FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 167333, January 11, 2016

PEDRO LADINES, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND EDWIN DE RAMON, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

To impose the highest within a period of the imposable penalty without specifying the justification for doing
so is an error on the part of the trial court that should be corrected on appeal. In default of such
justification, the penalty to be imposed is the lowest of the period.

The Case

The petitioner appeals the decision promulgated on October 22, 2004,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed his conviction for homicide by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 53, in Sorsogon City under
the judgment rendered on February 10, 2003.2

Antecedents

On August 12, 1993, an information was filed in the RTC charging the petitioner and one Herman Licup with
homicide, allegedly committed as follows: chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

That on or about the 12th day of June 1993, in the Municipality of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill,
conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another, armed with bladed weapons did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and stab one Erwin de Ramon, thereby inflicting
upon him serious and mortal wounds which resulted to his instantaneous death, to the damage and
prejudice of his legal heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3
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The factual background of the charge follows.

While Prosecution witnesses Philip de Ramon and Mario Lasala, along with victim Erwin de Ramon (Erwin),
were watching the dance held during the June 12, 1993 Grand Alumni Homecoming of the Bulabog
Elementary School in Sorsogon, Sorsogon, the petitioner and Licup appeared and passed by them. The
petitioner suddenly and without warning approached and stabbed Erwin below the navel with a machete.
The petitioner then left after delivering the blow. At that juncture, Licup also mounted his attack against
Erwin but the latter evaded the blow by stepping back. Erwin pulled out the machete from his body and
wielded it against Licup, whom he hit in the chest. Licup pursued but could not catch up with Erwin because
they both eventually fell down. Erwin was rushed to the hospital where he succumbed.4

Dr. Myrna Listanco, who performed the post-mortem examination on the cadaver of Erwin, attested that the
victim had sustained two stab wounds on the body, one in the chest and the other in the abdomen. She
opined that one or two assailants had probably inflicted the injuries with the use of two distinct weapons;
and that the chest wound could have been caused by a sharp instrument, like a sharpened screwdriver,
while the abdominal injury could have been from a sharp bladed instrument like a knife.5

In his defense, the petitioner tendered alibi and denial. He recounted that at the time in question, he was in
the Bulabog Elementary School compound along with his wife and their minor child; that they did not enter
the dance hall because there was trouble that had caused the people to scamper; that they had then gone
home; that he had learned about the stabbing incident involving Erwin on their way home from Barangay
Tanod Virgilio de Ramon who informed him that Licup and Erwin had stabbed each other; and that
Prosecution witnesses Philip and Lasala harbored ill-will towards him by reason of his having lodged a
complaint in the barangay against them for stealing coconuts from his property.

The petitioner presented Angeles Jasareno and Arnulfo Palencia to corroborate his denial. Jasareno and
Palencia testified that at the time in question they were in the Bulabog Elementary School, together with the
petitioner, the latter's wife and their minor daughter; that while they were watching the dance, a quarrel
had transpired but they did not know who had been involved; that they had remained in the dance hall with
the petitioner and his family during the quarrel; and that it was impossible for the petitioner to be have
stabbed Erwin. Palencia added that after the dance he and the petitioner and the latter's wife and child had
gone home together.6

Judgment of the RTC

On February 10, 2003, the RTC pronounced the petitioner guilty as charged, decreeing: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Pedro Ladines guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, sans any
mitigating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused Pedro Ladines is hereby
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of from Ten (10) years and One (1) day of prision mayor as minimum
to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the sum of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity without subsidiary imprisonment [in] case of insolvency and [to] pay the costs.

Meanwhile, accused Herman Licup is acquitted of the offense charge[d] for insufficiency of evidence. The
bond posted for his liberty is cancelled and discharged.

SO ORDERED.7
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Decision of the CA

The petitioner appealed, contending that: chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF HOMIdDE DESPITE
THE PRESENCE OF A REASONABLE DOUBT IN LIGHT OF THE DECLARATION OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESS THAT ACCUSED HERMAN LICUP WHO WAS ALSO INJURED DURING THE INCIDENT HAD
ATTACKED THE VICTIM ERWIN DE RAMON.8
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As stated, the CA affirmed the conviction, decreeing: chanRoble svi rtual Lawli bra ry

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
appealed Decision dated 10 December 2003 of the Regional Trial Court Branch 53, Sorsogon City, Sorsogon
in Criminal Case No. 93-3400 finding appellant guilty of Homicide is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
appellant.

