Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010

ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PUNO, C.J.:

Upon a careful review of the case at bar, this Court resolves to grant the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) motion for
reconsideration, and the movants-intervenors motions for reconsideration-in-intervention, of this Courts December 1, 2009 Decision (Decision).1

The assailed Decision granted the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. and declared as
unconstitutional the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, 2 Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code3 and
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678,4mainly on the ground that they violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution and suffer
from overbreadth. The assailed Decision thus paved the way for public appointive officials to continue discharging the powers, prerogatives and
functions of their office notwithstanding their entry into the political arena.

In support of their respective motions for reconsideration, respondent COMELEC and movants-intervenors submit the following arguments:

(1) The assailed Decision is contrary to, and/or violative of, the constitutional proscription against the participation of public appointive
officials and members of the military in partisan political activity;

(2) The assailed provisions do not violate the equal protection clause when they accord differential treatment to elective and
appointive officials, because such differential treatment rests on material and substantial distinctions and is germane to the purposes
of the law;

(3) The assailed provisions do not suffer from the infirmity of overbreadth; and

(4) There is a compelling need to reverse the assailed Decision, as public safety and interest demand such reversal.

We find the foregoing arguments meritorious.

I. Procedural Issues

First, we shall resolve the procedural issues on the timeliness of the COMELECs motion for reconsideration which was filed on December 15,
2009, as well as the propriety of the motions for reconsideration-in-intervention which were filed after the Court had rendered its December 1,
2009 Decision.

i. Timeliness of COMELECs Motion for Reconsideration

Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 56-A of the 1997 Rules of Court,5 in relation to Section 1, Rule 52 of the same rules,6COMELEC had a period of fifteen
days from receipt of notice of the assailed Decision within which to move for its reconsideration. COMELEC received notice of the assailed
Decision on December 2, 2009, hence, had until December 17, 2009 to file a Motion for Reconsideration.

The Motion for Reconsideration of COMELEC was timely filed. It was filed on December 14, 2009. The corresponding Affidavit of Service (in
substitution of the one originally submitted on December 14, 2009) was subsequently filed on December 17, 2009 still within the reglementary
period.

ii. Propriety of the Motions for Reconsideration-in-Intervention

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides:

A person who has legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as
to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of
court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.

Pursuant to the foregoing rule, this Court has held that a motion for intervention shall be entertained when the following requisites are satisfied:
(1) the would-be intervenor shows that he has a substantial right or interest in the case; and (2) such right or interest cannot be adequately
pursued and protected in another proceeding.7

Upon the other hand, Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides the time within which a motion for intervention may be filed, viz.:

SECTION 2. Time to intervene. The motion for intervention may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the
pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and served on the original parties. (italics supplied)

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This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even beyond the period prescribed in the Rule, when demanded by the
higher interest of justice. Interventions have also been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be
heard even after a decision has been rendered by the trial court,8 when the petition for review of the judgment has already been submitted for
decision before the Supreme Court,9 and even where the assailed order has already become final and executory.10 In Lim v. Pacquing,11 the
motion for intervention filed by the Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once
and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties.

In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of the court12 after consideration of the
appropriate circumstances.13 We stress again that Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers of the
court fully and completely available for justice.14 Its purpose is not to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. 15

We rule that, with the exception of the IBP Cebu City Chapter, all the movants-intervenors may properly intervene in the case at bar.

First, the movants-intervenors have each sufficiently established a substantial right or interest in the case.

As a Senator of the Republic, Senator Manuel A. Roxas has a right to challenge the December 1, 2009 Decision, which nullifies a long established
law; as a voter, he has a right to intervene in a matter that involves the electoral process; and as a public officer, he has a personal interest in
maintaining the trust and confidence of the public in its system of government.

On the other hand, former Senator Franklin M. Drilon and Tom V. Apacible are candidates in the May 2010 elections running against appointive
officials who, in view of the December 1, 2009 Decision, have not yet resigned from their posts and are not likely to resign from their posts. They
stand to be directly injured by the assailed Decision, unless it is reversed.

Moreover, the rights or interests of said movants-intervenors cannot be adequately pursued and protected in another proceeding. Clearly, their
rights will be foreclosed if this Courts Decision attains finality and forms part of the laws of the land.

With regard to the IBP Cebu City Chapter, it anchors its standing on the assertion that "this case involves the constitutionality of elections laws
for this coming 2010 National Elections," and that "there is a need for it to be allowed to intervene xxx so that the voice of its members in the
legal profession would also be heard before this Highest Tribunal as it resolves issues of transcendental importance." 16

Prescinding from our rule and ruling case law, we find that the IBP-Cebu City Chapter has failed to present a specific and substantial interest
sufficient to clothe it with standing to intervene in the case at bar. Its invoked interest is, in character, too indistinguishable to justify its
intervention.

We now turn to the substantive issues.

II. Substantive Issues

The assailed Decision struck down Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act (RA)
9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the following grounds:

(1) They violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because of the differential treatment of persons holding appointive
offices and those holding elective positions;

(2) They are overbroad insofar as they prohibit the candidacy of all civil servants holding appointive posts: (a) without distinction as to
whether or not they occupy high/influential positions in the government, and (b) they limit these civil servants activity regardless of
whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level; and

(3) Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right of these public appointive officials.

We grant the motions for reconsideration. We now rule that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the
second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not unconstitutional, and accordingly reverse our December 1, 2009 Decision.

III. Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 Compliant with Law

Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution 8678 is a faithful reflection of the present state of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, viz.:

Incumbent Appointive Official. - Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a
public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-
owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Incumbent Elected Official. Upon the other hand, pursuant to Section 14 of RA 9006 or the Fair Election Act, 17which repealed Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code18 and rendered ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436 insofar as it considered an elected official as resigned only upon the
start of the campaign period corresponding to the positions for which they are running, 19 an elected official is not deemed to have resigned from
his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elected office or position. In fine, an elected official may run for
another position without forfeiting his seat.

These laws and regulations implement Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits civil service officers and employees from
engaging in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.

The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil service officers and employees in partisan political campaigns is
unmistakable. The exchange between Commissioner Quesada and Commissioner Foz during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is
instructive:

2
MS. QUESADA.
xxxx

Secondly, I would like to address the issue here as provided in Section 1 (4), line 12, and I quote: "No officer or employee in the civil service shall
engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan political activity." This is almost the same provision as in the 1973 Constitution. However, we in the
government service have actually experienced how this provision has been violated by the direct or indirect partisan political activities of many
government officials.

So, is the Committee willing to include certain clauses that would make this provision more strict, and which would deter its violation?

MR. FOZ. Madam President, the existing Civil Service Law and the implementing rules on the matter are more than exhaustive enough to really
prevent officers and employees in the public service from engaging in any form of partisan political activity. But the problem really lies in
implementation because, if the head of a ministry, and even the superior officers of offices and agencies of government will themselves violate
the constitutional injunction against partisan political activity, then no string of words that we may add to what is now here in this draft will really
implement the constitutional intent against partisan political activity. x x x20 (italics supplied)

To emphasize its importance, this constitutional ban on civil service officers and employees is presently reflected and implemented by a number
of statutes. Section 46(b)(26), Chapter 7 and Section 55, Chapter 8 both of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
respectively provide in relevant part:

Section 44. Discipline: General Provisions:

xxxx
(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:
xxxx
(26) Engaging directly or indirectly in partisan political activities by one holding a non-political office.
xxxx

Section 55. Political Activity. No officer or employee in the Civil Service including members of the Armed Forces, shall engage directly or
indirectly in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote nor shall he use his official authority or influence to coerce
the political activity of any other person or body. Nothing herein provided shall be understood to prevent any officer or employee from
expressing his views on current political problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of his candidates for public office whom he supports:
Provided, That public officers and employees holding political offices may take part in political and electoral activities but it shall be unlawful for
them to solicit contributions from their subordinates or subject them to any of the acts involving subordinates prohibited in the Election Code.

Section 261(i) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code) further makes intervention by civil service officers and employees in
partisan political activities an election offense, viz.:

SECTION 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
xxxx

(i) Intervention of public officers and employees. Any officer or employee in the civil service, except those holding political offices; any officer,
employee, or member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any police force, special forces, home defense forces, barangay self-defense
units and all other para-military units that now exist or which may hereafter be organized who, directly or indirectly, intervenes in any election
campaign or engages in any partisan political activity, except to vote or to preserve public order, if he is a peace officer.

The intent of both Congress and the framers of our Constitution to limit the participation of civil service officers and employees in partisan
political activities is too plain to be mistaken.

But Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and the implementing statutes apply only to civil servants holding apolitical offices. Stated
differently, the constitutional ban does not cover elected officials, notwithstanding the fact that "[t]he civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters."21 This is because elected public officials, by the very nature of their office, engage in partisan political activities almost all year round,
even outside of the campaign period.22 Political partisanship is the inevitable essence of a political office, elective positions included. 23

The prohibition notwithstanding, civil service officers and employees are allowed to vote, as well as express their views on political issues, or
mention the names of certain candidates for public office whom they support. This is crystal clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, viz.:

MS. AQUINO: Mr. Presiding Officer, my proposed amendment is on page 2, Section 1, subparagraph 4, lines 13 and 14. On line 13, between the
words "any" and "partisan," add the phrase ELECTIONEERING AND OTHER; and on line 14, delete the word "activity" and in lieu thereof substitute
the word CAMPAIGN.

May I be allowed to explain my proposed amendment?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treas): Commissioner Aquino may proceed.

MS. AQUINO: The draft as presented by the Committee deleted the phrase "except to vote" which was adopted in both the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions. The phrase "except to vote" was not intended as a guarantee to the right to vote but as a qualification of the general prohibition
against taking part in elections.

Voting is a partisan political activity. Unless it is explicitly provided for as an exception to this prohibition, it will amount to disenfranchisement.
We know that suffrage, although plenary, is not an unconditional right. In other words, the Legislature can always pass a statute which can
withhold from any class the right to vote in an election, if public interest so required. I would only like to reinstate the qualification by specifying
the prohibited acts so that those who may want to vote but who are likewise prohibited from participating in partisan political campaigns or
electioneering may vote.

3
MR. FOZ: There is really no quarrel over this point, but please understand that there was no intention on the part of the Committee to
disenfranchise any government official or employee. The elimination of the last clause of this provision was precisely intended to protect the
members of the civil service in the sense that they are not being deprived of the freedom of expression in a political contest. The last phrase or
clause might have given the impression that a government employee or worker has no right whatsoever in an election campaign except to vote,
which is not the case. They are still free to express their views although the intention is not really to allow them to take part actively in a political
campaign.24

IV.

Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code Do Not Violate the Equal Protection Clause

We now hold that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the second proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 13 of RA 9369 are not violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

i. Farias, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. is Controlling

In truth, this Court has already ruled squarely on whether these deemed-resigned provisions challenged in the case at bar violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution in Farias, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. 25

In Farias, the constitutionality of Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, was assailed
on the ground, among others, that it unduly discriminates against appointive officials. As Section 14 repealed Section 67 (i.e., the deemed-
resigned provision in respect of elected officials) of the Omnibus Election Code, elected officials are no longer considered ipso facto resigned from
their respective offices upon their filing of certificates of candidacy. In contrast, since Section 66 was not repealed, the limitation on appointive
officials continues to be operative they are deemed resigned when they file their certificates of candidacy.

The petitioners in Farias thus brought an equal protection challenge against Section 14, with the end in view of having the deemed-resigned
provisions "apply equally" to both elected and appointive officials. We held, however, that the legal dichotomy created by the Legislature is a
reasonable classification, as there are material and significant distinctions between the two classes of officials. Consequently, the contention that
Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, infringed on the equal protection clause of the
Constitution, failed muster. We ruled:

The petitioners' contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials gives undue benefit to such
officials as against the appointive ones and violates the equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.

The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. The Court
has explained the nature of the equal protection guarantee in this manner:

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression
of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to
operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies
only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of
the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other
hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their
office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service
Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil
service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take (sic) part in any election except to vote. Under the same
provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral
activities.

By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of
officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than
those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification.

Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis--vis appointive officials, is anchored upon material and
significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the
Constitution is, thus, not infringed.26

The case at bar is a crass attempt to resurrect a dead issue. The miracle is that our assailed Decision gave it new life. We ought to be guided by
the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. This doctrine, which is really "adherence to precedents," mandates that once a case has been
decided one way, then another case involving exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same manner.27 This doctrine is one of
policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions. As the renowned jurist Benjamin Cardozo stated in his
treatise The Nature of the Judicial Process:

It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between another. "If a group of cases
involves the same point, the parties expect the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite principles. If a
case was decided against me yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide differently
would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement, material and moral, of my rights." Adherence to
precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed administration of justice in the
courts.28

4
Our Farias ruling on the equal protection implications of the deemed-resigned provisions cannot be minimalized as mere obiter dictum. It is trite
to state that an adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot be considered as obiter dictum. 29 This rule applies to all
pertinent questions that are presented and resolved in the regular course of the consideration of the case and lead up to the final conclusion, and
to any statement as to the matter on which the decision is predicated.30 For that reason, a point expressly decided does not lose its value as a
precedent because the disposition of the case is, or might have been, made on some other ground; or even though, by reason of other points in
the case, the result reached might have been the same if the court had held, on the particular point, otherwise than it did. 31 As we held in
Villanueva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, et al.:32

A decision which the case could have turned on is not regarded as obiter dictum merely because, owing to the disposal of the contention, it
was necessary to consider another question, nor can an additional reason in a decision, brought forward after the case has been disposed of on
one ground, be regarded as dicta. So, also, where a case presents two (2) or more points, any one of which is sufficient to determine the ultimate
issue, but the court actually decides all such points, the case as an authoritative precedent as to every point decided, and none of such points can
be regarded as having the status of a dictum, and one point should not be denied authority merely because another point was more dwelt on and
more fully argued and considered, nor does a decision on one proposition make statements of the court regarding other propositions
dicta.33 (italics supplied)

ii. Classification Germane to the Purposes of the Law

The Farias ruling on the equal protection challenge stands on solid ground even if reexamined.

To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction.34 What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. 35 The test developed by
jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness,36 which has four requisites:

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.37

Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness.
It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive officials vis--vis elected officials is not germane to the
purpose of the law, because "whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure
remain," viz.:
For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-President who
at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing,
social welfare development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no
valid justification to treat them differently when both file their [Certificates of Candidacy] for the elections. Under the present state of our law,
the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position during the entire election period and can still
use the resources of his office to support his campaign.38

Sad to state, this conclusion conveniently ignores the long-standing rule that to remedy an injustice, the Legislature need not address every
manifestation of the evil at once; it may proceed "one step at a time."39 In addressing a societal concern, it must invariably draw lines and make
choices, thereby creating some inequity as to those included or excluded.40 Nevertheless, as long as "the bounds of reasonable choice" are not
exceeded, the courts must defer to the legislative judgment.41 We may not strike down a law merely because the legislative aim would have been
more fully achieved by expanding the class.42 Stated differently, the fact that a legislative classification, by itself, is underinclusive will not render
it unconstitutionally arbitrary or invidious.43 There is no constitutional requirement that regulation must reach each and every class to which it
might be applied;44 that the Legislature must be held rigidly to the choice of regulating all or none.

Thus, any person who poses an equal protection challenge must convincingly show that the law creates a classification that is "palpably arbitrary
or capricious."45 He must refute all possible rational bases for the differing treatment, whether or not the Legislature cited those bases as reasons
for the enactment,46 such that the constitutionality of the law must be sustained even if the reasonableness of the classification is "fairly
debatable."47 In the case at bar, the petitioners failed and in fact did not even attempt to discharge this heavy burden. Our assailed Decision
was likewise silent as a sphinx on this point even while we submitted the following thesis:

... [I]t is not sufficient grounds for invalidation that we may find that the statutes distinction is unfair, underinclusive, unwise, or not the best
solution from a public-policy standpoint; rather, we must find that there is no reasonably rational reason for the differing treatment.48

In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of the deemed resigned provisions? I submit
that there is.

An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the people. 49 It involves the choice or
selection of candidates to public office by popular vote.50 Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite
term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of
the sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end
of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.

The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law. For the law was made not
merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial
scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will. 51 (emphasis in
the original)

In fine, the assailed Decision would have us "equalize the playing field" by invalidating provisions of law that seek to restrain the evils from
running riot. Under the pretext of equal protection, it would favor a situation in which the evils are unconfined and vagrant, existing at the behest
of both appointive and elected officials, over another in which a significant portion thereof is contained. The absurdity of that position is self-
evident, to say the least.

5
The concern, voiced by our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Nachura, in his dissent, that elected officials (vis--vis appointive officials) have
greater political clout over the electorate, is indeed a matter worth exploring but not by this Court. Suffice it to say that the remedy lies with the
Legislature. It is the Legislature that is given the authority, under our constitutional system, to balance competing interests and thereafter make
policy choices responsive to the exigencies of the times. It is certainly within the Legislatures power to make the deemed-resigned provisions
applicable to elected officials, should it later decide that the evils sought to be prevented are of such frequency and magnitude as to tilt the
balance in favor of expanding the class. This Court cannot and should not arrogate unto itself the power to ascertain and impose on the people
the best state of affairs from a public policy standpoint.

iii. Mancuso v. Taft Has Been Overruled

Finding no Philippine jurisprudence to prop up its equal protection ruling, our assailed Decision adverted to, and extensively cited, Mancuso v.
Taft.52 This was a decision of the First Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals promulgated in March 1973, which struck down as
unconstitutional a similar statutory provision. Pathetically, our assailed Decision, relying on Mancuso, claimed:

(1) The right to run for public office is "inextricably linked" with two fundamental freedoms freedom of expression and association;

(2) Any legislative classification that significantly burdens this fundamental right must be subjected to strict equal protection review;
and

(3) While the state has a compelling interest in maintaining the honesty and impartiality of its public work force, the deemed-resigned
provisions pursue their objective in a far too heavy-handed manner as to render them unconstitutional.

It then concluded with the exhortation that since "the Americans, from whom we copied the provision in question, had already stricken down a
similar measure for being unconstitutional[,] it is high-time that we, too, should follow suit."

Our assailed Decisions reliance on Mancuso is completely misplaced. We cannot blink away the fact that the United States Supreme Court
effectively overruled Mancuso three months after its promulgation by the United States Court of Appeals. In United States Civil Service
Commission, et al. v. National Association of Letter Carriers AFL-CIO, et al.53 and Broadrick, et al. v. State of Oklahoma, et al.,54 the United States
Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether statutory provisions prohibiting federal55 and state56 employees from taking an active part in
political management or in political campaigns were unconstitutional as to warrant facial invalidation. Violation of these provisions results in
dismissal from employment and possible criminal sanctions.

The Court declared these provisions compliant with the equal protection clause. It held that (i) in regulating the speech of its employees, the state
as employer has interests that differ significantly from those it possesses in regulating the speech of the citizenry in general; (ii) the courts must
therefore balance the legitimate interest of employee free expression against the interests of the employer in promoting efficiency of public
services; (iii) if the employees expression interferes with the maintenance of efficient and regularly functioning services, the limitation on speech
is not unconstitutional; and (iv) the Legislature is to be given some flexibility or latitude in ascertaining which positions are to be covered by any
statutory restrictions.57 Therefore, insofar as government employees are concerned, the correct standard of review is an interest-balancing
approach, a means-end scrutiny that examines the closeness of fit between the governmental interests and the prohibitions in question. 58

Letter Carriers elucidated on these principles, as follows:

Until now, the judgment of Congress, the Executive, and the country appears to have been that partisan political activities by federal employees
must be limited if the Government is to operate effectively and fairly, elections are to play their proper part in representative government, and
employees themselves are to be sufficiently free from improper influences. The restrictions so far imposed on federal employees are not aimed
at particular parties, groups, or points of view, but apply equally to all partisan activities of the type described. They discriminate against no racial,
ethnic, or religious minorities. Nor do they seek to control political opinions or beliefs, or to interfere with or influence anyone's vote at the polls.

But, as the Court held in Pickering v. Board of Education,59 the government has an interest in regulating the conduct and the speech of its
employees that differ(s) significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. The problem
in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the (employee), as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the (government), as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Although
Congress is free to strike a different balance than it has, if it so chooses, we think the balance it has so far struck is sustainable by the obviously
important interests sought to be served by the limitations on partisan political activities now contained in the Hatch Act.

