Contents

Right to self organization .............................................................................................................................. 2

167. HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA v. NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS ........................................................ 2
168. ........................................................................................................................................................... 4
169. STA. LUCIA EAST COMMERCIAL CORPORATION vs. sec. of labor and employment......................... 4
170. SAMMA-LIKHA vs. SAMMA CORPORATION ...................................................................................... 7
171. Picop.................................................................................................................................................. 8
172. ......................................................................................................................................................... 11
173. ......................................................................................................................................................... 12
174. ......................................................................................................................................................... 12
175. FVCLU-PTGWO vs. SANAMA-FVC-SIGLO ......................................................................................... 12
176. ......................................................................................................................................................... 14
177. San Miguel Corp. Employees Union-PTGWO vs. Confessor............................................................ 14
178. Tabigue, et. al. vs. International Copra Export Corp. ...................................................................... 16
179. ......................................................................................................................................................... 18
180. ......................................................................................................................................................... 18
181. ......................................................................................................................................................... 18
182. GREAT PACIFIC EMPLOYEES UNION vs. NLRC ................................................................................. 18
183. ......................................................................................................................................................... 21
184. ......................................................................................................................................................... 21
185. ......................................................................................................................................................... 21
186. ......................................................................................................................................................... 21
187. HACIENDA FATIMA vs. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE WORKERS-FOOD AND GENERAL
TRADE...................................................................................................................................................... 21
188. SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA BANDOLINO-LMLC vs. NLRC .......................................... 22
189. ST. JOHN COLLEGES, INC. vs. ST. JOHN ACADEMY FACULTY AND EMPLOYEES UNION ................. 25
190. PUREFOODS VS. NAGKAKAISANG SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG PUREFOODS ........................ 27
191. ......................................................................................................................................................... 28
192. Kimberly Independent Labor Union vs. Hon. Drilon ....................................................................... 28
193. Neri vs. NLRC ................................................................................................................................... 30
194. ......................................................................................................................................................... 31
 195. ......................................................................................................................................................... 31
196. ......................................................................................................................................................... 31
197. ......................................................................................................................................................... 31
198. ......................................................................................................................................................... 31
199. ......................................................................................................................................................... 31
200. ......................................................................................................................................................... 31

Right to self organization

167. HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA v. NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS

Facts

Respondent filed with the DOLE-NCR a petition for CE. The Med-Arbiter granted the petition
and ordered the holding of a CE. On appeal, the DOLE Secretary affirmed the Med-Arbiters
order and remanded the case to the Med-Arbiter for the holding of a pre-election conference.
Petitioner filed an MR, but the same was denied.

The pre-election conference was not held as initially scheduled; it was held a year later, or on
February 20, 1998. Petitioner moved to archive or to dismiss the petition due to alleged repeated
non-appearance of respondent. The latter agreed to suspend proceedings until further notice. The
pre-election conference resumed on January 29, 2000.

Subsequently, petitioner discovered that respondent had failed to submit to the BLR its annual
financial report for several years and the list of its members since it filed its registration papers in
1995. Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration of respondent, on
the ground of the non-submission of the said documents. Petitioner reiterated its request by filing
a Motion to Dismiss or Suspend the Certification Election Proceedings, arguing that the
dismissal or suspension of the proceedings is warranted, considering that the legitimacy of
respondent is seriously being challenged in the petition for cancellation of registration.
Nevertheless, the CE pushed through. Respondent emerged as the winner.

Petitioner filed a Protest with Motion to Defer Certification of Election Results and Winner,
stating that the certification election held on June 23, 2000 was an exercise in futility because,
once respondents registration is cancelled, it would no longer be entitled to be certified as the
exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisory employees. Petitioner also claimed that some of
respondents members were not qualified to join the union because they were either confidential
employees or managerial employees. Meanwhile, respondent filed its Answer. It averred that the
petition was filed primarily to delay the conduct of the certification election, the respondents
certification as the exclusive bargaining representative of the supervisory employees, and the
commencement of bargaining negotiations.
The Med-Arbiter held that the pendency of a petition for cancellation of registration is not a bar
to the holding of a CE. The Med-Arbiter dismissed petitioners protest, and certified respondent
as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all supervisory employees. Petitioner subsequently
appealed the Order to the DOLE Secretary, which was later dismissed by DOLE Secretary Sto.
Tomas. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the motion was also denied.

In the meantime, Regional Director Maraan finally resolved the petition for cancellation of
registration. While finding that respondent had indeed failed to file financial reports and the list
of its members for several years, he, nonetheless, denied the petition, ratiocinating that freedom
of association and the employees right to self-organization are more substantive considerations.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the decision to the BLR. BLR Director Cacdac inhibited himself
from the case because he had been a former counsel of respondent. DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas
took cognizance of the appeal. She dismissed the appeal, holding that the constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of association and right of workers to self-organization outweighed
respondents noncompliance with the statutory requirements to maintain its status as a legitimate
labor organization. Petitioner filed an MR, but the motion was likewise denied. DOLE Secretary
Sto. Tomas admitted that it was the BLR which had jurisdiction over the appeal, but she pointed
out that the BLR Director had voluntarily inhibited himself from the case because he used to
appear as counsel for respondent. In order to maintain the integrity of the decision and of the
BLR, she therefore accepted the motion to inhibit and took cognizance of the appeal.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA denied the petition. The CA opined
that the DOLE Secretary may legally assume jurisdiction over an appeal from the decision of the
Regional Director in the event that the Director of the BLR inhibits himself from the case. The
CA also found that the DOLE Secretary did not commit grave abuse of discretion when she
affirmed the dismissal of the petition for cancellation of respondents registration as a labor
organization. Petitioner filed an MR. The CA denied petitioners motion.

Issues and Ruling

Who has jurisdiction to review the Regional Director decision?

Jurisdiction to review the decision of the Regional Director lies with the BLR. This is clearly
provided in the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code and enunciated by the Court in Abbott. In
this case however, the BLR Director inhibited himself from the case because he was a former
counsel of respondent. Who, then, shall resolve the case in his place?

When the DOLE Secretary resolved the appeal, she merely stepped into the shoes of the BLR
Director and performed a function that the latter could not himself perform. She did so pursuant
to her power of supervision and control over the BLR. The DOLE Secretarys act of taking over
the function of the BLR Director was warranted and necessitated by the latters inhibition from
the case and the objective to maintain the integrity of the decision, as well as the Bureau itself.

**Should respondents registration be cancelled?

NO. The union members and, in fact, all the employees belonging to the appropriate bargaining
unit should not be deprived of a bargaining agent, merely because of the negligence of the union
officers who were responsible for the submission of the documents to the BLR.

Labor authorities should, indeed, act with circumspection in treating petitions for cancellation of
union registration, lest they be accused of interfering with union activities. In resolving the
petition, consideration must be taken of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article XIII,
Section 3 of the Constitution, i.e., the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities. Labor authorities should bear in
mind that registration confers upon a union the status of legitimacy and the concomitant right
and privileges granted by law to a legitimate labor organization, particularly the right to
participate in or ask for certification election in a bargaining unit. Thus, the cancellation of a
certificate of registration is the equivalent of snuffing out the life of a labor organization. For
without such registration, it losesas a ruleits rights under the Labor Code.

It is worth mentioning that the Labor Codes provisions on cancellation of union registration and
on reportorial requirements have been recently amended by Republic Act No. 9481 (An Act
Strengthening the Workers Constitutional Right to Self-Organization). The amendment sought
to strengthen the workers right to self-organization and enhance the Philippines compliance
with its international obligations as embodied in the International Labour Organization (ILO)
Convention No. 87.

ILO Convention No. 87, which we have ratified in 1953, provides that workers and employers
organizations shall not be liable to be dissolved or suspended by administrative authority. The
ILO has expressed the opinion that the cancellation of union registration by the registrar of labor
unions, which in our case is the BLR, is tantamount to dissolution of the organization by
administrative authority when such measure would give rise to the loss of legal personality of the
union or loss of advantages necessary for it to carry out its activities, which is true in our
jurisdiction. Although the ILO has allowed such measure to be taken, provided that judicial
safeguards are in place, i.e., the right to appeal to a judicial body, it has nonetheless reminded its
members that dissolution of a union, and cancellation of registration for that matter, involve
serious consequences for occupational representation. It has, therefore, deemed it preferable if
such actions were to be taken only as a last resort and after exhausting other possibilities with
less serious effects on the organization.

168.