SO ORDERED.9
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Issues

Hence, this appeal, with the petitioner insisting that the CA committed reversible error in affirming his
conviction despite the admission of Licup immediately after the incident that he had stabbed the victim; and
that the res gestae statement of Licup constituted newly-discovered evidence that created a reasonable
doubt as to the petitioner's guilt.10

The State countered11 that the insistence by Ladines raised factual questions that were improper for
consideration in an appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45; that the CA did not err in
affirming the conviction; and that the evidence to be adduced by the petitioner was not in the nature of
newly-discovered evidence.
 Ruling of the Court

The appeal is without merit.

First of all, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that the petition for review
on certiorari shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. A question, to be one of
law, must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or
any of them. There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the
law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or falsehood of alleged facts.12 In appeal by certiorari, therefore, only questions of law may be raised,
because the Court, by virtue of its not being a trier of facts, does not normally undertake the re-examination
of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial.

The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings thereon are received with
respect and are binding on the Court subject to certain exceptions, including: (a) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (f) when in making its
findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
(j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; and (k) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.13

There is no question that none of the foregoing exceptions applies in order to warrant the review of the
unanimous factual findings of the RTC and the CA. Hence, the Court upholds the CA's affirmance of the
conviction of the petitioner.

Secondly, the res gestae statement of Licup did not constitute newly-discovered evidence that created a
reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt. We point out that the concept of newly-discovered evidence is
applicable only when a litigant seeks a new trial or the re-opening of the case in the trial court. Seldom is
the concept appropriate on appeal, particularly one before the Court. The absence of a specific rule on the
introduction of newly-discovered evidence at this late stage of the proceedings is not without reason. The
Court would be compelled, despite its not being a trier of facts, to receive and consider the evidence for
purposes of its appellate adjudication.

Of necessity, the Court would remand the case to the lower courts for that purpose. But the propriety of
remanding for the purpose of enabling the lower court to receive the newly-discovered evidence would inflict
some degree of inefficiency on the administration of justice, because doing so would effectively undo or
reopen the decision that is already on appeal.14 That is a result that is not desirable. Hence, the Court has
issued guidelines designed to balance the need of persons charged with crimes to afford to them the fullest
opportunity to establish their defenses, on the one hand, and the public interest in ensuring a smooth,
efficient and fair administration of criminal justice, on the other. The first guideline is to restrict the concept
of newly-discovered evidence to only such evidence that can satisfy the following requisites, namely: (1) the
evidence was discovered after trial; (2) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the
judgment if admitted.15

We agree with the State that the proposed evidence of the petitioner was not newly-discovered because the
first two requisites were not present. The petitioner, by his exercise of reasonable diligence, could have
sooner discovered and easily produced the proposed evidence during the trial by obtaining a certified copy
of the police blotter that contained the alleged res gestae declaration of Licup and the relevant documents
and testimonies of other key witnesses to substantiate his denial of criminal responsibility.

Thirdly, homicide is punished with reclusion temporal.16 Taking the absence of any modifying circumstances
into consideration, the RTC fixed the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 17 years and four months of the medium period of reclusion temporal,as maximum. The CA
affirmed the penalty fixed by the RTC.
We declare that the lower courts could not impose 17 years and four months of the medium period
of reclusion temporal, which was the ceiling of the medium period of reclusion temporal, as the maximum of
the indeterminate penalty without specifying the justification for so imposing. They thereby ignored that
although Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, which has set the rules "for the application of penalties which
contain three periods," requires under its first rule that the courts should impose the penalty prescribed by
law in the medium period should there be neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, its seventh rule
expressly demands that "[w]ithin the limits of each period, the courts shall determine the extent of the
penalty according to the number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and. the
greater or lesser extent of the evil produced by the crime." By not specifying the justification for imposing
the ceiling of the period of the imposable penalty, the fixing of the indeterminate sentence became arbitrary,
or whimsical, or capricious. In the absence of the specification, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence
for the petitioner should be the lowest of the medium period of reclusion temporal, which is 14 years, eight
months and one day of reclusion temporal.

Lastly, the lower courts limited the civil liability to civil indemnity of P50,000.00. The limitation was a plain
error that we must correct. Moral damages and civil indemnity are always granted in homicide, it being
assumed by the law that the loss of human life absolutely brings moral and spiritual losses as well as a
definite loss. Moral damages and civil indemnity require neither pleading nor evidence simply because death
through crime always occasions moral sufferings on the part of the victim's heirs.17 As the Court said
in People v. Panad:18 chanroble svi rtual lawlib rary

x x x a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the
victim's family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes
the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of
the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves
them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them. cralawlawlib rary

The civil indemnity and moral damages are fixed at P75,000.00 each because homicide was a gross crime.