It seems fundamental in the first place that employees in the Executive Branch of the Government, or those working for any of its agencies,
should administer the law in accordance with the will of Congress, rather than in accordance with their own or the will of a political party. They
are expected to enforce the law and execute the programs of the Government without bias or favoritism for or against any political party or
group or the members thereof. A major thesis of the Hatch Act is that to serve this great end of Government-the impartial execution of the laws-
it is essential that federal employees, for example, not take formal positions in political parties, not undertake to play substantial roles in partisan
political campaigns, and not run for office on partisan political tickets. Forbidding activities like these will reduce the hazards to fair and effective
government.

There is another consideration in this judgment: it is not only important that the Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political
justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be
eroded to a disastrous extent.

Another major concern of the restriction against partisan activities by federal employees was perhaps the immediate occasion for enactment of
the Hatch Act in 1939. That was the conviction that the rapidly expanding Government work force should not be employed to build a powerful,
invincible, and perhaps corrupt political machine. The experience of the 1936 and 1938 campaigns convinced Congress that these dangers were
sufficiently real that substantial barriers should be raised against the party in power-or the party out of power, for that matter-using the
thousands or hundreds of thousands of federal employees, paid for at public expense, to man its political structure and political campaigns.

A related concern, and this remains as important as any other, was to further serve the goal that employment and advancement in the
Government service not depend on political performance, and at the same time to make sure that Government employees would be free from
pressure and from express or tacit invitation to vote in a certain way or perform political chores in order to curry favor with their superiors rather

6
than to act out their own beliefs. It may be urged that prohibitions against coercion are sufficient protection; but for many years the joint
judgment of the Executive and Congress has been that to protect the rights of federal employees with respect to their jobs and their political acts
and beliefs it is not enough merely to forbid one employee to attempt to influence or coerce another. For example, at the hearings in 1972 on
proposed legislation for liberalizing the prohibition against political activity, the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission stated that the
prohibitions against active participation in partisan political management and partisan political campaigns constitute the most significant
safeguards against coercion . . .. Perhaps Congress at some time will come to a different view of the realities of political life and Government
service; but that is its current view of the matter, and we are not now in any position to dispute it. Nor, in our view, does the Constitution forbid
it.

Neither the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute in any event.60 x x x

xxxx

As we see it, our task is not to destroy the Act if we can, but to construe it, if consistent with the will of Congress, so as to comport with
constitutional limitations. (italics supplied)

Broadrick likewise definitively stated that the assailed statutory provision is constitutionally permissible, viz.:

Appellants do not question Oklahoma's right to place even-handed restrictions on the partisan political conduct of state employees. Appellants
freely concede that such restrictions serve valid and important state interests, particularly with respect to attracting greater numbers of qualified
people by insuring their job security, free from the vicissitudes of the elective process, and by protecting them from political extortion. Rather,
appellants maintain that however permissible, even commendable, the goals of s 818 may be, its language is unconstitutionally vague and its
prohibitions too broad in their sweep, failing to distinguish between conduct that may be proscribed and conduct that must be permitted. For
these and other reasons, appellants assert that the sixth and seventh paragraphs of s 818 are void in toto and cannot be enforced against them or
anyone else.

We have held today that the Hatch Act is not impermissibly vague.61 We have little doubt that s 818 is similarly not so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.62 Whatever other problems there are with s 818, it is all but frivolous to suggest that
the section fails to give adequate warning of what activities it proscribes or fails to set out explicit standards' for those who must apply it. In the
plainest language, it prohibits any state classified employee from being an officer or member of a partisan political club or a candidate for any
paid public office. It forbids solicitation of contributions for any political organization, candidacy or other political purpose and taking part in
the management or affairs of any political party or in any political campaign. Words inevitably contain germs of uncertainty and, as with the
Hatch Act, there may be disputes over the meaning of such terms in s 818 as partisan, or take part in, or affairs of political parties. But what
was said in Letter Carriers, is applicable here: there are limitations in the English language with respect to being both specific and manageably
brief, and it seems to us that although the prohibitions may not satisfy those intent on finding fault at any cost, they are set out in terms that the
ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with, without sacrifice to the public interest.' x x x

xxxx

[Appellants] nevertheless maintain that the statute is overbroad and purports to reach protected, as well as unprotected conduct, and must
therefore be struck down on its face and held to be incapable of any constitutional application. We do not believe that the overbreadth doctrine
may appropriately be invoked in this manner here.

xxxx

The consequence of our departure from traditional rules of standing in the First Amendment area is that any enforcement of a statute thus
placed at issue is totally forbidden until and unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or
deterrence to constitutionally protected expression. Application of the overbreadth doctrine in this manner is, manifestly, strong medicine. It has
been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort. x x x

x x x But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial over-breadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice
and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves
from pure speech toward conduct and that conduct-even if expressive-falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect
legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Although such laws, if too
broadly worded, may deter protected speech to some unknown extent, there comes a point where that effect-at best a prediction-cannot, with
confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly within
its power to proscribe. To put the matter another way, particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the
overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. It is our view
that s 818 is not substantially overbroad and that whatever overbreadth may exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact
situations to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied.

Unlike ordinary breach-of-the peace statutes or other broad regulatory acts, s 818 is directed, by its terms, at political expression which if
engaged in by private persons would plainly be protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. But at the same time, s 818 is not a censorial
statute, directed at particular groups or viewpoints. The statute, rather, seeks to regulate political activity in an even-handed and neutral manner.
As indicted, such statutes have in the past been subject to a less exacting overbreadth scrutiny. Moreover, the fact remains that s 818 regulates a
substantial spectrum of conduct that is as manifestly subject to state regulation as the public peace or criminal trespass. This much was
established in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, and has been unhesitatingly reaffirmed today in Letter Carriers. Under the decision in Letter
Carriers, there is no question that s 818 is valid at least insofar as it forbids classified employees from: soliciting contributions for partisan
candidates, political parties, or other partisan political purposes; becoming members of national, state, or local committees of political parties, or
officers or committee members in partisan political clubs, or candidates for any paid public office; taking part in the management or affairs of any
political party's partisan political campaign; serving as delegates or alternates to caucuses or conventions of political parties; addressing or taking
an active part in partisan political rallies or meetings; soliciting votes or assisting voters at the polls or helping in a partisan effort to get voters to
the polls; participating in the distribution of partisan campaign literature; initiating or circulating partisan nominating petitions; or riding in
caravans for any political party or partisan political candidate.

7
x x x It may be that such restrictions are impermissible and that s 818 may be susceptible of some other improper applications. But, as presently
construed, we do not believe that s 818 must be discarded in toto because some persons arguably protected conduct may or may not be caught
or chilled by the statute. Section 818 is not substantially overbroad and it not, therefore, unconstitutional on its face. (italics supplied)

It bears stressing that, in his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Nachura does not deny the principles enunciated in Letter Carriers and Broadrick. He
would hold, nonetheless, that these cases cannot be interpreted to mean a reversal of Mancuso, since they "pertain to different types of laws and
were decided based on a different set of facts," viz.:

In Letter Carriers, the plaintiffs alleged that the Civil Service Commission was enforcing, or threatening to enforce, the Hatch Acts prohibition
against "active participation in political management or political campaigns." The plaintiffs desired to campaign for candidates for public office, to
encourage and get federal employees to run for state and local offices, to participate as delegates in party conventions, and to hold office in a
political club.

In Broadrick, the appellants sought the invalidation for being vague and overbroad a provision in the (sic) Oklahomas Merit System of Personnel
Administration Act restricting the political activities of the States classified civil servants, in much the same manner as the Hatch Act proscribed
partisan political activities of federal employees. Prior to the commencement of the action, the appellants actively participated in the 1970
reelection campaign of their superior, and were administratively charged for asking other Corporation Commission employees to do campaign
work or to give referrals to persons who might help in the campaign, for soliciting money for the campaign, and for receiving and distributing
campaign posters in bulk.

Mancuso, on the other hand, involves, as aforesaid, an automatic resignation provision. Kenneth Mancuso, a full time police officer and classified
civil service employee of the City of Cranston, filed as a candidate for nomination as representative to the Rhode Island General Assembly. The
Mayor of Cranston then began the process of enforcing the resign-to-run provision of the City Home Rule Charter.

Clearly, as the above-cited US cases pertain to different types of laws and were decided based on a different set of facts, Letter Carriers and
Broadrick cannot be interpreted to mean a reversal of Mancuso. x x x (italics in the original)

We hold, however, that his position is belied by a plain reading of these cases. Contrary to his claim, Letter Carriers, Broadrick and Mancuso all
concerned the constitutionality of resign-to-run laws, viz.:

(1) Mancuso involved a civil service employee who filed as a candidate for nomination as representative to the Rhode Island General
Assembly. He assailed the constitutionality of 14.09(c) of the City Home Rule Charter, which prohibits "continuing in the classified
service of the city after becoming a candidate for nomination or election to any public office."

(2) Letter Carriers involved plaintiffs who alleged that the Civil Service Commission was enforcing, or threatening to enforce, the Hatch
Acts prohibition against "active participation in political management or political campaigns"63 with respect to certain defined
activities in which they desired to engage. The plaintiffs relevant to this discussion are:

(a) The National Association of Letter Carriers, which alleged that its members were desirous of, among others, running in
local elections for offices such as school board member, city council member or mayor;

(b) Plaintiff Gee, who alleged that he desired to, but did not, file as a candidate for the office of Borough Councilman in his
local community for fear that his participation in a partisan election would endanger his job; and

(c) Plaintiff Myers, who alleged that he desired to run as a Republican candidate in the 1971 partisan election for the mayor
of West Lafayette, Indiana, and that he would do so except for fear of losing his job by reason of violation of the Hatch Act.

The Hatch Act defines "active participation in political management or political campaigns" by cross-referring to the rules made by the Civil
Service Commission. The rule pertinent to our inquiry states:

30. Candidacy for local office: Candidacy for a nomination or for election to any National, State, county, or municipal office is not permissible. The
prohibition against political activity extends not merely to formal announcement of candidacy but also to the preliminaries leading to such
announcement and to canvassing or soliciting support or doing or permitting to be done any act in furtherance of candidacy. The fact that
candidacy, is merely passive is immaterial; if an employee acquiesces in the efforts of friends in furtherance of such candidacy such acquiescence
constitutes an infraction of the prohibitions against political activity. (italics supplied)

Section 9(b) requires the immediate removal of violators and forbids the use of appropriated funds thereafter to pay compensation to these
persons.64

(3) Broadrick was a class action brought by certain Oklahoma state employees seeking a declaration of unconstitutionality of two sub-paragraphs
of Section 818 of Oklahomas Merit System of Personnel Administration Act. Section 818 (7), the paragraph relevant to this discussion, states that
"[n]o employee in the classified service shall be a candidate for nomination or election to any paid public office" Violation of Section 818
results in dismissal from employment, possible criminal sanctions and limited state employment ineligibility.

Consequently, it cannot be denied that Letter Carriers and Broadrick effectively overruled Mancuso. By no stretch of the imagination could
Mancuso still be held operative, as Letter Carriers and Broadrick (i) concerned virtually identical resign-to-run laws, and (ii) were decided by a
superior court, the United States Supreme Court. It was thus not surprising for the First Circuit Court of Appeals the same court that decided
Mancuso to hold categorically and emphatically in Magill v. Lynch65 that Mancuso is no longer good law. As we priorly explained:

Magill involved Pawtucket, Rhode Island firemen who ran for city office in 1975. Pawtuckets "Little Hatch Act" prohibits city employees from
engaging in a broad range of political activities. Becoming a candidate for any city office is specifically proscribed, 66 the violation being punished
by removal from office or immediate dismissal. The firemen brought an action against the city officials on the ground that that the provision of
the city charter was unconstitutional. However, the court, fully cognizant of Letter Carriers and Broadrick, took the position that Mancuso had
since lost considerable vitality. It observed that the view that political candidacy was a fundamental interest which could be infringed upon only if
less restrictive alternatives were not available, was a position which was no longer viable, since the Supreme Court (finding that the governments
interest in regulating both the conduct and speech of its employees differed significantly from its interest in regulating those of the citizenry in
8
general) had given little weight to the argument that prohibitions against the coercion of government employees were a less drastic means to the
same end, deferring to the judgment of Congress, and applying a "balancing" test to determine whether limits on political activity by public
employees substantially served government interests which were "important" enough to outweigh the employees First Amendment rights.67

It must be noted that the Court of Appeals ruled in this manner even though the election in Magill was characterized as nonpartisan, as it was
reasonable for the city to fear, under the circumstances of that case, that politically active bureaucrats might use their official power to help
political friends and hurt political foes. Ruled the court:

The question before us is whether Pawtucket's charter provision, which bars a city employee's candidacy in even a nonpartisan city election, is
constitutional. The issue compels us to extrapolate two recent Supreme Court decisions, Civil Service Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers and
Broadrick v. Oklahoma. Both dealt with laws barring civil servants from partisan political activity. Letter Carriers reaffirmed United Public Workers
v. Mitchell, upholding the constitutionality of the Hatch Act as to federal employees. Broadrick sustained Oklahoma's "Little Hatch Act" against
constitutional attack, limiting its holding to Oklahoma's construction that the Act barred only activity in partisan politics. In Mancuso v. Taft, we
assumed that proscriptions of candidacy in nonpartisan elections would not be constitutional. Letter Carriers and Broadrick compel new analysis.

xxxx

What we are obligated to do in this case, as the district court recognized, is to apply the Courts interest balancing approach to the kind of
nonpartisan election revealed in this record. We believe that the district court found more residual vigor in our opinion in Mancuso v. Taft than
remains after Letter Carriers. We have particular reference to our view that political candidacy was a fundamental interest which could be
trenched upon only if less restrictive alternatives were not available. While this approach may still be viable for citizens who are not government
employees, the Court in Letter Carriers recognized that the government's interest in regulating both the conduct and speech of its employees
differs significantly from its interest in regulating those of the citizenry in general. Not only was United Public Workers v. Mitchell "unhesitatingly"
reaffirmed, but the Court gave little weight to the argument that prohibitions against the coercion of government employees were a less drastic
means to the same end, deferring to the judgment of the Congress. We cannot be more precise than the Third Circuit in characterizing the Court's
approach as "some sort of 'balancing' process".68 It appears that the government may place limits on campaigning by public employees if the
limits substantially serve government interests that are "important" enough to outweigh the employees' First Amendment rights. x x x (italics
supplied)

Upholding thus the constitutionality of the law in question, the Magill court detailed the major governmental interests discussed in Letter Carriers
and applied them to the Pawtucket provision as follows:

In Letter Carriers[,] the first interest identified by the Court was that of an efficient government, faithful to the Congress rather than to party. The
district court discounted this interest, reasoning that candidates in a local election would not likely be committed to a state or national platform.
This observation undoubtedly has substance insofar as allegiance to broad policy positions is concerned. But a different kind of possible political
intrusion into efficient administration could be thought to threaten municipal government: not into broad policy decisions, but into the
particulars of administration favoritism in minute decisions affecting welfare, tax assessments, municipal contracts and purchasing, hiring, zoning,
licensing, and inspections. Just as the Court in Letter Carriers identified a second governmental interest in the avoidance of the appearance of
"political justice" as to policy, so there is an equivalent interest in avoiding the appearance of political preferment in privileges, concessions, and
benefits. The appearance (or reality) of favoritism that the charter's authors evidently feared is not exorcised by the nonpartisan character of the
formal election process. Where, as here, party support is a key to successful campaigning, and party rivalry is the norm, the city might reasonably
fear that politically active bureaucrats would use their official power to help political friends and hurt political foes. This is not to say that the
city's interest in visibly fair and effective administration necessarily justifies a blanket prohibition of all employee campaigning; if parties are not
heavily involved in a campaign, the danger of favoritism is less, for neither friend nor foe is as easily identified.

A second major governmental interest identified in Letter Carriers was avoiding the danger of a powerful political machine. The Court had in mind
the large and growing federal bureaucracy and its partisan potential. The district court felt this was only a minor threat since parties had no
control over nominations. But in fact candidates sought party endorsements, and party endorsements proved to be highly effective both in
determining who would emerge from the primary election and who would be elected in the final election. Under the prevailing customs, known
party affiliation and support were highly significant factors in Pawtucket elections. The charter's authors might reasonably have feared that a
politically active public work force would give the incumbent party, and the incumbent workers, an unbreakable grasp on the reins of power. In
municipal elections especially, the small size of the electorate and the limited powers of local government may inhibit the growth of interest
groups powerful enough to outbalance the weight of a partisan work force. Even when nonpartisan issues and candidacies are at stake, isolated
government employees may seek to influence voters or their co-workers improperly; but a more real danger is that a central party structure will
mass the scattered powers of government workers behind a single party platform or slate. Occasional misuse of the public trust to pursue private
political ends is tolerable, especially because the political views of individual employees may balance each other out. But party discipline
eliminates this diversity and tends to make abuse systematic. Instead of a handful of employees pressured into advancing their immediate
superior's political ambitions, the entire government work force may be expected to turn out for many candidates in every election. In
Pawtucket, where parties are a continuing presence in political campaigns, a carefully orchestrated use of city employees in support of the
incumbent party's candidates is possible. The danger is scarcely lessened by the openness of Pawtucket's nominating procedure or the lack of
party labels on its ballots.

The third area of proper governmental interest in Letter Carriers was ensuring that employees achieve advancement on their merits and that they
be free from both coercion and the prospect of favor from political activity. The district court did not address this factor, but looked only to the
possibility of a civil servant using his position to influence voters, and held this to be no more of a threat than in the most nonpartisan of
elections. But we think that the possibility of coercion of employees by superiors remains as strong a factor in municipal elections as it was in
Letter Carriers. Once again, it is the systematic and coordinated exploitation of public servants for political ends that a legislature is most likely to
see as the primary threat of employees' rights. Political oppression of public employees will be rare in an entirely nonpartisan system. Some
superiors may be inclined to ride herd on the politics of their employees even in a nonpartisan context, but without party officials looking over
their shoulders most supervisors will prefer to let employees go their own ways.

In short, the government may constitutionally restrict its employees' participation in nominally nonpartisan elections if political parties play a
large role in the campaigns. In the absence of substantial party involvement, on the other hand, the interests identified by the Letter Carriers
Court lose much of their force. While the employees' First Amendment rights would normally outbalance these diminished interests, we do not
suggest that they would always do so. Even when parties are absent, many employee campaigns might be thought to endanger at least one
strong public interest, an interest that looms larger in the context of municipal elections than it does in the national elections considered in Letter
Carriers. The city could reasonably fear the prospect of a subordinate running directly against his superior or running for a position that confers
great power over his superior. An employee of a federal agency who seeks a Congressional seat poses less of a direct challenge to the command

9
and discipline of his agency than a fireman or policeman who runs for mayor or city council. The possibilities of internal discussion, cliques, and
political bargaining, should an employee gather substantial political support, are considerable. (citations omitted)

The court, however, remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings in respect of the petitioners overbreadth charge. Noting that
invalidating a statute for being overbroad is "not to be taken lightly, much less to be taken in the dark," the court held:

The governing case is Broadrick, which introduced the doctrine of "substantial" overbreadth in a closely analogous case. Under Broadrick, when
one who challenges a law has engaged in constitutionally unprotected conduct (rather than unprotected speech) and when the challenged law is
aimed at unprotected conduct, "the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's
plainly legitimate sweep." Two major uncertainties attend the doctrine: how to distinguish speech from conduct, and how to define "substantial"
overbreadth. We are spared the first inquiry by Broadrick itself. The plaintiffs in that case had solicited support for a candidate, and they were
subject to discipline under a law proscribing a wide range of activities, including soliciting contributions for political candidates and becoming a
candidate. The Court found that this combination required a substantial overbreadth approach. The facts of this case are so similar that we may
reach the same result without worrying unduly about the sometimes opaque distinction between speech and conduct.

