DIVISION 116

[ GR No. 95753, Feb 12, 1992 ]

PEOPLE v. RUBEN LIM Y ORTIZ +

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Special Criminal Court, Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 88 in Criminal Case No. Q-56248 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Ruben Lim y
Ortiz" finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay moral damages amounting to P50,000.00
and to pay the costs of the suit.
The accused, Ruben Lim y Ortiz, was charged with the crime of rape in an information as follows:
"That on or about the 5th day of December, 1986 in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and intimidation through the
use of a gun, had carnal knowledge with DELAILAH LIM Y GARCIA, without her consent and
against her will, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded to her under
the provision of the Civil Code." (Rollo, p. 6)
On the basis of said information, a warrant of arrest was issued on February 29, 1988. The
accused, however, remained at large until April 22, 1988 when he surrendered for arraignment.
He entered a plea of not guilty.
The prosecution's version, as narrated in complainant's Memorandum below and as adopted by
the lower court in its decision is as follows:
"On December 4, 1986 at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, accused Ruben Lim went to the
house of the complainant at Barrio Palanas, Barangay Vasra, North Karen Saguban, (sic) the
sister of the complainant to allow the latter to go and stay temporarily in his house so that the
accused may go to Lucena City as his brother-in-law, Efren Mansion, was shot to death and no
one would take care of the house as all the household members proceeded to Lucena City to
attend the wake of their dead relative. Karen allowed her sister Delailah to go and stay in the
house of the accused for the purpose of taking care of the house.
At about 8:00 o'clock p.m., Delailah left for the house of the accused. When the complainant
arrived there at, (sic) the accused told her he would be leaving for Lucena City the following day.
He told Delailah to sleep upstairs as he would sleep downstairs. When Delailah learned that the
accused would not be leaving for the night, she asked permission to go home but she was told
by the accused not to leave as he would be leaving early morning.
At around 9:00 p.m., December 4, 1986, Delailah went to sleep upstairs believing that the
accused would leave the following morning, but at about dawn of December 5, 1986, she felt
somebody touching her. When she woke she saw Ruben doing the acts. Ruben Lim immediately
covered her mouth with his left hand, and pulled her hair with his right hand, and tried to push
down Delailah but as the latter was trying to resist and fight him, the accused told her not shout
(sic) otherwise he would kill her and her family specially the father who is suffering from a heart
ailment. Accused drew his firearm from his right waist and poked it at the neck of the victim. The
firearm was a .38 revolver. There was light coming from the electric post at the time of the
incident. While the .38 caliber revolver was poked at her neck, the accused continued
threatening her. The complainant believed the threats since when the accused was still single, he
was charged with frustrated murder in the province, and in Manila, the accused has a string of
cases and capable of carrying out his threats (sic). When Delailah tried to resist, accused hit her
stomach and the accused removed (hinablot) the panty of Delailah. Accused pressed the thigh
of Delailah. Accused placed his finger on the private part of the complainant, trying to loosen it.
Accused succeeded in having a sexual intercourse with the complainant despite the strong
resistance and her plea not to do so, since they were cousins. Accused even said 'Anong pinsan-
pinsan, walang pinsan-pinsan sa akin, kaysa iba pa ang mauna, ako na lang ang uuna.' After the
sexual intercourse, accused again threatened Delailah not to report to anybody or else he would
kill her and that of her family (sic) and the complainant believed such threat.
Before Delailah left the house of the accused, the latter showed an armalite and continued to
threaten her. In the morning of December 5, 1986 complainant was allowed to leave but she did
not reveal to anybody what happened to her for fear of being killed. For several months after the
commission of rape, the accused frequently visited private complainant to repeat his threats.
(TSN, 14 July 1988, p. 22) During those visits, accused released (sic) that Delailah Lim was
pregnant with his baby. Accused begun insisting that Delailah Lim have an abortion. Private
complainant refused and put a stop (sic) to Ruben Lim's harassment, she informed his wife and
was told to obey the wishes of the accused for he is capable of carrying out his threats. (TSN, 14
July 1988, p. 24) Despite complainant's continued refusal, accused, with the aid of his sister,
Virginia Lim, succeeded in bringing Delailah to an abortionist - known to complainant as Aling
Maring. On June 21, 1987, Delailah Lim had the abortion. Even as this happened, complainant
could not bring herself to report the case as she remained afraid of the accused. She only
revealed that she was raped by the accused when she learned that the accused was detained
