1.

FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
Posted by kaye lee on 10:58 PM
G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989 [Naturalization; Reacquisition]

FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office in
due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of
Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United
States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was
naturalized as American citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during the
Martial Law era.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.

RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among
other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for
suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims
that by actively participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited American
citizenship under the laws of the United States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged
forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he
could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
2. RAMON LABO, JR. VS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
176 SCRA 1 Law on Public Officers Election Laws Citizenship of a Public Officer Dual
Citizenship Labo Doctrine
In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a
petition for quo warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen
hence disqualified; that he was naturalized as an Australian after he married an Australian. Labo
avers that his marriage with an Australian did not make him an Australian; that at best he has
dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed became an Australian when he
married an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the Australian
was later declared void for being bigamous. Labo further asserts that even if hes considered as
an Australian, his lack of citizenship is just a mere technicality which should not frustrate the
will of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in the mayoralty race, can
replace Labo in the event Labo is disqualified.
HELD: 1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He was
naturalized as an Australian in 1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an
Australian. It was his act of subsequently swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to the
government of Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an Australian passport to return to
the Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as an immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he
is a dual citizen. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law. He lost his Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to Australia. He cannot
also claim that when he lost his Australian citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To restore
his Filipino citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or be declared as a Filipino through
an act of Congress none of this happened.
Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack of citizenship should
not overcome the will of the electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not have, even
unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution
simply by electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have voted for Labo had they known he
is Australian). The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the
Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that
privilege over their countrymen.
2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo warranto proceeding, that he
should be declared the mayor by reason of Labos disqualification because Lardizabal obtained
the second highest number of vote. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or
plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the
majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the
highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be
declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election.
3. TORAYNO VS COMELEC GR NO 137329 09 AUGUST 2000

Facts: Vicente Emano was provincial governor of Misamis Oriental for three terms until 1995
election and his certificate of candidacy showed that his residence was in Tagoloan, Misamis
Oriental. On 14 June 1997, while still governor he executed a voter registration record in
Cagayan de Oro City which is geographically located in Misamis Oriental, claiming 20 years of
residence. He filed candidacy for mayor in the said city and stated that his residence for the
preceding two years and five months was in the same city. Rogelio Torayno Sr filed petition for
disqualification of Emano fo failing to meet the residency requirement. Emano won the mayoral
post and proclaimed winner. Torayno filed for annulment of election of Emano. COMELEC
upheld its decision.
Issue: Whether or not Emano failed the constitutional residency requirement?
Decision: Petition dismissed, COMELEC resolution affirmed. Emano was the overwhelming
choice of the people of Cagayan de Oro. The court find it apt to reiterate the principle that the
manifest will of the people as expressed through the ballot be given the fullest effect. Emano was
actually and physically residing in CDO while discharging his duties as governor and even paid
his community tax certificate in the same. The residency requirement intends to prevent the
possibility of a stranger unacquainted with the conditions and needs of the community from
seeing an elective office to serve that community.
4. COQUILLA VS COMELEC
Posted by kaye lee on 11:07 PM
G.R. No. 151914, 31 July 2002 [Citizenship; Reacquisition]

FACTS:
Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided
there until 1965, when he was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US
Navy. In 1998, he came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he
continued making several trips to the United States.

Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On
November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar
which was approved in 2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating
that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.

Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel Coquillas
certificate of candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the two year residency in Oras was
a material misrepresentation as he only resided therein for 6 months after his oath as a citizen.

Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and Coquilla was
proclaimed the winner. On July 19, 2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez petition and ordered the
cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least on year before the
elections held on May 14, 2001 as what he represented in his COC.

RULING:
No. The statement in petitioners certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras,
Eastern Samar for two years at the time he filed such certificate is not true. The question is
whether the COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy
for this reason. Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his certificate of
candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to cancellation. In the case at bar, what is
involved is a false statement concerning a candidates qualification for an office for which he
filed the certificate of candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the
cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of petitioners certificate of
candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.
5. PAPANDAYAN, JR. VS COMELEC [381 SCRA 133]

Facts: In the May 14, 2001 elections, 3 candidates ran for the position of mayor of Tubaran,
Lanao del Sur, namely: petitioner Papandayan Jr., respondent Balt, who was the incumbent
mayor seeking reelection, and Bantuas. Respondent Balt sought the disqualification of petitioner
alleging that petitioner was not a resident of Barangay Tangcal in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur but a
permanent resident of Bayang, Lanao del Sur.
Petitioner claimed that he was a resident of Tangcal, Tubaran; that in 1990, he transferred his
domicile from Bayang to Tangcal and stayed there with his wife, a native of Tangcal; that he
managed an agricultural land in Tubaran; and that he filed in 1998 his COC for the position of
municipal mayor of Tubaran, which he later withdraw.
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in declaring him disqualified
in a resolution, on the ground that he is not a resident of Tubaran.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is disqualified to run as an elective official.
Held: No. The petitioner has duly proven that, although he was formerly a resident of Bayang,
he later transferred residence to Tangcal, Tubaran as shown by his actual and physical presence
therein for 10 years prior to the May 14, 2001 elections.
Par. 39, Chapter 1, Title 2 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160) provides that an elective
official must be a resident therein (barangay, municipality, city or province) for at least 1
year immediately preceding the day of the election
Domicile and residence are synonymous. The term residence as used in election law, imports not
only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, couple with
conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which
when absent for business, pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return.
Requisites in order to acquire a new domicile by choice are: there must concur (1) residence or
bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to
abandon the old domicile. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.
6. ENGR. ERNESTO T. MATUGAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
ROBERT LYNDON S. BARBERS, respondents.

G.R. No. 151944. January 20, 2004

TINGA, J.:

On 28 February 28 2001, Private Respondent Robert Lyndon Barbers filed his certificate of
candidacy as governor of Surigao del Norte for 2001 elections. Petitioner Ernesto T. Matugas,
who is also a candidate for governor, filed with COMELEC a Petition to Disqualify Barbers as
candidate.

His main contention is that Barbers is not a Filipino citizen. To support his claim, Matugas
presented the following documents:
1. Photocopy of a letter-request of a certain Jesus Agana, a confidential agent of
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID), addressed to one George Clarke,
purportedly of the United States Embassy regarding the US citizenship of Barbers;
2. A notation on the letter request allegedly made by George Clarke, stating that
Barbers was naturalized on 11 October 1991;
3. Photocopy of a Certification from the BID containing Barbers' travel records and
indicating in some documents that he is American;
4. Certification from the Office of the Solicitor General's Special Committee on
Naturalization stating that there is no pending petition by, or grant of repatriation to,
Barbers.
Meanwhile, Barbers won the gubernatorial race on 17 May 2001. Matugas then filed a Motion
for Suspension/Annulment of Proclamation of Barbers. However, Barbers was proclaimed the
duly elected governor of Surigao del Norte on 28 May 2001.

COMELEC then dismissed the Petition to Disqualify. It found little or no probative value in
the notation of George Clarke to Aganas letter-request.While noting that the BID certification
involving the travel records of Barbers stated that he was an American, it held that there is no
other independent evidence to justify Matugas's claim that Barbers has renounced his allegiance
to the Philippines.

Matugas filed a Motion for reconsideration, which was denied. He then filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the Supreme Court, and presented the following additional documents:
1. Photocopy of a document purportedly coming from the US Dirstrict Court of
California showing the Naturalization of Barbers signed by its Deputy Clerk;
2. Photocopy of a purported Authentication attached to the previous document
coming from the Philippine Consul in Los Angeles, California stating the following: "The
annexed document is an Information of Naturalization Re: Robert Lyndon Barbers
executed by United States District Court, Central District of California."
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Manifestation with Motion for Leave to Admit Original
Documents, appending the originals of the above documents.
Issue: W/N Barbers should have been disqualified.

Ruling: No.

One who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Matugas did not overcome his burden of
presenting substantial evidence with the documents he presented.

For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private. Public
documents include the written official acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a
foreign country. The record of such public documents may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record.

If the record is not kept in the Philippines, the attested copy should be accompanied by a
certificate that such officer has custody thereof. Said certificate may be made by a secretary of
the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer
in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and authenticated by the seal of his office.

The grant of United States citizenship by naturalization is an official act of the United States.
The document containing the record of this act is a public document, so this document can only
be evidenced by its official publication or a copy duly attested by the officer having legal
custody thereof.

The George Clarke's notation in the letter-request of Jesus Agana is neither an official
publication of the document that contains the record of private respondents naturalization, nor a
copy attested by the officer who has legal custody of the record. Matugas also did not show if
Clarke is the officer charged with the custody of such record.

Furthermore, Matugas only presented photocopies of the letter-request and notation, as well as
the BID certification, in contravention of the above-cited rule.

In any case, the BID certification contains inconsistent entries regarding the nationality of
Barbers. While some entries indicate that he is American, other entries state that he is
Filipino.

The new documents presented in the Petition for Certiorari cannot also be admitted in
evidence. In this case, the Authentication executed the Philippine Consul in Los Angeles does
not state that the Deputy Clerk who signed the document has the custody of the document being
authenticated.

Lastly, the Petitioner's calls to consider alleged new evidence not presented before the
COMELEC is clearly beyond the the Supreme Courts certiorari powers. Doing so would be
tantamount to holding a new investigation.

The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and it cannot be asked to substitute its own judgment
and discretion for that of the COMELEC.

The rule in appellate procedure is that a factual question may not be raised for the first time on
appeal,and documents forming no part of the proofs before the appellate court will not be
considered in disposing of the issues of an action. Piecemeal presentation of evidence is simply
not in accord with orderly justice.

The same rules apply with greater force in certiorari proceedings. It would be absurd to hold
COMELEC guilty of grave abuse of discretion for not considering evidence not presented before
it. The patent unfairness of Matugass plea militates against the admission and consideration of
the subject documents.
 7. KARE VS COMELEC
PETITIONERS (GR no 157526) Emiliana Kare; (GR 157527) Salvador K. Moll
RESPONDENTS COMELEC
FACTS
Moll and Ceriola were candidates for mayor of the Municipality of Malinao Albay (May 14,
2001 Elections). Moll won and Ceriola was the 2nd placer (vote difference: 987). Kare was
the elected vice mayor of the said election.
May 17 2001: Ceriola filed a Petition to Confirm the Disqualification and/or Ineligibility of
Moll to Run for Any Elective Position on the ground that Moll had been sentenced to 6 mos
of arresto mayor to 1 year and 9 mos of prision correccional for Usurpation of Authority or
Official functions (RPC 177)
Comelec 1st Div dismissed said petition
On reconsideration, COMELEC En Banc issued Mar 19 2003 Resolution which affirmed
Molls disqualification (as recommended by the provincial election supervisor of Albay) and
proclaimed Ceriola as the mayor-elect. COMELEC ruled that:
o Moll had been disqualified from being a mayoral candidae in the 2001 local
election and that his subsequent proclamation as mayor was void ab initio. He was
thus disqualified from holding office
o TCs final judgment disqualified Moll from filing his certificate of candidacy and
continued to disqualify him from holding office. Accordingly, votes case in his
favor were stray or invalid votes, and Ceriola was adjudged the winner.
Before Ceriolas actual proclamation, Kare filed a petition before the SC for a Status Quo
order, which was granted.
GR 157526: Kare seeks the nullification of the Mar 19 resolution wrt Ceriola being held as
winner.
GR 157527: Moll wants to annul the entire resolution. Cases were consolidated.

ISSUES & RATIO.

1. Should Moll be disqualified from running/holding the position of mayor? YES

Moll argues that he cannot be disqualified from running for mayor since his judgment of
conviction (the basis of his disqualification) has allegedly not attained finality. While he did not
appeal the said judgment (promulgated on May 11 1999) by filing a notice of appeal, he still
filed an MR on May 28 1999 within the reglementary period.

SC: The period for perfecting an appeal is interrupted when a MR of Motion for New Trial is
filed (Sec 6, Rule 122). Moll makes it appear that his filing of an MR should have stayed the
running of the period for filing an appeal. However, what he did file was a Motion to Quash the
Information; and when it was denied, he filed an MR. Neither the Motion to Quash nor his MR
was directed at the judgment of conviction. Rather, they both attacked a matter extraneous to the
judgment. Hence, they cannot affect the period of appeal granted by the ROC in relation to the
conviction. Further, Moll admitted that no regular appeal was filed. He also filed the MTQ
belatedly (filed it on day of promulgation instead of any time before entering a plea).

Since no appeal of conviction was seasonably filed by Moll, judgment against him has become
final. COMELEC en banc correctly ruled that he was disqualified from running for mayor under
Sec. 40 (a) LGC1. Moll was sentenced to suffer the penalty of 6 mos of arresto mayor to 1 year
and 9 mos of prison correccional, a penalty that clearly disqualified him from running for any
elective local position.

Moll argues that the promulgation of judgment was not valid because it was done in his absence.

SC: As correctly contended by the OSG, Moll received a notice of his promulgation, in fact his
counsel was present on the day of his promulgation- to file a motion to quash. Because of his
unexplained absence, promulgation of judgment can be validly made by recording the judgment
in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof to his last known address or thru counsel
as per Sec 6, Rule 120 of ROC.
8. DELA TORRE VS COMELEC [258 SCRA 485]
Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011
(Municipal Corporation, Disqualification of Local Elective Officials, Moral Turpitude)
Facts: Section 40 (a) of Republic Act 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) provides that a
prior conviction of a crime becomes a ground for disqualification from running for any elective
local position i.e. when the conviction is for an offense involving moral turpitude.
Citing above as ground, the COMELEC in a resolution, declared petitioner disqualified from
running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna. COMELEC held that petitioner was found
guilty by the MTC for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, an offense whose nature involves
moral turpitude.
Petitioner claimed that Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to his case
inasmuch as the probation granted him by the MTC which suspended the execution of the
judgment of conviction and all other legal consequences flowing therefrom, rendered
inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well. However, he admits all the elements of the crime of fencing.
Issue: WON the petitioner applicant is disqualified for the coming elections due to a crime
involving moral turpitude.
Held: Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.
From the definition of fencing in Sec. 2 of PD 1612, an element of the crime of fencing may be
gleaned that the accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
Moral turpitude is deducible from this. Actual knowledge by the fence of the fact that property
received as stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of ones rightful property as
that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral
turpitude. And although the participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in point in
time and in degree, both the fence and the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded
ones peaceful dominion for gain thus deliberately reneging the process private duties they
owe their fellowmen in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty,
justice, honesty and good morals.
Note: In determining whether a criminal act involves moral turpitude, the Court is guided by one
of the general principle that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude while crimes mala
prohibita do not. However, SC admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral
turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying as crime as mala in se or as mala
prohibita. Whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and
frequently depends on all the circumstance
10. LINGATING VS COMELEC
Facts:

During the first term of Mayor Sulong, an administrative complaint was filed against him and
several other individuals for Dishonesty, Falsification of Public Documents, Malversation of
Public Funds and violation RA No. 3019. On February 4 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Zamboanga Del Sur found him guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from
office. Mayor Sulong filed a motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal shortly
thereafter. The Sanggunian ordered the complainant in AC No 12-91 to comment.

