Search and Seizure Cases

People v. Marti

The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy. Protection

against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between
the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between a
private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some
forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of
the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary
and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first
secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest
or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in
the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not
the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the
ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Stonehill v. Diokno

The objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them
of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations
adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence
belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked
by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.

If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were
invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it is
clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have
been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of
defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been
disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its
violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another.

Soliven v. Makasiar

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission
of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.

Silva v. Presiding Judge of RTC Negros Oriental

In the case at bar, we have carefully examined the questioned search warrant as well as the "Application
for Search Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", and found that Judge Ontal failed to comply with the
legal requirement that he must examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers in order to determine the existence of probable cause. The joint "Deposition of
Witness" executed by Pfc. Alcoran and Pat. Quindo, which was submitted together with the "Application
for Search Warrant" contained, for the most part suggestive questions answerable by merely placing
"yes" or "no" in the blanks provided thereon. In fact there were only four (4) questions asked, to wit:

Q Do you personally know M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor, Jr. the applicant for a search warrant?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you have personal knowledge that the said premises subject of the offense stated above, and
other proceeds of fruit of the offense, used or obtain (sic) or intended to be used as means of
committing an offense?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you know personally who is/are the person who has/have the property in his/their possession and
control?
A Yes, sir.
Q How did you know all this (sic) things?
A Through discreet surveillance. 9

The above deposition did not only contain leading questions but it was also very broad. The questions
propounded to the witnesses were in fact, not probing but were merely routinary. The deposition was
already mimeogragphed and all that the witnesses had to do was fill in their answers on the blanks
provided.

Morano v. Vivo

They say that the Constitution limits to judges the authority to issue warrants of arrest and that the
legislative delegation of such power to the Commissioner of Immigration is thus violative of the Bill of
Rights.

Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, we perceive, does not require judicial intervention in the
execution of a final order of deportation issued in accordance with law. The constitutional limitation
contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power4 as a step preliminary or incidental
to prosecution or proceedings for a given offense or administrative action, not as a measure
indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a competent official, such as a legal order of
deportation, issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation.

The following from American Jurisprudence,5 is illuminating:

It is thoroughly established that Congress has power to order the deportation of aliens whose
presence in the country it deems hurtful. Owing to the nature of the proceeding, the
deportation of an alien who is found in this country in violation of law is not a deprivation of
liberty without due process of law. This is so, although the inquiry devolves upon executive
officers, and their findings of fact, after a fair though summary hearing, are made conclusive.

xxx xxx xxx

The determination of the propriety of deportation is not a prosecution for, or a conviction of,
crime; nor is the deportation a punishment, even though the facts underlying the decision
may constitute a crime under local law. The proceeding is in effect simply a refusal by the
government to harbor persons whom it does not want. The coincidence of local penal law
with the policy of Congress is purely accidental, and, though supported by the same facts, a
criminal prosecution and a proceeding for deportation are separate and independent.

In consequence, the constitutional guarantee set forth in Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution
aforesaid, requiring that the issue of probable cause be determined by a judge, does not extend to
deportation proceedings.6

The view we here express finds support in the discussions during the constitutional convention. The
convention recognized, as sanctioned by due process, possibilities and cases of deprivation of
liberty, other than by order of a competent court.7

Indeed, the power to deport or expel aliens is an attribute of sovereignty. Such power is planted on
the "accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in
sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its
dominions."8 So it is, that this Court once aptly remarked that there can be no controversy on the fact
that where aliens are admitted as temporary visitors, "the law is to the effect that temporary visitors
who do not depart upon the expiration of the period of stay granted them are subject to deportation
by the Commissioner of Immigration, for having violated the limitation or condition under which they
were admitted as non-immigrants (Immigration Law, Sec. 37 (a), subsection (7); C.A. 613, as
amended)."9

And, in a case directly in point, where the power of the Commissioner to issue warrants of arrest was
challenged as unconstitutional, because "such power is only vested in a judge by Section 1,
paragraph 3, Article III of our Constitution," this Court declared