(but was subsequently released) for illegal possession of firearms which was on October 7, 1987.
On the following day, private complainant was accompanied by her sister to the police station to
file her complaint for rape against the accused who was there held in custody. Delailah executed
a written complaint (Exhibit A) and submitted herself to medical examination by Doctor Moraleda
of the Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory.
Preliminary investigation was conducted by the Assistant City Fiscal and accused submitted his
counter-affidavit and rejoinder affidavit. On November 23, 1987, complainant filed another case
against the accused this time on intentional abortion with one 'Aling Maring', the abortionist as
co-accused. On February 5, 1988, the information was file (sic) in the sala of Judge Velasco with
no bail recommended. Acting on this information, a warrant of arrest was issued with no bail
recommended. The warrant of arrest returned unserved as the accused remained at large.
During the period when the accused eluded arrest, accused threatened his uncle - Atty. Eldorado
Lim, who was suspected of aiding the complainant. Ruben Lim warned Atty. Lim that he would
spray the lawyer's house with armalite (sic) if he could not convince Delailah to withdraw the
cases filed against him. Atty. Lim yielded and called Delailah and her sister, Karen, to execute an
affidavit of desistance. With great reservation Delailah executed on March 1, 1988, an affidavit of
desistance on the rape case and on March 8, 1988, a separate affidavit of desistance for the
case of intentional abortion. As result of the affidavit filed, the case of intentional abortion was
dismissed, and upon arraignment of the accused for the rape charge, bail was granted. On the
same date of arraignment, a motion for reconsideration of order granting bail was filed by
Delailah. This petition, however, was held in abeyance until the prosecution has presented
evidence. On April 28, 1988, complainant executed a 'Sinumpaang Salaysay' (Exh. F) explaining
that the affidavit of desistance was involuntary and executed under duress and meant to hasten
the capture of the accused who would have believed that the case against him would be
dropped. (Memorandum submitted by complainant. pp. 1-5)" (Rollo, pp. 28-31)
The defense, on the other hand, claims that at the time of the alleged rape on December 5, 1986,
the accused was in Lucena City attending the wake of his brother-in-law, Efren Mansion. He
claims, further, that he stayed in Lucena City from November 29, the start of the week-long vigil
for his brother-in-law, until interment on December 6. The only time he left Lucena City was in the
morning of December 5, 1986 to attend a preliminary investigation before Fiscal Silverio in
Quezon City set at 2:00 o'clock that afternoon for a theft case he filed against A. Paran and W.
Paran. He was, allegedly, even with his wife and children when he left for Quezon City since his
wife had to buy a few things to be used at the wake. His wife returned to Lucena City that same
afternoon while he left Quezon City early in the morning of December 6, 1986 with Jose Bacay,
his second degree cousin and Atty. Eldorado Lim, his uncle.
The lower court gave full faith and credit to the prosecution's version and rendered the herein
questioned decision. Hence, the present appeal with the accused-appellant raising the following
assignment of errors:
"I. THAT THE TRIAL COURT OVERLOOKED FACTS OF SUBSTANCE AND VALUE WHICH, IF
CONSIDERED, MAY AFFECT THE RESULT OF THE CASE THAT INSTEAD OF CONVICTION
THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN AN ACQUITTAL OF THE ALLEGED CRIME OF RAPE.
II. THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
DEFENSE OF ALIBI, WHERE IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED THAT IT WAS PHYSICALLY
IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE ACCUSED TO BE AT THE SCENE OF THE ALLEGED CRIME AT THE
TIME OF ITS COMMISSION.
III. THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE
ACCUSED, RUBEN LIM Y ORTIZ, IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT." (Brief for the accused-appellant, p. 87)
In People v. Yambao, (193 SCRA 571 (1991), this Court had occasion to state once more the
three settled principles to guide an appellate court in reviewing the evidence in rape cases, to wit:
(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the
person accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of
rape where two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its
own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.
After a very careful examination of the records with the foregoing principles in mind, this Court
has arrived at no other conclusion but that the present appeal must fail.
It must be noted that the issues raised in this appeal are factual and the appellant has not
presented any compelling reason that would warrant the reversal of the findings of facts of the
lower court. It is a settled principle that factual findings of trial courts are accorded utmost
respect, in the absence of arbitrariness, since they had the opportunity to observe the demeanor
and deportment of witnesses. (People v. Raptus, G. R. Nos. 92169-70, June 19, 1991; People v.