Pending appeal, then ViceMayor Vicente Imbing took his oath and assumed the office
of Mayor of Lapuyan on March 3, 1992 pursuant to Section 68 of the Local Gov't Code
which allows for the execution pending appeal ofadministrative decisions. From February
1992 to August 2001, no comment was ever filed by the complainant in AC No 12-91 nor has
the Sanggunian resolved Sulongs MR/Appeal.

In the May 2001 Elections, Lingating and Sulong both ran for the position of Mayor of Lapuyan.
On May 3, 2001, Lingating file a petition for disqualification of Sulong on the ground that the
latter is disqualified from running for any elective local position having been removed from
office during his first term (1988-1991) as a result of an administrative case (AC No 12-91)
pursuant to Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code. Respondent Sulong denied that the
decision in AC No 12-91 had ever become final and executory since up to the filing of the
disqualification case, no comment has been filed nor has the appeal been resolved. After the
parties had filed their memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution. The COMELEC,
however, was unable to render judgment before the elections of May 14, 2001, where Sulong
was elected and proclaimed Mayor of Lapuyan.

In a resolution dated August 1, 2001, the COMELEC declared respondent Cesar B. Sulong
disqualified adhering to section 40(b) of the Local Government Code. Respondent Sulong filed
an MR arguing that the decision in AC No. 12-91 has not become final and executory; that at
no time had he been removed by virtue of the said decision, and that the issue was moot and
academic having been "overtaken by the local elections of May 11, 1992."

Lingating filed an opposition to the MR contending that the fact that Sulong was succeeded by
Vice Mayor Imbing was proof that AC No. 12-91 had indeed become final. Lingating also
prayed that he be installed as Mayor of Lapuyuan in view of Sulong's disqualification.

The COMELEC First Division denied Lingatings motion on the ground that the disqualification
of an elected candidate does not entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of
votes to occupy the office vacated. Lingating then filed a motion for reconsideration of this
order.
The COMELEC en banc reversed the decision of the first division, citing Aguinaldov.
COMELEC that re-election renders an administrative case moot and academic. It also ruled that
respondent Sulong was not entitled to occupy the office thus vacated.

Lingating contends that the COMELEC en banc erred in applying the ruling inAguinaldo vs.
COMELEC. Instead, Lingating argues that the applicable case is Reyes v. COMELEC where
the court held that an elective local executive officer, who is removed before the expiration of
the term for which he was elected, is disqualified from being a candidate for a local elective
position under Section 40(b) of the LGC. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not Sumulong is disqualified to run for local election

Held:

The filing of motion for reconsideration by Sulong prevented the decision of Sangguniang
Panlalawigan from becoming final. There is thus no decision finding Sulong guilty to speak of.
Neither can the succession of the then vice-mayor of Lapuyan, Vicente Imbing, to the office of
mayor be considered proof that the decision in AC No. 12-91 had become final because it
appears to have been made pursuant to Sec 68 [16] of the Local Government Code, which makes
decisions inadministrative cases immediately executory.

Aguinaldo and Reyes Cases are inapplicable. In Aguinaldo v COMELEC, the court held that
removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed. If
a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if
he is thereafter re-elected for another term. However, Aguinaldo is not applicable as at the time
the case was decided, there was no provision similar to 40(b) of the LGC and hence, cannot be
given retroactive effect. Neither is Reyes vs. COMELEC applicable as AC No. 12-91 remains to
this day, not final. (G.R. No. 153475, November 13, 2002)
11. MERCADO V. MANZANO CASE DIGEST [G.R. NO. 135083. MAY 26, 1999]

FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-
Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Based on the results of the election, Manzano
garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation was suspended due to the
pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. From the facts presented, it appears that
Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen. The Commission on Elections declared Manzano
disqualified as candidate for said elective position. However, in a subsequent resolution of the
COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to
have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority and registered himself as
a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998. Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the
Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998. Thus the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the
philippines.

RULING: The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A.
7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different
from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws
of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual
allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides
"Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike
those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the
filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status
as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence
of conflicting laws of different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the
other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual
citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an
individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his
loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied
with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions
of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our
courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the
Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.
By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the
Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual
citizen.

On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered
with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the
court sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking
his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and
declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar
sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his
foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

12. RODRIGUEZ vs. COMELEC
259 SCRA 296, 1996

Facts: The petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez was a candidate for Governor in the Province of
Quezon in the May 8, 1995 elections. His rival candidate for the said position was Bienvenido O.
Marquez, Jr., herein private respondent. Private respondent filed a petition for disqualification
before the COMELEC based principally on the allegation that Rodriguez is a fugitive from
justice. Private respondent revealed that a charge for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft
and attempted grand theft of personal property is pending against the petitioner before the Los
Angeles Municipal Court. Rodriguez is therefore a fugitive from justice which is a ground for
his disqualification/ ineligibility under Section 40 (e) of the Local Government Code according
to Marquez.

Rodriguez, however, submitted a certification from the Commission of Immigration showing

that Rodriguez left the US on June 25, 1985- roughly five (5) months prior to the institution of
the criminal complaint filed against him before the Los Angeles Court.

Issue: Whether or not Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice.

Held: No. The Supreme Court reiterated that a fugitive from justice includes not only those
who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution. The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that
animates ones flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to
evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already
instituted indictment or of a promulgated judgement of conviction.
13. NOLASCO V COMELEC

FACTS: A disqualification case was filed against Meycauayan, Bulacan Mayor-elect Florentino
Blanco for alleged performing acts which are grounds for disqualification under the Omnibus
Election Code giving money to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials
performing election functions: for committing acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy, and for
spending an amount for his campaign in excess of what is allowed by the law.

The COMELEC First Division required both parties to submit their position papers. The case
was decided against Blanco.

A reconsideration was moved by Blanco in the COMELEC En Banc. Nolasco, the vice-mayor-
elect took part as intervenor, urging that should Blanco be finally disqualified, the mayoralty
position be turned over to him. The parties were allowed to file their memoranda. En Banc
denied Blanco and Nolascos motions thus this petition for certiorari.

Issues:

1. WON Blanco was denied due process and equal protection of laws
2. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in proclaiming Alarilla as the duly
elected mayor

Held:

1. Blanco was not denied due process and equal protection of the laws. He was given all the
opportunity to prove that the evidence on his disqualification was not strong. Blancos contention
that the minimum quantum of evidence was not met is untenable. What RA 6646 and the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure require is a mere evidence of guilt that should be strong to
justify the COMELEC in suspending a winning candidates proclamation.

2. Nolasco, not Alarilla, is adjudged as the Mayor of Meycauayan. It is already a settled principle
in the case of Reyes v COMELEC that the candidate with the second highest number of votes
cannot be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate be disqualified. There cannot be an
assumption that the second placer would have received the other votes otherwise it is a judgment
substituting the mind of a voter. It cannot be assumed that the second placer would have won the
elections because in the situation where the disqualified candidate is excluded, the condition
would have substantially changed.
14 .BORJA VS COMELEC [295 SCRA 157; GR 133495, SEPTEMBER 3, 1998]

Facts: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18,
1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of
law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. For the next two succeeding elections in
1992 and 1995, he was again re-elected as Mayor.
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of
Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a
candidate for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the theory that the latter would have
already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be
ineligible to serve for another term after that.
The Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared
private respondent Capco disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros but in the
motion for reconsideration, majority overturned the original decision.
Issue: WON Capco has served for three consecutive terms as Mayor?
Held: No. Article X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that the term of office of elective
local officials shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
This provision is restated in par. 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 71) which states
that no local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official concerned was elected.
The term served must therefore be one for which [the official concerned] was elected. The
purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms
an elective official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected
because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be
considered to have fully served the term not withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office
prior to its expiration.
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well
as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been
elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
15. SOCRATES VS COMELEC, 391 SCRA 457; G.R. NO. 154512, NOVEMBER 12, 2002

Facts: COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution against Mayor Socrates of the City
of Puerto Princesa, and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
On August 23, 2002, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall election.
Different petitioners filed their respective petitions, which were consolidated seeking the
disqualification of Hagedorn to run for the recall election and the cancellation of his COC on the
ground that the latter is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been
elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms in 1992, 1995
and 1998 immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post.
COMELECs First Division dismissed in a resolution the petitioner for lack of merit. And
COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.
Issue: WON one who has been elected and served for 3 consecutive full terms is qualified to run
for mayor in the recall election.
Held: Yes. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution, which states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code, which provides:
Section 43. Term of Office. (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was
elected.
The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive
terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit
rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not
interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for
any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the
interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-election for a
fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office
following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election,
is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall
election is no longer an immediate re-election after three consecutive terms. Second, the
intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission, what the Constitution prohibits is
an immediate re-election for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution,
however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as the re-election is
not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the
term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate re-
election after the third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate re-election to run in
any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits
is a consecutive fourth term.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an
immediate re-election after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The
immediate re-election that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular
elections in 2001.
16. LONZANIDA VS. COMELEC

Facts:

Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in
terms 1989-1992, 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. However, his proclamation relative to the 1995
election was protested and was eventually declared by the RTC and then by COMELEC null and
void on the ground of failure of elections.

On February 27, 1998, or about three months before the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida vacated
the mayoralty post in light of a COMELEC order and writ of execution it issued. Juan Alvez,
Lonzanidas opponent assumed office for the remainder of the term.

In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy. His opponent,
Efren Muli, filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that Lonzanida had already served
three consecutive terms in the same post. On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was
proclaimed winner.

The COMELEC granted the petition for disqualification.

Petitioner Lonzanida challenged the validity of the COMELEC resolution maintaining that he
was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in 1995
cannot be counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for local
government officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May
1995 elections. He also argued that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition
for disqualification after he was proclaimed winner in the 1998 mayoral elections as the proper
remedy is a petition for quo warranto with the appropriate regional trial court under Rule 36 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

The private respondent maintained that the petitioners assumption of office in 1995 should be
considered as service of one full term because he discharged the duties of mayor for almost three
years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next mayoral elections.

Issues:

1. WON petitioners assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to
1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term
limit for elective local government officials.

2. WON COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after
petitioner was proclaimed winner.
Held:

1. NO. Two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2)
that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough
that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also
have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification
can apply.
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner
cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and
second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary
relinquishment of office.

After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by
final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his previous
proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be
deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has
been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no
proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the
proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office
subject to the final outcome of the election protest. Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the
post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned
by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral
elections.

Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he
was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. The respondents contention
that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-1998 because
he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second
requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive
terms. The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. The clear intent of the framers
of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary
renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected
official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does
not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the
next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of
writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from
office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the
1995-1998 mayoral term.

In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold office for the full
term; hence, his assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a term
for purposes of computing the three term limit. The Resolution of the COMELEC finding him
disqualified on this ground to run in the May 1998 mayoral elections should therefore be set
aside.

2. NO. It was held in the case of Sunga vs. COMELEC that the proclamation or the assumption
of office of a candidate against whom a petition for disqualification is pending before the
COMELEC does not divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and to
resolve it on the merits.

Section 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that:

Sec. 6. Effects of disqualification Case.- any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
court or commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
The clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the
disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered. The outright dismissal of
the petition for disqualification filed before the election but which remained unresolved after the
proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly reward the said candidate and
may encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of the petition until after
he has been proclaimed.

It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the

candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the
election laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected does not signify
that his disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a separate
investigation. (Lonzanida vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 135150. July 28, 1999)
17. ADORMEO VS COMELEC CASE DIGEST

Facts:

Ramon Talaga, Jr. served as mayor of Lucena City during terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998.
During the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, before Tagaraos 1998-
2001 term ended, a recall election was conducted in May 2000 wherein Talaga won and served
the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001. When Talaga ran for mayor in 2001, his
candidacy was challenged on the ground that he had already served as mayor for three
consecutive terms in violation of the three term-limit rule. Comelec found Talaga disqualified to
run for mayor. Talaga filed a motion for reconsideration which Comelec granted. Talaga was
then elected Mayor.

Issue:

Whether Talaga was disqualified to run as mayor given that he had already served two full terms
and he won in the 2000 recall elections.

Held:

The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well
as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been
elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

For nearly two years Talaga was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship
was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. The time between his second term and the
recall election is sufficient interruption. Thus, there was no three consecutive terms as
contemplated in the disqualifications in the LGC.

Talaga only served two consecutive full terms. There was a disruption when he was defeated in
the 1998 elections. His election during the 2000 recall election is not a continuation of his two
previous terms which could constitute his third term thereby barring him for running for a fourth
term. Victory in the 2000 recall election is not the voluntary renunciation contemplated by the
law. (Adormeo vs Comelec, G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002)
18. LATASA VS. COMELEC
Facts:

Petitioner Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections
of 1992, 1995, and 1998. In February 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor
for the 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed that he
had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now
running for the first time for the position of city mayor.

Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a
petition to deny petitioner's candidacy since the latter had already been elected and served for
three consecutive terms. Petitioner countered that this fact does not bar him from filing a
certificate of candidacy for the 2001 elections since this will be the first time that he will be
running for the post of city mayor.

The Comelecs First Division denied petitioner's certificate of candidacy. However, his motion
for reconsideration was not acted upon by the Comelec en banc before election day and he was
proclaimed winner. Only after the proclamation did the Comelec en banc issue a resolution that
declared him disqualified from running for mayor of Digos City, and ordered that all votes cast
in his favor should not be counted.

Petitioner appealed, contending that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it
attained a different juridical personality separate from the municipality of Digos. So when he
filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor, it should not be construed as vying for the same
local government post.