The second difficulty is not so easily disposed of. Broadrick found no substantial overbreadth in a statute restricting partisan campaigning.
Pawtucket has gone further, banning participation in nonpartisan campaigns as well. Measuring the substantiality of a statute's overbreadth
apparently requires, inter alia, a rough balancing of the number of valid applications compared to the number of potentially invalid applications.
Some sensitivity to reality is needed; an invalid application that is far-fetched does not deserve as much weight as one that is probable. The
question is a matter of degree; it will never be possible to say that a ratio of one invalid to nine valid applications makes a law substantially
overbroad. Still, an overbreadth challenger has a duty to provide the court with some idea of the number of potentially invalid applications the
statute permits. Often, simply reading the statute in the light of common experience or litigated cases will suggest a number of probable invalid
applications. But this case is different. Whether the statute is overbroad depends in large part on the number of elections that are insulated from
party rivalry yet closed to Pawtucket employees. For all the record shows, every one of the city, state, or federal elections in Pawtucket is actively
contested by political parties. Certainly the record suggests that parties play a major role even in campaigns that often are entirely nonpartisan in
other cities. School committee candidates, for example, are endorsed by the local Democratic committee.

The state of the record does not permit us to find overbreadth; indeed such a step is not to be taken lightly, much less to be taken in the dark. On
the other hand, the entire focus below, in the short period before the election was held, was on the constitutionality of the statute as applied.
Plaintiffs may very well feel that further efforts are not justified, but they should be afforded the opportunity to demonstrate that the charter
forecloses access to a significant number of offices, the candidacy for which by municipal employees would not pose the possible threats to
government efficiency and integrity which Letter Carriers, as we have interpreted it, deems significant. Accordingly, we remand for consideration
of plaintiffs' overbreadth claim. (italics supplied, citations omitted)

Clearly, Letter Carriers, Broadrick, and Magill demonstrate beyond doubt that Mancuso v. Taft, heavily relied upon by the ponencia, has
effectively been overruled.69 As it is no longer good law, the ponencias exhortation that "[since] the Americans, from whom we copied the
provision in question, had already stricken down a similar measure for being unconstitutional[,] it is high-time that we, too, should follow suit" is
misplaced and unwarranted.70

Accordingly, our assailed Decisions submission that the right to run for public office is "inextricably linked" with two fundamental freedoms
those of expression and association lies on barren ground. American case law has in fact never recognized a fundamental right to express ones
political views through candidacy,71 as to invoke a rigorous standard of review.72 Bart v. Telford73 pointedly stated that "[t]he First Amendment
does not in terms confer a right to run for public office, and this court has held that it does not do so by implication either." Thus, ones interest in
seeking office, by itself, is not entitled to constitutional protection.74 Moreover, one cannot bring ones action under the rubric of freedom of
association, absent any allegation that, by running for an elective position, one is advancing the political ideas of a particular set of voters. 75

Prescinding from these premises, it is crystal clear that the provisions challenged in the case at bar, are not violative of the equal protection
clause. The deemed-resigned provisions substantially serve governmental interests (i.e., (i) efficient civil service faithful to the government and
the people rather than to party; (ii) avoidance of the appearance of "political justice" as to policy; (iii) avoidance of the danger of a powerful
political machine; and (iv) ensuring that employees achieve advancement on their merits and that they be free from both coercion and the
prospect of favor from political activity). These are interests that are important enough to outweigh the non-fundamental right of appointive
officials and employees to seek elective office.1avvphi1

En passant, we find it quite ironic that Mr. Justice Nachura cites Clements v. Fashing76 and Morial, et al. v. Judiciary Commission of the State of
Louisiana, et al.77 to buttress his dissent. Maintaining that resign-to-run provisions are valid only when made applicable to specified officials, he
explains:

U.S. courts, in subsequent cases, sustained the constitutionality of resign-to-run provisions when applied to specified or particular officials, as
distinguished from all others,78 under a classification that is germane to the purposes of the law. These resign-to-run legislations were not
expressed in a general and sweeping provision, and thus did not violate the test of being germane to the purpose of the law, the second requisite
for a valid classification. Directed, as they were, to particular officials, they were not overly encompassing as to be overbroad. (emphasis in the
original)

This reading is a regrettable misrepresentation of Clements and Morial. The resign-to-run provisions in these cases were upheld not because they
referred to specified or particular officials (vis--vis a general class); the questioned provisions were found valid precisely because the Court
deferred to legislative judgment and found that a regulation is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it happens to be incomplete. In
fact, the equal protection challenge in Clements revolved around the claim that the State of Texas failed to explain why some public officials are
subject to the resign-to-run provisions, while others are not. Ruled the United States Supreme Court:

Article XVI, 65, of the Texas Constitution provides that the holders of certain offices automatically resign their positions if they become
candidates for any other elected office, unless the unexpired portion of the current term is one year or less. The burdens that 65 imposes on
candidacy are even less substantial than those imposed by 19. The two provisions, of course, serve essentially the same state interests. The
District Court found 65 deficient, however, not because of the nature or extent of the provision's restriction on candidacy, but because of the
manner in which the offices are classified. According to the District Court, the classification system cannot survive equal protection scrutiny,
because Texas has failed to explain sufficiently why some elected public officials are subject to 65 and why others are not. As with the case of
19, we conclude that 65 survives a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause unless appellees can show that there is no rational predicate to
the classification scheme.

10
The history behind 65 shows that it may be upheld consistent with the "one step at a time" approach that this Court has undertaken with
regard to state regulation not subject to more vigorous scrutiny than that sanctioned by the traditional principles. Section 65 was enacted in 1954
as a transitional provision applying only to the 1954 election. Section 65 extended the terms of those offices enumerated in the provision from
two to four years. The provision also staggered the terms of other offices so that at least some county and local offices would be contested at
each election. The automatic resignation proviso to 65 was not added until 1958. In that year, a similar automatic resignation provision was
added in Art. XI, 11, which applies to officeholders in home rule cities who serve terms longer than two years. Section 11 allows home rule cities
the option of extending the terms of municipal offices from two to up to four years.

Thus, the automatic resignation provision in Texas is a creature of the State's electoral reforms of 1958. That the State did not go further in
applying the automatic resignation provision to those officeholders whose terms were not extended by 11 or 65, absent an invidious purpose,
is not the sort of malfunctioning of the State's lawmaking process forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause. A regulation is not devoid of a
rational predicate simply because it happens to be incomplete. The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid Texas to restrict one elected
officeholder's candidacy for another elected office unless and until it places similar restrictions on other officeholders. The provision's language
and its history belie any notion that 65 serves the invidious purpose of denying access to the political process to identifiable classes of potential
candidates. (citations omitted and italics supplied)

Furthermore, it is unfortunate that the dissenters took the Morial line that "there is no blanket approval of restrictions on the right of public
employees to become candidates for public office" out of context. A correct reading of that line readily shows that the Court only meant to
confine its ruling to the facts of that case, as each equal protection challenge would necessarily have to involve weighing governmental interests
vis--vis the specific prohibition assailed. The Court held:

The interests of public employees in free expression and political association are unquestionably entitled to the protection of the first and
fourteenth amendments. Nothing in today's decision should be taken to imply that public employees may be prohibited from expressing their
private views on controversial topics in a manner that does not interfere with the proper performance of their public duties. In today's decision,
there is no blanket approval of restrictions on the right of public employees to become candidates for public office. Nor do we approve any
general restrictions on the political and civil rights of judges in particular. Our holding is necessarily narrowed by the methodology employed to
reach it. A requirement that a state judge resign his office prior to becoming a candidate for non-judicial office bears a reasonably necessary
relation to the achievement of the state's interest in preventing the actuality or appearance of judicial impropriety. Such a requirement offends
neither the first amendment's guarantees of free expression and association nor the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection of
the laws. (italics supplied)

Indeed, the Morial court even quoted Broadrick and stated that:

In any event, the legislature must have some leeway in determining which of its employment positions require restrictions on partisan political
activities and which may be left unregulated. And a State can hardly be faulted for attempting to limit the positions upon which such restrictions
are placed. (citations omitted)

V.

Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code Do Not Suffer from Overbreadth

Apart from nullifying Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code on equal protection
ground, our assailed Decision struck them down for being overbroad in two respects, viz.:

(1) The assailed provisions limit the candidacy of all civil servants holding appointive posts without due regard for the type of position
being held by the employee seeking an elective post and the degree of influence that may be attendant thereto; 79 and

(2) The assailed provisions limit the candidacy of any and all civil servants holding appointive positions without due regard for the type
of office being sought, whether it be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or in the national, municipal or barangay level.

Again, on second look, we have to revise our assailed Decision.

i. Limitation on Candidacy Regardless of Incumbent Appointive Officials Position, Valid

According to the assailed Decision, the challenged provisions of law are overly broad because they apply indiscriminately to all civil servants
holding appointive posts, without due regard for the type of position being held by the employee running for elective office and the degree of
influence that may be attendant thereto.

Its underlying assumption appears to be that the evils sought to be prevented are extant only when the incumbent appointive official running for
elective office holds an influential post.

Such a myopic view obviously fails to consider a different, yet equally plausible, threat to the government posed by the partisan potential of a
large and growing bureaucracy: the danger of systematic abuse perpetuated by a "powerful political machine" that has amassed "the scattered
powers of government workers" so as to give itself and its incumbent workers an "unbreakable grasp on the reins of power." 80 As elucidated in
our prior exposition:81

Attempts by government employees to wield influence over others or to make use of their respective positions (apparently) to promote their
own candidacy may seem tolerable even innocuous particularly when viewed in isolation from other similar attempts by other government
employees. Yet it would be decidedly foolhardy to discount the equally (if not more) realistic and dangerous possibility that such seemingly
disjointed attempts, when taken together, constitute a veiled effort on the part of an emerging central party structure to advance its own agenda
through a "carefully orchestrated use of [appointive and/or elective] officials" coming from various levels of the bureaucracy.

[T]he avoidance of such a "politically active public work force" which could give an emerging political machine an "unbreakable grasp on the
reins of power" is reason enough to impose a restriction on the candidacies of all appointive public officials without further distinction as to the
type of positions being held by such employees or the degree of influence that may be attendant thereto. (citations omitted)

11
 ii. Limitation on Candidacy Regardless of Type of Office Sought, Valid

The assailed Decision also held that the challenged provisions of law are overly broad because they are made to apply indiscriminately to all civil
servants holding appointive offices, without due regard for the type of elective office being sought, whether it be partisan or nonpartisan in
character, or in the national, municipal or barangay level.

This erroneous ruling is premised on the assumption that "the concerns of a truly partisan office and the temptations it fosters are sufficiently
different from those involved in an office removed from regular party politics [so as] to warrant distinctive treatment," 82 so that restrictions on
candidacy akin to those imposed by the challenged provisions can validly apply only to situations in which the elective office sought is partisan in
character. To the extent, therefore, that such restrictions are said to preclude even candidacies for nonpartisan elective offices, the challenged
restrictions are to be considered as overbroad.

Again, a careful study of the challenged provisions and related laws on the matter will show that the alleged overbreadth is more apparent than
real. Our exposition on this issue has not been repudiated, viz.:

A perusal of Resolution 8678 will immediately disclose that the rules and guidelines set forth therein refer to the filing of certificates of candidacy
and nomination of official candidates of registered political parties, in connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local
Elections.83 Obviously, these rules and guidelines, including the restriction in Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, were issued specifically for purposes
of the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections, which, it must be noted, are decidedly partisan in character. Thus, it is clear that the restriction
in Section 4(a) of RA 8678 applies only to the candidacies of appointive officials vying for partisan elective posts in the May 10, 2010 National and
Local Elections. On this score, the overbreadth challenge leveled against Section 4(a) is clearly unsustainable.

Similarly, a considered review of Section 13 of RA 9369 and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, in conjunction with other related laws on
the matter, will confirm that these provisions are likewise not intended to apply to elections for nonpartisan public offices.

The only elections which are relevant to the present inquiry are the elections for barangay offices, since these are the only elections in this
country which involve nonpartisan public offices.84

In this regard, it is well to note that from as far back as the enactment of the Omnibus Election Code in 1985, Congress has intended that these
nonpartisan barangay elections be governed by special rules, including a separate rule on deemed resignations which is found in Section 39 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Said provision states:

Section 39. Certificate of Candidacy. No person shall be elected punong barangay or kagawad ng sangguniang barangay unless he files a sworn
certificate of candidacy in triplicate on any day from the commencement of the election period but not later than the day before the beginning of
the campaign period in a form to be prescribed by the Commission. The candidate shall state the barangay office for which he is a candidate.

xxxx

Any elective or appointive municipal, city, provincial or national official or employee, or those in the civil or military service, including those in
government-owned or-controlled corporations, shall be considered automatically resigned upon the filing of certificate of candidacy for a
barangay office.

Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule, under the present state of law, there would be no occasion to
apply the restriction on candidacy found in Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and later reiterated in the proviso of Section 13 of RA 9369,
to any election other than a partisan one. For this reason, the overbreadth challenge raised against Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and
the pertinent proviso in Section 13 of RA 9369 must also fail. 85

In any event, even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, that Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the corresponding provision
in Section 13 of RA 9369 are general rules that apply also to elections for nonpartisan public offices, the overbreadth challenge would still be
futile. Again, we explained:

In the first place, the view that Congress is limited to controlling only partisan behavior has not received judicial imprimatur, because the general
proposition of the relevant US cases on the matter is simply that the government has an interest in regulating the conduct and speech of its
employees that differs significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. 86

Moreover, in order to have a statute declared as unconstitutional or void on its face for being overly broad, particularly where, as in this case,
"conduct" and not "pure speech" is involved, the overbreadth must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statutes
plainly legitimate sweep.87

In operational terms, measuring the substantiality of a statutes overbreadth would entail, among other things, a rough balancing of the number
of valid applications compared to the number of potentially invalid applications.88In this regard, some sensitivity to reality is needed; an invalid
application that is far-fetched does not deserve as much weight as one that is probable.89 The question is a matter of degree.90 Thus, assuming for
the sake of argument that the partisan-nonpartisan distinction is valid and necessary such that a statute which fails to make this distinction is
susceptible to an overbreadth attack, the overbreadth challenge presently mounted must demonstrate or provide this Court with some idea of
the number of potentially invalid elections (i.e. the number of elections that were insulated from party rivalry but were nevertheless closed to
appointive employees) that may in all probability result from the enforcement of the statute. 91

The state of the record, however, does not permit us to find overbreadth. Borrowing from the words of Magill v. Lynch, indeed, such a step is not
to be taken lightly, much less to be taken in the dark,92 especially since an overbreadth finding in this case would effectively prohibit the State
from enforcing an otherwise valid measure against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe. 93

This Court would do well to proceed with tiptoe caution, particularly when it comes to the application of the overbreadth doctrine in the analysis
of statutes that purportedly attempt to restrict or burden the exercise of the right to freedom of speech, for such approach is manifestly strong
medicine that must be used sparingly, and only as a last resort.94

12
In the United States, claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained only where, in the judgment of the court, the possibility that protected
speech of others may be muted and perceived grievances left to fester (due to the possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes) outweighs
the possible harm to society in allowing some unprotected speech or conduct to go unpunished. 95 Facial overbreadth has likewise not been
invoked where a limiting construction could be placed on the challenged statute, and where there are readily apparent constructions that would
cure, or at least substantially reduce, the alleged overbreadth of the statute.96

In the case at bar, the probable harm to society in permitting incumbent appointive officials to remain in office, even as they actively pursue
elective posts, far outweighs the less likely evil of having arguably protected candidacies blocked by the possible inhibitory effect of a potentially
overly broad statute.a1f

In this light, the conceivably impermissible applications of the challenged statutes which are, at best, bold predictions cannot justify
invalidating these statutes in toto and prohibiting the State from enforcing them against conduct that is, and has for more than 100 years been,
unquestionably within its power and interest to proscribe.97 Instead, the more prudent approach would be to deal with these conceivably
impermissible applications through case-by-case adjudication rather than through a total invalidation of the statute itself.98

Indeed, the anomalies spawned by our assailed Decision have taken place. In his Motion for Reconsideration, intervenor Drilon stated that a
number of high-ranking Cabinet members had already filed their Certificates of Candidacy without relinquishing their posts. 99 Several COMELEC
election officers had likewise filed their Certificates of Candidacy in their respective provinces.100 Even the Secretary of Justice had filed her
certificate of substitution for representative of the first district of Quezon province last December 14, 2009101 even as her position as Justice
Secretary includes supervision over the City and Provincial Prosecutors,102 who, in turn, act as Vice-Chairmen of the respective Boards of
Canvassers.103 The Judiciary has not been spared, for a Regional Trial Court Judge in the South has thrown his hat into the political arena. We
cannot allow the tilting of our electoral playing field in their favor.

For the foregoing reasons, we now rule that Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678 and Section 13 of RA 9369, which merely reiterate Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code, are not unconstitutionally overbroad.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondents and the intervenors Motions for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE
this Courts December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, (2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code.

SO ORDERED.

13
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 176951 August 24, 2010

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR
JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as
taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY
OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF
BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR; and MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, Respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF
BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY
OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF
VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, Petitioners-In-
Intervention.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 177499

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR
JERRY P. TREAS,CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as
taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN, PROVINCE OF BASILAN; MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK, PROVINCE OF KALINGA;
MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF
MATI, PROVINCE OF DAVAO ORIENTAL; and MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, Respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF
BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY
OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF
VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, Petitioners-In-
Intervention.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 178056

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR
JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as
taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF
CEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR, MISAMIS ORIENTAL, Respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF
BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY
OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF
VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, Petitioners-In-
Intervention.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

For resolution are (1) the ad cautelam motion for reconsideration and (2) motion to annul the Decision of 21 December 2009 filed by petitioners
League of Cities of the Philippines, et al. and (3) the ad cautelam motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners-in-intervention Batangas City,
Santiago City, Legazpi City, Iriga City, Cadiz City, and Oroquieta City.

On 18 November 2008, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a majority vote, struck down the subject 16 Cityhood Laws for violating Section 10, Article
X of the 1987 Constitution and the equal protection clause. On 31 March 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, again by a majority vote, denied the
respondents first motion for reconsideration. On 28 April 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a split vote, denied the respondents second
motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, the 18 November 2008 Decision became final and executory and was recorded, in due course, in the
Book of Entries of Judgments on 21 May 2009.

However, after the finality of the 18 November 2008 Decision and without any exceptional and compelling reason, the Court En Banc
unprecedentedly reversed the 18 November 2008 Decision by upholding the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws in the Decision of 21
December 2009.

Upon reexamination, the Court finds the motions for reconsideration meritorious and accordingly reinstates the 18 November 2008 Decision
declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional.

14
 A. Violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution

Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)

The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any
other law. There is only one Local Government Code.1 The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the
criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other
law, like the Cityhood Laws.

The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-
discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local
Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the
creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring
to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does
not contain any exemption from this income requirement.

In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in
Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent
municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption
clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the
Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code. Section 1 of RA 9009 pertinently provides: "Section 450 of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, is hereby amended to read as follows: x x x." RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local
Government Code. RA 9009, by amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code, embodies the new and prevailing Section 450 of the Local
Government Code. Considering the Legislatures primary intent to curtail "the mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities," RA
9009 increased the income requirement for the creation of cities. To repeat, RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code, as it
expressly amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code.

The language of RA 9009 is plain, simple, and clear. Nothing is unintelligible or ambiguous; not a single word or phrase admits of two or more
meanings. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 by increasing the income requirement for the creation of cities.
There are no exemptions from this income requirement. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert
into a city must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law. Moreover, where the law does not
make an exemption, the Court should not create one.2

B. Operative Fact Doctrine

Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of
nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the operative fact doctrine is an admission that the
law is unconstitutional.

However, the minoritys novel theory, invoking the operative fact doctrine, is that the enactment of the Cityhood Laws and the functioning of the
16 municipalities as new cities with new sets of officials and employees operate to contitutionalize the unconstitutional Cityhood Laws. This novel
theory misapplies the operative fact doctrine and sets a gravely dangerous precedent.

Under the minoritys novel theory, an unconstitutional law, if already implemented prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality by the Court, can
no longer be revoked and its implementation must be continued despite being unconstitutional. This view will open the floodgates to the wanton
enactment of unconstitutional laws and a mad rush for their immediate implementation before the Court can declare them unconstitutional. This
view is an open invitation to serially violate the Constitution, and be quick about it, lest the violation be stopped by the Court.