Tongson, 194 SCRA 257 [1991]; People v. Calixtro, 193 SCRA 303 [1991]; People v. Rafanan,
182 SCRA 811 [1990])
The appellant's primary defense is alibi with his wife and sister corroborating his testimony. It has
long been recognized that alibi is an inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the accused. (People v. Godines, 196 SCRA 765 [1991]; People v.
Dinola, 183 SCRA 493 [1990]; People v. Robante, 178 SCRA 852 [1989]) Also, an alibi
corroborated by the wife or other relatives of the accused is extremely weak. (People v. Rio, G.
R. No. 90294, September 24, 1991; People v. Serenio, 179 SCRA 379 [1989]; People v.
Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989]) Moreover, whether or not the proffered alibi is to be believed
depends on the credibility of the appellant's version vis-a-vis that of the prosecution. The lower
court found the prosecution's version credible. This Court finds nothing in the records that would
lead to a different conclusion.
The appellant impugns the credibility of the prosecution's theory by pointing out that ten months
and three days had lapsed since the alleged rape before charges were filed against him. He
asserts that if ever the alleged incident occurred, the delay in filing the casewould lead to the
conclusion that there was tacit consent to the act. The prosecution, however, successfully
explained the delay. The victim, Delailah Lim, testified that the appellant threatened to kill her
and her family if she goes to the police. It was established that after the alleged rape, the
appellant made periodic visits to the victim's house, averaging twice a week, to repeat the
threats. (p. 7, TSN, May 9, 1989) The entire records of the case show that the appellant is a
violence prone ex-soldier and it is understandable why the victim should be afraid of him. The
affidavit of desistance itself is a product of fear.
The delay in filing the case is justified where such is due to death threats against the victim
and/or her family. (People v. Aquino, 186 SCRA 208 [1990]; People v. Nunag, 173 SCRA 274
[1989])
There appears to be no question that the threats were sufficiently effective to deter the victim
from reporting such an outrage perpetrated upon her person.
Delailah Lim's testimony established that she has a well-founded belief that the appellant is
capable of carrying out his threats. She knows that the appellant owns a .38 caliber gun and an
armalite - the former he used at the time he raped her, and the latter, he showed her before he
left the appellant's house the following morning. (p. 20, TSN, July 14, 1988) Delailah Lim also
testified that she knows of a frustrated murder case filed a few years back against the appellant
in the province. (p. 14, TSN, ibid)
The appellant tries to play down the alleged fears of Delailah by establishing during the cross-
examination of the latter that she was aware that the appellant did not face trial for the imputed
crime nor was he ever convicted for the same. (TSN, August 22, 1988, pp. 8-9)
It is the considered opinion of this Court that the fact of whether the appellant was actually
charged with frustrated murder or whether he was convicted for the same is not material in
resolving the particular question at hand. What is important is that Delailah Lim truly believed that
the appellant was capable of carrying out his threats although the factual bases for such belief
may turn out to be different from what she conceived them to be.
The appellant next contends that Delailah filed the present case due to the instigations of her
family since he confronted them regarding his share in the profits from the properties of their
deceased grandmother. However, in the counter-affidavit which the appellant submitted during
preliminary investigation, he stated a totally different motive of Delailah Lim and we quote:
"That the only reason I can think of why Delailah G. Lim had instituted this baseless and
preposterous complaint is that she is being manipulated by her sister's deceased boyfriend, who
is the brother of my sister's deceased husband, to force the latter to share the proceeds of the
death benefits which my sister received from the government after my brother-in-law died. x x
x" (Exhibit O)
In imputing ulterior motives to the complainant, the appellant hopes to convince this Court that
the charges against him are fabricated. But the manner by which the appellant presented his
contention convinces this Court that it is the imputed motives which have been fabricated. The
lower court also correctly pointed out that "....Even conceding that the grandmother's estate has
been contested by her heirs, William Lim, father of Delailah Lim, Atty. Eldorado Lim and Antonio
Lim (deceased), father of the accused, it is unlikely that the partition has not yet been settled
considering that Paula Tumlawen died in 1968 or almost two decades before this suit was
instituted. (TSN June 26, 1989, p. 3)" (Rollo, p. 32)
The appellant further impugns the credibility of the prosecution's theory by alleging that Delailah's
behavior after the alleged rape did not exhibit the fear and exhaustion which such a startling and
frightful experience should have instilled in her. She still accompanied her sister to Lucena City at
about 1:00 o'clock of December 5 considering that she knew that the accused would also be