169. STA. LUCIA EAST COMMERCIAL CORPORATION vs. sec. of labor and
employment
G.R. No. 162355. August 14, 2009.*

FACTS:
On 27 February 2001, Confederated Labor Union of the Philippines (CLUP), in behalf of
its chartered local, instituted a petition for certification election among the regular rank-
and-file employees of Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation (SLECC) and its
Affiliates. The affiliate companies included in the petition were SLE Commercial, SLE
Department Store, SLE Cinema, Robsan East Trading, Bowling Center, Planet Toys,
Home Gallery and Essentials.

On 10 October 2001, CLUP-Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation and its Affiliates
Workers Union [CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union] reorganized itself and
re-registered as CLUP-Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation Workers Association
(herein appellant CLUP-SLECCWA), limiting its membership to the rank-and-file
employees of Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation. It was issued Certificate of
Creation of a Local Chapter No. RO400-0110-CC-004.

On the same date, [CLUP-SLECCWA] filed the instant petition for direct certification. It
alleged that [SLECC] employs about 115 employees and that more than 20% of
employees belonging to the rank-and-file category are its members.

On 22 November 2001, SLECC filed a motion to dismiss the petition. It averred that it
has voluntarily recognized [SMSLEC] on 20 July 2001 as the exclusive bargaining agent
of its regular rank-and-file employees, and that collective bargaining negotiations already
commenced between them. SLECC argued that the petition should be dismissed for
violating the one year and negotiation bar rules under pars. (c) and (d), Section 11, Rule
XI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.

On 29 November 2001, a CBA between [SMSLEC] and [SLECC] was ratified by its
rank-and-file employees and registered with DOLE-Regional Office No. IV on 9 January
2002.

In the meantime, on 19 December 2001, [CLUP-SLECCWA] filed its Opposition and

Comment to [SLECCS] Motion to Dismiss.

In his Order dated 29 July 2002, Med-Arbiter Anastacio L. Bactin dismissed CLUP-
SLECCWAs petition for direct certification on the ground of contract bar rule. The prior
voluntary recognition of SMSLEC and the CBA between SLECC and SMSLEC bars the
filing of CLUP-SLECCWAs petition for direct certification. This was reversed by the
Secretary of Labor. The Secretary held that the subsequent negotiations and registration
of a CBA executed by SLECC with SMSLEC could not bar CLUP-SLECCWAs
petition. CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union constituted a registered labor
organization at the time of SLECCs voluntary recognition of SMSLEC.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the appellate court further ruled that the
Secretary of Labor and Employment (Secretary) was correct when she held that the
subsequent negotiations and registration of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
executed by SLECC with Samahang Manggagawa sa Sta. Lucia East Commercial
(SMSLEC) could not bar Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation Workers
Associations (SLECCWA) petition for direct certification.

Issue:

Can the subsequent negotiations and registration of a CBA executed by SLECC with SMSLEC
could not bar CLUP-SLECCWAs petition?

Ruling:

NEGATIVE. CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union constituted a registered labor
organization at the time of SLECCs voluntary recognition of SMSLEC. It may be recalled that
CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Unions initial problem was that they constituted a
legitimate labor organization representing a non-appropriate bargaining unit. However, CLUP-
SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union subsequently re-registered as CLUP-SLECCWA,
limiting its members to the rank-and-file of SLECC. SLECC cannot ignore that CLUP-SLECC
and its Affiliates Workers Union was a legitimate labor organization at the time of SLECCs
voluntary recognition of SMSLEC. SLECC and SMSLEC cannot, by themselves, decide whether
CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union represented an appropriate bargaining unit.

The employer may voluntarily recognize the representation status of a union in unorganized
establishments. SLECC was not an unorganized establishment when it voluntarily recognized
SMSLEC as its exclusive bargaining representative on 20 July 2001. CLUP-SLECC and its
Affiliates Workers Union filed a petition for certification election on 27 February 2001 and this
petition remained pending as of 20 July 2001. Thus, SLECCs voluntary recognition of
SMSLEC on 20 July 2001, the subsequent negotiations and resulting registration of a CBA
executed by SLECC and SMSLEC are void and cannot bar CLUP-SLECCWAs present petition
for certification election.

We find it strange that the employer itself, SLECC, filed a motion to oppose CLUP-
SLECCWAs petition for certification election. In petitions for certification election, the
employer is a mere bystander and cannot oppose the petition or appeal the Med-Arbiters
decision. The exception to this rule, which happens when the employer is requested to bargain
collectively, is not present in the case before us

NOTES:
Legitimate Labor Organization - Article 212(g) of the Labor Code defines a labor organization
as any union or association of employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of
collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of
employment. Upon compliance with all the documentary requirements, the Regional Office or
Bureau shall issue in favor of the applicant labor organization a certificate indicating that it is
included in the roster of legitimate labor organizations.[6] Any applicant labor organization shall
acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to
legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration.[7]

Bargaining Unit - is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less

than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicated
to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the
collective bargaining provisions of the law.

Fundamental factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are:

(1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine);
(2) affinity and unity of the employees interest, such as substantial similarity of work
and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual
Interests Rule);
(3) prior collective bargaining history; and
(4) similarity of employment status.

170. SAMMA-LIKHA vs. SAMMA CORPORATION

G.R. No. 167141 March 13, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner Union (Samma-Likha) filed a petition for certification election with the DOLE.
Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition arguing that (1) LIKHA Federation failed to
establish its legal personality; (2) petitioner failed to prove its existence as a local chapter; (3) it
failed to attach the certificate of non-forum shopping and (4) it had a prohibited mixture of
supervisory and rank-and-file employees.
Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioners failed to attach a
certificate of non-forum shopping. The Union filed a MR with the regional director of DOLE.
The Acting DOLE Sec, treating it as an appeal, reversed the Med-Arbiter. Respondent filed MR,
but DOLE Sec. denied.
Respondent elevated the case to the CA and it ultimately ruled in favor of respondent,
saying that under Administrative Circular No. 04-94, a certificate of non-forum shopping was
required in a petition for certification election.

ISSUE
 W/N a certificate for non-forum shopping (CNFS) is required in a petition for
certification election.

RULING
NO. Administrative Circular No. 04-94 states that: The complaint and other initiatory
pleadings referred to and subject of this Circular are the original civil complaint, counterclaim,
cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.) party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention, petition, or
application wherein a party asserts his claim for relief. The CA, in justifying its decision,
held that a petition for certification election asserts a claim, i.e., the conduct of a certification
election.
The SC ruled that the requirement for a CNFS refers to complaints, counter-claims,
cross-claims, petitions or applications where contending parties litigate their respective positions
regarding the claim for relief of the complainant, claimant, petitioner or applicant. A
certification proceeding, even though initiated by a "petition," is not a litigation but an
investigation of a non-adversarial and fact-finding character.
Such proceedings are not predicated upon an allegation of misconduct requiring
relief, but, rather, are merely of an inquisitorial nature. The Board's functions are not judicial
in nature, but are merely of an investigative character. The object of the proceedings is not the
decision of any alleged commission of wrongs nor asserted deprivation of rights but is merely
the determination of proper bargaining units and the ascertainment of the will and choice of the
employees in respect of the selection of a bargaining representative. The determination of the
proceedings does not entail the entry of remedial orders to redress rights, but culminates solely in
an official designation of bargaining units and an affirmation of the employees' expressed choice
of bargaining agent
Notably, under the Labor Code and the rules pertaining to the form of the petition for
certification election, there is no requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping either in
D.O. No. 9, series of 1997 or in D.O. No. 40-03, series of 2003 which replaced the former.
Considering the nature of a petition for certification election and the rules governing it, we
therefore hold that the requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping is inapplicable to such
a petition

171. Picop

Facts:

PRI had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with NAMAPRI-SPFL for a period of five (5)
years from May 22, 1995 until May 22, 2000. The CBA contained union security provisions
section 6.1 stating that all employees within the appropriate bargaining unit who are members
of the UNION at the time of the signing of this AGREEMENT shall, as a condition of
continued employment by the COMPANY, maintain their membership in the UNION in good
standing during the effectivity of this AGREEMENT.

PRI served notices of termination for causes to the 31 out of the 46 employees whom
NAMAPRIL-SPFL sought to be terminated on the ground of "acts of disloyalty" committed
against it when respondents allegedly supported and signed the Petition for Certification Election
of FFW before the "freedom period" during the effectivity of the CBA.

Respondents regular rank-and-file employees and bona fide members of NAMAPRI-

SPFL(Collective Baragaining Agent for PRI) filed for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal and
money claims against petitioner PICOP Resources, Incorporated and its officer, NAMAPRI-
SPFL and its officers.

The Labor Arbiter declared the respondents dismissal to be illegal and ordered PRI to reinstate
respondents to their former or equivalent positions without loss of seniority rights and to jointly
and solidarily pay their backwages.

