back to the car the driver demanded from her any piece of jewelry that could be
pawned. Ruefully, she removed her wristwatch and offered it to him. The driver
(G.R. No. 135784. December 15, 2000]
RICARDO FORTUNA Y GRAGASIN, petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J . :
Perhaps no other profession in the country has gone through incessant
maligning by the public in general than its own police force. Much has been heard
about the notoriety of this profession for excessive use and illegal discharge of
power. The present case is yet another excuse for such vilification.
On 21 July 1992 at about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, while Diosdada
Montecillo and her brother Mario Montecillo were standing at the corner of Mabini
and Harrison Streets waiting for a ride home, a mobile patrol car of the Western
Police District with three (3) policemen on board stopped in front of them. The
policeman seated on the right at the front seat alighted and without a word frisked
Mario. He took Marios belt, pointed to a supposedly blunt object in its buckle and
uttered the word "evidence."[1] Then he motioned to Mario to board the car. The
terrified Mario obeyed and seated himself at the back together with another
policeman. Diosdada instinctively followed suit and sat beside Mario.
They cruised towards Roxas Boulevard. The driver then asked Mario why he
was carrying a "deadly weapon," to which Mario answered, "for self-defense since
he was a polio victim."[2] The driver and another policeman who were both seated
in front grilled Mario. They frightened him by telling him that for carrying a deadly
weapon outside his residence he would be brought to the Bicutan police station
where he would be interrogated by the police, mauled by other prisoners and
heckled by the press. As they approached Ospital ng Maynila, the mobile car
pulled over and the two (2) policemen in front told the Montecillos that the
bailbond for carrying a "deadly weapon" was P12,000.00. At this point, the driver
asked how much money they had. Without answering, Mario gave his P1,000.00
to Diosdada who placed the money inside her wallet.
Diosdada was then made to alight from the car. She was followed by the
driver and was told to go behind the vehicle. There, the driver forced her to take
out her wallet and rummaged through its contents. He counted her money. She
had P5,000.00 in her wallet. The driver took P1,500.00 and left her P3,500.00. He
instructed her to tell his companions that all she had was P3,500.00. While going
1
declined saying, "Never mind,"[3] and proceeded to board the car. Diosdada, still
fearing for the safety of her brother, followed and sat beside him in the car.
Once in the car, Diosdada was directed by the policeman at the front
passenger seat to place all her money on the console box near the gearshift. The
car then proceeded to Harrison Plaza where the Montecillos were told to
disembark. From there, their dreadful experience over, they went home to Imus,
Cavite.
The following day Diosdada recounted her harrowing story to her employer
Manuel Felix who readily accompanied her and her brother Mario to the office of
General Diokno where they lodged their complaint. Gen. Diokno directed one of
his men, a certain Lt. Ronas, to assist the complainants in looking for the erring
policemen. They boarded the police patrol car and scoured the Mabini area for
the culprits. They did not find them.
When they returned to the police station, a line-up of policemen was
immediately assembled. Diosdada readily recognized one of them as the
policeman who was seated beside them in the back of the car. She trembled at
the sight of him. She then rushed to Lt. Ronas and told him that she saw the
policeman who sat beside them in the car. He was identified by Lt. Ronas as PO2
Ricardo Fortuna. A few minutes later, Gen. Diokno summoned the
complainants. As they approached the General, they at once saw PO2 Eduardo
Garcia whom they recognized as the policeman who frisked Mario. The following
day, they met the last of their tormentors, the driver of the mobile car who played
heavily on their nerves - PO3 Ramon Pablo.
The three (3) policemen were accordingly charged with robbery. After trial,
they were found guilty of having conspired in committing the crime with
intimidation of persons. They were each sentenced to a prison term of six (6)
years and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision mayor, to restitute in favor of
private complainants Diosdada Montecillo and Mario Montecillo the sum
of P5,000.00, and to indemnify them in the amount of P20,000.00 for moral
damages and P15,000.00 for attorneys fees.[4]
The accused separately appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 31 March
1997 the appellate court affirmed the lower court's verdict. [5] Accused-appellant
Ricardo Fortuna moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied. Hence,
this petition by Fortuna alone under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. He contends
that the appellate court erred in holding that private complainants gave the money
to the accused under duress, the same being negated by the prosecutions
evidence, and in affirming the decision of the court below. He argued that the
evidence presented by the prosecution did not support the theory of conspiracy
as against him.[6]
The issues raised by accused-appellant, as correctly observed by the
Solicitor General, are purely factual. We have consistently stressed that in a
petition for review on certiorari this Court does not sit as an arbiter of facts. As
such, it is not our function to re-examine every appreciation of facts made by the
trial and appellate courts unless the evidence on record does not support their
findings or the judgment is based on a misappreciation of facts. [7] The
ascertainment of what actually happened in a controverted situation is the
function of the lower courts. If we are to re-examine every factual finding made by
them, we would not only be prolonging the judicial process but would also be
imposing upon the heavily clogged dockets of this Court.
We do not see any infirmity in the present case justifying a departure from
this well-settled rule. On the contrary, we are convinced that the trial and
appellate courts did not err in holding that accused-appellant Fortuna conspired
with the accused Pablo and Garcia in intimidating private complainants to give
them their money.
We are convinced that there was indeed sufficient intimidation applied on the
offended parties as the acts performed by the three (3) accused, coupled with the
circumstances under which they were executed, engendered fear in the minds of
their victims and hindered the free exercise of their will. The three (3) accused
succeeded in coercing them to choose between two (2) alternatives, to wit: to part
with their money or suffer the burden and humiliation of being taken to the police
station.
To our mind, the success of the accused in taking their victims' money was
premised on threats of prosecution and arrest. This intense infusion of fear was
intimidation, plain and simple.
Accused-appellant further argues that assuming arguendo that the element
of intimidation did exist, the lower court erred in holding that he conspired with his
companions in perpetrating the offense charged.
This indeed is easy to assert, for conspiracy is something which exists only
in the minds of the conspirators, which can easily be denied. However,
conspiracy may be detected and deduced from the circumstances of the case
which when pieced together will indubitably indicate that they form part of a
common design to commit a felony; and, to establish conspiracy, it is not
essential that there be actual proof evincing that all of the conspirators took a
direct part in every act, it being sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant to
the same objective.[8]
In the present case, accused-appellant would want to impress upon this
Court that his silence inside the car during Marios interrogation confirmed his
claim that he did not participate in the offense.
We do not agree. As a police officer, it is his primary duty to avert by all
means the commission of an offense. As such, he should not have kept his
silence but, instead, should have protected the Montecillos from his mulcting
colleagues. This accused-appellant failed to do. His silence then could only be
viewed as a form of moral support which he zealously lent to his co-conspirators.
2
In one case, we ruled that in conspiracy all those who in one way or another
helped and cooperated in the consummation of a felony were co-
conspirators.[9] Hence, all of the three (3) accused in the present case should be
held guilty of robbery with intimidation against persons.
We however observe that the courts below failed to appreciate the
aggravating circumstance of "abuse of public position."[10] The mere fact that the
three (3) accused were all police officers at the time of the robbery placed them in
a position to perpetrate the offense. If they were not police officers they could not
have terrified the Montecillos into boarding the mobile patrol car and forced them
to hand over their money. Precisely it was on account of their authority that the
Montecillos believed that Mario had in fact committed a crime and would be
brought to the police station for investigation unless they gave them what they
demanded.
Accordingly, the penalty imposed should be modified. Under Art. 294, par.
(5), of The Revised Penal Code, the penalty for simple robbery is prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. In view
of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position, the penalty should be
imposed in its maximum period[11] while the minimum shall be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto mayor maximum to prision
correccional medium in any of its periods the range of which is four (4) months
and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed that of
the trial court finding accused-appellant Ricardo Fortuna guilty of robbery and
ordering him to pay complaining witnesses Diosdada Montecillo and Mario
Montecillo P5,000.00 representing the money taken from them, P20,000.00 for
moral damages and P15,000.00 for attorney's fees, is AFFIRMED with the
modification that accused-appellant Ricardo Fortuna is SENTENCED to the
indeterminate prison term of two (2) years four (4) months and twenty (20) days
of the medium period of arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional medium,
as minimum, to eight (8) years two (2) months and ten (10) days of the maximum
period of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium, as maximum.
Costs against accused-appellant Ricardo Fortuna.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. Nos. 113511-12. July 11, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANILO SINOC, y
SUMAYLO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
In a decision handed down on October 7, 1993 by Branch 30 of the Regional
Trial Court of Surigao City, Danilo Sinoc was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt in two cases jointly tried:[1] one, of the special complex crime of kidnapping
with murder (under Article 267 in relation to Articles 248 [2] and 48[3] of the Revised
Penal Code) -- in Criminal Case No. 3564; and the other, of the complex crime of
kidnapping with frustrated murder (under Articles 267, 248, 6, [4] and 48 of the
same Code) -- in Criminal Case No. 3565. In each case, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua was imposed on him.[5]
The amended informations under which Sinoc was tried and convicted, both
dated January 23, 1992, included five (5) other accused, namely: Vicente Salon
@ Dodong, Benjamin Espinosa @ Benji, Jaime Jornales @ James, Victorino
Delegencia @ Jun-Gren, and one Roger Doe @ Ram (at-large).[6] However, only
Sinoc and Vicente Salon were arraigned, on July 14, 1992, the other accused
being then at large, as they still appear to be to this day. Assisted by their
respective counsel, both Sinoc and Salon entered pleas of not guilty and were
thereafter jointly tried. The joint trial resulted in Salons acquittal in both
cases. The court agreed with him that none of the witnesses presented by the
prosecution remotely implicate** (him in) the crimes charged, and that (i)ndeed,
the only piece of evidence pointing to ** (him[Salon]) as the mastermind is
contained in the affidavit of confession of accused Danilo Sinoc, hence,
conspiracy not having been proved, the case against Salon has to be
dismissed. Only Sinoc, therefore, is concerned in the appeal at bar.
Respecting the essential facts constituting the corpus delicti, there appears
to be no serious dispute. It appears that on September 20, 1991, at about 6
oclock in the morning, Isidoro Viacrusis, manager of Taganito Mining Corporation,
was motoring from the company compound (at Taganito, Claver, Surigao del
Norte) to Surigao City. He was riding on a company vehicle, a
Mitsubishi Pajero (with Plate No. DFX-397), driven by Tarcisio Guijapon. As
Viacrusis and Guijapon were approaching the public cemetery of Claver, they
were stopped by several armed men. The latter, identifying themselves as
members of the New Peoples Army (NPA), boarded the Pajero and ordered
Guijapon to proceed. When they reached Barobo, Surigao del Norte, the armed
men ordered Viacrusis and Guijapon to alight, led them, their hands bound
3
behind their back, to a coconut grove some six meters from the road, and after
making them lie face down on the ground, shot them several times. Viacrusis
miraculously survived. The driver, Guijapon, was not as lucky; he died on the
spot.
These facts set forth in, among others, a sworn statement given to the police
by Sinoc, infra, and an affidavit executed and sworn to by Viacrusis on October
17, 1991, about a month later.[7] In that affidavit, Viacrusis described the armed
men who had kidnapped and shot him and Guijapon. The only malefactor he was
able to identify by name, however, was Danilo Sinoc who, he said, had curly hair,
(was) known as Colot (Danilo Sinoc), (and was known to ) driver Tarcing **.
Two prosecution witnesses gave germane testimony at the trial of the
consolidated cases: Marlyn Legaspi a resident of San Vicente, Barobo, Surigao
del Sur; and Barangay Captain Terencio Jamero, also of Barangay San Vicente.
Marlyn testified that she was startled by the sound of gunshots that morning
of September 20, 1991. She ran towards the direction of the gunfire and as she
neared the place, heard the moaning of a man. She moved quickly to the highway
and saw a blue Pajero parked at the barangay road, its engine idling; and
moments later, she saw the same vehicle running fast towards San Francisco,
Agusan del Sur. She lost no time in reporting the incident to Brangay Councilor
Terencio Jamero.
Jamero testified that on receiving Marlyn's report, he and another Councilor,
Alberto Saliling, at once proceeded to the place indicated. There they came upon
the slain driver, and Isidoro Viacrusis, lying on the ground, sorely wounded, crying
out for help. With the assistance of policemen of Barobo, they brought Viacrusis
to the Agusan del Sur Provincial Hospital at Patin-ay. Timely medical attention
enabled Viacrusis to recover from his grievous wounds.
The evidence of the prosecution further establishes that in the morning of the
following day, September 21, 1991, at about 7 oclock, a secret informant (known
as a civilian asset) named Boyet reported to the Police Station at Monkayo,
Davao del Norte that the stolen (carnapped) Pajero was parked behind the
apartment of a certain Paulino Overa at the Bliss Housing Project at Poblacion,
Monkayo. On instructions of the Station Commander, a police team [8]went to the
place. They saw the Pajero and, their initial inquiries having yielded the
information that the man who had brought it there would return that morning,
posted themselves in such a manner as to keep it in view. Some three hours
later, at about 10:30 oclock, they saw a man approach the Pajero who, on seeing
them, tried to run away. They stopped him. They found out that the man,
identified as Danilo Sinoc, of Surigao del Norte,[9] had the key of the Pajero, and
was acting under instruction of certain companions who were waiting for him at
the Star Lodge at Tagum, Davao del Norte. Riding on the recovered Pajero, the
police officers brought Sinoc to the Star Lodge only to discover that his
companions were no longer there. They later turned over Sinoc to the 459(th)
Mobile Force, together with the Pajero.