there. According to the testimonies of Ruth Lim, the appellant's wife and Rosalinda Mansion, the
appellant's sister, Delailah even played card games and would even jump with joy whenever she
wins. (TSN, May 9, 1989, p. 5 and TSN, May 13, 1989, p. 5, respectively)
In People v. Raptus, supra, citing People v. Ronquillo (184 SCRA 236 [1990]), it has been held
that "...different people react differently to a given situation or type of situation, and there is no
standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or startling
frightful experience."
Delailah Lim, moreover, has already explained her actions immediately after the rape during her
cross-examination. She decided to accompany her sister to Lucena City since her brother-in-law
requested her so. Also, she could not think of any excuse to refuse the request without her sister
and brother-in-law becoming suspicious of her behavior. (p. 39, TSN, July 27, 1988)
At any rate, the testimonies of the appellant's wife and sister regarding Delailah's
behavior in Lucena City are quite dubious for their narrations coincide in every respect and detail.
(People v. Talla, 181 SCRA 133 [1990]; People v. Madriago IV, 171 SCRA 103 [1989]; People v.
Rosario, 159 SCRA 192 [1988])
The appellant next contends that the Affidavit of Desistance (Exhibit 1) executed by Delailah Lim
stating that the rape case arose out of a mere misunderstanding should be considered
in his favor. It must be noted that the Affidavit was executed on March 1, 1988 at a time when the
accused was still at large. On April 22, 1988, the appellant surrendered for arraignment and
immediately thereafter, that is, on the 28th of the same month, the complainant executed a
'Sinumpaang Salaysay' explaining that the Affidavit of Desistance was involuntary and executed
under duress. It was also meant to hasten the capture of the accused who would have believed
that the case against him would be dropped. The foregoing series of events lends credence to
Delailah's claims as to why she executed the Affidavit. The trial court correctly observed the
following:
"x x x Its (referring to the Affidavit of Desistance) performance coincided with the time Ruben
remained at large after the warrant of arrest was issued with no bail grant. This Court takes note
that the tender of voluntary surrender by the accused was on April 22, 1988 for several days after
the affidavits of desistance on rape and intentional abortion were executed. From the facts
adduced, inference may be drawn that Ruben Lim had occasion to force the filing of the affidavits
as alleged by Delailah Lim and came out of hiding when the case against him would not prosper
due to the retraction.
"The duress angle of the affidavits of desistance is supported by the motions to withdraw filed on
March 4, 1988 by Atty. Eldorado Lim, counsel of the accused in the following cases: People v.
Ruben Lim (carnapping case) presented as evidence by the prosecution marked Exhibits I, J and
K. To quote:
'That last Saturday and Sunday, the accused threatened the undersigned counsel with death due
to suspicion that said undersigned counsel extended his help to his niece Delailah Lim in a rape
case by that letter (sic) against Ruben Lim which is assigned to this Honorable Court.'" (Rollo, p.
37)
The appellant belatedly impugns the credibility of Atty. Lim whom he alleges to have conspired
with Delailah for their grandmother's inheritance. It is quite improbable that the appellant would
have retained the services of Atty. Lim in the other cases filed by and against him, a relationship
which requires utmost confidence, if they maintained adverse interests.
In any case, to warrant the dismissal of the complaint, the victim's retraction or pardon should be
made prior to the institution of the criminal action (People v. Soliao, 194 SCRA 250 [1991]). The
present case was filed on February 24, 1988 while the Affidavit was executed only on March 1,
1988.
All the foregoing discussions clearly show the strength of the prosecution's case. This Court finds
it unnecessary, then, to delve lengthily into the other trivial points raised by the appellant in his
brief (such as Delailah Lim being at the age of highest sexual desire; the development of
intimacy between the complainant and appellant due to Delailah's frequent visits to the
appellant's house; Delailah having purposely worn a dress which is straight out and open from
the neckline down on the date of the alleged rape) to show that the act was consensual
inasmuch as the same are mere conjectures, not having been established during the trial.
As to the matter of the complainant submitting voluntarily to an abortion, such fact is impertinent
to the case at hand. Even assuming, arguendo, that complainant submitted to an abortion, such
does not detract from the fact that the appellant perpetrated the offense charged herein.
WHEREFORE, ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, the APPEAL is hereby
DISMISSED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ROMUALDEZ v. MARCELO
BENJAMIN ("KOKOY") T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO, in his official capacity as the Ombudsman, and
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, respondents
G.R. Nos. 165510-33
July 28, 2006