Issue:

Is petitioner Latasa eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created
City of Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the
Municipality of Digos?

Held:

As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to choose those
who will govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that
it limits the range of choice of the people.
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same local
government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned has been elected
for three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.) that he has fully served
three consecutive terms.

True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the
municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject
Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a
different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the
territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently,
the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the
same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three
consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority
as their chief executive for nine years.

The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples freedom to
choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating
excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the
same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served
for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the
framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as
mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive
over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years.
This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.(Latasa
vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 154829, 10 December 2003)

Note:

It cannot be denied that the Court has previously held in Mamba-Perez v. COMELEC that
after an elective official has been proclaimed as winner of the elections, the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction to pass upon his qualifications. An opposing party's remedies after proclamation
would be to file a petition for quo warranto within ten days after the proclamation. Time and
again, this Court has held that rules of procedure are only tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of the rules tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation. We will not
hesitate to set aside technicalities in favor of what is fair and just.
19. MONROY V CA
facts of the case: Petitioner Roberto Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas, Rizal
September 15, 1961: Filed his certificate of candidacy as representative of the first district
of Rizal
September 18: Petitioner filed a letter withdrawing said certificate of candidacy, which the
Comelec approved.
September 21: Felipe del Rosario, then the vice-mayor, took his oath of office as municipal
mayor on the theory that petitioner had forfeited the said office upon his filing of the certificate
of candidacy in question.
Petitioner then filed a suit for injunction (CFI Rizal) against respondent, which held that:
(a) The former had ceased to be mayor of Navotas, Rizal, after his certificate of candidacy
was filed;
(b) Respondent del Rosario became municipal mayor upon his having assumed office as
such;
(c) Petitioner must reimburse, as actual damages, the salaries to which respondent was
entitled as Mayor from September 21, 1961 up to the time he can reassume said office;
and
(d) Petitioner must pay respondent P1,000.00 as moral damages.
CA: Affirmed in toto except for the award of moral damages, which was eliminated.

issue
WON the TC and CA had jurisdiction to rule on decisions made by the COMELEC. Ha? Eh
wala namang COMELEC ruling dito!
WON the filing of the COC and its subsequent withdrawal amounted to a forfeiture of his current
seat. YES.

ratio
WRT jurisdiction of the regular courts
There appears to be no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC on any administrative
question or controversy. There was no dispute before the Commission. Respondent never
contested the filing of petitioner's COC neither has he disputed the withdrawal thereof.
Assuming there was a controversy before the COMELEC, the same did not and could not
possibly have anything to do with the conduct of elections. What the parties are actually
controverting is whether or not petitioner was still the municipal mayor after September
15, 1961. This purely legal dispute has absolutely no bearing or effect on the conduct of the
elections for the seat of Congressman for the first district of Rizal.
The election can go on irrespective of whether petitioner is considered resigned from his
position of municipal mayor or not. So when petitioner withdrew the certificate announcing his
candidacy for Congressman, he was no longer interested in running for that seat. The issue on the
forfeiture of his present position and the possible legal effect thereon by the withdrawal of his
certificate was completely out of the picture. Hence, that purely legal question properly fell
within the cognizance of the courts.
WRT the effect of filing and withdrawal of the COC
The withdrawal of a COC does not restore a candidate to his former position. Sec. 27 of the
Rev. Election Code2 makes the forfeiture automatic and permanently effective upon the filing
of the certificate of for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once
the certificate is filed, the seat is forfeited forever and nothing save a new election or
appointment can restore the ousted official.
Contention: My COC was filed without my knowledge and consent!
SC: It nowhere appears that the COMELECs resolution expressly invalidated the certificate.
The withdrawal of a COC does not necessarily render the certificate void ab initio. Once filed,
the permanent legal effects produced thereby remain even if the COC itself be subsequently
withdrawn. Moreover, both the TC and CA expressly found that the COC was filed with
petitioner's knowledge and consent. Since the nature of the remedy would allow a discussion of
purely legal questions only, such fact is deemed conceded.

Contention: CA erred in affirming the judgment requiring petitioner to pay actual damages
(salaries he was allegedly entitled to receive from September 21, 1961, to the date of vacation of
his office as mayor)
SC: Rodriguez v. Tan3 is not applicable here for absence of factual and legal similarities.
Such case requires that the candidate duly proclaimed must assume office notwithstanding a
protest filed against him and can retain the compensation paid during his incumbency. But the
case at bar does not involve a proclaimed elective official who will be ousted because of an
election contest. The present case involves the forfeiture of the office of municipal mayor by the
incumbent occupant thereof and the claim to that office by the vice-mayor because of the
operation of Sec. 27 of the Rev. Election Code.

Court then laid the general rule that the rightful incumbent of a public office may recover
from an officer de facto the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure,
even though he entered into the office in good faith and under color of title that applies in the
present case.
Rationale: For the protection of the public and individuals who get involved in the official
acts of persons discharging the duties of an office without being lawful officers.

As applied: Here, the issue is the possession of title, not of the office. A de facto officer, not
having good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must therefore account to the de jure officer

2
Sec. 27. Any elective provincial, municipal or city official running for an office, other then the one which he is
actually holding, shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
3
A senator who had been proclaimed and had office but was later on ousted in an election protest, is a de facto
officer during the time he held the office of senator, and can retain the emoluments received even as against the
successful protestant.
for whatever amount of salary he received during the period of his wrongful retention of the
public office.

20. AGUINALDO VS. COMELEC

QUISUMBING, June 21, 1999

NATURE
Original Action to the Supreme Court, Petition for Prohibition, Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order

FACTS
-Petitioners, at the time of the filing of the petition, were incumbent provincial or municipal
officials in Cagayan. Petitioners seek to prevent the COMELEC from enforcing during the 1998
elections Section 674 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) in accordance with its own
tenor or as modified by paragraph 3 of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 84365.
Petitioners claims:
1. Section 67, of the Omnibus Election Code is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution, as its classification of persons running for office is not a valid classification,
following the guidelines laid down by the Court in People v. Cayat,6 since it is not based on
substantial distinctions.
-According to petitioners, candidates for elective office are classified into the following groups
under Section 67:
(a) First classification: an incumbent elective official who runs for the same position as his
present incumbency (and) another incumbent elective official running for another position;
[the reelectionist is given an undue advantage since he is able to use the resources, prestige, and
influence of his position.]
(b) Second Classification: an incumbent elective official who runs for president or vice-
president(and) another incumbent elective [official] running for any other position (i.e., not his
incumbency nor for president or vice president) [There is no basis for giving candidates
special privilege]
-the classifications result into absurd or unwanted and difficult situations, and that the
provision did not get sufficient attention and analysis that would have brought out its
constitutional infirmities.
2. Petitioners also argue that Section 67 effectively shortens the terms of office of elected
officials, in violation of Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution7

4 Sec. 67. Candidates holding elective office. -- Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
5 SEC. 11. Official Ballot. -- Provided, That any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one he/she is holding in a permanent capacity, except for president and vice-president, shall be deemed resigned only upon the
start of the campaign period corresponding to the position for which he/she is running;

6 According to the doctrine laid down in Cayat, for a classification to be valid, (1) it must be based upon substantial distinctions, (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) it must apply equally
to all members of the same class.
7 Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Respondents Claim:
1. COMELEC: The classification embodied in Section 67 is reasonable and based on substantial
distinction: incumbents running for the same position are not considered resigned because the
intention of the law is to allow them to continue serving their constituents and avoid a disruption
in the delivery of essential services; those running for different positions are considered resigned
because they are considered to have abandoned their present position by their act of running for
other posts.
2. Solicitor General: the issue regarding Section 67 had already been passed upon by the Court in
the case of Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr. where the Court ruled that the provision seeks to ensure that
such officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another
public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their
candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with the
constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not
trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents.

ISSUE
Procedural
WON the petition for prohibition is already Moot and Academic
Substantive
WON the assailed Sections violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution

HELD
Procedural YES
Ratio Prohibition, as a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli.
Reasoning This present petition is one for prohibition which is a preventive remedy. The act
sought to be enjoined had already been accomplished with the holding of the 1998 elections.

Substantive NO
Reasoning (RATIO?) Section 67 was crafted with the intention of giving flesh to the
constitutional pronouncement that public service is a public trust.
- Section 67 is not violative of the Constitution as it does not unduly cut short the term of office
of local officials. The situation that results with the application of Section 67 is covered by the
term voluntary renunciation.
- the act, contemplated in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, of filing a certificate of
candidacy for another office constitutes an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the
elective office

Dispositive WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
21. MONTESCLAROS vs COMELEC GR N 152295 09 July 2002

Facts: The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed the Kabataang Barangay to Sangguniang
Kabataan and limited its membership to youths at least 15 but no more than 21 years of age.
On 18 February 2002, Antoniette VC Montesclaros demanded from COMELEC that SK
elections be held as scheduled on 6 May 2002. COMELEC Chairman Alfredo Benipayo wrote to
the House of Representatives and the Senate on 20 February 2002 inquiring on the status of
pending bills on SK and Barangay elections and expressed support to postpone the SK election
on November 2002. On 11 March 2002 the Bicameral Committee consolidated Senate Bill 2050
and House Bill 4456, resetting the SK election to 15 July 2002 and lowered the membership age
to at least 15 but no more than 18 years of age. This was approved by the Senate and House of
Representative on 11 March and 13 March 2002 respectively and signed by the President on 19
March 2002. The petitioners filed prohibition and mandamus for temporary restraining order
seeking the prevention of postponement of the SK election and reduction of age requirement on
11 March 2002.
Issue: Whether or not the proposed bill is unconstitutional.
Decision: Petition dismissed for utter lack of merit. This petition presents no actual justiciable
controversy. Petitioners do not cite any provision of law that is alleged to be unconstitutional.
Petitioners perayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill does not present
actual controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law. A
proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. Having no
legal effect it violates no constitutional right or duty. At the time petitioners filed this petition,
RA No. 9164 was not yet enacted into law. After its passage petitioners failed to assail any
provision in RA No. 9164 that could be unconstitutional.
22. MENZON VS PETILLA
Facts: In 1988, the DILG Secretary Luis Santos designated Vice-Governor Leopoldo E. Petilla
as Acting Governor of Leyte in view of the fact that no Governor had been proclaimed in the
province of Leyte.

Subsequently, Santos also designated Aurelio D. Menzon, a senior member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan to act as the Vice-Governor for the province of Leyte. Menzon then took his oath
of office.

In 1989, the provincial administrator inquired from DILG Undersecretary Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr.,
as to the legality of the appointment of Menzon to act as the Vice-Governor of Leyte.

Rubillar, Jr. replied that since B.P. 337 has no provision relating to succession in the Office of
the Vice-Governor in case of a temporary vacancy, the appointment of Menzon as the temporary
Vice- Governor is not necessary since the Vice-Governor who is temporarily performing the
functions of the Governor, could concurrently assume the functions of both offices.

As a result of the foregoing, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued Resolution No. 505 where it
invalidated the appointment of Menzon as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte.

Menzon then wrote to Undersecretary Rubillar to clarify the opinion that the latter issued.
Rubillar replied that Menzon was merely designated to act as vice governor. He was not
appointed to the post since there was no vacancy of the office to speak of.

As a result of this clarificatory letter, the DILG Regional Director requested Governor Petilla
that the resolution issued by the Sanggunian be modified so that Menzon would be able receive
his salary as vice governor, if he was deprived of such. However, Petilla and the Sanggunian
refused to correct Resolution 505 and correspondingly to pay the petitioner the emoluments
attached to the Office of Vice-Governor.

It was at this instance that Menzon decided to file this petition to determine whether he is entitled
to the emoluments for his services rendered as designated acting vicegovernor. During the
pendency of this case, the issue on the governorship of Leyte was settled and Adelina Larrazabal
was proclaimed Governor of Leyte.

Issue: Whether or not there was a vacancy

Held: Yes. The law on Public Officers is clear on the matter. There is no vacancy whenever the
office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. A sensu contrario,there is a vacancy when
there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the duties of the office.
In this case, it can be readily seen that the office of the Vice-Governor was left vacant when the
duly elected Vice-Governor Leopoldo Petilla was appointed Acting Governor. In the eyes of the
law, the office to which he was elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to exercise
the duties of the office of the Vice-Governor.

There is no showing that Leopoldo Petilla continued to simultaneously exercise the duties of the
Vice-Governor. The nature of the duties of a Provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to
discharge them. More so when the vacancy is for an extended period. Precisely, it was Petilla's
automatic assumption to the acting Governorship that resulted in the vacancy in the office of the
Vice-Governor. The fact that the Secretary of Local Government was prompted to appoint the
petitioner shows the need to fill up the position during the period it was vacant. The Department
Secretary had the discretion to ascertain whether or not the Provincial Governor should devote
all his time to that particular office. Moreover, it is doubtful if the Provincial Board, unilaterally
acting, may revoke an appointmentmade by a higher authority.

Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government has the authority to make
temporary appointments

Held: The Local Government Code is silent on the mode of succession in the event of a
temporary vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor. However, the silence of the law must not
be understood to convey that a remedy in law is wanting.

The circumstances of the case reveal that there is indeed a necessity for theappointment of an
acting Vice-Governor. For about two years after the governatorial elections, there had been no de
jure permanent Governor for the province of Leyte, Governor Adelina Larrazabal, at that time,
had not yet been proclaimed due to a pending election case before the Commission on Elections.

The two-year interregnum which would result from the respondents' view of the law is
disfavored as it would cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to the people
and in the proper management of the affairs of the local government of Leyte. Definitely, it is
incomprehensible that to leave the situation without affording any remedy was ever intended by
the Local Government Code.

Under the circumstances of this case and considering the silence of the Local Government Code,
the Court rules that, in order to obviate the dilemma resulting from an interregnum created by the
vacancy, the President, acting through her alter ego, the Secretary of Local Government, may
remedy the situation. We declare valid the temporary appointment extended to the petitioner
to act as the Vice-Governor. The exigencies of public service demanded nothing less than the
immediate appointment of an acting Vice-Governor.

The records show that it was primarily for this contingency that Undersecretary Jacinto Rubillar
corrected and reconsidered his previous position and acknowledged the need for an acting Vice-
Governor.
It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative Code of
1987, the President is empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public offices, in
case of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in
appointive positions. However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local
Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we see no cogent reason why the
procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly applied in the present case. The
respondents contend that the provincial board is the correctappointing power. This argument has
no merit. As between the President who has supervision over local governments as provided by
law and the members of the board who are junior to the vice-governor, we have no problem
ruling in favor of the President, until the law provides otherwise.