The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter;
thus, declaring the dismissal of respondents from employment as legal.

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied for lack of merit.

Respondents then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals which
reversed the NLRC and reinstated the Labor Arbiters decision. Hence, the petition for certiorari.

Issue:

1. WHETHER AN EXISTING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT (CBA)

CAN BE GIVEN ITS FULL FORCE AND EFFECT IN ALL ITS TERMS AND
CONDITION INCLUDING ITS UNION SECURITY CLAUSE, EVEN BEYOND THE
5-YEAR PERIOD WHEN NO NEW CBA HAS YET BEEN ENTERED INTO.

PRIs reliance on their decision to terminate respondents employment on Article 253 is

misplaced. It states that "it shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to
continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the
60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties."

Article 256 states that at the expiration of the freedom period, the employer shall continue to
recognize the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent where no petition for
certification election is filed. The reason is, with a pending petition for certification, any such
agreement entered into by management with a labor organization is fraught with the risk that
such a labor union may not be chosen thereafter as the collective bargaining representative. Any
other view would render nugatory the clear statutory policy to favor certification election as the
means of ascertaining the true expression of the will of the workers as to which labor
organization would represent them.

In the instant case, four (4) petitions were filed as early as May 12, 2000. In fact, a petition for
certification election was already ordered by the Med-Arbiter of DOLE Caraga Region on
August 23, 2000.22 Therefore, following Article 256, at the expiration of the freedom period,
PRI's obligation to recognize NAMAPRI-SPFL as the incumbent bargaining agent does not hold
true when petitions for certification election were filed, as in this case.

Moreover, the last sentence of Article 253 which provides for automatic renewal pertains only to
the economic provisions of the CBA, and does not include representational aspect of the CBA.
An existing CBA cannot constitute a bar to a filing of a petition for certification election. When
there is a representational issue, the status quo provision in so far as the need to await the
creation of a new agreement will not apply. Otherwise, it will create an absurd situation where
the union members will be forced to maintain membership by virtue of the union security clause
existing under the CBA and, thereafter, support another union when filing a petition for
certification election. If we apply it, there will always be an issue of disloyalty whenever the
employees exercise their right to self-organization. The holding of a certification election is a
statutory policy that should not be circumvented,23 or compromised.

2. WAS THE TERMINATION VALID?

No. In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the union security clause, the
employer needs to determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause is applicable; (2) the
union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA; and (3) there
is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the union to expel the employee from the union.
These requisites constitute just cause for terminating an employee based on the union security
provision of the CBA.

The first two is undisputedly present. The third element is not.

The mere signing of the authorization in support of the Petition for Certification Election of FFW
on March 19, 20 and 21, or before the "freedom period," is not sufficient ground to terminate the
employment of respondents inasmuch as the petition itself was actually filed during the freedom
period. An "authorization letter to file a petition for certification election" is different from an
actual "Petition for Certification Election." Likewise, as per records, it was clear that the actual
Petition for Certification Election of FFW was filed only on May 18, 2000. 17 Thus, it was within
the ambit of the freedom period which commenced from March 21, 2000 until May 21, 2000.
Strictly speaking, what is prohibited is the filing of a petition for certification election outside the
60-day freedom period. This is not the situation in this case. If at all, the signing of the
authorization to file a certification election was merely preparatory to the filing of the petition for
certification election, or an exercise of respondents right to self-organization.
Furthermore, nothing in the records would show that respondents failed to maintain their
membership in good standing in the Union. Respondents did not resign or withdraw their
membership from the Union to which they belong. Respondents continued to pay their union
dues and never joined the FFW.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 25, 2003 and the Resolution
dated October 23, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71760, which set aside the
Resolutions dated October 8, 2001 and April 29, 2002 of the National Labor Relations
Commission in NLRC CA No. M-006309-2001, are AFFIRMED accordingly. Respondents are
hereby awarded full backwages and other allowances, without qualifications and diminutions,
computed from the time they were illegally dismissed up to the time they are actually reinstated.
Let this case be remanded to the Labor Arbiter for proper computation of the full backwages due
respondents, in accordance with Article 279 of the Labor Code, as expeditiously as possible.

172. YOKOHAMA TIRE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs.YOKOHAMA EMPLOYEES UNION

G.R. No. 159553 December 10, 2007

FACTS: On October 7, 1999, respondent Yokohama Employees Union (Union) filed a petition for certification election among
the rank-and-file employees of Yokohama. Upon appeal from the Med-Arbiters order dismissing the petition, the Secretary of
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) ordered an election with (1) "Yokohama Employees Union" and (2) "No
Union" as choices. On November 23, 2001, a certification election was held at Yokohama Tire Philippines, Inc. to certify the
Yokohama Employees Union. A total of 401 votes were cast which is broken down in the following manner: 131 in favor of
union, 117 in favor of no union, 2 spoiled ballots, and 151 votes not yet counted as they were challenged by both parties.
During the election day, Yokohama challenged 78 votes which were cast as it alleged that these 78 votes comprised of
dismissed employees who have no rights to vote in the said election. Yokohama filed a formal protest in relation thereto.

On the other hand, the union contested the eligibility of 73 votes cast as it alleged that 5 votes were cast by supervisors and 68
were cast by newly regularized employees whose names were not submitted during the pre-election conference. The union did
not formalize its protest but on election day, it already submitted a handwritten manifestation of their contest regarding the
said 73 votes. Yokohama later on questioned the procedural validity of the unions contest regarding the 73 votes.

MED ARBITER RULING: the votes of the sixty-five (65) dismissed employees who contested their dismissal before the NLRC shall
be suspended until the final disposition of their complaint and the votes of the sixty-eight (68) so-called "newly-regularized"
rank-and-file employees shall be appreciated in the final tabulation.

Upon appealDOLE SEC DECISION: partial appeal of [Yokohama] is DENIED and the appeal of [the union] is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The votes of dismissed employees who contested their dismissal before the NLRC shall be appreciated in the final
tabulation of the certification election results. The votes of the sixty-eight (68) newly regularized rank-and-file employees
shall be excluded.

CA DECISION: affirmed in toto the decision of the DOLE Acting Secretary.

Yokohama tires appealed the CAs decision. it argued that "the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the votes of the dismissed
employees should be appreciated." Petitioner posits that "employees who have quit or have been dismissed for just cause prior
to the date of the certification election are excluded from participating in the certification election." Petitioner had questioned
the eligibility to vote of the 78 dismissed employees.

Respondent counters that Section 2, Rule XII16 of the rules implementing Book V of the Labor Code allows a dismissed
employee to vote in the certification election if the case contesting the dismissal is still pending.
ISSUE: Whether or not the votes cast by the dismissed employees should be counted.

HELD: Yes. The 78 dismissed employees, in this case, were currently contesting their dismissal as there was a pending illegal
dismissal case filed by them against Yokohama. Section 2, Rule XII of the rules implementing Book V of the Labor Code allows a
dismissed employee to vote in the certification election if the case contesting the dismissal is still pending.

Here, the votes of employees with illegal dismissal cases were challenged by petitioner although their cases were still pending
at the time of the certification election on November 23, 2001. These cases were filed on June 27, 2001 18 and the appeal of the
Labor Arbiters February 28, 2003 Decision was resolved by the NLRC only on August 29, 2003.19

Even the new rule20 has explicitly stated that without a final judgment declaring the legality of dismissal, dismissed employees
are eligible or qualified voters. Thus,

Rule IX Conduct of Certification Election

Section 5. Qualification of voters; inclusion-exclusion. . . . An employee who has been dismissed from work but has contested
the legality of the dismissal in a forum of appropriate jurisdiction at the time of the issuance of the order for the conduct of a
certification election shall be considered a qualified voter, unless his/her dismissal was declared valid in a final judgment at the
time of the conduct of the certification election.

Hence, the court finds no reversible error on the part of the DOLE Acting Secretary and the Court of Appeals in ordering the
appreciation of the votes of the dismissed employees.

The court further stated that it need not resolve the other issues for being moot. The 68 votes of the newly regularized rank-
and-file employees, even if counted in favor of "No Union," will not materially alter the result. There would still be 208 votes in
favor of respondent and 18921 votes in favor of "No Union."

The certification election is already a fait accompli, and clearly petitioners rank-and-file employees had chosen respondent as
their bargaining representative.

SC RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated April 9, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74273 and the Resolution dated August 15, 2003 are AFFIRMED.

173.

174.

