PNR v.

Del Valle

Facts:

Philippine National Railways (PNR) owned three strips of land along the Manila-
legazpi route, part of its railroad right of way. Some portions of the land were occupied
by people, prompting disputes. PNR adopted temporary rules for the possession of the
land through rentals. PNR awarded the use of the land after a bidding to Pantaleon
Bingabing for a period of three years creating a civil law lease expressly stipulating
Bingabing to "occupy and us the property. temporarily for agriculture." Bingabing
failed to take possession of the said piece of land as Pampilo Doltz had occupied the
land and claims that he is a tenant of the previous awardees and Bingabing too. In
response to this, PNR and Bingabing filed suit against Doltz for recovery of the
possession of the land, to remove the house of Doltz and pay for compensation to
Bingabing.

Doltz defenses state that he is inter alia tenant on the property for 20 years
placed by deceased lessor Pablo Gomba, and successor Demetrio de Vera. He also
claimed that he had given Bingabing 1/3 of the crop harvest profits and by effect
become a tenant of Bingabing.Upon the court's request, Doltz and Bingabing agreed to
temporarily liquidate the harvest on a sharing ratio of 70-30 in Doltz' favour. While the
case was pending, Doltz registered with the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) a petition
against Bingabing for security of tenure, the adoption of a sharing ratio of 70-30 of the
crops, and reliquidation of past harvests. PNR intervened in the case. Petitioners herein
there maintained the position that the premises in controversy are not an agricultural
land within the contemplation of the Agricultural Tenancy Act (Republic Act 1199) or the
Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act 3844); that no tenancy relationship existed
between the parties; that CAR, therefore, lacked jurisdiction over the case; and that
there is a pending case between the same parties in another court involving the same
subject matter and the same cause of action. CAR decided in favor of Doltz and that the
sharing ratio be maintained.

Issues:

(1) Is the land in dispute agricultural land within the Agricultural Tenancy act and the
Agricultural Land ref orm code?
(2) Is Doltz considered a tenant?

Held:

(1) No. Section 3 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, "agricultural tenancy is the physical
possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed
by, another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the
members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former agrees
to share the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in
produce or in money, or in both

Section 166(1) of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, "agricultural land" means
land devoted to any growth including but not limited to crop lands, salt beds, fishponds,
idle land and abandoned land as defined in paragraphs 18 and 19 of this section

The land here in controversy does not fit into the concept of agricultural land. PNR
cannot devote it to agriculture because by its own charter, Republic Act 4156, PNR
cannot engage in agriculture. Agricultural activities may hamper the operation, security
and safety of the PNR.

(2) The contract of lease executed by PNR in favour of Bingabing was merely temporary
and may be revocable at any time the PNR needs the leased land for its own use. Also,
the contract rules stipulate that any form of sublease of the land is prohibited and that
previous awardees de Vera, Gomba or present leaseholder Bingabing cannot create one,
since PNR did not consent to the creation of such.

Isidro v CA
Facts:
Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of the subject parcel of land.
In 1985, Aniceta Garcia, sister of private respondent and also the overseer of the latter,
allowed petitioner Remigio Isidro to occupy the swampy portion of the land. The
occupancy of a portion of said land was subject to the condition that petitioner would
vacate the land upon demand. Petitioner occupied the land without paying any rental and
converted the same into a fishpond. In 1990, private respondent through the overseer
demanded from petitioner the return of the land, but the latter refused to vacate and return
possession of said land, claiming that he had spent effort and invested capital in
converting the same into a fishpond. A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by
private respondent against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Gapan,
Nueva Ecija. The trial court dismissed the case because it ruled that it is an agrarian
dispute, hence not cognizable by civil courts. Private respondent appealed to the RTC
which affirmed in toto the decision of MTC. On appeal to the CA, the decision of the trial
court was reversed.
Issue:
 Whether or not the case is an agrarian dispute and hence not cognizable by civil
courts
Held:
No. A case involving an agricultural land does not automatically make such case
an agrarian dispute upon which the DARAB has jurisdiction. The mere fact that the land
is agricultural does not ipso facto make the possessor an agricultural lessee of tenant. The
law provides for conditions or requisites before he can qualify as one and the land being
agricultural is only one of them. The law states that an agrarian dispute must be a
controversy relating to a tenurial arrangement over lands devoted to agriculture. And as
previously mentioned, such arrangement may be leasehold, tenancy or stewardship.
Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does
upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding
when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided these are complied
with and are not contrary to law, are even more important.