FACTS:

Romualdez is being charged with violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 for failure to file his
Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the period 1967-1985 during his tenure as
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and for the period 1963-1966 during his
tenure as Technical Assistant in the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Romualdez claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in
recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic
Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;
Romualdez asserts that the Ombudsman (Marcello) cannot revive the aforementioned cases
which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10,
2004.
He also claims that the case should be dismissed on the ground of prescription.
The Ombudsman, however, contends that:
the dismissal of the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 does not mean
that petitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal prosecution;
that new informations may be filed by the Ombudsman should it find probable cause
in the conduct of its preliminary investigation;
that the filing of the complaint with the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the information with the
Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the prescriptive period;
that the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also
interrupted the aforesaid period based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
The PCGG avers that the Omdudsman need not wait for a new complaint with a new docket
number for it to conduct a preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses of the petitioner;
And since both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 (the Act To Establish Periods of Prescription
For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When
Prescription Shall Begin To Run) are silent as to whether prescription should begin to run
when the offender is absent from the Philippines, the RPC should be applied.
(RPC provides that prescription is interrupted when accused is outside of the Philippines)

ISSUE:
W/N the prior quashal of an information bars subsequent prosecution
W/N the offenses charged have already prescribed
HELD:
FOR THE FIRST ISSUE
The court held that the prior quashal of an information does not bar subsequent prosecution.
Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that an order sustaining a motion to
quash on grounds other than extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy does not
preclude the filing of another information for a crime constituting the same facts.
In this case, the original information was dismissed due to the lack of authority of the
officer who filed it, hence, a subsequent prosecution of the same offense is allowed
by law.
The court also pointed out that informations were filed by an unauthorized party. The defect
cannot be cured even by conducting another preliminary investigation. An invalid information
is no information at all and cannot be the basis for criminal proceedings.
Also, the court said that the petitioners right to be informed of the charges against him was
not violated when the preliminary investigation conducted used the same docket number,
which was already previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan.
The assignment of a docket number is an internal matter designed for efficient record
keeping. It is usually written in the Docket Record in sequential order corresponding to the
date and time of filing a case.
The use of the docket numbers of the dismissed cases was merely for reference. In fact,
after the new informations were filed, new docket numbers were assigned, i.e., Criminal
Cases Nos. 28031-28049.
FOR THE SECOND ISSUE
The court held that the offenses charged have already prescribed.
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be
considered:
(1) the period of prescription for the offense charged;
(2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and
(3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.
Section 11 of RA 3019 (amended by BP 195) provides a prescriptive period of 15 years but
before it was amended by BP 195 on March 16,1982, the prescriptive period was 10 years.
The amendment cannot be given retroactive effect because it is not favourable to the
accused.
Hence, offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner from 1962 up to March 15, 1982, the
same shall prescribe in 10 years. On the other hand, for offenses allegedly committed by the
petitioner during the period from March 16, 1982 until 1985, the same shall prescribe in 15
years.
As to when the period begins to run and when it is interrupted, reference is made to Section
2 of Act No. 3326:
 Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting jeopardy.

The court ruled that the prescriptive period began to run from the discovery thereof on May
8, 1987, which is the date of the complaint filed by the former Solicitor General Francisco I.
Chavez against the petitioner with the PCGG.
The court however disagrees to the respondents contention that the prescriptive period was
interrupted when petitioner was outside the Philippines because Article 91 of the RPC
should be applied suppletorily.
(Art 91 prescription is interrupted when accused in outside the Philippines)
Section 2 of Act. No. 3326 is conspicuously silent as to whether the absence of the offender
from the Philippines bars the running of the prescriptive period. The silence of the law can
only be interpreted to mean that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not intend such an
interruption of the prescription unlike the explicit mandate of Article 91.
Hence, petitioners absence from the Philippines did not interrupt the prescriptive period.