A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under the law for it deprives
the constituents of their right of representation and governance in their own local government.

In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their chosen few, and if one of
them is incapacitated or absent, etc., the management of governmental affairs to that extent, may
be hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to
the people of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.

Whether or not the absence of a Vice-Governor would main or prejudice the province of Leyte,
is for higher officials to decide or, in proper cases, for the judiciary to adjudicate. As shown in
this case where for about two years there was only an acting Governor steering the leadership of
the province of Leyte, the urgency of filling the vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor to
free the hands of the acting Governor to handle provincial problems and to serve as the buffer in
case something might happen to the acting Governor becomes unquestionable. We do not have
to dwell ourselves into the fact that nothing happened to acting Governor Petilla during the two-
year period. The contingency of having simultaneous vacancies in both offices cannot just be set
aside. It was best for Leyte to have a full-time Governor and an acting Vice-Governor. Service to
the public is the primary concern of those in the government. It is a continuous duty unbridled by
any political considerations.

The appointment of the petitioner, moreover, is in full accord with the intent behind the Local
Government Code. There is no question that Section 49 in connection with Section 52 of the
Local Government Code shows clearly the intent to provide for continuity in the performance of
the duties of the Vice-Governor.

The Local Government Code provides for the mode of succession in case of a permanent
vacancy, viz:

Section 49:

In case a permanent vacancy arises when a Vice-Governor assumes the Office of the
Governor, . . . refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office,
voluntary resigns or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of
his office the sangguniang panlalawigan member who obtained the highest number of votes
in the election immediately preceding, . . . shall assume the office for the unexpired term of
the Vice-Governor. . . .

By virtue of the surroundings circumstance of this case, the mode of succession provided for
permanent vacancies may likewise be observed in case of a temporary vacancy in the same
office. In this case, there was a need to fill the vacancy. The petitioner is himself the member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who obtained the highest number of votes. The Department
Secretary acted correctly in extending the temporary appointment.

Issue: Whether or not Menzon is entitled to be paid the salary attached to the Office of the
Vice Governor

Held: In view of the foregoing, the petitioner's right to be paid the salary attached to the Office
of the Vice Governor is indubitable. The compensation, however, to be remunerated to the
petitioner, must only be such additional compensation as, with his existing salary, shall not
exceed the salary authorized by law for the Office of the Vice-Governor.

Even granting that the President, acting through the Secretary of Local Government, possesses
no power to appoint the petitioner, at the very least, the petitioner is a de facto officer entitled to
compensation.

There is no denying that the petitioner assumed the Office of the Vice-Governor under color of a
known appointment. As revealed by the records, the petitioner was appointed by no less than the
alter ego of the President, the Secretary of Local Government, after which he took his oath of
office before Senator Alberto Romulo in the Office of Department of Local Government
Regional Director Res Salvatierra.

Concededly, the appointment has the color of validity. The respondents themselves
acknowledged the validity of the petitioner's appointment and dealt with him as such. It was only
when the controversial Resolution No. 505 was passed by the same persons who recognized him
as the acting Vice-Governor that the validity of the appointment of the petitioner was made an
issue and the recognition withdrawn.

The petitioner, for a long period of time, exercised the duties attached to the Office of the Vice-
Governor. He was acclaimed as such by the people of Leyte. Upon theprinciple of public policy
on which the de facto doctrine is based and basic considerations of justice, it would be highly
iniquitous to now deny him the salary due him for the services he actually rendered as the acting
Vice-Governor of the province of Leyte. (See Cantillo v. Arrieta, 61 SCRA 55 [1974])
(G.R. No. 90762, May 20, 1991)
23. RAMON LABO, JR. VS COMELEC [211 SCRA 297;GR 105111, JULY 3, 1992]
Facts: For the second time around, believing that he is a Filipino ctizen, Ramon Labo, Jr filed his
COC for mayor of Baguio City on March 23, 1992 for the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner
Roberto Ortega on other hand, also filed his COC for the same office on March 25, 1992.
On March 26, 1992, petitioner Ortega filed a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the
COMELEC on the ground that Labo is not a Filipino citizen.
On May 9, 1992, respondent Comelec issued the assailed resolution denying Labos COC.
On May 10, 1992, respondent Comelec issued an Order which reads: Acting on the Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion for Clarification, filed by respondent (Labo) on May 9, 1992, the Commission
resolves that the decision promulgated on May 9, 1992 disqualifying respondent Ramon L. Labo,
Jr., shall become final and executory only after five (5) days from promulgation pursuant to Rule
18, Section 13, Paragraph (b) of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
Accordingly, respondent (Labo) may still continue to be voted upon as candidate for City Mayor
of Baguio City on May 11, 1992 subject to the final outcome of this case in the event the issue is
elevated to the Supreme Court either on appeal or certiorari.
On May 13, 1992, respondent Comelec resolved, motu proprio to suspend the proclamation of
Labo in the event he wins in the elections for the City Mayor of Baguio.
On May 15, 1992, petitioner Labo filed the instant petition for review with prayer, among others,
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to set aside the May 9, 1992 resolution of
respondent Comelec; to render judgment declaring him as a Filipino citizen; and to direct
respondent Comelec to proceed with his proclamation in the event he wins in the contested
elections.
Petitioner Ortega argues that respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it
refused to implement its May 9, 1992 resolution notwithstanding the fact that said resolution
disqualifying Labo has already become final and executory.
Petitioner Ortega submits that since this Court did not issue a temporary restraining order as
regards the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling Labos certificate of
candidacy, said resolution has already become final and executory. Ortega further posits the view
that as a result of such finality, the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes should
be declared Mayor of Baguio City.
Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: Petition to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy
(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days from receipt of a
copy thereof by the parties, be final and executory unless stayed by the Supreme Court.
Issue:
WON Petitioner Labo who had the highest number of votes is qualified to assume as Mayor of
Baguio City.
WON disqualification of petitioner Labo entitles the candidate (Ortega) receiving the next
highest number of votes to be proclaimed as the winning candidate for mayor of Baguio City.
Held:
First Issue:
No. At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition on May 15, 1992, the May 9, 1992 resolution of
respondent Comelec cancelling his (Labos) certificate of candidacy had already become final
and executory a day earlier, or on May 14, 1992, said resolution having been received by
petitioner Labo on the same day it was promulgated, i.e., May 9, 1992 and in the interim no
restraining order was issued by this Court.
The resolution cancelling Labos certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is not a Filipino
citizen having acquired finality on May 14, 1992 constrains the SC to rule against his
proclamation as Mayor of Baguio City.
Sec. 39 of the LGC provides that an elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines.
Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification
for the contested office. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an
elective office. The fact that he was elected by the majority of the electorate is of no moment.
Second Issue:
No. The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily entitle petitioner Ortega as the
candidate with the next highest number of votes to proclamation as the Mayor of Baguio City.
While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office of city
mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was
overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of mayor in the belief that he was then
qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification does not make
respondent Ortega the mayor-elect.
Petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. He was obviously not
the choice of the people of Baguio City.
Thus, while respondent Ortega (GR No. 105111) originally filed a disqualification case with the
Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking to deny due course to petitioners (Labos)
candidacy, the same did not deter the people of Baguio City from voting for petitioner Labo,
who, by then, was allowed by the respondent Comelec to be voted upon, the resolution for his
disqualification having yet to attain the degree of finality (Sec. 78. Omnibus Election Code).
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the
eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority
or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.

Note: Its useless to file for disqualification when the decision comes out after the election.
24. JOEL G. MIRANDA VS. ANTONIO M. ABAYA

Jose "Pempe" Miranda, then incumbent mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, filed his certificate of
candidacy for the same mayoralty post for the synchronized May 11, 1998 elections. Private
respondent Antonio M. Abaya filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel Certificate
of Candidacy. The petition was GRANTED by Comelec and they further ruled to DISQUALIFY
Jose "Pempe" Miranda.

On May 6, 1998, way beyond the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, petitioner Joel G.
Miranda filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty post, supposedly as a substitute for
his father, Jose "Pempe" Miranda. During the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner and private
respondent vied for the mayoralty seat, with petitioner garnering 22,002 votes, 1,666 more votes
than private respondent who got only 20, 336 votes.

Private respondent filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void Substitution with Prayer for
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. He prayed for
the nullification of petitioner's certificate of candidacy for being void ab initio because the
certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda, whom petitioner was supposed to substitute,
had already been cancelled and denied due course.

Issue: WON the petitioner, who was beyond the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, be
qualified to substitute a candidate whose COC was cancelled and denied?

Held: NO.

In Bautista vs. Comelec the Court explicitly ruled that "a cancelled certificate does not give
rise to a valid candidacy." A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be
considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed any certificate of
candidacy at all can not, by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all.

The law clearly provides:

SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy -- No person shall be eligible for any elective public
office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.
By its express language, the foregoing provision of law is absolutely mandatory. It is but logical
to say that any person who attempts to run for an elective office but does not file a certificate of
candidacy, is not a candidate at all. No amount of votes would catapult him into office.

In Gador vs. Comelec (95 SCRA 431 [1980]), the Court held that a certificate of candidacy filed
beyond the period fixed by law is void, and the person who filed it is not, in law, a candidate.
Much in the same manner as a person who filed no certificate of candidacy at all and a person
who filed it out of time, a person whose certificate of candidacy is cancelled or denied due
course is no candidate at all. No amount of votes should entitle him to the elective office aspired
for. The evident purposes of the law in requiring the filing of certificates of candidacy and in
fixing the time limit therefor are: (a) to enable the voters to know, at least sixty days before the
regular election, the candidates among whom they are to make the choice, and (b) to avoid
confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast. For if the law did not confine the
choice or election by the voters to the duly registered candidates, there might be as many persons
voted for as there are voters, and votes might be cast even for unknown or fictitious persons as a
mark to identify the votes in favor of a candidate for another office in the same election.
After having considered the importance of a certificate of candidacy, it can be readily understood
why in Bautista the Court ruled that a person with a cancelled certificate is no candidate at all.

A disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the
first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed
certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he
cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. Besides, if we were to
allow the so-called "substitute" to file a "new" and "original" certificate of candidacy beyond the
period for the filing thereof, it would be a crystalline case of unequal protection of the law, an act
abhorred by our Constitution.

Hence, Comelec ruling to ANNUL the election and proclamation of petitioner was AFFIRMED.
25. RECABO VS COMELEC
FACTS:

On March 27, 1998, Francisco R. Reyes, Jr., filed his certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of
Mainit, Surigao Del Norte under the LAKAS NUCD-UMDP (LAKAS). His nomination is
evidence by the certificate of nomination and acceptance signed by Fidel V. Ramos and Jose de
Venecia, National Chairman and Secretary General, respectively, of the said political party.

On April 2, 1998, Kaiser B. Recabo, Jr., claiming to be the official candidate of LAKAS as vice-
mayor of the same municipality, also filed his certificate of candidacy. Recabo submitted to the
Comelec a copy of the certificate of his nomination and acceptance signed only by one
representative of LAKAS, Francisco T. Matugas. The space of the other representative (Robert
Z. Barbers) is blank.

Reyes filed with the Comelec a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Recabo, alleging
that Recabo is a substitute candidate of his mother, Candelaria B. Recabo. Reyes submits that
since the certificate of nomination and acceptance in favor of Candelaria B. Recabo is not signed
by Robert Barbers, there is no valid nomination by LAKAS in favor of Candelaria. Therefore,
Candelaria not having been validly nominated, should be deemed an
independent candidate only. And since Candelaria is an independent candidate, she cannot be
validly substituted because under Sec. 11 of Comelec Res. No. 2977 promulgated on January 15,
1998, no substitution shall be allowed for an independent candidate.

Comelec cancelled the certificate of candidacy of Recabo. The Motion for Reconsideration was
denied.

Hence, Recabo filed before the SC a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 alleging that: 1) His
certificate of candidacy and that of his mother whom he substituted substantially complied with
the requirements of being official candidate of the LAKAS; 2) The people of Mainit have spoken
loud and clear in his favor by giving him a resounding majority of 1,102 votes or 12% of the
votes cast for both of them; and, 3) By cancelling his certificate of candidacy, Comelec acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners certificate of nomination by LAKAS NUCD-UMDP is

valid?

NO. COMELEC Resolution No. 2977 provides under Section 5 thereof: The certificate of
nomination by registered political parties of their official candidates shall be filed with the
certificates of candidacy not later than the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy as
specified in Section 4 hereof, duly signed and attested under oath by the party president,
chairman, secretary-general or any other party officer duly authorized in writing to do so.

Pursuant to said resolution, the political party of LAKAS NUCD-UMDP issued an

`Authorization designating two (2) Party officers to nominate, sign, attest under oath and issue
the Official Certificates of Nomination, namely, Francisco T. Matugas and Robert Ace S.
Barbers. Consistent with the foregoing, the certificate of nomination and acceptance, as pointed
out by the Comelec, requires the joint signing of the two party officers.

The certificate of nomination of the petitioner as well as his mother did not comply with
the requirements of being official candidates of LAKAS Party. The certificate of nomination was
invalid because it was signed only by one authorized party officer as compared to Reyes which
was signed by the National Chairman and Secretary General, respectively, of said political party.

Moreover, the chronology of events would still call for the cancellation of petitioners certificate
of candidacy to curb the evil that the Comelec sought toabate pursuant to its mandate to hold
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. As the respondent Commission stated, to
allow respondent to run under the circumstances adverted to herein would put the election
process in mockery and disrepute for we would in effect be allowing an anomalous situation
where a single political party may field-in multiple candidates for a single election position.

It will be recalled that the mother of herein petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy on March
25, 1998 and later withdrew the same on March 31, 1998. In the meantime, Reyes, Jr. filed his
certificate of candidacy on March 27, 1998. Thereafter, Recabo, Jr. filed his certificate of
candidacy on April 2, 1998, in substitution of his mother who had withdrawn earlier.

Assuming all three candidates were fielded-in by the same political party, at the time petitioner
Recabo, Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy there was no more void to fill in as respondent
Reyes, Jr. had already filed his certificate of candidacy as official candidate of LAKAS NUCD-
UMDP. Verily, there was no more vacancy to be substituted for. Disunity and discord amongst
members of a political party should not be allowed to create a mockery of our electoral process,
which envisions onecandidate from a political party for each position.