Heirs of Amunategui vs Director of Forestry

Facts:

There were two petitions for review on certiorari questioning the decision of the
Court of Appeals which declared the disputed property as forest land, not subject to
titling in favor of private persons, Borre and Amunategui.

The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an
opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that the land was
mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of the public
domain.

Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot
No. 885 containing 117,956 square meters was concerned and prayed that title to
said portion be confirmed and registered in his name.

Issue:

WON the lot in question can be subject of registration and confirmation of title in
the name of the private person.

Held:
The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate court's
finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose
Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the
area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the property was converted into fishpond
but only after a previous warning from the District Forester that the same could not
be done because it was classified as "public forest.

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places.
Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in
brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The possession of forest
lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. Therefore, the lot in
question never ceased to be classified as forest land of public domain.

TONGSON vs. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY

September 27, 1977
G.R. No. L-34463

FACTS:
This case started in the application for registration of title of a lot (Lot 855).
Testimonial evidence shows that a parcel of land, to which the subject lot belong, was
under the exclusive possession of one Francisco Borja. Borja cut trees for firewood in the
land. It was alleged that the land at that time was a mangrove swamp. After subsequent
transfers, a portion of the land was transferred to Santiago Bermejo. After Santiagos
death, Macario Bermejo, his heir and administrator, converted the land into a fishpond.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a parcel of land, possessed as far back as 1905, which has been
alleged to be a mangrove swamp and converted into a fishpond, is considered as part of
the timber domain, and thus is not disposable and cannot be registered.

HELD:
The possession of Borja and the subsequent owners was peaceful, continuous,
open, and adverse under claim of ownership for a period of not less than 50 years. The
application for registration must be granted.
Besides, the definition of forestry; as including manglares found in the
Administrative Code of 1917 cannot affect rights which are vested prior to its enactment.
The applicable law is the Act of Congress of July 1st 1902. The Act classifies the public
lands in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public
lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands,
whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglare, fisheries, or ordinary farmlands.
Therefore, mangrove lands are not forest lands in the sense in which this phrase is used in
the Act of Congress.
So even if the subject land was indeed a mangrove land, it still does not make it
into an inalienable forest land.

The Director of Forestry vs. Villareal

GR No. L-32266

February 27, 1989

Cruz, J.

Facts: The petitioner, Director of Forestry was one of the several persons who opposed the
application for registration of a parcel land classified as mangrove swamps in the municipality of
Sapian, Capiz with an area of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps, to the applicant
Ruperto Villareal. He alleged that he and his predecessors-in-interests had been in possession
of the said parcel of land for more than forty years (40). Both parties agreed in one point that the
disputed land was a mangrove swamp. The respondent argued that mangrove swamp are
agricultural land but the petitioner contended that it is a forestall land therefore not
disposable.The Court of the First Instance of Capiz however grants the application of the
respondent. The decision of the lower court was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence the
Director of Forestry elevated the case to the Supreme Court for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not, mangrove swamps are agricultural land or forest land.