This argument overlooks the fact that the stay of appellant Ng Hua To as temporary visitor is
subject to certain contractual stipulations as contained in the cash bond put up by him,
among them, that in case of breach the Commissioner may require the recommitment of the
person in whose favor the bond has been filed. The Commissioner did nothing but to enforce
such condition. Such a step is necessary to enable the Commissioner to prepare the ground
for his deportation under section 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act 613. A contrary interpretation
would render such power nugatory to the detriment of the State.10

It is in this context that we rule that Section 37 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 is not
constitutionally proscribed.
Harvey v. Santiago

There can be no question that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by
Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, is available to all persons, including aliens, whether
accused of crime or not (Moncado vs. People's Court, 80 Phil. 1 [1948]. One of the constitutional
requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be based upon probable
cause. Probable cause has been defined as referring to "such facts and circumstances antecedent
to the issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on
them and act in pursuance thereof." (People vs. Syjuco 64 Phil. 667 [1937]; Alverez vs. CFI, 64 Phil.
33 [1937]).

The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure also provide that an arrest wit a warrant may be effected by
a peace officer or even a private person (1) when such person has committed, actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence; and (2) when an offense has, in fact, been
committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it (Rule 113, Section 5).

In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close
surveillance for three (3) months during which period their activities were monitored. The existence
of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and
posters without warrant (See Papa vs. Mago, L-27360, February 28, 1968,22 SCRA 857; People vs.
Court of First Instance of Rizal, L-41686, November 17, 1980, 101 SCRA 86, cited in CRUZ,
Constitutional Law, 1987 ed., p. 143). Those articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest
and, are therefore, admissible in evidence (Section 12, Rule 126,1985 Rules on criminal Procedure).

But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid at its inception, the records
show that formal deportation charges have been filed against them, as undesirable aliens, on 4
March 1988. Warrants of arrest were issued against them on 7 March 1988 "for violation of Section
37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Administrative Code." A hearing is
presently being conducted by a Board of Special Inquiry. The restraint against their persons,
therefore, has become legal. The Writ has served its purpose. The process of the law is being
followed (Cruz vs. Montoya, L-39823, February 25, 1975, 62 SCRA 543). "were a person's detention
was later made by virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases subsequently filed against the
detainee, his petition for hebeas corpus becomes moot and academic" (Beltran vs. Garcia, L-49014,
April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 717). "It is a fumdamental rule that a writ of habeas corpus will not be
granted when the confinement is or has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the
beginning" (Matsura vs. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 1050 [1947]).

That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal. Petitioners were found
with young boys in their respective rooms, the ones with John Sherman being naked. Under those
circumstances the CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioners had committed
"pedophilia" defined as "psychosexual perversion involving children" (Kraft-Ebbing Psychopatia
Sexualis p. 555; Paraphilia (or unusual sexual activity) in which children are the preferred sexual
object" (Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1971 ed., p. 1665) [Solicitor General's Return
of the Writ, on p. 101. While not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it is behavior offensive to
public morals and violative of the declared policy of the State to promote and protect the physical,
moral, spiritual, and social well-being of our youth (Article II, Section 13, 1987 Constitution).

At any rate, the filing by petitioners of a petition to be released on bail should be considered as a
waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity (Callanta
v. Villanueva, L-24646 & L-24674, June 20, 1977, 77 SCRA 377; Bagcal vs. Villaraza, L-61770,
January 31, 1983, 120 SCRA 525).
The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance with Section
37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, in relation to Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code. Section 37(a) provides in part:

(a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation or any other officer designated by him for the purpose
and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation
after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground
for deportation as charged against the alien;

xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing provision should be construed in its entirety in view of the summary and indivisible
nature of a deportation proceeding, otherwise, the very purpose of deportation proceeding would be
defeated.

Section 37(a) is not constitutionally proscribed (Morano vs. Vivo, L-22196, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA
562). The specific constraints in both the 1935 1 and 1987 2 Constitutions, which are substantially
Identical, contemplate prosecutions essentially criminal in nature. Deportation proceedings, on the
other hand, are administrative in character. An order of deportation is never construed as a
punishment. It is preventive, not a penal process. It need not be conducted strictly in accordance
with ordinary Court proceedings.