ISSUE: Whether or not a certificate of votes is sufficient to establish the results of the
election.

To put matters in the proper perspective, we shall resolve the second issue first that the
electorate has spoken loud and clear in favor of petitioner by giving him a resounding majority
of 1,102 votes or 12% of the votes cast for both of them. Petitioner, in effect, argues that the
popular will as clearly expressed in votes cast and counted should prevail, such that the election
of a candidate cannot be annulled because of formal defects in his certificate.

Recabo submitted a Certified List of Candidates with their Votes Obtained and an undated
`Certified List of Winning Candidates both signed by the Acting Election Officer and Election
Officer-OIC, respectively.
In Garay vs. Commission on Elections, we had occasion to rule that: xxx. According to Section
17, a certificate of votes can only be evidence to prove tampering, alteration, falsification or any
other anomaly committed in the election returns concerned, when duly authenticated x x x. A
certificate of votes does not constitute sufficient evidence of the true and genuine results of the
election; only election returns are.

In like manner, neither is the certified list of winning candidates sufficient evidence of the real
results of the election. Moreover, the certificate of votes submitted does not conform with
Section 16 of R.A. 6646. It does not state the number of votes obtained in words; it does not state
the number of the precinct, the total number of voters who voted in the precinct and the time
issued. Most importantly, it was merely certified true and correct by a certain Lydia P. Mahinay
as acting election officer. As aforequoted, Section 16 of R.A. 6646 requires that the certificate of
votes be signed and thumbmarked by each member of the board of election inspectors.

Thus, the doctrine that a mere technicality cannot be used to frustrate the peoples will finds
no application in the case at bar considering that the results of the election have not been duly
established.

ISSUE: Should Reyes be proclaimed winner and assume the position of vice-mayor being
the second highest winning candidate?

No. A certificate of votes is not sufficient to establish the true and genuine results of the
election. A certificate of canvass issued on the basis of the election returns is required to
proclaim the elected candidate. It is settled that the disqualification or non-qualification of the
winner in a vice mayoralty race does not justify theproclamation of the defeated candidate who
obtained the second highest number of votes. To simplistically assume that the second placer
would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the
voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated
by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified
candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would
have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the
circumstances.

ISSUE: How then the vacancy should be filled up?

The vacancy due to the ineligibility of herein petitioner should be filled up in accordance with
Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides that the highest ranking
sanggunian member shall become the vice-mayor. (G.R. No. 134293, June 21, 1999)
26. DOCENA V. SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF EASTERN SAMAR

FACTS: The case arose when Luis B. Capito, who had been elected to and was serving as a
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar (SPES) died in office and petitioner
Agustin B. Docena was appointed to succeed him. The appointmentwas issued on November 19,
1990, by Secretary Luis T. Santos of the Department of Local Government. Docena took his oath
of office before Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives on November 22,
1990, and assumed office as member of the SPES on November 26, 1990. On November 27,
1990, private respondent Socrates B. Alar was appointed, also by Secretary Luis T. Santos, to the
position already occupied by Docena. On December 18, 990, the SPES passedResolution No. 75
recognizing Alar rather than Docena as the legitimate successor of the late Board Member
Capito. The following day, the SPES was reversed by Secretary Santos. On January 8, 1991,
SPES passed a resolution reiterating the appointment of Alar and declaring void the recall issued
by Secretary Santos. Docena filed a petition for mandamus to compel the respondents (SPES) to
recognize and admit him as a lawfully appointed member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Eastern Samar.

ISSUE:

Whether Docenas appointment was already complete?

HELD

YES. The said appointment had been accepted by Docena, who had in fact already assumed
office as member of the SPES as per certification of the Provincial Secretary. For all legal intents
and purposes, the petitioners appointment had already become complete and enforceable at the
time it was supposed to have been superseded by the appointment in favor
of Alar. Docenas appointment having been issued and accepted earlier, and the petitioner
having already assumed office, he could not thereafter be justrecalled and replaced
to accommodate Alar. The appointment was permanent in nature, and for the unexpired portion
of the deceased predecessors term. Docena had already acquired security of tenure in the
position and could be removed therefrom only for any of the causes, and conformably to the
procedure, prescribed by the Local Government Code. These requirementscould not be
circumvented by the simple process of recalling his appointment.
27. GAMBOA V. AGUIRRE
July 20, 1999
ROMEO J. GAMBOA, JR., petitioner, vs.
MARCELO AGUIRRE, JR., and JUAN Y. ARANETA, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

SUMMARY: Negros Oriental Governor went on an official trip abroad and designated Vice-
Governor Gamboa as Acting Governor. When the SP held session, SP Members Aguirre and
Araneta (AA) questioned Gamboas authority to preside over the SP, conisdering that he was the
Acting Governor. Gamboa refused to vacate the Chair. Later, SP voted 7-4-1 to allow Gamboa to
continue presiding. AA filed a declaratory relief and prohibition action against Gamboa. RTC
ruled that Gamboa cannot preside over the SP while he is Acting Governor. ISSUE: W/N an
incumbent Vice-Governor, while concurrently the Acting Governor, can continue to preside over
the sessions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. On appeal by Gamboa, SC upheld RTC, holding
that when the Vice-Governor becomes Acting Governor, he does not relinquish his original post
and thus, only a temporary vacancy is created in the Vice-Governorship because there is no
person legally authorized to discharge the functions of Vice-Governor. LGC did not provide for
this situation where a temporary vacancy is created in the Vice-Governorship, so SC used the
rule on permanent vacancies and the SP must elect an Acting Presiding Officer. VG cannot
preside over the SP because under the LGC, the executive and legislative functions have been
separated at the provincial level. The office of the Governor is purely executive in nature [not
like in the old LGC, where the Governor also presides over the SP], while the SP is purely
legislative in nature. Thus the Vice-Governor who becomes Acting Governor cannot preside
over the SP, since he would be performing executive and legislative functions simultaneously,
contrary to the separation policy of the LGC, which is intended to promote better service
delivery and provide a system of checks and balances. SC resolved the issue despite its mootness
[terms of everyone involved expired in 1998] because of its novelty, and being capable of
repetition yet evading review.
DOCTRINE: The creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor creates a
corresponding temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor whenever the latter acts as
Governor by virtue of such temporary vacancy. This event constitutes an "inability" on the part
of the regular presiding officer (Vice Governor) to preside during the SP sessions, which thus
calls for the operation of the remedy set in LGC 49(b) - concerning the election of a temporary
presiding officer. The continuity of the Acting Governor's (Vice-Governor) powers as presiding
officer of the SP is suspended so long as he is in such capacity. Under LGC 49(b), "(i)n the event
of the inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at the sanggunian session, the members
present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a temporary presiding
officer.".
Effective absence is one that renders the officer concerned powerless, for the time being, to
discharge the powers and prerogatives of his office.
NATURE: Petition for review. Original action for declaratory relief and prohibition.
FACTS
 Trouble in hacendero paradise, i.e., Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Negros
Occidental. 1995-1998 term.
PARTIES INVOLVED
o Rafael COSCOLLUELA Governor
o Romeo GAMBOA, Jr. Vice Governor and Presiding Officer of SP
o Marcelo AGUIRRE and Juan ARANETA (AA) SP members
Aug. 1995 Coscolluela went on an official trip abroad. He designated Gamboa as
Acting Governor for the duration of his trip..
Sep. 6, 1995 SP held its regular session, with Gamboa presiding.
o AA questioned Gamboas authority to preside over the session in view of his
designation as Acting Governor. Alis ka diyan. Gamboa refused to vacate the
Chair.
Another SP Session Gamboa was allowed to continue presiding by a vote of 7-4-1.
Sep. 22. 1995 AA filed an action for declaratory relief and prohibition.
Oct. 2, 1995 Coscolluela reassumed office.
RTC DECISION
o Gamboa temporarily incapacitated to preside over SP sessions for the period that
he Acting Governor.
Gamboa filed the present petition for review.
Although mooted by the expiry of the officials terms, SC resolved to dispose of the
issues in light of their controversy and novelty.
ISSUE (HELD): W/N an incumbent Vice-Governor, while concurrently the Acting Governor,
can continue to preside over the sessions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (NO)
RATIO
Under LGC 49(a) and 466(a)(1), the Vice-Governor is the Presiding Officer of the SP.
Vice-Governor also assumes the Governorship for the unexpired term of his predecessor,
in case of permanent vacancy.
When the vacancy is temporary, the Vice-Governor "shall automatically exercise the
powers (subject to certain limitations) and perform the duties and functions" of the
Governor.
RA 7160 does not supply a rule of succession in case of a temporary vacancy in the Vice-
Governorship (unlike its predecessor law, BP 337).
When the Vice-Governor fills a temporary vacancy in the Governorship, he does not
assume the office; but simply acts as Governor. Kaya Acting Governor. He does not
relinquish his position and title as Vice-Governor.
This temporary assumption of governor duties by the vice-governor does not create a
permanent vacancy in the vice-governorship.
The crux of the matter: When the Vice-Governor acts as Governor, does he
temporarily relinquish the powers, functions, duties, and responsibilities of the Vice-
Governor, including the power to preside over SP sessions? RA 7160 is silent on the
matter, but SC says YES.
A Vice-Governor who is concurrently Acting Governor is actually a quasi-Governor,
meaning that, for the purposes of of exercising his legislative prerogative and power, he
is deemed a non-member of the SP for the time being.
 Governor and Vice-Governor are executive offices by nature while SP is legislative in
nature, because the authority vested in the SP is a Congressional delegation of legislative
power.
RA 7160 separated the executive and legislative functions at the local level, except in the
Barangay. Thus, while under BP 337, the Governor presided over the SP and was
considered a member thereof, that is no longer true under RA 7160.
This is clear from the law, which states that local legislative power shall be vested in the
SP; and enumerates who are members of the SP [When the law enumerates, it
necessarily excludes.]:
o Vice-Governor (as Presiding Officer)
o Regular elected members
o 3 elected sectoral representatives
o Ex officio members [Provincial Liga President, Provincial SK Liga President, and
Provincial ULAP President (municipalities and component cities)]
En contrario, the provincial executive power is vested in the Governor alone.
Consequently, the union of legislative-executive powers in the office of the local chief
executive under the former Code has been disbanded, so that either department now
comprises different and non-intermingling official personalities with the end in view of
ensuring a better delivery of public service and provide a system of check and balance
between the two.
Paredes v. Antillon: If the Mayor is out of the country and thus effectively absent, the
Vice-Mayor should discharge the duties of the mayor during the latters absence
This rule applies to the Vice-Governor as well, because he is similarly situated with the
Vice-Mayor.
"Effective" absence: one that renders the officer concerned powerless, for the time being,
to discharge the powers and prerogatives of his office.
There is no vacancy whenever the office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. A
vacancy occurs when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume the powers and
duties of the office. Thus, the designation, appointment or assumption of the Vice-
Governor as the Acting Governor creates a corresponding temporary vacancy in the
office of the Vice-Governor during such contingency.
Considering the silence of the law on the matter, the mode of succession provided for
permanent vacancies, under RA 7160, in the office of the Vice-Governor may likewise be
observed in the event of temporary vacancy occurring in the same office
REASON: in the eyes of the law, the office to which he was elected was left barren of a
legally qualified person to exercise the duties of the office of the Vice-Governor.
Being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor cannot continue to simultaneously
exercise the duties of the latter office, since the nature of the duties of the provincial
Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them. Such is not only consistent with
but also appears to be the clear rationale of the new Code wherein the policy of
performing dual functions in both offices has already been abandoned.
The creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor creates a
corresponding temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor whenever the latter
acts as Governor by virtue of such temporary vacancy. This event constitutes an
"inability" on the part of the regular presiding officer (Vice Governor) to preside during
the SP sessions, which thus calls for the operation of the remedy set in LGC 49(b) -
 concerning the election of a temporary presiding officer. The continuity of the Acting
Governor's (Vice-Governor) powers as presiding officer of the SP is suspended so long as
he is in such capacity. Under LGC 49(b), "(i)n the event of the inability of the regular
presiding officer to preside at the sanggunian session, the members present and
constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a temporary presiding officer.".
DISPOSITION: Petition denied.
29. LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIAONAL (LIGA) v. ATIENZA, JR.
G.R. No. 154599 | 21 JANUARY 2004

FACTS:
Petitioner Liga is the national organization of all barangays in the Philippines, as provided
for in RA 7160 (The Local Government CodeLGC). The LGC also provides for the
members of the Board of Directors of the Liga, i.e., president, vice-president and 5 members
duly elected at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and
national levels.
16 MAR 2000 Petitioner adopted and ratified its own Election Code.
Respondent City Council of Manila enacted an ordinance providing, among other things, for
the election of representative of the District Chapters in the City Chapter of Manila and
setting the date for the elections for such. The assailed ordinance was later transmitted to
respondent City Mayor Atienza, Jr., for his signature and approval.
Upon learning of said facts, petitioner Liga sent respondent Mayor a letter requesting the
latter to veto the ordinance because it encroached upon, or even assumed, the functions of the
Liga through legislation, a function which was clearly beyond the powers of the City
Council. However, respondent Mayor signed and approved and issued the assailed ordinance.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the petition for review for certiorari is proper.
NOTE: Respondents aver that certiorari under Rule 65 is available to one aggrieved by the
decision of a tribunal, officer, or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The City
Council and City Mayor do not fall under those contemplated by the Rule because both do not
exercise judicial functions.

HELD:
NO. Petition dismissed

RATIO:
The Court held that respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor
arrogated unto themselves any judicial or quasi-judicial prerogatives.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is a special civil action that may be invoked only
against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. For such
writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur:
o (1) It must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions;
o (2) The tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
 o (3) There is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions. As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the enactment by the City
Council of Manila of the assailed ordinance and the issuance by respondent Mayor of the
questioned executive order were done in the exercise of legislative and executive functions,
respectively, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. On this score alone, certiorari will
not lie.
32. MANUEL ZAMORA VS. GOV. JOSE CABALLERO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 147767. January 14, 2002

Facts: Manuel Zamora, a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Compostela Valley, filed
before the RTC a petition to invalidate all acts executed and resolutions issued by the
Sanggunian during its sessions held on February 8 and 26, 2001 for lack of quorum. Said
sessions noted the resignation letter of Board Member Sotto, declared the entire province under a
state of calamity and approved the Governor to enter into the contract with the Allado Company.
Zamora, the petitioner, argued that the Sanggunian, during its February 26 session, conducted
official business without a quorum since only 7 out of the 14 members were present. He further
questioned the February 8 sessions validity arguing that only 7 members were present and the
failure to provide written notice to all members at least 24 hours before the holding of the special
session. Respondents argued that Board Member Sotto was in the United States during such
sessions and that the actual number of Board Members in the country was only 13 which, they
claimed, should be the basis for the determination of a quorum. Such petition raised by Zamora
was dismissed by the RTC but reversed and granted by the Supreme Court.