 Four months afterwards, in the afternoon of January 21, 1993, SPO1 Roger
A. Basadre and two other officers (of the CIS) brought Danilo Sinoc to the Public
Attorneys Office at Curato Street Butuan City. They asked one of the attorneys
there, Atty. Alfredo Jalad, for permission to take Sinocs statement in writing in his
office. Sinoc asked Jalad to assist him because he wished to make an affidavit of
confession.
Atty. Jalad told Sinoc that he had the right to choose his own counsel, and to
remain silent. Sinoc said he wanted to make the affidavit nonetheless, and be
assisted by Jalad in doing so. The latter then had Sinoc narrate the occurrence in
question in Cebuano/Visayan, a dialect with which Sinoc was familiar. That done,
Jalad asked Sinoc if the CIS had promised him anything for the affidavit he would
execute. Sinoc said no. Only then did the CIS officers commence to take Sinocs
statement, typing their questions and Sinocs answer -- as well as the initial
appraisal of his constitutional rights -- on a typewriter in Atty. Jalads office.
In his sworn statement,[10] Sinoc declared that he knew the victims, Isidoro
Viacrusis and Tarcisio Guijapon because he was formerly working at Taganito
Mining Company (TAMICO); that in June, 1991, he learned that Benjamin
Espinosa (@ Benji), Jaime Jornales (@ James), Victorino Delegencio (@ Jun-
Gren), and a certain Ram had been monitoring the activities of TAMICO Manager
Viacrusis whom they planned to kidnap and rob of his Pajero, and make it appear
to be an act of the NPA; that the criminal undertaking was planned by a certain
Vicente Salon (@ Dodong), who made available the needed funds and two (2)
hand guns; that in September, 1991, at a meeting of the group at the boarding
house of Jun-Gren to which he (Sinoc) was invited, Sinoc was offered P20,000.00
to join in the kidnapping and carnapping operation; that he agreed because of
poverty; that in the morning of September 20, 1991, at about 6:30 oclock, he,
Ram and Benjamin Espinosa stopped the Pajero driven by Tarcisio Guijapon in
which Viacrusis was riding, brandishing two .35 caliber revolvers, and a piece of
wood shaped like a rifle; that they boarded the vehicle, identifying themselves as
NPA (soldiers of the New Peoples Army) and had the driver proceed towards
Surigao City; that at the bridge of Tres de Mayor, they had the Pajero stop to
pick-up two other companions, James (Jaime Jornales) and Jun-Gren (Victor
Delegencia); that Ram took over the wheel and drove towards Butuan City; that at
San Vicente, Barobo, Ram turned into a feeder road and stopped about seven (7)
meters from the highway; that there, Viacrusis and Guijapon, whose hands had
been tied behind their back, were made to get down; that James Jornales shot
Viacrusis four times after which Jun-Gren Delegencia, Jr. fired at Guijapon four
times , too; that when Sinoc remonstrated at the shootings, he was told it was on
Dodong Salons orders; that the malefactors then proceeded to the Bliss Housing
Project at Monkayo where they left the Pajero, this being the place where the
mastermind, Vicente Salon, was supposed to get the vehicle and pay Sinoc the
promised sum of P20,000.00; that they then all went to Tagum; that on the
following day, Sinoc was instructed by Jun-gren and James to return to Monkayo
with the key of the Pajero and deliver it to Ram, and that when he arrived at the
place at about 9 o clock in the morning, he was apprehended by soldiers and
brought to the 459(th) PNP Mobile Company.
4
During the entire period of Sinocs interrogation, which commenced at about
3:00 P.M., Atty. Jalad remained seated beside him; and at its conclusion, Jalad
read to Sinoc the contents of his statement from beginning to end. The statement
was thereafter signed by Sinoc and by Jalad, the latter being described as
witness to signature.[11]
Sinoc was next brought to the home of Butuan City Prosecutor Ernesto M.
Brocoy so that he might take oath on his statement. This was about 7:00 P.M.
After going over the statement, City Fiscal Brocoy told Sinoc that it was very
damaging, briefly discussing the contents thereof in Cebuano. The latter stood by
his answers, however, averring that they have been voluntarily given. Evidently
satisfied of the authenticity and voluntariness of the statement, Brocoy
administered the oath to Sinoc, and signed the certification typed at the left hand
margin of page 4 thereof, reading: SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
21st day of January 1992, at Butuan City, Philippines. I hereby certify that I
personally examined the herein affiant and that I am satisfied that he voluntarily
executed and understood his statement." He also initialed every page of the
statement.[12]
While under detention at the Provincial Jail, awaiting trial, Sinoc wrote two
(2) letters to the Trial Judge dated June and July, 1992, in both of which he asked
that he be transferred to the City Jail because he had heard that Vicente Salon,
who had been arrested on the strength of his sworn statement, had made plans
to kill him. He sent the Judge a third letter -- dated August 11, 1993, consisting of
four (4) pages -- which is described by His Honor as substantially a repetition of
the contents of his affidavit of confession. All the letters were handwritten in block
letters in the Cebuano dialect.[13]
Sinoc proffered the defense of alibi. His claim, as summarized by his
counsel, was that on September 19, 1991, he was in Sibagat, Agusan del Sur
together with his wife and prepared on that early morning to sell tableya (native
chocolate) in Tagum, Davao del Norte. On the same day they reached Tagum
and they sold tableya and on the same day they were not able to sell the tableya;
on September 20, 1991 they were again selling tableya in Tagum, Davao del
Norte. It was while in Tagum that ** (they met) a certain Darves, they did not
know exactly the name, he offered to them the money to accompany the said
driver of Darves who is name(d) Ram. He was offered ** money to accompany
this Ram in prior (sic) to allegedly get the Pajero vehicle from Moncayo together
with Ram, and while in Moncayo he was first apprehended by the police and
detained at Moncayo, first ** (by) the 459 Mobile Force of ** Moncayo and on
January 14, 1992 to January 24, 1992 he was detained by the CIS authorities in
Butuan City.
Elaborating, Sinoc testified that he saw Darves with three companions at a
certain restaurant in Tagum; that Darves introduced himself, and offered to give
him P1,000.00) if he would accompany his driver to get a vehicle at Moncayo;
that he agreed, and at 6 o clock in the morning of September 21, 1991 he went to
the Star Lodge where Darves was staying; that there, he was introduced to the
latters driver, Ram, given P1,000.00, and told to go with Ram; and that he went
out of the Star Lodge, gave his wife P800.00, and then went with Ram to
Moncayo on board a bus.
In Moncayo, they went to where the Pajero was parked. Sinoc went towards
the vehicle. Ram lagged behind, having paused to buy some cigarettes. When
Sinoc reached the Pajero, five persons suddenly pointed guns at him, searched
him, and found on him the key to the Pajero which Darves had given to him. The
five persons, who were led by Sgt. Michael Aringgo of the PNP, brought him to
the Moncayo police station where they investigated him without informing him of
his constitutional rights.
In the afternoon of that day, September 21, 1991, he was surrendered to the
459th Mobile Force Company which detained him until January 14, 1992. On this
date he was taken by CIS personnel and brought to the CIS Compound at Butuan
City, at which place he was confined up to January 24, 1992, and subjected to
interrogation without being informed that he had a right to remain silent. He was
told, however, that he had the right to counsel, but although he told the
investigators that his lawyer was Atty. Gavino Samontina, they never called the
latter.
The investigators wish him to sign an affidavit. When he refused, they
maltreated him by repeatedly submerging his head in a toilet bowl full of
excrement, as well as by tying him on a bed, raising the bed on one end so that
his feet were up and his head down, and keeping him in that position for hours.
On January 20, 1992, his wife and Efren Dak-ang came to see him at the
CIS Compound. He talked to them and revealed what was being done to him
while under investigation.
On January 21, 1992, after having been interrogated the whole night, he
finally agreed to sign the affidavit because the CIS officers told him, (We) will kill
you or salvage you. In fact, the night before, police officers had brought him to an
uninhabited place near the bridge and, with guns pointed at his head,
commanded him to run. He refused, of course. So, in the afternoon of that day, at
around 4 o clock, he was brought to the office of Public Attorney Jalad, where the
police investigators hurriedly typed his affidavit and made him sign it. He denied
that Atty. Jalad informed him of his constitutional rights. He asserted that when he
told Jalad he had his own lawyer, Jalad merely remarked, Never mind, all
attorneys are just the same as long as it is attorney. He was next brought to
Fiscal Brocoy who, without talking to him, right away signed that document (his
confession).
Sinoc also explained how he had come to write the letter of August 11, 1992
to the judge some seven months after his confession. That letter -- it will be
recalled and as is evident from a comparison of both documents -- was described
by the latter as substantially a repetition of the contents of his affidavits of
confession, supra.[14] He said: (T)here were persons who visited me while at the
Provincial Jail and told me to accept the crime ** because if I will not accept the
crime my wife and my children (and) my parents, they will liquidate all of them **.
5
Sinocs wife, Jovita, testified for the defense, and sought to corroborate his
testimony. She affirmed that she had seen her husband at the CIS on September
20, 1992, at about 8:30 in the evening, and he had told her to keep ** silent, not
to tell anybody that he will be accompan(ied) by the CIS. Efren Dak-ang also
gave corroborating testimony.
For some undisclosed reason, the surviving victim, Isodoro Viacrusis, did not
testify; this, despite the fiscals assurances to the Trial Judge that he was very
interested in giving evidence. Obviously because of Viacrusis failure to testify, his
affidavit of October 17, 1991 was not formally offered, being obviously hearsay,
although it is attached to the record.
Be this at it may, the Trial Court was satisfied that the evidence actually
presented by the Government sufficed to establish Sinocs guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the two felonies with which he stood charged.
Sinoc has taken an appeal to this Court and ascribes to the Trial Court the
following errors: (1) convicting him of the offenses charged although conspiracy
had not been independently proven to exist among him and the other persons
named in the indictment; (2) not rejecting the evidence obtained after he had
been arrested without any warrant of arrest, and (3) not rejecting his confession
after he had been illegally arrested and had thereafter been under custodial
investigation ..without a counsel of choice from September 21, 1991 to January
20, 1992, first by the Monkayo 459th Mobile Force, and later by the C.I.S., Butuan
City.
As regards Sinocs claim of illegal arrest, the law provides that an arrest
without warrant may be licitly effected by a peace officer, inter alia When an
offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.[15]
There is no question that the police officers in this case were aware that an
offense had just been committed: i.e., that some twelve hours earlier, a Pajero
belonging to a private company had been stolen (carnapped) and its driver and
passenger shot, the former having died and the latter being on the verge of death.
Nor is there any doubt that an informer (asset) had reported that the stolen Pajero
was at the Bliss Housing Project at the Moncayo. It was precisely to recover the
Pajero that a team composed of SPO1 Micheal Aringo and joint elements of 459
PNP MFC and Monkayo Police Stn. Led by Insptr. Eden T. Ugale, went to that
place and, on taking custody of the Pajero, forthwith dispatched a radio message
to Higher Headquarters advising of that fact.[16]
There is no question either that when SPO1 Aringo and his companions
reached the place where the Pajero was parked, they were told by Paulino Overa,
owner of the apartment behind which the vehicle was parked, that the man who
had brought the Pajero would be back by 12:00 noon; that the person thus
described did in fact show up at about 10:00 A.M., and was immediately identified
by Overa as the one who rode on that car pajero;'[17] just as there is no question
that when the police officers accosted him, Sinoc had the key to the stolen Pajero
and was in the act of moving toward it admittedly to take possession of it (after
having arrived by bus from Tagum together with another suspect, Ram). Sinocs
link to the stolen vehicle (and hence to the kidnapping and killing accompanying
its asportation) was thus palpable.
The foregoing circumstances left the police officers no alternative save to
arrest Sinoc and take possession of the Pajero. His arrest without warrant was
justified; indeed, it was in the premises the officers clear duty to apprehend him;
their omission to do so would have been inexcusable.
Sinocs assault against the propriety of his interrogation after his warrantless
arrest, because conducted without advice to him of his constitutional rights, is
pointless. It is true that, as candidly admitted by the arresting officers, their initial
interrogation of Sinoc was made without his first being told of his corresponding
rights. This is inconsequential, for the prosecution never attempted to prove what
he might have said on that occasion.
The confession made by him some time afterwards at the Public Attorneys
Office at Butuan City is altogether a different matter, however. The record
adequately shows it to have been executed voluntarily and under applicable
safeguards, apart from being confirmed by, or consistent with, other evidence.
Sinoc does not dispute that he was taken to the Public Attorneys Office; that
he spoke to Atty. Alfredo Jalad and it was in the latters office that his confession
was prepared by the CIS investigator. Nor does he deny that he was then brought
to the home of City Prosecutor Ernesto M. Brocoy who certified that the
confession had been subscribed and sworn to before him and that he was
satisfied that Sinoc had voluntarily executed and understood his statement. Sinoc
nonetheless claims that he was under intimidation at that time and never advised
of his constitutional rights.