It is of course well-settled that deportation proceedings do not constitute a criminal

action. The order of deportation is not a punishment, (Maliler vs. Eby, 264 U.S., 32),
it being merely the return to his country of an alien who has broken the conditions
upon which he could continue to reside within our borders (U.S. vs. De los Santos,
33 Phil., 397). The deportation proceedings are administrative in character, (Kessler
vs. Stracker 307 U.S., 22) summary in nature, and need not be conducted strictly in
accordance with the ordinary court proceedings (Murdock vs. Clark, 53 F. [2d], 155).
It is essential, however, that the warrant of arrest shall give the alien sufficient
information about the charges against him, relating the facts relied upon. (U.S. vs.
Uhl 211 F., 628.) It is also essential that he be given a fair hearing with the
assistance of counsel, if he so desires, before unprejudiced investigators (Strench
vs. Pedaris, 55 F. [2d], 597; Ex parte Jew You On, 16 F. [2d], 153). However, all the
strict rules of evidence governing judicial controversies do not need to be observed;
only such as are fumdamental and essential like the right of cross-examination. (U.S.
vs. Hughes, 104 F. [2d], 14; Murdock vs. Clark, 53 F. [2d], 155.) Hearsay evidence
may even be admitted, provided the alien is given the opportunity to explain or rebut
it (Morrell vs. Baker, 270 F., 577; Sercerchi vs. Ward, 27 F. Supp., 437). (Lao Tang
Bun vs. Fabre 81 Phil. 682 [1948]).

The ruling in Vivo vs. Montesa (G. R. No. 24576, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 155) that "the issuance of
warrants of arrest by the Commissioner of Immigration, solely for purposes of investigation and
before a final order of deportation is issued, conflicts with paragraph 3, Section I of Article III of the
Constitution" (referring to the 1935 Constitution) 3 is not invocable herein. Respondent
Commissioner's Warrant of Arrest issued on 7 March 1988 did not order petitioners to appear and
show cause why they should not be deported. They were issued specifically "for violation of Sections
37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code." Before
that, deportation proceedings had been commenced against them as undesirable aliens on 4 March
1988 and the arrest was a step preliminary to their possible deportation.
 Section 37 of the Immigration Law, which empowers the Commissioner of
Immigration to issue warrants for the arrest of overstaying aliens is constitutional.
The arrest is a stop preliminary to the deportation of the aliens who had violated the
condition of their stay in this country. (Morano vs. Vivo, L-22196, June 30, 1967, 20
SCRA 562).

To rule otherwise would be to render the authority given the Commissioner nugatory to the detriment
of the State.

The pertinent provision of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, which gives
authority to the Commissioner of Immigration to order the arrest of an alien
temporary visitor preparatory to his deportation for failure to put up new bonds
required for the stay, is not unconstitutional.

xxx xxx xxx

... Such a step is necessary to enable the Commissioner to prepare the ground for
his deportation under Section 37[al of Commonwealth Act 613. A contrary
interpretation would render such power nugatory to the detriment of the State. (Ng
Hua To vs. Galang, G. R. No. 10145, February 29, 1964, 10 SCRA 411).

"The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation
proceedings." (Morano vs. Vivo, supra, citing Tiu Chun Hai vs. Commissioner, infra). There need be
no "truncated" recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a single deportation
proceedings.

Alvarez v. CFI

I. A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands,
signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to
search for personal property and bring it before the court (section 95, General Orders. No. 58, as
amended by section 6 of Act No. 2886). Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or
more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the
exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others (In
re Pacific Railways Commission, 32 Fed., 241; Interstate Commerce Commission vs Brimson, 38
Law. ed., 1047; Broyd vs. U. S., 29 Law. ed., 746; Caroll vs. U. S., 69 Law. ed., 543, 549). While the
power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights or citizen, for the enforcement of no statue is
of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basis principles of government (People vs.Elias,
147 N. E., 472).