Issues: 1) Whether or not Section 53 (a) of the LGC provides and specifies applicable rule
regarding the determination of a quorum.

2) Whether or not Sanggunian Members who are abroad should not be included in the counting
of the entire Sangguniang body.

3) Whether or not the approved decisions during the sessions, alleged to be without quorum, is
deemed to be valid.

Held: Section 53 (a) of the LGC states that : A majority of all members of the Sanggunian who
have been elected and qualified shall constitute a quorum to transact official business. Quorum
is defined as the number of members of a body which, when legally assembled, will enable the
body to transact its proper business or that number which makes a lawful body and gives it
power to pass upon a law or ordinance or do any valid act. When required to constitute a
quorum, majority means the number greater than half or more than half of the total.
As further stated, it requires the majority of ALL members of the Sanggunian. Quorum should,
thus, be based on the total number of members regardless of whether or not a member is said to
be abroad.
Therefore, in cases where decisions have been made during sessions deemed to have not met the
required quorum, such sessions and decisions shall be considered void.
34. PERCIVAL MODAY VS COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Percival Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. In 1989, the Sangguniang
Bayan of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing the mayor to initiate an expropriation case
against a 1 hectare portion of Modays land. Purpose of which was to erect a gymnasium and
other public buildings. The mayor approved the resolution and the resolution was transmitted to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which disapproved the said resolution ruling that the
expropriation is not necessary because there are other lots owned by Bunawan that can be used
for such purpose. The mayor pushed through with the expropriation nonetheless.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal
resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
HELD: Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the
instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is
governments right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State,
private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the
power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities
and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the taking
must be for public use and there must be just compensation. The only ground upon which a
provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid is when such
resolution, ordinance, or order is beyond the powers conferred upon the council or president
making the same. This was not the case in the case at bar as the SP merely stated that there are
other available lands for the purpose sought, the SP did not even bother to declare the SB
resolution as invalid. Hence, the expropriation case is valid.
36. RNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG
PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-
in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

Facts:

1. On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and
approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous
House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.
2. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the
Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF).
3. On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the
public trust and other high crimes. The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives,
and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13
October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was sufficient in form, but voted to
dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
4. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with
the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the
House of Representatives.
5. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme
Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the
filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of
 Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that [n]o impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the
12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution.
3. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
37. ADELIO CRUZ VS QUITERIO DALISAY
In 1984, the National Labor Relations Commission issued an order against Qualitrans Limousine
Service, Inc. (QLSI) ordering the latter to reinstate the employees it terminated and to pay them
backwages. Quiterio Dalisay, Deputy Sheriff of the court, to satisfy the backwages, then
garnished the bank account of Adelio Cruz. Dalisay justified his act by averring that Cruz was
the owner and president of QLSI. Further, he claimed that the counsel for the discharged
employees advised him to garnish the account of Cruz.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action of Dalisay is correct.
HELD: No. What Dalisay did is tantamount to piercing the veil of corporate fiction. He actually
usurped the power of the court. He also overstepped his duty as a deputy sheriff. His duty is
merely ministerial and it is incumbent upon him to execute the decision of the court according to
its tenor and only against the persons obliged to comply. In this case, the person judicially named
to comply was QLSI and not Cruz. It is a well-settled doctrine both in law and in equity that as a
legal entity, a corporation has a personality distinct and separate from its individual stockholders
or members. The mere fact that one is president of a corporation does not render the property he
owns or possesses the property of the corporation, since the president, as individual, and the
corporation are separate entities.
 38. AGUINALDO VS. SANTOS

Facts:

Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan. After the December 1989
coup dtat was crushed, DILG Secretary Santos sent a telegram & letter to
GovernorAguinaldo requiring him toshow cause why he should not be suspended or removed
from office for disloyalty to theRepublic. A sworn complaint was also filed by Mayors of
several municipalities in Cagayan against Aguinaldo for acts committed during the
coup. Aguinaldo denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively participating in its
execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers.

The Secretary suspended petitioner from office for 60 days from notice, pending the outcome of
the formal investigation. Later, the Secretary rendered a decision finding petition guilty as
charged and ordering his removal from office. Vice-Governor Vargas was installed as
Governor. Aguinaldo appealed.

Aguinaldo filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction
and/or restraining order with the SC, assailing the decision of respondent Secretary of Local
Government. Petitioner argued that: (1) that the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or
remove local government official under Section 60, Chapter IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was repealed by
the 1987 Constitution; (2) that since respondent Secretary no longer has power to suspend or
remove petitioner, the former could not appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor; and (3)
the alleged act of disloyalty committed by petitioner should be proved by proof beyond
reasonable doubt, and not be a mere preponderance of evidence, because it is an act punishable
as rebellion under the Revised Penal Code.

While the case was pending before the SC, Aguinaldo filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of Governor of Cagayan. Three petitions for disqualification were filed against him on
the ground that he had been removed from office.

The Comelec granted the petition. Later, this was reversed on the ground that the decision of the
Secretary has not yet attained finality and is still pending review with the
Court. As Aguinaldo won by a landslide margin in the elections, the resolution paved the way
for his eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.

Issues:

1. WON petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered

the administration case moot and academic

2. WON the Secretary has the power to suspend or remove local government officials as alter ego of
the President

3. WON proof beyond reasonable doubt is required before petitioner could be removed from office.
Held:

1. Yes. Aguinaldos re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered

the administrative case pending moot and academic. It appears that after the canvassing of votes,
petitioner garnered the most number of votes among the candidates for governor of Cagayan
province. The rule is that a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct
committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the
officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The
foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts
he may have committed during the failed coup.

2. Yes. The power of the Secretary to remove local government officials is anchored on both the
Constitution and a statutory grant from the legislativebranch. The constitutional basis is provided
by Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the President the power of
control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices and the power of general supervision
over local governments. It is a constitutional doctrine that the acts of the department head are
presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly rejected by him. Furthermore, it cannot
be said that BP337 was repealed by the effectivity of the present Constitution as both the 1973
and 1987 Constitution grants to the legislature the power and authority to enact a local
government code, which provides for the manner of removal of local government officials.
Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al., this court had the occasion to state that B.P.
Blg. 337 remained in force despite the effectivity of the present Constitution, until such time as
the proposed Local Government Code of 1991 is approved. The power of the DILG secretary to
remove local elective government officials is found in Secs. 60 and 61 of BP 337.

3. No. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally, but administratively where the quantum of
proof required is only substantial evidence. (Aguinaldo vs. Santos, G.R. No. 94115, August 21,
1992)
39. SALALIMA VS. GUINGONA

Facts:
- NPC filed a case against the Province of Albay questioning the validity of the auction sale,
which the
Province conducted because of NPCs failure to pay real property taxes assessed.
- The Albay Sangguniang Panlalawigan, through a resolution, authorized respondent Governor to
engage
the services of a Manila-based law firm (Cortes & Reyna Law Firm) to handle the case against
NPC.
Later, the Province also engaged the services of Atty. Cornago. This is despite the availability
of the
Provincial Legal Officer, Atty. Ricafort, who already filed the Provinces comment on the NPC
petition.
- A retainer agreement was entered into which provided that Atty. Cornago and the law firm
shall receive
P50,000 as acceptance fee and 18% of the value of the property subject matter of the case
which is
P214 Million.
- The province had already paid P7,380,410.31 as attorneys fees when the COA disallowed
further
disbursements for lack of the requisite prior written conformity and acquiescence of the Sol
Gen and the
written concurrence of the COA as required by COA Circular No. 86-255.
- An administrative complaint was then filed against Gov. Salalima, Vice Gov. Azaa, and other
Albay
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members relative to the questioned retainer contract and the
disbursement
of public funds in payment thereof.

Issue: WON respondents have incurred administrative liability in entering into the retainer
agreement with Atty. Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm and in making payments
pursuant to said agreement

Held: YES. In hiring private lawyers to represent the Province of Albay, respondents exceeded
their authority and violated a provision of the LGC and a Supreme Court doctrine. Moreover,
the entire transaction was attended by irregularities.

Ratio:
Sec. 481 LGC: requires the appointment of a legal officer to represent the LGU in all
civil actions and specal proceedings wherein the LGU or any official thereof, in his
official capacity is a party
 o EXCEPTION: In actions or proceedings where a component city or municipality is a
party adverse to the provincial government or to another component city or municipality,
a special legal officer may be employed to represent the adverse party
Municipality of Bocaue, et al. v. Manotok: LGUs cannot be represented by private
lawyers and it is solely the Provincial Fiscal who can rightfully represent them
Attendant Irregularities:
o No prior written approval of the Sol Gen and COA before the disbursements were made
o The resolution passed by the Sanggunian only authorized the Governor to sign a retainer
contract with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm and yet he also signed with Atty. Cornago, a
different entity
o The Province paid the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm despite the fact that it didnt appear as
counsel for the Province in the SC case
o Considering the standing of both Atty. Cornago the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm, the P38.5
Million attorneys fees is unconscionable and violative of (a) COA Circular No. 85-55-A
prohibiting irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of
funds; and (b) Sec. 3 (e) and (g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

*** However, it was held that respondents could no longer be subject to disciplinary action for
such administrative misconduct as it was committed during a prior term.
40. ESPIRITU VS. MELGAR FEBRUARY 13, 1991
Petitioner: Governor Benjamin Espiritu
Respondents: Nelson Melgar and Hon. Judge

Facts: Ramir Garing filed a sworn letter-complaint with Secretary Luis Santos of DILG charging
Mayor Nelson Melgar of Naujan. Oriental Mindoro, with grave misconduct, oppression, abuse of
authority, culpable violation of the Constitution and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
public service.

Melgar allegedly assaulted Garing and ordered his arrest and detention in the municipal jail of
Naujan without filing any charges until his released the following day. An identical letter
complaint was filed by Garing with Provincial Governor of Oriental Mindoro Benjamin Espiritu,
accusing Melgar of the same violations. A third complaint filed by Garing with the Presidential
Action Center, OP.Mayor Melgar submitted his answer wherein he said that while he was
delivering a speech during a graduation ceremony, Garing suddenly clapped causing disturbance
on the part of the audience. When the Mayor ended his speech, he instructed a policeman to
investigate Garing. It appeared that Garing was drunk. The mayor also presented medical
certificate proving that Garing was not hurt. A balisong was then taken from Garing. The mayor
informed Garing to go home (he had sobered up), but he refused to go and only did so the
following morning. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro passed Resolution No
55, recommending tothe Provincial Governor that the Mayor be preventively suspended for 45
days pending the investigation of the administrative complaint. When the mayor received the
order of suspension, he filed a "Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction with prayer for
Restraining Order" in the RTC of Oriental Mindoro alleging that "the order of suspension was an
arrogant, despotic and arbitrary abuse of power" by the Governor. The RTC judge issued a writ
of preliminary injunction enjoining Governor Espiritu from implementing the Order of
suspension against Mayor Melgar

On appeal, petitioner contends that the trial judge erred in granting the preliminary injunction
since the Governor is empowered under Sec 63 LGC to place an elective municipal official
under preventive suspension pending decision of an administrative case against the elective
municipal official. Also, under Sec 61 LGC, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan has jurisdiction over
the complaints against any municipal official, while Section 19(c) of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1930 withdrew from RTCs jurisdictions over such cases. Also, the mayor
has a remedy of appeal under Sec 66 LGC.

Issue:WON the governor has the power to suspend the mayor

HELD: YES, Under Section 63 LGC, the provincial governor of Oriental Mindoro is authorized
by law to preventively suspend the municipal mayor of Naujan anytime after the issues had been
joined and any of the following grounds were shown to exist:
1. When there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts
complained of;
2. When the evidence of culpability is strong;
3. When the gravity of the offense so warrants; or
4. When the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a
threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.

There is nothing improper in suspending an officer before the charges against him are heard and
before he is given an opportunity to prove his innocence. Preventive suspension is allowed so
that the respondent may not hamper the normal course of the investigation through the use of his
influence and authority over possible witnesses. Since the mayor believed that his preventive
suspension was unjustified and politically motivated, he should have sought relief first from the
Secretary of DILG, not from the courts. Mayor Melgar's direct recourse to the courts without
exhausting administrative remedies was premature.

WON the RTC has jurisdiction to stop the provincial governor from placing a municipal mayor
under preventive suspension pending the investigation of administrative charges against the latter

HELD: NO. The RTC had no jurisdiction over Special Civil Action and gravely abused
its discretion in refusing to dismiss the case. There may exist honest differences of opinion with
regard to the seriousness of the charges, or as to whether they warrant disciplinary action.
However, as a general rule, the office or body that is invested with the power of removal or
suspension should be the sole judge of the necessity and sufficiency of the cause. So, unless a
flagrant abuse of the exercise of that power is shown, public policy and a becoming regard for
the principle of separation of powers demand that the action of said officer or body should be left
undisturbed. However, in this particular case. since the 60-day preventive suspension of Mayor
Melgar was maintained by the Temporary Restraining Order which we issued on August 6, 1991,
and therefore has already been served, he is deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the
continuation of the administrative investigation of the charges against him.
41. PIMENTEL VS. GARCHITORENA

The petitioners Mariano J. Pimentel, provincial governor of Quirino province, Lilia L. Salun-at,
the provincial secretary, and Edgardo Merjudio, the private secretary of the Governor, in SB
Crim. Cases Nos. 13834-36 and 16540 where they face four (4) counts of Falsification of Public
Documents and in SB Crim. Case No. 16560 where they are charged with Violation of Section
3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

In Crim. Cases Nos. 13834, 13835 and 13836, the petitioners, Pimentel and Salun-at, are accused
of having falsified or caused the falsification of the excerpts from the minutes of the regular
sessions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Quirino province on August 15, 1988 and
September 19, 1988.