The only matter left is whether the filing of the complaint with the PCGG in 1987 as well as
the filing of the informations with the Sandiganbayan to initiate Criminal Case Nos. 13406-
13429 in 1989 interrupted the running of the prescriptive period.
The court held that an invalid information is no information at all and cannot be the basis for
criminal proceedings. Hence, no proceedings exist that could have merited the suspension
of the prescriptive periods.
In addition, the complaint was filed with the wrong body, the PCGG. Thus, the same could
not have interrupted the running of the prescriptive periods.

JUSTICE CARPIO DISSENT:

Justice Carpio argues Article 91 should apply to RA 3019.
He claims that there is nothing in RA 3019 that prohibits the supplementary application of
Article 91 of the RPC. He claims that the prescriptive period should have been interrupted
when petitioner was outside the Philippines. He said An accused cannot acquire legal
immunity by being a fugitive from the States jurisdiction.

The courts answer is that suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code to special laws,
by virtue of Article 10 thereof, finds relevance only when the provisions of the special law are
silent on a particular matter.
The court said that RA 3019 is a special law and its prescription is governed by Act 3326.
The Revised Penal Code explicitly states that the absence of the accused from the
Philippines shall be a ground for the tolling of the prescriptive period while Act No. 3326
does not. In such a situation, Act No. 3326 must prevail over Article 91 because it
specifically and directly applies to special laws while the Revised Penal Code shall apply to
special laws only suppletorily and only when the latter do not provide the contrary. Indeed,
elementary rules of statutory construction dictate that special legal provisions must prevail
over general ones.

Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not provide that the absence of the accused from the
Philippines prevents the running of the prescriptive period. Thus, the only inference that can
be gathered from the foregoing is that the legislature, in enacting Act No. 3326, did not
consider the absence of the accused from the Philippines as a hindrance to the running of
the prescriptive period.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius - express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others CARPIO, J.:

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 167333, January 11, 2016

PEDRO LADINES, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND EDWIN DE

RAMON, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

To impose the highest within a period of the imposable penalty without specifying the justification for
doing so is an error on the part of the trial court that should be corrected on appeal. In default of such
justification, the penalty to be imposed is the lowest of the period.

The Case

The petitioner appeals the decision promulgated on October 22, 2004,1 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed his conviction for homicide by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 53, in Sorsogon City
under the judgment rendered on February 10, 2003.2

Antecedents

On August 12, 1993, an information was filed in the RTC charging the petitioner and one Herman Licup
with homicide, allegedly committed as follows: chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

That on or about the 12th day of June 1993, in the Municipality of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
kill, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another, armed with bladed weapons did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and stab one Erwin de Ramon, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which resulted to his instantaneous death, to the damage
and prejudice of his legal heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3
cralawlawl ibra ry
ChanRoblesVi rt ualawlib ra ry

The factual background of the charge follows.

While Prosecution witnesses Philip de Ramon and Mario Lasala, along with victim Erwin de Ramon
(Erwin), were watching the dance held during the June 12, 1993 Grand Alumni Homecoming of the
Bulabog Elementary School in Sorsogon, Sorsogon, the petitioner and Licup appeared and passed by
them. The petitioner suddenly and without warning approached and stabbed Erwin below the navel with
a machete. The petitioner then left after delivering the blow. At that juncture, Licup also mounted his
attack against Erwin but the latter evaded the blow by stepping back. Erwin pulled out the machete from
his body and wielded it against Licup, whom he hit in the chest. Licup pursued but could not catch up
with Erwin because they both eventually fell down. Erwin was rushed to the hospital where he
succumbed.4

Dr. Myrna Listanco, who performed the post-mortem examination on the cadaver of Erwin, attested that
the victim had sustained two stab wounds on the body, one in the chest and the other in the abdomen.
She opined that one or two assailants had probably inflicted the injuries with the use of two distinct
weapons; and that the chest wound could have been caused by a sharp instrument, like a sharpened
screwdriver, while the abdominal injury could have been from a sharp bladed instrument like a knife.5

In his defense, the petitioner tendered alibi and denial. He recounted that at the time in question, he
was in the Bulabog Elementary School compound along with his wife and their minor child; that they did
not enter the dance hall because there was trouble that had caused the people to scamper; that they
had then gone home; that he had learned about the stabbing incident involving Erwin on their way home
from Barangay Tanod Virgilio de Ramon who informed him that Licup and Erwin had stabbed each other;
and that Prosecution witnesses Philip and Lasala harbored ill-will towards him by reason of his having
lodged a complaint in the barangay against them for stealing coconuts from his property.