II. As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional right is one of the highest
duties and privileges of the court, these constitutional guaranties should be given a liberal
construction or a strict construction in favor of the individual, to prevent stealthy encroachment upon,
or gradual depreciation on, the rights secured by them(State vs. Custer County, 198 Pac., 362;
State vs. McDaniel, 231 Pac., 965; 237 Pac., 373). Since the proceeding is a drastic one, it is the
general rule that statutes authorizing searches and seizure or search warrants must be strictly
construed (Rose vs. St. Clair, 28 Fed., [2d], 189; Leonard vs. U. S., 6 Fed. [2d], 353; Perry vs. U. S.
14 Fed. [2d],88; Cofer vs. State, 118 So., 613).

III. The petitioner claims that the search warrant issued by the court is illegal because it has been
based upon the affidavit of agent Mariano G. Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had no
personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as a basis for the issuance of the warrant but
that he had knowledge thereof through mere information secured from a person whom he
considered reliable. To the question "What are your reason for applying for this search warrant",
appearing in the affidavit, the agent answered: "It has been reported to me by a person whom I
consider to be reliable that there are being kept in said premises, books, documents, receipts, lists,
chits, and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money-lender, charging a
usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law" and in attesting the truth of his statements contained
in the affidavit, the said agent states that he found them to be correct and true to the best of his
knowledge and belief.

Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution, relative to the bill of rights, provides that "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to
be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place top be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized." Section 97 of General Orders, No. 58 provides that "A search warrant shall
not issue except for probable cause and upon application supported by oath particularly describing
the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized." It will be noted that both provisions
require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the
search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant ands the
witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which
a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is
sometimes defined asan outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise
is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God (Bouvier's Law Dictionary;
State vs. Jackson, 137 N. W., 1034; In re Sage, 24 Oh. Cir. Ct. [N. S.], 7; Pumphery vs. State, 122
N. W., 19; Priest vs. State, 6 N. W., 468; State vs. Jones, 154 Pac., 378; Atwood vs. State, 111 So.,
865). The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate,
not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause (U. S. vs. Tureaud, 20 Fed., 621; U. S. vs. Michalski, 265 Fed., 8349; U.
S. vs. Pitotto, 267 Fed., 603; U. S. vs. Lai Chew, 298 Fed., 652). The true test of sufficiency of an
affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that
perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused (State vs. Roosevelt
Country 20th Jud. Dis. Ct., 244 Pac., 280; State vs. Quartier, 236 Pac., 746).

It will likewise be noted that section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizure. Unreasonable searches and seizures are a menace against
which the constitutional guarantee afford full protection. The term "unreasonable search and seizure"
is not defined in the Constitution or in General Orders No. 58, and it is said to have no fixed,
absolute or unchangeable meaning, although the term has been defined in general language. All
illegal searches and seizure are unreasonable while lawful ones are reasonable. What constitutes a
reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question,
determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the
search, the presence or absence or probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure
was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured (Go-Bart Importing
Co. vs. U. S. 75 Law. ed., 374; Peru vs. U. S., 4 Fed., [2d], 881;U. S. vs. Vatune, 292 Fed., 497;
Angelo vs. U. S. 70 Law, ed., 145; Lambert vs. U. S. 282 Fed., 413; U. S. vs. Bateman, 278 Fed.,
231; Mason vs. Rollins, 16 Fed. Cas. [No. 9252], 2 Biss., 99).

In view of the foregoing and under the above-cited authorities, it appears that the affidavit, which
served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of
the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, it is hereby held that the search warrant in
question and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal and do
not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the petitioner was subjected.

IV. Another ground alleged by the petitioner in asking that the search warrant be declared illegal and
cancelled is that it was not supported by other affidavits aside from that made by the applicant. In
other words, it is contended that the search warrant cannot be issued unless it be supported by
affidavits made by the applicant and the witnesses to be presented necessity by him. Section 1,
paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution provides that no warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce. Section 98 of General Orders, No. 58 provides that the judge or
justice must, before issuing the warrant, examine under oath the complainant and any witnesses he
may produce and take their depositions in writing. It is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the
affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who
issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Mariano
G. Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. Neither the
Constitution nor General Orders. No. 58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to take the
deposition of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the
affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more
than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the
affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other
witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was insufficient because his
knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the
affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to
warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant of the complaint
contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is
satisfied that there exist probable cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere
hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the fact is
necessary. We conclude, therefore, that the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based
only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.