After carefully considering the evidence, this Court is convinced that the Trial
Judge was correct in accepting the account of the execution of Sinocs confession
(Exhs. K, K-1 to K-5) narrated by Public Atty. Alfedo Jalad and City Prosecutor
Ernesto Brocoy, to the effect that the confession was voluntarily given after he
had been duly informed of his constitutional rights. No reason whatever is
discernible in the record for these Government officials to give false evidence
against Sinoc, or testify otherwise than to the truth.
Sinocs confession of January 21, 1992 is confirmed by the letter he
admittedly wrote to the Trial Judge more than a year later, on August 11,
1993,[18] the contents of which are, as observed by the Trial Judge, substantially
identical with those of the confession. In said letter, in which he narrates in no
little detail the same story contained in his confession, he apologizes for bothering
you again at this time (obviously referring to his prior letters to the Judge of June
and July 1992), and gives his reasons for writing the latest letter: to ask for the
Judges assistance and take account of his allegation that his agreement with his
co-accused was only to stop the "Pajero," that it was poverty that impelled him to
join the plotters (Vicente Salon, et al.); to see that Tarcisio Guijapon and Viacrucis
6
be given justice; and to plead that the Judge take pity on him, and not give him
too heavy a penalty.
The confession is also consistent with Sinoc's testimony at his trial in which
he admitted that he had indeed traveled from Tagum to Monkayo where he was
arrested; and that he had made the trip, together with his co-accused, Ram,
precisely to get the stolen Pajero the key of which he had on his person at the
time. It contains details (e.g., the use of two (2) hand guns and a wooden rifle, the
bringing of the Pajero from the scene of the killing to Moncayo, the identities of
the individual malefactors who shot the victims) which is improbable to think were
conjured out of thin air by the police investigators or deduced from other
evidence. The confession is consistent, too, with the other proofs, particularly the
testimony of Marlyn Legaspi and Barangay Councilor Jamero as regards the time
and place of the shooting of the hapless victims.
In any event, the Trial Judge appears to have carefully assessed the
demeanor of the witnesses for the prosecution and those for the defense, in
relation to the documents on record, and on this basis and from his vantage point,
found that the prosecutions proof were more credible than the defense, and that
their combined weight established beyond reasonable doubt the appellants
culpable participation in the crimes charged.
It must additionally be pointed out that apart from Sinocs protestations that
his extrajudicial confession was the result of torture and threats, no competent
evidence exists on record to substantiate that claim. He made no such claim to
either Public Attorney Alfredo Jalad or City Prosecutor Ernesto Brocoy although
there is absolutely nothing in the record to indicate any cause for him to distrust
either government officer, much less believe they were in conspiracy with the
police officers to concoct a case against him. In fact, although he professes to
have disclosed his supposed maltreatment to his wife when she visited him at the
place of his detention, the latter made no mention of it in her testimony, nor did
she ever attempt to have him medically examined to confirm such a revelation, if
it had been made. Moreover, the counsel he said he wanted to represent him
during his interrogation at Public Attorney Jalads office, Atty. Gavino Samontina,
was never presented to confirm his statement.
While the evidence does show that Sinoc became embroiled in a criminal
conspiracy[19] -- he agreed (out of poverty, he says) to join in a crime being
planned by certain men named by him and decided to commit it with them -- the
agreement, as far as he was concerned, was to waylay Viacrusis, the Manager of
the Tagum Mining Company, and rob him of his Pajero, for which his share would
be P20,000.00; but it did not include the shooting of Viacrusis or any one else. In
fact, he raised a protest when Viacrusis and Guijapon were shot. In other words,
as far as Sinoc understood it, and as far as may in fact be deduced from the
evidence, the plan was not so much to capture Viacrusis and deprived him of
liberty, even less to assassinate him, but to steal his Pajero by violent
means. The kidnapping was not the principal objective; it was merely incidental to
the forcible taking of the vehicle. Unfortunately, by reason or on the occasion of
the seizure of the Pajero -- and (as far as the proofs demonstrate) without
foreknowledge on Sinocs part -- its driver was killed, and the lone passenger
seriously injured.
There was thus no kidnapping as the term is understood in Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code -- the essential object of which is to kidnap, or detain
another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty. The idea of kidnapping
in this case appears to have been the result of the continuous but uninformed use
of that term by the peace officers involved in the investigation, carelessly carried
over into the indictments and the record of the trial, and even accepted by His
Honor.[20]
The offense actually committed in Criminal Case No. 3564 -- where the
killing of Tarcesio Guijapon accompanied the taking of the Pajero-- is that defined
and penalized by Article 294 of the Criminal Code,[21] viz.:
ART. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons-- Penalties.--
Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against any person shall
suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of
the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the
robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
*** *** ***."
It is germane to observe that even if the intent to deprive of liberty were as
important or primordial an objective as the asportation of the Pajero, the
kidnapping would be absorbed in the robbery with homicide; [22] and that the term,
homicide, is used in the quoted article in the generic sense-- i.e., as also including
murder, the nature of the offense not being altered by the treacherous character,
or the number, of the killings in connection with the robbery.[23]
On the other hand, the wrongful acts actually proven to have been
committed by the defendants in Criminal Case No. 3565 are: (1) robbery, of
course, as above described, and (2) frustrated murder on the occasion thereof --
gunshot wounds having been inflicted on Isidoro Viacrusis, while bound and
prostrate on the ground, utterly unable to put up any defense, the wounds being
of such a nature as would have resulted in his death were it not for timely medical
intervention. Obviously, these acts do not fall within the ambit of article 294, which
treats of the special complex crime of robbery with violence against or intimidation
of persons, but NOT robbery with attempted or frustrated homicide (or murder),
although the law does punish the crime of attempted and frustrated robbery with
homicide.[24]
Neither do the crimes come within the operation of Article 48 of the Criminal
Code which, speaking of complex crimes, provides that when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the more serious crime
7
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Actually in this
case, the two crimes of carnapping and frustrated murder did not result from a
single act. Nor was either offense a necessary means for committing the other.
The shooting of the victim was not necessary to commit the carnapping; indeed,
at the time the victim was shot, the carnapping had already been
consummated. And, of course, the cannapping which, according to the evidence,
was the conspirators principal objective, was not necessary to perpetrate the
shooting.
It follows then that the malefactors felonious acts in Criminal Case No.
3565 cannot be regarded as juridically fused into a complex crime under Article
48. They should be considered separate offenses, separately punishable.
Now, Sinoc admittedly entered into a conspiracy with his co-accused; but he
insists that as far as he was concerned, the conspiracy was to carnap the Pajero,
and did not include any killing or assault against persons. His theory is that the
slaying of the driver and passenger might conceivably have been contemplated
from the outset by one or some or all his co-conspirators; But Sinoc himself never
had that intention. Indeed, he says he had no inkling that the shooting would take
place; had no opportunity to prevent it, and could only remonstrate about it after it
was done; and he invokes the doctrine that conspirators may only be held
accountable for the acts embraced in the criminal agreement; and as regards
felonious acts not included, only the author thereof would be liable.[25]
Sinocs disclaimers notwithstanding, it is this Courts view that the crime that
may properly be ascribed to him in Case No. 3564 is robbery with homicide under
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. For unfortunately for him, there is no
avoiding the fact that a homicide -- although not agreed to or expected by him --
was committed on the occasion of the robbery of the Pajero; and he could not but
have realized or anticipated the possibility of serious harm, even death, being
inflicted on the person or persons in the Pajero targeted for robbery, since two of
his companions were armed with guns, even if in his mind, to repeat, his
agreement with them did not include killing.[26] The most that can be conceded is
to credit him with the mitigating circumstance of having no intention to commit so
grave a wrong as that committed.[27]
Sinoc may not be held liable in Case No. 3565 for the separate offense of frustrated murder as
regards Viacrusis, for the reasons already mentioned; in this particular case, the evidence shows that
he agreed only to the plan to carnap the Pajero, but not to any assault or killing. [28] Nor is it logical to
convict him twice of robbery of the same property under the same circumstances. Hence, he may not
be pronounced responsible for the separate offense of robbery of the same Pajero, in addition to
being declared guilty of robbery (of that same Pajero) with homicide under Article 294.
The penalty imposable on Sinoc is that provided in Article 294 of the Penal Code, which
is reclusion perpetua to death. Appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention
to commit so grave a wrong as that done, the penalty that should be applied to him is reclusion
perpetua.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 3564, appellant Danilo Sinoc, being guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of robbery with homicide defined and punished by Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Criminal Case No. 3565 is DISMISSED as
to him. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-20911 October 30, 1967
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SULPICIO DE LA CERNA, ET AL., defendants.
SULPICIO DE LA CERNA, SERAPIO MAQUILING, TEODORO LIBUMFACIL,
GODOFREDO ROTOR, SEVERINO MATCHOCA, and ANTONIO
BAUTISTA, defendants-appellants.
Godofredo Galindez for defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Sixteen persons, among them herein appellants, were indicted by the provincial
fiscal in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato for double murder for the fatal
shooting of Rafael and Casiano Cabizares,1 father and son, in Barrio Cebuano,
municipality of Tupi, province of Cotabato, on February 3, 1958. All pleaded not
guilty.
In the course of the trial, after the prosecution had rested the People's case, the
accused filed a motion to dismiss on the ground, inter alia, that the fiscal, after
conducting his own preliminary investigation, included in the charge the other
accused who were already dropped therefrom by the Municipal Court. The trial
court denied said motion but acquitted accused Gaspar Bautista, Agapito
Avellana, Cesar Abapo and Eriberto Matchoca for insufficiency of evidence
against them.
The defense then presented its evidence. While at this stage, accused Segundo
de la Cerna died and the charge against him was dropped.
After trial, the lower court, on January 3, 1962 promulgated its decision. Acquitted
were Guillermo Esperanza, Concordio Pardillo, Deogracias Pardillo, Andres
Abapo and Joaquin Libumfacil.
Convicted for the murder of Rafael Cabizares were Sulpicio de la Cerna and
Serapio Maquiling, as principals, and Godofredo Rotor, Antonio Bautista,
Severino Matchoca and Teodoro Libumfacil, as accomplices.
For the murder of Casiano Cabizares, the court convicted Sulpicio de la Cerna
and Serapio Maquiling as principals, and Ramon Alquizar as accessory.
A motion to reconsider by the convicted accused failed to move the lower court.
So the said accused followed up with their notice of appeal. Two days later
accused Ramon Alquizar was allowed to withdraw his intended appeal. And
8
during the pendency of the appeal in this Court, accused Serapio Maquiling
moved to withdraw his appeal also, and this was granted on August 8, 1967.
The present appeal, therefore, involves only Sulpicio de la Cerna as principal for
the killing of both Rafael and Casiano Cabizares; and Teodoro Libumfacil,
Godofredo Rotor, Severino Matchoca and Antonio Bautista as accomplices for
the killing of Rafael Cabizares.
The first question is procedural. It appears that when the municipal court finished
with the preliminary investigation, it opined that only appellant Sulpicio de la
Cerna was guilty while the rest of the accused were not. The fiscal, however,
without seeking a review of the findings of the court, conducted his own
investigation and, afterwards, indicted all the accused. It is contended that this
was serious error. The objection, however, was raised only after the prosecution
had already rested its case. Hence, whatever procedural defect there was, had
been waived by the appellants by their failure to raise it before entering their
pleas.2
Appellants next assail the lower court for relying on the prosecution witnesses
who gave, in substance, the following narration of facts and circumstances:
Early in the morning of February 3, 1958, Rafael Cabizares, accompanied by his
wife, Hospicia, his brothers Margarito and Romualdo, and his sons Gumercindo,
Marcelo, Casiano, Juan and Lamberto, left Barrio Cebuano headed for the
poblacion of Tupi, Cotabato, bringing five sacks of corn loaded on a bull cart to be
milled in Tupi. Juan, Marcelo and Lamberto, who were all minors, were then
going to school. Upon approaching a hilly part, they had to stop since the carabao
could not pull the bull cart uphill. Rafael then requested his two brothers and his
son Gumercindo to accompany him up the hill and carry on their backs the sacks
of corn. With Rafael leading, the four proceeded uphill.
As the four approached Sulpicio de la Cerna's house on top of the hill and were
about to put down the sacks of corn, appellant Sulpicio, who was in the house,
fired at and hit Rafael, who fell down. Sulpicio then ordered his companions to
burn his house so that they would have an excuse. Meanwhile, Casiano,
Gumercindo, Marcelo and Romualdo brought the wounded Rafael Cabizares to
the house of the latter's father, Demetrio, 100 meters away. Felisa Bastismo,
Rafael's mother, Ursula Cabizares and Segundino Cabizares were there at the
time.
After the group reached the house, Rafael's wounds were washed with hot water
and then he was brought inside the third room of the house. Subsequently,
appellant Sulpicio and the other accused arrived at the premises, armed with
firearms, bolos and canes. They stoned the house and trust their bolos thru the
bamboo walls and flooring. Finding that there were women inside the house, the
accused ordered them to get out or else they would be killed also. As Felisa
Bastismo and Ursula Cabizares alighted from the besieged house, Marcelo
Cabizares followed them, and although held by accused Conrado Pardillo and
boxed by Serapio Maquiling, he was able to escape to the nearby forest.