175. FVCLU-PTGWO vs. SANAMA-FVC-SIGLO

G.R. No. 176249, November 27, 2009

Facts:

On December 22, 1997, the petitioner FVCLU-PTGWO the recognized bargaining agent of the rank-and-
file employees of the FVC Philippines, Incorporated (company) signed a five-year collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) with the company. The five-year CBA period was from February 1, 1998 to January 30, 2003. At
the end of the 3rd year of the five-year term, FVCLU-PTGWO and the company entered into the renegotiation of the
CBA and modified, among other provisions, the CBAs duration. Article XXV, Section 2 of the renegotiated CBA
provides that this re-negotiation agreement shall take effect beginning February 1, 2001 and until May 31,
2003 thus extending the original five-year period of the CBA by four (4) months.
 On January 21, 2003, nine (9) days before the January 30, 2003 expiration of the originally-agreed five-year
CBA term (and four [4] months and nine [9] days away from the expiration of the amended CBA period), the
respondent Sama-Samang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa FVC-Solidarity of Independent and General Labor
Organizations (SANAMA-SIGLO) filed before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a petition for
certification election for the same rank-and-file unit covered by the FVCLU-PTGWO CBA. FVCLU-PTGWO
moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the certification election petition was filed outside the freedom
period or outside of the sixty (60) days before the expiration of the CBA on May 31, 2003. On June 17, 2003, Med-
Arbiter dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed outside the 60-day period counted from the May 31,
2003 expiry date of the amended CBA. SANAMA-SIGLO appealed the Med-Arbiters Order to the DOLE
Secretary, contending that the filing of the petition on January 21, 2003 was within 60-days from the January 30,
2003 expiration of the original CBA term. DOLE Secretary sustained SANAMA-SIGLOs position, thereby setting
aside the decision of the Med-Arbiter. She ordered the conduct of a certification election. FVCLU-PTGWO moved
for the reconsideration of the Secretarys decision which was granted by DOLE Acting Secretary on November 06,
2003. The Acting Secretary held that the amended CBA (which extended the representation aspect of the original
CBA by four [4] months) had been ratified by members of the bargaining unit some of whom later organized
themselves as SANAMA-SIGLO, the certification election applicant. Since these SANAMA-SIGLO members fully
accepted and in fact received the benefits arising from the amendments, the Acting Secretary rationalized that they
also accepted the extended term of the CBA and cannot now file a petition for certification election based on the
original CBA expiration date.

SANAMA-SIGLO moved for the reconsideration of the Acting Secretarys Order but denied by the
Secretary on January 30, 2004.

SANAMA-SIGLO sought relief from the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court based on the grave abuse of discretion the Labor Secretary committed when she reversed her earlier decision
calling for a certification election. SANAMA-SIGLO pointed out that the Secretarys new ruling is patently
contrary to the express provision of the law and established jurisprudence.The CA found SANAMA-SIGLOs
petition meritorious on the basis of the applicable law and the rules. It set aside the challenged DOLE Secretary
decisions and reinstated her earlier ruling calling for a certification election. FVCLU-PTGWO moved to reconsider
the CA decision but the CA denied the motion. Thus, this petition under Rule 45.

Issues:
(1) What is the effect of the amended or extended term of the CBA on the exclusive representation status of the
collective bargaining agent?
(2) May another union ask for certification as exclusive bargaining agent? Was the petition for certification
election filed on time?

Ruling:

(1) While the parties may agree to extend the CBAs original five-year term together with all
other CBA provisions, any such amendment or term in excess of five years will not carry with it a
change in the unions exclusive collective bargaining status. By express provision of Article 253-A,
the exclusive bargaining status cannot go beyond five years and the representation status is a legal
matter not for the workplace parties to agree upon. In other words, despite an agreement for a CBA
with a life of more than five years, either as an original provision or by amendment, the bargaining
unions exclusive bargaining status is effective only for five years and can be challenged within sixty
(60) days prior to the expiration of the CBAs first five years.
FVCLU-PTGWO has taken the view that its exclusive representation status should fully be in step
with the term of the CBA and that this status can be challenged only within 60 days before the expiration of
this term. Thus, when the term of the CBA was extended, its exclusive bargaining status was similarly
extended so that the freedom period for the filing of a petition for certification election should be counted
back from the expiration of the amended CBA term. FVCLU-PTGWO position is correct, but only with
respect to the original five-year term of the CBA which, by law, is also the effective period of the unions
exclusive bargaining representation status.
 (2) The negotiated extension of the CBA term has no legal effect on the FVCLU-PTGWOs exclusive
bargaining representation status which remained effective only for five years ending on the original expiry
date of January 30, 2003. Thus, sixty days prior to this date, or starting December 2, 2002, SANAMA-
SIGLO could properly file a petition for certification election. Its petition, filed on January 21, 2003 or
nine (9) days before the expiration of the CBA and of FVCLU-PTGWOs exclusive bargaining status, was
seasonably filed.

There is no error in the appellate courts ruling reinstating the DOLE order for the conduct of a
certification election. If this ruling cannot now be given effect, the only reason is SANAMA-SIGLOs
own desistance; we cannot disregard its manifestation that the members of SANAMA themselves are no
longer interested in contesting the exclusive collective bargaining agent status of FVCLU-PTGWO. This
recognition is fully in accord with the Labor Codes intent to foster industrial peace and harmony in the
workplace.

176.

177. San Miguel Corp. Employees Union-PTGWO vs. Confessor

G.R. no. 111262 September 19, 1996

Facts:

On June 28, 1990, petitioner-union San Miguel Corporation Employees Union PTGWO
entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with private respondent San Miguel Corporation
(SMC) to take effect upon the expiration of the previous CBA or on June 30, 1989. Effective October 1,
1991, Magnolia and Feeds and Livestock Division were spun-off and became two separate and distinct
corporations: Magnolia Corporation (Magnolia) and San Miguel Foods, Inc. (SMFI). Notwithstanding the
spin-offs, the CBA remained in force and effect.

After June 30, 1992, the CBA was renegotiated in accordance with the terms of the CBA and
Article 253-A of the Labor Code. Negotiations started sometime in July, 1992 with the two parties
submitting their respective proposals and counterproposals. During the negotiations, the petitioner-union
insisted that the bargaining unit of SMC should still include the employees of the spun-off corporations -
Magnolia and SMFI - and that the renegotiated terms of the CBA shall be effective only for the remaining
period of two years or until June 30, 1994. SMC, on the other hand, contended that the
members/employees who had moved to Magnolia and SMFI, automatically ceased to be part of the
bargaining unit at the SMC. Furthermore, the CBA should be effective for three years in accordance with
Art. 253-A of the Labor Code.

Unable to agree on these issues with respect to the bargaining unit and duration of the CBA,
petitioner-union declared a deadlock on September 29, 1990. On October 2, 1992, a Notice of Strike was
filed against SMC. In order to avert a strike, SMC requested the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB) to conduct preventive mediation. No settlement was arrived at despite several meetings
held between the parties. On November 3, 1992, a strike vote was conducted which resulted in a yes
vote in favor of a strike. On November 4, 1992, private respondents SMC, Magnolia and SMFI filed a
petition with the Secretary of Labor praying that the latter assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute in a
vital industry. Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. Several conciliation
meetings were held but still no agreement/settlement was arrived at by both parties.
 After the parties submitted their respective position papers, the Secretary of Labor issued the
assailed Order on February 15, 1993 directing, among others, that the renegotiated terms of the
CBA shall be effective for the period of three (3) years from June 30, 1992; and that such CBA shall
cover only the employees of SMC and not of Magnolia and SMFI. TRO was filed and granted.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the duration of the renegotiated terms of the CBA is to be effective for three years
or for only two years;
2) Whether or not the bargaining unit of SMC includes also the employees of the Magnolia and
SMFI.

Ruling:

1. The Court agrees with the Secretary of Labor. Pertinent to the first issue is Art. 253-A of the Labor
Code as amended. Article 253-A is a new provision. This was incorporated by Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 6715 (the Herrera-Veloso Law) which took effect on March 21, 1989. This
new provision states that the CBA has a term of five (5) years instead of three years, before the
amendment of the law as far as the representation aspect is concerned. All other provisions of the CBA
shall be negotiated not later than three (3) years after its execution. The representation aspect refers to
the identity and majority status of the union that negotiated the CBA as the exclusive bargaining
representative of the appropriate bargaining unit concerned. All other provisions simply refers to the
rest of the CBA, economic as well as non-economic provisions, except representation.