The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must be applied as an exception to the general rule that an unconstitutional law
produces no effects. It can never be invoked to validate as constitutional an unconstitutional act. In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil
Corporation,3 the Court stated:

The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void. It produces no rights, imposes no duties and affords no protection. It has no legal effect. It
is, in legal contemplation, inoperative as if it has not been passed. Being void, Fertiphil is not required to pay the levy. All levies paid should be
refunded in accordance with the general civil code principle against unjust enrichment. The general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil
Code, which provides:

ART. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to
the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an
unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.

15
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law.
Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo
the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it. (Emphasis supplied)

The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law. Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional
law remains unconstitutional, but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a
matter of equity and fair play. In short, the operative fact doctrine affects or modifies only the effects of the unconstitutional law, not the
unconstitutional law itself.

Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case, the Cityhood Laws remain unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article
X of the Constitution. However, the effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity, such as the
payment of salaries and supplies by the "new cities" or their issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may be recognized as valid and
effective. This does not mean that the Cityhood Laws are valid for they remain void. Only the effects of the implementation of these
unconstitutional laws are left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play to innocent people who may have relied on the presumed validity of
the Cityhood Laws prior to the Courts declaration of their unconstitutionality.

C. Equal Protection Clause

As the Court held in the 18 November 2008 Decision, there is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the
11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material
difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th
Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress
might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion mere
pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable
municipalities from converting into cities.

Moreover, the fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage
of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to
existing conditions only. In fact, the minority concedes that "the conditions (pendency of the cityhood bills) adverted to can no longer be
repeated."

Further, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date the filing of
their cityhood bills before the end of the 11th Congress as against all other municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of
RA 9009.

In addition, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly
situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent
municipalities can. Clearly, as worded, the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

D. Tie-Vote on a Motion for Reconsideration

Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. Where the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had,
the case shall again be deliberated on, and if after such deliberation no decision is reached, the original action commenced in the court shall be
dismissed; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion
shall be denied. (Emphasis supplied)

The En Banc Resolution of 26 January 1999 in A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC, reads:

A MOTION FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF A DECISION OR RESOLUTION OF THE COURT EN BANC OR OF A DIVISION MAY BE GRANTED UPON A
VOTE OF A MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE EN BANC OR OF A DIVISION, AS THE CASE MAY BE, WHO ACTUALLY TOOK PART IN THE
DELIBERATION OF THE MOTION.

IF THE VOTING RESULTS IN A TIE, THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS DEEMED DENIED. (Emphasis supplied)

The clear and simple language of the clarificatory en banc Resolution requires no further explanation. If the voting of the Court en banc results in
a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed denied. The Courts prior majority action on the main decision stands affirmed.4 This
clarificatory Resolution applies to all cases heard by the Court en banc, which includes not only cases involving the constitutionality of a law, but
also, as expressly stated in Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution, "all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be
heard en banc."

The 6-6 tie-vote by the Court en banc on the second motion for reconsideration necessarily resulted in the denial of the second motion for
reconsideration. Since the Court was evenly divided, there could be no reversal of the 18 November 2008 Decision, for a tie-vote cannot result in
any court order or directive.5 The judgment stands in full force.6 Undeniably, the 6-6 tie-vote did not overrule the prior majority en
banc Decision of 18 November 2008, as well as the prior majority en banc Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying reconsideration. The tie-vote
on the second motion for reconsideration is not the same as a tie-vote on the main decision where there is no prior decision. Here, the tie-vote
plainly signifies that there is no majority to overturn the prior 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, and thus the second
motion for reconsideration must be denied.

Further, the tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration did not mean that the present cases were left undecided because there remain
the Decision of 18 November 2008 and the Resolution of 31 March 2009 where a majority of the Court en banc concurred in declaring the
unconstitutionality of the sixteen Cityhood Laws. In short, the 18 November 2008 Decision and the 31 March 2009 Resolution, which were both
reached with the concurrence of a majority of the Court en banc, are not reconsidered but stand affirmed.7 These prior majority actions of the
Court en banc can only be overruled by a new majority vote, not a tie-vote because a tie-vote cannot overrule a prior affirmative action.

16
The denial, by a split vote, of the second motion for reconsideration inevitably rendered the 18 November 2008 Decision final. In fact, in its
Resolution of 28 April 2009, denying the second motion for reconsideration, the Court en banc reiterated that no further pleadings shall be
entertained and stated that entry of judgment be made in due course.1wphi1

The dissenting opinion stated that "a deadlocked vote of six is not a majority and a non-majority does not constitute a rule with precedential
value."8

Indeed, a tie-vote is a non-majority a non-majority which cannot overrule a prior affirmative action, that is the 18 November 2008 Decision
striking down the Cityhood Laws. In short, the 18 November 2008 Decision stands affirmed. And assuming a non-majority lacks any precedential
value, the 18 November 2008 Decision, which was unreversed as a result of the tie-vote on the respondents second motion for reconsideration,
nevertheless remains binding on the parties.9

Conclusion

Section 10, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that "no x x x city shall be created x x x except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code." This provision can only be interpreted in one way, that is, all the criteria for the creation of cities
must be embodied exclusively in the Local Government Code. In this case, the Cityhood Laws, which are unmistakably laws other than the Local
Government Code, provided an exemption from the increased income requirement for the creation of cities under Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Clearly, the Cityhood Laws contravene the letter and intent of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution.

Adhering to the explicit prohibition in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution does not cripple Congress power to make laws. In fact, Congress is
not prohibited from amending the Local Government Code itself, as what Congress did by enacting RA 9009. Indisputably, the act of amending
laws comprises an integral part of the Legislatures law-making power. The unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress
provided an exemption contrary to the express language of the Constitution that "[n]o x x x city x x x shall be created except in accordance with
the criteria established in the local government code." In other words, Congress exceeded and abused its law-making power, rendering the
challenged Cityhood Laws void for being violative of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the motions for reconsideration of the 21 December 2009 Decision and REINSTATEthe 18 November 2008 Decision
declaring UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408,
9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.

We NOTE petitioners motion to annul the Decision of 21 December 2009.

SO ORDERED.

17
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

EN BANC

G.R. No. 176951 April 12, 2011

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treas; City of Calbayog, represented by Mayor
Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Baybay, Province of Leyte; Municipality of Bogo, Province of Cebu; Municipality of Catbalogan,
Province of Western Samar; Municipality of Tandag, Province of Surigao del Sur; Municipality of Borongan, Province of Eastern Samar; and
Municipality of Tayabas, Province of Quezon, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 177499

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treas; City of Calbayog, represented by Mayor
Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Lamitan, Province of Basilan; Municipality of Tabuk, Province of Kalinga; Municipality of
Bayugan, Province of Agusan del Sur; Municipality of Batac, Province of Ilocos Norte; Municipality of Mati, Province of Davao Oriental; and
Municipality of Guihulngan, Province of Negros Oriental, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 178056

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Treas; City of Calbayog, represented by Mayor
Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Treas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; Municipality of Cabadbaran, Province of Agusan del Norte; Municipality of Carcar, Province of Cebu;
Municipality of El Salvador, Province of Misamis Oriental; Municipality of Naga, Cebu; and Department of Budget and
Management, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

We consider and resolve the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners vis--vis the Resolution promulgated on February
15, 2011.

To recall, the Resolution promulgated on February 15, 2011 granted the Motion for Reconsideration of the respondents presented against the
Resolution dated August 24, 2010, reversed the Resolution dated August 24, 2010, and declared the 16 Cityhood Laws Republic Acts Nos.
9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491 constitutional.

Now, the petitioners anchor their Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration upon the primordial ground that the Court could no longer modify,
alter, or amend its judgment declaring the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional due to such judgment having long become final and executory. They
submit that the Cityhood Laws violated Section 6 and Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as the Equal Protection Clause.

The petitioners specifically ascribe to the Court the following errors in its promulgation of the assailed February 15, 2011 Resolution, to wit:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO PROMULGATE THE RESOLUTION OF 15 FEBRUARY 2011 BECAUSE THERE IS NO
LONGER ANY ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY TO SETTLE.

II. THE RESOLUTION CONTRAVENES THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND RELEVANT SUPREME COURT ISSUANCES.

III. THE RESOLUTION UNDERMINES THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN ITS DISREGARD OF THE PRINCIPLES OF RES JUDICATA AND THE DOCTRINE
OF IMMUTABILITY OF FINAL JUDGMENTS.

IV. THE RESOLUTION ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE SIXTEEN (16) CITYHOOD BILLS DO NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE X, SECTIONS 6 AND 10
OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.

V. THE SIXTEEN (16) CITYHOOD LAWS VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RIGHT OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS TO A JUST SHARE IN THE NATIONAL TAXES.

Ruling

Upon thorough consideration, we deny the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration for its lack of merit.

18
 I. Procedural Issues

With respect to the first, second, and third assignments of errors, supra, it appears that the petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Court in
promulgating the February 15, 2011 Resolution, claiming that the decision herein had long become final and executory. They state that the Court
thereby violated rules of procedure, and the principles of res judicata and immutability of final judgments.

The petitioners posit that the controversy on the Cityhood Laws ended with the April 28, 2009 Resolution denying the respondents second
motion for reconsideration vis--vis the November 18, 2008 Decision for being a prohibited pleading, and in view of the issuance of the entry of
judgment on May 21, 2009.

The Court disagrees with the petitioners.

In the April 28, 2009 Resolution, the Court ruled:

By a vote of 6-6, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 31 March 2009 is DENIED for lack of merit. The motion is denied since there
is no majority that voted to overturn the Resolution of 31 March 2009.

The Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of 18 November 2008 is DENIED for being a prohibited pleading, and the Motion for Leave
to Admit Attached Petition in Intervention dated 20 April 2009 and the Petition in Intervention dated 20 April 2009 filed by counsel for Ludivina T.
Mas, et al. are also DENIED in view of the denial of the second motion for reconsideration. No further pleadings shall be entertained. Let entry of
judgment be made in due course.

Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. wrote a Dissenting Opinion, joined by Justices Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Renato C. Corona, Minita Chico-Nazario,
Teresita Leonardo-De Castro, and Lucas P. Bersamin. Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno and Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura took no part. Justice
Leonardo A. Quisumbing is on leave.1

Within 15 days from receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution, the respondents filed a Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 By Declaring
Instead That Respondents "Motion for Reconsideration Of the Resolution Of March 31, 2009" And "Motion For Leave To File, And To Admit
Attached Second Motion For Reconsideration Of The Decision Dated November 18, 2008 Remain Unresolved And To Conduct Further
Proceedings Thereon, arguing therein that a determination of the issue of constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood Laws upon a motion for
reconsideration by an equally divided vote was not binding on the Court as a valid precedent, citing the separate opinion of then Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno in Lambino v. Commission on Elections.2

Thus, in its June 2, 2009 Resolution, the Court issued the following clarification of the April 28, 2009 Resolution, viz:

As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides that: "No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained." Thus, a decision
becomes final and executory after 15 days from receipt of the denial of the first motion for reconsideration.

However, when a motion for leave to file and admit a second motion for reconsideration is granted by the Court, the Court therefore allows the
filing of the second motion for reconsideration. In such a case, the second motion for reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading.

In the present case, the Court voted on the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent cities. In effect, the Court allowed the filing of
the second motion for reconsideration. Thus, the second motion for reconsideration was no longer a prohibited pleading. However, for lack of
the required number of votes to overturn the 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, the Court denied the second motion
for reconsideration in its 28 April 2009 Resolution.3

As the result of the aforecited clarification, the Court resolved to expunge from the records several pleadings and documents, including
respondents Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc.

The respondents thus filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009, asseverating that their Motion To Amend
Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc. was not another motion for reconsideration of the November 18, 2008 Decision, because it assailed the April 28,
2009 Resolution with respect to the tie-vote on the respondents Second Motion For Reconsideration. They pointed out that the Motion To
Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc. was filed on May 14, 2009, which was within the 15-day period from their receipt of the April 28, 2009
Resolution; thus, the entry of judgment had been prematurely made. They reiterated their arguments with respect to a tie-vote upon an issue of
constitutionality.

In the September 29, 2009 Resolution,4 the Court required the petitioners to comment on the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of
June 2, 2009 within 10 days from receipt.

As directed, the petitioners filed their Comment Ad Cautelam With Motion to Expunge.

The respondents filed their Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached "Reply to Petitioners Comment Ad Cautelam With Motion to
Expunge", together with the Reply.

On November 17, 2009, the Court resolved to note the petitioners Comment Ad Cautelam With Motion to Expunge, to grant the respondents
Motion for Leave to File and Admit Reply to Petitioners Comment Ad Cautelam with Motion to Expunge, and to note the respondents Reply to
Petitioners Comment Ad Cautelam with Motion to Expunge.

On December 21, 2009, the Court, resolving the Motion To Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc. and voting anew on the Second Motion For
Reconsideration in order to reach a concurrence of a majority, promulgated its Decision granting the motion and declaring the Cityhood Laws as
constitutional,5 disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, respondent LGUs Motion for Reconsideration dated June 2, 2009, their "Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009 by
Declaring Instead that Respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009 and Motion for Leave to File and to Admit
19
Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision Dated November 18, 2008 Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further
Proceedings," dated May 14, 2009, and their second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated November 18, 2008 are GRANTED. The
June 2, 2009, the March 31, 2009, and April 31, 2009 Resolutions are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The entry of judgment made on May 21, 2009
must accordingly be RECALLED.

The instant consolidated petitions and petitions-in-intervention are DISMISSED. The cityhood laws, namely Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391,
9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491 are declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.

SO ORDERED.

On January 5, 2010, the petitioners filed an Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration against the December 21, 2009 Decision. 6 On the same date,
the petitioners also filed a Motion to Annul Decision of 21 December 2009.7

On January 12, 2010, the Court directed the respondents to comment on the motions of the petitioners.8

On February 4, 2010, petitioner-intervenors City of Santiago, City of Legazpi, and City of Iriga filed their separate Manifestations with
Supplemental Ad Cautelam Motions for Reconsideration.9 Similar manifestations with supplemental motions for reconsideration were filed by
other petitioner-intervenors, specifically: City of Cadiz on February 15, 2010;10 City of Batangas on February 17, 2010;11 and City of Oroquieta on
February 24, 2010.12The Court required the adverse parties to comment on the motions.13 As directed, the respondents complied.

On August 24, 2010, the Court issued its Resolution reinstating the November 18, 2008 Decision.14

On September 14, 2010, the respondents timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the "Resolution" Dated August 24, 2010. 15 They followed
this by filing on September 20, 2010 a Motion to Set "Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated August 24, 2010" for Hearing.16 On
November 19, 2010, the petitioners sent in their Opposition [To the "Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution dated August 24, 2010"].17 On
November 30, 2010,18 the Court noted, among others, the petitioners Opposition.

On January 18, 2011,19 the Court denied the respondents Motion to Set "Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated August 24, 2010"
for Hearing.

Thereafter, on February 15, 2011, the Court issued the Resolution being now challenged.

It can be gleaned from the foregoing that, as the June 2, 2009 Resolution clarified, the respondents Second Motion For Reconsideration was not
a prohibited pleading in view of the Courts voting and acting on it having the effect of allowing the Second Motion For Reconsideration; and that
when the respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 questioning the expunging of their Motion To
Amend Resolution Of April 28, 2009 etc. (which had been filed within the 15-day period from receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution), the Court
opted to act on the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 by directing the adverse parties through its September 29, 2009
Resolution to comment. The same permitting effect occurred when the Court, by its November 17, 2009 Resolution, granted the respondents
Motion for Leave to File and Admit Reply to Petitioners Comment Ad Cautelam with Motion to Expunge, and noted the attached Reply.

Moreover, by issuing the Resolutions dated September 29, 2009 and November 17, 2009, the Court: (a) rendered ineffective the tie-vote under
the Resolution of April 28, 2009 and the ensuing denial of the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009 for lack of a
majority to overturn; (b), re-opened the Decision of November 18, 2008 for a second look under reconsideration; and (c) lifted the directive that
no further pleadings would be entertained. The Court in fact entertained and acted on the respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of June 2, 2009. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to deliberate anew on the respondents Second Motion for Reconsideration and
ended up with the promulgation of the December 21, 2009 Decision (declaring the Cityhood Laws valid and constitutional).

It is also inaccurate for the petitioners to insist that the December 21, 2009 Decision overturned the November 18, 2008 Decision on the basis of
the mere Reflections of the Members of the Court. To be sure, the Reflections were the legal opinions of the Members and formed part of the
deliberations of the Court. The reference in the December 21, 2009 Decision to the Reflections pointed out that there was still a pending incident
after the April 28, 2009 Resolution that had been timely filed within 15 days from its receipt, 20 pursuant to Section 10, Rule 51,21 in relation to
Section 1, Rule 52,22 of the Rules of Court. Again, the Court did act and deliberate upon this pending incident, leading to the issuance of the
December 21, 2009 Decision (declaring the Cityhood Laws free from constitutional infirmity). It was thereafter that the Court rendered its August
24, 2010 Resolution (reinstating the November 18, 2008 Decision), to correct which the respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the
"Resolution" Dated August 24, 2010 was filed. And, finally, the Court issued its February 15, 2011 Resolution, reversing and setting aside the
August 24, 2010 Resolution.

It is worth repeating that the actions taken herein were made by the Court en banc strictly in accordance with the Rules of Court and its internal
procedures. There has been no irregularity attending or tainting the proceedings.

It also relevant to state that the Court has frequently disencumbered itself under extraordinary circumstances from the shackles of technicality in
order to render just and equitable relief.23

On whether the principle of immutability of judgments and bar by res judicata apply herein, suffice it to state that the succession of the events
recounted herein indicates that the controversy about the 16 Cityhood Laws has not yet been resolved with finality. As such, the operation of the
principle of immutability of judgments did not yet come into play. For the same reason is an adherence to the doctrine of res judicata not yet
warranted, especially considering that the precedential ruling for this case needed to be revisited and set with certainty and finality.

II. Substantive Issues

The petitioners reiterate their position that the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6 and Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution, the Equal
Protection Clause, and the right of local governments to a just share in the national taxes.

The Court differs.

20
Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. The
apprehensions of the then Senate President with respect to the considerable disparity between the income requirement of P20 million under the
Local Government Code (LGC) prior to its amendment, and the P100 million under the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 9009 were definitively
articulated in his interpellation of Senator Pimentel during the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157. The then Senate President was cognizant of
the fact that there were municipalities that then had pending conversion bills

during the 11th Congress prior to the adoption of Senate Bill No. 2157 as R.A. No. 9009,24 including the municipalities covered by the Cityhood
Laws. It is worthy of mention that the pertinent deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157 occurred on October 5, 2000 while the 11th Congress was in
session, and the conversion bills were then pending in the Senate. Thus, the responses of Senator Pimentel made it obvious that R.A. No. 9009
would not apply to the conversion bills then pending deliberation in the Senate during the 11th Congress.

R.A. No. 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear legislative intent to exempt the
municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th

Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in
Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on Joint Resolution No.
29. Even so, the House of Representatives readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as

Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress,25 and forwarded Joint Resolution No. 1 to the Senate for approval. Again, the Senate failed to
approve Joint Resolution No. 1.

At this juncture, it is worthwhile to consider the manifestation of Senator Pimentel with respect to Joint Resolution No. 1, to wit:

MANIFESTATION OF SENATOR PIMENTEL

House Joint Resolution No. 1 seeks to exempt certain municipalities seeking conversion into cities from the requirement that they must have at
least P100 million in income of locally generated revenue, exclusive of the internal revenue share that they received from the central government
as required under Republic Act No. 9009.

The procedure followed by the House is questionable, to say the least. The House wants the Senate to do away with the income requirement of
P100 million so that, en masse, the municipalities they want exempted could now file bills specifically converting them into cities. The reason they
want the Senate to do it first is that Cong. Dodo Macias, chair of the House Committee on Local Governments, I am told, will not entertain any bill
for the conversion of municipalities into cities unless the issue of income requirement is first hurdled. The House leadership therefore wants to
shift the burden of exempting certain municipalities from the income requirement to the Senate rather than do it itself.