Serapio Maquiling then climbed up the window of the kitchen, and with the
carbine which he got from appellant Sulpicio de la Cerna, shot at Rafael
Cabizares who was sitting in the third room. At this moment, Casiano Cabizares
jumped down from the house thru the kitchen door and ran away. Serapio
Maquiling followed him and shot the latter at the back, killing him a few meters
away from Demetrio's house. Appellant Sulpicio de la Cerna then got back the
carbine, climbed up the house and fired once more at Rafael, who was now lying
down on the floor, killing him finally. Thereafter, the cadaver of Casiano
Cabizares was tied to a bamboo pole, carried by accused Ramon Alquizar and
one Wilfredo Malias (at large) and placed near the burned house of Sulpicio de la
Cerna, as some of the accused followed while the rest proceeded to Rafael's
house.
The post mortem examination3 conducted that very same day showed that
Casiano Cabizares died from a gunshot wound, the bullet entering the back and
passing out in front, while Rafael Cabizares sustained three gunshot wounds of
entrance, one gunshot exit wound, and one stab wound. Dr. Bienvenido Garcia,
the Municipal Health Officer, explained that the bullet which caused the first
wound located in front, at the left lower abdomen, did not go thru at the back but
split into two parts after entering the body. However, these two parts were already
palpable on the left buttock of the decedent from which they were extracted. The
bullet which caused the second wound located directly at the back lodged in the
11th thoracic vertebra. The third bullet entered near the left breast and went out
at the right lumbar region.
The prosecution also presented proof that prior to the incident, a land dispute
arose between Rafael and some of the accused,4 and that he had filed
complaints5 with the Agrarian Court against the latter, the trial of which cases was
scheduled on February 10, 1958.
Appellants would have this Court believe that they are innocent. The four
appellants convicted as accomplices insist they were never at the vicinity of the
killing. On the other hand, appellant Sulpicio de la Cerna claims that both Rafael
and Casiano were killed in self-defense.
Sulpicio's version of what transpired is this:
In the morning of February 3, 1958, Guillermo Esperanza and Sulpicio de la
Cerna had just roasted corn in the latter's house when Rafael, Casiano, and
others, all armed with bolos and canes, arrived. Rafael demanded of Sulpicio to
come down for a confrontation. The latter's refusal to do so angered Rafael who
threw his cane at Sulpicio and ordered his companions to surround the house,
9
thrust their bolos thru it and burn it. Because the house was on fire, and fearing
that he would be killed, Sulpicio alerted Guillermo Esperanza got his carbine and
fired indiscriminately at his attackers to drive them away. When Rafael and
Casiano were hit, their companions fled. Guillermo Esperanza and Sulpicio then
got down from the burning house and left, passing by the prostrate bodies of the
decedents. Sulpicio proceeded to the house of one Pedro Esperanza to drink
water and while there, he saw a jeep coming loaded with policemen to whom be
surrendered himself and his carbine. Expectedly Guillermo Esperanza gave the
same version as above-narrated.
Said appellant's version cannot be accepted. The autopsy reports contradict
Sulpicio's claim that he shot the decedents frontally while he was up in his house.
For both deceased each sustained a gunshot wound directly at the back.
Moreover Casiano's wound of entry located along the 12th rib is lower than
the wound of exit located along the 6th rib6 showing that the bullet flight
path was upwards, not downwards. A gun fired from the elevated flooring7 of a
house like Sulpicio's, and aimed downwards, could not have caused such
wounds. Lastly, Rafael's cadaver bore a stab wound on the left side. Appellant's
version could not account for this.
While on the one hand nothing was found around the burned house of appellant
Sulpicio de la Cerna, such as the alleged cane thrown by Rafael, nor any other
weapon or stones which may indicate agression or violence, on the other,
bloodstains were found inside Demetrio Cabizares' house8 and also on the
ground at the spot where, according to the prosecution,9 Casiano fell when shot
by Serapio Maquiling. An empty carbine shell (Exh. I) was also found by Dr.
Garcia in the kitchen. In this regard, his testimony is not hearsay, as appellant
contends, for although Dr. Garcia did not personally pick it up, he saw the empty
shell taken from the floor and handed over to his companions before finally
reaching him.10 While Casiano's body was found near Sulpicio's burned' house,
even appellant's own witness11 admitted having found Rafael's body inside
Demetrio's house right after the incidents occurred. Appellant's supposition that
Rafael's companions must have returned and carried away his body can hardly
be accepted since there is no reason why they would not also bring back
Casiano's body.
Moreover, we find it hard to believe that Sulpicio, after felling the decedents and
dispersing the latter's companions would still leave his house when it was not yet
totally burned, as he himself admitted. The natural thing for him to have done
were it true that it was decedents who set fire to it was to put down the fire and
save his house. Anyway his life was no longer in danger.
Lastly, Sulpicio has more reason to resent and kill Rafael than the latter would
have as to him. The source of the possible motive is the same: land trouble
between Rafael Cabizares and Sulpicio's father, and the ejectment suit instituted
before the Agrarian Court against the latter by the former. Considering that Rafael
was the prevailing party in the land dispute before the NARRA, it is quite hard to
believe that he would be the one entertaining a grudge against those over whom
he had prevailed. Rather, it was the accused, who were defeated and who were
now facing an ejectment suit which was set for hearing, that harbored resentment
against the deceased.
Furthermore, all the foregoing considerations fit well into the prosecution's
version. We have gone over the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and
found them credible. That most of them are related to the victim does not
necessarily impair their credibility.12 Appellants however invite our attention to
inconsistencies and improbabilities allegedly abounding in their testimonies. We
shall consider each witness and their testimonies separately.
1. Romualdo Cabizares He was with his brother Rafael when the latter was
shot near Sulpicio's house and was among those who brought Rafael to their
father's (Demetrio) house 100 meters away. He did not go up the house since he
had to go back and evacuate his family to a forest 400 meters away. Having done
so, he went back and saw the incidents around Demetrio's house from a place
covered with corn plants just 25 meters away.
Appellants point out that his statements on the whereabouts of Conrado Pardillo
were inconsistent, leading the lower court to disbelieve him and acquit Pardillo.
We find no inconsistency since Pardillo's going to Rafael's house with the other
accused was after the events in Demetrio's premises had taken place.13 The
lower court acquitted Pardillo not because it disbelieved Romualdo but rather,
taking his testimony as true, the court held that the facts proved were insufficient
to tack criminal liability on Pardillo.14
This witness was able to observe the events around Demetrio's house. Even if
the corn plants where he hid were sparse, because of the 25-meter distance from
the accused whose attentions were focused on Demetrio's house, and
considering that he was in a hidden place15 while the accused were in the open
field, Romualdo could see them without their noticing him. It is true that the forest
where Romualdo took his family was 400 meters away, but the accused took
some time before they followed to Demetrio's house and Romualdo ran back after
hiding his family.16
2. Margarito Cabizares He was beside his brother Rafael at the hill top when
the latter was shot by Sulpicio. When he tried to hide near some banana clumps,
Guillermo Esperanza stabbed him, hitting him near the left shoulder and causing
him to fall unconscious. Shortly later when he recovered consciousness, he
followed Rafael who was being brought to Demetrio's house but he was told by
Rafael to save himself so he went to a forest 400 meters away where he saw the
goings-on around Demetrio's house.
10
Appellants state that nothing much can be gathered from his testimony. However,
they overlook the obvious fact that Margarito was an eyewitness to the shooting
of Rafael near Sulpicio's house. Although he lost consciousness after being
stabbed, it was momentary only, the wound not being very serious.17 It was not
impossible for him to have observed activities around Demetrio's house at a
distance of 400 meters. Witness Bonifacio Barro corroborates him on this
point.18 Lastly, he need not be a ballistics expert to recognize gunshot bursts.
3. Gumercindo Cabizares He was with his father Rafael at the hill top. He
warned his father just before Sulpicio fired the carbine. After Rafael was hit, he
helped carry him to Demetrio's house but did not stay there since he was told by
Rafael to go to Dadiangas to call the P.C.
Appellants claim that his testimony regarding a conversation with Juan Cabizares
on the way downhill is contradicted by Juan himself who stated that he was not
with those who brought Rafael to Demetrio's house. We fail to see any
contradiction. Juan did not deny having conversed with Gumercindo. And what
the latter said was that after meeting Juan, they went ahead and Juan probably
followed behind.19 We do not think it is stupidity for a son to warn his father of
imminent danger as Gumercindo did and to come to the latter's aid despite
danger. We prefer to consider such behavior as "courage under fire."
4. Marcelo Cabizares He was near the bullcart downhill and when he heard
gun shots, he went uphill. There he helped carry his father Rafael to his
grandfather Demetrio's house. After the accused arrived in the latter's house, the
women were ordered to get out. He followed Ursula Cabizares and Felisa
Bastismo on the way down but he was held by Pardillo and boxed by Serapio
Maquiling. Still, he was able to escape.
Appellants point out to two statements of his, one wherein he was able to identify
all the accused and the other, wherein he was able to name only four of them,
alleging material inconsistency. The statements however referred to different
situations. The first was when all the accused arrived at Demetrio's place, and the
second statement refers to those whom Marcelo Cabizares saw when he came
down from the house.20 He was able to run away after Serapio Maquiling boxed
him because he was freed from the hold of Pardillo and Serapio.21 On redirect, he
clarified that he left Demetrio's house in the morning.22
5. Juan Cabizares He also stayed with the bullcart downhill and when he heard
gun shots, he went uphill and saw his father wounded. He then followed behind
the group carrying Rafael to Demetrio's house and while inside the house, saw
the killing of Rafael and Casiano.
Juan did not lie when he said his father was shot by Sulpicio for altho he did not
see the actual shooting, he had good reasons to conclude that Sulpicio fired the
shot since he saw the latter, shortly after the shooting, holding the carbine which
was still pointed at Rafael.23 Anyway, his testimony on the point is merely
corroborative of the others who were eyewitnesses. He was able to identify
Serapio Maquiling as the one who first shot his father in Demetrio's house
although Serapio was behind the bamboo partition, since there were openings in
it enabling one to see thru and he peeped thru it.24 The measurements in the third
room (3 m x 4 m) are compatible with Juan's statement that Sulpicio was 1-1/2 m
away from Rafael when the third shot was fired since Sulpicio did not go inside
the room but fired from the window outside.25 Juan was competent to testify on
what occurred outside the house since he was also peeping thru the slits in the
bamboo walls.26
6. Felisa Bastismo She was the mother of Rafael Cabizares. She was with
Ursula Cabizares and Segundino Cabizares inside Demetrio's house when the
wounded Rafael was brought in. After Rafael's wounds were washed, Felisa went
down from the house with Ursula, as ordered by the accused. And in the corn
fields nearby, she witnessed the killing of Casiano.
Appellants make much of Felisa's testimony referring to Rafael's "wounds" when
he was brought in the house, and argue that Rafael had been shot at least twice
already. But Felisa did not examine the wound of Rafael. Neither did she state
how many wounds he had. The substance of her testimony is only that Rafael
was wounded when he arrived. As to the impossibility for the stones to go thru the
broken window shutter (Exh. K), Felisa admitted that she merely heard the sound
when they fell on the floor.27 Surely, appellant cannot seriously contend that one
has to see stones going thru the house to know that it is being stoned. Anyway, it
is not impossible for a large stone hurled against a bamboo shutter to cause a
hole therein measuring 14" x 1 ." And assuming that such hole appears more to
have been cut by a bolo and forced open, Felisa testified that the accused also
thrust their bolos thru the walls.28
It is not impossible for Felisa to have seen Casiano's shooting for she lay flat on
the ground after having witnessed it already.29 She also explained why she was
alone in the corn fields although she left the house together with Ursula. Being 76
years old, she was slower than Ursula, and she stumbled while fleeing so she
was able to reach up to the corn fields only.30 As to Juan's arrival, the testimonies
of the other witnesses are uniform that the group carrying Rafael arrived in
Demetrio's house first and Juan, who followed behind, arrived afterwards.31 Juan
corroborates Felisa that he helped carry Rafael to the third room.32 Marcelo
probably noticed Juan only after Rafael had been brought to the third room,
leading him to say that Juan arrived after Rafael was brought there. 33
7. Ursula and Segundino Cabizares Both were in Demetrio's house with Felisa
Bastismo. They saw the arrival of the accused and the stoning and thrusting of
bolos thru the wallings. One of the bolos wounded Segundino Cabizares on the
left thigh. Ursula Cabizares hid in a palay container but when they were ordered
to get out, she and Felisa Bastismo left and returned later in the afternoon.
11
While Ursula was evidently mistaken when she said that Margarito was also in
the house, the error is immaterial. Contrary to appellants' contention, she saw
Serapio Maquiling on her way down the house.34 As to whether the other accused
besides appellant Antonio Bautista were armed with bolos, she stated she did not
know since she only saw the bolo tips penetrating thru the wallings. 35 Her positive
statement that She saw appellant Godofredo Rotor36 prevails, of course, over the
negative testimony of Maximo Caa.
Appellants argue that since Segundino Cabizares was fearful, he could not have
been moving inside the besieged house of Demetrio, peeping every now and then
thru the openings in the walls and observing the accused. They seem to forget
however that different people react differently even when apprehensive. Thus,
Segundino's restlessness inside the house is neither unnatural or ridiculous to
believe.
8. Bonifacio Barro He was with Fiscal Daproza and Sgt. Paladin inside
Demetrio's house a few days after February 3, 1958 and upon orders of the
Fiscal, he took out part of the flooring (Exh. K), the bamboo slatch (Exhs. L and L-
1) and the stones (Exhs. M, M-1 and M-2).