Considering that the decisions of the lower courts contained no treatment of the actual damages, the Court
is in no position to dwell on this. The lack of such treatment notwithstanding, the Court holds that temperate
damages of P25,000.00 should be allowed to the heirs of the victim. Article 2224 of the Civil
Code authorizes temperate damages to be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot be proved with certainty. There is no longer any doubt that when actual damages for burial
and related expenses are not substantiated with receipts, temperate damages of at least P25,000.00 are
warranted, for it is certainly unfair to deny to the surviving heirs of the victim the compensation for such
expenses as actual damages.19 This pronouncement proceeds from the sound reasoning that it would be
anomalous that the heirs of the victim who tried and succeeded in proving actual damages of less than
P25,000.00 would only be put in a worse situation than others who might have presented no receipts at all
but would still be entitled to P25,000.00 as temperate damages.20 In addition, in line with recent
jurisprudence,21 all the items of civil liability shall earn interest of 6% per annum, computed from the date of
the finality of this judgment until the items are fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on October 22, 2004 subject to
the MODIFICATION that: (a) the INDETERMINATE SENTENCE of petitioner PEDRO LADINES is 10
years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, eight months and one day of the medium
period of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and (b) the petitioner shall pay to the heirs of the victim Erwin
de Ramon: (1) civil indemnity and moral damages of P75,000.00 each; (2) temperate damages of
P25,000.00; (c) interest of 6% per annum on all items of the civil liability computed from the date of the
finality of this judgment until they are fully paid; and (d) the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry

[G.R. No. 130492. January 31, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SALVADOR ARROJADO, accused-appellant.
Facts:
On June 1, 1996 the accused stabbed one Mary Ann Arrojado with a knife with treachery and
evident premeditation on the different parts of her body inflicting serious and mortal wounds which were
the direct and immediate cause of her death.
The RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
sentenced him to imprisonment of 30 years of reclusion perpetua.
The trial court held that there was a circumstantial evidence to convict accused-appellant for the
death of the victim.
Appelant argued that the victim committed suicide. He claimed that most of the victims wounds
were inflicted after she committed suicide to make it appear that she was murdered. He also stated that he
only saw one wound in the victims stomach.

Issue:

Whether or not the victim was murdered by the accused-appellant

Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence can appreciated and
would elevate the penalty of murder from reclusion perpetua to death eventhough it was not alleged
in the said information.

Ruling:
Yes.
In sum, the following circumstances point to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime:
. Accused-appellant, the victim, and the latters father were the only ones living in the house in
which the crime was committed in the evening of May 31, 1996.
2. No one from the outside can gain entry since all doors of the house were locked and the
windows had grills.
3. Accused-appellant had access to the victims bedroom because the bedroom doors were left
unlocked so that the victim could check on her fathers condition during the night. Accused-
appellant sleeps in the same bedroom as the victims father.
4. The murder weapon was a kitchen knife readily accessible to the occupants of the house . As
the Solicitor General observed, common sense dictates that if an outsider entered the house with
the intent to kill the victim, he would have brought his own weapon to ensure the execution of his
purpose
5. None of the victims belongings was missing or disturbed, indicating that the motive for the
crime was not gain but revenge.
6. Judging from the number and severity of the wounds (10 stab wounds, half of which were
fatal), the killer felt deep-seated resentment and anger toward the victim. Accused-appellant had
admitted those feelings to Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo and Thelma Arrojado.
 7. Aside from accused-appellant, no one was known to harbor a grudge against the victim.
8. As the Solicitor General also pointed out, accused-appellants behavior in the morning of June
1, 1996 was inconsistent with someone who had just found his cousin and employer, a person
he claims to get along with, dead.[59] By his testimony, he did not even go inside the room to check
on her condition on the lame excuse that he was afraid. He also did not inform his neighbors
about the incident for the equally flimsy reason that he did not know them nor did he go to the
police.
The supreme court held that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence is present in this
case. For this aggravating circumstance to exist, it is essential to show that the confidence between the
parties must be immediate and personal such as would give the accused some advantage or make it easier
for him to commit the criminal act. The confidence must be a means of facilitating the commission of the
crime, the culprit taking advantage of the offended partys belief that the former would not abuse said
confidence.[68] In this case, while the victim may have intimated her fear for her safety for which reason she
entrusted her jewelry and bank book to Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo, her fears were subsequently allayed
as shown by the fact that she took back her personal effects from Erlinda. [69] Thinking that accused-
appellant would not do her any harm, because he was after all her first cousin, the victim allowed accused-
appellant to sleep in the same room with her father and left the bedroom doors unlocked.
No. Eventhough, the murder in this case took place after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659 on
December 31, 1993 which increased the penalty for murder from reclusion temporal maximum to death
to reclusion perpetua to death. In view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
confidence and in accordance with Art. 63(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court should have
imposed the penalty of death on accused-appellant.
However,The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000, requiring
that every complaint or information state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances.
This provision may be given retroactive effect in the light of the well settled rule that statutes regulating the
procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent.
In this case, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence was not alleged in the said
information the information, thus the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence cannot be
appreciated to raise the penalty to death.