In Crim. Case No. 16560, the petitioner, Governor Mariano J. Pimentel, was charged with having
illegally granted to his son-in-law and co-accused Edgardo Merjudio, the lease of a government
building in the capitol grounds together with the equipment therein, to be operated as a canteen,
although there was no formal lease contract between the provincial government and Merjudio,
nor a resolution awarding such lease to him.

On motion of the prosecution, the Sandiganbayan suspended Governor Pimentel pendente

lite pursuant to Section 13 of R.A. 3019. The petitioners assailed the suspension, hence this
petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the suspension of the petitioners are valid.

Held:

Yes. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and
the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records
which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him.

In the aforementioned criminal cases, however, while the suspension of Governor Pimentel and
the Provincial Secretary, Mrs. Salun-at, was proper because the informations against them charge
"offense(s) involving fraud against the government or public funds or property . . . " such
suspension may not exceed the maximum period of ninety (90) days fixed in Section 42 of P.D.
No. 807.

Since the petitioners were suspended from their positions on April 15, 1991, their suspension has
already exceeded the maximum limit of ninety (90) days, hence, it should now be lifted.

The preventive suspension of petitioners Pimentel and Merjudio in Crim. Case No. 16560 was
fixed for a period of ninety (90) days, from August 2, 1991, or up to November 1, 1991 yet.
Their prayer to lift the said suspension, if it has not yet been done, is proper and meritorious.
44. GARCIA VS MOJICA
[G.R. No. 139043. September 10, 1999]
QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS:
On May 7, 1998, petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor, signed a contract with F.E.
Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the city. The contract covers the period 1998-2001, which
period was to commence on September 1998 when the first delivery should have been made by
F.E. Zuellig.
Sometime in March 1999, news reports came out regarding the alleged anomalous
purchase of asphalt by Cebu City, through the contract signed by petitioner. This prompted the
Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into the matter.[1]
Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special prosecution officer of the Office of the
Ombudsman, was assigned to conduct the inquiry, docketed as INQ-VIS-99-0132. After his
investigation, he recommended that the said inquiry be upgraded
to criminal and administrative cases against petitioner and the other city officials
involved. Respondent Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, approved this
recommendation.
ISSUES:
1. WON Garcia may be held administratively liable.

NO. In a number of cases, we have repeatedly held that a reelected local official may not
be held administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term of
office.[24] The rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is
presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his past
misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then such reelection is
considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.
However, in the present case, respondents point out that the contract entered into by
petitioner with F.E. Zuellig was signed just four days before the date of the elections. It was not
made an issue during the election, and so the electorate could not be said to have voted for
petitioner with knowledge of this particular aspect of his life and character.
For his part, petitioner contends that the only conclusive determining factor as regards the
peoples thinking on the matter is an election. On this point, we agree with petitioner. That the
people voted for an official with knowledge of his character is presumed, precisely to eliminate
the need to determine, in factual terms, the extent of this knowledge. Such an undertaking will
obviously be impossible. Our rulings on the matter do not distinguish the precise timing or
period when the misconduct was committed, reckoned from the date of the officials reelection,
except that it must be prior to said date.
The above ruling in Salalima applies to this case. Petitioner cannot anymore be
held administratively liable for an act done during his previous term, that is, his signing of the
contract with F.E. Zuellig.
 The agreement between petitioner (representing Cebu City) and F.E. Zuellig was perfected
on the date the contract was signed, during petitioners prior term. At that moment, petitioner
already acceded to the terms of the contract, including stipulations now alleged to be prejudicial
to the city government. Thus, any culpability petitioner may have in signing the contract already
became extant on the day the contract was signed. It hardly matters that the deliveries under the
contract are supposed to have been made months later.
While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for signing the contract with
F. E. Zuellig, however, this should not prejudice the filing of any case other than administrative
against petitioner. Our ruling in this case, may not be taken to mean the total exoneration of
petitioner for whatever wrongdoing, if any, might have been committed in signing the subject
contract. The ruling now is limited to the question of whether or not he may be
held administratively liable therefor, and it is our considered view that he may not.
2. WON the Ombudsman was stripped of its powers by virtue of the LGC.

No. Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed,
whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two
statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to
compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other. The decision of the Ombudsman (6
month suspension) will prevail over the LGC (60day suspension) if the evidence of guilt is
strong.
* The power to preventively suspend is available not only to the Ombudsman but also to the
Deputy Ombudsman.
SEC. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively
suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment
the evidence of guilt is strong,
45. ESPIRITU VS. MELGAR FEBRUARY 13, 1991
Petitioner: Governor Benjamin Espiritu
Respondents: Nelson Melgar and Hon. Judge

Facts: Ramir Garing filed a sworn letter-complaint with Secretary Luis Santos of DILG charging
Mayor Nelson Melgar of Naujan. Oriental Mindoro, with grave misconduct, oppression, abuse of
authority, culpable violation of the Constitution and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
public service.

Melgar allegedly assaulted Garing and ordered his arrest and detention in the municipal jail of
Naujan without filing any charges until his released the following day. An identical letter
complaint was filed by Garing with Provincial Governor of Oriental Mindoro Benjamin Espiritu,
accusing Melgar of the same violations. A third complaint filed by Garing with the Presidential
Action Center, OP.Mayor Melgar submitted his answer wherein he said that while he was
delivering a speech during a graduation ceremony, Garing suddenly clapped causing disturbance
on the part of the audience. When the Mayor ended his speech, he instructed a policeman to
investigate Garing. It appeared that Garing was drunk. The mayor also presented medical
certificate proving that Garing was not hurt. A balisong was then taken from Garing. The mayor
informed Garing to go home (he had sobered up), but he refused to go and only did so the
following morning. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro passed Resolution No
55, recommending tothe Provincial Governor that the Mayor be preventively suspended for 45
days pending the investigation of the administrative complaint. When the mayor received the
order of suspension, he filed a "Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction with prayer for
Restraining Order" in the RTC of Oriental Mindoro alleging that "the order of suspension was an
arrogant, despotic and arbitrary abuse of power" by the Governor. The RTC judge issued a writ
of preliminary injunction enjoining Governor Espiritu from implementing the Order of
suspension against Mayor Melgar

On appeal, petitioner contends that the trial judge erred in granting the preliminary injunction
since the Governor is empowered under Sec 63 LGC to place an elective municipal official
under preventive suspension pending decision of an administrative case against the elective
municipal official. Also, under Sec 61 LGC, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan has jurisdiction over
the complaints against any municipal official, while Section 19(c) of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1930 withdrew from RTCs jurisdictions over such cases. Also, the mayor
has a remedy of appeal under Sec 66 LGC.

Issue:WON the governor has the power to suspend the mayor

HELD: YES, Under Section 63 LGC, the provincial governor of Oriental Mindoro is authorized
by law to preventively suspend the municipal mayor of Naujan anytime after the issues had been
joined and any of the following grounds were shown to exist:
1. When there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts
complained of;
2. When the evidence of culpability is strong;
3. When the gravity of the offense so warrants; or
4. When the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a
threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.

There is nothing improper in suspending an officer before the charges against him are heard and
before he is given an opportunity to prove his innocence. Preventive suspension is allowed so
that the respondent may not hamper the normal course of the investigation through the use of his
influence and authority over possible witnesses. Since the mayor believed that his preventive
suspension was unjustified and politically motivated, he should have sought relief first from the
Secretary of DILG, not from the courts. Mayor Melgar's direct recourse to the courts without
exhausting administrative remedies was premature.

WON the RTC has jurisdiction to stop the provincial governor from placing a municipal mayor
under preventive suspension pending the investigation of administrative charges against the latter

HELD: NO. The RTC had no jurisdiction over Special Civil Action and gravely abused
its discretion in refusing to dismiss the case. There may exist honest differences of opinion with
regard to the seriousness of the charges, or as to whether they warrant disciplinary action.
However, as a general rule, the office or body that is invested with the power of removal or
suspension should be the sole judge of the necessity and sufficiency of the cause. So, unless a
flagrant abuse of the exercise of that power is shown, public policy and a becoming regard for
the principle of separation of powers demand that the action of said officer or body should be left
undisturbed. However, in this particular case. since the 60-day preventive suspension of Mayor
Melgar was maintained by the Temporary Restraining Order which we issued on August 6, 1991,
and therefore has already been served, he is deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the
continuation of the administrative investigation of the charges against him.
46. RICARDO T. GLORIA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:

Private respondent Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools Division Superintendent of
Quezon City in 1989. Upon recommendation of DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria, Icasiano was
reassigned as Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology (MIST) to fill
up the vacuum created by the retirement of its Superintendent in 1994.

Icasiano filed a TRO and preliminary mandatory injuction enjoining the implementation of his
reassignment. The Court of Appeals granted the petition holding that the indefinite reassignment
is violative of Icasianos right to security of tenure.

The DECS Secretary argued that the filing of the case is improper because the
same attacks an act of the President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from
suit.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the filing of the case violates the presidential immunity from suit.

2. Whether or not private respondent's reassignment is violative of his security of tenure.

Held:

1. Petitioners contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed against
petitioners and not against the President. The questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of
the President. Furthermore, presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where
there is grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

2. After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that the
reassignment of petitioner to MIST "appears to be indefinite". The same can be inferred from the
Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that the
reassignment of private respondent will "best fit his qualifications and experience" being "an
expert in vocational and technical education." It can thus be gleaned that subject reassignment is
more than temporary as the private respondent has been described as fit for the (reassigned) job,
being an expert in the field. Besides, there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the
reassignment of private respondent is temporary or would only last until a permanent
replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact evinces an intention on the
part of petitioners to reassign private respondent with no definite period or duration. Such feature
of the reassignment in question is definitely violative of the security of tenure of the private
respondent. As held in Bentain vs. Court of Appeals (209 SCRA 644):
"Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our civil service.
The mantle of its protection extends not only to employees removed without cause but also
to cases of unconsented transfers which are tantamount to illegal removals (Department of
Education, Culture and Sports vs. Court ofAppeals, 183 SCRA 555; Ibanez vs. COMELEC, 19
SCRA 1002; Brillantes vs. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138).

While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the

employees prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his
removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or designed to indirectly
terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent
the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service (Sta.
Maria vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA 651; Garcia vs. Lejano, 109 Phil. 116)."

Having found the reassignment of private respondent to the MIST to be violative of his security
of tenure, the order for his reassignment to the MIST cannot be countenanced. (Ricardo T.
Gloria vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119903. August 15, 2000)
48. EVARDONE V. COMELEC, 204 SCRA 464, 472, DECEMBER 2, 1991
PETITIONER: FELIPE EVARDONE
RESPONDENTS: COMELEC, ALEXANDER APELADO, VICTORINO ACLANA AND
NOEL NIVAL
PONENTE: PADILLA

Facts: Felipe Evardone the mayor of Sulat, Eastern Samar, having been elected to the position
during the 1988 local elections. He assumed office immediately after proclamation. In
1990, Alexander R. Apelado, Victozino E. Aclan and Noel A. Nival filed a petition for
the recall of Evardone with the Office of the Local Election Registrar, Municipality of
Sulat. The Comelec issued a Resolution approving the recommendation of Election
Registrar Vedasto Sumbilla to hold the signing of petition for recall against Evardone.

Evardone filed a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer of restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Later, in an en banc resolution, the Comelec
nullified the signing process for being violative of the TRO of the court. Hence, this
present petition.

Issue 1: WON Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by the COMELEC by virtue of its
powers under the Constitution and BP 337 (Local Government Code) was valid.
Held: Yes
Ratio: Evardone maintains that Article X, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution repealed Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 in favor of one to be enacted by Congress. Since there was, during
the period material to this case, no local government code enacted by Congress after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution nor any law for that matter on the subject of recall of
elected government officials, Evardone contends that there is no basis for COMELEC
Resolution No. 2272 and that the recall proceedings in the case at bar is premature.
The COMELEC avers that the constitutional provision does not refer only to a
local government code which is in futurum but also in esse. It merely sets forth the
guidelines which Congress will consider in amending the provisions of the present LGC.
Pending the enactment of the amendatory law, the existing Local Government Code
remains operative.
Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution express provides that all
existing laws not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall remain operative, until
amended, repealed or revoked. Republic Act No. 7160 providing for the Local
Government Code of 1991, approved by the President on 10 October 1991, specifically
repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act. But the Local
Government Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old
Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) is still the law applicable to the present case.
Prior to the enactment of the new Local Government Code, the effectiveness of B.P. Blg.
337 was expressly recognized in the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
We therefore rule that Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by the COMELEC is valid and
 constitutional. Consequently, the COMELEC had the authority to approve the petition for
recall and set the date for the signing of said petition.

Issue 2: WON the TRO issued by this Court rendered nugatory the signing process of the
petition for recall held pursuant to Resolution No. 2272.
Held: No
Ratio: In the present case, the records show that Evardone knew of the Notice of Recall filed by
Apelado, on or about 21 February 1990 as evidenced by the Registry Return Receipt; yet,
he was not vigilant in following up and determining the outcome of such notice.
Evardone alleges that it was only on or about 3 July 1990 that he came to know about the
Resolution of the COMELEC setting the signing of the petition for recall on 14 July
1990. But despite his urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO, Evardone filed the petition
for prohibition only on 10 July 1990. Indeed, this Court issued a TRO on 12 July 1990
but the signing of the petition for recall took place just the same on the scheduled date
through no fault of the COMELEC and Apelado. The signing process was undertaken by
the constituents of the Municipality of Sulat and its Election Registrar in good faith and
without knowledge of the TRO earlier issued by this Court. As attested by Election
Registrar Sumbilla, about 2,050 of the 6,090 registered voters of Sulat, Eastern Samar or
about 34% signed the petition for recall. As held in Parades vs. Executive Secretary there
is no turning back the
clock.
The right to recall is complementary to the right to elect or appoint. It is included
in the right of suffrage. It is based on the theory that the electorate must maintain a direct
and elastic control over public functionaries. It is also predicated upon the idea that a
public office is "burdened" with public interests and that the representatives of the people
holding public offices are simply agents or servants of the people with definite powers
and specific duties to perform and to follow if they wish to remain in their respective
offices. Whether or not the electorate of Sulat has lost confidence in the incumbent mayor
is a political question. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the
judge. "Loss of confidence is the formal withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a
person's ability to discharge his office previously bestowed on him by the same
electorate. The constituents have made a judgment and their will to recall Evardone has
already been ascertained and must be afforded the highest respect. Thus, the signing
process held last 14 July 1990 for the recall of Mayor Felipe P. Evardone of said
municipality is valid and has legal effect.
However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation
provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg, 337. The Constitution has mandated a synchronized
national and local election prior to 30 June 1992, or more specifically, as provided for in
Article XVIII, Sec. 5 on the second Monday of May, 1992. Thus, to hold an election on
recall approximately seven (7) months before the regular local election will be violative
of the above provisions of the applicable Local Government Code
49. GARCIA ET AL. VS COMELEC
FACTS:
Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of Bataan in the 1992 elections. Some mayors, vice-
mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the province
constituted themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of
petitioner Garcia. They issued Resolution No. 1 as formal initiation of the recall proceedings.
COMELEC scheduled the recall election for the gubernatorial position of Bataan.

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction
to annul the Resolution of the COMELEC because the PRAC failed to comply with the
"substantive and procedural requirement" laid down in Section 70 of R.A. 7160 (Local
Government Code 1991). They pointed out the most fatal defect of the proceeding followed by
the PRAC in passing the Resolution: the deliberate failure to send notices of the meeting to 65
members of the assembly.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the people have the sole and exclusive right to initiate recall proceedings.
2) Whether or not the procedure for recall violated the right of elected local public officials
belonging to the political minority to equal protection of the law.

RULING:
1) No. There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have the
"sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The Constitution
did not provide for any mode, let alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections.
The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local
government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum . . ." By this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose
the effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates.
What the Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of recall, whether one or many, to
be chosen by Congress should be effective. Using its constitutionally granted discretion,
Congress deemed it wise to enact an alternative mode of initiating recall elections to supplement
the former mode of initiation by direct action of the people. The legislative records reveal there
were two (2) principal reasons why this alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an
assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action
of the people; and (b) to cut down on its expenses.

2) No. Under the Sec. 70 of the LGC, all mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang members of the
municipalities and component cities are made members of the preparatory recall assembly at the
provincial level. Its membership is not apportioned to political parties. No significance is given
to the political affiliation of its members. Secondly, the preparatory recall assembly, at the
provincial level includes all the elected officials in the province concerned. Considering their
number, the greater probability is that no one political party can control its majority. Thirdly, sec.
69 of the Code provides that the only ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss of
confidence of the people. The members of the PRAC are in the PRAC not in representation of
their political parties but as representatives of the people. By necessary implication, loss of
confidence cannot be premised on mere differences in political party affiliation. Indeed, our
Constitution encourages multi-party system for the existence of opposition parties is
indispensable to the growth and nurture of democratic system. Clearly then, the law as crafted
cannot be faulted for discriminating against local officials belonging to the minority.
Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the recall process by a
preparatory recall assembly will not be corrupted by extraneous influences. We held that notice
to all the members of the recall assembly is a condition sine qua non to the validity of its
proceedings. The law also requires a qualified majority of all the preparatory recall assembly
members to convene in session and in a public place. Needless to state, compliance with these
requirements is necessary, otherwise, there will be no valid resolution of recall which can be
given due course by the COMELEC.
50. ANGOBUNG versus COMELEC
G. R. No. 126576 (March 5, 1997)
This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside Resolution No. 96-2951 (15 October 1996)
issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which approved the Petition for Recall
filed and signed by only one registered voter, private respondent Ma. Aurora S. de Alban, against
petitioner incumbent Mayor Ricardo M. Angobung; set the further signing of said petition by the
rest of the registered voters of Tumauini, Isabela on 09 November 1996; and in case the said
petition is signed by at least 25% of the total number of registered votes in Tumauini, Isabela,
scheduled the recall election on 02 December 1996. The Supreme Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining COMELEC from implementing and enforcing the assailed
Resolution.

FACTS:
Petitioner Ricardo M. Angobung was the elected Mayor of the Municipality of Tumauini, Isabela
in the local elections of 1995. Private respondent de Alban was also a candidate in said
elections. In September 1996, de Alban filed with the Local Election Registrar of Tumauini,
Isabela, a Petition for Recall against Angubong. Said petition was forwarded to the Regional
Office in Tuguegarao, Cagayan and then to the main office of COMELEC in Manila, for
approval. Deputy Executive Director for Operations Pio Jose Joson then submitted to the
COMELEC en banc, a Memorandum (08 October 1996) which recommends the approval of the
petition for recall filed by de Alban and its signing by other qualified voters in order to garner at
least 25% of the total number of registered voters as required by Section 69[d] of the Local
Government Code of 1991. The COMELEC en banc, acting on said Memorandum, issued the
herein assailed Resolution No. 96-2951.

Petitioner now attacks the aforementioned resolution as being unconstitutional and therefore
invalid.

ISSUES
1) Whether the Resolution violated the one-year bar on recall elections;
Whether the Resolution violated the statutory minimum requirement of 25% as to the number of
signatures supporting any petition for recall.
HELD, RATIO
1. NO. The recall election scheduled on 02 December 1996 is not barred by the May 1997
Barangay Elections. The one-year bar finds no application in the case; Resolution No.
96-2951 is therefore valid on this ground.
Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that "no recall shall take place within one
year immediately preceding a regular local election." For the time bar to apply, the approaching
regular local election must be one where the position of the official to be recalled is to be actually
contested and filled by the electorate.

2. YES. Private respondent de Alban filed the petition for recall with only herself as the
filer and initiator. She claims in her petition that she has, together with many others in
Tumauini, Isabela, lost confidence in the leadership of petitioner. The petition,
however, does not bear the names of all these other citizens of Tumauini who have
reportedly also become anxious to oust petitioner from the post of mayor.
Section 69 [d] of the Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that "recall of any elective
municipal official may also be validly initiated upon petition of at least 25% of the total number of
registered voters in the local government unit concerned during the election in which the local official
sought to be recalled was elected". The law is plain and unequivocal as to what initiates recall
proceedings: only a petition of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters may validly
initiate recall proceedings. The law does not state that the petition must be signed by at least 25% of
the registered voters but rather it must be "of" or by, at least 25% of the registered voters, i.e., the
petition must be filed, not by one person only, but by at least 25% of the total number of registered
voters.

Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his
term of office. The people's prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident of their
sovereign power and in the absence of constitutional restraint, the power is implied
in all governmental operations. Such power has been held to be indispensable for the
proper administration of public affairs. Not undeservedly, it is frequently described as a
fundamental right of the people in a representative democracy (Garcia v. COMELEC, 27
SCRA 100, 1993).
Recall was intended to be an effective and speedy remedy to remove an official who is
not giving satisfaction to the electorate regardless of whether or not he is discharging his full
duty to the best of his ability and as his conscience dictates. It is a power granted to the people
who, in concert, desire to change their leaders for reasons only they, as a collective, can
justify. It must be pursued by the people, not just by one disgruntled loser in the elections or a
small percentage of disenchanted electors. Otherwise, its purpose as a direct remedy of the
people shall be defeated by the ill motives of a few among them whose selfish resort to recall
would destabilize the community and seriously disrupt the running of government.
 While the people are vested with the power to recall their elected officials, the same
power is accompanied by the concomitant responsibility to see through all the
consequences of the exercise of such power, including rising above anonymity, confronting
the official sought to be recalled, his family, his friends, and his supporters, and seeing the recall
election to its ultimate end. The procedure of allowing just one person to file the initiatory recall
petition and then setting a date for the signing of the petition, which amounts to inviting and
courting the public which may have not, in the first place, even entertained any displeasure in
the performance of the official sought to be recalled, is not only violative of statutory law but
also tainted with an attempt to go around the law.
The Supreme Court (1) granted the Petition for Certiorari; (2) declared COMELEC
Resolution No. 96- 2951 null and void; (3) set aside the same; made permanent the restraining
order it issued.
51. DANILO E. PARAS, PETITIONER,
VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.
PONENTE: FRANCISCO

FACTS:
Petitioner was the incumbent Punong Barangay who won during the last regular barangay
election. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the
barangay. At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25%
requirement provided by law. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition and set recall election date. To prevent
the holding of recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for
injunction which was later dismissed. Petitioner filed petition for certiorari with urgent prayer
for injunction, insisting that the recall election is barred by the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
election under Sec. 74(b) of Local Government Code (LGC) which states that no recall shall
take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prohibition on Sec.74(b) of the LGC may refer to SK elections, where the
recall election is for Barangay post.
HELD:
NO. But petition was dismissed for having become moot and academic.
RATIO:
Recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit
necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one
year immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity
of the next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate
could choose the officials replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in
office than a successor elected through a recall election.
It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to
construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local
elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.
By the time of judgment, recall was no longer possible because of the limitation stated under the
same Section 74(b) now referred to as Barangay Elections.
CONCURRING OPINION:
DAVIDE:
A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election participated in by
those who possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise disqualified by law, and who are
registered voters. One of the requirements for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1, Article V
of the Constitution is that the person must be at least 18 years of age, and one requisite before he
can vote is that he be a registered voter pursuant to the rules on registration prescribed in the
Omnibus Election Code (Section 113-118).
Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21 (Sec. 424, Local
Government Code of 1991). Accordingly, they include many who are not qualified to vote in a
regular election, viz., those from ages 15 to less than 18. In no manner then may SK elections be
considered a regular election (whether national or local).
52. CLAUDIO V. COMELEC
Topic: Recall
Ponente: V.V. Mendoza, J.
Date: 4 May 2000
DOCTRINE: To what doctrine is the case related and how is it explained. Make sure that this is
related to the topic.
QUICK FACTS: One to two liner facts.
FACTS:
LGU concerned: Pasay City
Position of person/s involved: Mayor of Pasay City
Contested Law/Ordinance:
Jovito O. Claudio (Claudio) was duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Sometime in May 1999, the chairs of several barangays in Pasay City gathered for the purpose of
convening the Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) and to file a petition for recall against Mayor
Claudio for loss of confidence.

On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA composed of barangay chairs, kagawads, and
sangguniang kabataan chairs of Pasay City, adopted Resolution No. 01, S-1999 recalling Claudio
as mayor for loss of confidence. The petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999 and copies of
the petition were in public areas throughout the City.

Claudio filed an opposition against the petition alleging, among others, that the petition for recall
was filed within one year from his assumption into office and therefore prohibited. He argued
that the PRA was convened within the 1 year prohibited period as provided by Section 74 of the
Local Government Code. The COMELEC, however, granted the petition for recall ruling that
recall is a process which starts with the filing of the petition for recall and since the petition was
filed exactly one year and a day after Claudio's assumption of office, the petition was filed on
time. Thereafter, COMELEC set the date of the recall elections on April 15, 2000. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: WoN the petition for recall was filed within the proper period provided for by Section
74 of the Local Government Code

HELD: Yes. SC Affirmed COMELEC

The limitations in Section 74 apply to the exercise of the power of recall (i.e. the recall election
itself) which is vested with the registered voters of the LGU. It does not apply to the preparatory
processes to such exercise of recall such as the proceedings of the PRA.

RATIO:

Recall as used in Section 74 refers to the election itself

We can agree that recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory, recall
assembly or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the registered voters of a local
government unit, and then proceeds to the filing of a recall resolution or petition with the
COMELEC, the verification of such resolution or petition, the fixing of the date of the recall
election, and the holding of the election on the scheduled date. However, as used in paragraph
(b) of 74, "recall" refers to the election itself by means of which voters decide whether
they should retain their local official or elect his replacement.

Section 69 of the Local Government Code provides that "the power of recall ...shall be exercised
by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official belongs."
Since the power vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate recall proceedings but the
power to elect an official into office, the limitations in 74 cannot be deemed to apply to the
entire recall proceedings. In other words, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers only to the
recall election, excluding the convening of the PRA and the filing of a petition for recall with the
COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at least 25 % of the voters for a petition for
recall.

Anything steps prior to recall election itself are merely preliminary steps for the purpose of
initiating a recall. The limitations in 74 apply only to the exercise of the power of recall which
is vested in the registered voters. It is this - and not merely, the preliminary steps required to be
taken to initiate a recall - which paragraph (b) of 74 seeks to limit by providing that no recall
shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of office of an elective local official.

The proceedings of the PRA do not constitute the exercise of recall

It is the power to recall and not the power to initiate recall that the Constitution gave to the
people. A recall resolution "merely sets the stage for the official concerned before the tribunal of
the people so he can justify why he should be allowed to continue in office. [But until] the
people render their sovereign judgment, the official concerned remains in office. Thus, the
preliminary proceedings of the PRA do not produce a decision by the electorate on whether the
local official concerned continues to enjoy the confidence of the people, then, the prohibition in
paragraph (b) against the holding of a recall, except one year after the official's assumption of
office, cannot apply to such proceedings.

Purpose of the one year prohibitory period against the exercise of recall

The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for judging the performance of
an elective local official. Hence, in this case, as long as the election is held outside the one-year
period, the preliminary proceedings to initiate a recall can be held even before the end of the first
year in office of a local official.

Including the convening of the PRA as part of recall restricts right of speech and assembly

Third, to construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including the convening of the PRA for
the purpose of discussing the performance in office of elective local officials would be to unduly
restrict the constitutional right of speech and of assembly of its members. The people cannot just
be asked on the day of the election to decide on the performance of their officials. The
crystallization and formation of an informed public opinion takes time. To hold, therefore, that
the first limitation in paragraph (b) includes the holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas
and opinions among citizens is to unduly curtail one of the most cherished rights in a free
society. Indeed, it is wrong to assume that such assemblies will always eventuate in a recall
election. To the contrary, they may result in the expression of confidence in the incumbent.

The phrase regular local election does not include the campaign period
Claudio contends that the date April 15, 2000 also falls within the second prohibition under
Section 74 of the Local Government Code arguing that the phrase "regular local elections" in
paragraph (b) does not only mean "the day of the regular local election" which, for the year 2001
is May 14, but the election period as well. Hence, he contends that beginning March 30, 2000,
no recall election may be held.

The contention is untenable. First there is nothing in the law that shows the campaign period is
included for purposes of computing the prohibitory period. Moreover, petitioner's interpretation
would severely limit the period during which a recall election may be held. Actually, because no
recall election may be held until one year after the assumption of office of an elective local
official, presumably on June 30 following his election, the free period is only the period from
July 1 of the following year to about the middle of May of the succeeding year. This is a period
of only nine months and 15 days, more or less. To construe the second limitation in paragraph
(b) as including the campaign period would reduce this period to eight months. Such an
interpretation must be rejected, because it would devitalize the right of recall which is designed
to make local government units" more responsive and accountable."