His statement that Exhs. M, M-1 and M-2 were some of the stones Fiscal
Daproza found on the roof of Demetrio's house corroborates the other
prosecution witnesses who testified that the accused stoned the house. He also
stated that there were other stones inside the house, corroborating Romualdo
Cabizares.37
9. Dr. Bienvenido Garcia As municipal health officer, he performed the autopsy
on Rafael and Casiano Cabizares on February 3, 1958. He found Casiano's body
near the burned house of Sulpicio de la Cerna, and Rafael's, inside Demetrio's
house. In the latter house, he also saw a bullet hole on the floor (Exh. J-1) and a
carbine shell (Exh. 1).
Appellants would cavil on Dr. Garcia's statement that he saw Exh. J (part of the
flooring) only in court. What he said however was that he saw it as cut already
from the floor only in court.38 His statements as to the room dimensions (3-4 m x
4-5 m) and the distance of Rafael's body to the partition (1 m or 2 ft.)
are approximations only and not exact measurements.39 A difference of a few
insignificant meters is to be expected. Lastly, his statements that the bullet hole
(Exhibit J-1) was on the floor coincides with Barro's testimony that Exh. J was cut
from the flooring.40
From all the foregoing, it is apparent that the so-charged inconsistencies and
improbabilities in the testimonies are without substantial and significant basis.
Hence, the lower court's findings should stand, especially since they involve an
appreciation of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses.
We now proceed to the criminal liability of the appellants.
The killing of Rafael Cabizares was attended by treachery. Appellant Sulpicio
contends that the first shot, fired by him, was not attended with treachery since
there is evidence that Rafael was warned by his son Gumercindo just before he
was hit in the lower abdomen.41 However, even assuming the argument to be
tenable, the second shot, by Serapio Maquiling, was definitely treacherously fired
since Rafael was then in the third room of Demetrio's house, wounded and
defenseless. The treachery here has to be independently considered due to the
sufficient lapse of time42 from the first shot, in which the following events
intervened: (1) the bringing of Rafael to Demetrio's house 100 meters away after
being hit; (2) the washing of his wounds and his being brought to the third room to
rest; (3) the arrival of the accused and their ordering the two women to get out. It
was only after the women left that Serapio climbed up the kitchen and fired the
second shot at Rafael.
Appellant Sulpicio is chargeable for the treacherous shooting of Rafael by
Serapio Maquiling since both were acting as co-conspirators pursuant to their
understanding in the meeting held the day before in Andres Abapo's house, as
will be shown presently. Anyway, the third shot, fired by Sulpicio, was
treacherously done. Rafael was then flat on the floor and although still alive, was
completely defenseless, having been shot twice already. The portion of Dr.
Garcia's testimony43 cited by appellants shows that Rafael died after the third shot
hit him
Q. After wound No. 1 was inflicted, is it possible that Rafael
Cabizares was still alive?
A. Rafael Cabizares was still alive.
Q. After inflicting wound No. 2, is it possible that Rafael
Cabizares was still alive?
A. He was still alive.
Q. When wound No. 3 was inflicted, was he still alive by your
conclusion?
A. He was dead.
Q. What makes you conclude that he was already dead when
wound No. 3 was inflicted?
A. Because wound No. 3 is mortal.
12
thus corroborating Juan Cabizares' testimony that his father was still alive after
the second shot wounded him.
Evident premeditation was also present in this case. The previous plan to kill
Rafael Cabizares was testified to by witness Maximo Caa who was present in
the meeting of February 2, 1958, in the house of Andres Abapo. Of the many
persons present, he recognized only appellants Sulpicio de la Cerna, Antonio
Bautista, Severino Matchoca and Serapio Maquiling. Bautista told the group that
the purpose of the meeting was to plan the killing of Rafael Cabizares. Then both
he and Serapio Maquiling signified their willingness to execute it. Appellant
Sulpicio also offered to do it provided his family would be taken care of. To this
offer, Bautista and Maquiling replied that they would take care of Sulpicio's family.
Caa testified further that none of those attending voiced out any objection but all
agreed to the plan. Caa was also present in the early morning of February 3,
1958, when Matchoca, accompanied by Bautista, gave the magazine of bullets to
Godofredo Rotor. He was likewise with the accused when Rafael was shot at the
hill top, and when he (Rafael) and Casiano were killed in Demetrio's place.
However, one year and ten months after he had testified for the prosecution,
witness Caa was presented as a defense witness. As such, he completely
retracted on his previous testimony, explaining that all what he had stated was
false since he was not in Tupi on February 2 and 3, 1958. Gaudencio Esperanza,
presented to corroborate him, testified that in August, 1958, Hospicia Cabizares,
widow of Rafael, went to the former's house where Caa was staying, and gave
the latter P50.00 to testify falsely for the prosecution. On rebuttal, Hospicia
Cabizares denied this.44
We have thus two sets of testimonies by Caa completely at variance with each
other. Now the rule is that mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not
necessarily vitiate the original testimony otherwise credible.45 The proper thing for
the trial court to do is to weigh and compare both testimonies. Here, the lower
court, after having done so, accepted Caa's testimony for the prosecution. In
this, it did not err.
Firstly, the original testimony is positive and replete with details,
and Caa withstood a long and thorough cross-examination which could not have
been so, if the story were merely fabricated. Secondly, Caa's narration of the
shooting incident was fully corroborated by the other prosecution witnesses.
Lastly, the charged inconsistencies and improbabilities therein are too
insignificant to affect the substance thereof.
On the other hand, in his subsequent testimony,46 Caa was evasive and most of
his answers were: I don't remember" or "I don't know". His statement that he was
in Marbel on February 2 and 3, 1958 is not only uncorroborated but even
contradicted by two prosecution witnesses who saw him with the accused on
February 3, 1958.47 Caa was also in sincere, claiming that his conscience
bothered him greatly but he admitted that he could not sleep only in the
mornings48 and notwithstanding the serious predicament he was in because of
the inconsistent statements made in open court he was even
smiling.49 Moreover, according to Gaudencio Esperanza, who is the father-in-law
of Serapio Maquiling, Caa was only constrained to testify falsely when he was
bribed by Rafael's widow, Hospicia Cabizares, sometime in August, 1958. This
pretense can not be believed since a month prior to that, or on July 28, 1958,
Caa had already executed an affidavit (Exh. V) incriminating the appellants. It
also appears highly improbable for Rafael's widow to go to the house of a relative
of the accused and in his presence openly bribe Caa, a resident therein. Lastly,
it is hard to believe that although Gaudencio Esperanza knew of this incident, he
told the defense counsel about it only after Caa had already testified for the
defense and had been incarcerated to face a charge of perjury.50 The impulse of
a man similarly situated would have been to relate such matter at once to his
accused relatives. Gaudencio's failure to do so makes of his story a worthless
fabrication.
There being a previous direct conspiracy one day before the killing, evident
premeditation is duly established.51 This qualifying circumstance is further
buttressed by the following actuations of appellant on February 3, 1958: (1) Upon
seeing Rafael near his house, Sulpicio told his companions to get ready since the
one they were awaiting was there already. And then he shot at Rafael. (2) As
Rafael was being brought to Demetrio's house, Sulpicio ordered his companions
to burn his house so they would have an excuse already. (3) With the other
appellants, he pursued the wounded Rafael to Demetrio's house where after they
had stoned the same and thrust their bolos thru its wallings, they ordered the
women folk to leave lest they be killed also; and (4) after Serapio had already
shot at Rafael, Sulpicio still fired a third shot, finally killing Rafael. All these still
overtly show appellant's determination to end Rafael's life. The killing, therefore,
was properly qualify as murder.
However, appellant Sulpicio cannot be held liable for the killing of Casiano
Cabizares notwithstanding a conspiracy between him and Serapio Maquiling. The
conspiracy was to kill Rafael only and no one else. Nothing was said or agreed
upon about the members of Rafael's family. In fact, in executing their plan
appellants let the two women inside Demetrio's house leave unhurt and they did
no harm to the remaining companions of Rafael in the house. Their target was
solely Rafael Cabizares. And the rule has always been that co-conspirators are
liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspiracy. For other acts done outside
the contemplation of the co-conspirators or which are not the necessary and
logical consequence of the intended crime, only the actual perpetrators are
liable.52 Here, only Serapio killed Casiano Cabizares. The latter not even going to
the aid of his father Rafael but was fleeing away when shot.
Although Serapio got the carbine from Sulpicio, the latter cannot be considered a
principal by indispensable cooperation or an accomplice. There is no evidence at
all that Sulpicio was aware Serapio would use the rifle to kill Casiano.
13
Presumably, he gave the carbine to Serapio for him to shoot Rafael only as per
their agreement. Neither is there concrete proof that Sulpicio abetted the shooting
of Casiano. Sulpicio might have been liable if after the shooting of Rafael, Serapio
returned the carbine to him but upon seeing Casiano fleeing, immediately asked
again for the carbine and Sulpicio voluntarily gave it to him. Serapio's criminal
intention then would be reasonably apparent to Sulpicio and the latter's giving
back of the rifle would constitute his assent thereto. But such was not the case.
Sulpicio, therefore, must be acquitted for the killing of Casiano Cabizares.
Appellants Godofredo Rotor, Antonio Bautista, Severino Matchoca and Teodoro
Libumfacil all put up alibi as their defense. This the trial court rejected but it held
them liable as accomplices only, finding reasonable doubt on their guilt as co-
principals. Appellants would again advance their respective alibis here.
Appellant Rotor claims that at dawn on February 3, 1957, he went alone to the
spring in Barrio Cebuano to fetch water and after staying awhile there, started
back home. On the way back, his mother met him and told him not to go home
because of an incident (the killing of the decedents) so he went instead to Simeon
Navajas' house and stayed there until February 18, 1958.
The prosecution, however, proved that in the early morning of February 3, 1958,
Rotor was with Maximo Caa fetching water in the spring. On their way home,
they met appellants Bautista and Matchoca. The latter gave Rotor a carbine
magazine with bullets, saying: "Here is the magazine of the bullets and give it to
Sulpicio de la Cerna." And appellant Bautista said: "Please hurry. Give it to
Sulpicio de la Cerna because we will follow later on." Shortly afterwards, Caa
went with him to Sulpicio's house where he gave the magazine to Sulpicio,
saying: "Here are some bullets supposed to be given to you."53
Rotor was seen outside downstairs of Sulpicio's house later that morning by
Margarito and Gumercindo Cabizares. After Sulpicio had fired at Rafael, Rotor
got the pistol from appellant Libumfacil and fired also at Rafael. 54 This appellant
was also seen by Romualdo, Ursula and Segundino Cabizares as among those
who arrived at Demetrio's house.55 When Ursula Cabizares alighted from the
house, she saw Rotor outside holding a pistol which he gave to Libumfacil
commenting that it was stuck.56 After the killing of the decedents, Romualdo
Cabizares saw him with the group following the cadaver of Casiano Cabizares
which was being brought near Sulpicio's burned house.57
In the face of the overwhelming positive identification of six prosecution
witnesses, Rotors uncorroborated alibi must fail. Although he was not present or
did not participate in the meeting of February 2, 1968, his presence in the situs of
the shootings on February 3, 1958 was not merely passive. His active
participation shooting at Rafael and carrying a pistol which has a direct
connection with the criminal design against Rafael Cabizares makes him a
principal by indirect conspiracy, not an accomplice only. Motive is not wanting.
Rotor admitted that his wife is the sister of Sulpicio's wife58 and the evidence
shows that his father had a land dispute with Rafael Cabizares and was a
respondent in the case before the Agrarian Court.59
Appellant Bautista claims that on February 2, 1958, he left Barrio Cebuano for
Tupi (5 kms. away) to get a truck to load his corn. That afternoon, he returned to
Cebuano where they loaded corn but he could not return to Tupi as the truck
would not start, so he slept at home. Early the next day, February 3, 1958, they
pushed the truck to start it. Later, appellant Matchoca arrived and helped them.
He also rode in the truck but upon reaching an uphill road, it stopped again. They
were able to recharge its batteries from a tractor that happened to pass by. They
continued the trip and finally arrived in the poblacion of Tupi at about 8:00 A.M.
Several months later, while he was at Sergio Rotor's house, his child told him that
a P.C. soldier was waiting at home, so instead of going home, he had a
conference with Andres Abapo, Ramon Alquizar, Roberto Matchoca (son of
Severino) and Agapito Avellana. They all decided to proceed to Tupi and
surrender to the Mayor.
Appellant Matchoca related the same incident told by Bautista regarding the trip
to Tupi. He then claimed to have returned to Barrio Cebuano about noontime and
there learned of the incident. The next day, he evacuated his family to avoid
trouble.
The prosecution, however, has established that these two appellants were in the
meeting held in Abapo's house on February 2, 1958. They openly participated
therein. Their meeting with appellant Rotor early the following morning has also
been established thru the testimony of Maximo Caa.