People vs. Lucas

G.R. No. 80102. January 22, 1990

Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines

Accused-appellant: Jovencio Lucas
Ponente: J. Cortes

FACTS:
Mauricia Lucas was then thirteen years old and working as a housemaid in
Sampaloc, Manila. Sometime in September 1985, she was fetched by her father,
herein accused Jovencio Lucas, from her place of work. They boarded a jeepney
and alighted in a place which Mauricia found unfamiliar. She was thereafter
brought to a dark room where the accused tied both her hands and feet to a bed,
undressed her, burnt her face with a lighted cigarette, kissed her, fondled her
private parts, pointed a knife at her neck, and laughed while consummating the
sexual act. The physical and genital examination supported the fact of defloration
and further testified that the findings were consonant to that of a woman who had
several experience with sexual intercourse. Nonetheless, as the examinations
were conducted about six months after the alleged rape took place, evidence of
violence can no longer be established.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating
circumstance of cruelty in the case.
2) Whether or not the trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating
circumstance of relationship in the case.

HELD:
1) Yes. The Court held that there is cruelty when the offender enjoys and delights
in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing unnecessary physical
pain in the consummation of the offense. Moreover, the absence of any evidence
of force does not negate a finding that forcible sexual intercourse actually took
place. The trial court, having had the opportunity of hearing the witnesses of both
prosecution and defense, gave weight to the sincerity and conviction of the victim.
The appellant tied the victim to a bed, burnt her face with a lighted cigarette, and
laughed while consummating the crime. Undeniably, cruelty is present in this
case.

2) Yes. Article 15 of the Revised Penal code provides that, in the case of rape, the
alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration when
the victim is the descendant of the offender. The Court found that in order for the
appellant to carry out the crime to his advantage, the filial trust reposed in him by
his daughter was undeniable abused. He personally fetched his daughter, at her
place of work, took her to the scene of the crime, and forced himself sexually.
The aggravating circumstance of relationship in the case was correctly applied in
the case.

Vasquez v People
GR No. 159255, Jan. 28, 2008
TINGA, J.:

FACTS:
The trial court finds the accused Rodolfo Vasquez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
estafa penalized by an indeterminate prison term of from [sic] seventeen (17) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum and indemnification to Gemma Argoso.

Upon appeal, CA affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty imposed to an indeterminate
penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to thirty (30) years of reclusion perpetua
as maximum with same indemnification.

ISSUE:
W/O the court erroneously relied on the case of People v. Hernando in stating that the maximum
period of indeterminate penalty imposable on Vasquez should not exceed thirty years.

HELD:
Yes. Although the court adopts the findings of fact and conclusions at law in the decision of the
Court of Appeals finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and it
affirmed said Decision but with the modification that petitioner is sentenced to an indeterminate
prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prisin correccional, as minimum, to twenty
(20) years of reclusin temporal, as maximum.

RULING:
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code,
the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty the maximum term of which
shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term of which shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.

In the case at bar, CA relied on People v. Hernandez in modifying the penalty imposed to
Vasquez. The accused spouses in People v. Hernando were charged with estafa under Article
315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 818 (PD 818),
which increased the penalty only for estafa committed by issuing a check dishonored for lack or
insufficiency of funds. Under PD 818, if the amount of the fraud exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty
of reclusion temporal is imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
P10,000.00, but the total penalty shall not exceed thirty (30) years which shall be termed as
reclusion perpetua. Thus, the Court sentenced the accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to thirty (30) years of reclusion perpetua, as
maximum.

The amendment to the imposable penalty introduced by PDssss 818 clearly does not apply to the
present case as it does not involve bouncing checks. The fact that the amount involved exceeds
P22,000.00 should not be considered in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty, but
should be regarded as analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the maximum
term of the full indeterminate sentence.