Kordi & erkez Appeals Judgement Summary 2004, p. 7.
^ Jump up to: a b c d CIA 2002, p. 191.
^ Jump up to: a b Christia 2012, p. 156.
^ Jump up to: a b Shrader 2003, p. 4.
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^ Jump up to: a b Marijan 2004, p. 266.
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^ Jump up to: a b CIA 2002, p. 182.
^ Jump up to: a b Malcolm 1995, p. 326.
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WarCivil wars involving the states and peoples of EuropeWars involving
CroatiaBosnia and HerzegovinaCroatia relationsHistory of the Federation of Bosnia
and HerzegovinaWars involving the BalkansCroatian nationalism in Bosnia and
Herzegovina
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This page was last edited on 30 November 2017, at 15:35.
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