These two were also seen outside Sulpicio's house. Bautista was carrying a bolo
and a cane and was heard shouting at Rafael thus: "Rafael, you cannot reach the
trial because we will kill you."60 Gumercindo Cabizares also heard Matchoca
shouting: "Go ahead, shoot. We will kill him so that he will not reach the day of
the hearing."61
Bautista and Matchoca were among those who went to Demetrio's house.62 The
former thrust his bolo thru the bamboo wallings hitting Segundino
Cabizares.63 When Ursula Cabizares came down from the house, she saw
Bautista holding a bolo.64 Romualdo, on the other hand, claimed having seen him
holding a firearm.65 After the killings had taken place, Bautista went with the
group that proceeded back to Sulpicio's burned house whereas Matchoca
marched with the other group headed for Rafael's house.66
The positive identification of the several prosecution witnesses must prevail over
the alibis proferred by these appellants. Their presence and active participation in
the meeting in Abapo's house make them actual conspirators in the killing of
Rafael. They were also present and zealously participating in the execution of
14
their criminal design, giving a carbine magazine and instructions to appellant
Rotor, threatening Rafael and giving encouragement to Sulpicio to shoot at the
latter. They were among those who laid siege to Demetrio's house and left
together with the others after finally accomplishing their criminal deeds as agreed
upon. Appellants Bautista and Matchoca are therefore also liable as co-principals
in Rafael's murder. Regarding motive, it was proved that both were among those
involved in the land conflict with Rafael Cabizares and were among the
respondents in the case before the Agrarian Court.
Appellant Libumfacil's story is that in the morning of February 3, 1958 he was in
the Menzi Area about 6 kilometers from Barrio Cebuano. That afternoon, he
returned to the poblacion of Tupi. To corroborate him, Lauro Esconde stated that
he saw Libumfacil that day working on the latter's farm lot in the Menzi area.
However, Maximo Caa saw appellant Libumfacil outside Sulpicio's house when
the former arrived there with appellant Rotor in the morning of February 3, 1958.
Libumfacil had a pistol which he also fired at Rafael. 67Gumercindo Cabizares also
saw him holding a pistol which he gave to Rotor who then took a shot at Rafael. 68
Appellant Libumfacil was seen by Caa again among those who went with the
other accused downhill from Sulpicio's house to Demetrio's house.69 The other
prosecution witnesses saw him also around Demetrio's house, armed with a
pistol.70 He was among those who stoned the house.71 When Ursula Cabizares
alighted therefrom, she saw appellant Libumfacil outside, conversing with Rotor
and receiving from the latter a pistol which had gotten stuck. After the incidents in
Demetrio's house, Libumfacil went with appellants Rotor and Bautista to
Sulpicio's burned house.72
Libumfacil's alibi, though corroborated, cannot overcome the positive identification
of the eight prosecution witnesses who saw him. Although he was not present in
Abapo's house on February 2, 1958, he was present at Sulpicio's house and in
the premises of Demetrio's house with the other accused and appellants. He was
armed, had fired at Rafael also, and took part in the stoning of Demetrio's house
where Rafael was brought. His actuations manifest that he was aware of the
criminal design of the original conspirators that he approved of it and carried it
out, thus showing that his presence at the scene of the crime was not merely
passive. Consequently, he is a co-principal in Rafael's murder. And motive is not
wanting. It was established that his mother had a land conflict with Rafael73 and
that his step-father Diosdado Esperanza was one of the respondents in the case
before the Agrarian Court.
We find therefore all five appellants guilty as co-principals in the murder of Rafael
Cabizares.
The aggravating circumstance of treachery, applicable against appellant Sulpicio
de la Cerna only, is offset by his voluntary surrender after the incident. This
mitigating circumstance however can not benefit the remaining appellants who
did not voluntarily surrender. For all the appellants, therefore, the penalty for
Rafael Cabizares' murder must be imposed in the medium period. For the killing
of Casiano Cabizares, appellant Sulpicio de la Cerna must be acquitted.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified as follows:

(a) Appellants Sulpicio de la Cerna, Godofredo Rotor, Antonio Bautista,

Severino Matchoca and Teodoro Libumfacil are hereby found guilty as
principals for the murder of Rafael Cabizares and sentenced to each
suffer reclusion perpetua, to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of
Rafael Cabizares the sum of P6,000.00 and to pay the costs;

(b) Appellant Sulpicio de la Cerna is hereby acquitted for the murder of

Casiano Cabizares.

So ordered.

15

[G.R. No. 133489 & 143970. January 15, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. RONALD a.k.a ROLAND GARCIA y FLORES,* RODANTE ROGEL
y ROSALES, ROTCHEL LARIBA y DEMICILLO, and GERRY B.
VALLER, accused-appellants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049 accused-appellants Ronald a.k.a Roland
Garcia y Flores, Rodante Rogel y Rosales, Rotchel Lariba y Demicillo and Gerry
B. Valler, along with a certain Jimmy Muit, were charged with and convicted of
kidnapping for ransom and were sentenced each to death, except
aforementioned Jimmy Muit who has remained at large, for obvious reasons, and
to indemnify their victim Romualdo Tioleco P200,000.00 and to pay the costs.[1]
In a related case, Crim. Case No. Q-96-68050, which was decided jointly
with Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049, accused-
appellants Rotchel Lariba and Rodante Rogel were also found guilty of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition and each sentenced to an indeterminate
prison term of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days
of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay a fine of P30,000.00 plus the
costs.[2] No notice of appeal[3] was filed in this criminal case; nonetheless, for
reasons herein below stated, we take cognizance of the case.
Atty. Romualdo Tioleco was jogging alone at Gilmore Avenue, New
Manila, Quezon City, at about 5:30 oclock in the morning of 5 October 1996.[4] He
was heading towards 4th Avenue when he noticed a blue car parked at the corner
of this street.[5] As he was about to cross 4th Avenue, the car lurched towards him
and stopped.[6] Two (2) men quickly alighted from the car.[7] One of them pointed a
gun at Atty. Tioleco while the other hit his back and pushed him into the back seat
of the car.[8] Once inside, he saw two (2) other men, one on the drivers seat and
the other on the back seat directly behind the driver. [9] He found out later the
identities of the driver whom he undoubtedly recognized during the abduction to
be accused-appellant Gerry Valler, and of the other person on the passenger seat
behind Valler as accused-appellant Roland Ronald Garcia.[10] He described the
man who disembarked from the car and who pushed him inside to be 55 or 56 in
height, medium built, and the other, who threatened him with a gun, at 54 or 55 in
height, dark complexioned and medium built although heftier than the
16
other.[11] These two (2) persons have since the commission of the crime have
remained at large.
While inside the car Atty. Tioleco was made to crouch on the leg room.[12] As
it sped towards a destination then unknown to the victim, the men on board
feigned to be military men and pestered him with the accusation of being a drug
pusher and the threat of detention at Camp Crame.[13] As they were psyching him
down, they started putting blindfold on [him] and packaging tape on [his]face and
handcuffed [him] on the back of [his] body. [14] His eyeglasses were taken off when
they were putting blindfold on [him] x x x.[15] Then they divested him of his other
personal belongings, e.g., his keys, wristwatch, etc.[16]
The car cruised for thirty (30) to forty-five (45) minutes.[17] When it finally
stopped, Atty. Tioleco was told to alight, led to a house and then into a
room.[18] He remained blindfolded and handcuffed throughout his ordeal and
made to lie down on a wooden bed.[19] During his captivity, one of the kidnappers
approached him and told him that he would be released for a ransom of P2
million[20] although the victim bargained for an amount between P50,000.00
and P100,000.00 which according to him was all he could afford. While still under
detention, one of his abductors told him that they had mistaken him for a Chinese
national and promised his release without ransom.[21] But he was just being taken
for a ride since the kidnappers had already begun contacting his
sister Floriana Tioleco.
Floriana was at her office when her mother called up about her brothers
kidnapping.[22] Floriana hurried home to receive a phone call from a person who
introduced himself as Larry Villanueva demanding P3 million for
Atty. Tiolecosransom.[23] Several other calls to Floriana were made during the day
and in one of those calls the ransom was reduced to P2 million.[24] Around 7:00
oclock in the evening of the same day, 5 October 1996, P/Sr.
Insp. Ronaldo Mendoza of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC)
arrived at Florianas house to monitor her brothers kidnapping upon the request of
her friends.[25] Floriana received the following day about eight (8) phone calls from
the kidnappers still demanding P2 million for her brothers safe release.[26]
By the end of the day on 7 October 1996 Floriana was able to raise
only P71,000.00,[27] which she relayed to the kidnappers when they called her
up.[28] They finally agreed to set her brother free upon payment of this amount,
which was short of the original demand.[29] The pay-off was scheduled that same
day at around 8:00 oclock in the evening at Timog Avenue corner
Scout Tuazon in Quezon City near the Lighthaus and Burger Machine.[30] Upon
instruction of P/Sr. Insp. Mendoza, Floriana together with only two (2) female
friends proceeded to this meeting place.[31] They reached there at 8:40 oclock in
the evening and waited for the kidnappers until about 10:30 or 11:00 o clock that
evening.[32]
Meanwhile, P/Sr. Insp. Mendoza relayed the information about the pay-off
and other relevant facts to P/Chief Insp. Gilberto Cruz at the PACC
headquarters.[33] With the information from P/Sr. Insp. Mendoza, P/Chief Insp.
Cruz, together with P/Chief Insps. Winnie Quidato and Paul Tucay with P/Sr.
Insp. Nilo Pagtalunan, immediately went to Timog Avenue corner
scout Tuazon near the Lighthaus and Burger Machine in Quezon City.[34] They
surveyed this site and saw a blue Toyota Corona with three (3) persons on board
suspiciously stopping about five (5) meters from Floriana and her friends and
remaining there for almost two (2) hours.[35]
Floriana and her friends left the pay-off site after waiting for two (2) hours
more or less;[36] so did the blue Toyota Corona almost simultaneously.[37] No
payment of ransom took place.[38]3P/Chief Insp. Cruz then ordered
P/Chief Insps. Quidato and Tucay and their subordinates to tail this car which
they did all the way to the De Vega Compound at Dahlia Street in
Fairview, Quezon City.[39] This compound consisted of one bungalow house and
was enclosed by a concrete wall and a steel gate for ingress and egress.[40] They
posted themselves thirty (30) to forty (40) meters from the compound to
reconnoiter the place.[41] Meanwhile, the kidnappers explained in a phone call
to Floriana that they had aborted the pay-off on account of their belief that her two
(2) companions at the meeting place were police officers.[42] But she assured
them that her escorts were just her friends.[43]
At around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of 8 October 1996 Floriana received a
call from the kidnappers at her house[44] who wanted to set another schedule for
the payment of the ransom money an hour later or at 2:00 oclock.[45] This time the
rendezvous would be in front of McDonalds fastfood at Magsaysay Boulevard in
Sta. Mesa, Manila.[46] She was told by the kidnappers that a man would go near
her and whisper Romy to whom she would then hand over the ransom
money. Floriana agreed to the proposal. With her two (2) friends, she rushed to
the place and brought with her the P71,000.00.[47] About this time, the same blue
Toyota Corona seen at the first pay-off point left the De Vega Compound
in Fairview.[48] A team of PACC operatives under P/Chief Insp. Cruz again
stationed themselves in the vicinity of McDonalds.[49]
Floriana arrived at the McDonalds restaurant and waited for a few
minutes.[50] Not long after, the blue Toyota Corona was spotted patrolling the
area.[51] The blue car stopped and, after dropping off a man, immediately left the
place.The man approached Floriana and whispered Romy to her.[52] She handed
the money to him who took it.[53] Floriana identified this man during the trial as
accused-appellant Roland (Ronald) Garcia.[54]
The PACC operatives tried to follow the blue car but were prevented by
traffic.[55] They were however able to catch up and arrest Garcia who was in
possession of the ransom money in the amount of P71,000.00.[56] They brought
him inside their police car and there apprised him of his custodial rights. [57] Garcia
informed the PACC operatives that Atty. Tioleco was being detained inside the
De Vega compound in Fairview.[58] With this information, P/Chief Insp. Cruz
ordered P/Chief Insps. Tucay and Quidato who had been posted near the
compound to rescue the victim.[59]
17
The two (2) PACC officers, together with their respective teams, entered the
compound and surged into the bungalow house where they saw two (2) men
inside the living room.[60] As one of the PACC teams was about to arrest the two
(2) men, the latter ran towards a room in the house where they were about to
grab a .38 cal. revolver without serial number loaded with six (6) rounds of
ammunitions and a .357 cal. revolver with six (6) live ammunitions. [61] The other
PACC team searched the house for Atty. Tioleco and found him in the other
room.[62] The two (2) men were arrested and informed of their custodial
rights. They were identified in due time as accused-
appellants Rodante Rogel and Rotchel Lariba.[63]
P/Chief Insp. Cruz arrived at the De Vega compound[64] and coordinated with
the proper barangay authorities.[65] While the PACC operatives were completing
their rescue and arrest operations, the house phone rang.[66] Accused-
appellant Rogel answered the call upon the instruction of P/Chief Insp.
Cruz.[67] Rogel identified the caller to be accused-appellant Valler who was then
driving towards the De Vega compound.[68] In the same phone call, Valler also
talked with accused-appellant Garcia to inquire about the ransom money.[69]
Then a blue Toyota Corona arrived at the De Vega
compound.[70] Valler alighted from the car and shouted at the occupants of the
house to open the gate.[71] Suspicious this time, however, he went back to his car
to flee.[72] But the PACC operatives pursued his car, eventually subduing and
arresting him.[73] The operations at the De Vega Compound ended at 8:30 in the
evening and the PACC operatives, together with Atty. Tioleco and the accused-
appellants, left the De Vega compound and returned to their headquarters
in Camp Crame, Quezon City.[74] The ransom money was returned intact to
Atty. Tioleco.[75]
When arraigned, accused-appellants Ronald Roland
Garcia, Rodante Rogel, Rotchel Lariba and Gerry Valler pleaded not guilty to the
charge of kidnapping for ransom in Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049, although during
the trial Garcia admitted complicity in the abduction of Atty. Tioleco and in the
receipt of the ransom money from the victims sister Floriana.[76] In Crim. Case No.