Held: The Supreme Court held that mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal
nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Furthermore the legislative definition embodied in section 1820 of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917 which declares that mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the public forests
of the Philippines hence they are not alienable. The evidence presented by the respondent in its
claim were not sufficient to prove its possession and ownership of the land, he only presented tax
declaration. Wherefore the decision of the Court of Appeals was set aside and the application for
registration of title by the respondent is dismissed by the Supreme Court.
DENR vs YAP
568 SCRA 164 Civil Law Land Titles and Deeds Land Classifications
Boracay Cases Positive Act by the Government in Reclassifying Lands
These are two consolidated cases.
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al filed for declaratory relief to have a judicial
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes for the land
theyve been occupying in Boracay. Yap et al alleged that Proclamation No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their
occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-
in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They
declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the
petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was
an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands
classified as public forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to
Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code.
Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever
possession they had cannot ripen into ownership. RTC Ruled in favor of Yap et al.
The OSG appealed.
G.R. No. 173775
During the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, in May 2006, then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into four
hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six
hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable
and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone
on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which
shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Subsequently, Dr. Orlando Sacay, and other Boracay landowners in Boracay filed
with the Supreme Court (SC) an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They alleged that the Proclamation infringed
on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued
possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have
also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and building internationally
renowned first class resorts on their lots.
The OSG again opposed Sacays petition. The OSG argued that Sacay et al do not
have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an
unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public
forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the
courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and
disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release
the lots for disposition.
ISSUES: Whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal
obstacle for Yap et al and Sacay et al, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title
to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled against Yap et al and Sacay et al. The Regalian Doctrine
dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the
source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation
of such patrimony. All lands that have not been acquired from the government, either
by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In
keeping with the presumption of State ownership, there must be a positive act of
the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public
land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In the case at bar, no
such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to
2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a
government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such
well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that
lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006.
Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed.
Also, private claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions of
Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926 ipso
facto converted the island into private ownership. Private claimants continued
possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption that the land is
alienable. It is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill
of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals
of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied
lands under the said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:
(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona
fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and
(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the
first element of possession. The SC noted that the earliest of the tax declarations in
the name of private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax
declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession
and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.
Yap et al and Sacay et al insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been
in possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in
developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and
investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by
Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not
automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to
apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. The SC is constitutionally
bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As
the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial
confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued
possession and considerable investment in the island.

DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY vs HON. EMMANUEL M. MUOZ

23 SCRA 1183 Civil Law Land Titles and Deeds Systems of Registration Prior
to PD 1529 Spanish Titles
Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc. (Piadeco) is a company
engaged in logging. It was given a Certificate of Private Woodland Registration so
that it can operate in a 72,000 hectare land. It also has a Titulo de Propriedad which
it acquired in 1894 under the Spanish regime.
In 1964, the NAWASA (National Water and Sewerage Authority) director ordered the
cancellation of Piadecos certificate because it encroached beyond what was
allowed in the certificate. It actually cut trees in the Angat and Marikina watershed
area which was prohibited. The lower court ruled in favor of Piadeco. Piadeco also
had a settlement with Nawasa. Piadeco sought to renew its certificate but it was
denied by the Asst. Director of Forestry. The latter ruled that the Spanish title is no
longer recognized and should have never been used to apply for a Certificate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Piadeco can claim ownership over the property.
HELD: No. The Spanish title it acquired cannot be used to register for another
Certificate. There should be no question now that Forestry Administrative Order 12-2
has the force and effect of law. It was promulgated pursuant to law. Section 1817,
Revised Administrative Code, empowers the Bureau of Forestry, with the approval of
the department head, to issue regulations deemed expedient or necessary to
secure the protection and conservation of the public forests in such manner as to
insure a continued supply of valuable timber and other forest products for the future,
and regulating the use and occupancy of the forests and forest reserves, to the
same end. Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 was recommended by the Director of
Forestry, and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. It is
no less a valid law. It is an administrative regulation germane to the objects and
purposes of the law. A rule shaped out by jurisprudence is that when Congress
authorized the promulgation of administrative rules and regulations to implement a
given legislation, [a]ll that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but
conform to the standards that the law prescribes.
 DIRECTOR OF LAND MANAGEMENT VS. COURT OF APPEALS (1989)
GUTIERREZ, J.:

DOCTRINE: There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet
classified as disposable or alienable. Declassification of forest land is an express and
positive act of Government. It cannot be presumed. Neither should it be ignored nor
deemed waived.