That is most unusual because, in effect, the House wants the Senate to pass a blanket resolution that would qualify the municipalities concerned
for conversion into cities on the matter of income alone. Then, at a later date, the House would pass specific bills converting the municipalities
into cities. However, income is not only the requirement for municipalities to become cities. There are also the requirements on population and
land area.

In effect, the House wants the Senate to tackle the qualification of the municipalities they want converted into cities piecemeal and separately,
first is the income under the joint resolution, then the other requirements when the bills are file to convert specific municipalities into cities. To
repeat, this is a most unusual manner of creating cities.

My respectful suggestion is for the Senate to request the House to do what they want to do regarding the applications of certain municipalities to
become cities pursuant to the requirements of the Local Government Code. If the House wants to exempt certain municipalities from the
requirements of the Local Government Code to become cities, by all means, let them do their thing. Specifically, they should act on specific bills
to create cities and cite the reasons why the municipalities concerned are qualified to become cities. Only after the House shall have completed
what they are expected to do under the law would it be proper for the Senate to act on specific bills creating cities.

In other words, the House should be requested to finish everything that needs to be done in the matter of converting municipalities into cities
and not do it piecemeal as they are now trying to do under the joint resolution.

In my long years in the Senate, this is the first time that a resort to this subterfuge is being undertaken to favor the creation of certain cities. I am
not saying that they are not qualified. All I am saying is, if the House wants to pass and create cities out of certain municipalities, by all means let
them do that. But they should do it following the requirements of the Local Government Code and, if they want to make certain exceptions, they
can also do that too. But they should not use the Senate as a ploy to get things done which they themselves should do.

Incidentally, I have recommended this mode of action verbally to some leaders of the House. Had they followed the recommendation, for all I
know, the municipalities they had envisioned to be covered by House Joint Resolution No. 1 would, by now if not all, at least some have been
converted into cities. House Joint Resolution No. 1, the House, in effect, caused the delay in the approval in the applications for cityhood of the
municipalities concerned.

Lastly, I do not have an amendment to House Joint Resolution No. 1. What I am suggesting is for the Senate to request the House to follow the
procedure outlined in the Local Government Code which has been respected all through the years. By doing so, we uphold the rule of law

and minimize the possibilities of power play in the approval of bills converting municipalities into cities. 26

Thereafter, the conversion bills of the respondents were individually filed in the House of Representatives, and were all unanimously and

favorably voted upon by the Members of the House of Representatives.27 The bills, when forwarded to the Senate, were likewise unanimously
approved by the Senate.28 The acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws
are but the express articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009.
Thereby, R.A. No. 9009, and, by necessity, the LGC, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions being embodied in the
exemption clauses.

21
The petitioners further contend that the new income requirement of P100 million from locally generated sources is not arbitrary because it is not
difficult to comply with; that there are several municipalities that have already complied with the requirement and have, in fact, been converted
into cities, such as Sta. Rosa in Laguna (R.A. No 9264), Navotas (R.A. No. 9387) and San Juan (R.A. No. 9388) in Metro Manila, Dasmarias in Cavite
(R.A. No. 9723), and Bian in Laguna (R.A. No. 9740); and that several other municipalities have supposedly reached the income of P100 million
from locally generated sources, such as Bauan in Batangas, Mabalacat in Pampanga, and Bacoor in Cavite.

The contention of the petitioners does not persuade.

As indicated in the Resolution of February 15, 2011, fifty-nine (59) existing cities had failed as of 2006 to post an average annual income of P100
million based on the figures contained in the certification dated December 5, 2008 by the Bureau of Local Government. The large number of
existing cities, virtually 50% of them, still unable to comply with the P100 million threshold income five years after R.A. No. 9009 took effect
renders it fallacious and probably unwarranted for the petitioners to claim that the P100 million income requirement is not difficult to comply
with.

In this regard, the deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2157 may prove enlightening, thus:

Senator Osmea III. And could the gentleman help clarify why a municipality would want to be converted into a city?
Senator Pimentel. There is only one reason, Mr. President, and it is not hidden. It is the fact that once converted into a city, the municipality will
have roughly more than three times the share that it would be receiving over the internal revenue allotment than it would
have if it were to remain a municipality. So more or less three times or more.
Senator Osmea III. Is it the additional funding that they will be able to enjoy from a larger share from the internal revenue allocations?
Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Osmea III. Now, could the gentleman clarify, Mr. President, why in the original Republic Act No. 7160, known as the Local Government
Code of 1991, such a wide gap was made between a municipalitywhat a municipality would earnand a city? Because
essentially, to a persons mind, even with this new requirement, if approved by Congress, if a municipality is earning P100
million and has a population of more than 150,000 inhabitants but has less than 100 square kilometers, it would not qualify as
a city.
Senator Pimentel. Yes.
Senator Osmea III. Now would that not be quite arbitrary on the part of the municipality?
Senator Pimentel. In fact, Mr. President, the House version restores the "or". So, this is a matter that we can very well take up as a policy issue.
The chair of the committee does not say that we should, as we know, not listen to arguments for the restoration of the word "or"
in the population or territorial requirement.
Senator Osmea III. Mr. President, my point is that, I agree with the gentlemans "and", but perhaps we should bring down the area. There are
certainly very crowded places in this country that are less than 10,000 hectares100 square kilometers is 10,000 hectares. There
might only be 9,000 hectares or 8,000 hectares. And it would be unfair if these municipalities already earning P100,000,000 in
locally generated funds and have a population of over 150,000 would not be qualified because of the simple fact that the physical
area does not cover 10,000 hectares.
Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, in fact, in Metro Manila there are any number of municipalities. San Juan is a specific example which, if we apply
the present requirements, would not qualify: 100 square kilometers and a population of not less than 150,000.But my reply to
that, Mr. President, is that they do not have to become a city?
Senator Osmea III. Because of the income.
Senator Pimentel. But they are already earning a lot, as the gentleman said. Otherwise, the danger here, if we become lax in the requirements, is
the metropolis-located local governments would have more priority in terms of funding because they would have more
qualifications to become a city compared to far-flung areas in Mindanao or in the Cordilleras, or whatever. Therefore, I think
we should not probably ease up on the requirements. Maybe we can restore the word "or" so that if they do not have the 100
square kilometers of territory, then if they qualify in terms of population and income, that would be all right, Mr. President.
Senator Osmea III. Mr. President, I will not belabor the point at this time. I know that the distinguished gentleman is considering several
amendments to the Local Government Code. Perhaps this is something that could be further refined at a later time, with his
permission. So I would like to thank the gentleman for his graciousness in answering our questions.
Senator Pimentel. I also thank the gentleman, Mr. President.29

The Court takes note of the fact that the municipalities cited by the petitioners as having generated the threshold income of P100 million from
local sources, including those already converted into cities, are either in Metro Manila or in provinces close to Metro Manila. In comparison, the
municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws are spread out in the different provinces of the Philippines, including the Cordillera and Mindanao
regions, and are considerably very distant from Metro Manila. This reality underscores the danger the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 sought to
prevent, i.e., that "the metropolis-located local governments would have more priority in terms of funding because they would have more
qualifications to become a city compared to the far-flung areas in Mindanao or in the Cordilleras, or whatever," actually resulting from the abrupt
increase in the income requirement. Verily, this result is antithetical to what the Constitution and LGC have nobly envisioned in favor of
countryside development and national growth. Besides, this result should be arrested early, to avoid the unwanted divisive effect on the entire
country due to the local government units closer to the National Capital Region being afforded easier access to the bigger share in the national
coffers than other local government units.
There should also be no question that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws belong to a class of their own. They have proven
themselves viable and capable to become component cities of their respective provinces. They are and have been centers of trade and
commerce, points of convergence of transportation, rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources, and flourishing tourism
spots. In his speech delivered on the floor of the Senate to sponsor House Joint Resolution No. 1, Senator Lim recognized such unique traits,30viz:

It must be noted that except for Tandag and Lamitan, which are both second-class municipalities in terms of income, all the rest are categorized
by the Department of Finance as first-class municipalities with gross income of at least P70 million as per Commission of Audit Report for 2005.
Moreover, Tandag and Lamitan, together with Borongan, Catbalogan, and Tabuk, are all provincial capitals.

The more recent income figures of the 12 municipalities, which would have increased further by this time, indicate their readiness to take on the
responsibilities of cityhood.

Moreover, the municipalities under consideration are leading localities in their respective provinces. Borongan, Catbalogan, Tandag, Batac and
Tabuk are ranked number one in terms of income among all the municipalities in their respective provinces; Baybay and Bayugan are number
two; Bogo and Lamitan are number three; Carcar, number four; and Tayabas, number seven. Not only are they pacesetters in their respective
provinces, they are also among the frontrunners in their regions Baybay, Bayugan and Tabuk are number two income-earners in Regions VIII,
XIII, and CAR, respectively; Catbalogan and Batac are number three in Regions VIII and I, respectively; Bogo, number five in Region VII; Borongan
and Carcar are both number six in Regions VIII and VII, respectively. This simply shows that these municipalities are viable.

22
Petitioner League of Cities argues that there exists no issue with respect to the cityhood of its member cities, considering that they became cities
in full compliance with the criteria for conversion at the time of their creation.

The Court considers the argument too sweeping. What we pointed out was that the previous income requirement of P20 million was definitely
not insufficient to provide the essential government facilities, services, and special functions vis--vis the population of a component city. We also
stressed that the increased income requirement of P100 million was not the only conclusive indicator for any municipality to survive and remain
viable as a component city. These observations were unerringly reflected in the respective incomes of the fifty-nine (59) members of the League
of Cities that have still failed, remarkably enough, to be compliant with the new requirement of the P100 million threshold income five years after
R.A. No. 9009 became law.

Undoubtedly, the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million from local sources under R.A. No. 9009 was arbitrary. When the sponsor
of the law chose the specific figure of P100 million, no research or empirical data buttressed the figure. Nor was there proof that the proposal
took into account the after-effects that were likely to arise. As already mentioned, even the danger the passage of R.A. No. 9009 sought to
prevent might soon become a reality. While the Constitution mandates that the creation of local government units must comply with the criteria
laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC despite such
amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside
development, and the concomitant national growth.

Moreover, if we were now to adopt the stringent interpretation of the Constitution the petitioners are espousing, we may have to apply the same
restrictive yardstick against the recently converted cities cited by the petitioners, and find two of them whose conversion laws have also to be
struck down for being unconstitutional. The two laws are R.A. No. 938731 and R.A. No. 9388,32 respectively converting the municipalities of San
Juan and Navotas into highly urbanized cities. A cursory reading of the laws indicates that there is no indication of compliance with the
requirements imposed by the LGC, for, although the two local government units concerned presumably complied with the income requirement
of P50 million under Section 452 of the LGC and the income requirement of P100 million under the amended Section 450 of the LGC, they
obviously did not meet the requirements set forth under Section 453 of the LGC, to wit:

Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status.It shall be the duty of the President to declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30)
days after it shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and
ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein.

Indeed, R.A. No. 9387 and R.A. No. 9388 evidently show that the President had not classified San Juan and Navotas as highly urbanized cities
upon proper application and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein. A further perusal of R.A. No. 9387 reveals that San Juan did
not qualify as a highly urbanized city because it had a population of only 125,558, contravening the required minimum population of 200,000
under Section 452 of the LGC. Such non-qualification as a component city was conceded even by Senator Pimentel during the deliberations on
Senate Bill No. 2157.

The petitioners contention that the Cityhood Laws violated their right to a just share in the national taxes is not acceptable.

In this regard, it suffices to state that the share of local government units is a matter of percentage under Section 285 of the LGC, not a specific
amount. Specifically, the share of the cities is 23%, determined on the basis of population (50%), land area (25%), and equal sharing (25%). This
share is also dependent on the number of existing cities, such that when the number of cities increases, then more will divide and share the
allocation for cities. However, we have to note that the allocation by the National Government is not a constant, and can either increase or
decrease. With every newly converted city becoming entitled to share the allocation for cities, the percentage of internal revenue allotment (IRA)
entitlement of each city will decrease, although the actual amount received may be more than that received in the preceding year. That is a
necessary consequence of Section 285 and Section 286 of the LGC.

As elaborated here and in the assailed February 15, 2011 Resolution, the Cityhood Laws were not violative of the Constitution and the LGC. The
respondents are thus also entitled to their just share in the IRA allocation for cities. They have demonstrated their viability as component cities of
their respective provinces and are developing continuously, albeit slowly, because they had previously to share the IRA with about 1,500
municipalities. With their conversion into component cities, they will have to share with only around 120 cities.

Local government units do not subsist only on locally generated income, but also depend on the IRA to support their development. They can spur
their own developments and thereby realize their great potential of encouraging trade and commerce in the far-flung regions of the country. Yet
their potential will effectively be stunted if those already earning more will still receive a bigger share from the national coffers, and if commercial
activity will be more or less concentrated only in and near Metro Manila.

III.
Conclusion

We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending during the 11th
Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9009. Congress undeniably
gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the
clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress.

WHEREFORE, the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011) is denied with finality.

SO ORDERED.

23
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 162224 June 7, 2007

2nd LT. SALVADOR PARREO represented by his daughter Myrna P. Caintic, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT and CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari1 assailing the 9 January 2003 Decision2 and 13 January 2004 Resolution3 of the Commission on Audit
(COA).

The Antecedent Facts

Salvador Parreo (petitioner) served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for 32 years. On 5 January 1982, petitioner retired from the
Philippine Constabulary with the rank of 2nd Lieutenant. Petitioner availed, and received payment, of a lump sum pension equivalent to three
years pay. In 1985, petitioner started receiving his monthly pension amounting to P13,680.

Petitioner migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American citizen. In January 2001, the AFP stopped petitioners monthly pension in
accordance with Section 27 of Presidential Decree No. 16384 (PD 1638), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1650.5 Section 27 of PD 1638, as
amended, provides that a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated
upon loss of Filipino citizenship. Petitioner requested for reconsideration but the Judge Advocate General of the AFP denied the request.

Petitioner filed a claim before the COA for the continuance of his monthly pension.

The Ruling of the Commission on Audit

In its 9 January 2003 Decision, the COA denied petitioners claim for lack of jurisdiction. The COA ruled:

It becomes immediately noticeable that the resolution of the issue at hand hinges upon the validity of Section 27 of P.D. No. 1638, as amended.
Pursuant to the mandate of the Constitution, whenever a dispute involves the validity of laws, "the courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have
the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where
the statute violates the Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act as unconstitutional and void." (Tatad
vs. Secretary of Department of Energy, 281 SCRA 330) That being so, prudence dictates that this Commission defer to the authority and
jurisdiction of the judiciary to rule in the first instance upon the constitutionality of the provision in question.

Premises considered, the request is denied for lack of jurisdiction to adjudicate the same. Claimant is advised to file his claim with the proper
court of original jurisdiction.6

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner alleged that the COA has the power and authority to incidentally rule on the
constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. Petitioner alleged that a direct recourse to the court would be dismissed for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. Petitioner further alleged that since his monthly pension involves government funds, the reason for the
termination of the pension is subject to COAs authority and jurisdiction.

In its 13 January 2004 Resolution, the COA denied the motion. The COA ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
apply if the administrative body has, in the first place, no jurisdiction over the case. The COA further ruled that even if it assumed jurisdiction over
the claim, petitioners entitlement to the retirement benefits he was previously receiving must necessarily cease upon the loss of his Filipino
citizenship in accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

1. Whether Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, is constitutional;

2. Whether the COA has jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended; and

3. Whether PD 1638, as amended, has retroactive or prospective effect.7

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

24
 Jurisdiction of the COA

Petitioner filed his money claim before the COA. A money claim is "a demand for payment of a sum of money, reimbursement or compensation
arising from law or contract due from or owing to a government agency."8 Under Commonwealth Act No. 327,9 as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1445,10 money claims against the government shall be filed before the COA.11

Section 2(1), Article IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution prescribes the powers of the COA, as follows:

Sec. 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue
and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit
basis; (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state
colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities
receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which are required by law or the granting institution to
submit such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the
Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It
shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting
papers pertaining thereto.

The jurisdiction of the COA over money claims against the government does not include the power to rule on the constitutionality or validity of
laws. The 1987 Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare unconstitutional a law, treaty, international or executive
agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in this Court and in all Regional Trial Courts. 12 Petitioners money
claim essentially involved the constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. Hence, the COA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing petitioners money claim.

Petitioner submits that the COA has the authority to order the restoration of his pension even without ruling on the constitutionality of Section
27 of PD 1638, as amended. The COA actually ruled on the matter in its 13 January 2004 Resolution, thus:

Furthermore, assuming arguendo that this Commission assumed jurisdiction over the instant case, claimants entitlement to the retirement
benefits he was previously receiving must necessarily be severed or stopped upon the loss of his Filipino citizenship as prescribed in Section 27,
P.D. No. 1638, as amended by P.D. No. 1650.13

The COA effectively denied petitioners claim because of the loss of his Filipino citizenship.

Application of PD 1638, as amended

Petitioner alleges that PD 1638, as amended, should apply prospectively. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agrees with petitioner. The
OSG argues that PD 1638, as amended, should apply only to those who joined the military service after its effectivity, citing Sections 33 and 35,
thus:

Section 33. Nothing in this Decree shall be construed in any manner to reduce whatever retirement and separation pay or gratuity or other
monetary benefits which any person is heretofore receiving or is entitled to receive under the provisions of existing law.

xxxx

Section. 35. Except those necessary to give effect to the provisions of this Decree and to preserve the rights granted to retired or separated
military personnel, all laws, rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

The OSG further argues that retirement laws are liberally construed in favor of the retirees. Article 4 of the Civil Code provides: "Laws shall have
no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." Section 36 of PD 1638, as amended, provides that it shall take effect upon its approval. It
was signed on 10 September 1979. PD 1638, as amended, does not provide for its retroactive application. There is no question that PD 1638, as
amended, applies prospectively.

However, we do not agree with the interpretation of petitioner and the OSG that PD 1638, as amended, should apply only to those who joined
the military after its effectivity. Since PD 1638, as amended, is about the new system of retirement and separation from service of military
personnel, it should apply to those who were in the service at the time of its approval. In fact, Section 2 of PD 1638, as amended, provides that
"th[e] Decree shall apply to all military personnel in the service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines." PD 1638, as amended, was signed on 10
September 1979. Petitioner retired in 1982, long after the approval of PD 1638, as amended. Hence, the provisions of PD 1638, as amended,
apply to petitioner.

Petitioner Has No Vested Right to his

Retirement Benefits

Petitioner alleges that Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, deprives him of his property which the Constitution and statutes vest in him.
Petitioner alleges that his pension, being a property vested by the Constitution, cannot be removed or taken from him just because he became a
naturalized American citizen. Petitioner further alleges that the termination of his monthly pension is a penalty equivalent to deprivation of his
life.

The allegations have no merit. PD 1638, as amended, does not impair any vested right or interest of petitioner. Where the employee retires and
meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to the benefits that is protected by the due process clause.14 At the time of the
approval of PD 1638 and at the time of its amendment, petitioner was still in active service. Hence, petitioners retirement benefits were only
future benefits and did not constitute a vested right. Before a right to retirement benefits or pension vests in an employee, he must have met the
stated conditions of eligibility with respect to the nature of employment, age, and length of service.15 It is only upon retirement that military

25
personnel acquire a vested right to retirement benefits. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate
payment under pre-existing law.16

Further, the retirement benefits of military personnel are purely gratuitous in nature. They are not similar to pension plans where employee
participation is mandatory, hence, the employees have contractual or vested rights in the pension which forms part of the compensation.17

Constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638

Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, provides:

Section 27. Military personnel retired under Sections 4, 5, 10, 11 and 12 shall be carried in the retired list of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
The name of a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon such
loss.

The OSG agrees with petitioner that Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, is unconstitutional. The OSG argues that the obligation imposed on
petitioner to retain his Filipino citizenship as a condition for him to remain in the AFP retired list and receive his retirement benefit is contrary to
public policy and welfare, oppressive, discriminatory, and violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The OSG argues that the
retirement law is in the nature of a contract between the government and its employees. The OSG further argues that Section 27 of PD 1638, as
amended, discriminates against AFP retirees who have changed their nationality.