Q-96-68050 for illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition, Rodante Rogel and RotchelLariba also pleaded not guilty.[77]
During the trial, Gerry Valler denied being part of the kidnapping for ransom
and asserted that he was at the De Vega compound where he was arrested on 8
October 1996 solely to pay for the fighting cocks he had bought from one
Jimmy Muit, alleged owner of the compound.[78] Accused Ronald Garcia, despite
his admission to the crime, nevertheless disowned any role in planning the crime
or knowing the other accused-appellants since his cohorts were allegedly
Jimmy Muit and two (2) others known to him only as Tisoy and Tony.[79] He also
alleged that it was Jimmy Muits red Toyota car that was used in the
crime.[80] Explaining their presence at the De Vega compound at the time they
were arrested, Rogel claimed that he was employed as a helper for breeding
cocks in this compound[81] while Laribas defense focused on an alleged prior
agreement for him to repair Jimmy Muits car.[82]
 Accused-appellants filed separate appellants briefs. In the brief submitted by
the Public Attorneys Office in behalf of accused-appellants
Garcia, Rogel and Lariba, they argue that the crime of kidnapping for ransom was
not committed since Atty. Tioleco was released from detention by means of the
rescue operation conducted by the PACC operatives and the ransom money
subsequently recovered.[83] They conclude that their criminal liability should only
be for slight illegal detention under Art. 268, of The Revised Penal
Code. Accused-appellants Rogel and Lariba further assert that they could not be
held guilty of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition since neither was in
complete control of the firearms and ammunition that were recovered when they
were arrested and no evidence was offered to prove responsibility for the
presence of firearms and ammunition inside the room.[84]
The brief filed for accused-appellant Gerry B. Valler asserts the same
defense he made at the trial that he was at the De Vega compound only to pay
his debts to Jimmy Muit,[85] arguing that Atty. Tioleco did not have the opportunity
to really recognize him so that his identification as the driver of the car was
tainted by police suggestion, and that P/Chief Insp. Cruz testimony is allegedly
replete with inconsistencies that negate his credibility. [86]
Encapsulated, the issues herein focun on (a) the ransom as element of the
crime under Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended; (b) the sufficiency
of the prosecution evidence to prove kidnapping for ransom; (c) the degree of
responsibility of each accused-appellant for kidnapping for ransom; and, (d) the
liability for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under RA 8294,
amending PD 1866.
First. We do not find any quantum of merit in the contention that kidnapping
for ransom is committed only when the victim is released as a result of the
payment of ransom. In People v. Salimbago[87] we ruled -
No specific form of ransom is required to consummate the felony of kidnapping
for ransom so long as it was intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for the
victims freedom. In municipal criminal law, ransom refers to the money, price or
consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons,
a payment that releases from captivity. Neither actual demand for nor actual
payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be committed. It is enough if the
crime was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom. Considering therefore,
that the kidnapping was committed for such purpose, it is not necessary that one
or any of the four circumstances be present.
So the gist of the crime, as aptly stated in American jurisprudence from which
was derived the crime of kidnapping for ransom,[88] is not the forcible or secret
confinement, imprisonment, inveiglement, or kidnapping without lawful authority,
but x x x the felonious act of so doing with intent to hold for a ransom the person
so kidnapped, confined, imprisoned, inveigled, etc.[89]
18
It is obvious that once that intent is present, as in the case at bar, kidnapping
for ransom is already committed. Any other interpretation of the role of ransom,
particularly the one advanced by accused-appellants, is certainly absurd since it
ironically penalizes rescue efforts of kidnap victims by law enforcers and in turn
rewards kidnappers for the success of police efforts in such rescue
operations. Moreover, our jurisprudence is replete with cases, e.g., People v.
Chua Huy,[90] People v. Ocampo[91] and People v. Pingol,[92] wherein botched
ransom payments and effective recovery of the victim did not deter us from
finding culpability for kidnapping for ransom.
Second. Issues of sufficiency of evidence are resolved by reference to
findings of the trial court that are entitled to the highest respect on appeal in the
absence of any clear and overwhelming showing that the trial court neglected,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance affecting the result of the case.[93] Bearing this elementary principle in
mind, we find enough evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
cooperation of all accused-appellants in the kidnapping for ransom of
Atty. Tioleco.
Truly incriminating is the judicial confession of accused-appellant Garcia of
his participation in the commission of the crime. He admitted that he took part in
actually depriving Atty. Tioleco of his liberty[94] and in securing the ransom
payment from Floriana Tioleco.[95] He could not have been following mechanically
the orders of an alleged mastermind, as he claims, since by his own admission he
was neither threatened, forced or intimidated to do so[96] nor mentally impaired to
resist the orders.[97] In the absence of evidence to the contrary, he is presumed to
be in full possession of his faculties and conscience to resist and not to do evil.
We cannot also give credence to Garcias asseveration that the persons still
at large were his co-conspirators. This posture is a crude attempt to muddle the
case as discerned by the trial court from his demeanor when he testified -
Because he had been caught in flagrante delicto, Roland Garcia admitted his
participation in the crime charged. From his testimony, however, there appears a
veiled attempt to shield Gerry Valler from conviction. First, Garcia claimed that the
car they used was reddish in color (TSN, October 20, 1997, pp. 9, 19 & 20). Then
he added that the owner of the car was Jimmy Muit and not Gerry Valler (TSN,
October 20, 1997, p. 9). Next, he said that there was no conspiracy and he did
not know then Gerry Valler, RodanteRogel and Rogel Lariba until they were
placed together in Camp Crame (Ibid., p. 22).
The Court however cannot simply accept this part of his story. To begin with, his
repeated reference to the color of the car as reddish is quite suspicious. He
conspicuously stressed the color of the car in three (3) instances without being
asked. The transcripts of the notes bear out the following:
ATTY. MALLABO: Did you use any vehicle while you were there
at Gilmore Street?
 A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind of vehicle was that?
A: Jimmys car, a Toyota, somewhat reddish in color x x x x
Q: By the way, what car did you use when you were roaming
around Quezon City on October 6 in the evening?
A: Jimmys car, which was somewhat red in color. Reddish.
Q: And what car did you use the following day when you took the
bag? The same car?
A: The same car, the Toyota car which was somewhat reddish in color.
Such a clear attempt to mislead and deceive the Court with such unsolicited
replies cannot succeed. On October 8, 1996, in the vicinity of McDonalds, he was
seen alighting from the blue Toyota Corona (TSN, March 17, 1997, pp. 28-32). As
earlier pointed out, the blue Toyota Corona car is owned by Gerry Valler who was
the one driving it in the afternoon of the same day to the De Vega compound
(TSN, April 28, 1997, pp. 64-67; and November 10, 1997, pp. 22-28).
Gerry Valler was also identified by Atty. Tiolecoas the driver of the dark blue car
used in his abduction (TSN, April 10, 1997, pp. 10-11; and TSN, April 14, 1997,
pp. 21-27).[98]
Accused-appellant Vallers profession of innocence also deserves no
consideration. Various circumstances indubitably link him to the crime. For one,
he was positively identified by Atty. Tioleco to be the driver of the dark blue
Toyota car used in the abduction on 5 October 1997, which car was seen again
twice during the occasions for ransom payment. This was followed by a telephone
call made by Valler to the house where Atty. Tioleco was being detained and in
fact talked with accused-appellant Rogel to tell him that he was coming
over[99] and with accused-appellant Garcia to ask from him about the ransom
supposedly earlier collected.[100] Given the overwhelming picture of his complicity
in the crime, this Court cannot accept the defense that he was only trying to pay
his debts to Jimmy Muit when he was arrested.
We find nothing substantive in Vallers attempt to discredit the victims
positive identification of him on the trifling observation that Atty. Tioleco was too
confused at the time of his abduction to recognize accused-appellants physical
features accurately. It is truly evident from the testimony of Atty. Tioleco that his
vision and composure were not impaired by fear or shock at the time of his
abduction and that he had the opportunity to see vividly and remember
unerringly Vallers face -
Q: Where were these two unidentified men positioned inside the car?
A: One of them was at the drivers seat and the other one was
immediately behind the drivers seat.
19
Q: Now, could you please describe to this honorable court the person
who was seated on the drivers seat?
A: He has a dark complexion, medium built and short hair at that time.
Q: If you see that person again will you be able to identify him sir?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And if hes present in the courtroom will you be able to point to him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: At this juncture your honor we would like to request with the courts
permission the witness be allowed to step down from the witness
stand and approach the person just described and tap him on his
shoulder.
COURT INTERPRETER: Witness stepping down from the witness
stand and approached the person he had just described and
tapped him on his shoulder and who when asked to identify himself
he gave his name as Gerry Valler.[101]
Even on cross-examination, Atty. Tioleco was steadfast in his reference to
Gerry Valler -
Q: What stage was that when your eyeglasses were grabbed by these
persons inside the car?
A: That was after the other accused entered the vehicle and the car
zoomed away, that was when they were putting a blindfold on me,
that was the time when they started removing my eyeglasses, sir
x x x x[102]
Q: So when you were inside the car, you had difficulty seeing things
inside the car because you were not wearing your eyeglasses?
A: No, sir, that is not correct, because they were close, so I can see
them x x x x[103]
Q: And as a matter of fact, it was the PACC operatives who informed
you that the person being brought in was also one of the suspects,
am I correct?
A: That is not correct, sir. They said that, but I know that is one of the
suspects because he was the person who was driving the vehicle
at the time I got kidnapped. So I know him.
Q: So you saw him at the time you were kidnapped that is why you were
able to identify him when he was ushered in?
A: When he was brought into the kitchen I saw him. When I saw him, I
knew he was one of the suspects.
 Q: When you saw him, he was in handcuffs?
A: Yes, sir, that is correct.
Q: You were informed that his name is Gerry Valler?
A: When he went inside the house and the kitchen, they started
interviews, that is where I learned his name, Gerry Valler x x x x[104]
Q: But I thought that when you were pushed inside the car, you were
pushed head first, how can you easily describe this person driving
the vehcile and the person whom you now identified as Roland
Garcia?
A: Even if they pushed my head, there was an opportunity for me to see
the face of the accused.[105]
As we held in People v. Candelario,[106] it is the most natural reaction for
victims of crimes to strive to remember the faces of their assailants and the
manner in which the craven acts are committed. There is no reason to disbelieve
Atty. Tioelecos claim that he saw the faces of his abductors considering that they
brazenly perpetrated the crime in broad daylight without donning masks to hide
their faces. Besides, there was ample opportunity for him to discern their features
from the time two (2) of his kidnappers approached and forced him into their car
and once inside saw the other two (2), including Gerry Valler, long enough to
recall them until he was blindfolded.
The victims identification of accused-appellant Valler is not any bit prejudiced
by his failure to mention Vallers name in his affidavit. It is well-settled that
affidavits are incomplete and inaccurate involving as they do mere passive
mention of details anchored entirely on the investigators questions.[107] As the
victim himself explained -
Q: Now, in Question No. 5 and I quote x x x Why did you not identify
here the name of the driver as one Gerry Valler?
A: Because they never asked me the name. They just asked me to
narrate what happened. Had they asked me the name, I could
have mentioned the name.[108]
In light of the positive identification by the victim of accused-appellant Valler,
the latters denial must fall absolutely. Clearly, positive identification of the
accused where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive
on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter prevails over his
defense.[109] When there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper
motive why a prosecution witness would testify falsely against an accused or
falsely implicate him in a heinous crime, the testimony is worthy of full faith and
credit.[110]
Finally, we do not see any merit in Vallers enumeration of alleged
inconsistencies in the testimony of P/Chief Insp. Gilbert Cruz concerning (a) the
20
time and place of meeting between the PACC operatives and Floriana Tioleco;
(b) the schedule of the first and second ransom pay-offs; (c) the number
of Floriana Tiolecos companions during the aborted first pay-off; (d) the number
of occupants in the blue Toyota car; and, (e) the PACC operatives recognition
of FlorianaTioleco during the ransom payments. This is an argument that clutches
at straws. For one, the purported inconsistencies and discrepancies involve
estimations of time or number, hence, the reference thereto by the witness would
understandably vary. Furthermore, they are too minor to warrant the reversal of
the judgment of conviction. They do not affect the truth of the testimonies of
witnesses nor do they discredit their positive identification of accused-appellants.
On the contrary, such trivial inconsistencies strengthen rather than diminish the
prosecutions case as they erase suspicion of a rehearsed testimony and negate
any misgiving that the same was perjured.[111]
We also do not believe that accused-appellants Rogel and Lariba are
innocent bystanders in this case. It taxes the mind to believe Rogels defense that
as a caretaker of the place where Atty. Tioleco was detained, he observed
nothing unusual about this incident. An innocent man would have immediately
reported such dastardly act to the authorities and refused to sit idly by, but a guilty
person in contrast would have behaved otherwise as Rogel did.[112]
Accused-appellant Laribas defense is similarly incredible. He joins
Gerry Valler in proclaiming that he too was allegedly at the wrong place at the
wrong time for the wrong reason of just wanting to tune up the car of Jimmy Muit.