FACTS:
Private Respondent Mino Hilario filed an application for registration, claiming
ownership in fee simple over a parcel of land purchased from his father Hilario
Molang on April 17, 1972.
The land was within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, the Ambuklao-Binga
Watershed, and the Upper Agno River Basin Multiple Use of Forest Management
District. The applicant seeks to register the title to the subject land under the Land
Registration Act (Act 496). However, as an alternative, the applicant invokes the
benefits of Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874 as superseded by Commonwealth Act 141,
as well as the provisions of Republic Act 1942 and Republic Act 3872 because the
applicant is a member of the cultural minorities.
o Answer of Director Lands: The land was not acquired by any of the
various types of title issued by the Spanish Government, or have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
land in question for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the
filing of the present application, and that the aforesaid property is a portion
of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and is not
subject to private appropriation.
o Answer of Director of Bureau of Forest Development: Opposed because
the area applied for is within the "Central Cordillera Forest Reserve", aside
from the fact that it is a part of the Ambuklao-Binga Watershed evidenced
by the letter-report of Forest Ranger Antonio Chagyo, and Engineer Carlito
Banac; that the area sought to be registered is not in the entire possession of
applicant Mino Hilario in the concept of an owner considering that there are
several houses built by different individuals within the area in question; that
the applicant does not have any registrable title either in law or in fact over
the property; and that the area is not classified as alienable or disposable
land.
LOWER COURT: Decreed the confirmation and registration of the subject land
in the name of applicant Mino Hilario
o Applicant and his predecessors successively, continuously, publicly and
adversely occupied, possessed and worked on the land in the concept of
absolute owners since before the First World War, building supporting walls,
rice paddies where they planted rice.
o The preponderance of evidence clearly shows that the applicant, and his
predecessors-in-interest before him, all of whom are members of the
national cultural minorities, have been in actual, open, public, peaceful,
 continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land
subject hereof which is suitable to agriculture, under a bona fide claim of
ownership since before the First World War up to the present or at least
more than sixty (60) years.
Issue: Whether or not the applicant Hilario acquired a private right to the land
despite the the fact that it is within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve

Ratio:
There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified as
disposable or alienable. Declassification of forest land is an express and positive act
of Government. It cannot be presumed. Neither should it be ignored nor deemed
waived.
The Court cited Republic v. Court of Appeals (previously discussed case in the
syllabus), where the Court ruled: It is already a settled rule that forest lands or forest
reserves are not capable of private appropriation and possession thereof, however
long, cannot convert them into private property. unless such lands are reclassified
and considered disposable and alienable by the Director of Forestry, but even then,
possession of the land prior to the reclassification of the land as disposable and
alienable cannot be credited as part of the thirty-year requirement under Section 48
(b) of the Public Land Act. In this case, there is no showing that the land in
question is disposable or alienable. This is a matter which cannot be assumed. It
calls for proof.
Although Section 48 (c) of CA No. 141 states that members of the national
cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not,
under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the
rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. (as amended by RA. No. 3872, section 1,
approved June 18, 1964) may apply to the Court of First Instance for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefore does not apply in this
case.
o Respondent Hilario contends that the phrase "whether disposable or not"
should be construed to mean that a parcel of land situated in an inalienable
land may be privately-owned by a member of the cultural minorities.
o Republic Act No. 3872 is only amendatory to Commonwealth Act No. 141,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act. The Public Land Act applies to
agricultural public lands and to no other type of land borne out by the
explicit terms of Section 2, Chapter I and Section 2, Chapter II, both under
Title I of the Public Land Act. Chapter I is subtitled "Short title of the Act,
lands to which it applies, and officers charged with its execution." Section 2
clearly states that the "provisions of this Act apply to the lands of the public
domain; but timber and mineral lands shall be governed by special laws ...
Section 10 provides that the words "alienation", "disposition", or
"concession" as used in this Act, shall mean any of the methods authorized
by this Act for the acquisition, lease, use, or benefit of the lands of the public
 domain other than timber or mineral lands.
o The new sub-section (c) of Section 48 of the Public Land Act should be read
together with the provision of the preceding subsection (b) which expressly
refers to "agricultural lands of the public domain."
o For, both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution, petitions do not include timber
or forest lands as alienable. Section 8, Article XIV of 1973 Constitution
states that 'with the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial,
residential and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources
shall not be alienated." The new Constitution, in its Article XII, Section 2,
also expressly states that "with the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated."
o What the law contemplates are lands that are agricultural although not
disposable, such as agricultural lands within a reservation for fruit
experiments (as the one in Baguio City administered by the Bureau of Plant
Industry, or agricultural lands reserved for the Camarines Sur Agricultural
School in Pili, Camarines Sur), or those reserved for a specific purpose, but
certainly not a forest reserve, a timber land, which the Constitution, the
Public Land Act itself, and jurisprudence have excluded from alienation.

Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43938 (April 15, 1988)

Case Digest
Surface Rights of Landowner (Article 437)

Facts:

Jose dela Rosa filed an application for registration of a parcel of land on his own behalf and
on behalf of his children. This application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated,
Inc. (Benguet) and Atok Big Wedge Corporation (Atok).

The petitioners claimed that they have acquired the land from their parents and that they
have been in possession of the land ever since. Benguet and Atok opposed on the ground
that they have mineral claims covering the property and had been in actual, continuous and
exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner.

The trial court denied the application while the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant but subject to the rights of Benguet and
Atok respecting their mining claims. In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-
surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA's ruling was correct.

Held:

No, the CA was incorrect.

Art. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it,
and he can construct thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations which he
may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and
ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.

Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land while
the mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because
he may interfere with the operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he
destroy the crops above. How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner, go without
encroaching on each other's rights? Where is the dividing line between the surface and the
sub-surface rights?

It is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface
but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height.

The rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and
half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely
mineral or completely agricultural.

In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally classified as forest
land ceased to be so and became mineral and completely mineral once the mining
claims were perfected. As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or
underneath, it did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because
it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the
surface.

G.R. No. L-66866: REPUBLIC VS. DE PORKAN

June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 88
- Possession resulting in presumption of right to grant application
FACTS

Minda de Porkan and Lolita Macatindog acquired Lots Nos. 1099 and 1546 from
their predecessors-interests, who in turn acquired said lots though a grant by the
government by virtue of their proven, open, exclusive and undisputed possession
for more than 30 years. An issue over said lots arose when a certain Viola Azurin
obtained from the then Philippine Fisheries Commission an Ordinary Fishpond
Permit covering portions of Lots Nos. 1099 and 1546.

Azurin filed with the Bureau of Lands a complaint for correction, amendment or
cancellation of the Homestead Patent of De Porkan over Lot no. 1546 and the
Free Patent of Macatindog over Lot No. 1099 alleging among others that the
patentees secured their patents and titles through fraud, misrepresentation and
illegal machinations.

The Solicitor General sided with Azurin; when the case was brought to the Court
of First Instance, the SG stated that the disputed portions of land were actually
claimed by Azurin and that such lands could not be disposed by the Director of
Lands under the Public Land Act. Hence, the patents and titles issued to de
Porkan and Macatindog were void insofar as the portion occupied and covered
by the fishpond permit of Azurin.
After hearing however, the CFI dismissed the complaints and upheld the validity
of the titles/patents of de Porkan & Macatindog over the lands in dispute.

The SG in the present petition avers among others that the lots in dispute could
not be the subject of disposition under the Homestead and Free Patent
provisions of the Public Act since they are marshy and swampy, certified as such
as more suitable for fishpond development, disposable only thru lease under the
Public Land Act.

ISSUE

Whether or not possession and cultivation of a land for more than 30 years will
entitle the possessor thereof of a government grant and a certificate of title.

HELD

Yes.

As early as 1953, the respondents had already acquired by operation of law not
only a right to a grant over Lot No. 1099, but a grant of the Government over the
same alienable land by virtue of their proven, open, exclusive and undisputed
possession for more than 30 years, since the Spanish colonial period.

The possession of a public land identified as Lot No. 1099 dates back to the time
of the Spanish colonial period. Such possessions of the said public land has
attained the character and duration prescribed by law as the equivalent of an
express grant from the Government. The mandate of the law itself provides that
possessors shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title. By
legal fiction, the land ceases to be public and thus becomes a private land.