We do not agree.

The constitutional right to equal protection of the laws is not absolute but is subject to reasonable classification. 18To be reasonable, the
classification (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must
not be limited to existing conditions only; and (d) must apply equally to each member of the class.19

There is compliance with all these conditions. There is a substantial difference between retirees who are citizens of the Philippines and retirees
who lost their Filipino citizenship by naturalization in another country, such as petitioner in the case before us. The constitutional right of the
state to require all citizens to render personal and military service20 necessarily includes not only private citizens but also citizens who have
retired from military service. A retiree who had lost his Filipino citizenship already renounced his allegiance to the state. Thus, he may no longer
be compelled by the state to render compulsory military service when the need arises. Petitioners loss of Filipino citizenship constitutes a
substantial distinction that distinguishes him from other retirees who retain their Filipino citizenship. If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. 21

Republic Act No. 707722 (RA 7077) affirmed the constitutional right of the state to a Citizen Armed Forces. Section 11 of RA 7077 provides that
citizen soldiers or reservists include ex-servicemen and retired officers of the AFP. Hence, even when a retiree is no longer in the active service,
he is still a part of the Citizen Armed Forces. Thus, we do not find the requirement imposed by Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, oppressive,
discriminatory, or contrary to public policy. The state has the right to impose a reasonable condition that is necessary for national defense. To
rule otherwise would be detrimental to the interest of the state.

There was no denial of due process in this case. When petitioner lost his Filipino citizenship, the AFP had no choice but to stop his monthly
pension in accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. Petitioner had the opportunity to contest the termination of his pension when he
requested for reconsideration of the removal of his name from the list of retirees and the termination of his pension. The Judge Advocate General
denied the request pursuant to Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended.

Petitioner argues that he can reacquire his Filipino citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 23 (RA 9225), in which case he will still be considered a
natural-born Filipino. However, petitioner alleges that if he reacquires his Filipino citizenship under RA 9225, he will still not be entitled to his
pension because of its prior termination. This situation is speculative. In the first place, petitioner has not shown that he has any intention of
reacquiring, or has done anything to reacquire, his Filipino citizenship. Secondly, in response to the request for opinion of then AFP Chief of Staff,
General Efren L. Abu, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued DOJ Opinion No. 12, series of 2005, dated 19 January 2005, thus:

[T]he AFP uniformed personnel retirees, having re-acquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 and its IRR, are entitled to pension
and gratuity benefits reckoned from the date they have taken their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. It goes without saying
that these retirees have no right to receive such pension benefits during the time that they have ceased to be Filipinos pursuant to the
aforequoted P.D. No. 1638, as amended, and any payment made to them should be returned to the AFP. x x x. 24

Hence, petitioner has other recourse if he desires to continue receiving his monthly pension. Just recently, in AASJS Member-Hector Gumangan
Calilung v. Simeon Datumanong,25 this Court upheld the constitutionality of RA 9225. If petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship, he will even
recover his natural-born citizenship.26 In Tabasa v. Court of Appeals,27 this Court reiterated that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow
him to recover his natural-born citizenship x x x."

Petitioner will be entitled to receive his monthly pension should he reacquire his Filipino citizenship since he will again be entitled to the benefits
and privileges of Filipino citizenship reckoned from the time of his reacquisition of Filipino citizenship. There is no legal obstacle to the
resumption of his retirement benefits from the time he complies again with the condition of the law, that is, he can receive his retirement
benefits provided he is a Filipino citizen.

We acknowledge the service rendered to the country by petitioner and those similarly situated. However, petitioner failed to overcome the
presumption of constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. Unless the provision is amended or repealed in the future, the AFP has to
apply Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the 9 January 2003 Decision and 13 January 2004 Resolution of the Commission on Audit.

SO ORDERED.

26
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999

PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,

vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA,
NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors.

MARTINEZ, J.:

The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is being
challenged in this petition for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco
Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceedings with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder)
against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties' pleadings and documentary proofs, are as follows:

In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime
syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, where slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by
elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine
National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police officers from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor
Senior Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief
Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal
Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a
summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the
incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and personal allegedly involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a
finding that the said incident was a legitimate police operation. 1

However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified modified the Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended
the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. The recommendation was
approved by the Ombudsman except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.

Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in eleven (11) information for murder 2 before the
Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same informations as
accessories after-in-the-fact.

Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information, 3 the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman's action. 4

After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended informations 5before the Sandiganbayan,
wherein petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and other. One of the accused 6 was
dropped from the case.

On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended
informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No.
7975. 7 They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are
government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The
highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG
27.

Thereafter, in a Resolution 8 dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon
concurring, and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena dissenting, 9 the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the cases
transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused
has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.

On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with the
Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the accused.

While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the
amended informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No. 2299 10 and No. 1094 11(sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Lagman and
Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 844 12 (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in Congress,
defining expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.

These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249 13 by the President of the Philippines on February 5, 1997.

27
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution 14 denying the motion for reconsideration of the Special
Prosecutor, ruling that it "stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996."

On the same day 15 the Sandiganbayan issued and ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 Resolution, the pertinent portion of which reads:

After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it, but before Justice de Leon. Jr. rendered his
concurring and dissenting opinion, the legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the President of the Philippines approved it
on February 5, 1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor
of granting, as they are now granting, the Special Prosecutor's motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done
so in his concurring and dissenting opinion.

xxx xxx xxx

Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo
M. Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases in fact, no order of arrest has been
issued this court has competence to take cognizance of these cases.

To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 of 2, the court admitted the Amended Informations
in these cases by the unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring not dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and decide
the cases 16 (Empahasis supplied)

Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 thereof which provides that the said law "shall
apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as to the approval hereof." Petitioner argues that:

a) The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely
suit the situation in which petitioner's cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereof to it, thereby
violating his right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the
Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases
to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such resolution to render the issue
therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioner's vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)

b) Retroactive application of the law is plan from the fact that it was again made to suit the peculiar circumstances in which
petitioner's cases were under, namely, that the trial had not yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make certain that
those cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone should try
them, thus making it an ex post facto legislation and a denial of the right of petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos.
23047-23057 to procedural due process.

c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid "innocuous" provisions in Sections 4 and 7 which actually
expands rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title one-subject requirement
for the passage of statutes under Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution. 17

For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that "while Republic Act No. 8249 innocuously appears to have merely
expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of Section 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the character of a class
legislation and an ex-post facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case pending before the
Sandiganbayan. 18 They further argued that if their case is tried before the Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process would be violated
as they could no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the
Supreme Court.

Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General filed separate pleadings in support of the constitutionality of the challenged
provisions of the law in question and praying that both the petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.

This Court then issued a Resolution 19 requiring the parties to file simultaneously within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from notice
thereof additional memoranda on the question of whether the subject amended informations filed a Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently
allege the commission by the accused therein of the crime charged within the meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to bring the
said cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the Philippines, filed the required supplemental memorandum
within the nonextendible reglementary period.

The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. 20 The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those
who challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in the present case.

The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over
criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and
employees including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined
by law.

The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following provisions in Article XI, Section 4:

Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as
now or hereafter may be provided by law.

28
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486 21 created the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws on the
Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were enacted: P.D. No. 1606, 22 Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 123, 23 P.D. No. 1860, 24 P.D. No.
1861, 25 R.A. No. 7975, 26 and R.A. No. 8249. 27 Under the latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the following cases:

Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic
Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Titile VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade
"27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) Officers of the Philippines National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and
those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher.

(f) City of provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations,

state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as-Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and connection with Executive Orders Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in
the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be
vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as
the case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as privided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial
courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.

The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction
and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed
under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be
exclusive of the Supreme Court.

The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has
promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to
appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the
People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A, issued in 1986.

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employee,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public
officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.

29
 xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:

Sec. 7. Transitory provision This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the
approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied)

The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:

Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended) is hereby further amended to read as
follows:

Sec 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic
Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the pricipal
accused are afficials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade
"27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineer, and other provincial department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations,

state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in
relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A.

In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade "27" or higher, as
presribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent,
exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court,
and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appelas from the final judgment, resolutions or orders of
regular court where all the accused are occupying positions lower than grade "27," or not otherwise covered by the
preceding enumeration.

xxx xxx xxx

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public
officers and employees in the proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them.

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

30
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:

Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred
to the proper courts.

Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word "principal" before the word "accused" appearing in the above-quoted Section 2
(paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word "principal" that the parties herein are at loggerheads over the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan,
has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases since none of the principal accused under the amended information has the rank of
Superintendent 28 or higher. On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the
People before the Supreme Court except in certain cases, 29 contends that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.

A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act),
(b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), 30 (d)
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), 31 or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed
with other crimes; (2) the offender comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee 32 holding any of the positions
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.

Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised
Penal Code, the governing on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to
"other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation to their office. "The phrase" other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of
murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accused's officials functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in pargraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to the
criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the
Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite
to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law 33 because its enactment
was particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete
evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest
officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who
challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. 34

It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on
reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:

(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;

(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class, 35

all of which are present in this case.

The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and reasonables of the questioned
provisions. The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commence and whose
cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had
already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. 36 In the first instance, evidence against
them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witnesses and presented
documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, 37 it can be
reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to privide for a remedy in
the form of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different
category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to "all case involving" certain public
officials and, under the transitory provision in Section 7, to "all cases pending in any court." Contrary to petitioner and intervenors' argument, the
law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the
Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just happened that Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases
where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).

In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is perceived as bad faith on the part of a Senator and
two Justices of the Sandiganbaya 38 for their participation in the passage of the said provisions. In particular, it is stressed that the Senator had
expressed strong sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted on the matter by the
committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further contends that the legislature is biased against him as he claims to have been selected from
among the 67 million other Filipinos as the object of the deletion of the word "principal" in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and
of the transitory provision of R.A. 8249. 39 R.A 8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and by about 250
Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.

On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner during the committe hearings, the same would not
constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their presence and participation in the legislative hearings was deemed
necessary by Congress since the matter before the committee involves the graft court of which one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the
other a member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear
before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 40

31
Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex
post facto law 41 for they are deprived of their right to procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal which they had
allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.

Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull, 42 an ex post facto law is one

(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent when
committed, and punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime
when it was committed.
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves less or different testimony that the law required
at the time of the commission of the offense on order to convict the defendant. 43
(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his
disadvantage.
This Court added two more to the list, namely:
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or
deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;
(g) deprives a person accussed of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled,
such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of a amnesty.

Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. 46 R.A. 8249 is not penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not
penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; 47 or those
that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide dor their punishment. 48 R.A 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural
statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. 49 Not being a penal
law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the
enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention has already been rejected by the court several times 50 considering that the right to
appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of
appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws. 51 R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an
amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within
the prohibition. 52 Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. 53 It has been ruled that adjective statutes may be
made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. 54

In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review questions of law. 55 On the removal of the
intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of review to determine if he presumption of innocence has been convincing
overcome. 56

Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provision of the Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the
wording in the title of the law that it "defines" the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to "expand" its jurisdiction. The
expantion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law
because such is the necessary consequence of the amendments. The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the
title 57 is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks
to achieve. 58 Such rule is liberally interpreted and should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. There is here sufficient
compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and
the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the law are germane to that general subject. 59 The Congress, in employing
the word "define" in the title of the law, acted within its power since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body
to "define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. 60

There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of Section 4 and the retroactive procedural application of the
law as provided in Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, we shall now determine whether under the allegations in the Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan
or Regional Trial Court which has jurisdictions over the multiple murder case against herein petitioner and entervenors.

The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the complaint or information
so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or informations, 61 and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial. 62

As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4
requires that the offense charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction
over it. 63 This jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that the
Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by the public officers and employees, including those in goverment-owned
or controlled corporations, "in relation to their office as may be determined by law." This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new
(1987) Constitution when it declared in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or
hereafter may be provided by law.

The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder was committed in relation to the office of the accussed
PNP officers.

In People vs. Montejo, 64 we held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it (the offense) is "intimately
connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. 65 This intimate relation
between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties "must be alleged in the informations." 66

As to how the offense charged be stated in the informations, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:

Sec. 9 Couse of accusation The acts or omissions complied of as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and
concise language without repetition not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such from as is

32
 sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court
to pronounce proper judgment. (Emphasis supplied)

As early as 1954 we pronounced that "the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts." 67The real nature of the criminal
charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the informations nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. 68

The noble object or written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v. Karelsen: 69

The object of this written accusations was First; To furnish the accused with such a descretion of the charge against him as
will enable him to make his defense and second to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further
prosecution for the same cause and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged so that it may decide whether they are
sufficient in law to support a conviction if one should be had. In order that the requirement may be satisfied, facts must be
stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent these must be set forth in the complaint with
reasonable particularly of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and circumstances. In short, the complaint must
contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied)

It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him as "he is presumed to have no indefendent knowledge
of the facts that constitute the offense." 70

Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended informations for murder against herein petitioner and
intervenors wanting of specific factual averments to show the intimate relation/connection between the offense charged and the discharge of
official function of the offenders.

In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations 71 for murder reads:

AMENDED INFORMATIONS

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III. Office of the Ombudsman hereby accuses CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY
AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE
P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C.
CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO
M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP.
CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP.
CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, SPO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA, and
PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined and penalize under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
committed as follows

That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City Philippines and within the jurisdiction of his
Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO
T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V.
PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO
B. CARINO, all taking advantage of their public and official positions as officers and members of the Philippine National Police
and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to their public office, conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with
treachery evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strenghts did then and there willfully unlawfully and
feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.

That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMOE M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR
SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIAM JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES,
SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3
CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to office as officers and members of the
Philippine National Police are charged herein as accessories after-the-fact for concealing the crime herein above alleged by
among others falsely representing that there where no arrest made during the read conducted by the accused herein at
Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.

CONTRARY LAW.

While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused committed the crime of murder "in relation to thier public
office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the
discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and
investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.

Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and intevenors as among the accessories after-the-facts, the
amended information is vague on this. It is alleged therein that the said accessories concelead "the crime herein-above alleged by, among others,
falsely representing that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque Metro
Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995." The sudden mention of the "arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused"
surprises the reader. There is no indication in the amended information that the victim was one of those arrested by the accused during the
"raid." Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted "at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged in the
immediately preceding paragraph of the amended information, the shooting of the victim by the principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos
Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in the two places far away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is
the allegation in the amended information that the said accessories committed the offense "in relation to office as officers and members of the
(PNP)," we, however, do not see the intimate connection between the offense charged and the accused's official functions, which, as earlier
discussed, is an essential element in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularly as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is
alleged to have committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the amended information
33
that the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion between
of law, not a factual avernment that would show the close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the accused's official
duties.

In People vs. Magallanes, 72 where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:

It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information and not by the
result of evidence after trial.

In (People vs) Montejo (108 Phil 613 (1960), where the amended information alleged

Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol and civilian
commandoes consisting of regular policeman and . . . special policemen appointed and provided by him
with pistols and higher power guns and then established a camp . . . at Tipo-tipo which is under his
command . . . supervision and control where his co-defendants were stationed entertained criminal
complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations as well as assumed the authority to arrest
and detain person without due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that
in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders his
co-defendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag who denied in consequence thereof.

we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the accused because it was perpetreated while
they were in the performance, though improper or irregular of their official functions and would not have been committed
had they not held their office, besides, the accused had no personal motive in committing the crime thus, there was an
intimate connection between the offense and the office of the accused.

Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court below do not indicate that the
accused arrested and investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The informations
merely allege that the accused for the purpose of extracting or extortin the sum of P353,000.00 abducted, kidnapped and
detained the two victims, and failing in their common purpose they shot; and killed the said victims. For the purpose of
determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the
trial.

In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in relation to public office "does not appear in the
information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the
specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the accused's official duties and the
commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official
functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,73 not the Sandiganbayan.

WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original jurisdiction over the said cases.1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.

34
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 148208 December 15, 2004

CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Can a provision of law, initially valid, become subsequently unconstitutional, on the ground that its continuedoperation would violate the equal
protection of the law? We hold that with the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of seven (7) other governmental financial
institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, constitutes invidious
discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).

I. The Case

First the facts.

On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP.

On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a
petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing
the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.

Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:

Section 15. Exercise of Authority - In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or
dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in
accordance with sound principles of management.

A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board's approval, shall be instituted as
an integral component of the Bangko Sentral's human resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make
its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization
Act]. Provided, however, That compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below
shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758. [emphasis supplied]

The thrust of petitioner's challenge is that the above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1)
the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary
Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that this classification is "a
classic case of class legislation," allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP
personnel's position. Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important
of which is to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP.1 Petitioner offers the following sub-set of arguments:

a. the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that the questioned proviso does not appear in the original and amended versions of
House Bill No. 7037, nor in the original version of Senate Bill No. 1235; 2

b. subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-and-file employees to the rate prescribed by the SSL actually defeats the purpose of
the law3 of establishing professionalism and excellence at all levels in the BSP; 4 (emphasis supplied)

c. the assailed proviso was the product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of Senate Bill No. 1235, without showing its
relevance to the objectives of the law, and even admitted by one senator as discriminatory against low-salaried employees of the BSP;5

d. GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from the coverage of the SSL; thus within the class of rank-and-file personnel of
government financial institutions (GFIs), the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon;6 and

e. the assailed proviso has caused the demoralization among the BSP rank-and-file and resulted in the gross disparity between their
compensation and that of the BSP officers'.7

In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.8 Petitioner also stresses: (a) that R.A. No. 7653 has a separability clause, which will allow the declaration of the unconstitutionality
of the proviso in question without affecting the other provisions; and (b) the urgency and propriety of the petition, as some 2,994 BSP rank-and-
file employeeshave been prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the
inequitable proviso has no force and effect of law, respondents' implementation of such amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal

35
nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course except through this petition for prohibition, which this Court should take
cognizance of, considering the transcendental importance of the legal issue involved. 9

Respondent BSP, in its comment,10 contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause and can stand the constitutional test,
provided it is construed in harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as "fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP," and the mandate
of the Monetary Board to "establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound principles of management."

The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary, also defends the validity of the provision. Quite simplistically, he argues that
the classification is based on actual and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated policy of R.A. No. 7653 to establish
professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the national government. 11

II. Issue

Thus, the sole - albeit significant - issue to be resolved in this case is whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs
afoul of the constitutional mandate that "No person shall be. . . denied the equal protection of the laws." 12

III. Ruling

A. UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION,

SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID.

Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges indubitably show that the classification created by the questioned proviso, on its face
and in its operation, bears no constitutional infirmities.

It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or
objects upon which different rules shall operate - so long as the classification is not unreasonable. As held in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers'
Union,13 and reiterated in a long line of cases:14

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It
is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child
should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as
such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution
does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause
does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of
knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A
law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the
mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it
must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to
each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.

In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction, the state is
recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not necessary that the classification be based on scientific or marked differences
of things or in their relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative
classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the
legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear. (citations omitted)

Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification.15 The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies
only to those persons falling within a specified class.16 If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences,
one class may be treated and regulated differently from another.17 The classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must
apply to all those belonging to the same class.18

In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address
the BSP's lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-
and-file. If the end-result did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between the officers and the rank-and-file in terms of salaries and benefits,
the discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense. 19

That the provision was a product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of the Senate Bill does not detract from its validity. As early
as 1947 and reiterated in subsequent cases,20 this Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to refuse invalidating a provision
of law, on the ground that the bill from which it originated contained no such provision and was merely inserted by the bicameral conference
committee of both Houses.

Moreover, it is a fundamental and familiar teaching that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a
statute.21 An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. 22 To justify the nullification of a
law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach.23

B. THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS -

EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES
OF GFIs FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE CONTINUED
APPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISION
A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

36
While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislature's power, we hold that the enactment of subsequent laws exempting all
rank-and-file employees of other GFIs leeched all validity out of the challenged proviso.