But for all these assertions, he failed to produce satisfactory evidence that he was
indeed there to repair such car. Of all the days he could have discharged his
work, he chose to proceed on 8 October 1997 when the kidnapping was in full
swing. There was even no car to repair on the date that he showed up. Like the
submission of Rogel, Laribas defense falls completely flat for he could have so
easily observed the kidnapping of Atty. Tioleco that was taking place in the house
of Jimmy Muit.
In sum, accused-appellants cannot rely upon the familiar phrase reasonable
doubt for their acquittal. As demonstrated by the fastiduous references of Valler to
alleged inconsistencies of P/Chief Insp. Cruz, not all possible doubt is reasonable
since in the nature of things everything relating to human affairs is open to some
imaginary dilemma. As we have said in People v. Ramos,[113] it is not such a
doubt as any man may start by questioning for the sake of a doubt; nor a doubt
suggested or surmised without foundation in facts or testimony, for it is possible
always to question any conclusion derived from testimony. Reasonable doubt
must arise from the evidence adduced or from the lack of evidence, and it should
pertain to the facts constitutive of the crime charged. Accused-appellants have
not shown the presence of such fatal defects in this case. Clearly, all the
elements and qualifying circumstances to warrant conviction for the crime of
kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention have been established
beyond reasonable doubt.
Third. We go into the criminal liability of each accused-appellant. There is no
doubt that Gerry Valler and Ronald Garcia are principals by direct participation
and co-conspirators in the kidnapping for ransom of Atty. Tioleco. Their
respective participation in perpetrating the crime cannot be denied. As regards
their liability as co-conspirators, we find the same to have also been shown
beyond reasonable doubt. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it for
which liability is joint.[114] Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence
as the felonious covenant itself may be inferred from the conduct of the parties
before, during, and after the commission of the crime disclosing a common
understanding between them relative to its commission.[115] The acts of Valler and
Garcia in coordinating the abduction, collection of ransom and detention of their
victim indubitably prove such conspiracy.
Lariba and Rogel were caught inside the house where Atty. Tioleco was
detained. P/Chief Insp. Paul Tucay testified on their involvement -
Q: Okey, when you stormed the place, do you know where these two
men were?
A: The two men were seated at the sala during that time, sir.
Q: They were seated at the sala when you entered the place?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened after entering the gate?
A: We announced that we were police officers of the Presidential Anti-
Crime Commission.
Q: Do you know what happened with these two men during that time?
A: They were caught by surprise and they were about to run to the first
room.
Q: What happened when these two men who were at the living room or
at the sala, when they ran to the first room?
A: We surprised them and cornered them in that room.
Q: What about the team of Major Quidato, where did they proceed?
A: Major Quidatos team proceeded to the second room where
Atty. Tioleco was being kept.
Q: According to you, you gave chase to these two men who were earlier
in the sala and they ran upon your announcement that you were
police officers?
A: When we cornered them in that room, they were about to grab the
two revolvers loaded with six (6) rounds of ammunitions.
Q: Where were these revolvers placed, Mr. Witness?
21
A: They were placed on top of a cabinet, which, when you enter in the
room, is placed on the right side of the room.
Q: How many revolvers were you able to recover?
A: There were two revolvers.
Q: And can you please describe these revolvers to this Honorable
Court?
A: Yes, sir x x x x The revolvers confiscated on that raid are one (1) .38
caliber revolver without serial number loaded with 6 rounds of
ammunition, live ammo, one .357 also loaded with 6 rounds of live
ammunitions.[116]
Correlating the above testimony with the other evidence, it is clear that at the
time Lariba and Rogel were caught, Atty. Tioleco had already been rendered
immobile with his eyes blindfolded and his hands handcuffed. No evidence exists
that he could have gone elsewhere or escaped. At the precise moment of their
apprehension, accused-appellants Lariba and Rogel were unarmed although
guns inside one of the rooms of the house were available for their use and
possession.
Assessing these established circumstances in the manner most favorable
to Lariba and Rogel, we conclude that they were merely guarding the house for
the purpose of either helping the other accused-appellants in facilitating the
successful denouement to the crime or repelling any attempt to rescue the victim,
as shown by the availability of arms and ammunition to them. They thus
cooperated in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts by
means of which they aided or facilitated the execution of the crime but without
any indispensable act for its accomplishment. Under Art. 18 of The Revised Penal
Code, they are mere accomplices.
In People v. De Vera[117] we distinguished a conspirator from an accomplice
in this manner -
Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree
with the criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention
because they themselves have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices
come to know about it after the principals have reached the decision, and only
then do they agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a crime
should be committed; accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not decide
whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan and
cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of a crime;
accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not essential to the
perpetration of the offense.
In the instant case, we cannot deny knowledge on the part
of Lariba and Rogel that Valler and Garcia had kidnapped Atty. Tioleco for the
purpose of extorting ransom and their cooperation to pursue such crime. But
these facts without more do not make them co-conspirators since knowledge of
and participation in the criminal act are also inherent elements of an
accomplice.[118] Further, there is no evidence indubitably proving
that Lariba and Rogel themselves participated in the decision to commit the
criminal act. As the evidence stands, they were caught just guarding the house
for the purpose of either helping the other accused-appellants in facilitating the
success of the crime or repelling any attempt to rescue the victim as shown by
the availability of arms and ammunition to them. These items contrast starkly with
the tried and true facts against Valler and Garcia that point to them as the
agents ab initio of the design to kidnap Atty. Tioleco and extort ransom from his
family.
Significantly, the crime could have been accomplished even without the
participation of Lariba and Rogel. As stated above, the victim had been rendered
immobile by Valler and Garcia before the latter established contacts
with Floriana Tioleco and demanded ransom. The participation
of Lariba and Rogel was thus hardly indispensable. As we have held in Garcia v.
CA, in some exceptional situations, having community of design with the principal
does not prevent a malefactor from being regarded as an accomplice if his role in
the perpetration of the homicide or murder was, relatively speaking, of a minor
character.[119] At any rate, where the quantum of proof required to establish
conspiracy is lacking and doubt created as to whether the accused acted as
principal or accomplice, the balance tips for the milder form of criminal liability of
an accomplice.[120]
We are not unaware of the ruling in People v. Licayan that conspiracy can be
deduced from the acts of the accused-appellants and their co-accused which
show a concerted action and community of interest. By guarding Co
and Manaysay and preventing their escape, accused-appellants exhibited not
only their knowledge of the criminal design of their co-conspirators but also their
participation in its execution.[121] But the instant case is different. Considering the
roles played by Lariba and Rogel in the execution of the crime and the state the
victim was in during the detention, it cannot be said beyond reasonable doubt that
these accused-appellants were in a real sense detaining Atty. Tioleco and
preventing his escape. The governing case law is People v. Chua Huy[122] where
we ruled -
The defendants statements to the police discarded, the participation of the other
appellants in the crime consisted in guarding the detained men to keep them from
escaping. This participation was simultaneous with the commission of the crime if
not with its commencement nor previous thereto. As detention is an essential
element of the crime charged, as its name, definition and graduation of the
penalty therefor imply, the crime was still in being when Lorenzo Uy,
Tan Si Kee, Ang Uh Ang, William Hao and Young Kiat took a hand in it. However,
we are not satisfied from the circumstances of the case that the help given by
these accused was indispensable to the end proposed. Our opinion is that these
defendants are responsible as accomplices only.
22
Fourth. In the beginning, we noted that neither Lariba nor Rogel who were
both convicted of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in Crim. Case
No. Q-96-68049 filed a notice of appeal in accordance with established
procedures, although the records show that accused-appellant
Gerry Valler needlessly did so exclusively in his behalf. [123] But in light of the
enactment of RA 8294 amending PD 1866 effective 6 July 1997,[124] and our
ruling in People v. Ladjaalam[125] followed in Evangelista v. Siztoza,[126] we
nonetheless review this conviction to give effect to Art. 22 of The Revised Penal
Code mandating in the interest of justice the retroactive application of penal
statutes that are favorable to the accused who is not a habitual criminal.[127]
In Ladjaalam we ruled that if another crime was committed by the accused
he could not be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms under RA 8294
amending PD 1866 -
Aside from finding appellant guilty of direct assault with multiple attempted
homicide, the trial court convicted him also of the separate offense of illegal
possession of firearms under PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, and sentenced
him to 6 years of prisioncorreccional to 8 years of prision mayor x x x x
The trial courts ruling and the OSGs submission exemplify the legal communitys
difficulty in grappling with the changes brought about by RA 8294. Hence, before
us now are opposing views on how to interpret Section 1 of the new law, which
provides as follows:
Sec. 1. - Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby
further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of
Firearms or Ammunition Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. - The penalty of prision correccional in
its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000)
shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in,
acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun,
.380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of
any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand
pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered
firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .30 caliber and 9
millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but
considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 centerfire magnum and
other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or
three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person
arrested.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such
use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection
with the crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup detat, such
violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection,
sedition, or attempted coup detat.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director
or other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or
entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such
firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found
guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs or willfully or
knowingly allow any of them to use unlicensed firearms or firearms without any
legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their
employment.
The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry
any licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor.
x x x x A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the
commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal
possession of firearms. Hence, if the other crime is murder or homicide, illegal
possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a
separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was
committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal
possession of firearms.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case,
the plain meaning of RA 8294s simple language is most favorable to herein
appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the language of the new
law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused. Accordingly,
appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of
firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide. Moreover, since the crime
committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of
firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance x x x x The law is clear:
the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided
that no other crime was committed by the person arrested. If the intention of the
law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should
have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does
not distinguish, neither should we.
The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates accused-appellants
x x x of illegal possession of an M-14 rifle, an offense which normally carries a
penalty heavier than that for direct assault. While the penalty for the first
is prision mayor, for the second, it is only prision correccional. Indeed, an
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accused may evade conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using such
weapons in committing an even lighter offense, like alarm and scandal or slight
physical injuries, both of which are punishable by arresto menor. This
consequence necessarily arises from the language of RA 8294 the wisdom of
which is not subject to review by this Court.[128]
Accordingly, we are constrained to dismiss Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049 and
set aside the judgment of conviction therein since accused-
appellants Rotchel Lariba and Rodante Rogel cannot be held liable for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions there being another crime - kidnapping
for ransom - which they were perpetrating at the same time.
In fine, we affirm the conviction of Gerry Valler and Ronald Roland Garcia as
principals and Rotchel Lariba and Rodante Rogel as accomplices for the crime of
kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention. This Court is compelled to
impose the supreme penalty of death on Valler and Garcia as mandated by Art.
267 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659.
The penalty imposable on Lariba and Rogel as accomplices
is reclusion perpetua, the penalty one degree lower than that prescribed for the
crime committed pursuant to Art. 52 in relation to Art. 61, par. (1), of
the Code. We however set aside the judgment in Crim. Case No. Q-96-68049
convicting Lariba and Rogel of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in
light of the foregoing discussion.
As regards the moral damages against accused-appellants to be paid by
them in solidum, we find the amount of P200,000.00 to be reasonable
compensation for the ignominy and sufferings Atty. Tioleco and his family
endured due to accused-appellants inhumane act of detaining him in blindfold
and handcuffs and mentally torturing him and his family to raise the ransom
money. The fact that they suffered the trauma of mental, physical and
psychological ordeal which constitute the bases for moral damages under the
Civil Code[129] is too obvious to require still the recital thereof at the trial through
the superfluity of a testimonial charade.
Following our finding that only Gerry Valler and Ronald Roland Garcia are
principals by direct participation and conspirators
while Rotchel Lariba and Rodante Rogel are accomplices, we apportion their
respective responsibilities for the amount adjudged as moral damages to be paid
by them solidarily within their respective class and subsidiarily for the
others.[130] Thus, the principals, accused-appellants Ronald Roland Garcia and
Gerry Valler, shall pay their victim Atty. Romualdo Tioleco P150,000.00 for moral
damages and the accomplices P50,000.00 for moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED. In Crim. Case
No. Q-96-68049 (G.R. No. 133489) accused-appellants RONALD ROLAND
GARCIA y FLORES and GERRY B. VALLER are declared guilty as PRINCIPALS
of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention and are sentenced each to
death, while accused-appellants RODANTE ROGEL y ROSALES and ROTCHEL
LARIBA y DEMICILLO are convicted as ACCOMPLICES and are ordered to
serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessories provided by law for
the same crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention. Accused-
appellants are further ordered to pay moral damages in the amount
of P200,000.00, with the principals being solidarily liable for P150,000.00 of this
amount and subsidiarily for the civil liability of the accomplices, and the
accomplices being solidarily liable for P50,000.00 for moral damages
and subsidiarily for the civil liability of the principals.
Finally, in Crim. Case No. Q-96-68050 (G.R. No. 143970) the Decision of the
court a quo convicting RODANTE ROGEL y ROSALES and ROTCHEL LARIBA y
DEMICILLO of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE in light of the enactment of RA 8294 and our rulings in People
v. Ladjaalam[131] and Evangelista v. Siztoza.[132]
Four (4) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is
unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they
submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and the death
penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
In accordance with Art. 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec.
25 of RA No. 7659, upon the finality of this Decision let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for the possible exercise of Her
Excellencys pardoning power. Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.

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