The representation aspect refers to the identity and majority status of the union that negotiated
the CBA as the exclusive bargaining representative of the appropriate bargaining unit concerned. All
other provisions simply refers to the rest of the CBA, economic as well as non-economic provisions,
except representation. The law is clear and definite on the duration of the CBA insofar as the
representation aspect is concerned, but is quite ambiguous with the terms of the other provisions of the
CBA. It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that the Court must ascertain the legislative intent
for the purpose of giving effect to any statute. The legislators were more inclined to have the period of
effectivity for three (3) years insofar as the economic as well as non-economic provisions are concerned,
except representation. Obviously, the framers of the law wanted to maintain industrial peace and stability
by having both management and labor work harmoniously together without any disturbance. Thus, no
outside union can enter the establishment within five (5) years and challenge the status of the incumbent
union as the exclusive bargaining agent. Likewise, the terms and conditions of employment (economic
and non-economic) cannot be questioned by the employers or employees during the period of effectivity
of the CBA. The CBA is a contract between the parties and the parties must respect the terms and
conditions of the agreement.

2. The Court agreed with the Secretary of Labor. the transformation of the companies was a
management prerogative and business judgment which the courts cannot look into unless it is contrary to
law, public policy or morals. Neither can bad faith be imputed on the part of SMC so as to justify the
application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. Ever mindful of the employees interests,
management has assured the concerned employees that they will be absorbed by the new corporations
without loss of tenure and retaining their present pay and benefits according to the existing CBAs. They
were advised that upon the expiration of the CBAs, new agreements will be negotiated between the
management of the new corporations and the bargaining representatives of the employees concerned.
Magnolia and SMFI became distinct entities with separate juridical personalities. Thus, they can not
belong to a single bargaining unit.
 Moreover, in determining an appropriate bargaining unit, the test of grouping is mutuality or
commonality of interests. The employees sought to be represented by the collective bargaining agent must
have substantial mutual interests in terms of employment and working conditions as evinced by the type
of work they performed. Considering the spin-offs, the companies would consequently have their
respective and distinctive concerns in terms of the nature of work, wages, hours of work and other
conditions of employment. Interests of employees in the different companies perforce differ. SMC is
engaged in the business of the beer manufacturing. Magnolia is involved in the manufacturing and
processing of diary products while SMFI is involved in the production of feeds and the processing of
chicken. The nature of their products and scales of business may require different skills which must
necessarily be commensurated by different compensation packages. The different companies may have
different volumes of work and different working conditions. For such reason, the employees of the
different companies see the need to group themselves together and organize themselves into distinctive
and different groups. It would then be best to have separate bargaining units for the different companies
where the employees can bargain separately according to their needs and according to their own working
conditions.

178. Tabigue, et. al. vs. International Copra Export Corp.

GR No. 183335
December 23, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner Tabigue and his 19 co-petitioners, all employees of respondent INTERCO,
filed a Notice of Preventive Mediation with the DOLE NCMB against respondent, for violation
of the CBA and failure to sit on the grievance conference/meeting.

As the parties failed to reach a settlement before the NCMB, petitioners requested to
elevate the case to voluntary arbitration.

Before the parties could finally meet, respondent presented before the NCMB a letter of
INTERCO Employees/Laborers Union president Tan, addressed to respondents plant manager
Engr. Tangente, stating that petitioners "are not duly authorized by the]board or the officers to
represent the union, hence all actions, representations or agreements made by these people
with the management will not be honored or recognized by the union." Respondent thus moved
to dismiss petitioners complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioners soon sent union president Tan and respondents plant manager Tangente a
Notice to Arbitrate.

The parties having failed to arrive at a settlement, NCMB Director Yosores wrote
petitioner Bibat and respondents plant manager Tangente of the lack of willingness of both
parties to submit to voluntary arbitration, which willingness is a pre-requisite to submit the case
thereto; and that under the CBA forged by the parties, the union is an indispensable party to a
voluntary arbitration but that since Tan informed respondent that the union had not authorized
petitioners to represent it, it would be absurd to bring the case to voluntary arbitration.
 The NCMB Director thus concluded that "the demand of petitioners to submit the issues
to voluntary arbitration CAN NOT BE GRANTED." He thus advised petitioners to avail of the
compulsory arbitration process to enforce their rights.

Issue:
1. Are the petitioners duly authorized to represent the union, thus their unsettled
grievances should be referred to voluntary arbitration as called for in the CBA?
2. Can the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator be the subject of judicial review pursuant
to their quasi-judicial capacity?

Ruling:

(first issue)

No. Petitioners have not been duly authorized to represent the union.
Apropos is this Courts pronouncement in Atlas Farms, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, viz:

x x x Pursuant to Article 260 of the Labor Code, the parties to a CBA shall name or designate their
respective representatives to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is unsettled in that
level, it shall automatically be referred to the voluntary arbitrators designated in advance by parties
to a CBA. Consequently only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to
the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.

Clutching at straws, petitioners invoke the first paragraph of Article 255 of the Labor
Code which states:

Art. 255. The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an
appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in
such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. However, an individual employee or group of
employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer.

To petitioners, the immediately quoted provision is meant to be an exception to the

exclusiveness of the representative role of the labor organization/union.

This Court is not persuaded. The right of any employee or group of employees to
present grievances to the employer does not imply the right to submit the same to voluntary
arbitration.

(second issue)

No. The NCMB can not be considered a quasi-judicial agency.

Under Section 9 (3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the CA exercises
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards
of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions.

An agency is said to be exercising judicial function where it has the power to determine
what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine
these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function is a term
which applies to the action, discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or bodies, who are
required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial
nature.

Given NCMBs following functions, as enumerated in Section 22 of Executive Order No.

126 (the Reorganization Act of the Ministry of Labor and Employment), it can not be considered
a quasi-judicial agency. viz:

(a) Formulate policies, programs, standards, procedures, manuals of operation and

guidelines pertaining to effective mediation and conciliation of labor disputes;
(b) Perform preventive mediation and conciliation functions;
(c) Coordinate and maintain linkages with other sectors or institutions, and other government
authorities concerned with matters relative to the prevention and settlement of labor disputes;
(d) Formulate policies, plans, programs, standards, procedures, manuals of operation and
guidelines pertaining to the promotion of cooperative and non-adversarial schemes, grievance
handling, voluntary arbitration and other voluntary modes of dispute settlement; (e)
Administer the voluntary arbitration program; maintain/update a list of voluntary arbitrations;
compile arbitration awards and decisions;
(f) Provide counseling and preventive mediation assistance particularly in the administration
of collective agreements;
(g) Monitor and exercise technical supervision over the Board programs being implemented
in the regional offices; and
(h) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law or assigned by the Minister.

179.

180.

181.

182. GREAT PACIFIC EMPLOYEES UNION vs. NLRC

Facts

Petitioner and respondent entered sometime in 1990 into a CBA to take effect July 1, 1990 until
June 30, 1993.

About a month and a half before the expiration of the CBA, the parties submitted their respective
proposals and counter-proposals to serve as bases for their discussions on its projected renewal.
The ensuing series of negotiations however resulted in a deadlock prompting petitioner to file a
notice of strike with the NCMB. Despite several conciliatory conferences before the Board, the
impasse could not be resolved. Thus, petitioner UNION led by its President Domingo and Vice
President de la Rosa went on strike.

Respondent required all striking employees to explain in writing within 48 hours why no
disciplinary action, including possible dismissal from employment, should be taken against them
for committing illegal acts against the company in the course of the strike. The company
directive was apparently triggered by some violent incidents that took place while the strike was
in progress. Strikers reportedly blocked all points of ingress and egress of the company premises
in Makati City thus preventing Grepalife employees reporting for work from entering their
respective offices. These employees and third persons doing business with the company,
including lessees of the Grepalife building, were allegedly forced by the strikers to submit their
cars/vehicles, bags and other belongings to illegal search. Union PresidentDomingo and some
strikers explained that they did not violate any law as they were merely exercising their
constitutional right to strike. Petitioner de la Rosa and the rest of the strikers however ignored the
management directive.

Grepalife found the explanation of Domingo totally unsatisfactory and considered de la Rosa as
having waived his right to be heard. Thus, both officers were notified of the termination of their
services, effective immediately, as Senior Benefits Clerk and Senior Data Analyst, respectively.
All other strikers whose explanations were found unacceptable or who failed to submit written
explanations were likewise dismissed. Domingo and de la Rosa continued to lead the members
of the striking union in their concerted action against management.

The NCMB resumed conciliatory conferences between the disputants. Respondent submitted a
draft Agreement as the last and final offer by Management. Petitioner Union assented to the
offers. The parties then executed a MOA before the NCMB which ended their dispute.

Domingo and de la Rosa filed a joint letter of resignation with respondent company but
emphasized therein that (their) resignation is submitted only because the same is demanded by
the Company, and it should not be understood as a waiveras none is expressingly or impliedly
madeof whatever rights (they) may have under existing contracts and labor and social
legislation. Domingo and de la Rosa then sued respondent for illegal dismissal, unfair labor
practice and damages.