1. The concept of relative constitutionality.

The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of
the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another.24

A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances.25 Thus, if a statute in its practical operation
becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light
of changed conditions.26

Demonstrative of this doctrine is Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon,27 where the Court of Appeals of New York declared as
unreasonable and arbitrary a zoning ordinance which placed the plaintiff's property in a residential district, although it was located in the center
of a business area. Later amendments to the ordinance then prohibited the use of the property except for parking and storage of automobiles,
and service station within a parking area. The Court found the ordinance to constitute an invasion of property rights which was contrary to
constitutional due process. It ruled:

While the common council has the unquestioned right to enact zoning laws respecting the use of property in accordance with a well-
considered and comprehensive plan designed to promote public health, safety and general welfare, such power is subject to the
constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably and this is so whenever the zoning ordinance precludes
the use of the property for any purpose for which it is reasonably adapted. By the same token, an ordinance valid when adopted will
nevertheless be stricken down as invalid when, at a later time, its operation under changed conditions proves confiscatory such, for
instance, as when the greater part of its value is destroyed, for which the courts will afford relief in an appropriate case. 28 (citations
omitted, emphasis supplied)

In the Philippine setting, this Court declared the continued enforcement of a valid law as unconstitutional as a consequence of significant
changes in circumstances. Rutter v. Esteban29 upheld the constitutionality of the moratorium law - its enactment and operation being a valid
exercise by the State of its police power30 - but also ruled that the continued enforcement of the otherwise valid law would be unreasonable
and oppressive. It noted the subsequent changes in the country's business, industry and agriculture. Thus, the law was set aside because its
continued operation would be grossly discriminatory and lead to the oppression of the creditors. The landmark ruling states: 31

The question now to be determined is, is the period of eight (8) years which Republic Act No. 342 grants to debtors of a monetary
obligation contracted before the last global war and who is a war sufferer with a claim duly approved by the Philippine War Damage
Commission reasonable under the present circumstances?

It should be noted that Republic Act No. 342 only extends relief to debtors of prewar obligations who suffered from the ravages of the
last war and who filed a claim for their losses with the Philippine War Damage Commission. It is therein provided that said obligation
shall not be due and demandable for a period of eight (8) years from and after settlement of the claim filed by the debtor with said
Commission. The purpose of the law is to afford to prewar debtors an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves by giving them a
reasonable time within which to pay their prewar debts so as to prevent them from being victimized by their creditors. While it is
admitted in said law that since liberation conditions have gradually returned to normal, this is not so with regard to those who have
suffered the ravages of war and so it was therein declared as a policy that as to them the debt moratorium should be continued in
force (Section 1).

But we should not lose sight of the fact that these obligations had been pending since 1945 as a result of the issuance of Executive
Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and at present their enforcement is still inhibited because of the enactment of Republic Act No. 342 and would
continue to be unenforceable during the eight-year period granted to prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate
themselves, which in plain language means that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least twelve (12) years before they
could effect a liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941. his period seems to us unreasonable, if not oppressive. While
the purpose of Congress is plausible, and should be commended, the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who are practically left
at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect collection becomes extremely remote, more so if the credits are unsecured. And the
injustice is more patent when, under the law, the debtor is not even required to pay interest during the operation of the relief, unlike
similar statutes in the United States.

xxx xxx xxx

In the face of the foregoing observations, and consistent with what we believe to be as the only course dictated by justice, fairness and
righteousness, we feel that the only way open to us under the present circumstances is to declare that the continued operation and
enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute
longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared null and void and without effect. (emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

2. Applicability of the equal protection clause.

In the realm of equal protection, the U.S. case of Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ivey32 is illuminating. The Supreme Court of Florida ruled against
the continued application of statutes authorizing the recovery of double damages plus attorney's fees against railroad companies, for animals
killed on unfenced railroad right of way without proof of negligence. Competitive motor carriers, though creating greater hazards, were not
subjected to similar liability because they were not yet in existence when the statutes were enacted. The Court ruled that the statutes became
invalid as denying "equal protection of the law," in view of changed conditions since their enactment.

In another U.S. case, Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Faulkner,33 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky declared unconstitutional a provision of a statute which
imposed a duty upon a railroad company of proving that it was free from negligence in the killing or injury of cattle by its engine or cars. This,
notwithstanding that the constitutionality of the statute, enacted in 1893, had been previously sustained. Ruled the Court:

The constitutionality of such legislation was sustained because it applied to all similar corporations and had for its object the safety of
persons on a train and the protection of property. Of course, there were no automobiles in those days. The subsequent inauguration

37
 and development of transportation by motor vehicles on the public highways by common carriers of freight and passengers created
even greater risks to the safety of occupants of the vehicles and of danger of injury and death of domestic animals. Yet, under the law
the operators of that mode of competitive transportation are not subject to the same extraordinary legal responsibility for killing such
animals on the public roads as are railroad companies for killing them on their private rights of way.

The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Brandeis in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 55 S.Ct. 486, 488, 79
L.Ed. 949, stated, "A statute valid when enacted may become invalid by change in the conditions to which it is applied. The police
power is subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably." A number of prior opinions of
that court are cited in support of the statement. The State of Florida for many years had a statute, F.S.A. 356.01 et seq. imposing
extraordinary and special duties upon railroad companies, among which was that a railroad company was liable for double damages
and an attorney's fee for killing livestock by a train without the owner having to prove any act of negligence on the part of the carrier in
the operation of its train. In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Ivey, it was held that the changed conditions brought about by motor
vehicle transportation rendered the statute unconstitutional since if a common carrier by motor vehicle had killed the same animal, the
owner would have been required to prove negligence in the operation of its equipment. Said the court, "This certainly is not equal
protection of the law."34 (emphasis supplied)

Echoes of these rulings resonate in our case law, viz:

[C]ourts are not confined to the language of the statute under challenge in determining whether that statute has any discriminatory
effect. A statute nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation. Though the law itself be fair on its face
and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as
practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of
equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.35 (emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

[W]e see no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be
fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional
prohibition.. In other words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation. If a law has the effect
of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional. .36 (emphasis supplied, citations omitted

3. Enactment of R.A. Nos. 7907 + 8282 + 8289 + 8291 + 8523 + 8763

+ 9302 = consequential unconstitutionality of challenged proviso.

According to petitioner, the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653 is also violative of the equal protection clause because after it
was enacted, the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS were also amended, but the personnel of the latter GFIs were all exempted from the
coverage of the SSL.37 Thus, within the class of rank-and-file personnel of GFIs, the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon.

Indeed, we take judicial notice that after the new BSP charter was enacted in 1993, Congress also undertook the amendment of the charters of
the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS, and three other GFIs, from 1995 to 2004, viz:

1. R.A. No. 7907 (1995) for Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP);
2. R.A. No. 8282 (1997) for Social Security System (SSS);
3. R.A. No. 8289 (1997) for Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation, (SBGFC);
4. R.A. No. 8291 (1997) for Government Service Insurance System (GSIS);
5. R.A. No. 8523 (1998) for Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP);
6. R.A. No. 8763 (2000) for Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC);38 and
7. R.A. No. 9302 (2004) for Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC).

It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out, that the subsequent charters of the seven other GFIs share this common proviso: a blanket exemption
of all their employees from the coverage of the SSL, expressly or impliedly, as illustrated below:
1. LBP (R.A. No. 7907)

Section 10. Section 90 of [R.A. No. 3844] is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section 90. Personnel. -

xxx xxx xxx

All positions in the Bank shall be governed by a compensation, position classification system and qualification standards approved by
the Bank's Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation
plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subject to periodic review by the
Board no more than once every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on productivity and
profitability. The Bank shall therefore be exempt from existing laws, rules and regulations on compensation, position classification
and qualification standards. It shall however endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under
Republic Act No. 6758. (emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

2. SSS (R.A. No. 8282)

Section 1. [Amending R.A. No. 1161, Section 3(c)]:

xxx xxx xxx

(c)The Commission, upon the recommendation of the SSS President, shall appoint an actuary and such other personnel as may [be]
deemed necessary; fix their reasonable compensation, allowances and other benefits; prescribe their duties and establish such
methods and procedures as may be necessary to insure the efficient, honest and economical administration of the provisions and
38
 purposes of this Act: Provided, however, That the personnel of the SSS below the rank of Vice President shall be appointed by the SSS
President: Provided, further, That the personnel appointed by the SSS President, except those below the rank of assistant manager,
shall be subject to the confirmation by the Commission; Provided further, That the personnel of the SSS shall be selected only from civil
service eligibles and be subject to civil service rules and regulations: Provided, finally, That the SSS shall be exempt from the provisions
of Republic Act No. 6758 and Republic Act No. 7430. (emphasis supplied)

3. SBGFC (R.A. No. 8289)

Section 8. [Amending R.A. No. 6977, Section 11]:

xxx xxx xxx

The Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 6758, and Compensation Circular No. 10, series of 1989 issued by the
Department of Budget and Management, the Board of Directors of SBGFC shall have the authority to extend to the employees and
personnel thereof the allowance and fringe benefits similar to those extended to and currently enjoyed by the employees and
personnel of other government financial institutions. (emphases supplied)

4. GSIS (R.A. No. 8291)

Section 1. [Amending Section 43(d)].

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 43. Powers and Functions of the Board of Trustees. - The Board of Trustees shall have the following powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) upon the recommendation of the President and General Manager, to approve the GSIS' organizational and administrative structures
and staffing pattern, and to establish, fix, review, revise and adjust the appropriate compensation package for the officers and
employees of the GSIS with reasonable allowances, incentives, bonuses, privileges and other benefits as may be necessary or proper
for the effective management, operation and administration of the GSIS, which shall be exempt from Republic Act No. 6758,
otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law and Republic Act No. 7430, otherwise known as the Attrition Law. (emphasis
supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

5. DBP (R.A. No. 8523)

Section 6. [Amending E.O. No. 81, Section 13]:

Section 13. Other Officers and Employees. - The Board of Directors shall provide for an organization and staff of officers and employees
of the Bank and upon recommendation of the President of the Bank, fix their remunerations and other emoluments. All positions in the
Bank shall be governed by the compensation, position classification system and qualification standards approved by the Board of
Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with
the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subject to periodic review by the Board of Directors once every
two (2) years, without prejudice to yearly merit or increases based on the Bank's productivity and profitability. The Bank shall,
therefore, be exempt from existing laws, rules, and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standards.
The Bank shall however, endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758, as amended). (emphasis supplied)

6. HGC (R.A. No. 8763)

Section 9. Powers, Functions and Duties of the Board of Directors. - The Board shall have the following powers, functions and duties:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) To create offices or positions necessary for the efficient management, operation and administration of the Corporation: Provided,
That all positions in the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) shall be governed by a compensation and position classification system and
qualifications standards approved by the Corporation's Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual
duties and responsibilities: Provided, further, That the compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation
plans in the private sector and which shall be exempt from Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization
Law, and from other laws, rules and regulations on salaries and compensations; and to establish a Provident Fund and determine the
Corporation's and the employee's contributions to the Fund; (emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

7. PDIC (R.A. No. 9302)

Section 2. Section 2 of [Republic Act No. 3591, as amended] is hereby further amended to read:

39
 xxx xxx xxx

3.

xxx xxx xxx

A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the Board's approval, shall be instituted as
an integral component of the Corporation's human resource development program: Provided, That all positions in the Corporation
shall be governed by a compensation, position classification system and qualification standards approved by the Board based on a
comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the
prevailing compensation plans of other government financial institutions and shall be subject to review by the Board no more than
once every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on productivity and profitability. The
Corporation shall therefore be exempt from existing laws, rules and regulations on compensation, position classification and
qualification standards. It shall however endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under Republic
Act No. 6758, as amended. (emphases supplied)

Thus, eleven years after the amendment of the BSP charter, the rank-and-file of seven other GFIs were granted the exemption that was
specifically denied to the rank-and-file of the BSP. And as if to add insult to petitioner's injury, even the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) was granted the same blanket exemption from the SSL in 2000!39

The prior view on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its classification between the rank-and-file and the
officers of the BSP, found reasonable because there were substantial distinctions that made real differences between the two classes.

The above-mentioned subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in circumstancethat considerably alter the
reasonability of the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653, thereby exposing the proviso to
more serious scrutiny. This time, the scrutiny relates to the constitutionality of the classification - albeit made indirectly as a consequence of the
passage of eight other laws - between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the seven other GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but
must also apply equally to all members of the class. The proviso may be fair on its face and impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly
discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make unjust distinctions between persons who are without differences. 40

Stated differently, the second level of inquiry deals with the following questions: Given that Congress chose to exempt other GFIs (aside the BSP)
from the coverage of the SSL, can the exclusion of the rank-and-file employees of the BSP stand constitutional scrutiny in the light of the fact that
Congress did not exclude the rank-and-file employees of the other GFIs? Is Congress' power to classify so unbridled as to sanction unequal and
discriminatory treatment, simply because the inequity manifested itself, not instantly through a single overt act, but gradually and progressively,
through seven separate acts of Congress? Is the right to equal protection of the law bounded in time and space that: (a) the right can only be
invoked against a classification made directly and deliberately, as opposed to a discrimination that arises indirectly, or as a consequence of
several other acts; and (b) is the legal analysis confined to determining the validity within the parameters of the statute or ordinance (where the
inclusion or exclusion is articulated), thereby proscribing any evaluation vis--vis the grouping, or the lack thereof, among several similar
enactments made over a period of time?

In this second level of scrutiny, the inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each exemption (granted to the seven
other GFIs) rests "on a policy determination by the legislature." All legislative enactments necessarily rest on a policy determination - even
those that have been declared to contravene the Constitution. Verily, if this could serve as a magic wand to sustain the validity of a statute, then
no due process and equal protection challenges would ever prosper. There is nothing inherently sacrosanct in a policy determination made by
Congress or by the Executive; it cannot run riot and overrun the ramparts of protection of the Constitution.

In fine, the "policy determination" argument may support the inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it
cannot justify the inequality of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and other GFIs' who are similarly situated. It fails to appreciate that what is
at issue in the second level of scrutiny is not the declared policy of each law per se, but the oppressive results of Congress' inconsistent and
unequal policy towards the BSP rank-and-file and those of the seven other GFIs. At bottom, the second challenge to the constitutionality of
Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is premised precisely on the irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its
treatment of persons similarly situated. In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that "no person shall be denied the equal protection of
the laws" includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious discrimination, directly or indirectly. If a law has the effect of
denying the equal protection of the law, or permits such denial, it is unconstitutional. 41

It is against this standard that the disparate treatment of the BSP rank-and-file from the other GFIs cannot stand judicial scrutiny. For as regards
the exemption from the coverage of the SSL, there exist no substantial distinctions so as to differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the other
rank-and-file of the seven GFIs. On the contrary, our legal history shows that GFIs have long been recognized as comprising one distinct class,
separate from other governmental entities.

Before the SSL, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 985 (1976) declared it as a State policy (1) to provide equal pay for substantially equal work, and (2)
to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. P.D. No.
985 was passed to address disparities in pay among similar or comparable positions which had given rise to dissension among government
employees. But even then, GFIs and government-owned and/or controlled corporations (GOCCs) were already identified as a distinct class
among government employees. Thus, Section 2 also provided, "[t]hat notwithstanding a standardized salary system established for all
employees, additional financial incentives may be established by government corporation and financial institutions for their employees to be
supported fully from their corporate funds and for such technical positions as may be approved by the President in critical government
agencies."42

The same favored treatment is made for the GFIs and the GOCCs under the SSL. Section 3(b) provides that one of the principles governing the
Compensation and Position Classification System of the Government is that: "[b]asic compensation for all personnel in the government and
government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions shall generally be comparable with those in the private sector doing
comparable work, and must be in accordance with prevailing laws on minimum wages."

40
Thus, the BSP and all other GFIs and GOCCs were under the unified Compensation and Position Classification System of the SSL, 43 but rates of pay
under the SSL were determined on the basis of, among others, prevailing rates in the private sector for comparable work. Notably, the
Compensation and Position Classification System was to be governed by the following principles: (a) just and equitable wages, with the ratio of
compensation between pay distinctions maintained at equitable levels;44 and (b) basic compensation generally comparable with the private
sector, in accordance with prevailing laws on minimum wages.45 Also, the Department of Budget and Management was directed to use, as guide
for preparing the Index of Occupational Services, the Benchmark Position Schedule, and the following factors: 46

(1) the education and experience required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the positions;
(2) the nature and complexity of the work to be performed;
(3) the kind of supervision received;
(4) mental and/or physical strain required in the completion of the work;
(5) nature and extent of internal and external relationships;
(6) kind of supervision exercised;
(7) decision-making responsibility;
(8) responsibility for accuracy of records and reports;
(9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment; and
(10) hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the job.

The Benchmark Position Schedule enumerates the position titles that fall within Salary Grades 1 to 20.
Clearly, under R.A. No. 6758, the rank-and-file of all GFIs were similarly situated in all aspects pertaining to compensation and position
classification, in consonance with Section 5, Article IX-B of the 1997 Constitution.47

Then came the enactment of the amended charter of the BSP, implicitly exempting the Monetary Board from the SSL by giving it express
authority to determine and institute its own compensation and wage structure. However, employees whose positions fall under SG 19 and below
were specifically limited to the rates prescribed under the SSL.

Subsequent amendments to the charters of other GFIs followed. Significantly, each government financial institution (GFI) was not only expressly
authorized to determine and institute its own compensation and wage structure, but also explicitly exempted - without distinction as to salary
grade or position - all employees of the GFI from the SSL.

It has been proffered that legislative deliberations justify the grant or withdrawal of exemption from the SSL, based on the perceived need "to
fulfill the mandate of the institution concerned considering, among others, that: (1) the GOCC or GFI is essentially proprietary in character; (2) the
GOCC or GFI is in direct competition with their[sic] counterparts in the private sector, not only in terms of the provisions of goods or services, but
also in terms of hiring and retaining competent personnel; and (3) the GOCC or GFI are or were [sic] experiencing difficulties filling up plantilla
positions with competent personnel and/or retaining these personnel. The need for the scope of exemption necessarily varies with the particular
circumstances of each institution, and the corresponding variance in the benefits received by the employees is merely incidental."

The fragility of this argument is manifest. First, the BSP is the central monetary authority,48 and the banker of the government and all its
political subdivisions.49 It has the sole power and authority to issue currency;50provide policy directions in the areas of money, banking, and
credit; and supervise banks and regulate finance companies and non-bank financial institutions performing quasi-banking functions, including
the exempted GFIs.51 Hence, the argument that the rank-and-file employees of the seven GFIs were exempted because of the importance of their
institution's mandate cannot stand any more than an empty sack can stand.

Second, it is certainly misleading to say that "the need for the scope of exemption necessarily varies with the particular circumstances of each
institution." Nowhere in the deliberations is there a cogent basis for the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file from the exemption which was granted
to the rank-and-file of the other GFIs and the SEC. As point in fact, the BSP and the seven GFIs are similarly situated in so far as Congress deemed
it necessary for these institutions to be exempted from the SSL. True, the SSL-exemption of the BSP and the seven GFIs was granted in the
amended charters of each GFI, enacted separately and over a period of time. But it bears emphasis that, while each GFI has a mandate different
and distinct from that of another, the deliberations show that the raison d'tre of the SSL-exemption was inextricably linked to and for the most
part based on factors common to the eight GFIs, i.e., (1) the pivotal role they play in the economy; (2) the necessity of hiring and retaining
qualified and effective personnel to carry out the GFI's mandate; and (3) the recognition that the compensation package of these GFIs is not
competitive, and fall substantially below industry standards. Considering further that (a) the BSP was the first GFI granted SSL exemption; and (b)
the subsequent exemptions of other GFIs did not distinguish between the officers and the rank-and-file; it is patent that the classification made
between the BSP rank-and-file and those of the other seven GFIs was inadvertent, and NOT intended, i.e., it was not based on any substantial
distinction vis--vis the particular circumstances of each GFI. Moreover, the exemption granted to two GFIs makes express reference to allowance
and fringe benefits similar to those extended to and currently enjoyed by the employees and personnel of other GFIs,52 underscoring that GFIs are
a particular class within the realm of government entities.

It is precisely this unpremeditated discrepancy in treatment of the rank-and-file of the BSP - made manifest and glaring with each and every
consequential grant of blanket exemption from the SSL to the other GFIs - that cannot be rationalized or justified. Even more so, when the SEC -
which is not a GFI - was given leave to have a compensation plan that "shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plan in the [BSP]
and other [GFIs],"53 then granted a blanket exemption from the SSL, and its rank-and-file endowed a more preferred treatment than the rank-
and-file of the BSP.