The petitioner presented Angeles Jasareno and Arnulfo Palencia to corroborate his denial. Jasareno and
Palencia testified that at the time in question they were in the Bulabog Elementary School, together with
the petitioner, the latter's wife and their minor daughter; that while they were watching the dance, a
quarrel had transpired but they did not know who had been involved; that they had remained in the
dance hall with the petitioner and his family during the quarrel; and that it was impossible for the
petitioner to be have stabbed Erwin. Palencia added that after the dance he and the petitioner and the
latter's wife and child had gone home together.6

Judgment of the RTC

On February 10, 2003, the RTC pronounced the petitioner guilty as charged, decreeing: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Pedro Ladines guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, sans
any mitigating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused Pedro Ladines is
hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of from Ten (10) years and One (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the sum of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity without subsidiary imprisonment [in] case of insolvency and [to] pay the
costs.

Meanwhile, accused Herman Licup is acquitted of the offense charge[d] for insufficiency of evidence. The
bond posted for his liberty is cancelled and discharged.

SO ORDERED.7
cralawlawl ibra ry
ChanRoblesVi rtualaw lib rary

Decision of the CA

The petitioner appealed, contending that: chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF HOMIdDE
DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF A REASONABLE DOUBT IN LIGHT OF THE DECLARATION OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESS THAT ACCUSED HERMAN LICUP WHO WAS ALSO INJURED DURING THE
INCIDENT HAD ATTACKED THE VICTIM ERWIN DE RAMON.8
cralawlawl ibra ry
ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry

As stated, the CA affirmed the conviction, decreeing: chanRoble svi rtual Lawli bra ry
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
appealed Decision dated 10 December 2003 of the Regional Trial Court Branch 53, Sorsogon City,
Sorsogon in Criminal Case No. 93-3400 finding appellant guilty of Homicide is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against appellant.

SO ORDERED.9
cralawlawl ibra ry
ChanRoblesVi rtualaw lib rary

Issues

Hence, this appeal, with the petitioner insisting that the CA committed reversible error in affirming his
conviction despite the admission of Licup immediately after the incident that he had stabbed the victim;
and that the res gestae statement of Licup constituted newly-discovered evidence that created a
reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt.10

The State countered11 that the insistence by Ladines raised factual questions that were improper for
consideration in an appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45; that the CA did not err in
affirming the conviction; and that the evidence to be adduced by the petitioner was not in the nature of
newly-discovered evidence.

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is without merit.

First of all, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that the petition for review
on certiorari shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. A question, to be one of
law, must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or
any of them. There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what
the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to
the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.12 In appeal by certiorari, therefore, only questions of law may be
raised, because the Court, by virtue of its not being a trier of facts, does not normally undertake the re-
examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial.

The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings thereon are received with
respect and are binding on the Court subject to certain exceptions, including: (a) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (f) when in making
its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of
both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when
the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondent; (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.13

There is no question that none of the foregoing exceptions applies in order to warrant the review of the
unanimous factual findings of the RTC and the CA. Hence, the Court upholds the CA's affirmance of the
conviction of the petitioner.

Secondly, the res gestae statement of Licup did not constitute newly-discovered evidence that created a
reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt. We point out that the concept of newly-discovered evidence
is applicable only when a litigant seeks a new trial or the re-opening of the case in the trial court.
Seldom is the concept appropriate on appeal, particularly one before the Court. The absence of a specific
rule on the introduction of newly-discovered evidence at this late stage of the proceedings is not without
reason. The Court would be compelled, despite its not being a trier of facts, to receive and consider the
evidence for purposes of its appellate adjudication.