The LA sustained the charge of illegal dismissal. He found that the evidence of respondent
company consisting of affidavits of its employees was self-serving and inadequate to prove the
illegal acts allegedly committed during the strike by Domingo and de la Rosa. The LA
rationalized that if indeed there was justifiable ground to terminate complaints employment,
there would have been no need for the company to demand the resignation of the two union
officers in exchange for the reinstatement of all the strikers. He branded this offer as nothing
more than a scheme to get rid the complainants, noting the undue haste with which their services
were terminated by the respondent company. This, he observed, constituted nothing less than a
deprivation of due process of law.

Both parties appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC rejected the finding that Domingo and de la Rosa
were illegally dismissed, contending that a just cause for dismissal had been sufficiently
established. However, it agreed that respondent company failed to comply strictly with the
requirements of due process prior to termination. Respondents MR was denied. Pending finality
thereof, respondent company and Domingo entered into compromise agreement which they
submitted to the NLRC for approval. The NLRC considered the case against Domingo
terminated, and denied de la Rosas MR.
Issues and Ruling

Did the NLRC err in ruling that Domingo and de la Rosa were not illegally dismissed?

NO, the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The right to strike, while
constitutionally recognized, is not without legal constrictions. The Labor Code is emphatic
against the use of violence, coercion and intimidation during a strike and to this end prohibits the
obstruction of free passage to and from the employers premises for lawful purposes. The
sanction provided in Article 262(a) is so severe that any worker or union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his
employment status. Respondent submitted before the LA several affidavits of its employees
which de la Rosa did not refute. Of these documents, 2 specifically described the illegal incidents
that transpired during the strike.

While it is true that affidavits may be regarded as infirm evidence before the regular courts
unless the affiants are presented on the stand, such affidavits by themselves are acceptable in
proceedings before the LA. Under Section 7, Rule V, of the New Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC, these proceedings, save for the constitutional requirements of due process, are not to be
strictly governed by the technicalities of law and procedural rules. Section 3(2) of the same Rule
provides that verified position papers are to be accompanied by all supporting documents
including the affidavits of the parties respective witnesses in lieu of direct testimony. It is
therefore a clear mandate that the LA may employ all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of
the controversy before him.

Since de la Rosa did not present countervailing evidence, the NLRC correctly appreciated the
affidavits of the 2 security guards as having adequately established the charges leveled against de
la Rosa thus justifying his dismissal from employment.

Was de la Rosa forced to resign?

NO. The joint letter of resignation submitted by Domingo and de la Rosa a day after the MOA
was executed was never acted upon by respondent company. And rightly so for, having been
earlier dismissed, on November 16, 1993, these 2 union officers had no more employment to
resign from. To be sure, under the MOA their resignations were no longer a condition imposed
by respondent company for the eventual reinstatement of the other strikers. This being the case,
de la Rosa cannot now complain that he was forced to resign.

Did respondent company commit unfair labor practice (discrimination)?

NO. While an act or decision of an employer may be unfair, certainly not every unfair act or
decision constitutes unfair labor practice as defined and enumerated under Article 248 of the
Labor Code.

There should be no dispute that all the prohibited acts instituting unfair labor practice in essence
relate to the workers right to self-organization. Thus, an employer may be held liable under this
provision if his conduct affects in whatever manner the right of an employee to self-organize.
The decision of respondent to consider the top officers of petitioner as unfit for reinstatement is
not essentially discriminatory and constitutive of an unlawful labor practice of employers.
Discriminating in the context of the Code involves either encouraging membership in any labor
organization or is made on account of the employee's having given or being about to give
testimony under the Labor Code. These have not been proved in the case at bar.

To elucidate further, there can be no discrimination where the employees concerned are not
similarly situated. A union officer has larger and heavier responsibilities than a union member.
Union officers are duty bound to respect the law and to exhort and guide their members to do the
same; their position mandates them to lead by example. By committing prohibited activities
during the strike, de la Rosa as Vice President of petitioner Union demonstrated a high degree of
imprudence and irresponsibility. Verily this justifies his dismissal from employment. Since the
objective of the Labor Code is to ensure a stable but dynamic and just industrial peace, the
dismissal of undesirable labor leaders should be upheld.

That respondent company opted to reinstate all the strikers except Domingo and de la Rosa is an
option taken in good faith for the just and lawful protection and advancement of its interest.
Readmitting the union members to the exclusion of Domingo and de la Rosa was nothing less
than a sound exercise of management prerogative, an act of self-preservation in fact, designed to
insure the maintenance of peace and order in the company premises. The dismissal of de la Rosa
who had shown his capacity for unmitigated mischief was intended to avoid a recurrence of the
violence that attended the fateful strike in November.

183.

184.

185.

186.

187. HACIENDA FATIMA vs. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE

WORKERS-FOOD AND GENERAL TRADE

G.R. No. 149440 January 28, 2003

FACTS:

Contrary to the findings of the Labor Arbiter that complainants [herein respondents] refused to
work and/or were choosy in the kind of jobs they wanted to perform, the records is replete with
complainants' persistence and dogged determination in going back to work.

It appears that respondents did not look with favor workers' having organized themselves into a
union. Thus, when complainant union was certified as the collective bargaining representative in
the certification elections, respondents refused to sit down with the union for the purpose of
entering into a collective bargaining agreement. Moreover, the workers including complainants
were not given work for more than one month. In protest, complainants staged a strike which
was however settled upon the signing of a Memorandum of Agreement.

Alleging that complainants failed to load the fifteen wagons, respondents reneged on its
commitment to sit down and bargain collectively. Thereafter, respondents did not give work
assignments to the complainants forcing the union to stage a strike yet again. But due to the
conciliation efforts by the DOLE, another Memorandum of Agreement was signed by the
complainants and respondents.

Respondents again reneged on its commitment; prompting complainants to file the present
complaint.

ISSUE: WON peitioner committed ULP.

RULING:

The NLRC also found herein petitioners guilty of unfair labor practice. It ruled as follows:

"Indeed, from respondents' refusal to bargain, to their acts of economic

inducements resulting in the promotion of those who withdrew from the union, the
use of armed guards to prevent the organizers to come in, and the dismissal of union
officials and members, one cannot but conclude that respondents did not want a
union in their haciendaa clear interference in the right of the workers to self-
organization."

We uphold the CA's affirmation of the above findings. Indeed, factual findings of labor officials,
who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions, are
generally accorded not only respect but even finality. Their findings are binding on the Supreme
Court. Verily, their conclusions are accorded great weight upon appeal, especially when
supported by substantial evidence. Consequently, the Court is not duty-bound to delve into the
accuracy of their factual findings, in the absence of a clear showing that these were arbitrary and
bereft of any rational basis."

The finding of unfair labor practice done in bad faith carries with it the sanction of moral and
exemplary damages.

188. SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA BANDOLINO-LMLC vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 125195 July 17, 1997

Facts:
Petitioners are former employees of private respondent Bandolino Shoe Corporation and
members of petitioner union, Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Bandolino-LMLC. Private
respondents German Alcantara, Aida Alcantara, and Mimi Alcantara are the owners and officers
of Bandolino Shoe Corporation.

Petitioners Franco, Florencio, and Reyes were directed to take a two-week leave because of a
strike at the Shoemart, Bandolinos biggest customer. Petitioners were told by management that,
should the circumstances improve, they would be recalled to work after two weeks. Later that
day, petitioner Marcial Franco and his wife were called to the personnel managers office and told
that Ligaya Franco had been dismissed. Marcial Franco pleaded with German Alcantara not to
terminate his wife from employment, but his entreaties were rejected, allegedly because of his
refusal to divulge the names of the organizers and members of the petitioner union. Three other
relatives, were subsequently dismissed. Other petitioners were likewise informed by the
personnel manager of the termination of their employment and asked to turn in their
identification cards.

The petitioners tried to return to work after two weeks, but they were refused entry into the
company premises. Subsequent efforts to return to work were likewise thwarted. The
management refused to allow them to return to work allegedly to prevent any untoward incident
between the petitioner union and the Bandolino Shoes Independent Labor Union.

Petitioners filed a notice of strike. A conciliation conference was held but it was unsuccessful.
Although petitioners did not strike, they staged a picket for one hour each on two successive
Saturdays to protest their dismissal.

They filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, underpayment, overtime pay,
and holiday pay. The Labor Arbiter decided the case in favor of petitioners. He found that
petitioners had been illegally dismissed because of their union activities and that private
respondents had committed unfair labor practice. Pursuant to the decision of the labor arbiter,
private respondents sent telegrams to the petitioners ordering them to report to work
immediately. Failure to do so within 10 days shall be interpreted that they are no longer
interested to work.

In a letter, petitioners responded, that while all the complainants are ready and willing to return
to work at the soonest time possible and while we do not in any way reject the scheduled
reinstatement, it may not be possible within the time frame stated in the telegram. In response,
private respondents state that there is no justifiable reason why they should not immediately
return to work and cause unnecessary delay.

Private respondents appealed to the NLRC, contending that the rotation of petitioners was not a
termination of employment; that petitioners did not report for work although they had been
reinstated; and that the labor arbiters finding that the company imposed illegal conditions was
based upon an off the record offer which was privileged in nature and therefore could not be
used in evidence against private respondents.

In its decision, the NLRC reversed the labor arbiter. It ruled that except for Jaime Sibug,
petitioners were all piece-rate workers entitled only to 13th month pay for three years. It held
further that there was no evidence showing specific instances of coercion or restraint committed
by the private respondents to justify a finding of ULP.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not Private respondents committed Unfair Labor practice ?

RULING:

In this case, the labor arbiters finding of illegal dismissal was based not only upon the private
respondents off the record offer containing illegal conditions but also on facts of record found by
the arbiter which the NLRC disregarded. These are: (1) that following the order for rotation,
some of the petitioners were made to surrender their IDs and (2) that although the rotation
scheme was ostensibly implemented because of the Shoemart strike, even after the strike had
ended, petitioners attempts to return to work were thwarted. In truth, private respondents claim
that petitioners, who were regular employees, were put on rotation while the casual workers were
not because petitioners were skilled and it was much easier for them to find new jobs only
succeeds in revealing their real intention.

Even disregarding evidence of the illegal conditions imposed by private respondents for
petitioners return to work, there was substantial evidence remaining in the record to sustain the
labor arbiters decision that private respondents were guilty of ULP. There was evidence to the
effect that Franco had been asked to disclose the names of the members of the union and that the
management had shown interest in the unionizing activities of the petitioners. What is more, it
appears that only alleged members of the petitioner union were put on rotation. The labor arbiters
observation during the hearing that the private respondents had shown hostility towards
petitioners for their union activities is a determination of fact which is based on the totality of
private respondents conduct, indicating anti-union bias. Nor is it disputed that private
respondents opposed petitioners petition for certification election when this matter should be the
sole concern of the workers. Private respondents interest belies their claim that they were not
aware of petitioners organizational and union activities prior to the unions registration. An
employer may be guilty of ULP in interfering with the right to self-organization even before the
union has been registered.
189. ST. JOHN COLLEGES, INC. vs. ST. JOHN ACADEMY FACULTY AND
EMPLOYEES UNION

G.R. No. 167892 October 27, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioner St. John Colleges, Inc. (SJCI) is a domestic corporation which owns and operates the
St. Johns Academy. The Academy offered a secondary course only. The high school then
employed about 80 teaching and non-teaching personnel who were members of the St. John
Academy Faculty & Employees Union (Union). The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
between SJCI and the Union was set to expire on May 31, 1997. During the ensuing collective
bargaining negotiations, SJCI rejected all the proposals of the Union for an increase in workers
benefits. This resulted to a bargaining deadlock which led to the holding of a valid strike by the
Union on November 10, 1997. In order to end the strike, on November 27, 1997, SJCI and the
Union, through the efforts of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), agreed to
refer the labor dispute to the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE) for assumption of
jurisdiction.

After which, the strike ended and classes resumed. Subsequently, the SOLE issued an Order
dated January 19, 1998 assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute pursuant to Article 263 of
the Labor Code. The parties were required to submit their respective position papers within ten
(10) days from receipt of said Order.

Pending resolution of the labor dispute before the SOLE, the Board of Directors of SJCI
approved on February 22, 1998 a resolution recommending the closure of the high school which
was approved by the stockholders on even date.

Subsequently, some teaching and non-teaching personnel of the high school agreed to the
closure. On April 2, 1998, SJCI informed the DOLE that as of March 31, 1998, 51 employees
had received their separation compensation package while 25 employees refused to accept the
same.

On May 4, 1998, the aforementioned 25 employees conducted a protest action within the
perimeter of the high school. The Union filed a notice of strike with the NCMB only on May 7,
1998.

On May 19, 1998, SJCI filed a petition to declare the strike illegal before the NLRC which was
docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-IV-5-10035-98-L. It claimed that the strike was conducted in
violation of the procedural requirements for holding a valid strike under the Labor Code.

On May 21, 1998, the 25 employees filed a complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP), illegal
dismissal and nonpayment of monetary benefits against SJCI before the NLRC. The Union
members alleged that the closure of the high school was done in bad faith in order to get rid of
the Union and render useless any decision of the SOLE on the CBA deadlocked issues.
These two cases were then consolidated. On January 8, 1999, Labor Arbiter Antonio R. Macam
rendered a Decision dismissing the Unions complaint for ULP and illegal dismissal while
granting SJCIs petition to declare the strike illegal coupled with a declaration of loss of
employment status of the 25 Union members involved in the strike.

After the favorable decision of the Labor Arbiter, SJCI resolved to reopen the high school for
school year 19992000. However, it did not restore the high school teaching and non-teaching
employees it earlier terminated. That same school year SJCI opened an elementary and college
department.

The NLRC rendered judgment reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It found SJCI guilty
of ULP and illegal dismissal and ordered it to reinstate the 25 employees to their former
positions without loss of seniority rights and other benefits, and with full backwages.

The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the NLRC. Hence this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether it is liable for ULP and illegal dismissal when it closed down the high school on
March 31, 1998 and

2. Whether the Union is liable for illegal strike due to the protest actions which its 25
members undertook within the high schools perimeter on May 4, 1998.

HELD:
The petition lacks merit.

Prior to the closure of the high school by SJCI, the parties agreed to refer the 1997 CBA
deadlock to the SOLE for assumption of jurisdiction under Article 263 of the Labor Code. As a
result, the strike ended and classes resumed. After the SOLE assumed jurisdiction, it required the
parties to submit their respective position papers. However, instead of filing its position paper,
SJCI closed its high school, allegedly because of the "irreconcilable differences between the
school management and the Academys Union particularly the safety of our students and the
financial aspect of the ongoing CBA negotiations." Thereafter, SJCI moved to dismiss the
pending labor dispute with the SOLE contending that it had become moot because of the closure.
Nevertheless, a year after said closure, SJCI reopened its high school and did not rehire the
previously terminated employees.

Under these circumstances, it is not difficult to discern that the closure was done to defeat the
parties agreement to refer the labor dispute to the SOLE; to unilaterally end the bargaining
deadlock; to render nugatory any decision of the SOLE; and to circumvent the Unions right to
collective bargaining and its members right to security of tenure. By admitting that the closure
was due to irreconcilable differences between the Union and school management, specifically,
the financial aspect of the ongoing CBA negotiations, SJCI in effect admitted that it wanted to
end the bargaining deadlock and eliminate the problem of dealing with the demands of the
Union. This is precisely what the Labor Code abhors and punishes as unfair labor practice
since the net effect is to defeat the Unions right to collective bargaining.
The Labor Code does not authorize the employer to close down the establishment on the ground
of illegal or excessive demands of the Union. Instead, aside from the remedy of submitting the
dispute for voluntary or compulsory arbitration, the employer may file a complaint for ULP
against the Union for bargaining in bad faith. If found guilty, this gives rise to civil and criminal
liabilities and allows the employer to implement a lock out, but not the closure of the
establishment resulting to the permanent loss of employment of the whole workforce.

In fine, SJCI undermined the Labor Codes system of dispute resolution by closing down the
high school while the 1997 CBA negotiations deadlock issues were pending resolution before the
SOLE. The closure was done in bad faith for the purpose of defeating the Unions right to
collective bargaining. Besides, as found by the NLRC, the alleged illegality and excessiveness of
the Unions demands were not sufficiently proved by SJCI. Even on the assumption that the
Unions demands were illegal or excessive, SJCIs remedy was to await the resolution by the
SOLE and to file a ULP case against the Union. However, SJCI did not have the power to take
matters into its own hands by closing down the school in order to get rid of the Union.

Finally, when SJCI reopened its high school, it did not rehire the Union members. Evidently, the
closure had achieved its purpose, that is, to get rid of the Union members.

Lastly, SJCI asserts that the strike conducted by the 25 employees on May 4, 1998 was illegal for
failure to take the necessary strike vote and give a notice of strike. However, we agree with the
findings of the NLRC and CA that the protest actions of the Union cannot be considered a strike
because, by then, the employer-employee relationship has long ceased to exist because of the
previous closure of the high school on March 31, 1998.

190. PUREFOODS VS. NAGKAKAISANG SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG

PUREFOODS
GR. No. 150896, August 28, 2008

Facts:

Three labor organizations and a federation are respondents in this case NAGSAMA-Purefoods,
the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file workers of Purefoods, STFWU, (Sto. Tomas, Batangas)
and PGFWU (Sta. Rosa, Laguna). The three were affiliates of the respondent federation, Purefoods
Unified Labor Organization (PULO). They manifested their desire to re-negotiate CBA and submitted
their respective demands and proposals. They also authorized a negotiating panel which included a
PULO representative. While Purefoods formally acknowledged receipt of the unions proposals, but
refused to negotiate with the unions should a PULO representative be in the panel which resulted in a
deadlock. However, the petitioner company concluded a new CBA with another union in its farm in
Malvar, Batangas and terminated the service of regular rank-and file workers in Sto Tomas. The farm
manager, supervisors and electrical workers of the Sto. Tomas farm, who were members of another
union were nevertheless retained by the company in its employ. The 4 respondent labor organizations
jointly instated a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice, illegal lockout/dismissal and damages.

Issue: Did Purefoods commit an unfair labor practice?

Held: Yes

It is crystal clear that the closure of the Sto. Tomas farm was made in bad faith. Badges of bad faith are
evident from the following acts of the petitioner. It unjustifiably refused to recognize the STFWUs and
the other unions affiliation with PULO but concluded a new CBA with another union in another farm
during the agreed indefinite suspension of the collective bargaining negotiations. It surreptitiously
transferred and continued its business in a less hostile environment and it suddenly terminated the
STFWU members, but retained and brought the non-members to the Malvar farm. Petitioner presented
no evidence to support the contention that it was incurring losses or that the subject farms lease
agreement was pre-terminated. The closure therefore of the Sto. Tomas farm circumvented the labor
organizations right to collective bargaining and violated the members right to security of tenure.

191.

192. Kimberly Independent Labor Union vs. Hon. Drilon

G.R. no. L-77629 May 9, 1990

FACTS:

Kimberly-Clark Philippines, Inc. (KIMBERLY) executed a three-year collective bargaining

agreement (CBA) with United Kimberly-Clark Employees Union- Philippine Transport and General
Workers' Organization (UKCEU-PTGWO) which expired on June 30, 1986. Within the 60-day freedom
period prior to the expiration of and during the negotiations for the renewal of the aforementioned CBA,
some members of the bargaining unit formed another union called "Kimberly Independent Labor Union
for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism- Organized Labor Association in Line Industries and
Agriculture (KILUSAN-OLALIA).

On April 21, 1986, KILUSAN-OLALIA filed a petition for certification election in the Ministry
of Labor and Employment (MOLE). KIMBERLY and (UKCEU-PTGWO) did not object to the holding
of a certification election but objected to the inclusion of the so-called contractual workers whose
employment with KIMBERLY was coursed through an independent contractor, Rank Manpower
Company (RANK for short), as among the qualified voters. On June 2, 1986, Med-Arbiter Bonifacio
Marasigan, who was handling the certification election case, issued an order declaring those casuals who
have worked at least six (6) months as appearing in the payroll months prior to the filing of the instant
petition on April 21, 1986 as eligible to vote in the certification election. During the pre-election
conference, 64 casual workers were challenged by KIMBERLY and (UKCEU-PTGWO) on the ground
that they are not employees, of KIMBERLY but of RANK. It was agreed by all the parties that the 64
voters shall be allowed to cast their votes but that their ballots shall be segregated and subject to challenge
proceedings. KILUSAN-OLALIA filed with the med-arbiter a "Protest and Motion to Open and Count
Challenged Votes" on the ground that the 64 workers are employees of KIMBERLY within the meaning
of Article 212(e) of the Labor Code. KIMBERLY filed an opposition to the protest and motion, asserting
that there is no employer-employee relationship between the casual workers and the company.

On November 13, 1986, the then Minister of Labor rendered a decision declaring that the other
casual employees not performing janitorial and yard maintenance services were deemed labor-only
contractual and since labor-only contracting is prohibited, such employees were held to have attained the
status of regular employees, the regularization being effective as of the date of the decision. On
November 25, 1986, KIMBERLY flied a motion for reconsideration with respect to the regularization of
contractual workers.

ISSUE: Whether those engaged in janitorial or yard maintenance as well as the other casual employees
attained the status of regular employee on November 13, 1986.

HELD: YES, the former labor minister gravely abused his discretion in holding that those workers
not engaged in janitorial or yard maintenance service attained the status of regular employees only
on November 13, 1986, which thus deprived them of their constitutionally protected right to vote in
the certification election and choose their rightful bargaining representative.

The Labor Code defines who are regular employees. Article 280 thus provides for two kinds of
regular employees, namely: 1. those who are engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; and 2. those who have rendered at least one year
of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which they are employed. The
individual petitioners herein who have been adjudged to be regular employees fall under the second
category. These are the mechanics, electricians, machinists machine shop helpers, warehouse helpers,
painters, carpenters, pipefitters and masons. It is not disputed that these workers have been in the employ
of KIMBERLY for more than one year at the time of the filing of the Petition for certification election by
KILUSAN-OLALIA.

Owing to their length of service with the company, these workers became regular employees, by
operation of law, one year after they were employed by KIMBERLY through RANK. While the actual
regularization of these employees entails the mechanical act of issuing regular appointment papers and
compliance with such other operating procedures as may be adopted by the employer, it is more in
keeping with the intent and spirit of the law to rule that the status of regular employment attaches to the
casual worker on the day immediately after the end of his first year of service. To rule otherwise, and to
instead make their regularization dependent on the happening of some contingency or the fulfillment of
certain requirements, is to impose a burden on the employee which is not sanctioned by law. That the first
stated position is the situation contemplated and sanctioned by law is further enhanced by the absence of a
statutory limitation before regular status can be acquired by a casual employee. The law is explicit. As
long as the employee has rendered at least one year of service, he becomes a regular employee with
respect to the activity in which he is employed. The law does not provide the qualification that the
employee must first be issued a regular appointment or must first be formally declared as such before he
can acquire a regular status. Obviously, where the law does not distinguish, no distinction should be
drawn.

193. Neri vs. NLRC

GR No. 97008-09, July 23, 1993

Facts:
Respondents Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) and Building Care
Corporation (BCC) are sued by two employees of BCC, which provides janitorial and other
specific services to various firms, to compel FEBTC to recognize them as its regular employees
and be paid the same wages which its employees receive.

BCC established that it had substantial capitalization of P1 Million or a stockholders

equity of P1.5 Million. Thus the Labor Arbiter ruled that BCC was only job contracting and that
consequently its employees were not employees of FEBTC.

On appeal, this factual finding was affirmed by NLRC. Nevertheless, petitioners insist
that BCC is engaged in "labor-only" contracting hence, they conclude, they are employees of
FEBTC.

Petitioners instituted complaints against FEBTC and BCC before Regional Arbitration
Branch of the DOLE to compel the bank to accept them as regular employees and for it to pay
the differential between the wages being paid them by BCC and those received by FEBTC
employees with similar length of service.

Issue:
Is BCC engaged in "labor-only" contracting?

Ruling:
No. BCC is a highly capitalized venture and cannot be deemed engaged in "labor-only"
contracting. BCC need not prove that it made investments in the form of tools, equipment,
machineries, work premises, etc. because it has established that it has sufficient capitalization.
The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC both determined that BCC had a capital stock of P1 million
fully subscribed and paid for.

It is well-settled that there is "labor-only" contracting where:

(a) the person supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial capital or
investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others;
and,
(b) the workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are
directly related to the principal business of the employer.

Article 106 of the Labor Code defines "labor-only" contracting thus

 Art. 106. Contractor or subcontractor. There is "labor-only" contracting where the
person supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial capital or
investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others,
and the workers recruited by such persons are performing activities which are directly
related to the principal business of such employer.

Based on the foregoing, BCC cannot be considered a "labor-only" contractor because it

has substantial capital. The law does not require both substantial capital and investment in the
form of tools, equipment, machineries, etc. This is clear from the use of the conjunction "or". If
the intention was to require the contractor to prove that he has both capital and the requisite
investment, then the conjunction "and" should have been used. But, having established that it
has substantial capital, it was no longer necessary for BCC to further adduce evidence to prove
that it does not fall within the purview of "labor-only" contracting. There is even no need for it to
refute petitioners' contention that the activities they perform are directly related to the principal
business of respondent bank.

194.

195.

196.

197.

198.

199.

200.