The violation to the equal protection clause becomes even more pronounced when we are faced with this undeniable truth: that if Congress had
enacted a law for the sole purpose of exempting the eight GFIs from the coverage of the SSL, the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file employees
would have been devoid of any substantial or material basis. It bears no moment, therefore, that the unlawful discrimination was not a direct
result arising from one law. "Nemo potest facere per alium quod non potest facere per directum." No one is allowed to do indirectly what he is
prohibited to do directly.

It has also been proffered that "similarities alone are not sufficient to support the conclusion that rank-and-file employees of the BSP may be
lumped together with similar employees of the other GOCCs for purposes of compensation, position classification and qualification standards.
The fact that certain persons have some attributes in common does not automatically make them members of the same class with respect to a
legislative classification." Cited is the ruling in Johnson v. Robinson:54 "this finding of similarity ignores that a common characteristic shared by
beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries alike, is not sufficient to invalidate a statute when other characteristics peculiar to only one group rationally
explain the statute's different treatment of the two groups."

41
The reference to Johnson is inapropos. In Johnson, the US Court sustained the validity of the classification as there were quantitative and
qualitative distinctions, expressly recognized by Congress, which formed a rational basis for the classification limiting educational benefits to
military service veterans as a means of helping them readjust to civilian life. The Court listed the peculiar characteristics as follows:

First, the disruption caused by military service is quantitatively greater than that caused by alternative civilian service. A conscientious
objector performing alternative service is obligated to work for two years. Service in the Armed Forces, on the other hand, involves a
six-year commitment

xxx xxx xxx

Second, the disruptions suffered by military veterans and alternative service performers are qualitatively different. Military veterans
suffer a far greater loss of personal freedom during their service careers. Uprooted from civilian life, the military veteran becomes part
of the military establishment, subject to its discipline and potentially hazardous duty. Congress was acutely aware of the peculiar
disabilities caused by military service, in consequence of which military servicemen have a special need for readjustment
benefits55 (citations omitted)

In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL, there are no characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs
or their rank-and-file so as to justify the exemption which BSP rank-and-file employees were denied (not to mention the anomaly of the SEC
getting one). The distinction made by the law is not only superficial,56 but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real
differences between the BSP rank-and-file and the seven other GFIs.

Moreover, the issue in this case is not - as the dissenting opinion of Mme. Justice Carpio-Morales would put it - whether "being an employee of a
GOCC or GFI is reasonable and sufficient basis for exemption" from R.A. No. 6758. It is Congress itself that distinguished the GFIs from other
government agencies, not once but eight times, through the enactment of R.A. Nos. 7653, 7907, 8282, 8289, 8291, 8523, 8763, and 9302. These
laws may have created a "preferred sub-class within government employees," but the present challenge is not directed at the wisdom of these
laws. Rather, it is a legal conundrum involving the exercise of legislative power, the validity of which must be measured not only by looking at the
specific exercise in and by itself (R.A. No. 7653), but also as to the legal effects brought about by seven separate exercises - albeit indirectly and
without intent.

Thus, even if petitioner had not alleged "a comparable change in the factual milieu as regards the compensation, position classification and
qualification standards of the employees of the BSP (whether of the executive level or of the rank-and-file) since the enactment of the new
Central Bank Act" is of no moment. In GSIS v. Montesclaros,57 this Court resolved the issue of constitutionality notwithstanding that claimant had
manifested that she was no longer interested in pursuing the case, and even when the constitutionality of the said provision was not squarely
raised as an issue, because the issue involved not only the claimant but also others similarly situated and whose claims GSIS would also deny
based on the challenged proviso. The Court held that social justice and public interest demanded the resolution of the constitutionality of
the proviso. And so it is with the challenged proviso in the case at bar.

It bears stressing that the exemption from the SSL is a "privilege" fully within the legislative prerogative to give or deny. However, its subsequent
grant to the rank-and-file of the seven other GFIs and continued denial to the BSP rank-and-file employees breached the latter's right to equal
protection. In other words, while the granting of a privilege per se is a matter of policy exclusively within the domain and prerogative of
Congress, the validity or legality of the exercise of this prerogative is subject to judicial review.58 So when the distinction made is superficial, and
not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between those included and excluded, it becomes a matter of arbitrariness that
this Court has the duty and the power to correct.59 As held in the United Kingdom case of Hooper v. Secretary of State for Work and
Pensions,60 once the State has chosen to confer benefits, "discrimination" contrary to law may occur where favorable treatment already afforded
to one group is refused to another, even though the State is under no obligation to provide that favorable treatment. 61

The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other seven GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable badge of
invidious discrimination - no one can, with candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the subsequent blanket and total exemption
of the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as unalikes without any rational basis.

Again, it must be emphasized that the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot
be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not identical, are
analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion; whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group is equally binding on the rest.62

In light of the lack of real and substantial distinctions that would justify the unequal treatment between the rank-and-file of BSP from the seven
other GFIs, it is clear that the enactment of the seven subsequent charters has rendered the continued application of the
challenged proviso anathema to the equal protection of the law, and the same should be declared as an outlaw.

IV.

Equal Protection Under International Lens

In our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection challenges in the main have followed the "rational basis" test, coupled with a
deferential attitude to legislative classifications63 and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach
of the Constitution. 64

A. Equal Protection in the United States

In contrast, jurisprudence in the U.S. has gone beyond the static "rational basis" test. Professor Gunther highlights the development in equal
protection jurisprudential analysis, to wit: 65

Traditionally, equal protection supported only minimal judicial intervention in most contexts. Ordinarily, the command of equal
protection was only that government must not impose differences in treatment "except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly
related to the object of regulation." The old variety of equal protection scrutiny focused solely on the means used by the legislature: it

42
 insisted merely that the classification in the statute reasonably relates to the legislative purpose. Unlike substantive due process,
equal protection scrutiny was not typically concerned with identifying "fundamental values" and restraining legislative ends. And
usually the rational classification requirement was readily satisfied: the courts did not demand a tight fit between classification and
purpose; perfect congruence between means and ends was not required.

xxx xxx xxx

[From marginal intervention to major cutting edge: The Warren Court's "new equal protection" and the two-tier approach.]

From its traditional modest role, equal protection burgeoned into a major intervention tool during the Warren era, especially in the
1960s. The Warren Court did not abandon the deferential ingredients of the old equal protection: in most areas of economic and social
legislation, the demands imposed by equal protection remained as minimal as everBut the Court launched an equal protection
revolution by finding large new areas for strict rather than deferential scrutiny. A sharply differentiated two-tier approachevolved by
the late 1960s: in addition to the deferential "old" equal protection, a "new" equal protection, connoting strict scrutiny, arose. The
intensive review associated with the new equal protection imposed two demands - a demand not only as to means but also one as to
ends. Legislation qualifying for strict scrutiny required a far closer fit between classification and statutory purpose than the rough and
ready flexibility traditionally tolerated by the old equal protection: means had to be shown "necessary" to achieve statutory ends, not
merely "reasonably related" ones. Moreover, equal protection became a source of ends scrutiny as well: legislation in the areas of the
new equal protection had to be justified by "compelling" state interests, not merely the wide spectrum of "legitimate" state ends.

The Warren Court identified the areas appropriate for strict scrutiny by searching for two characteristics: the presence of a "suspect"
classification; or an impact on "fundamental" rights or interests. In the category of "suspect classifications," the Warren Court's major
contribution was to intensify the strict scrutiny in the traditionally interventionist area of racial classifications. But other cases also
suggested that there might be more other suspect categories as well: illegitimacy and wealth for example. But it was the 'fundamental
interests" ingredient of the new equal protection that proved particularly dynamic, open-ended, and amorphous.. [Other
fundamental interests included voting, criminal appeals, and the right of interstate travel .]

xxx xxx xxx

The Burger Court and Equal Protection.

The Burger Court was reluctant to expand the scope of the new equal protection, although its best established ingredient retains
vitality. There was also mounting discontent with the rigid two-tier formulations of the Warren Court's equal protection doctrine. It
was prepared to use the clause as an interventionist tool without resorting to the strict language of the new equal protection.
[Among the fundamental interests identified during this time were voting and access to the ballot, while "suspect" classifications
included sex, alienage and illegitimacy.]

xxx xxx xxx

Even while the two-tier scheme has often been adhered to in form, there has also been an increasingly noticeable resistance to the
sharp difference between deferential "old" and interventionist "new" equal protection. A number of justices sought formulations that
would blur the sharp distinctions of the two-tiered approach or that would narrow the gap between strict scrutiny and deferential
review. The most elaborate attack came from Justice Marshall, whose frequently stated position was developed most elaborately in his
dissent in the Rodriguez case: 66

The Court apparently seeks to establish [that] equal protection cases fall into one of two neat categories which dictate the appropriate
standard of review - strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But this (sic) Court's [decisions] defy such easy categorization. A principled
reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of
the equal protection clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with which Court will scrutinize
particular classification, depending, I believe, on the constitutional and societal importance of the interests adversely affected and the
recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn.

Justice Marshall's "sliding scale" approach describes many of the modern decisions, although it is a formulation that the majority
refused to embrace. But the Burger Court's results indicate at least two significant changes in equal protection law: First, invocation
of the "old" equal protection formula no longer signals, as it did with the Warren Court, an extreme deference to legislative
classifications and a virtually automatic validation of challenged statutes. Instead, several cases, even while voicing the minimal
"rationality" "hands-off" standards of the old equal protection, proceed to find the statute unconstitutional. Second, in some areas
the modern Court has put forth standards for equal protection review that, while clearly more intensive than the deference of the
"old" equal protection, are less demanding than the strictness of the "new" equal protection. Sex discrimination is the best established
example of an "intermediate" level of review. Thus, in one case, the Court said that "classifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." That standard is
"intermediate" with respect to both ends and means: where ends must be "compelling" to survive strict scrutiny and merely
"legitimate" under the "old" mode, "important" objectives are required here; and where means must be "necessary" under the "new"
equal protection, and merely "rationally related" under the "old" equal protection, they must be "substantially related" to survive the
"intermediate" level of review. (emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

B. Equal Protection in Europe

The United Kingdom and other members of the European Community have also gone forward in discriminatory legislation and jurisprudence.
Within the United Kingdom domestic law, the most extensive list of protected grounds can be found in Article 14 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR). It prohibits discrimination on grounds such as "sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status." This list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Discrimination on the
basis of race, sex and religion is regarded as grounds that require strict scrutiny. A further indication that certain forms of discrimination are
regarded as particularly suspect under the Covenant can be gleaned from Article 4, which, while allowing states to derogate from certain
Covenant articles in times of national emergency, prohibits derogation by measures that discriminate solely on the grounds of "race, colour,
language, religion or social origin."67

43
Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has developed a test of justification which varies with the ground of discrimination. In
the Belgian Linguistics case68 the European Court set the standard of justification at a low level: discrimination would contravene the Convention
only if it had no legitimate aim, or there was no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to
be realised.69 But over the years, the European Court has developed a hierarchy of grounds covered by Article 14 of the ECHR, a much higher
level of justification being required in respect of those regarded as "suspect" (sex, race, nationality, illegitimacy, or sexual orientation) than of
others. Thus, in Abdulaziz, 70 the European Court declared that:

. . . [t]he advancement of the equality of the sexes is today a major goal in the member States of the Council of Europe. This means that
very weighty reasons would have to be advanced before a difference of treatment on the ground of sex could be regarded as
compatible with the Convention.

And in Gaygusuz v. Austria,71 the European Court held that "very weighty reasons would have to be put forward before the Court could regard a
difference of treatment based exclusively on the ground of nationality as compatible with the Convention." 72 The European Court will then
permit States a very much narrower margin of appreciation in relation to discrimination on grounds of sex, race, etc., in the application of the
Convention rights than it will in relation to distinctions drawn by states between, for example, large and small land-owners. 73

C. Equality under International Law

The principle of equality has long been recognized under international law. Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims
that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. Non-discrimination, together with equality before the law and equal
protection of the law without any discrimination, constitutes basic principles in the protection of human rights. 74

Most, if not all, international human rights instruments include some prohibition on discrimination and/or provisions about equality.75 The
general international provisions pertinent to discrimination and/or equality are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR);76 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the International Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD);77 the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).

In the broader international context, equality is also enshrined in regional instruments such as the American Convention on Human Rights;78 the
African Charter on Human and People's Rights;79 the European Convention on Human Rights;80 the European Social Charter of 1961 and revised
Social Charter of 1996; and the European Union Charter of Rights (of particular importance to European states). Even the Council of the League of
Arab States has adopted the Arab Charter on Human Rights in 1994, although it has yet to be ratified by the Member States of the League. 81

The equality provisions in these instruments do not merely function as traditional "first generation" rights, commonly viewed as concerned
only with constraining rather than requiring State action. Article 26 of the ICCPR requires "guarantee[s]" of "equal and effective protection
against discrimination" while Articles 1 and 14 of the American and European Conventions oblige States Parties "to ensure ... the full and free
exercise of [the rights guaranteed] ... without any discrimination" and to "secure without discrimination" the enjoyment of the rights
guaranteed.82 These provisions impose a measure of positive obligation on States Parties to take steps to eradicate discrimination.

In the employment field, basic detailed minimum standards ensuring equality and prevention of discrimination, are laid down in the ICESCR 83 and
in a very large number of Conventions administered by the International Labour Organisation, a United Nations body. 84 Additionally, many of the
other international and regional human rights instruments have specific provisions relating to employment.85

The United Nations Human Rights Committee has also gone beyond the earlier tendency to view the prohibition against discrimination (Article
26) as confined to the ICCPR rights.86 In Broeks87 and Zwaan-de Vries,88 the issue before the Committee was whether discriminatory provisions in
the Dutch Unemployment Benefits Act (WWV) fell within the scope of Article 26. The Dutch government submitted that discrimination in social
security benefit provision was not within the scope of Article 26, as the right was contained in the ICESCR and not the ICCPR. They accepted that
Article 26 could go beyond the rights contained in the Covenant to other civil and political rights, such as discrimination in the field of taxation,
but contended that Article 26 did not extend to the social, economic, and cultural rights contained in ICESCR. The Committee rejected this
argument. In its view, Article 26 applied to rights beyond the Covenant including the rights in other international treaties such as the right to
social security found in ICESCR:

Although Article 26 requires that legislation should prohibit discrimination, it does not of itself contain any obligation with respect to
the matters that may be provided for by legislation. Thus it does not, for example, require any state to enact legislation to provide for
social security. However, when such legislation is adopted in the exercise of a State's sovereign power, then such legislation must
comply with Article 26 of the Covenant.89

Breaches of the right to equal protection occur directly or indirectly. A classification may be struck down if it has the purpose or effect of violating
the right to equal protection. International law recognizes that discrimination may occur indirectly, as the Human Rights Committee90 took into
account the definitions of discrimination adopted by CERD and CEDAW in declaring that:

. . . "discrimination" as used in the [ICCPR] should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which
is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth
or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons,
on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms. 91 (emphasis supplied)

Thus, the two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of the challenged provision, and its conclusion of unconstitutionality by subsequent
operation, are in cadence and in consonance with the progressive trend of other jurisdictions and in international law. There should be no
hesitation in using the equal protection clause as a major cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable irrational discrimination in our society.
Indeed, the social justice imperatives in the Constitution, coupled with the special status and protection afforded to labor, compel this
approach.92

Apropos the special protection afforded to labor under our Constitution and international law, we held in International School Alliance of
Educators v. Quisumbing: 93

44
 That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these
evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The
very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."

International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law include
principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111)
Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation - all embody the general principle against discrimination, the
very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national
laws.

In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by
the employer are all the more reprehensible.

The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These conditions are not restricted to the
physical workplace - the factory, the office or the field - but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.

The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides
that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and
letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities,
closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.

xxx xxx xxx

Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in Article 7 thereof, provides:

The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and [favorable] conditions of work,
which ensure, in particular:

a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:

i. Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women
being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work;

xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work."
Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar
salaries. (citations omitted)

Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should be accorded recognition and respect by the courts
of justice except when they run afoul of the Constitution.94 The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or
prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as
the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis
should not suffice.

Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the Constitution requires a stricter judicial scrutiny finds no
support in American or English jurisprudence. Nevertheless, these foreign decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction.
At best, they are persuasive and have been used to support many of our decisions.95 We should not place undue and fawning reliance upon them
and regard them as indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of our own
endowments. We live in a different ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of our own interests and needs, and of our qualities
and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own concept of law and justice. 96 Our laws must be construed in accordance with the
intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local legislation related
thereto. More importantly, they must be construed to serve our own public interest which is the be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it need
not be stressed that our public interest is distinct and different from others. 97

In the 2003 case of Francisco v. House of Representatives, this Court has stated that: "[A]merican jurisprudence and authorities, much less the
American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive
merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned....[I]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign
jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs."98 Indeed,
although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. 99

Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for the use of equal protection as a tool of effective judicial intervention.

Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution. The Preamble proclaims "equality" as an ideal
precisely in protest against crushing inequities in Philippine society. The command to promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, in
"all phases of national development," further explicitated in Article XIII, are clear commands to the State to take affirmative action in
the direction of greater equality. [T]here is thus in the Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for a more vigorous state
effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of equality.100

Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including
labor.101 Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane
justification that those with less privilege in life should have more in law.102 And the obligation to afford protection to labor is incumbent not only
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on the legislative and executive branches but also on the judiciary to translate this pledge into a living reality.103 Social justice calls for the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated.104

IV. A Final Word

Finally, concerns have been raised as to the propriety of a ruling voiding the challenged provision. It has been proffered that the remedy of
petitioner is not with this Court, but with Congress, which alone has the power to erase any inequity perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653. Indeed, a bill
proposing the exemption of the BSP rank-and-file from the SSL has supposedly been filed.

Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion
given to Congress in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational basis" test, and the legislative discretion
would be given deferential treatment. 105

But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored
by the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down view would call for the
abdication of this Court's solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the
actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be
struck down regardless of the character or nature of the actor. 106

Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on whether or not the prescribed
qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations respected, is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being
one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations - particularly
those prescribed or imposed by the Constitution - would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue and the
settlement thereof are the main functions of courts of justice under the Presidential form of government adopted in our 1935
Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its basic predicates. As a consequence, We have neither the authority nor
the discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation - made particularly more exacting and
peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend the Constitution - to settle it. This
explains why, in Miller v. Johnson, it was held that courts have a "duty, rather than a power", to determine whether another branch of
the government has "kept within constitutional limits." Not satisfied with this postulate, the court went farther and stressed that, if the
Constitution provides how it may be amended - as it is in our 1935 Constitution - "then, unless the manner is followed, the judiciary as
the interpreter of that constitution, will declare the amendment invalid." In fact, this very Court - speaking through Justice Laurel, an
outstanding authority on Philippine Constitutional Law, as well as one of the highly respected and foremost leaders of the Convention
that drafted the 1935 Constitution - declared, as early as July 15, 1936, that "(i)n times of social disquietude or political excitement, the
great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments" of the government.107 (citations omitted; emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on
economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now
receive higher compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates
prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while
employees higher in rank - possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career advancement - are given higher compensation
packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people whose status and rank in
life are less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is they - and not the officers - who have the real economic and
financial need for the adjustment This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social
services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all." 108 Any act of Congress that runs counter to this
constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass muster.

To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this Court. They represent the more impotent rank-and-file
government employees who, unlike employees in the private sector, have no specific right to organize as a collective bargaining unit and
negotiate for better terms and conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor practices. Not only are they
impotent as a labor unit, but their efficacy to lobby in Congress is almost nil as R.A. No. 7653 effectively isolated them from the other GFI rank-
and-file in compensation. These BSP rank-and-file employees represent the politically powerless and they should not be compelled to seek a
political solution to their unequal and iniquitous treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many years for the legislature to act. They cannot be
asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be given any waiting time. Unless the equal protection clause of the Constitution is a mere
platitude, it is the Court's duty to save them from reasonless discrimination.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and implementation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No.
7653 is unconstitutional.

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