Of necessity, the Court would remand the case to the lower courts for that purpose. But the propriety of
remanding for the purpose of enabling the lower court to receive the newly-discovered evidence would
inflict some degree of inefficiency on the administration of justice, because doing so would effectively
undo or reopen the decision that is already on appeal.14 That is a result that is not desirable. Hence, the
Court has issued guidelines designed to balance the need of persons charged with crimes to afford to
them the fullest opportunity to establish their defenses, on the one hand, and the public interest in
ensuring a smooth, efficient and fair administration of criminal justice, on the other. The first guideline is
to restrict the concept of newly-discovered evidence to only such evidence that can satisfy the following
requisites, namely: (1) the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) such evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) the evidence is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight
that it would probably change the judgment if admitted.15

We agree with the State that the proposed evidence of the petitioner was not newly-discovered because
the first two requisites were not present. The petitioner, by his exercise of reasonable diligence, could
have sooner discovered and easily produced the proposed evidence during the trial by obtaining a
certified copy of the police blotter that contained the alleged res gestae declaration of Licup and the
relevant documents and testimonies of other key witnesses to substantiate his denial of criminal
responsibility.

Thirdly, homicide is punished with reclusion temporal.16 Taking the absence of any modifying
circumstances into consideration, the RTC fixed the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and one day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and four months of the medium period of reclusion
temporal,as maximum. The CA affirmed the penalty fixed by the RTC.

We declare that the lower courts could not impose 17 years and four months of the medium period
of reclusion temporal, which was the ceiling of the medium period of reclusion temporal, as the
maximum of the indeterminate penalty without specifying the justification for so imposing. They thereby
ignored that although Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, which has set the rules "for the application
of penalties which contain three periods," requires under its first rule that the courts should impose the
penalty prescribed by law in the medium period should there be neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances, its seventh rule expressly demands that "[w]ithin the limits of each period, the courts
shall determine the extent of the penalty according to the number and nature of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and. the greater or lesser extent of the evil produced by the crime." By not
specifying the justification for imposing the ceiling of the period of the imposable penalty, the fixing of
the indeterminate sentence became arbitrary, or whimsical, or capricious. In the absence of the
specification, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence for the petitioner should be the lowest of the
medium period of reclusion temporal, which is 14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion
temporal.

Lastly, the lower courts limited the civil liability to civil indemnity of P50,000.00. The limitation was a
plain error that we must correct. Moral damages and civil indemnity are always granted in homicide, it
being assumed by the law that the loss of human life absolutely brings moral and spiritual losses as well
as a definite loss. Moral damages and civil indemnity require neither pleading nor evidence simply
because death through crime always occasions moral sufferings on the part of the victim's heirs.17 As
the Court said in People v. Panad:18 chanroble svi rtual lawlib rary

x x x a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of
the victim's family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one
becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from
the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, but
often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them. cralawlawli bra ry

The civil indemnity and moral damages are fixed at P75,000.00 each because homicide was a gross
crime.

Considering that the decisions of the lower courts contained no treatment of the actual damages, the
Court is in no position to dwell on this. The lack of such treatment notwithstanding, the Court holds that
temperate damages of P25,000.00 should be allowed to the heirs of the victim. Article 2224 of the Civil
Code authorizes temperate damages to be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but
its amount cannot be proved with certainty. There is no longer any doubt that when actual damages for
burial and related expenses are not substantiated with receipts, temperate damages of at least
P25,000.00 are warranted, for it is certainly unfair to deny to the surviving heirs of the victim the
compensation for such expenses as actual damages.19 This pronouncement proceeds from the sound
reasoning that it would be anomalous that the heirs of the victim who tried and succeeded in proving
actual damages of less than P25,000.00 would only be put in a worse situation than others who might
have presented no receipts at all but would still be entitled to P25,000.00 as temperate damages.20 In
addition, in line with recent jurisprudence,21 all the items of civil liability shall earn interest of 6% per
annum, computed from the date of the finality of this judgment until the items are fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on October 22, 2004 subject to
the MODIFICATION that: (a) the INDETERMINATE SENTENCE of petitioner PEDRO LADINES is 10
years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, eight months and one day of the medium
period of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and (b) the petitioner shall pay to the heirs of the victim
Erwin de Ramon: (1) civil indemnity and moral damages of P75,000.00 each; (2) temperate damages of
P25,000.00; (c) interest of 6% per annum on all items of the civil liability computed from the date of the
finality of this judgment until they are fully paid; and (d) the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry