FIRST DIVISION I will kill you.
I will kill you." [5] Juanito, obviously terrified, immediately obeyed and
[G.R. No. 118075. September 5, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EMILIANO
CATANTAN y TAYONG, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
EMILIANO CATANTAN and JOSE MACVEN URSAL alias
"Bimbo" were charged with violation of PD No. 532 otherwise known as
theAnti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law of 1974 for having on 27 June
1993, while armed with a firearm and a bladed weapon, acting in
conspiracy with one another, by means of violence and intimidation,
wilfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and inflicted physical injuries
on Eugene Pilapil and Juan Pilapil Jr. who were then fishing in the
seawaters of Tabogon, Cebu, and seized their fishing boat, to their
damage and prejudice. [1]
The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, after trial, found both accused
Emiliano Catantan y Tayong and Jose Macven Ursal alias "Bimbo"
guilty of the crime charged and sentenced them to reclusion
perpetua. [2] Of the duo only Emiliano Catantan appealed.
In his appeal, accused Catantan contends that the trial court
erred in convicting him of piracy as the facts proved only constitute
grave coercion defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code and not
piracy under PD No. 532.
The evidence for the prosecution is that at 3:00 o'clock in the
morning of 27 June 1993, the Pilapil brothers Eugene, 21, and Juan Jr.,
18, were fishing in the sea some 3 kilometers away from the shores of
Tabogon, Cebu. Suddenly, another boat caught up with them. One of
them, later identified as the accused Emiliano Catantan, boarded the
pumpboat of the Pilapils and leveled his gun at Eugene. With his gun,
Catantan struck Eugene on the left cheekbone and ordered him and
Juan Jr. to "dapa." [3] Then Catantan told Ursal to follow him to the
pumpboat of the Pilapils. There they hogtied Eugene, forced him to lie
down at the bottom of the boat, covered him with a tarpaulin up to his
neck, stepped on him and ordered Juan Jr. to ferry them to Daan
Tabogon. They left behind the other pumpboat which the accused had
earlier used together with its passengers one of whom was visibly tied.
Noting that they were already far out into the sea, Eugene
reminded Catantan that they were now off-course but Catantan told
Eugene to keep quiet or he would be killed. Later, the engine conked
out and Juan Jr. was directed to row the boat. Eugene asked to be set
free so he could help but was not allowed; he was threatened with bodily
harm instead.
Meanwhile Juan Jr. managed to fix the engine, but as they went
farther out into the open sea the engine stalled again. This time Eugene
was allowed to assist his brother. Eugene's hands were set free but his
legs were tied to the outrigger. At the point of a tres cantos [4] held by
Ursal, Eugene helped row the boat.
As they passed the shoreline of Nipa, they saw another
boat. Catantan asked whose boat that was and the Pilapils told him that
it was operated by a certain Juanito and that its engine was new. Upon
learning this, Catantan ordered the Pilapil brothers to approach the boat
cautioning them however not to move or say anything.
On the pretext that they were buying fish Catantan boarded the
"new" pumpboat. Once aboard he ordered the operator Juanito to take
them to Mungaz, another town of Cebu. When Juanito tried to beg-off
by saying that he would still pull up his net and harvest his catch,
Catantan drew his revolver and said, "You choose between the two, or
Q: When you said the passengers of that pumpboat boarded your
Ursal hopped in from the other pumpboat and joined Catantan.
But, as Ursal was transferring to the "new" pumpboat, its
outrigger caught the front part of the pumpboat of the Pilapils so he
kicked hard its prow; it broke. The jolt threw Eugene into the sea and he
landed on the water headlong. Juan Jr. then untied his brother's legs
and the two swam together clinging to their boat. Fortunately another
pumpboat passed by and towed them safely ashore.
Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as "any attack
upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part
thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of the
complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means
of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things,
committed by any person, including a passenger or member of the
complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters, shall be considered as
piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as
hereinafter provided." And a vessel is construed in Sec. 2, par. (b), of
the same decree as "any vessel or watercraft used for transport of
passengers and cargo from one place to another through Philippine
waters. It shall include all kinds and types of vessels or boats used in
fishing (underscoring supplied).
On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art. 286 of the
Revised Penal Code is committed by "any person who, without authority
of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent another from doing
something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do something against
his will, whether it be right or wrong."
Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be
committed it is essential that there be an attack on or seizure of a
vessel. He claims that he and his companion did not attack or seize the
fishing boat of the Pilapil brothers by using force or intimidation but
merely boarded the boat, and it was only when they were already on
board that they used force to compel the Pilapils to take them to some
other place. Appellant also insists that he and Ursal had no intention of
permanently taking possession or depriving complainants of their
boat. As a matter of fact, when they saw another pumpboat they
ordered the brothers right away to approach that boat so they could
leave the Pilapils behind in their boat. Accordingly, appellant claims, he
simply committed grave coercion and not piracy.
We do not agree. Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532
as well as grave coercion as penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal
Code, this case falls squarely within the purview of piracy. While it may
be true that Eugene and Juan Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere other
than their place of destination, such compulsion was obviously part of
the act of seizing their boat. The testimony of Eugene, one of the
victims, shows that the appellant actually seized the vessel through
force and intimidation. The direct testimony of Eugene is significant and
enlightening -
Q: Now, while you and your younger brother were fishing at the
seawaters of Tabogon at that time, was there anything unusual that
happened?
A: Yes.
Q: Will you please tell the Court what that was?
A: While we were fishing at Tabogon another pumpboat arrived and
the passengers of that pumpboat boarded our pumpboat.
Q: Now, that pumpboat which you said approached you, how many
were riding in that pumpboat?
A: Four.
heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all
pumpboat, how did they do that? obstacles to the economic, social, educational and community
A: They approached somewhat suddenly and came aboard progress of the people.
the pumpboat (underscoring supplied). The Pilapil brothers are mere fisherfolk whose only means of
Q: How many suddenly came aboard your pumpboat? livelihood is fishing in sea waters. They brave the natural elements and
A: Only one. contend with the unknown forces of the sea to bring home a bountiful
Q: What did that person do when he came aboard your pumpboat? harvest. It is on these small fishermen that the townspeople depend for
A: When he boarded our pumpboat he aimed his revolver at the daily bread. To impede their livelihood would be to deprive them of
us (underscoring supplied). their very subsistence, and the likes of the accused within the purview
Q: By the way, when he aimed his revolver to you, did he say anything of PD No. 532 are the obstacle to the "economic, social, educational
to you? and community progress of the people." Had it not been for the chance
xxxx passing of another pumpboat, the fate of the Pilapil brothers, left alone
A: He said, "dapa," which means lie down (underscoring supplied). helpless in a floundering, meandering outrigger with a broken prow and
COURT: a conked-out engine in open sea, could not be ascertained.
Q: To whom did he aim that revolver? While appellant insists that he and Ursal had no intention of
A: He aimed the revolver on me. depriving the Pilapils permanently of their boat, proof of which they left
TRIAL PROS. ECHAVEZ: behind the brothers with their boat, the truth is, Catantan and Ursal
Q: What else did he do? abandoned the Pilapils only because their pumpboat broke down and it
A: Then he ordered his companion to come aboard the pumpboat. was necessary to transfer to another pumpboat that would take them
Q: What did he do with his revolver? back to their lair. Unfortunately for the pirates their "new" pumpboat ran
A: He struck my face with the revolver, hitting the lower portion of my out of gas so they were apprehended by the police soon after the
left eye. Pilapils reported the matter to the local authorities.
Q: Now, after you were struck with the revolver, what did these The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to seize the boat
persons do? was not produced in evidence cannot exculpate him from the crime.The
A: We were ordered to take them to a certain place. fact remains, and we state it again, that Catantan and his co-accused
Q: To what place did he order you to go? Ursal seized through force and intimidation the pumpboat of the Pilapils
A: To Daan Tabogon. [6] while the latter were fishing in Philippine waters.
To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision
of grave coercion would be to ignore the fact that a fishing vessel appealed from, the conviction of accused-appellant EMILIANO
cruising in Philippine waters was seized by the accused by means of CATANTAN y TAYONG for the crime of piracy penalized under PD No.
violence against or intimidation of persons. As Eugene Pilapil testified, 532 and sentencing him accordingly to reclusion perpetua, is
the accused suddenly approached them and boarded their pumpboat AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-appellant.
and Catantan aimed his revolver at them as he ordered complaining SO ORDERED.
witness Eugene Pilapil to "dapa" or lie down with face downwards, and Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
then struck his face with a revolver, hitting the lower portion of his left
eye, after which, Catantan told his victims at gun point to take them to
Daan Tabogon.
The incident happened at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. The
sudden appearance of another pumpboat with four passengers, all
strangers to them, easily intimidated the Pilapil brothers that they were
impelled to submit in complete surrender to the marauders. The
moment Catantan jumped into the other pumpboat he had full control of
his victims. The sight of a drawn revolver in his hand drove them to
submission. Hence the issuance of PD No. 532 designed to avert
situations like the case at bar and discourage and prevent piracy in
Philippine waters. Thus we cite the succeeding "whereas" clauses of
the decree -
Whereas, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless
elements are still committing acts of depredations upon the persons
and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel
from one place to another, thereby disturbing the peace, order and
tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social progress
of the people;
Whereas, such acts of depredations constitute either piracy or
highway robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of
lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries; and,
Whereas, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged
from perpetrating such acts of depredations by imposing
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 153524-25. January 31, 2005]
RODOLFO SORIA and EDIMAR BISTA, petitioners, vs. HON.
ANIANO DESIERTO in his capacity as Head of the
Office of the Ombudsman, HON. ORLANDO C.
CASIMIRO in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for
Military, P/INS. JEFFREY T. GOROSPE, SPO2
ROLANDO G. REGACHO, SPO1 ALFREDO B. ALVIAR,
JR., PO3 JAIME D. LAZARO, PO2 FLORANTE B.
CARDENAS, PO1 JOSEPH A. BENAZA, SPO1
FRANKLIN D. CABAYA and SPO4 PEDRO
PAREL, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Yet again, we are tasked to substitute our judgment for that of
the Office of the Ombudsman in its finding of lack of probable cause
made during preliminary investigation. And, yet again, we reaffirm the
time-honored practice of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary
investigations by our prosecutory bodies absent a showing of grave
abuse of discretion on their part.
Petitioners, thru a special civil action for certiorari,[1] contend
precisely that the public respondents herein officers of the Office of the
Ombudsman gravely abused their discretion in dismissing the complaint
for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code (Delay in the
delivery of detained persons) against private respondents herein,
members of the Philippine National Police stationed at the Municipality
of Santa, Ilocos Sur.
From the respective pleadings[2] of the parties, the following
facts appear to be indubitable:
1. On or about 8:30 in the evening of 13 May 2001 (a Sunday and
the day before the 14 May 2001 Elections[3]), petitioners were arrested
without a warrant by respondents police officers for alleged illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition;
2. Petitioner Soria was arrested for alleged illegal possession of .38
cal. revolver (a crime which carries with it the penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period) and for violation of Article 261 par.
(f) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to the Commission on
Election Resolution No. 3328 (which carries the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than one [1] year but not more than six [6]
years);
3. Petitioner Bista was arrested for alleged illegal possession of sub-
machine pistol UZI, cal. 9mm and a .22 cal. revolver with ammunition;
4. Immediately after their arrest, petitioners were detained at the
Santa, Ilocos Sur, Police Station. It was at the Santa Police Station
that petitioner Bista was identified by one of the police officers to have
a standing warrant of arrest for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6
issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 12272;
5. The next day, at about 4:30 p.m. of 14 May 2001 (Monday and
election day), petitioners were brought to the residence of Provincial
Prosecutor Jessica Viloria in San Juan, Ilocos Sur, before whom a
Joint-Affidavit against them was subscribed and sworn to by the
arresting officers. From there, the arresting officers brought the
petitioners to the Provincial Prosecutors Office in Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
and there at about 6:00 p.m. the Joint-Affidavit was filed and docketed;
6. At about 6:30 in the evening of the same day, 14 May 2001,
petitioner Soria was released upon the order of Prosecutor Viloria to
undergo the requisite preliminary investigation, while petitioner Bista
was brought back and continued to be detained at the Santa Police
Station. From the time of petitioner Sorias detention up to the time of
his release, twenty-two (22) hours had already elapsed;
7. On 15 May 2001, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, petitioner Bista
was brought before the MTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where the case for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 was pending. Petitioner Bista
posted bail and an Order of Temporary Release was issued thereafter;
8. At this point in time, no order of release was issued in connection
with petitioner Bistas arrest for alleged illegal possession of
firearms. At 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day (15 May 2001),
an information for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 4413-S, was filed against petitioner
Bista with the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur.
At 5:00 in the afternoon, informations for Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition and violation of Article 261 par. (f) of the
Omnibus Election Code in relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 3328,
docketed as Criminal Cases No. 2269-N and No. 2268-N,
respectively, were filed in the Regional Trial Court at Narvacan, Ilocos
Sur;
9. On 08 June 2001, petitioner Bista was released upon filing of bail
bonds in Criminal Cases No. 2268-N and No. 4413-S. He was
detained for 26 days.
10. On 15 August 2001, petitioners filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman for Military Affairs a complaint-affidavit for violation of Art.
125 of the Revised Penal Code against herein private respondents.
11. After considering the parties respective submissions, the Office
of the Ombudsman rendered the first assailed Joint Resolution dated
31 January 2002 dismissing the complaint for violation of Art. 125 of
the Revised Penal Code for lack of merit; and
12. On 04 March 2002, petitioners then filed their motion for
reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit in the second
assailed Resolution dated 25 March 2002.
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper
judicial authorities. - The penalties provided in the next preceding
article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall
detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such
person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of: twelve
(12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their
equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by
correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and thirty-six (36) hours, for
crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their
equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of
his detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate
and confer at any time with his attorney or counsel.
It is not under dispute that the alleged crimes for which petitioner
Soria was arrested without warrant are punishable by correctional
penalties or their equivalent, thus, criminal complaints or information
should be filed with the proper judicial authorities within 18 hours of his
arrest. Neither is it in dispute that the alleged crimes for which petitioner
Bista was arrested are punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or
their equivalent, thus, he could only be detained for 36 hours without
criminal complaints or information having been filed with the proper
judicial authorities.
The sole bone of contention revolves around the proper
application of the 12-18-36 periods. With respect specifically to the
detention of petitioner Soria which lasted for 22 hours, it is alleged that
public respondents gravely erred in construing Article 125[4] as
excluding Sundays, holidays and election days in the computation of
the periods prescribed within which public officers should deliver
arrested persons to the proper judicial authorities as the law never
makes such exception. Statutory construction has it that if a statute is
clear and unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without any attempts at interpretation.[5] Public respondents, on the
other hand, relied on the cases of Medina v. Orozco, Jr.,[6] and Sayo v.
Chief of Police of Manila[7] and on commentaries[8] of jurists to bolster
their position that Sundays, holidays and election days are excluded in
the computation of the periods provided in Article 125,[9] hence, the
arresting officers delivered petitioners well within the allowable time.
In addition to the foregoing arguments and with respect
specifically to petitioner Bista, petitioners maintain that the filing of the
information in court against petitioner Bista did not justify his continuous
detention. The information was filed at 4:30 p.m. of 15 May 2001but
the orders for his release were issued by the Regional Trial Court and
Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on 08 June 2001.
They argued that based on law and jurisprudence, if no charge is filed
by the prosecutor within the period fixed by law, the arresting officer
must release the detainee lest he be charged with violation of Article
125.[10] Public respondents countered that the duty of the arresting
officers ended upon the filing of the informations with the proper judicial
authorities following the rulings in Agbay v. Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military,[11] and People v. Acosta.[12]
From a study of the opposing views advanced by the parties, it
is evident that public respondents did not abuse their discretion in
dismissing for lack of probable cause the complaint against private
respondents.
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer concerned which
is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all
in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.[13]
No grave abuse of discretion, as defined, can be attributed to
herein public respondents. Their disposition of petitioners complaint for
violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be said to
have been conjured out of thin air as it was properly backed up by law
and jurisprudence. Public respondents ratiocinated thus:
As aptly pointed out by the respondents insofar as the complaint of
Rodolfo Soria is concerned, based on applicable laws and
jurisprudence, an election day or a special holiday, should not be
included in the computation of the period prescribed by law for the
filing of complaint/information in courts in cases of warrantless arrests,
it being a no-office day. (Medina vs. Orosco, 125 Phil. 313.) In the
instant case, while it appears that the complaints against Soria for
Illegal Possession of Firearm and Violation of COMELEC Resolution
No. 3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial
Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on May 15, 200[1] at 4:30 p.m., he
had already been released the day before or on May 14, 2001 at
about 6:30 p.m. by the respondents, as directed by Prov. Prosecutor
Jessica [Viloria]. Hence, there could be no arbitrary detention or
violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to speak of.[14]
Indeed, we did hold in Medina v. Orozco, Jr.,[15] that
. . . The arresting officers duty under the law was either to deliver him
to the proper judicial authorities within 18 hours, or thereafter release
him. The fact however is that he was not released. From the time of
petitioners arrest at 12:00 oclock p.m. on November 7 to 3:40 p.m. on
November 10 when the information against him for murder actually
was in court, over 75 hours have elapsed.
But, stock should be taken of the fact that November 7 was a Sunday;
November 8 was declared an official holiday; and November 9
(election day) was also an official holiday. In these three no-office
days, it was not an easy matter for a fiscal to look for his clerk and
stenographer, draft the information and search for the Judge to have
him act thereon, and get the clerk of court to open the courthouse,
docket the case and have the order of commitment prepared. And
then, where to locate and the uncertainty of locating those officers and
employees could very well compound the fiscals difficulties. These are
considerations sufficient enough to deter us from declaring that Arthur
Medina was arbitrarily detained. For, he was brought to court on the
very first office day following arrest.
And, in Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila[16] --
. . . Of course, for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an
officer detaining a person for more than six hours prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code, the means of communication as well as the hour
of arrest and other circumstances, such as the time of surrender and
the material possibility for the fiscal to make the investigation and file
in time the necessary information, must be taken into consideration.
As to the issue concerning the duty of the arresting officer after
the information has already been filed in Court, public respondents
acted well within their discretion in ruling thus:
In the same vein, the complaint of Edimar Bista against the
respondents for Violation of Article 125, will not prosper because the
running of the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law for the filing
of the complaint against him from the time of his arrest was tolled by
one day (election day). Moreover, he has a standing warrant of arrest
for Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and it was only on May 15, 2001, at about
2:00 p.m. that he was able to post bail and secure an Order of
Release. Obviously, however, he could only be released if he has no
other pending criminal case requiring his continuous detention.
The criminal Informations against Bista for Violations of Article 125,
RPC and COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the Regional
Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, on May
15, 2001 (Annexes G and I, Complaint-Affidavit of Edimar Bista) but
he was released from detention only on June 8, 2001, on orders of the
RTC and MTC of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur (Annexes J and K, Complaint-
Affidavit). Was there a delay in the delivery of detained person to the
proper judicial authorities under the circumstances? The answer is in
the negative. The complaints against him was (sic) seasonably filed in
the court of justice within the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by
law as discussed above. The duty of the detaining officers is deemed
complied with upon the filing of the complaints. Further action, like
issuance of a Release Order, then rests upon the judicial authority
(People v. Acosta [CA] 54 O.G. 4739).[17]
The above disposition is in keeping with Agbay v. Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military,[18] wherein we ordained that
. . . Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint with the Municipal
Trial Court, the intent behind Art. 125 is satisfied considering that by
such act, the detained person is informed of the crime imputed against
him and, upon his application with the court, he may be released on
bail. Petitioner himself acknowledged this power of the MCTC to order
his release when he applied for and was granted his release upon
posting bail. Thus, the very purpose underlying Article 125 has been
duly served with the filing of the complaint with the MCTC. We agree
with the position of the Ombudsman that such filing of the complaint
with the MCTC interrupted the period prescribed in said Article.
All things considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion,
we have no choice but to defer to the Office of the Ombudsmans
determination that the facts on hand do not make out a case for violation
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
As we have underscored in numerous decisions --
We have consistently refrained from interfering with the investigatory
and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman absent any compelling
reason. This policy is based on constitutional, statutory and practical
considerations. We are mindful that the Constitution and RA 6770
endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with a wide latitude of
investigatory and prosecutorial powers, virtually free from legislative,
executive or judicial intervention, in order to insulate it from outside
pressure and improper influence. Moreover, a preliminary investigation
is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case.
Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that
when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound, as a matter of
law, to order an acquittal. Hence, if the Ombudsman, using
professional judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court shall
respect such findings, unless clothed with grave abuse of
discretion. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously
hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman
with regard to complaints filed before it. In much the same way, the
courts will be swamped with cases if they will have to review the
exercise of discretion on the part of fiscals or prosecuting attorneys
each time the latter decide to file an information in court or dismiss a
complaint by a private complainant.[19] (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition dated 27 May
2002 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Joint Resolution dated
31 January 2002 and the Order dated 25 March 2002 of the Office of
the Ombudsman are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga,
JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
A.M. No. 03-1462-MTJ April 19, 2007
JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPAOL, Regional Trial Court, Branch 90,
Dasmarias, Cavite, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE LORINDA B. TOLEDO-MUPAS, Municipal Trial Court,
Dasmarias, Cavite, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Bizarre. The word would aptly describe this tale of the accuser turning
out to be the culprit.
This case started with Judge Lorinda B. Toledo-Mupas (Judge Mupas)
of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Dasmarias, Cavite, filing an
administrative complaint (Administrative Matter No. OCA IPI No. 02-
1515-RTJ) against Judge Dolores L. Espaol (Judge Espaol) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite, for Gross
Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Misconduct, and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. She imputed
these offenses against Judge Espaol for allegedly illegally usurping
the functions of the Executive Judge of Dasmarias, Cavite, and for
ordering her (Mupas) on April 18, 2002, in connection with Criminal
Case No. 9292-01 (People v. Belinda Ventura Singello), "to desist
from accepting, for preliminary investigation,' criminal cases falling
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, where
suspects are apprehended pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure."
Judge Espaol filed her Comment dated September 16, 20021 stating
that since she was appointed to the single sala RTC of Dasmarias,
Cavite, under Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 6 of 1975, she
ipso facto became the Executive Judge exercising supervision over
the MTC of Dasmarias, Cavite. She further stated that her Order
dated April 18, 2002, directing the respondent to desist from
conducting preliminary investigation, did not deprive the latter of the
authority to conduct preliminary investigation but merely stopped her
from conducting the same for being
violative of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code and Republic Act No. 7438.
In the same Comment, Judge Espaol said that Judge Mupas
operated the MTC of Dasmarias, Cavite as a "One-Stop Shop" where
criminal suspects apprehended without a warrant are ordered
detained in the municipal jail by virtue of an unsigned "Detention
Pending Investigation of the Case," in lieu of a waiver of the provisions
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as prescribed by R.A. No.
7438 and by Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Thus, according to Judge Espaol, the apprehended
persons were detained for a long time until Judge Mupas set the case
for preliminary investigation. If the detainee can post bail, Judge
Mupas would fix the amount of bail and require that the premium,
usually equivalent to 20% or 30% thereof, be paid in cash. If the surety
bond was secured outside of the MTC, the bond would be rejected.
Hence, the applicants for bail bonds would go to the RTC of
Dasmarias, Cavite to complain and apply for the release of the
detention prisoners.
This Court, acting on the Report dated July 4, 2003 of the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA), issued on August 6, 2003 a
Resolution,2 the dispositive portion of which reads:
"(T)he Court Resolved to ADOPT the following recommendations:
(a) to DISMISS the charges against Judge Dolores L.
Espaol for lack of merit;
(b) to TREAT the comment dated September 16, 2002 of
Judge Espaol as a SEPARATE ADMINISTRATIVE
COMPLAINT against Judge Lorinda Mupas of MTC,
Dasmarias, Cavite; and
(c) to REQUIRE Judge Toledo-Mupas to COMMENT on
the allegations against her, contained in Judge Espaols
comment."
Thus, a complaint against the respondent Judge Mupas was deemed
filed, and docketed as OCA IPI No. 03-1462-MTJ.
On September 8, 2003, Judge Mupas filed a motion seeking
reconsideration of this Courts Resolution. On October 1, 2003, this
Court required the OCA to file its comment thereon within 15 days
from notice. The OCA wrote a Memorandum dated April 15, 20043 to
then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. recommending the denial of
the respondents motion being a mere reiteration of her arguments
already passed upon by the Court. This Court adopted the said
recommendation of the OCA in its Resolution dated May 31, 2004.4
Accordingly, Judge Mupas faced the following charges: (1) violation of
Rule 112, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, and Republic Act No. 7438;
and (2) violation of the rules on preliminary investigation (a) for the
delay in the resolution of preliminary investigation cases pending in
[Judge Mupas] court; (b) for failure to perform her ministerial duty of
transmitting the records of the case, including the resolution on the
preliminary investigation, within 10 days from the issuance of the said
resolution to the provincial prosecutor of Cavite; and (c) for conducting
preliminary investigation despite the fact that there were many
prosecutors in Cavite not indisposed to do the job.
On September 19, 2005, Judge Mupas filed her Reply5 (should be
Comment) to Judge Espaols Comment which was treated as a
separate administrative complaint. She claimed that the August 6,
2003 Resolution of this Court failed to consider relevant laws, rules,
and pronouncements of the Court itself. She further said that under
Rule 112, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, she
is expressly authorized to conduct preliminary investigation. She
questioned the authority of Judge Espaol in ordering her to desist
from conducting preliminary investigations in the guise of "supervising"
or "reviewing" her actions, as the said authority was lodged in the
provincial prosecutors. She pointed out that, in the case of "People vs.
Belinda Ventura Singello" (Criminal Case No. 9292-01), subject of
Judge Espaols Order dated April 18, 2002, the provincial prosecutor
affirmed her (Mupas) finding of probable cause against the accused
without any question on the manner in which the preliminary
investigation was conducted.
She likewise claimed that, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 59-99
dated 1 June 1999, while in single-sala stations the presiding judges
are ex officio executive judges, for purposes of supervision in the
interest of the service, their salas may be merged with multi-sala
stations. Therefore, the RTC of Dasmarias, Cavite had long been
merged with the multi-sala station of the RTC of Imus, Cavite. In
support of this claim, Judge Mupas noted that then Executive Judge
Lucenito N. Tagle of the RTC of Imus, Cavite issued a Memorandum
to all judges within his supervision, including both Judge Espaol and
Judge Mupas, to submit periodic reports on detention prisoners.
She further argued that none of the detention prisoners had filed an
administrative complaint against her. She said that it was her duty to
conduct preliminary investigation of complaints filed with her sala. In
addition, Judge Mupas posited that Judge Espaol could not entertain
applications for bail in the RTC because the cases were pending
before the MTC.
On January 30, 2006, the Court noted this Reply (should be
Comment), and referred the same to the OCA for evaluation, report,
and recommendation.
In the Memorandum dated July 26, 20066 addressed to then Chief
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, the OCA found that the Reply of
Judge Mupas was merely a rehash of the arguments she raised in her
Motion for Reconsideration; it did not refute the specific allegations of
Judge Espaol. The OCA said that the explanation given by the
respondent was unsatisfactory and insufficient to absolve her from
administrative liability. However, the OCA recommended that this case
be referred to an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals for
investigation, report, and recommendation. Eventually, this case was
referred to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-
Vidal.
During the proceedings before Justice Vidal, Judge Espaol filed her
Rejoinder [Re: Reply dated September 19, 2005] dated December 8,
20067 reiterating that: (1) her Order dated April 18, 2002 was lawful
and within her authority to issue as the OCA declared that she was
merely performing her function as Executive Judge of Dasmarias,
Cavite; (2) Judge Mupas violated the rights of the accused whose
preliminary investigation is pending in her court, they being detained
by virtue only of a "Detention Pending Investigation of the Case" in
place of a valid waiver signed in the presence of counsel for
considerable lengths of time; (3) there was no basis for Judge Mupas
counter-charge that she could not grant bail while preliminary
investigation was pending before the Mupas court, considering the
latter's absence upon the prisoners' applications for bail; and (4)
Judge Mupas failed to adequately explain her failure to forward the
records and the resolution of the preliminary investigation of accused
Belinda Singello in Criminal Case No. 9292-01.
Judge Mupas filed her Comment (Re: Rejoinder Dated December 8,
2006) dated December 21, 20068 and averred that: (1) acts made in
her judicial capacity and in good faith could not be subject to
disciplinary action; (2) as judge, she enjoys the presumption of
regularity in the performance of her duties; (3) the preliminary
investigation she conducted was within the scope of her authority; and
(4) the reason behind the seeming delay in the conduct of preliminary
investigation was the heavy congestion of the dockets of the MTC of
Dasmarias, Cavite.
Preliminary conferences were conducted by Justice Vidal on January
2, 2007 and January 9, 2007.9 However, both parties opted not to
present any testimonial evidence. In fact, Judge Espaol filed on
January 5, 2007 an Urgent Manifestation and Motion to
Resolve,10 praying that, inasmuch as the proceedings were summary
in nature, the case be decided based on the available records and
pleadings submitted.
On the same day, Judge Espaol filed her Reply [Re: Comment dated
December 21, 2006],11 arguing that: (1) Judge Mupas is guilty of gross
ignorance of the law even if she acted in good faith; and (2) the
presumption of regularity in the performance of her judicial function
could not cure the incompetence of the respondent.
Both the complainant12 and the respondent13 filed their respective
memoranda encompassing all the arguments they raised in their
respective pleadings. Judge Espaol also filed a Counter
Memorandum (Re: Memorandum of the Respondent dated January
18, 2007) dated January 29, 2007.14
In an undated Resolution filed with the OCA on February 9, 2007,
Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal found, contrary to Judge Mupas
claim, that the document entitled "Detention Pending Investigation of
Cases" cannot validly be deemed to be an implied waiver of the rights
of the accused under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Justice
Vidal submits the following findings:
"Extant from the records, is Respondents admission of her practice in
the issuance of the document entitled Detention Pending Investigation
of Cases claiming, however, that such document served as an implied
waiver of the rights of the accused under Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code.
"The undersigned disagrees.
"Sec. 2 e) of RA 7438 is in point, thus:
xxx Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under custodial
investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such person in the
presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be null and void
and of no effect. (Underscoring supplied)
"The afore cited law is clear and simple. Thus, construction is
unnecessary. Clearly, what the said provision requires to protect the
rights of the accused is a written waiver signed by the accused with
the assistance of a counsel. However, the procedure adopted by the
Respondent runs counter thereto. She resorted to the issuance of a
commitment order dubbed as Detention Pending Investigation of the
Case to legally prolong the detention of the accused pending the
resolution of the preliminary investigation. Obviously, this is not within
the contemplation of the law. Thus, the practice is highly erroneous
a blatant manifestation of ignorance in the legal procedure.
"The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary15 provides:
Canon 6 Competence and Diligence
xxx
Sec. 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance
their knowledge, skills and personal qualities necessary for the proper
performance of judicial duties, taking advantage for this purpose of the
training and other facilities which should be made available, under
judicial control, to judges.
xxx
"Otherwise put, Respondent is presumed to know the basic measures
to protect the rights of the accused during preliminary investigation.
Sadly, Respondent failed in this regard. Instead, she maintained the
practice of issuing this highly improper order, i.e., Detention Pending
Investigation of the Case, just to put a semblance of legality in the
detention of the accused."16
With respect to the other charges, Justice Vidal found the evidence
insufficient to support the accusations that Judge Mupas: (1) detained
the accused for a long period of time while the preliminary
investigation was pending in her court; (2) failed to transmit to the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite the records of the case within 10 days
after preliminary investigation; and (3) acted without authority to
conduct preliminary investigation because there were enough
prosecutors in Cavite to conduct the same.1a\^/phi1.net
Justice Vidal then concludes:
"However, the undersigned finds that Respondent should still be held
administratively liable. Respondents act of issuing orders dubbed as
Detention Pending Investigation of Cases instead of requiring the
accused to execute a written waiver, with the assistance of counsel,
pursuant to Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, fall [sic] short of
the measure of responsibility expected from a judge.
"Respondent should be reminded that the actions of everyone
connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from
the presiding judge to the clerk of lowest rank, should be
circumscribed with a high degree of responsibility. The image of a
court, as a true temple of justice, is mirrored in the conduct, official or
otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat. Judicial
personnel are expected to be living examples of uprightness in the
performance of official duties [and] preserve at all times the good
name and standing of the courts in the community."17
Thus, the dispositive portion of her Resolution reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, and it appearing that this is the
first time the Respondent has committed the infraction, supra, the
undersigned respectfully recommends that she be REPRIMANDED for
her practice of issuing the "Detention Pending Investigation of the
Case" orders with STERN WARNING that a repetition thereof or any
similar act will be dealt with more severely".
We agree with the findings of Justice Vidal, but We find the
recommended penalty too light, grossly disproportionate to the offense
committed, especially when viewed in the light of Judge Mupas record
of incorrigible misconduct.
There is no gainsaying that Judge Mupas practice of issuing
"Detention Pending Investigation of the Case" orders in lieu of a
written waiver signed by the accused with the assistance of counsel is,
in the words of Justice Vidal, "a blatant manifestation of ignorance in
the legal procedure." It is gross ignorance of the law, pure and simple.
Under Rule 140, Section 8, of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 01-8-10 SC, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified
as a serious charge, and Section 11 thereof provides the sanctions, as
follows:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious
charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the
benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations: Provided, however, that the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6)
months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding
P40,000.00.
While Justice Vidal considered the respondent's practice of issuing
"Detention Pending Investigation of the Case" orders as a first-time
infraction, We note that this case is not the first time the respondent
was charged and found guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
In Espaol v. Mupas,18 the respondent judge was fined the amount of
P21,000.00 for violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross
ignorance of the law when she ordered the arrest of the accused in six
criminal cases before the expiration of the 10-day period she gave was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial
them to file their counter-affidavits, and without any finding of probable authority.25
cause. All said, this Court finds the respondent, Judge Lorinda B. Toledo-
In Loss of Court Exhibits at MTC-Dasmarias, Cavite,19 aside from Mupas, administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law.
being found guilty of grave misconduct for refusing to turn over to the Considering that this is her fourth offense, she deserves to be meted
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for ballistics examination a the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service, with all the
firearm that a court employee surreptitiously took from the court's steel accessory penalties appurtenant thereto.
cabinet and used to commit suicide, Judge Mupas was held WHEREFORE, Judge Lorinda B. Toledo-Mupas of the Municipal Trial
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for her failure to Court of Dasmarias, Cavite is found guilty of gross ignorance of the
submit to the provincial prosecutor her resolution and the records of law. This being her fourth offense, she is hereby ORDERED
the case within 10 days after preliminary investigation. The Court DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of all benefits due
imposed on the respondent the penalty of suspension for three (3) her, excluding her accrued leave benefits, and with perpetual
months without pay, with a stern warning that a similar infraction will disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
be dealt with more severely. including government-owned or controlled corporations.
In Bitoon, et al. v. Toledo-Mupas,20 the respondent was also found This Decision is final and immediately executory.
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for changing the SO ORDERED.
designation of the crime from a non-bailable offense to a bailable
one, i.e., syndicated estafa to simple estafa, and granted bail without
hearing on the ground that the accused is entitled to it as a matter of
right. The Court found her to have exceeded her authority in the
conduct of preliminary investigation and to have failed to observe the
elementary rules on bail. She was meted the penalties of a fine in the
amount of P40,000.00, suspension for three (3) months without
salaries and benefits, and a stern warning that a same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.
Upon motion for reconsideration, however, the penalty of fine of
P40,000.00 was deleted on the ground that the acts of the respondent
in the Espaol v. Mupas and the Loss of Court Exhibits cases were
done after the acts complained of in Bitoon. While the Court
maintained that the respondent's acts in Bitoon remain inexcusable,
the respondent was not found to be an incorrigible third-time offender
deserving the penalty originally imposed. The Court also noted that
the respondent was not motivated by malice, bad faith or corrupt
motives and that there was an absence of any serious damage to the
complainants. However, the stern warning of the Court should have
been ample reminder that the penalty of dismissal would be imposed
should the respondent commit the same or a similar infraction.21
In the present case, while the documents denominated "Detention
Pending Investigation of the Case" were issued during the same
period of time that the three (3) above-cited cases were decided, it is
noteworthy that Judge Mupas continued with the practice even after
her attention had been called. Worse, she remained insistent that the
document was an implied waiver of the rights of the accused under
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.22 Judge Mupas must be
reminded that although judges have in their favor the presumption of
regularity and good faith in the performance of their official functions, a
blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable terms of the law
obviates this presumption and renders them susceptible to
administrative sanctions.23 Being among the judicial front-liners who
have direct contact with the litigants, a wanton display of utter lack of
familiarity with the rules by the judge inevitably erodes the confidence
of the public in the competence of our courts to render justice. 24 It
subjects the judiciary to embarrassment. Worse, it could raise the
specter of corruption.
When the gross inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic
and elemental a rule, a law, or a principle in the discharge of his or her
duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the
exalted position and title he or she holds, or the oversight or omission
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984
JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and
J. BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL
OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.
Lorenzo M. Taada, Wigberto E. Taada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto
Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo, Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for
petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the validity of two
[2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge
Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance
of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19,
Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were
searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia,
motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and
distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the
possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor
of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles,
and that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer, Presidential
Security Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal
of Quezon City, their representatives, assistants, subalterns,
subordinates, substitute or successors" be enjoined from using the
articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr.
and the other accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos,
Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to
answer the petition. The plea for preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on June 28, 1983, later reset
to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of
respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing
petitioners' prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
manifested that respondents "will not use the aforementioned articles
as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution of the
legality of the seizure of the aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this
manifestation, the prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction was
rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground
that petitioners had come to this Court without having previously
sought the quashal of the search warrants before respondent judge.
Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of the warrants
before this Court, should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in
the court that issued them. 3 But this procedural flaw notwithstanding,
we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and
urgency of the constitutional issues raised not to mention the public
interest generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices, which was
televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies.
The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to
exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. In the words of the
revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza
v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the power of the court [Supreme Court]
to suspend its rules or to except a particular case from its operation,
whenever the purposes of justice require it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of
laches. Considerable stress is laid on the fact that while said search
warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant petition
impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse
of a period of more than six [6] months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the
delay in the filing of the petition thus:
Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3,
Manifestation] with the fact that the Petition was filed on June 16,
1983, more than half a year after the petitioners' premises had been
raided.
The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they
had waited this long to bring their case to court, it was because they
tried at first to exhaust other remedies. The events of the past eleven
fill years had taught them that everything in this country, from release
of public funds to release of detained persons from custody, has
become a matter of executive benevolence or largesse
Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons
close to the President, like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to President
Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronet asking the return at least of
the printing equipment and vehicles. And after such a letter had been
sent, through Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief Intelligence and Legal
Officer of the Presidential Security Command, they were further
encouraged to hope that the latter would yield the desired results.
After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to
come to Court. [pp. 123-124, Rollo]
Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our
judicial system, We find no ground to punish or chastise them for an
error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts exerted by
petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they had
abandoned their right to the possession of the seized property,
thereby refuting the charge of laches against them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos,
Jr. had used and marked as evidence some of the seized documents
in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now estopped from challenging
the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow the logic of
respondents. These documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he pleases with them, within legal
bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does not and
cannot in any way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants
assailed in this petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to
nullify the search warrants in question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct
an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his
witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision
as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court .6 This objection,
however, may properly be considered moot and academic, as
petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9,
1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent
judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to
search two distinct places: No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and
784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution of Search
Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the ground that the two
search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed
therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City. This assertion is
based on that portion of Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which states:
Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and
means of committing the crime of subversion penalized under P.D.
885 as amended and he is keeping and concealing the same at 19
Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely,
two search warrants were applied for and issued because the purpose
and intent were to search two distinct premises. It would be quite
absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants
intended for one and the same place. Besides, the addresses of the
places sought to be searched were specifically set forth in the
application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the
team which executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that might
have arisen by reason of the typographical error is more apparent than
real. The fact is that the place for which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b]
was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, which address appeared in the opening paragraph of the
said warrant. 7 Obviously this is the same place that respondent judge
had in mind when he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the
premises to be searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held
"that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in
the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where
the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had
issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant
intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has also been
said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official
court file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be
searched." 8
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact
that although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr.
alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr.,
Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal
properties that may be seized under a search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. A search warrant may be
issued for the search and seizure of the following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the
offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing
an offense.
The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should
be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed.
It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b] of the
above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized is
stolen property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one
other than the person in whose possession it may be at the time of the
search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and
it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has
control or possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner
Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles and
property seized under the warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties
were seized under the disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptables, instruments or
implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or
works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and
which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works"
are considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v.
Castillo9 where this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that
machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when
placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so
when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having
only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the
owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land
and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the
case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground
remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search
warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge
upon application of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the
P.C. Metrocom.10 The application was accompanied by the Joint
Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members
of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla
which conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the
application for the search warrants on December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned
documents could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a
probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue in accordance
with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a
search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search
warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor
in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the
case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must
contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive
material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col.
Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his
control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications
and other documents which were used and are all continuously being
used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable
under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." 12 is a mere
conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the
existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for
the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for
respondent judge to have done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is
the statement contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez
and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and collated by our
unit clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned and the articles
and things above-described were used and are continuously being
used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the
objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement,
Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 13
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined by the judge, ... after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge
by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the
issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court of
First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to
the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or
his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and
seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause." As couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed
before respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency
established by this Court in Alvarez case.
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration
constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general
warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to be
seized in this wise:
1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment,
typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/recording equipment,
tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the
printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents
communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE
FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other
publication to promote the objectives and piurposes of the subversive
organization known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire
Movement and April 6 Movement; and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE
FORUM" and other subversive materials and propaganda, more
particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with
marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized
the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists,
memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos,
concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the expressing alarm over the "WE FORUM " case. 20 In this reply dated
U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:
"seize any evidence in connectionwith the violation of SDC 13-3703 or 2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the
otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search recommendation of our authorities to close the paper's printing
warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which facilities and confiscate the equipment and materials it uses. 21
could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and
Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy]" was held to 20-82[b] issued by respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby
be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. 17 The description of the declared null and void and are accordingly set aside. The prayer for a
articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is
cannot be characterized differently. hereby granted and all articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable released to petitioners. No costs.
chapter in English history: the era of disaccord between the Tudor SO ORDERED.
Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were
given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to
suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and
Puritan Reference herein to such historical episode would not be
relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any
newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-
conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and
printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum
newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these
premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the
printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship
abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the
fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners'
freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently
anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even
militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of
the citizenry.
Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing
machines on the ground that they have been sequestered under
Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which
authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person, natural or
artificial, engaged in subversive activities against the government and
its duly constituted authorities ... in accordance with implementing
rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National
Defense." It is doubtful however, if sequestration could validly be
effected in view of the absence of any implementing rules and
regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was
reported that no less than President Marcos himself denied the
request of the military authorities to sequester the property seized
from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:
The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for
sequestration of the WE FORUM newspaper and its printing presses,
according to Information Minister Gregorio S. Cendana.
On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We
Forum offices in Quezon City and took a detailed inventory of the
equipment and all materials in the premises.
Cendaa said that because of the denial the newspaper and its
equipment remain at the disposal of the owners, subject to the
discretion of the court. 19
That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been
sequestered is further confirmed by the reply of then Foreign Minister
Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983 of U.S.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 172070-72 June 1, 2007
VICENTE P. LADLAD, NATHANAEL S. SANTIAGO, RANDALL B.
ECHANIS, and REY CLARO C. CASAMBRE,Petitioners,
vs.
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO,
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR JOSELITA C. MENDOZA, SENIOR
STATE PROSECUTOR AILEEN MARIE S. GUTIERREZ, STATE
PROSECUTOR IRWIN A. MARAYA, and STATE PROSECUTOR
MERBA A. WAGA, in their capacity as members of the
Department of Justice panel of prosecutors investigating I.S.
Nos. 2006-225, 2006-226 and 2006-234, JUSTICE SECRETARY
RAUL M. GONZALEZ, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C.
LOMIBAO, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine National Police,
P/CSUPT. RODOLFO B. MENDOZA, JR., and P/SUPT. YOLANDA
G. TANIGUE, Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. Nos. 172074-76 June 1, 2007
LIZA L. MAZA, JOEL G. VIRADOR, SATURNINO C. OCAMPO,
TEODORO A. CASIO, CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, and RAFAEL V.
MARIANO, Petitioners,
vs.
RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Justice, JOVENCITO R. ZUO, in his capacity as
Chief State Prosecutor, the Panel of Investigating Prosecutors
composed of EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, JOSELITA C. MENDOZA,
AILEEN MARIE S. GUTIERREZ, IRWIN A. MARAYA and MERBA A.
WAGA (Panel), RODOLFO B. MENDOZA, in his capacity as Acting
Deputy Director, Directorate for Investigation and Detective
Management (DIDM), YOLANDA G. TANIGUE, in her capacity as
Acting Executive Officer of DIDM, the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
(DOJ), and the PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
(PNP), Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 175013 June 1, 2007
CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SECRETARY RAUL M.
GONZALEZ, in his capacity as the Secretary of Justice and
overall superior of the Public Prosecutors, HONORABLE
ENCARNACION JAJA G. MOYA, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146, and
HONORABLE ELMO M. ALAMEDA, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
150,Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions for the writs of prohibition and
certiorari to enjoin petitioners prosecution for Rebellion and to set
aside the rulings of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City (RTC Makati) on the investigation and
prosecution of petitioners cases.
The Facts
Petitioner in G.R. No. 175013, Crispin B. Beltran (Beltran), and
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172074-76, Liza L. Maza (Maza), Joel G.
Virador (Virador), Saturnino C. Ocampo (Ocampo), Teodoro A. Casio
(Casio), and Rafael V. Mariano (Mariano),1 are members of the
House of Representatives representing various party-list
groups.2Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172070-72 are private individuals.
Petitioners all face charges for Rebellion under Article 134 in relation
to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code in two criminal cases
pending with the RTC Makati.
G.R. No. 175013 (The Beltran Petition)
Following the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 on 24 February 2006 declaring a
"State of National Emergency," police officers3 arrested Beltran on 25
February 2006, while he was en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and
detained him in Camp Crame, Quezon City. Beltran was arrested
without a warrant and the arresting officers did not inform Beltran of
the crime for which he was arrested. On that evening, Beltran was
subjected to an inquest at the Quezon City Hall of Justice for Inciting
to Sedition under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code based on a
speech Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in Quezon City on 24
February 2006, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the EDSA
Revolution. The inquest was based on the joint affidavit of Beltrans
arresting officers who claimed to have been present at the rally. The
inquest prosecutor4indicted Beltran and filed the corresponding
Information with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (MeTC).5
The authorities brought back Beltran to Camp Crame where, on 27
February 2006, he was subjected to a second inquest, with 1st Lt.
Lawrence San Juan (San Juan), this time for Rebellion. A panel of
State prosecutors6 from the DOJ conducted this second inquest. The
inquest was based on two letters, both dated 27 February 2006, of
Yolanda Tanigue (Tanigue) and of Rodolfo Mendoza (Mendoza).
Tanigue is the Acting Executive Officer of the Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group (CIDG), Philippine National Police (PNP), while
Mendoza is the Acting Deputy Director of the CIDG. The letters
referred to the DOJ for appropriate action the results of the CIDGs
investigation implicating Beltran, the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172074-
76, San Juan, and several others as "leaders and promoters" of an
alleged foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo government. The plot was
supposed to be carried out jointly by members of the Communist Party
of the Philippines (CPP) and the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas
(MKP), which have formed a "tactical alliance."
On 27 February 2006, the DOJ panel of prosecutors issued a
Resolution finding probable cause to indict Beltran and San Juan as
"leaders/promoters" of Rebellion. The panel then filed an Information
with the RTC Makati. The Information alleged that Beltran, San Juan,
and other individuals "conspiring and confederating with each other, x
x x, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously form a
tactical alliance between the CPP/NPA, renamed as Partidong
Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) and its armed regular members as
Katipunan ng Anak ng Bayan (KAB) with the Makabayang Kawal ng
Pilipinas (MKP) and thereby rise publicly and take up arms against the
duly constituted government, x x x."7 The Information, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 06-452, was raffled to Branch 137 under Presiding
Judge Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-Delorino (Judge Delorino).
Beltran moved that Branch 137 make a judicial determination of
probable cause against him.8 Before the motion could be resolved,
Judge Delorino recused herself from the case which was re-raffled to
Branch 146 under Judge Encarnacion Jaja-Moya (Judge Moya).
In its Order dated 31 May 2006, Branch 146 sustained the finding of
probable cause against Beltran.9 Beltran sought reconsideration but
Judge Moya also inhibited herself from the case without resolving
Beltrans motion. Judge Elmo M. Alameda of Branch 150, to whom the
case was re-raffled, issued an Order on 29 August 2006 denying
Beltrans motion.
Hence, the petition in G.R. No. 175013 to set aside the Orders dated
31 May 2006 and 29 August 2006 and to enjoin Beltrans prosecution.
In his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General claims that
Beltrans inquest for Rebellion was valid and that the RTC Makati
correctly found probable cause to try Beltran for such felony.
G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76 (The Maza and Ladlad Petitions)
Based on Tanigue and Mendozas letters, the DOJ sent subpoenas to
petitioners on 6 March 2006 requiring them to appear at the DOJ
Office on 13 March 2006 "to get copies of the complaint and its
attachment." Prior to their receipt of the subpoenas, petitioners had
quartered themselves inside the House of Representatives building for
fear of being subjected to warrantless arrest.
During the preliminary investigation on 13 March 2006, the counsel for
the CIDG presented a masked man, later identified as Jaime Fuentes
(Fuentes), who claimed to be an eyewitness against petitioners.
Fuentes subscribed to his affidavit before respondent prosecutor
Emmanuel Velasco who then gave copies of the affidavit to media
members present during the proceedings. The panel of
prosecutors10 gave petitioners 10 days within which to file their
counter-affidavits. Petitioners were furnished the complete copies of
documents supporting the CIDGs letters only on 17 March 2006.
Petitioners moved for the inhibition of the members of the prosecution
panel for lack of impartiality and independence, considering the
political milieu under which petitioners were investigated, the
statements that the President and the Secretary of Justice made to the
media regarding petitioners case,11 and the manner in which the
prosecution panel conducted the preliminary investigation. The DOJ
panel of prosecutors denied petitioners motion on 22 March 2006.
Petitioners sought reconsideration and additionally prayed for the
dismissal of the cases. However, the panel of prosecutors denied
petitioners motions on 4 April 2006.
Petitioners now seek the nullification of the DOJ Orders of 22 March
2006 and 4 April 2006.
Acting on petitioners prayer for the issuance of an injunctive writ, the
Court issued a status quo order on 5 June 2006. Prior to this,
however, the panel of prosecutors, on 21 April 2006, issued a
Resolution finding probable cause to charge petitioners and 46 others
with Rebellion. The prosecutors filed the corresponding Information
with Branch 57 of the RTC Makati, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-
944 (later consolidated with Criminal Case No. 06-452 in Branch 146),
charging petitioners and their co-accused as "principals, masterminds,
[or] heads" of a Rebellion.12Consequently, the petitioners in G.R. Nos.
172070-72 filed a supplemental petition to enjoin the prosecution of
Criminal Case No. 06-944.
In his separate Comment to the Maza petition, the Solicitor General
submits that the preliminary investigation of petitioners was not tainted
with irregularities. The Solicitor General also claims that the filing of
Criminal Case No. 06-944 has mooted the Maza petition.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
1. In G.R. No. 175013, (a) whether the inquest proceeding against
Beltran for Rebellion was valid and (b) whether there is probable
cause to indict Beltran for Rebellion; and
2. In G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76, whether respondent
prosecutors should be enjoined from continuing with the prosecution
of Criminal Case No. 06-944.13
The Ruling of the Court
We find the petitions meritorious. On the Beltran Petition
The Inquest Proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is Void.
Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been
lawfully arrested without warrant.14 Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the instances when such
warrantless arrest may be effected, thus:
Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
xxxx
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with
section 7 of Rule 112.
The joint affidavit of Beltrans arresting officers15 states that the officers
arrested Beltran, without a warrant,16 for Inciting to Sedition, and not
for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor could only have conducted
as he did conduct an inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no other.
Consequently, when another group of prosecutors subjected Beltran
to a second inquest proceeding for Rebellion, they overstepped their
authority rendering the second inquest void. None of Beltrans
arresting officers saw Beltran commit, in their presence, the crime of
Rebellion. Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that Beltran had just committed Rebellion, sufficient to
form probable cause to believe that he had committed Rebellion. What
these arresting officers alleged in their affidavit is that they saw and
heard Beltran make an allegedly seditious speech on 24 February
2006.17
Indeed, under DOJ Circular No. 61, dated 21 September 1993, the
initial duty of the inquest officer is to determine if the arrest of the
detained person was made "in accordance with the provisions of
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113."18 If the arrest was not
properly effected, the inquest officer should proceed under Section 9
of Circular No. 61 which provides:
Where Arrest Not Properly Effected. Should the Inquest Officer find
that the arrest was not made in accordance with the Rules, he shall:
a) recommend the release of the person arrested or detained;
b) note down the disposition on the referral document;
c) prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the action
taken; and
d) forward the same, together with the record of the case, to the City
or Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.
Where the recommendation for the release of the detained person is
approved by the City or Provincial Prosecutor but the evidence on
hand warrant the conduct of a regular preliminary investigation, the
order of release shall be served on the officer having custody of said
detainee and shall direct the said officer to serve upon the detainee
the subpoena or notice of preliminary investigation, together with the
copies of the charge sheet or complaint, affidavit or sworn statements
of the complainant and his witnesses and other supporting evidence.
(Emphasis supplied)
For the failure of Beltrans panel of inquest prosecutors to comply with
Section 7, Rule 112 in relation to Section 5, Rule 113 and DOJ
Circular No. 61, we declare Beltrans inquest void.19 Beltran would
have been entitled to a preliminary investigation had he not asked the
trial court to make a judicial determination of probable cause, which
effectively took the place of such proceeding.
There is No Probable Cause to Indict
Beltran for Rebellion.
Probable cause is the "existence of such facts and circumstances as
would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within
the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of
the crime for which he was prosecuted."20 To accord respect to the
discretion granted to the prosecutor and for reasons of practicality, this
Court, as a rule, does not interfere with the prosecutors determination
of probable cause for otherwise, courts would be swamped with
petitions to review the prosecutors findings in such
investigations.21 However, in the few exceptional cases where the
prosecutor abused his discretion by ignoring a clear insufficiency of
evidence to support a finding of probable cause, thus denying the
accused his right to substantive and procedural due process, we have
not hesitated to intervene and exercise our review power under Rule
65 to overturn the prosecutors findings.22 This exception holds true
here.
Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed
[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the
purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its
laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof,
or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces or depriving the
Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their
powers or prerogatives.
The elements of the offense are:
1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the
Government; and
2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either
(a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws:
(1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or
(2) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or
(b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of
any of their powers and prerogatives.23
Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes
involving crowd action done in furtherance of a political end.24
The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the
inquest of Beltran for Rebellion consisted of the affidavits and other
documents25 attached to the CIDG letters. We have gone over these
documents and find merit in Beltrans contention that the same are
insufficient to show probable cause to indict him for Rebellion. The
bulk of the documents consists of affidavits, some of which were
sworn before a notary public, executed by members of the military and
some civilians. Except for two affidavits, executed by a certain Ruel
Escala (Escala), dated 20 Febuary 2006,26 and Raul Cachuela
(Cachuela), dated 23 February 2006,27 none of the affidavits mentions
Beltran.28 In his affidavit, Escala recounted that in the afternoon of 20
February 2006, he saw Beltran, Ocampo, Casio, Maza, Mariano,
Virador, and other individuals on board a vehicle which entered a
chicken farm in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas and that after the
passengers alighted, they were met by another individual who looked
like San Juan. For his part, Cachuela stated that he was a former
member of the CPP and that (1) he attended the CPPs "10thPlenum"
in 1992 where he saw Beltran; (2) he took part in criminal activities;
and (3) the arms he and the other CPP members used were
purchased partly from contributions by Congressional members, like
Beltran, who represent party-list groups affiliated with the CPP.
The allegations in these affidavits are far from the proof needed to
indict Beltran for taking part in an armed public uprising against the
government. What these documents prove, at best, is that Beltran was
in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas on 20 February 2006 and that 14
years earlier, he was present during the 1992 CPP Plenum. None of
the affidavits stated that Beltran committed specific acts of promoting,
maintaining, or heading a rebellion as found in the DOJ Resolution of
27 February 2006. None of the affidavits alleged that Beltran is a
leader of a rebellion. Beltrans alleged presence during the 1992 CPP
Plenum does not automatically make him a leader of a rebellion.
In fact, Cachuelas affidavit stated that Beltran attended the 1992 CPP
Plenum as "Chairman, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU)." Assuming that
Beltran is a member of the CPP, which Beltran does not acknowledge,
mere membership in the CPP does not constitute rebellion.29 As for
the alleged funding of the CPPs military equipment from Beltrans
congressional funds, Cachuelas affidavit merely contained a general
conclusion without any specific act showing such funding. Cachuela
merely alleged that "ang mga ibang mga pondo namin ay galing sa
mga party list na naihalal sa Kongreso tulad ng BAYAN MUNA
pimumunuan nila SATUR OCAMPO at CRISPIN BELTRAN, x x
x."30Such a general conclusion does not establish probable cause.
In his Comment to Beltrans petition, the Solicitor General points to
Fuentes affidavit, dated 25 February 2006,31 as basis for the finding of
probable cause against Beltran as Fuentes provided details in his
statement regarding meetings Beltran and the other petitioners
attended in 2005 and 2006 in which plans to overthrow violently the
Arroyo government were allegedly discussed, among others.
The claim is untenable. Fuentes affidavit was not part of the
attachments the CIDG referred to the DOJ on 27 February 2006.
Thus, the panel of inquest prosecutors did not have Fuentes affidavit
in their possession when they conducted the Rebellion inquest against
Beltran on that day. Indeed, although this affidavit is dated 25
February 2006, the CIDG first presented it only during the preliminary
investigation of the other petitioners on 13 March 2006 during which
Fuentes subscribed to his statement before respondent prosecutor
Velasco.
Respondent prosecutors later tried to remedy this fatal defect by motu
proprio submitting to Branch 137 of the RTC Makati Fuentes affidavit
as part of their Comment to Beltrans motion for judicial determination
of probable cause. Such belated submission, a tacit admission of the
dearth of evidence against Beltran during the inquest, does not
improve the prosecutions case. Assuming them to be true, what the
allegations in Fuentes affidavit make out is a case for Conspiracy to
Commit Rebellion, punishable under Article 136 of the Revised Penal
Code, not Rebellion under Article 134. Attendance in meetings to
discuss, among others, plans to bring down a government is a mere
preparatory step to commit the acts constituting Rebellion under
Article 134. Even the prosecution acknowledged this, since the felony
charged in the Information against Beltran and San Juan in Criminal
Case No. 06-452 is Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion and not
Rebellion. The Information merely alleged that Beltran, San Juan, and
others conspired to form a "tactical alliance" to commit Rebellion.
Thus, the RTC Makati erred when it nevertheless found probable
cause to try Beltran for Rebellion based on the evidence before it.
The minutes32 of the 20 February 2006 alleged meeting in Batangas
between members of MKP and CPP, including Beltran, also do not
detract from our finding.1a\^/phi1.net Nowhere in the minutes was
Beltran implicated. While the minutes state that a certain "Cris"
attended the alleged meeting, there is no other evidence on record
indicating that "Cris" is Beltran. San Juan, from whom the "flash drive"
containing the so-called minutes was allegedly taken, denies knowing
Beltran.
To repeat, none of the affidavits alleges that Beltran is promoting,
maintaining, or heading a Rebellion. The Information in Criminal Case
No. 06-452 itself does not make such allegation. Thus, even assuming
that the Information validly charges Beltran for taking part in a
Rebellion, he is entitled to bail as a matter of right since there is no
allegation in the Information that he is a leader or promoter of the
Rebellion.33 However, the Information in fact merely charges Beltran
for "conspiring and confederating" with others in forming a "tactical
alliance" to commit rebellion. As worded, the Information does not
charge Beltran with Rebellion but with Conspiracy to Commit
Rebellion, a bailable offense.34
On the Ladlad and Maza Petitions
The Preliminary Investigation was Tainted
With Irregularities.
As in the determination of probable cause, this Court is similarly loath
to enjoin the prosecution of offenses, a practice rooted on public
interest as the speedy closure of criminal investigations fosters public
safety.35 However, such relief in equity may be granted if, among
others, the same is necessary (a) to prevent the use of the strong arm
of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner36 or (b) to afford
adequate protection to constitutional rights.37The case of the
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76 falls under these
exceptions.
The procedure for preliminary investigation of offenses punishable by
at least four years, two months and one day is outlined in Section 3,
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:
Procedure.The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the
following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall
be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to establish
probable cause. They shall be in such number of copies as there are
respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The affidavits shall
be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government
official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or
unavailability, before a notary public, each of whom must certify that
he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the
investigating officer shall either dismiss it if he finds no ground to
continue with the investigation, or issue a subpoena to the respondent
attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its supporting affidavits and
documents.
The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence
submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished
and to copy them at his expense. If the evidence is voluminous, the
complainant may be required to specify those which he intends to
present against the respondent, and these shall be made available for
examination or copying by the respondent at his expense.
Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made
available for examination, copying, or photographing at the expense of
the requesting party.
(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the
complaint and supporting affidavits and documents, the respondent
shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other
supporting documents relied upon for his defense. The counter-
affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in
paragraph (a) of this section, with copies thereof furnished by him to
the complainant. The respondent shall not be allowed to file a motion
to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit.
(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does
not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the
investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the evidence
presented by the complainant.
(e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and
issues to be clarified from a party or a witness. The parties can be
present at the hearing but without the right to examine or cross-
examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating officer
questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned.
The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from submission of the
counter-affidavits and other documents or from the expiration of the
period for their submission. It shall be terminated within five (5) days.
(f) Within ten (10) days after the investigation, the investigating officer
shall determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the
respondent for trial. (Emphasis supplied)
Instead of following this procedure scrupulously, as what this Court
had mandated in an earlier ruling, "so that the constitutional right to
liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any material
damage,"38 respondent prosecutors nonchalantly disregarded it.
Respondent prosecutors failed to comply with Section 3(a) of Rule 112
which provides that the complaint (which, with its attachment, must be
of such number as there are respondents) be accompanied by the
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, subscribed and sworn
to before any prosecutor or government official authorized to
administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary
public. Respondent prosecutors treated the unsubscribed letters of
Tanigue and Mendoza of the CIDG, PNP as complaints39 and
accepted the affidavits attached to the letters even though some of
them were notarized by a notary public without any showing that a
prosecutor or qualified government official was unavailable as required
by Section 3(a) of Rule 112.
Further, Section 3(b) of Rule 112 mandates that the prosecutor, after
receiving the complaint, must determine if there are grounds to
continue with the investigation. If there is none, he shall dismiss the
case, otherwise he shall "issue a subpoena to the respondents." Here,
after receiving the CIDG letters, respondent prosecutors peremptorily
issued subpoenas to petitioners requiring them to appear at the DOJ
office on 13 March 2006 "to secure copies of the complaints and its
attachments." During the investigation, respondent prosecutors
allowed the CIDG to present a masked Fuentes who subscribed to an
affidavit before respondent prosecutor Velasco. Velasco proceeded to
distribute copies of Fuentes affidavit not to petitioners or their
counsels but to members of the media who covered the proceedings.
Respondent prosecutors then required petitioners to submit their
counter-affidavits in 10 days. It was only four days later, on 17 March and 172074-76, we SET ASIDE the Orders dated 22 March 2006 and
2006, that petitioners received the complete copy of the attachments 4 April 2006 issued by respondent prosecutors. We ORDER the
to the CIDG letters.1a\^/phi1.net Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150 to DISMISS Criminal
These uncontroverted facts belie respondent prosecutors statement in Case Nos. 06-452 and 06-944.
the Order of 22 March 2006 that the preliminary investigation "was SO ORDERED.
done in accordance with the Revised Rules o[f] Criminal
Procedure."40 Indeed, by peremptorily issuing the subpoenas to
petitioners, tolerating the complainants antics during the investigation,
and distributing copies of a witness affidavit to members of the media
knowing that petitioners have not had the opportunity to examine the
charges against them, respondent prosecutors not only trivialized the
investigation but also lent credence to petitioners claim that the entire
proceeding was a sham.
A preliminary investigation is the crucial sieve in the criminal justice
system which spells for an individual the difference between months if
not years of agonizing trial and possibly jail term, on the one hand,
and peace of mind and liberty, on the other hand. Thus, we have
characterized the right to a preliminary investigation as not "a mere
formal or technical right" but a "substantive" one, forming part of due
process in criminal justice.41 This especially holds true here where the
offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua and may be non-
bailable for those accused as principals.
Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, respondent
prosecutors filing of the Information against petitioners on 21 April
2006 with Branch 57 of the RTC Makati does not moot the petitions in
G.R. Nos. 172070-72 and 172074-76. Our power to enjoin
prosecutions cannot be frustrated by the simple filing of the
Information with the trial court.1a\^/phi1.net
On Respondent Prosecutors Lack of Impartiality
We find merit in petitioners doubt on respondent prosecutors
impartiality. Respondent Secretary of Justice, who exercises
supervision and control over the panel of prosecutors, stated in an
interview on 13 March 2006, the day of the preliminary investigation,
that, "We [the DOJ] will just declare probable cause, then its up to the
[C]ourt to decide x x x."42 Petitioners raised this issue in their
petition,43 but respondents never disputed the veracity of this
statement. This clearly shows pre-judgment, a determination to file the
Information even in the absence of probable cause.
A Final Word
The obvious involvement of political considerations in the actuations of
respondent Secretary of Justice and respondent prosecutors brings to
mind an observation we made in another equally politically charged
case. We reiterate what we stated then, if only to emphasize the
importance of maintaining the integrity of criminal prosecutions in
general and preliminary investigations in particular, thus:
[W]e cannot emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should not allow,
and should avoid, giving the impression that their noble office is being
used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends, or other
purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental
objective of observing the interest of justice evenhandedly, without
fear or favor to any and all litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or
strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the
established procedure may be publics perception of the impartiality of
the prosecutor be enhanced.44 1a\^/phi1.net
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions. In G.R. No. 175013, we SET
ASIDE the Order dated 31 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court,
Makati City, Branch 146 and the Order dated 29 August 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150. In G.R. Nos. 172070-72
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006
LT. (SG) EUGENE GONZALES, LT. (SG) ANDY TORRATO, LT.
(SG) ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, CPT. GARY ALEJANO, LT. (SG)
JAMES LAYUG, CPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, CPT. NICANOR
FAELDON, LT. (SG) MANUEL CABOCHAN, ENS. ARMAND
PONTEJOS, LT. (JG) ARTURO PASCUA, and 1LT. JONNEL
SANGGALANG, Petitioners,
vs.
GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and B. GEN. MARIANO M.
SARMIENTO, JR., in his capacity as the Judge Advocate General
of the Judge Advocate Generals Office (JAGO), Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the Petition for Prohibition (with prayer for a
temporary restraining order) filed by the above-named members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), herein petitioners, against the
AFP Chief of Staff and the Judge Advocate General, respondents.
The facts are:
On July 26, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo received
intelligence reports that some members of the AFP, with high-powered
weapons, had abandoned their designated places of assignment.
Their aim was to destabilize the government. The President then
directed the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to track and
arrest them.
On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed
junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP mostly from the elite
units of the Armys Scout Rangers and the Navys Special Warfare
Group entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury
Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati City. They disarmed the security
guards and planted explosive devices around the building.
Led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV, the troops sported red
armbands emblazoned with the emblem of the "Magdalo" faction of
the Katipunan. 1 The troops then, through broadcast media,
announced their grievances against the administration of President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, such as the graft and corruption in the
military, the illegal sale of arms and ammunition to the "enemies" of
the State, and the bombings in Davao City intended to acquire more
military assistance from the US government. They declared their
withdrawal of support from their Commander-in-Chief and demanded
that she resign as President of the Republic. They also called for the
resignation of her cabinet members and the top brass of the AFP and
PNP.
About noontime of the same day, President Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 427 declaring a state of rebellion, followed by
General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and PNP to take all necessary
measures to suppress the rebellion then taking place in Makati City.
She then called the soldiers to surrender their weapons at five oclock
in the afternoon of that same day.
In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent
negotiators to dialogue with the soldiers. The aim was to persuade
them to peacefully return to the fold of the law. After several hours of
negotiation, the government panel succeeded in convincing them to
lay down their arms and defuse the explosives placed around the
premises of the Oakwood Apartments. Eventually, they returned to
their barracks.
A total of 321 soldiers, including petitioners herein, surrendered to the
authorities.
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident
and recommended that the military personnel involved be charged
with coup detat defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. On July 31, 2003, the Chief State
Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ) recommended the filing
of the corresponding Information against them.
Meanwhile, on August 2, 2003, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of
War, respondent General Narciso Abaya, then AFP Chief of Staff,
ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers involved in the
Oakwood incident and directed the AFP to conduct its own separate
investigation.
On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Makati City an Information for coup detat 2against those soldiers,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and eventually raffled off to
Branch 61, presided by Judge Romeo F. Barza. 3 Subsequently, this
case was consolidated with Criminal Case No. 03-2678, involving the
other accused, pending before Branch 148 of the RTC, Makati City,
presided by Judge Oscar B. Pimentel.
On August 13, 2003, the RTC directed the DOJ to conduct a
reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 03-2784.
On the same date, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order No.
625 creating a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel tasked to determine the
propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for violations of the
Articles of War under Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4 as amended,
against the same military personnel. Specifically, the charges are: (a)
violation of Article 63 for disrespect toward the President, the
Secretary of National Defense, etc., (b) violation of Article 64 for
disrespect toward a superior officer, (c) violation of Article 67 for
mutiny or sedition, (d) violation of Article 96 for conduct unbecoming
an officer and a gentleman, and (e) violation of Article 97 for conduct
prejudicial to good order and military discipline.
Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only 243
(including petitioners herein) filed with the RTC, Branch 148 an
Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial court assume jurisdiction
over all the charges filed with the military tribunal. They invoked
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7055. 5
On September 15, 2003, petitioners filed with the Judge Advocate
Generals Office (JAGO) a motion praying for the suspension of its
proceedings until after the RTC shall have resolved their motion to
assume jurisdiction.
On October 29, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its
Initial Report to the AFP Chief of Staff recommending that the military
personnel involved in the Oakwood incident be charged before a
general court martial with violations of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97
of the Articles of War.
Meanwhile, on November 11, 2003, the DOJ, after conducting a
reinvestigation, found probable cause against only 31 (petitioners
included) of the 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784.
Accordingly, the prosecution filed with the RTC an Amended
Information. 6
In an Order dated November 14, 2003, the RTC admitted the
Amended Information and dropped the charge of coup detat against
the 290 accused.
Subsequently, or on December 12, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation
Panel submitted its Final Pre-Trial Investigation Report 7 to the JAGO,
recommending that, following the "doctrine of absorption," those
charged with coup detatbefore the RTCshould not be charged before
the military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War.
For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order 8 stating
that "all charges before the court martial against the accusedare
hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in
furtherance of the alleged crime of coup detat." The trial court then
proceeded to hear petitioners applications for bail.
In the meantime, Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his capacity as officer-in-
charge of the JAGO, reviewed the findings of the Pre-Trial
Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29 of the officers involved
in the Oakwood incident, including petitioners, be prosecuted before a
general court martial for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming
an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War.
On June 17, 2004, Colonel Magnos recommendation was approved
by the AFP top brass. The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed
petitioners to submit their answer to the charge. Instead of complying,
they filed with this Court the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that
respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with violation of
Article 96 of the Articles of War in relation to the Oakwood incident. 9
Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in
its Order of February 11, 2004 that the offense for violation of Article
96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of
War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup
detat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its
jurisdiction.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, counters that
R.A. No. 7055 specifies which offenses covered by the Articles of War
areservice-connected. These are violations of Articles 54 to 70, 72 to
92, and 95 to 97. The law provides that violations of these Articles are
properly cognizable by the court martial. As the charge against
petitioners is violation of Article 96 which, under R.A. No. 7055 is a
service-connected offense, then it falls under the jurisdiction of the
court martial.
Subsequently, petitioners filed with this Court a Supplemental Petition
raising the additional issue that the offense charged before the
General Court Martial has prescribed. Petitioners alleged therein that
during the pendency of their original petition, respondents proceeded
with the Pre-Trial Investigation for purposes of charging them with
violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman) of the Articles of War; that the Pre-Trial Investigation
Panel then referred the case to the General Court Martial; that "almost
two years since the Oakwood incident on July 27, 2003, only petitioner
Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes was arraigned, and this was done under
questionable circumstances;" 10 that in the hearing of July 26, 2005,
herein petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground
that they were not arraigned within the prescribed period of two (2)
years from the date of the commission of the alleged offense, in
violation of Article 38 of the Articles of War; 11 that "the offense
charged prescribed on July 25, 2005;" 12 that the General Court Martial
ruled, however, that "the prescriptive period shall end only at 12:00
midnight of July 26, 2005;" 13 that "(a)s midnight of July 26, 2005 was
approaching and it was becoming apparent that the accused could not
be arraigned, the prosecution suddenly changed its position and
asserted that 23 of the accused have already been arraigned;" 14 and
that petitioners moved for a reconsideration but it was denied by the
general court martial in its Order dated September 14, 2005. 15
In his Comment, the Solicitor General prays that the Supplemental
Petition be denied for lack of merit. He alleges that "contrary to
petitioners pretensions, all the accused were duly arraigned on July
13 and 18, 2005." 16 The "(r)ecords show that in the hearing on July
13, 2005, all the 29 accused were present" and, "(o)n that day, Military
Prosecutor Captain Karen Ong Jags read the Charges and
Specifications from the Charge Sheet in open court (pp. 64, TSN, July
13, 2005)." 17
The sole question for our resolution is whether the petitioners are
entitled to the writ of prohibition.
There is no dispute that petitioners, being officers of the AFP, are
subject to military law. Pursuant to Article 1 (a) of Commonwealth Act
No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War, the
term "officer" is "construed to refer to a commissioned officer." Article
2 provides:
Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. The following persons are
subject to these articles and shall be understood as included in the
term "any person subject to military law" or "persons subject to military
law," whenever used in these articles:
(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or of the Philippine Constabulary, all
members of the reserve force, from the dates of their call to active
duty and while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military
instructions; and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered
into, or to duty or for training in the said service, from the dates they
are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same.
Upon the other hand, Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055 reads:
SEC. 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other
persons subject to military law, including members of the Citizens
Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses
penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or
local government ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians
are co-accused, victims, or offended parties, which may be natural or
juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when
the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is
service-connected, in which case, the offense shall be tried by court-
martial, Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the
interest of justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment that
any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts.
As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be
limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and
Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended.
In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial
may take into consideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the
Revised Penal Code, other special laws, or local government
ordinances.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055, quoted above, is clear and unambiguous.
First, it lays down the general rule that members of the AFP and other
persons subject to military law, including members of the Citizens
Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses
penalized under the Revised Penal Code (like coup detat), other
special penal laws, or local ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil
court. Next, it provides the exception to the general rule, i.e., where
the civil court, before arraignment, has determined the offense to be
service-connected, then the offending soldier shall be tried by a court
martial. Lastly, the law states an exception to the exception, i.e.,
where the President of the Philippines, in the interest of justice, directs
before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the
proper civil court.
The second paragraph of the same provision further identifies the
"service-connected crimes or offenses" as "limited to those defined
in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97" of the
Articles of War. Violations of these specified Articles are triable by
court martial. This delineates the jurisdiction between the civil courts
and the court martial over crimes or offenses committed by military
personnel.
Such delineation of jurisdiction by R.A. No. 7055 is necessary to
preserve the peculiar nature of military justice system over military
personnel charged with service-connected offenses. The military
justice system is disciplinary in nature, aimed at achieving the highest
form of discipline in order to ensure the highest degree of military
efficiency. 18 Military law is established not merely to enforce discipline
in times of war, but also to preserve the tranquility and security of the
State in time of peace; for there is nothing more dangerous to the
public peace and safety than a licentious and undisciplined military
body. 19 The administration of military justice has been universally
practiced. Since time immemorial, all the armies in almost all countries
of the world look upon the power of military law and its administration
as the most effective means of enforcing discipline. For this reason,
the court martial has become invariably an indispensable part of any
organized armed forces, it being the most potent agency in enforcing
discipline both in peace and in war. 20
Here, petitioners are charged for violation of Article 96 (conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War before
the court martial, thus:
All persons subject to military law, did on or about 27 July 2003 at
Oakwood Hotel, Makati City, Metro Manila, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously violate their solemn oath as officers to defend the
Constitution, the law and the duly-constituted authorities and
abused their constitutional duty to protect the people and the
State by, among others, attempting to oust the incumbent duly-elected
and legitimate President by force and violence, seriously disturbing the
peace and tranquility of the people and the nation they are sworn to
protect, thereby causing dishonor and disrespect to the military
profession, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, in
violation of AW 96 of the Articles of War.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring ours)
Article 96 of the Articles of War 21 provides:
ART. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. Any
officer, member of the Nurse Corps, cadet, flying cadet, or
probationary second lieutenant, who is convicted of conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be dismissed from the
service. (Underscoring ours)
We hold that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of
War is service-connected. This is expressly provided in Section 1
(second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the
charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their
solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-
constituted authorities.Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and
disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a
bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military
officers. Equally indicative of the "service-connected" nature of the
offense is the penalty prescribed for the same dismissal from the
service imposable only by the military court.Such penalty is purely
disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military
profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military
discipline.
Obviously, there is no merit in petitioners argument that they can no
longer be charged before the court martial for violation of Article 96 of
the Articles of War because the same has been declared by the RTC
in its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather
absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup detat,"
hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in making such
declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the
court martial the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or
offenses." What the law has conferred the court should not take away.
It is only the Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the
court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an
action which can do so. 22 And it is only through a constitutional
amendment or legislative enactment that such act can be done. The
first and fundamental duty of the courts is merely to apply the law "as
they find it, not as they like it to be." 23 Evidently, such declaration by
the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.
In Navales v. Abaya., 24 this Court, through Mr. Justice Romeo J.
Callejo, Sr., held:
We agree with the respondents that the sweeping declaration made by
the RTC (Branch 148) in the dispositive portion of its Order dated
February 11, 2004 that all charges before the court-martial against the
accused were not service-connected, but absorbed and in furtherance
of the crime of coup detat, cannot be given effect. x x x, such
declaration was made without or in excess of jurisdiction; hence, a
nullity.
The second paragraph of the above provision (referring to Section 1 of
R.A. No. 7055) explicitly specifies what are considered "service-
connected crimes or offenses" under Commonwealth Act No. 408, as
amended, also known as the Articles of War, to wit:
Articles 54 to 70:
Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.
Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.
Art. 56. False Muster.
Art. 57. False Returns.
Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.
Art. 59. Desertion.
Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.
Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.
Art. 62. Absence Without Leave.
Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President,
Congress of the Philippines, or Secretary of National
Defense.
Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer.
Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer.
Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer.
Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.
Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.
Articles 72 to 92:
Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners.
Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received.
Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority.
Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities.
Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.
Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender.
Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign.
Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard.
Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service.
Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property.
Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy.
Art. 83. Spies.
Art. 84. Military Property.Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage
or wrongful Disposition.
Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property
Issued to Soldiers.
Art. 86. Drunk on Duty.
Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel.
Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions.
Art. 88-A. Unlawful Influencing Action of Court.
Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions.
Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed.
Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures.
Art. 92. Dueling.
Articles 95 to 97:
Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government.
Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
Art. 97. General Article.
Further, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 vests on the military courts
the jurisdiction over the foregoing offenses. x x x.
It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did not divest the
military courts of jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of Articles
54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War
as these are considered "service-connected crimes or offenses." In
fact, it mandates that these shall be tried by the court-martial.
Moreover, the observation made by Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio
during the deliberation of this case is worth quoting, thus:
The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding
that the charge of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is
absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup detat.
Firstly, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is peculiar to criminal law
and generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, 25unlike
here where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine
applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here,
Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-
connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Thus,
the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.
Military law is sui generis (Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 [1975]),
applicable only to military personnel because the military constitutes
an armed organization requiring a system of discipline separate from
that of civilians (see Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 [1953]). Military
personnel carry high-powered arms and other lethal weapons not
allowed to civilians. History, experience, and the nature of a military
organization dictate that military personnel must be subjected to a
separate disciplinary system not applicable to unarmed civilians or
unarmed government personnel.
A civilian government employee reassigned to another place by his
superior may question his reassignment by asking a temporary
restraining order or injunction from a civil court. However, a soldier
cannot go to a civil court and ask for a restraining or injunction if his
military commander reassigns him to another area of military
operations. If this is allowed, military discipline will collapse.
xxx
This Court has recognized that courts-martial are instrumentalities of
the Executive to enable the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to
effectively command, control, and discipline the armed forces (see
Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875 [1946], citing Winthrops Military
Law and Precedents, 2nd edition, p. 49). In short, courts-martial form
part of the disciplinary system that ensures the Presidents control,
and thus civilian supremacy, over the military. At the apex of this
disciplinary system is the President who exercises review powers over
decisions of courts-martial (citing Article 50 of the Articles of War;
quoted provisions omitted).
xxx
While the Court had intervened before in courts-martial or similar
proceedings, it did so sparingly and only to release a military
personnel illegally detained (Ognir v. Director of Prisons, 80 Phil. 401
[1948] or to correct objectionable procedures (Yamashita v. Styer, 75
Phil. 563 [1945]). The Court has never suppressed court-martial
proceedings on the ground that the offense charged is absorbed and
in furtherance of another criminal charge pending with the civil courts.
The Court may now do so only if the offense charged is not one of the
service-connected offenses specified in Section 1 of RA 7055. Such is
not the situation in the present case.
With respect to the issue of prescription raised by petitioners in their
Supplemental Petition, suffice it to say that we cannot entertain the
same. The contending parties are at loggerheads as to (a) who among
the petitioners were actually arraigned, and (b) the dates of their
arraignment. These are matters involving questions of fact, not within
our power of review, as we are not a trier of facts. In a petition for
prohibition, such as the one at bar, only legal issues affecting the
jurisdiction of the tribunal, board or officer involved may be resolved
on the basis of the undisputed facts. 26
Clearly, the instant petition for prohibition must fail. The office of
prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of
authority and is directed against proceedings that are done without or
in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being
no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. 27 Stated differently, prohibition is the remedy to prevent
inferior courts, corporations, boards, or persons from usurping or
exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been
vested by law. 28
In fine, this Court holds that herein respondents have the authority in
convening a court martial and in charging petitioners with violation of
Article 96 of the Articles of War.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 173150 July 28, 2010
LYDIA C. GELIG, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
An examination of the entire records of a case may be
explored for the purpose of arriving at a correct
conclusion, as an appeal in criminal cases throws the
whole case open for review, it being the duty of the court
to correct such error as may be found in the judgment
appealed from.1
Petitioner Lydia Gelig (Lydia) impugns the
Decision2 promulgated on January 10, 2006 by the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27488 that vacated
and set aside the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Cebu City, Branch 23, in Criminal Case No. CU-
10314. The RTC Decision convicted Lydia for committing
the complex crime of direct assault with unintentional
abortion but the CA found her guilty only of the crime of
slight physical injuries.
Factual Antecedents
On June 6, 1982, an Information4 was filed charging Lydia
with Direct Assault with Unintentional Abortion committed
as follows:
That on the 17th day of July, 1981 at around 10:00
oclock in the morning, at Barangay Nailon, Municipality of
Bogo, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously assault, attack, employ force and seriously
intimidate one Gemma B. Micarsos a public classroom
teacher of Nailon Elementary School while in the
performance of official duties and functions as such which
acts consequently caused the unintentional abortion upon
the person of the said Gemma S. Micarsos.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Lydia pleaded not guilty during her arraignment.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Prosecutions Version
Lydia and private complainant Gemma B. Micarsos
(Gemma), were public school teachers at the Nailon
Elementary School, in Nailon, Bogo, Cebu. Lydias son,
Roseller, was a student of Gemma at the time material to
this case.
On July 17, 1981, at around 10:00 oclock in the morning,
Lydia confronted Gemma after learning from Roseller that
Gemma called him a "sissy" while in class. Lydia slapped
Gemma in the cheek and pushed her, thereby causing
her to fall and hit a wall divider. As a result of Lydias
violent assault, Gemma suffered a contusion in her
"maxillary area", as shown by a medical
certificate5 issued by a doctor in the Bogo General
Hospital. However, Gemma continued to experience
abdominal pains and started bleeding two days after the
incident. On August 28, 1981, she was admitted in the
Southern Islands Hospital and was diagnosed, to her
surprise, to have suffered incomplete abortion.
Accordingly, a medical certificate6 was issued.
The Defenses Version
Lydia claimed that she approached Gemma only to tell
her to refrain from calling her son names, so that his
classmates will not follow suit. However, Gemma
proceeded to attack her by holding her hands and kicking
her. She was therefore forced to retaliate by pushing
Gemma against the wall.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On October 11, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision
convicting Lydia of the complex crime of direct assault
with unintentional abortion. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused LYDIA
GELIG, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
direct assault with unintentional abortion, and she is
hereby sentenced to suffer an Indeterminate Penalty of
SIX (6) MONTHS OF ARRESTO MAYOR AS MINIMUM
TO FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS OF PRISION
CORRECCIONAL AS MAXIMUM. She is likewise ordered
to pay the offended party the amount of Ten Thousand
(10,000.00) Pesos as actual damages and Fifteen
Thousand (15,000.00) Pesos for moral damages.
SO ORDERED.7
Thus, Lydia filed an appeal.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA vacated the trial courts judgment. It ruled that
Lydia cannot be held liable for direct assault since
Gemma descended from being a person in authority to a
private individual when, instead of pacifying Lydia or
informing the principal of the matter, she engaged in a
fight with Lydia.8 Likewise, Lydias purpose was not to
defy the authorities but to confront Gemma on the alleged
name-calling of her son.9
The appellate court also ruled that Lydia cannot be held
liable for unintentional abortion since there was no
evidence that she was aware of Gemmas pregnancy at
the time of the incident.10 However, it declared that Lydia
can be held guilty of slight physical injuries, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed
Decision of the Regional Trial Court-Branch 23 of Cebu
City, dated October 11, 2002 is hereby VACATED AND
SET ASIDE. A new one is entered CONVICTING the
accused-appellant for slight physical injuries pursuant to
Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing
her to suffer the penalty of arresto menor minimum of ten
(10) days.
SO ORDERED.11
Issues
Still dissatisfied, Lydia filed this petition raising the
following as errors:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that
the petitioner is liable for Slight Physical Injuries pursuant
to Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code and
sentencing her to suffer the penalty
of arrestomenor minimum of ten days.
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that
the petitioner can be convicted of Slight Physical Injuries
under the information charging her for Direct Assault with
Unintentional Abortion.12
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
When an accused appeals from the judgment of his
conviction, he waives his constitutional guarantee against
double jeopardy and throws the entire case open for
appellate review. We are then called upon to render such
judgment as law and justice dictate in the exercise of our
concomitant authority to review and sift through the whole
case to correct any error, even if unassigned.13
The Information charged Lydia with committing the
complex crime of direct assault with unintentional
abortion. Direct assault is defined and penalized under
Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. The provision
reads as follows:
Art. 148. Direct assaults. - Any person or persons who,
without a public uprising, shall employ force or
intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes
enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and
sedition, or shall attack, employ force, or seriously
intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his
agents, while engaged in the performance of official
duties, or on occasion of such performance, shall suffer
the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos,
when the assault is committed with a weapon or when the
offender is a public officer or employee, or when the
offender lays hands upon a person in authority. If none of
these circumstances be present, the penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum period and a fine not
exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.1avvphi1
It is clear from the foregoing provision that direct assault
is an offense against public order that may be committed
in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without
a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the
attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining
the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any
person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall
attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any
person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in
the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such
performance.14
The case of Lydia falls under the second mode, which is
the more common form of assault. Its elements are:
1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs
force, (c) makes a serious intimidation, or (d) makes a
serious resistance.
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or
his agent.
3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or
his agent (a) is engaged in the actual performance of
official duties, or [b] that he is assaulted by reason of the
past performance of official duties.
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is
a person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his
duties.
4. That there is no public uprising.15
On the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was
engaged in the performance of her official duties, that is,
she was busy with paperwork while supervising and
looking after the needs of pupils who are taking their
recess in the classroom to which she was assigned. Lydia
was already angry when she entered the classroom and
accused Gemma of calling her son a "sissy". Lydia
refused to be pacified despite the efforts of Gemma and
instead initiated a verbal abuse that enraged the victim.
Gemma then proceeded towards the principals office but
Lydia followed and resorted to the use of force by
slapping and pushing her against a wall divider. The
violent act resulted in Gemmas fall to the floor.
Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the
class of persons in authority expressly mentioned in
Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The
pertinent portion of the provision reads as follows:
Art. 152. Persons in Authority and Agents of Persons in
Authority Who shall be deemed as such.
xxxx
In applying the provisions of articles 148 and 151 of this
Code, teachers, professors, and persons charged with
the supervision of public or duly recognized private
schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in the
actual performance of their professional duties or on the
occasion of such performance shall be deemed persons
in authority. (As amended by Batas Pambansa
Bilang 873, approved June 12, 1985).16
Undoubtedly, the prosecution adduced evidence to
establish beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the
crime of direct assault. The appellate court must be
consequently overruled in setting aside the trial courts
verdict. It erred in declaring that Lydia could not be held
guilty of direct assault since Gemma was no longer a
person in authority at the time of the assault because she
allegedly descended to the level of a private person by
fighting with Lydia. The fact remains that at the moment
Lydia initiated her tirades, Gemma was busy attending to
her official functions as a teacher. She tried to pacify
Lydia by offering her a seat so that they could talk
properly,17 but Lydia refused and instead unleashed a
barrage of verbal invectives. When Lydia continued with
her abusive behavior, Gemma merely retaliated in kind as
would a similarly situated person. Lydia aggravated the
situation by slapping Gemma and violently pushing her
against a wall divider while she was going to the
principals office. No fault could therefore be attributed to
Gemma.
The prosecutions success in proving that Lydia
committed the crime of direct assault does not
necessarily mean that the same physical force she
employed on Gemma also resulted in the crime of
unintentional abortion. There is no evidence on record to
prove that the slapping and pushing of Gemma by Lydia
that occurred on July 17, 1981 was the proximate cause rendered finding Lydia Gelig guilty beyond reasonable
of the abortion. While the medical certificate of Gemmas doubt of the crime of direct assault and is ordered to
attending physician, Dr. Susan Jaca (Dr. Jaca), was suffer an indeterminate prison term of one (1) year and
presented to the court to prove that she suffered an one (1) day to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-
abortion, there is no data in the document to prove that one (21) days of prision correccional. She is also ordered
her medical condition was a direct consequence of the to pay a fine of 1,000.00.
July 17, 1981 incident.18 It was therefore vital for the SO ORDERED.
prosecution to present Dr. Jaca since she was competent
to establish a link, if any, between Lydias assault and
Gemmas abortion. Without her testimony, there is no
way to ascertain the exact effect of the assault on
Gemmas abortion.
It is worth stressing that Gemma was admitted and
confined in a hospital for incomplete abortion on August
28, 1981, which was 42 days after the July 17, 1981
incident. This interval of time is too lengthy to prove that
the discharge of the fetus from the womb of Gemma was
a direct outcome of the assault. Her bleeding and
abdominal pain two days after the said incident were not
substantiated by proof other than her testimony. Thus, it
is not unlikely that the abortion may have been the result
of other factors.
The Proper Penalty
Having established the guilt of the petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of direct assault, she must
suffer the penalty imposed by law. The penalty for this
crime is prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000.00, when the
offender is a public officer or employee, or when the
offender lays hands upon a person in authority.19 Here,
Lydia is a public officer or employee since she is a
teacher in a public school. By slapping and pushing
Gemma, another teacher, she laid her hands on a person
in authority.1avvphi1
The penalty should be fixed in its medium period in the
absence of mitigating or aggravating
circumstances.20Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law,21 the petitioner should be sentenced to an
indeterminate term, the minimum of which is within the
range of the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, and the maximum of which is that
properly imposable under the Revised Penal Code, i.e.,
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Thus, the proper and precise prison sentence that should
be imposed must be within the indeterminate term of four
(4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4)
months of arresto mayor, maximum to prision
correccional minimum to three (3) years, six (6) months
and twenty-one (21) days to four (4) years, nine (9)
months and ten (10) days of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods. A fine of not more than
1,000.00 must also be imposed on Lydia in accordance
with law.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
finding petitioner Lydia Gelig guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Judgment is hereby
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 100231. April 28, 1993.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RODRIGO DASIG @ KA RUBIN DAKU @ ARMAND; EDWIN NUEZ
Y TABANAS @ MABI; ALVIN DOE @ AL @ KA ALVIN; ROGER DOE
@ KA JAMES @ KA PEPE; TUDING ANDRINO @ KA ERMI @ KA
ROEL @ KA GRINGO MONTAYRE; RUBEN DOE @ KA RUBEN @
KA JOJI @ INO ECHAVEZ; ANASTACIO BANGKAL @ KA JUNIOR;
AND CARLITO MAGASIN @ BOBBY, accused, RODRIGO DASIG,
accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Kinaadman and Archival for accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CONFESSION, AS A RULE,
ADMISSIBLE; EXCEPTION; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR.
The settled jurisprudence on the matter is that a confession is
admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a
result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency.
Appellant relies on the much abused claim that his extra-judicial
confession was legally defective and hence, should not have been
admitted and considered by the trial judge. This accusation is
whimsical and obviously a mere refuge for appellant's turnabout. In an
attempt to avoid criminal liability, he now questions the integrity of the
police authorities and the reputation of the lawyer who stood by him
during the investigation. Indubitably established and now a matter of
record is the fact that appellant was assisted by Atty. Parawan who
even signed the former's sworn declarations. It is likewise a matter of
record that before appellant made his extra-judicial confession, he was
first asked if he was amenable to the services of Atty. Parawan to
which query he answered affirmatively. Finally, the alleged use of
force and intimidation has not been substantiated by evidence other
than his self-serving testimony. as has been pointed out, such
allegation is another naive effort of appellant to back track from his
prior voluntary admission of guilt. Evidently, the taking of his extra-
judicial confession was done with regularity and legality.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; ABSORBS THE CRIME OF
DIRECT ASSAULT WHEN DONE IN FURTHERANCE THEREOF.
The crime of rebellion consists of may acts. It is a vast movement of
men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in
furtherance of rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed
absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. The act of killing a police
officer, knowing too well that the victim is a person in authority is a
mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in
furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a separate
charge.
3. ID.; ID.; NOT COVERED BY INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW
(R.A. 4203). The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to
persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203), contrary to the
insinuation of the Solicitor General. Article 135 of the Revised Penal
Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding
P20,000.00 to any person who promotes, maintains, or heads a
rebellion.
DECISION
NOCON, J p:
Appellant, Rodrigo Dasig is now before Us to plead the reversal of his
conviction by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Mandaue City
finding him guilty of Murder with Direct Assault.
He was charged together with Edwin Nuez and 6 others who are still
at large, in an information which reads:
"That on or about the 4th day of August, 1987, in the city of Mandaue,
of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill,
treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and use
of motor vehicle, all armed with unlicensed firearms, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one
Redempto Manatad, a police officer on traffic duty, at his vital portion
which caused his death soon thereafter, knowing beforehand that the
victim was a policeman who was then in the performance of his official
duties."
Upon arraignment, appellant and Edwin Nues entered a plea of "not
guilty." However, after the prosecution had presented its first witness,
accused Nues changed his plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." Hence, the
lower court held in abeyance the promulgation of a judgment against
said accused until the prosecution had finished presenting its
evidence. While trial was still ongoing, Nuez died on March 10, 1989,
thereby extinguishing his criminal liability.
The facts surrounding this case show that in the afternoon of August
4, 1987, Pfc. Redempto Manatad, Pfc. Ninah Tizon and Pfc. Rene
Catamora were tasked by their commanding officer to assist in
canning the traffic at M.N. Briones and Bonifacio Streets in Mandaue
City. Pfc. Tizon controlled the traffic lighting facility; Pfc. Manatad
manned the traffic; while Pfc. Catamora acted as back-up and posted
himself at Norkis Trading building.
At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora noticed eight (8)
persons, one of whom he identified as Edwin Nuez, acting
suspiciously. He noticed one of them giving instructions to two of the
men to approach Pfc. Manatad. He followed the two, but sensing that
they were being followed, they immediately proceeded to the middle of
the road and engaged Pfc. Catamora to a gun battle. At that instant,
Pfc. Catamora heard a series of shots from the other group and
thereafter saw Pfc. Manatad sprawled on the ground. Being out-
numbered and to save his own life, Pat. Catamora sought refuge at
the nearby BIR Office from where he saw two (2) persons take Pfc.
Manatad's gun and again fired at him to make sure that he is dead
while the rest of the group including Nues acted as back up.
Thereafter, the Nues group commandeered a vehicle and fled from
the scene of the shooting. Pfc. Rene Catamora testified that he can
identify accused-appellant Nues because of a mole at the bridge of
his nose near the left eye which he noticed when the accused passed
2 or 3 meters in front of him together with his companions.
On August 16, 1987, two teams of police officers were tasked to
conduct surveillance on a suspected safehouse of members of the
sparrow unit located in Peace Valley, Cebu City. Upon reaching the
place, the group saw Rodrigo Dasig and Edwin Nues trying to
escape. The team of Capt. Antonio Gorre captured Nues and
confiscated a .45 caliber revolver with 3 magazines and ammunitions,
while the group of Sgt. Ronald Arnejo pursued Dasig, who threw a
grenade at his pursuers, but was shot on his left upper arm and
subsequently apprehended. A .38 caliber revolver with 17 live
ammunitions were confiscated from him.
Thereafter, Dasig was brought to the hospital for treatment, while
Nues was turned over to the Metrodiscom for investigation.
Meanwhile, Dasig was interrogated by M/Sgt. Ariston Ira of the PC
Criminal Investigation Service on August 19, 1987 at his hospital bed
at the Lapulapu Army Hospital in Cebu City. Assisting Dasig during the
interrogation was Atty. Fortunato Parawan of the Creer Law Office,
who was requested by the military to represent appellant who did not
have a lawyer. Before the start of the interrogation, Atty. Parawan
asked appellant whether he was willing to avail of his services, to
which appellant agreed. M/Sgt. Ira then appraised Dasig of his
constitutional rights. The interrogation was conducted in Cebuano
upon appellant's request.
Dasig confessed that he and the group of Edwin Nues killed Pfc.
Manatad. He likewise admitted that he and Nues were members of
the sparrow unit and the their aliases were "Armand" and "Mabi,"
respectively. The extra-judicial confession of appellant marked as
Exhibit "J" 2 was signed by him on every page thereof with the first
page containing a certification likewise signed by him, which states: "I
hereby certify that the herein statement is free and voluntary, and that
I am assisted by my counsel in the course of this investigation"
followed by the signed conformity of Atty. Parawan. The extra-judicial
confession was subscribed and sworn to before Cebu City Asst. Fiscal
Salvador Solima.
In the present appeal, Dasig contends that the procedure by which his
extra-judicial confession was taken was legally defective, and contrary
to his Constitutional rights. He further contends that assuming he
conspired in the killing of Pfc. Manatad, he should be convicted at
most of simple rebellion and not murder with direct assault.
Appellant also claims that the custodial interrogation was done while
he was still very sick and consequently, he could not have fully
appreciated the wisdom of admitting such a serious offense. That
even with the presence of counsel, his extra-judicial confession is
inadmissible in evidence as said counsel did not actively assist him
and advise him of his rights. In effect, his presence was merely to give
a semblance of legality to the proceedings and not to protect appellant
against possible abuses of the investigator. Dasig, likewise questions
the sincerity of Atty. Parawan in protecting his rights considering that
the latter is a known anti-Communist advocate and that the law firm to
which he belongs has represented high ranking officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines.
We find the argument specious. Fiscal Salvador Solima in his
certification, Exhibit "J-7-B," stated that he had personally examined
the affiant and that he is convinced that the latter's statement was free
and voluntary and that the affiant signed the same in his presence and
swore under oath as to the veracity of everything therein. Atty.
Fortunato L. Parawan also testified that he assisted the affiant from
the start of the investigation up to its termination. Atty. Parawan
testified thus:
"Q Who introduced Rodrigo Dasig to you?
A I inquired from the personnel of the hospital the whereabout of
Rodrigo Dasig and I introduced myself as a lawyer. So they informed
me the room of Rodrigo Dasig. At that time I introduced myself as a
lawyer who came to assist the person of Rodrigo Dasig. Once we had
a confrontation with Rodrigo Dasig, I asked him whether he was willing
to get me as his lawyer in that investigation. Then he told me yes.
Q Did he tell you whether he as a counsel of his own choice?
A No.
xxx xxx xxx
Q In other words he accepted your services as counsel in connection
with that investigation which was about to be made?
A Yes.
Q Who are the persons present at that time?
A There were guards outside and inside. There was a man from the
CIS in the person of Sgt. Ira, myself and Dasig.
Q What happened after that?
A The CIS started the investigation.
Q You mean this Ariston Ira?
A Yes.
Q Before Ariston Ira conducted the investigation was Dasig informed
of his constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and if he
chooses to testify or say something, that statement of his will be used
against or in his favor in the court of justice?
A Yes. He was willing to get me as counsel in that investigation.
Q After he was informed of his constitutional rights what transpired
next?
A The investigation started.
Q Were you present at the very start of that investigation?
A Yes. I was present from the start until it was finished.
Q Was that reduced to writing?
A Yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said you were present during the entire investigation. Were the
answers of the accused, Rodrigo Dasig, to the questions propounded
by the investigator voluntary?
A Yes, they voluntary.
Q After the investigation was finished what transpired next?
A After the investigation, I think that was already past 3:00 or 4:00, we
proceeded to the office of the City Fiscal at F. Ramos St., Cebu City
and then we proceeded to the Office of Fiscal Solema (sic) and then it
was subscribed there before Fiscal Solema (sic).
Q Were you present during the proceeding?
A I was also present."
We do not find any reason to doubt the factual findings and
conclusions of the trial court that the extra-judicial confession of the
appellant was voluntarily made. Said the trial court:
"The prosecution's evidence clearly shows that herein accused during
his investigation was properly informed and appraised of his
constitutional right to remain silent and to have a competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice but since at that
time he did not signify his intention to retain a lawyer of his own
choice, so he was provided with a lawyer in the person of Atty.
Fortunato Parawan of the Creer Law Office who was available at that
time, to assist him during the custodial investigation conducted by
T/Sgt. Ariston L. Ira at his hospital bed at Camp Lapulapu Army
Station Hospital, Cebu City where he was confined after being hit on
his upper left arm and in fact, Atty. Parawan only consented to assist
herein accused after the latter has answered in the affirmative to his
question as to whether he would be amenable to be assisted by him
as his counsel of his own choice.
"The prosecution's evidence further show that Atty. Fortunato
Parawan after consenting to be his counsel was with him when his
extra-judicial confession or sworn statement was subscribed and
sworn to by him before Assistant City Fiscal Salvador O. Solima of the
Cebu City Fiscal's Office who, before accused has actually affixed his
signature on each and every pages of his extra-judicial confession,
has informed him (accused) of his constitutional rights and has
explained the contents of his extra-judicial confession.
"Moreover, per certification made by Assistant City Fiscal Salvador O.
Solima of the Cebu City Fiscal's Office, clearly shows that accused in
executing the same has done so voluntarily and after having
understood the contents thereof which is in the visayan language, a
language known to him, found on the last page thereof now marked as
Exhibit "J-7-B."
"Furthermore, this sworn statement of accused Dasig is collaborated
by the sworn statement of his co-accused Edwin Nues dated August
18, 1987 which is sworn and subscribed to before City Fiscal
Jopelinito Pareja of the city Fiscal's Office of Cebu City."
The settled jurisprudence on the matter is that a confession is
admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a
result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency.
5 The case of People of the Philippines v. Parojinog is four square to
the case at bar. In Parojinog this court had this to say:
"Anent his claim that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice, Section 12 (1)
of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
'Sec. 12(1). Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel he
must provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.'
"It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that a person under
investigation for the commission of an offense may choose his own
counsel but if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. While the initial choice of the lawyer in the latter
case is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused really
has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and
ask for another one. In the instant case, the records show that no
objection was voiced by the accused throughout the entire
proceedings of the investigation and afterwards when he subscribed to
its veracity before City Prosecutor Luzminda V. Uy. Thus, he
apparently acquiesced to the choice of the investigators. He
complained for the first time that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice only
during trial. Thus it was too late."
Appellant relies on the much abused claim that his extra-judicial
confession was legally defective and hence, should not have been
admitted and considered by the trial judge. This accusation is
whimsical and obviously a mere refuge for appellant's turnabout. In an
attempt to avoid criminal liability, he now questions the integrity of the
police authorities and the reputation of the lawyer who stood by him
during the investigation. Indubitably established and now a matter of
record is the fact that appellant was assisted by Atty. Parawan who
even signed the former's sworn declarations. It is likewise a matter of
record that before appellant made his extra-judicial confession, he was
first asked if he was amenable to the services of Atty. Parawan to
which query he answered affirmatively. Finally, the alleged use of fore
and intimidation has not been substantiated by evidence other than his
self-serving testimony. As has been pointed out, such allegation is
another naive effort of appellant to back track from his prior voluntary
admission of guilt. Evidently, the taking of his extra-judicial confession
was done with regularity and legality.
Nevertheless, there is merit in appellant's argument that granting he is prision mayor, and to pay the heirs of Pfc. Redempto Manatad,
guilty, what he committed was a political crime of simple rebellion, and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
hence he should not be convicted of murder with direct assault. SO ORDERED.
The Solicitor General agrees with the accused-appellant on this point
as manifested in the People's brief, which We quote:
"However, as correctly pointed by appellant, the lower court
erroneously convicted him of Murder with Assault Upon a Person in
Authority, instead of Rebellion.
"Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against the government,
among other means. (Article 135, Revised Penal Code). In this case,
appellant not only confessed voluntarily his membership with the
sparrow unit but also his participation and that of his group in the
killing of Pfc. Manatad while manning the traffic in Mandaue City in the
afternoon of August 4, 1987. It is of judicial notice that the sparrow unit
is the liquidation squad of the New People's Army with the objective of
overthrowing the duly constituted government. It is therefore not hard
to comprehend that the killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed as a
means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA.
Consequently, appellant is liable for the crime of rebellion, not murder
with direct assault upon a person in authority."
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of
men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in
furtherance of rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed
absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. 9 The act of killing a police
officer, knowing too well that the victim is a person in authority is a
mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in
furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a separate
charge.
Moreover, in the case of People v. Mangallan 10 We held that where
the accused who was charged with murder admitted his membership
with the NPA and the killing of a suspected PC informer, the crime
committed is not murder but rebellion punishable under Articles 134
and 135 of the Revised Penal Code.
As to the proper imposable penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law
is not applicable to persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203),
contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General. Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor and a fine
not exceeding P20,000.00 to any person who promotes, maintains, or
heads a rebellion. However, in the case at bar, there is no evidence to
prove that appellant Dasig headed the crime committed. As a matter
of fact he was not specifically pinpointed by Pfc. Catamora as the
person giving instructions to the group which attacked Pfc. Manatad.
Appellant merely participated in committing the act, or just executed
the command of an unknown leader. Hence, he should be made to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision mayor.
For the resulting death, appellant is likewise ordered to pay the heirs
of Pfc. Manatad FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil
indemnity.
Premises considered, We uphold the findings of the trial court that the
extra-judicial confession was legally obtained. However, appellant
being a confessed member of the sparrow unit, the liquidation squad
of the New People's Army whose objective is to overthrow the duly
constituted government, the crime committed is simple rebellion and
not murder with direct assault.
WHEREFORE, accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of participating
in an act of rebellion beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 88189 July 9, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TIBURCIO ABALOS, accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:p
In this appeal, accused-appellant Tiburcio Abalos seeks absolution
from the judgment of conviction rendered by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 27, of Catbalogan, Samar which pronounced him guilty of the
complex crime of direct assault with murder in Criminal Case No.
2302. His arguments in the present appeal turn on the central question
of unwarranted credence allegedly extended by the trial court to the
version of the criminal incident narrated by the sole prosecution
witness. The totality of the evidence adduced, however, indubitably
confirms appellant's guilt of the offense charged. Accordingly, we
affirm.
An information filed in the trial court, dated April 21, 1983, imputed the
crime of direct assault with murder to herein appellant Tiburcio
Abalos, alias "Ewet," with the allegations
That on or about the 20th day of March, 1983, at nighttime, in the
Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation
and knowing fully well that one Sofronio Labine was an agent of a
person in authority being a member of the Integrated National Police
with station at Catbalogan, Samar, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strike said Sofronio
Labine with a piece of wood, which said accused ha(d) conveniently
provided himself for the purpose while said P/Pfc. Sofronio Labine, a
duly appointed and qualified member of the said INP, was engaged in
the performance of his official duties or on the occasion of such
performance, that is, maintaining peace and order during the barangay
fiesta of Canlapwas, of said municipality, thereby inflicting upon him
"Lacerated wound 2 inches parietal area right. Blood oozing from both
ears and nose" which wound directly caused his death.
That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstance of
nocturnity was present.1
At his arraignment on June 7, 1983, appellant, with the assistance of
counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.2 The trial conducted thereafter
culminated in the decision3 of the trial court on February 3, 1989
finding appellant guilty as charged and meting out to him the penalty
of "life imprisonment, with the accessories of the law." Appellant was
likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of
P30,000.00; actual and compensatory damages in the amount of
P2,633.00, with P15,000.00 as moral damages; and to pay the costs. 4
As recounted by prosecution witness Felipe Basal, a farmer residing in
Barangay Pupua, Catbalogan, Samar, appellant assaulted the victim,
Pfc. Sofronio Labine, at around 8:00 P.M. of March 20, 1983, which
was then the day of the barangay fiesta celebrations in Barangay
Canlapwas, Catbalogan, Samar. The incident transpired near the
house of appellant at the said barangay. Felipe Basal was then having
a drinking session in front of the shanty of one Rodulfo Figueroa, Jr.
which was situated just a few meters from the residence of appellant.
According to Basal, at about that time he noticed the father of
appellant, Police Major Cecilio Abalos, scolding his employees in his
transportation business for turning in only two hundred pesos in
earnings for that day. While Major Abalos was thus berating his
employees, appellant arrived and asked his father not to scold them
and to just let them take part in the barangay festivities. This infuriated
the elder Abalos and set off a heated argument between father and
son.5
While the two were thus quarreling, a woman shouted "Justicia,
boligue kumi! Adi in mag-a-aringasa." meaning, "Police officer, help
us! Somebody's making trouble here." The victim, Pfc. Sofronio
Labine, then appeared on the scene and asked Major Abalos, "What is
it, sir?" The victim saluted Abalos when the latter turned around to
face him. As Major Abalos leveled his carbine at Labine, appellant
hurriedly left and procured a piece of wood, about two inches thick,
three inches wide and three feet long, from a nearby Ford Fiera
vehicle.
He then swiftly returned and unceremoniously swung with that wooden
piece at Labine from behind, hitting the policeman at the back of the
right side of his head. Labine collapsed unconscious in a heap, and he
later expired from the severe skull fracture he sustained from that
blow. Felipe Basal and his wife took flight right after appellant struck
the victim, fearful that they might be hit by possible stray
bullets6 should a gunfight ensue.
Appellant's testimony, on the other hand, is of a different tenor. He
admits having struck Labine with a piece of wood during the incident in
question but claims that he did so in the erroneous belief that his
father was being attacked by a member of the New People's Army
(NPA). According to appellant, he was then seated inside their family-
owned Sarao jeepney parked beside the store of Rodulfo Figueroa, Jr.
near their home in Barangay Canlapwas when he noticed a man in
fatigue uniform suddenly accost his father. At that time, appellant's
father had just arrived from a trip from Wright, Samar and had just
alighted from his service vehicle, a Ford Fiera.
The man tried to disarm Major Abalos of his firearm but the latter
resisted and while the two were grappling for possession of the gun,
appellant instinctively went to the rescue of his father. He got a piece
of wood from Figueroa's store with which he then clubbed Labine
whom he did not recognize at that point. When Labine fell to the
ground from the blow, appellant immediately fled to Barangay
Mercedes nearby, fearing that the man had companions who might
retaliate. When he came to know of the identity of his victim the
following morning, he forthwith surrendered to the authorities.7
As mentioned at the outset, the foregoing version of the factual
antecedents as presented by appellant was roundly rejected by the
lower court which found the same unworthy of belief. Appellant
ascribes reversible errors to the trial court (a) in not giving credence to
the evidence adduced by the defense; (b) in believing the evidence
presented by the prosecution; (c) in relying on the prosecution's
evidence which falls short of the required quantum of evidence that
would warrant a conviction; (d) in finding that treachery attended the
commission of the crime and failing to credit in appellant's favor his
voluntary surrender; and (e) in finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.8
In the main, appellant insists that the trial court should not have given
credence to the story of the lone eyewitness for the prosecution. He
also contends that since the testimony of that witness bore clear
traces of incredibility, particularly the fact that he could not have had a
clear view of the incident due to poor visibility, the prosecution should
have presented as well the woman who had called for help at the
height of the incident if only to corroborate Basal's narration of the
events. Appellant also assails as inherently incredible the fact that it
took quite a time for witness Felipe Basal to come forward and divulge
what he knew to the authorities. All these, unfortunately, are flawed
arguments.
From the evidence in the case at bar, the prosecution has convincingly
proved, through the clear and positive testimony of Basal, the manner
in which the victim was killed by herein appellant. The record is bereft
of any showing that said prosecution witness was actuated by any evil
motivation or dubious intent in testifying against appellant. Moreover, a
doctrine of long standing in this jurisdiction is that the testimony of a
lone eyewitness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict an
accused.9 There was thus no need, as appellant would want the
prosecution to do, to present in court the woman who shouted for
assistance since her testimony would only be corroborative in nature.
The presentation of such species of evidence in court would only be
warranted when there are compelling reasons to suspect that the
eyewitness is prevaricating or that his observations were
inaccurate. 10 Besides, it is up to the People to determine who should
be presented as prosecution witness on the basis of its own
assessment of the necessity for such testimony. 11 Also, no
unreasonable delay could even be attributed to Felipe Basal
considering that during the wake for Pfc. Labine, Basal came and
intimated to the widow of the victim that he was going to testify
regarding her husband's slaying. 12
Appellant's contention that the deceased had attacked and attempted
to divest his father of his firearm is rather preposterous considering
that no reason was advanced as to why the deceased patrolman
would assault a police officer of superior rank. Parenthetically, the
condition of visibility at the time of the incident was conducive not only
to the clear and positive identification of appellant as the victim's
assailant but likewise to an actual and unobstructed view of the events
that led to the victim's violent death.
Basal was seated just a few meters away from the protagonists whom
he all knew, he being also a long-time resident of that municipality.
There was a twelve-foot high fluorescent lamppost located along the
road and which, by appellant's own reckoning, was just seventeen
meters away from them. 13 Notwithstanding the fact that a couple of
trees partly obstructed the post, the illumination cast by the fluorescent
lamp and the nearby houses provided sufficient brightness for the
identification of the combatants.
Curiously enough, appellant's assertion that there was poor visibility is
ironically contradicted by his testimony which is detailed on facts that
one could readily recall after witnessing an event in broad daylight.
While appellant considers unbelievable Basal's identification of him
supposedly because of inadequate lighting, he himself, under the
same conditions, could clearly see his father's assailant wearing a
fatigue uniform which was different from that worn by policemen. He
even asserts that he saw his father clutching the carbine with his
hands holding the butt while his purported assailant held on tightly to
the rifle. 14 What these facts establish is that the lights in the area at
the time of the incident were enough to afford Basal an excellent view
of the incident, contrary to appellant's pretense. Appellant's testimony
is thus negated by the rule that evidence, to be believed, must have
been given not only by a credible witness, but that the same must also
be reasonably acceptable in itself.
Appellant's flight right after he had assaulted the victim is also
corrosive of his testimony. For, if it were true that he had merely
labored under the wrong notion that his father was being attacked by a
member of the NPA, and that it was an innocent case of error in
personae, he could have readily surrendered to his father right then
and there. After all, Cecilio Abalos was a police major and was the
Station Commander of the Integrated National Police (INP) in Wright,
Samar. Further, there was no necessity at all for him to flee from the
crime scene for fear of retaliation considering that he was in the
company of his own father who, aside from his position, was then
armed with a carbine. Appellant's explanation is, therefore, absurd and
should be considered as self-serving evidence with no weight in law.
On the offense committed by appellant, the trial court correctly
concluded that he should be held accountable for the complex crime
of direct assault with murder. There are two modes of
committing atentados contra la autoridad o sus agentes under Article
148 of the Revised Penal Code. The first is not a true atentado as it is
tantamount to rebellion or sedition, except that there is no public
uprising. On the other hand, the second mode is the more common
way of committing assault and is aggravated when there is a weapon
employed in the attack, or the offender is a public officer, or the
offender lays hands upon a person in authority. 15
Appellant committed the second form of assault, the elements of
which are that there must be an attack, use of force, or serious
intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his agent; the
assault was made when the said person was performing his duties or
on the occasion of such performance; and the accused knew that the
victim is a person in authority or his agent, that is, that the accused
must have the intention to offend, injure or assault the offended party
as a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority. 16
Here, Labine was a duly appointed member of the then INP in
Catbalogan, Samar and, thus, was an agent of a person in authority
pursuant to Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
There is also no dispute that he was in the actual performance of his
duties when assaulted by appellant, that is, he was maintaining peace
and order during the fiesta in Barangay Canlapwas. Appellant himself
testified that he personally knew Labine to be a policeman 17 and, in
fact, Labine was then wearing his uniform. These facts should have
sufficiently deterred appellant from attacking him, and his defiant
conduct clearly demonstrates that he really had the criminal intent to
assault and injure an agent of the law.
When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in
authority for that matter, there arises the complex crime of direct
assault with murder or homicide. 18 The killing in the instant case
constituted the felony of murder qualified by alevosia through
treacherous means deliberately adopted Pfc. Labine was struck from
behind while he was being confronted at the same time by appellant's
father. The evidence shows that appellant deliberately went behind the
victim whom he then hit with a piece of wood which he deliberately got
for that purpose.
Obviously, appellant resorted to such means to avoid any risk to
himself, knowing fully well that his quarry was a policeman who could
readily mount a defense. The aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and nocturnity, however, were not duly proven, as
correctly ruled by the court below. On the other hand, appellant's
voluntary surrender even if duly taken into account by the trial court
would have been inconsequential.
The offense is a complex crime, the penalty for which is that for the
graver offense, to be imposed in the maximum period. Considering
that the more serious crime of murder then carried the penalty
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, the imposable
penalty should have been death. The mitigating circumstance, in that
context, would have been unavailing and inapplicable since the
penalty thus imposed by the law is indivisible. 19 At all events, the
punishment of death could not be imposed as it would have to be
reduced to reclusion perpetua due to the then existing proscription
against the imposition of the death penalty. 20
However, the designation by the trial court of the imposable penalty as
"life imprisonment" is erroneous, as the same should properly be
denominated as reclusion perpetua. 21 Also, the death indemnity
payable to the heirs of the victim, under the present jurisprudential
policy, is P50,000.00.
ACCORDINGLY, with the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed
upon accused-appellant Tiburcio Abalos should be reclusion perpetua,
and that the death indemnity is hereby increased to P50,000.00, the
judgment of the court a quo in Criminal Case No. 2302 is AFFIRMED
in all other respects, with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5803 November 29, 1954
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NARCISO UMALI, ET AL., defendants.
NARCISO UMALI, EPIFANIO PASUMBAL and ISIDRO
CAPINO, defendants-appellants.
Jose P. Laurel, Cipriano Primicias, Alejo Mabanag,
Manuel Concordia, P.M. Stuart Del Rosario, Tomas R.
Umali, Eufemio E. De Mesa and Edmundo T. Zepeda for
appellants.
Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Martiniano
P. Vivo for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Narciso Umali, Epifanio Pasumbal, and Isidro Capino are
appealing directly to this Tribunal from a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Quezon province finding them
guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery, and
sentencing each of them to "life imprisonment, other
accessories of the law, to indemnify jointly and severally
Marcial Punsalan in the amount of P24,023; Valentin
Robles in the amount of P10,000; Yao Cabon in the
amount of P700; Claro Robles in the amount of P12,800;
Pocho Guan in the amount of P600; the heirs of Domingo
Pisigan in the amount of P6,000; the heirs of Locadio
Untalan in the amount of P6,000; Patrolman Pedro
Lacorte in the amount of P500; Lazaro Ortega in the
amount of P300; Hilarion Aselo in the amount of P300;
Calixto Rivano in the amount P50; Melecio Garcia in the
amount of P60; and Juanito Lector in the amount of P90,
each to pay one fifteenth of the costs, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency due to the nature of
the principal penalty that is imposed upon them."
The complex crime of which appellants were found guilty
was said to have been committed during the raid staged
in the town of Tiaong, Quezon, between 8:00 and 9:00 in
the evening of November 14, 1951, by armed men. It is
not denied that such a raid took place resulting in the
burning down and complete destruction of the house of
Mayor Marcial Punzalan including its content valued at
P24,023; the house of Valentin Robles valued at
P10,000, and the house of one Mortega, the death of
Patrolman Domingo Pisigan and civilians Vicente Soriano
and Leocadio Untalan, and the wounding of Patrolman
Pedro Lacorte and five civilians; that during and after the
burning of the houses, some of the raiders engaged in
looting, robbing one house and two Chinese stories; and
that the raiders were finally dispersed and driven from the
town by the Philippine Army soldiers stationed in the town
led by Captain Alzate.
To understand the reason for and object of the raid we
have to go into the political situation in Tiaong not only
shortly before that raid but one year or two years before
it. Narciso Umali and Marcial Punzalan were old time
friends and belonged to the same political faction. In the
general elections of 1947 Umali campaigned for Punzalan
who later was elected Mayor of Tiaong. In the elections of
1949 Punzalan in his turn campaigned and worked for
Narciso Umali resulting in the latter's election as
Congressman. However, these friendly relations between
the two did not endure. In the words of Punzalan, Narciso
Umali who as Congressman regarded himself as the
political head and leader in that region including Tiaong,
became jealous because of his (Punzalan's) fast growing
popularity among the people of Tiaong who looked to him
instead of Umali for political guidance, leadership, and
favors. In time the strain in their relations became such
that they ceased to have any dealings with each other
and they even filed mutual accusations. According to
Punzalan, in May 1950, Umali induced about twenty-six
special policemen of his (Punzalan's) to flee to the
mountains with their arms and join the Huks, this is in
order to discredit Punzalan's administration; that he was
later able to contact two of his twenty-six policemen and
tried to persuade them to return to the town and to the
service, but they told him that they and their companions
would not surrender except and with through the
intervention of Congressman Umali, and so Punzalan had
to seek Umali's intervention which resulted in the
surrender of the 26 men with their firearms; that thereafter
Umali wanted to have their firearms, claiming that they all
belonged to him from his guerrilla days when he was a
colonel, and that after liberation he had merely loaned
them to the municipal authorities of Tiaong to help keep
peace and order; and that the refusal of Punzalan to grant
Umali's request further strained their relations, and
thereafter Umali would not speak to him even when they
happened to meet at parties.
On September 19, 1951, the Chief of Police of Punzalan
disarmed four of Umali's men, including his bodyguard
Isidro Capino who were then charged with illegal
possession of firearms. Umali interceded for his men and
Col. Gelveson, Provincial Commander, sent a telegram
stating that the firearms taken away from the men were
licensed. As a result the complaint was dismissed. This
incident was naturally resented by Umali and spurred him
to have a showdown with Punzalan.
Then the elections of 1951 (November 13) approached
and Punzalan ran for reelection. To oppose him, and to
clip his political wings and definitely blast his ambition for
continued power and influence in Tiaong, Umali picked
Epifanio Pasumbal, his trusted leader.
The pre-election campaign and fight waged by both
factions Punzalan and Pasumbal, was intense and
bitter, even ruthless. The election was to be a test of
political strength and would determine who was who in
Tiaong, Umali or Punzalan. Umali spoke at political
meetings, extolling the virtues of Pasumbal and the
benefits and advantages that would accrue to the town if
he was elected, at the same time bitterly attacking
Punzalan, accusing him of dishonesty, corruption in
office, abuse of power, etc. At one of those meetings he
told the audience not to vote for Punzalan because he
would not be elected and that even if he won the election,
he would not sit for blood will flow, and that he (Umali)
had already prepared a golden coffin for him (Punzalan).
After denying the charges, in retort, Punzalan would say
that Umali as a Congressman was useless, and that he
did not even attend the sessions and that his chair in
Congress had gathered dust, even cobwebs.
To help in the Umali-Pasumbal campaign, Amado
Mendoza who later was to play the role of star witness for
the prosecution, was drafted. He was a compadre of
Pasumbal and had some experience in political
campaigns, and although he was not exactly a model
citizen, being sometimes given to drunkenness, still, he
had the gift of speech and persuasion. In various political
meetings he delivered speeches for Pasumbal. He was
ever at the back and call of Umali and Pasumbal, and
naturally he frequented the latter's houses or
headquarters. The result of the elections plainly showed
that Punzalan was the political master and leader in
Tiaong. He beat Pasumbal by an overwhelming majority
of 2,221 votes. Naturally, Umali and Pasumbal were
keenly disappointed, and according to the evidence,
adopted measures calculated to frustrate Punzalan's
victory, even as prophesied by Umali himself in one of his
pre-election speeches about blood flowing and gold
coffin.
Going back to the raid staged in Tiaong on November 14,
1951, it is well to make a short narration of the
happenings shortly before it, established by the evidence,
so as to ascertain and be informed of the reason or
purpose of said raid, the persons, behind it, and those
who took part in it. According to the testimony of Amado
Mendoza, in the morning of November 12th, that is, on
the eve of the election, at the house of Pasumbal's father,
then being used as his electoral headquarters, he heard
Umali instruct Pasumbal to contact the Huks through
Commander Abeng so that Punzalan will be killed,
Pasumbal complying with the order of his Chief (Umali)
went to the mountains which were quite near the town
and held a conference with Commander Abeng. It would
seem that Umali and Pasumbal had a feeling that
Punzalan was going to win in the elections the next day,
and that his death was the surest way to eliminate him
from the electoral fight.
The conference between Pasumbal and Commander
Abeng on November 12th was witnessed and testified to
by Nazario Anonuevo, a Huk who was under Commander
Abeng, and who later took an active part in the raid. In the
evening of the same day, Mendoza heard Pasumbal
report to Umali about his conference with Commander
Abeng, saying that the latter was agreeable to the
proposition and had even outlined the manner of attack,
that the Huks would enter the town (Tiaong) under
Commander Lucio and Aladin, the latter to lead the sector
towards the East; but that Commander Abeng had
suggested that the raid be postponed because Pasumbal
may yet win the election the following day, thereby
rendering unnecessary the raid and the killing of
Punzalan.
Continuing with the testimony of Amado Mendoza, he told
the court that as per instructions of Umali he went to the
house of the latter, in the evening of November 14th, the
day following the election, with the result of the election
already known, namely, the decisive victory of Punzalan
over Pasumbal. He was told by Umali to come with him,
and Pasumbal and the three boarded a jeep with
Pasumbal at the wheel. They drove toward the Tiaong
Elementary School and once there he (Mendoza) was left
at the school premises with instructions by Umali to wait
for Commander Abeng and the Huks and point to them
the house of Punzalan. After waiting for sometime, Abeng
and his troops numbering about fifty, armed with garands
and carbines, arrived and after explaining his identity and
his mission to Abeng, he had led the dissidents or part of
the contingent in the direction of Punzalan's house and
on arriving in front of the bodega of Robles, he pointed
out Punzalan's house and then walked toward his home,
leaving the Huks who proceeded to lie flat in a canal.
Before reaching his house, he already heard shots, so, he
evacuated his family to their dugout in his yard. While
doing so he and his wife Catalina Tinapunan saw armed
men in the lanzones grove just across the street from
their house, belonging to the father of Umali, and among
those men they saw Congressman Umali holding a
revolver, in the company of Huk Commander Torio and
about 20 armed men. Afterwards they saw Umali and his
companions leave in the direction of Taguan, by way of
the railroad tracks.
It would appear from the evidence that the raid was well-
planned. As a diversionary measure, part of the attacking
force was deployed toward the camp or station of the
Army (part of 8th B.C.T.) in the suburbs and the camp
was fired upon, not exactly to destroy or drive out that
Army unit but to keep it from going to the rescue and aid
of the main objective of the raid. The rest of the raiding
party went toward Punzalan's house and attacked it with
automatic weapons, hand grenades, and even with
bottles filled with gasoline (popularly known as Molotov's
cocktail). It was evident that the purpose of the attack on
Punzalan's house was to kill him. Fortunately, however,
and apparently unknown to the attackers and those who
designed the raid, at six o'clock that morning of
November 14th Punzalan and his Chief of Police had left
Tiaong to go to Lucena, the capital, to report the results of
the election to the Governor.
The attack on the house of Punzalan was witnessed and
described by several persons, including policemen who
happened to be near the house. Policeman Tomas
Maguare who was in front of the house saw Epifanio
Pasumbal, Isidro Umali (brother of Congressman Umali)
and Moises Escueta enter the gate of Punzalan's house
and take part in the firing. Policeman Pedro Lacorte who
was stationed as guard at the gate of Mayor Punzalan's
house recognized defendant Isidro Capino as one of
those firing at the house. Lacorte said that he was
guarding the house of Punzalan when he suddenly heard
shots coming from the sides of the house and going over
to the place to investigate, he saw armed men in fatigue
and shouting "burn the house of Mayor Punzalan"; that he
was hit on the left check and later Isidro Capino threw at
him a hand grenade and he was hit in the right forearm
and in the right eye and became permanently blind in said
eye. Mateo Galit, laundryman who was sitting inside a
jeep parked in front of the house of Punzalan recognized
defendant Pasumbal as one of the attackers who, once in
the yard said ina loud voice as though addressing
somebody in the house "Pare, come down." Mrs.
Punzalan who was then inside the house related to the
court that at about eight in the evening while she was
resting she heard shots and rapid firing. As a precaution
she took her children to the bathroom. Then she noticed
that her house was being fired at because the glass
window panes were being shattered and she heard the
explosion of a hand grenade inside the house, followed
by flares in the sala and burning of blankets and mosquito
nets in the bedrooms and she noticed the smell of smoke
of gasoline. Realizing the great danger, she and the
children ran out of the house and went to hide in the
house of a neighbor.
Nazario Aonuevo declared in court that he was a farmer
and was picked up and seized by Huk Commander
Tommy sometime in August 1951, and was taken to Mt.
Banahaw in Laguna and mustered in the ranks of the
Huks; that just before the elections of November 13,
1951, he saw Pasumbal come to the mountains near
Tiaong and talk to Commander Abeng; that on November
14th by order of Commander Abeng he with other Huks
left Mt. Banahaw for Tiaong; that when they crossed the
Osiw River already near Tiaong, they were met by
Pasumbal and Capino; that when they were at the
outskirts of the town, he and the party were told by
Commander Tommy to attack the 8th BCT camp in
Tiaong to prevent the sending of army help to the town
proper; that he took part in firing on the camp which
returned the fire in the course of which he was wounded;
and that because of his wound he could not escape with
his companions to the mountains when the Army soldiers
dispersed and drove them out of the town and so he was
finally captured by said soldiers.
As to defendants Pasumbal and Capino, their
participation in and responsibility for the raid was duly
established not only by the going of Pasumbal on
November 12th to the mountains following instructions of
Umali, and conferring with Commander Abeng asking him
to raid Tiaong and kill Punzalan, but also by the fact that
Pasumbal and Capino in the afternoon or evening of
November 14th met the Huks at the Osiw River as the
dissidents were on their way to Tiaong and later
Pasumbal and Capino were seen in the yard of Punzalan
firing at the house with automatic weapons and hand
grenades.
What about Umali? His criminal responsibility was also
established, tho indirectly. We have the testimony of
Amado Mendoza who heard him instructing Pasumbal to
contact Commander Abeng and ask him to raid Tiaong
and kill Punzalan. The rest of the evidence is more or less
circumstantial, but nonetheless strong and convincing. No
one saw him take part in the firing and attack on the
house of Punzalan; nor was he seen near or around said
house. Because of his important position as
Congressman, perchance he did not wish to figure too
prominently in the actual raid. Besides, he would seem to
have already given out all the instructions necessary and
he could well stay in the background. However, during the
raid, not very far from Punzalan's house he was seen in
the lanzonesan of his father, holding a revolver and in the
company of about 20 armed men with Huk Commander
Torio, evidently observing and waiting for developments.
Then he and his companions left in the direction of
Taguan.
Umali and Pasumbal, however, claim that during the raid,
they were in the home of Pasumbal in Taguan, about
seven kilometers away from Tiaong where a consolation
party was being held. There is ample evidence however
to the effect that they arrived in Pasumbal's home only
around midnight. An Army soldier named Cabalona who
happened to be in Pasumbal's home arriving there earlier
in the evening and who was invited to take some
refreshments said that he did not see the two men until
they arrived about midnight when the Army
reinforcements from Lucena passed by on their way to
Tiaong. Thus, we have this chain of circumstances that Legaspi of the Army was looking for him. Instead of
does not speak in favor of Umali, or Pasumbal for that seeking Col. Legaspi and find out what was wanted of
matter. But this is not all. There is the rather strange and him, he left in the opposite direction and fled to
unexplained, at least not satisfactorily, behaviour of Umali Candelaria and later to Lucena, and the next day he took
and Pasumbal that evening of November 14th. Assuming the train for Manila. This strange act and behaviour of the
for a moment as they claim, that the two were not in two men, particularly Umali, all contrary to impulse and
Tiaong at the commencement of the raid between 8:00 natural reaction, and what other people would ordinarily
and 9:00 p.m., and during the whole time the raid lasted, have done under the circumstances, prompted the trial
and that they were all that time in the home of Pasumbal court in its decision to repeat the old saying "The guilty
in Taguan, still, according to their own evidence, they man flees even if no one pursues, but the innocent stands
were informed by persons coming or fleeing from Tiaong bold as a lion." We might just as well reproduce that
that there was a raid going on there, and that some portion of the decision of the trial court, to wit:
houses were burning. As a matter of fact, considering the
promixity of Taguan to Tiaong, a distance of about seven
. . . Considering the fact that Taguan is very
kilometers and the stillness and darkness of the night, the
near Tiaong so that even taking it for granted
fire and the glow produced by the burning of three houses
as true, for the sake of argument, that the said
and the noise produced by the firing of automatic
accused were really at the party of Pasumbal
weapons and the explosion of the hand grenades and
on the night in question, that would not prevent
bottles of gasoline, could and must have been seen and
them from being in Tiaong between 8 and 9.
heard from Taguan. The natural and logical reaction on
Besides, why was it that night the hasag lamp
the part of Umali and Pasumbal would have been to rush
was replaced with candles when the
to Tiaong, see what had really happened and then render
reinforcements passed through Taguan about
help and give succor to the stricken residents, including
midnight of November 14, 1951. Why did
their own relatives. It will be remembered that the houses
Congressman Umali and company instead of
of the fathers of Umali and Pasumbal were in Tiaong and
going to Tiaong which was the scene of the
their parents and relatives were residing there. And yet,
attack hurried towards Candelaria, after the
instead of following a natural impulse and urge to go to
reinforcement has passed and went to the
Tiaong, they fled in the opposite direction towards
house of Felix Ona walking through a muddy
Candelaria. And Umali instead of taking the road,
path under the coconut groves? Why was
purposely avoided the same and preferred to hike
Umali afraid to pass through the provincial road
through coconut groves so that upon arriving in
and preferred a muddy road instead? Was he
Candelaria, he was wet, and spattered and very tired.
trying to conceal himself? Why did Pasumbal
Had they wanted to render any help to Tiaong they could
and company also go to the house of Ona?
have asked the police authorities of Candelaria to send a
Why did they go to the house of Felix Ona
rescue party to that town. Or better still, when the army
instead of going to the house of Manalo who
reinforcements from Lucena sent at the instance of
could have given them better protection? And
Punzalan, who at about eight or nine that evening was
again why did Congressman Umali and the
returning to Tiaong from Lucena, found at the barrio or
other co-accused repaired and sought the
sitio of Lusakan near Tiaong that there was fighting in the
company of Fiscal Reyes in going at such an
town, he immediately returned to Lucena to get army
early hour to the Army authorities, did they fear
reinforcements to relieve his town, was passing by
any reprisal? From whom? Why did Umali go to
Taguan, where they were, Umali and Pasumbal could
Manila from Lucena on November 16, 1951?
have joined said reinforcements and gone to Tiaong.
"The guilty man flees even if no one pursues,
Instead the two continued on their way to the capital
but the innocent stands bold as a lion."
(Lucena) where before dawn, they went and contacted
Provincial Fiscal Mayo, a first cousin of Umali, and
Assistant Fiscal Reyes and later had these two officials At first blush it would appear rather unbelievable that
accompany them to the Army camp to see Col. Gelveson, Umali and Pasumbal, particularly the former should seek
not for the purpose of asking for the sending of aid or the aids of the Huks in order to put down and eliminate
reinforcement to Tiaong but presumably to show to the their political enemy Punzalan. It would seem rather
prosecution officials, specially the Army Commander that
strange and anomalous that a member of Congress
they (Umali and Pasumbal) had nothing to do whatsoever should have friendly relations with this dissidents whom
with the raid. Umali said he was trying to avoid and keep
the Government had been fighting all these years. But if
clear of Tiaong because he might be suspected of having
we study the evidence, it will be found that the reason
had some connection with the raid and might be the and the explanation are there. As already stated, during
object of reprisal. As a matter of fact, according to Umali
the Japanese occupation, to further the resistance
himself, while still in Taguan that evening and before he
movement, guerillas were organized in different parts of
went to Candelaria, somebody had informed him that Col. the Philippines. One of these was the guerilla unit known
as President Quezon's Own Guerillas (PQOG) operating
in the provinces of Tayabas (now Quezon) and Laguna.
Umali, Pasumbal, Commander Abeng and even Punzalan
himself were officers in this guerilla unit, Umali attaining
the rank of colonel, and Pasumbal and Punzalan that of
Lieutenant-colonel, Pasumbal then being known as
"Panzer". After Liberation, Abeng joined the dissidents,
and became a Huk Commander. It was not unnatural that
Umali and Pasumbal should continue their friendship and
association with Commander Abeng and seek his aid
when convenient and necessary. Umali admitted that he
knew Huk Commander Kasilag. Graciano Ramos, one of
the witnesses of the prosecution told the court that way
back in May 1950, in a barrio of San Pablo City he saw
Umali confer with Commander Kasilag, which
Commander after the conference told his soldiers
including Ramos that Umali wanted the Huks to raid
Tiaong, burn the presidencia and kidnap Punzalan. Of
course, the last part of the testimony may be regarded as
hearsay, but the fact is that Umali conferred with a Huk
commander as early as 1950. Then we have the fact that
on November 18 of the same year Punzalan wrote to
President Quirino denouncing the congressman Umali for
fraternizing with the Huks and conducting a campaign
among them in preparation for the elections the following
year. And we may also consider the fact that the town of
Tiaong stands at the foothills of Mt. Banahaw where the
dissidents under Commander Abeng, Tommy, Lucio,
Aladin, and others had their hideout, so that it was not
difficult for residents of Tiaong like Umali and Pasumbal
to communicate and even associate with dissidents in
that region.
After carefully considering all the evidence in the case,
we are constrained to agree with the trial court that the
three appellants are guilty. Besides, the determination of
this case, in great measure, hinges on the credibility of
witnesses. The learned trial court which had the
opportunity of observing the demeanor of witnesses on
the stand and gauging their sincerity and evaluating their
testimony, decided the Government witnesses, including
Amado Mendoza, to be more credible and reliable. And
we find nothing in the record to warrant correction or
reversal of the stand and finding of the trial court on the
matter. We have not overlooked the rather belated
retraction of Amado Mendoza made on October 31, 1952,
about a year and 9 months after he testified in court.
Considering the circumstances surrounding the making of
this affidavit or retraction, the late date at which it was
made, the reasons given by him for making it and the fact
that when he testified in court under the observation and
scrutiny of the trial court bearing in mind that he was the
star witness for the prosecution and his testimony
naturally extremely important, and the trial court after the
opportunity given to it of observing his demeanor while on
the witness stand had regarded him as a witness,
sincere, and his testimony truthful, and considering
further the case with which affidavits of retraction of this
nature are obtained, we confess that we are not
impressed with such retraction of Mendoza.
The last point to be determined is the nature of the
offense of offenses committed. Appellants were charged
with and convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery. Is
there such a complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder, etc? While the Solicitor General in his brief
claims that appellants are guilty of said complex crime
and in support of his stand "asks for leave to incorporate
by reference" his previous arguments in opposing Umali's
petition for bail, counsel for appellants considered it
unnecessary to discuss the existence or non-existence of
such complex crime, saying that the nature of the crime
committed "is of no moment to herein appellants because
they had absolutely no part in it whatsoever". For that
present, and with respect to this particular case, we deem
it unnecessary to decide this important and controversial
question, its consideration and determination to another
case or occasion more opportune, when it is more directly
and squarely raised and both parties given an opportunity
to discuss and argue the question more adequately and
exhaustively. Considering that, assuming for the moment
that there is no such complex crime of rebellion with
murder, etc., and that consequently appellants could not
have been legally charged with, much less convicted of
said complex crime, and the information should therefore,
be regarded as having charged more than one offense,
contrary to Rule 106, section 12 and Rule 113, section 2
(e), of the Rules of Court, but that appellants having
interposed no objection thereto, they were properly tried
for and lawfully convicted if guilty of the several, separate
crimes charged therein, we have decided and we rule that
the appellants may properly be convicted of said several
and separate crimes, as hereinafter specified. We feel
particularly supported and justified in this stand that we
take, by the result of the case, namely, that the prison
sentence we impose does not exceed, except perhaps in
actual duration, that meted out by the Court below, which
is life imprisonment.
We are convinced that the principal and main, tho not
necessarily the most serious, crime committed here was
not rebellion but rather that of sedition. The purpose of
the raid and the act of the raiders in rising publicly and
taking up arms was not exactly against the Government
and for the purpose of doing the things defined in Article
134 of the Revised Penal code under rebellion. The
raiders did not even attack the Presidencia, the seat of
local Government. Rather, the object was to attain by
means of force, intimidation, etc. one object, to wit, to
inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the person or
property of a public official, namely, Punzalan was then
Mayor of Tiaong. Under Article 139 of the same Code this
was sufficient to constitute sedition. As regards the crime
of robbery with which appellants were charged and of
which they were convicted, we are also of the opinion that and physical injuries; however, the sums awarded the
it was not one of the purposes of the raid, which was victims (Lacorte, Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and
mainly to kidnap or kill Punzalan and destroy his house. Lector), by the court below will stand. With these
The robberies were actually committed by only some of modifications, the decision appealed from is hereby
the raiders, presumably dissidents, as an afterthought, affirmed, with costs.
because of the opportunity offered by the confusion and
disorder resulting from the shooting and the burning of
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista
the three houses, the articles being intended presumably
Angelo, Concepcion and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.
to replenish the supplies of the dissidents in the
mountains. For these robberies, only those who actually
took part therein are responsible, and not the three
appellants herein. With respect to the crime of multiple
frustrated murder, while the assault upon policeman
Pedro Lacorte with a hand grenade causing him injuries
resulting in his blindness in one eye, may be regarded as
frustrated murder; the wounding of Ortega, Anselo,
Rivano, Garcia and Lector should be considered as mere
physical injuries. The crimes committed are, therefore,
those of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated
murder and physical injuries. The murders may not be
qualified by evident premeditation because the
premedition was for the killing of Punzalan. The result
was the killing of three others intended by the raiders
(People vs. Guillen, 47 Off). The killing may, however, be
qualified by treachery, the raiders using firearms against
which the victims were defenseless, with the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The three
murders may be punished with the penalty of death.
However, because of lack of the necessary votes, the
penalty should be life imprisonment.
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points
raised by the appellants in their brief.
In conclusion, we find appellants guilty of sedition,
multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and physical
injuries. For the crime of sedition each of the appellants is
sentenced to 5 years of prision correctional and to pay a
fine of P4,000; for each of the three murders, each of the
appellants is sentenced to life imprisonment and to
indemnify the heirs of each victim in the sum of P6,000;
and for the arson, for which we impose the maximum
penalty provided in Article 321, paragraph 1, of the
Revised Penal Code, for the reason that the raiders in
setting fire to the buildings, particularly the house of
Punzalan they knew that it was then occupied by one or
more persons, because they even and actually saw an
old lady, the mother of Punzalan, at the window, and in
view of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, each
of the appellants is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and
to pay the indemnities mentioned in the decision of the
lower court. It shall be understood, however, the pursuant
to the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code
the duration of all penalties shall not exceed 40 years. In
view of the heavy penalties already imposed and their
long duration, we find it unnecessary to fix and impose
the prison sentences corresponding to frustrated murder
 SECOND DIVISON
G.R. No. 125796, Promulgated: December 27, 2000
OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR OF
ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ATICO ABORDO, JUDY
CATUBIG, PETER MOLATO, and FLORENCIO
CANDIA,Respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
The issue in this case is whether, even before the start of
trial, the prosecution can be ordered to change the
information which it had filed on the ground that the
evidence presented at the preliminary investigation shows
that the crime committed is not murder with multiple
frustrated murder, but rebellion. The trial court ruled that
the power to determine what crime to charge on the basis
of the evidence gathered is the prerogative of the public
prosecutor. The Court of Appeals, however, while
agreeing with the trial court, nevertheless found the
prosecutor to have gravely abused his discretion in
charging murder with frustrated murder on the ground
that the evidence adduced at the preliminary investigation
shows that the crime committed was rebellion.
Accordingly, it ordered the prosecutor to substitute the
information filed by him. Hence, this petition brought by
the provincial prosecutor of Zamboanga del Norte for a
review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are not in dispute. On August 3, 1993, the
provincial prosecutor of Zamboanga del Norte1 filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Dipolog City, an
information (docketed as Criminal Case No, 6427)
charging private respondents and 10 other individuals
with murder and multiple frustrated murder. The
Information reads:
The undersigned, Provincial Prosecutor, accuses ATICO
OBODO alias "Dondoy," NACENCIANO PACA-LIUGA,
JR., ELEAZAR FLORENDO, NESTOR BASES alias
Beses/Belly, FLORENCIO CANDIA alias "Bimbo," JUDY
CATUBIG alias Elboy/Al," PETER MOLATO alias, Joker,
ALBERTO CATUBIG alias "Blacky", ALMARIO CATUBIG
alias Nixon, JIMMY BENGAL alias "Macoboy," ENRICO
SIMBULAN alias Monstop, JIMMY GARIG alias "Gino"
and BERNIDO QUENCAS alias "Digoy of the crime of
MURDER WITH MULTIPLE FRUSTRATED MURDER,
committed as follows:
That, in the morning, on or about the 1st day of May,
1988, in the Municipality of Katipunan, Zamboanga del
Norte, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused armed with the high caliber
firearms, conspiring, confederating together and mutually
helping one another and with intent to kill by means of
treachery and evident premeditation did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and fire several shots to one Cpl. ALFREDO
DELA CRUZ PA, which accused his instantaneous death
and causing injuries to the following victims namely: SGT.
RODRIGO ALVIAR PA, SGT. RODRIGO BARADI, SGT.
LINOGAMAN PIATOS and SGT. BELLIZAR PA, which
injuries would ordinarily cause their death; thus
performing all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of MURDER, as a consequence, but
which nevertheless did not produce it for reason of
causes independent of the will of the herein accused, that
is the timely and able medical attendance rendered to the
said victims which prevented their death; that as a result
of the commission of the said crime the heirs of Cpl.
Alfredo de la Cruz and the herein victims suffered the
following damages, vis:
On victim CPL ALFREDO DELA CRUZ:
a. Indemnity for
Victims death .. P50, 000.00
b. Loss of earning
Capacity 30,000.00
P80, 000.00
SGT. RODRIGO ALVIAR:
a) Hospitalization P10, 000.00
c. Loss of earning
Capacity .. 10,000.00
P20, 000.00
SGT. LINOGAMAN PIATOS:
a) Hospitalization P10, 000.00
d. Loss of earning
Capacity .. 10,000.00
P20,000.00
SGT. RODRIGO BARADI;
a) Hospitalization P10,000.00
e. Loss of earning
Capacity .. 10,000.00
P20,000.00
SGT. BELLIZAR:
a) Hospitalization P10,000.00
f. Loss of earning
Capacity
.. 10,000.00
P20,000.00
CONTR ARY TO LAW (Viol. Of Art. 248, in relation or Art.
48 of the Revised Penal Code), with the aggravating
circumstance of superior strength and with the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.2
The foregoing information is based on a joint affidavit
executed on June 1, 1993 by five individuals, who claim
to be former members of the New Peoples Army (NPA),
before the Municipal Trial Court of Katipunan,
Zamboanga del Norte. The affiants stated that on May 1,
1988, their group, which included private respondents,
figured in an armed encounter with elements of the
Philippine Army in Campo Uno, Femagas, Katipunan,
Zamboanga del Norte, as a result of which one solider,
Cpl. Alfredo de la Cruz, was killed while four others, Sgts.
Rodrigo Alviar, Linomagan Piatos, Rodrigo Baradi, and a
certain Bellizar, were seriously wounded. Although private
respondents did not appear nor submit affidavits in the
preliminary investigation, they appealed the resolution of
the provincial prosecutor to the Secretary of Justice on
the ground that, in accusing them of murder and multiple
frustrated murder, the provincial prosecutor disregarded
the political motivation which made the crime committed
rebellion. When the case was filed in court, private
respondents reiterated their contention and prayed that
the provincial prosecutor be ordered to change the
charge from murder with multiple frustrated murder to
rebellion.
On September 29, 1995, the trial court issued an order
denying private respondents motion for the correction or
amendment of the information. The trial court said.3
Be it recalled, that as pointed out by the Asst. Provincial
Prosecutor, the same moving counsel sometime on July
22, 1993 filed a notice of appeal assailing the resolution
of the provincial prosecutor dated July 16, 1993 finding
probable cause against all the above-named accused for
the crime of Murder and Multiple frustrated Murder, to the
Honorable Secretary of Justice, by raising the same issue
that "instead of recommending the filing of a political
crime such as subversion or rebellion, the investigating
prosecutor is recommending the filing of the common
crime of murder to cover-up the apparent political color of
the alleged crime committed. Until the Secretary of
Justice therefore resolves the appeal by the movant, this
court will have no basis to order the public prosecutor to
amend or change the crime charged in the information.
Besides, this Court recognizes and respects the
prerogative of the fiscal to determine whether or not a
prima facie case exists in a given case against the
accused. This power vested in the fiscal cannot be
interfered with even by the courts.
But since the case has already been filed with this Court,
jurisdiction therefor now lies with the court. It may not
even be bound by the ruling of the Secretary of Justice
Private respondents twice moved for reconsideration and
twice were rebuffed. They then filed a petition for
certiorari with this Court to set aside the orders dated
September 29, October 24, and November 3, 1995 of the
trial court. They impleaded the provincial prosecutor of
Zamboanga del Norte as co-respondent of Judge Pacifico
Garcia of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Dipolog
City.
Without ruling on the petition, this Court referred the case
to the Court of Appeals, which, in decision4 dated July 24,
1996, the subject of this review, found the provincial
prosecutor guilty of grave abuse of discretion in charging
private respondents with murder with multiple frustrated
murder. The Court of Appeals held:
The New Peoples Army (NPA) is the
armed component of the Communist
Party in this country called the
national Democratic Front (NDF).
The ultimate objective of the
NPA/NDF is to overthrow the
constitutional democratic plant it with
a government anchored on the
communist ideology.
It is common practice of the military and police to charge
captured or arrested members f the NPA with capital
offenses like murder, robbery with homicide, illegal
possession of firearms used in the commission of
homicide or murder, arson resulting in death rather than
on simple rebellion.
If an NPA fighter (terrorist, according to the military
lexicon) commits homicide, murder, arson, robbery, illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition in furtherance or
on the occasion of his revolutionary pursuit, the only
crime he has committed is rebellion because all those
common crimes are absorbed in the latter one pursuant
to the ruling in People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 and
several subsequent cases.
The reason why instead of charging the NPA fighter with
capital offenses mentioned supra and not the proper
offense of rebellion is obvious. Rebellion is a bailable
offense and given the resources of the NPA, it is the
easiest thing for it to bail out its members facing rebellion
charges in court. Once out, the NPA fighter goes back to
his mountain lair and continues the fight against the
government. If he is accused of a capital offense where
the granting of bail is a matter of discretion, his chances
of securing provisional liberty during the pendency of the
trial are very much lessened.
Since, the military and the police carry the brunt of
fighting the NPAs and in so doing they put their limbs and
lives on the line, it is easy for Us to understand why they
usually charge the captured or arrested NPAs with capital
offenses instead of the proper offense which is rebellion.
The police or military practice is of course wrong, but it is
not much of a problem because it is at most
recommendatory in nature. It is the prosecutory service
that ultimately decides the offense to be charged.
No one disputes the well-entrenched principle in criminal
procedure that the public prosecutor has the discretion to
determine the crime to be charged in a criminal action.
But like all discretions, his must be exercised soundly,
meaning, reasonably, responsibly, and fairly. As stated by
the Supreme Court in Misola v. Panga cited in
respondents Comment (p. 61, Rollo); "The question of
instituting a criminal charge is one addressed to the
sound discretion of the investigating Fiscal. The
information must be supported by the facts brought about
by an inquiry made by him." (Underscoring supplied).
If then, a public prosecutor deliberately ignores or
suppresses an evidence in his hands which palpably
indicates the chargeable offense and files an information
charging a more serious one, he departs from the
precinct of discretion and treads on the forbidden field or
arbitrary action.
This was what happened in the case at bench. The
evidentiary bases of the criminal action against petitioners
are the Joint Affidavit and the recorded testimony earlier
adverted to. It is not at all disputed that based upon these
two documents, the proper offense to charge petitioners
with is rebellion. No amount of legalistic sophistry can
make those documents support murder for these offenses
in the factual milieu in this case were all absorbed by
rebellion.
We vehemently reject respondents contention that the
petitioners do not suffer any prejudice because they can
use their theory that the chargeable offense is only
rebellion as a defense in the trial on the merits and if the
trial court finds that the evidence establishes only
rebellion, then, it can convict them under the Information
for just that lesser crime. This argument is not only wrong
but betrays insensitivity to violation of human rights. If
prosecutory discretion is twisted to charge a person of an
unbailable offense and, therefore, keeps him under
detention when the truly chargeable offense is a bailable
one, the prosecutor transgresses upon the human rights
of the accused.5
The appeals court was more kindly disposed toward the
trial court. It said:
Respecting the respondent court, the situation is
different
The Joint Affidavit and the recorded testimony mentioned
earlier are not part of the records. The trial has not yet
been started and, therefore, no evidence has yet been
adduced. There is no basis then for the trial court even to
call the attention of the prosecutor to a mistake in the
crime charged.
We hold that respondent court did not commit an error in
issuing the assailed orders, much less gravely abused its
discretion in issuing them.6
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals ordered:
WHEREFORE, with the foregoing premises, We a)
dismiss the petition as against respondent court for lack
of merit; and b) order the respondent office of Provincial
Prosecutor to file a substitute Information in Criminal
Case No. 6472 charging the petitioners with rebellion
only.7
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred
I. IN MAKING DISPARATE AND
IRRECONCILABLE RULINGS
CONCERNING THE
CORRECTNESS OF THE ACTION
OF PETITIONER AND THE LOWER
COURT.
II. IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN CHARGING
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WITH
MURDER AND MULTIPLE
FRUSTRATED MURDER.8
We find the contentions to be well taken.
First. It was improper for the Court of Appeals to consider
the record of the preliminary investigation as basis for
finding petitioner provincial prosecutor guilty of grave
abuse of discretion when such record was not presented
before the trial court and, therefore, was not part of the
record of the case. Rule 112, 8 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal procedure provide;
SEC. 8. Record of preliminary investigation. The record
of the preliminary investigation whether conducted by a
judge or a fiscal, shall not form part of the record of the
case in the Regional Trial Court. However, the said court,
on its own initiative or that of any party, may order the
production of the record of any part thereof whenever the
same shall be necessary in the resolution of the case or
any incident therein, or shall be introduced as evidence
by the party requesting for its production.
The certiorari proceedings in the Court of Appeals was
limited to the record of the trial court and indeed the Court
of Appeals recognized this by absolving the trial court of
any liability for abuse of its discretion. It is petitioner
provincial prosecutor, which it found guilty of grave abuse
of discretion in filing a case for murder with multiple
frustrated murder against private respondents because, in
its view, the crime committed is rebellion. The Court of
Appeals based its ruling on the joint affidavit of five
prosecution witnesses and their testimonies relating to
such affidavit before the Municipal Trial Court of
Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte, which had conducted
the preliminary investigation. But this could not be done
because the petition before it was a petition for certiorari
to set aside orders of the Regional Trial Court denying
private respondents motion to compel petitioner to
change the charge against them from murder with
frustrated murder to rebellion.
To sustain the procedure followed by the Court of
Appeals of considering evidence dehors the record of the
trial court would be to set a bad precedent whereby the
accused in any case can demand, upon the filing of the
information, a review of the evidence presented during
the preliminary investigation for the purpose of compelling
the trial court to change the charge to a lesser offense.
Such a ruling would undermine the authority of the
prosecutor and impose and intolerable burden on the trial
court. As held in Depamaylo v. Brotario.9
The Court in a number of cases has declared that a
municipal judge has no legal authority to determine the
character of the crime but only to determine whether or
not the evidence presented supported prima facie the
allegation of facts contained in the complaint. He has no
legal authority to determine the character of the crime and
his declaration upon that point can only be regarded as
an expression of opinion in no wise binding on the court
(People vs. Gorospe, 53 Phil. 960; de Guzman vs.
Escalona, 97 SCRA 619). This power belongs to the
fiscal Bais vs. Tugaoen, 89 SCRA 101).
It is to be noted that private respondents did not even
attend the preliminary investigation during which they
could have shown that the crime committed was rebellion
because the killing and wounding of the government
troopers was made in furtherance of rebellion and not for
some private motive.
Second. Indeed, it is not at all clear that the crime as
made out by the facts alleged in the Joint Affidavit of
witnesses is rebellion and not murder with multiple
murder. The affidavit reads:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE) S.S
Municipality of Jose Dalman)
X---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------x
JOINT AFFIDAVIT
I..Teofilo D. Sarigan, 31 years old, Manuel A. Cuenca, 28
yrs. Old, Romulo A. Pacaldo, 25 years old, Carmelito
Carpe, 36 yrs. Old, all married and Pablo D. Maladia, 20
yrs. old and with postal address of Brgy. Lopero, Brgy.
Lumaping, of Jose Dalman, Brgy. Villahermosa, Roxas,
all of ZDN, Brgy. Sigamok, Dumingag, ZDS and Brgy.
Lipay. Jose Dalman, ZDN after having been duly sworn to
an oath in accordance to law do hereby depose and
answer questions propounded:
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:
1. Q Why are you here now in this
office?
A To render statement regarding
the alleged incident wherein we were
previously involved when we were
still with the underground movement
of CPP/NPA that transpired on or
about 011000H May 1988 at vicinity
Campo Uno, Femagas, Katipunan,
ZDN against the government troops
of 321B.
2. Q Since when the five (5) of you
entered the underground movement
of CPP.NPA?
A Since May 16, 1980, August 12,
1980, March 12, 1981, May 7, 1983
and August 27, 2987, sir.
3. Q What is your previous position?
A CO, FCOM (Front Command)
and second deputy secretary of FC-1
"BBC, the Vice CO, FCOM, the CO,
FCOM after @ Bebeth surrender, a
Unit Militia (YM) member, GYP
element under squad Lion all of FC-1
"BBC" in which we are operating
within the Province of ZDN.
4. Q Will you narrate to me what and
how the incident you are referring to
all about?
A Actually sir, last 30 April 1988 our
main force of FGU, FC-1 "BBC" had
a meeting at vicinity basketball court
of vicinity Campo Uno, Femagas,
Katipunan ZDN. While on that status
our security group left at the high
ground portion of the place and
engaged the advancing government
troops of 321B after which we then
decided to postpone the meeting
hence, the government troops
presence. However, on the following
day of 01 May 1988 at about 10:00
oclock in the morning when we
assembled again at the aforesaid
place, firefight occurred between us
and the government troops of 321B
which resulted to inflict casualties to
the 321B troopers, KIA one (1) Cpl.
Alfredo Dela Cruz and wounding four
(4) others, Sgt. Rodrigo Alviar, Sgt.
Linogaman Piatos, Sgt. Rodrigo
Baradi and Sgt. Bellizar while on our
side with one wounded @ TOY.
5. Q Can you still recall the names of
those other NPAs that participated in
that encounter against the
government troops?
A Yes, sir. ATICO OBORDO @ DONDOY,
NACENCIANO PACALIUGA JR., @ ALFIE/IGI,
ELEAZAT FLOREDO, NESTOR BASES @
BELOY/BELLY. FLORENCIO CANDIA @ BIMBO, JUDY
CATUBIG @ ELBOY/AL, PETER MOLATO @ JOKER,
BIENVENIDO CATUBIG @ RASTY, ALBERTO
CATUBIG @ BLACKY/RENATO, ALMARIO CATUBIG @
NOEL, ROGER CATUBIG @ JAMSE, JOEL CATUBIG @
NIXON, JIMMY DINGAL @ MACBOY, ENRICO
SIMBULAN @ NONSTOP, @ DANDY, @ WAWAY, @
ALBA/JONAS, JIMMY GARIG @ NONOY, NILO
CATUNGAN @ GINO, BERNIDO QUENECAS @
DIGOY, @ CRISTINE/LFA @ MARILOU @ ELNA, @
BENIGNO PAULINO CORPUZ @ JR/PAWA, BENJAMIN
SANTANDER @ JAKE, @NESTOR, @ JAY, @
ISAGANI, @ RONIE, ESMAEL OBORDO @ ANICIO, @
FREDO, @ RUEL, @ DODONG, JULITA ADJANAN @
GENIE, @ TONY, @ RJ, @ LANNIE @ DEMET, @
RENDON, @JESS, @ SAMSON AND many others, sir.
Q Then what transpired next?
A Right after the encounter, we withdraw our troops
towards vicinity SVR, complex, Sergio Osmea, Sr., ZDN.
Q Do you have something more to say?
A Nothing more, sir.
Q Are you willing to sign you statement without being
forced, coerced or intimidated?
A Yes, sir.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, WE hereunto affix our
signature this 1st day of June 1993 at Katipunan,
ZN Philippines.
(SGD.) TEOFILO D. SARIGAN
Affiant
(SGD,) MANUEL A. CUENCA
Affiant
(SGD,) ROMULO A. PACALDO
Affiant
(SGD.) CARMELITO L. CARPE
Affiant
(SGD.) PABLO G. MALADIA
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 1st day of
June 1993 at Katipunan, ZN, Philippines.
(SGD.) ADELA S. GANDOLA
Municipal Trial Judge
Nowhere is the political motivation for the commission of
the crime indicated in foregoing affidavit. Merely because
it is alleged that private respondents were members of
the CCP/NPA who engaged government troops in a
firefight resulting in the death of a government trooper
and the wounding of four others does not necessarily
mean that the killing and wounding of the victims was
made in furtherance of a rebellion. The political motivation
for the crime must be shown in order to justify finding the
crime committed to be rebellion. Otherwise, as in People
v. Ompad,10although it was shown that the accused was
an NPA commander, he was nonetheless convicted of
murder for the killing of a person suspected of being a
government informer. At all events, as this Court said
in Balosis v. Chanvez:11
Certainly, the public prosecutors should have the option
to ascertain which prosecutions should be initiated on the
basis of the evidence at hand. That a criminal act may
have elements common to more than one offense does
not rob the prosecutor of that option (or discretion) and
mandatory require him to charge the lesser offense
although the evidence before him may warrant
prosecution of the more serious one.12
In Baylosis v. Chavez, the accused, who were NPA
members, assailed the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1866
under which they were charged with illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition on the ground that it gave
prosecutors the discretion to charge an accused either
with rebellion or with other crimes committed in
furtherance thereof. In rejecting their contention, this
Court said:
The argument is not tenable. The fact is that the Revised
Penal Code trets rebellion or insurrection as a crime
distinct from murder, homicide, arson, or other felonies
that might conceivably be committed in the course of
rebellion. It is the Code, therefore, in relation to the
evidence in the hands of the public prosecutor, and not
the latters whim or caprice, which gives the choice. The
Code allows, for example, separate prosecutions for
either murder or rebellion, although not for both where the
indictment alleges that the former has been committed in
furtherance of or in connection with the latter.13
The burden of proving that the motivation for the crime is
political and not private is on the defense. This is the
teaching of another case.14 in which it was held;
In deciding if the crime is rebellion, not murder, it
becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain whether or
not the act was done in furtherance of a political end. The
political motive of the act should be conclusively
demonstrated.
In such cases the burden of demonstrating political
motive falls on the defense, motive, being a state of mind
which the accused better than any individual knows.
Its not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly
proven. Both purpose and overt acts are essential
components of the crime. With either of these elements
wanting, the crime of rebellion legally does not exist.
The proceedings in the case at bar is still in the pre- WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals,
arraignment stage. The parties have yet to present their dated July 24, 1996, is REVERSED insofar as it orders
respective evidence. If during the trial, private petitioner to file a substitute information for rebellion in
respondents are able to show proof which would support Criminal Case No. 6427. In other respects, it
their present contention, then they can avail of the is AFFIRMED.1wphi1.nt
remedy provided under the second paragraph of Rule SO ORDERED.
110, 1415 which provides:
If it appears at any time before judgement that a mistake
has been made in charging the proper offense, the court
shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon
the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the
accused would not be placed thereby in double
jeopardy
Until then, however, petitioner provincial prosecutor is
under no obligation to change against private
respondents.
Third. The Court of Appeals says it is a common practice
of the military and the police to charge captured members
of the NPA with capital offenses like murder, robbery with
homicide, or illegal possession of firearms rather than
rebellion. The alleged purpose is to deny them bail only if
it can be shown that the evidence against them is not
strong, whereas if the charge is rebellion, private
respondents would have an absolute right to bail.
As already stated, however, given the Joint affidavit of the
prosecution witnesses alone, it is not possible to
determine at this stage of the criminal proceeding that in
engaging the government troops in a "firefight," private
respondents were acting in pursuance of rebellion. It
could be that the "firefight" was more of an ambush
staged by the NPA, as shown by the fact that while the
government troop suffered one dead and four wounded,
the CPP/NPA suffered only one wounded.
The charge that it is "common practice for the military
and the police to charge suspected rebels with murder in
order to prevent them from going on bail can be laid
equally at the door of the accused. As noted in Enrile v.
Salazar:16
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act
of rebellion has lost that quintessentially quixotic quality
that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded
and punished by law, that present-day rebels are less
impelled by love of country than by lust for power and
have become no better than mere terrorists to whom
nothing, not even the sancity of human life, is allowed to
stand in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so c this
aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless killings,
bombings, kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in
the news these days, as often perpetrated against
innocent civilians as against the military, but by and large
attributable to, or even claimed by so called rebels to be
part of, an ongoing rebellion.17
What the real crime is must await the presentation of
evidence at the trial or at the hearing on the application
for bail. Those accused of common crimes can then show
proof that the crime with which they were charged is
really rebellion. They are thus not without any remedy.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 186739-960 April 17, 2013
LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an appeal seeking to nullify the December 19, 2008
Decision1 of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259, which convicted Leovegildo R. Ruzol
(Ruzol), then Mayor of General Nakar, Quezon, of Usurpation of
Official Functions penalized under Article 177 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).
The Facts
Ruzol was the mayor of General Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to 2004.
Earlier in his term, he organized a Multi-Sectoral Consultative
Assembly composed of civil society groups, public officials and
concerned stakeholders with the end in view of regulating and
monitoring the transportation of salvaged forest products within the
vicinity of General Nakar. Among those present in the organizational
meeting were Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer
(PENRO) Rogelio Delgado Sr. and Bishop Julio Xavier Labayen, the
OCD-DD of the Prelature of Infanta Emeritus of the Catholic Church
and Chairperson of TIPAN, an environmental non-government
organization that operates in the municipalities of General Nakar,
Infanta and Real in Quezon province. During the said assembly, the
participants agreed that to regulate the salvaged forests products, the
Office of the Mayor, through Ruzol, shall issue a permit to transport
after payment of the corresponding fees to the municipal treasurer.2
Consequently, from 2001 to 2004, two hundred twenty-one (221)
permits to transport salvaged forest products were issued to various
recipients, of which forty-three (43) bore the signature of Ruzol while
the remaining one hundred seventy-eight (178) were signed by his co-
accused Guillermo T. Sabiduria (Sabiduria), then municipal
administrator of General Nakar.3
On June 2006, on the basis of the issued Permits to Transport, 221
Informations for violation of Art. 177 of the RPC or for Usurpation of
Authority or Official Functions were filed against Ruzol and Sabiduria,
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-0039 to 0259.
Except for the date of commission, the description of forest product,
person given the permit, and official receipt number, the said
Informations uniformly read:
That, on (date of commission) or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in General Nakar, Quezon, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused Leovegildo R. Ruzol and
Guillermo M. Sabiduria, both public officers, being then the Municipal
Mayor and Municipal Administrator, respectively, of General Nakar,
Quezon, taking advantage of their official position and committing the
offense in relation to their office, conspiring and confederating with
each other did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, issue
permit to transport (description of forest product) to (person given the
permit) under O.R. No. (official receipt number) under the pretense of
official position and without being lawfully entitled to do so, such
authority properly belonging to the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, to the damage and prejudice of the of the
government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Considering that the facts are undisputed, the parties during Pre-Trial
agreed to dispense with the presentation of testimonial evidence and
submit the case for decision based on the documentary evidence and
joint stipulation of facts contained in the Pre-Trial Order. Thereafter,
the accused and the prosecution submitted their respective
memoranda.6
Ruzol's Defense
As summarized by the Sandiganbayan, Ruzol professes his innocence
based on following arguments:
(1) As Chief Executive of the municipality of General
Nakar, Quezon, he is authorized to issue permits to
transport forest products pursuant to RA 7160 which give
the LGU not only express powers but also those powers
that are necessarily implied from the powers expressly
granted as well as those that are necessary, appropriate
or incidental to the LGUs efficient and effective
governance. The LGU is likewise given powers that are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare of the
inhabitants. The general welfare clause provided in
Section 16, Chapter 2, Title One, Book I of R.A. 7160 is a
massive grant of authority that enables LGUs to perform
or exercise just about any power that will benefit their
local constituencies.
(2) In addition to the foregoing, R.A. 7160 has devolved
certain functions and responsibilities of the DENR to the
LGU. And the permits to transport were issued pursuant
to the devolved function to manage and control communal
forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square
kilometers.
(3) The Permits to Transport were issued as an incident to
the payment of Transport Fees levied by the municipality
for the use of local public roads for the transport of
salvaged forest products. Under (a) Section 5, Article X of
the Constitution, (b) Section 129, Chapter I, Title One
Book II of R.A. 7160, and (c) Section 186, Article Five,
Chapter 5, Tile One, Book II of R.A. 7160, the municipality
is granted the power to create its own sources of revenue
and to levy fees in accordance therewith.
(4) The only kind of document the DENR issues relating
to log, timber or lumber is denominated "Certificate of
Timber Origin" or CTO for logs and "Certificate of Lumber
Origin" or CLO for lumber; hence, even if accused issued
the Transport Permits on his side, a person wanting to
transport the said forest products would have to apply and
obtain a CTO or CLO from the DENR. The Transport
Permits issued by the accused were never taken as a
substitute for the CTO or CLO, and this is the reason why
said permits contain the annotation "Subject to DENR
rules, laws and regulations."
(5) There is no proof of conspiracy between the accused.
The Transport Permits were issued by accused Sabiduria
in his capacity as Municipal Administrator and his mere
issuance is not enough to impute upon the accused Ruzol
any transgression or wrongdoing that may have been
committed in the issuance thereof following the ruling in
Arias v. Sandiganbayan (180 SCRA 309).
(6) The DENR directly sanctioned and expressly
authorized the issuance of the 221 Transport permits
through the Provincial Environment and natural
Resources officer Rogelio Delgado Sr., in a Multi-Sectoral
Consultative Assembly.
(7) The accused cannot be convicted of Usurpation of
Authority since they did not act "under the pretense of
official position," accused Ruzol having issued the permits
in his capacity as Mayor and there was no pretense or
misrepresentation on his part that he was an officer of
DENR.7
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
After due consideration, the Sandiganbayan rendered on December
19, 2008 a Decision, acquitting Sabiduria but finding Ruzol guilty as
charged, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves these cases
as follows:
1. Against the accused LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL,
judgment is hereby rendered finding him GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Two Hundred Twenty One (221)
counts of the offense of Usurpation of Official Functions
as defined and penalized under Article 177 of the Revised
Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer for each
case a straight penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY.
However, in the service of his sentences, accused Ruzol
shall be entitled to the benefit of the three-fold rule as
provided in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.
2. On the ground of reasonable doubt, accused
GUILLERMO M. SABIDURIA is ACQUITTED of all 221
charges. The cash bond posted by him for his provisional
liberty may now be withdrawn by said accused upon
presentation of the original receipt evidencing payment
thereof subject to the usual accounting and auditing
procedures. The hold departure procedure issued by this
Court dated 16 April 2008 is set aside and the Order
issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 29 April 2008
including the name of Sabiduria in the Hold Departure List
is ordered recalled and cancelled.
SO ORDERED.8
The Sandiganbayan predicated its ruling on the postulate that the
authority to issue transport permits with respect to salvaged forest
products lies with the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and that such authority had not been devolved to
the local government of General Nakar.9 To the graft court, Ruzols
issuance of the subject permits constitutes usurpation of the official
functions of the DENR.
The Issue
The critical issue having a determinative bearing on the guilt or
innocence of Ruzol for usurpation revolves around the validity of the
subject permits to transport, which in turn resolves itself into the
question of whether the authority to monitor and regulate the
transportation of salvaged forest product is solely with the DENR, and
no one else.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is partly meritorious.
Subsidiary Issue:
Whether the Permits to Transport Issued by Ruzol Are Valid
In ruling that the DENR, and not the local government units (LGUs),
has the authority to issue transportation permits of salvaged forest
products, the Sandiganbayan invoked Presidential Decree No. 705
(PD 705), otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines and in relation to Executive Order No. 192, Series of 1987
(EO 192), or the Reorganization Act of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources.
Section 5 of PD 705 provides:
Section 5. Jurisdiction of Bureau. The Bureau of Forest Management
shall have jurisdiction and authority over all forest land, grazing lands,
and all forest reservations including watershed reservations presently
administered by other government agencies or instrumentalities.
It shall be responsible for the protection, development, management,
regeneration, and reforestation of forest lands; the regulation and
supervision of the operation of licensees, lessees and permittees for
the taking or use of forest products therefrom or the occupancy or use
thereof; the implementation of multiple use and sustained yield
management in forest lands; the protection, development and
preservation of national parks, marine parks, game refuges and
wildlife; the implementation of measures and programs to prevent
kaingin and managed occupancy of forest and grazing lands; in
collaboration with other bureaus, the effective, efficient and economic
classification of lands of the public domain; and the enforcement of
forestry, reforestation, parks, game and wildlife laws, rules, and
regulations.
The Bureau shall regulate the establishment and operation of
sawmills, veneer and plywood mills and other wood processing plants
and conduct studies of domestic and world markets of forest products.
(Emphasis Ours.)
On the other hand, the pertinent provisions of EO 192 state:
SECTION 4. Mandate. The Department shall be the primary
government agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development, and proper use of the countrys environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing lands of the public domain,
as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as
maybe provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the
benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future
generations of Filipinos.
xxxx
SECTION 5. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its mandate, the
Department shall have the following functions:
xxxx
(d) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands,
alienable and disposal lands, and mineral resources and
in the process of exercising such control the Department
shall impose appropriate payments, fees, charges, rentals
and any such revenues for the exploration, development,
utilization or gathering of such resources.
xxxx
(j) Regulate the development, disposition, extraction,
exploration and use of the countrys forest, land and
mineral resources;
(k) Assume responsibility for the assessment,
development, protection, conservation, licensing and
regulation as provided for by law, where applicable, of all
 natural resources; the regulation and monitoring of
service contractors, licensees, lessees, and permittees for
the extraction, exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources products; the implementation of
programs and measures with the end in view of promoting
close collaboration between the government and the
private sector; the effective and efficient classification and
sub-classification of lands of the public domain; and the
enforcement of natural resources laws, rules and
regulations;
(l) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the
issuance of co-production, joint venture or production
sharing agreements, licenses, permits, concessions,
leases and such other privileges and arrangement
concerning the development, exploration and utilization of
the countrys natural resources and shall continue to
oversee, supervise and police our natural resources; to
cancel or cause to cancel such privileges and
arrangement upon failure, non-compliance or violations of
any regulations, orders, and for all other causes which are
furtherance of the conservation of natural resources and
supportive of the national interests;
xxxx
(n) Implement measures for the regulation and
supervision of the processing of forest products, grading
and inspection of lumber and other forest products and
monitoring of the movement of timber and other forest
products. (Emphasis Ours.)
Invoked too is DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-78 (DAO 2000-
78) which mandates that the permittee should secure the necessary
transport and other related documents before the retrieved wood
materials are sold to the buyers/users and/or wood processing
plants.10 DAO 2000-78 obliges the entity or person concerned to
secure a Wood Recovery Permita "permit issued by the DENR to
gather/retrieve and dispose abandoned logs, drifted logs, sunken logs,
uprooted, and fire and typhoon damaged tress, tree stumps, tops and
branches."11 It prescribes that the permittee shall only be allowed to
gather or recover logs or timber which had already been marked and
inventoried by the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Officer.12 To the Sandiganbayan, this mandatory requirement for
Wood Recovery Permit illustrates that DENR is the sole agency
vested with the authority to regulate the transportation of salvaged
forest products.1wphi1
The Sandiganbayan further reasoned that the "monitoring and
regulating salvaged forest products" is not one of the DENRs
functions which had been devolved upon LGUs. It cited Sec. 17 of
Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) or the Local Government Code
(LGC) of 1991 which provides:
Section 17. Basic Services and Facilities. -
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall
continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and
functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the
functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices
devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall
likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other
functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or
incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic services and
facilities enumerated herein.
xxxx
(2) For a Municipality:
xxxx
(ii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and
review of the DENR, implementation of community-based forestry
projects which include integrated social forestry programs and similar
projects; management and control of communal forests with an area
not exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers; establishment of tree parks,
greenbelts, and similar forest development projects. (Emphasis Ours.)
According to the Sandiganbayan, Sec. 17 of the LGC has limited the
devolved functions of the DENR to the LGUs to the following: (1) the
implementation of community-based forestry products; (2)
management and control of communal forests with an area not
exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers; and (3) establishment of tree
parks, greenbelts and similar forest development projects.13 It also
referred to DENR Administrative Order No. 30, Series of 1992 (DAO
1992-30), which enumerates the forest management functions,
programs and projects of the DENR which had been devolved to the
LGUs, as follows:14
Section 3.1 Forest Management
a. Implementation of the following community-based forestry projects:
i. Integrated Social Forestry Projects, currently funded out of regular
appropriations, except at least one project per province that shall
serve as research and training laboratory, as identified by the DENR,
and those areas located in protected areas and critical
ii. Establishment of new regular reforestation projects, except those
areas located in protected areas and critical watersheds;
iii. Completed family and community-based contract reforestation
projects, subject to policies and procedures prescribed by the DENR;
iv. Forest Land Management Agreements in accordance with DENR
Administrative Order No. 71, Series of 1990 and other guidelines that
the DENR may adopt; and
v. Community Forestry Projects, subject to concurrence of financing
institution(s), if foreign assisted.
b. Management and control of communal forests with an area not
exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers or five thousand (5,000)
hectares, as defined in Section 2, above. Provided, that the concerned
LGUs shall endeavor to convert said areas into community forestry
projects;
c. Management, protection, rehabilitation and maintenance of small
watershed areas which are sources of local water supply as identified
or to be identified by the DENR; and
d. Enforcement of forest laws in community-based forestry project
areas, small watershed areas and communal forests, as defined in
Section 2 above, such as but not limited to:
i. Prevention of forest fire, illegal cutting and kaingin;
ii. Apprehension of violators of forest laws, rules and regulations;
iii. Confiscation of illegally extracted forest products on site;
iv. Imposition of appropriate penalties for illegal logging, smuggling of
natural resources products and of endangered species of flora and
fauna, slash and burn farming and other unlawful activities; and
v. Confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances, equipment
and other implements used in the commission of offenses penalized
under P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987 and other
forestry laws, rules and regulations.
Provided, that the implementation of the foregoing activities outside
the devolved areas above mentioned, shall remain with the DENR.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that since the authority relative to salvaged
forest products was not included in the above enumeration of
devolved functions, the correlative authority to issue transport permits
remains with the DENR15and, thus, cannot be exercised by the LGUs.
We disagree and refuse to subscribe to this postulate suggesting
exclusivity. As shall be discussed shortly, the LGU also has, under the
LGC of 1991, ample authority to promulgate rules, regulations and
ordinances to monitor and regulate salvaged forest products, provided
that the parameters set forth by law for their enactment have been
faithfully complied with.
While the DENR is, indeed, the primary government instrumentality
charged with the mandate of promulgating rules and regulations for
the protection of the environment and conservation of natural
resources, it is not the only government instrumentality clothed with
such authority. While the law has designated DENR as the primary
agency tasked to protect the environment, it was not the intention of
the law to arrogate unto the DENR the exclusive prerogative of
exercising this function. Whether in ordinary or in legal parlance, the
word "primary" can never be taken to be synonymous with "sole" or
"exclusive." In fact, neither the pertinent provisions of PD 705 nor EO
192 suggest that the DENR, or any of its bureaus, shall exercise such
authority to the exclusion of all other government instrumentalities, i.e.,
LGUs.
On the contrary, the claim of DENRs supposedly exclusive mandate
is easily negated by the principle of local autonomy enshrined in the
1987 Constitution16 in relation to the general welfare clause under Sec.
16 of the LGC of 1991, which provides:
Section 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall
exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for
its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to
the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among
other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote
health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced
ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and
self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. (Emphasis
Ours.)
Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, municipal governments are
clothed with authority to enact such ordinances and issue such
regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon them by law, and such as shall be
necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and
convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals,
promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and its
inhabitants, and ensure the protection of property in the municipality.17
As held in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,18 the right of the people "to a
balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment." In ensuring that this duty is
upheld and maintained, a local government unit may, if it deems
necessary, promulgate ordinances aimed at enhancing the right of the
people to a balanced ecology and, accordingly, provide adequate
measures in the proper utility and conservation of natural resources
within its territorial jurisdiction. As can be deduced from Ruzols
memoranda, as affirmed by the parties in their Joint Stipulation of
Facts, it was in the pursuit of this objective that the subject permits to
transport were issued by Ruzolto regulate the salvaged forest
products found within the municipality of General Nakar and, hence,
prevent abuse and occurrence of any untoward illegal logging in the
area.19
In the same vein, there is a clear merit to the view that the monitoring
and regulation of salvaged forest products through the issuance of
appropriate permits is a shared responsibility which may be done
either by DENR or by the LGUs or by both. DAO 1992-30, in fact, says
as much, thus: the "LGUs shall share with the national government,
particularly the DENR, the responsibility in the sustainable
management and development of the environment and natural
resources within their territorial jurisdiction."20 The significant role of
the LGUs in environment protection is further echoed in Joint
Memorandum Circular No. 98-01(JMC 1998-01) or the Manual of
Procedures for DENR-DILG-LGU Partnership on Devolved and other
Forest Management Functions, which was promulgated jointly by the
DILG and the DENR in 1998, and provides as follows:
Section 1. Basic Policies
Subject to the general policies on devolution as contained in RA 7160
and DENR Administrative Order No. 30, Series of 1992, the following
basic policies shall govern the implementation of DENR-DILG-LGU
partnership on devolved and other forest management functions:
1.1. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
shall be the primary government agency responsible for the
conservation, management, protection, proper use and sustainable
development of the countrys environment and natural resources.
1.2. The LGUs shall share with DENR the responsibility in the
sustainable management and development of the forest resources
within their territorial jurisdiction. Toward this end, the DENR and the
LGUs shall endeavor to strengthen their collaboration and partnership
in forest management.
1.3. Comprehensive land use and forest land use plans are important
tools in the holistic and efficient management of forest resources.
Toward this end, the DENR and the LGUs together with other
government agencies shall undertake forest land use planning as an
integral activity of comprehensive land use planning to determine the
optimum and balanced use of natural resources to support local,
regional and national growth and development.
1.4. To fully prepare the LGUs to undertake their shared
responsibilities in the sustainable management of forest land
resources, the DENR, in coordination with DILG, shall enhance the
capacities of the LGUs in the various aspects of forest management.
Initially, the DENR shall coordinate, guide and train the LGUs in the
management of the devolved functions. As the LGUs capacity in
forest management is enhanced, the primary tasks in the
management of devolved functions shall be performed by the LGUs
and the role of the DENR becomes assistive and coordinative.
1.5. To further the ends of local autonomy, the DENR in consultation
with the LGUs shall devolved [sic] additional functions and
responsibilities to the local government units, or enter into agreements
with them for enlarged forest management and other ENR-related
functions.
1.6. To seek advocacy, popular support and ultimately help achieve
community empowerment, DENR and DILG shall forge the partnership
and cooperation of the LGUs and other concerned sectors in seeking
and strengthening the participation of local communities for forest
management including enforcement of forestry laws, rules and
regulations. (Emphasis Ours.)
To our mind, the requirement of permits to transport salvaged forest
products is not a manifestation of usurpation of DENRs authority but
rather an additional measure which was meant to complement
DENRs duty to regulate and monitor forest resources within the
LGUs territorial jurisdiction.
This is consistent with the "canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of
pitting one statute against another in an inevitably destructive
confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile them,
remembering that both laws deserve respect as the handiwork of
coordinate branches of the government."21 Hence, if there appears to
be an apparent conflict between promulgated statutes, rules or
regulations issued by different government instrumentalities, the
proper action is not to immediately uphold one and annul the other,
but rather give effect to both by harmonizing them if
possible.22 Accordingly, although the DENR requires a Wood
Recovery Permit, an LGU is not necessarily precluded from
promulgating, pursuant to its power under the general welfare clause,
complementary orders, rules or ordinances to monitor and regulate the
transportation of salvaged forest products.
Notwithstanding, We still find that the Permits to Transport issued by
Ruzol are invalid for his failure to comply with the procedural
requirements set forth by law for its enforcement.
Then and now, Ruzol insists that the Permit to Transport partakes the
nature of transport fees levied by the municipality for the use of public
roads.23 In this regard, he argues that he has been conferred by law
the right to issue subject permits as an incident to the LGUs power to
create its own sources of revenue pursuant to the following provisions
of the LGC:
Section 153. Service Fees and Charges. Local government units
may impose and collect such reasonable fees and charges for
services rendered.
xxxx
Section 186. Power to Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges. Local
government units may exercise the power to levy taxes, fees or
charges on any base or subject not otherwise specifically enumerated
herein or taxed under the provisions of the National Internal Revenue
Code, as amended, or other applicable laws: Provided, That the taxes,
fees, or charges shall not be unjust, excessive, oppressive,
confiscatory or contrary to declared national policy: Provided, further,
That the ordinance levying such taxes, fees or charges shall not be
enacted without any prior public hearing conducted for the purpose.
(Emphasis Ours.)
Ruzol further argued that the permits to transport were issued under
his power and authority as Municipal Mayor under Sec. 444 of the
same law:
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for
any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had
been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance;
xxxx
vii) Adopt adequate measures to safeguard and conserve land,
mineral, marine, forest, and other resources of the municipality;
provide efficient and effective property and supply management in the
municipality; and protect the funds, credits, rights and other properties
of the municipality. (Emphasis Ours.)
Ruzol is correct to a point. Nevertheless, We find that an enabling
ordinance is necessary to confer the subject permits with validity. As
correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the power to levy fees or
charges under the LGC is exercised by the Sangguniang Bayan
through the enactment of an appropriate ordinance wherein the terms,
conditions and rates of the fees are prescribed.24 Needless to say, one
of the fundamental principles of local fiscal administration is that "local
revenue is generated only from sources expressly authorized by law
or ordinance."25
It is likewise expressly stated in Sec. 444(b)(3)(iv) of the LGC that the
authority of the municipal mayor to issue licenses and permits should
be "pursuant to a law or ordinance." It is the Sangguniang Bayan, as
the legislative body of the municipality, which is mandated by law to
enact ordinances against acts which endanger the environment, i.e.,
illegal logging, and smuggling of logs and other natural resources.26
In this case, an examination of the pertinent provisions of General
Nakars Revised Municipal Revenue Code27 and Municipal
Environment Code28 reveals that there is no provision unto which the
issuance of the permits to transport may be grounded. Thus, in the
absence of an ordinance for the regulation and transportation of
salvaged products, the permits to transport issued by Ruzol are infirm.
Ruzols insistence that his actions are pursuant to the LGUs devolved
function to "manage and control communal forests" under Sec. 17 of
the LGC and DAO 1992-3029 is specious. Although We recognize the
LGUs authority in the management and control of communal forests
within its territorial jurisdiction, We reiterate that this authority should
be exercised and enforced in accordance with the procedural
parameters established by law for its effective and efficient execution.
As can be gleaned from the same Sec. 17 of the LGC, the LGUs
authority to manage and control communal forests should be
"pursuant to national policies and is subject to supervision, control and
review of DENR."
As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the term "communal
forest"30 has a well-defined and technical meaning.31Consequently, as
an entity endowed with specialized competence and knowledge on
forest resources, the DENR cannot be discounted in the establishment
of communal forest. The DILG, on behalf of the LGUs, and the DENR
promulgated JMC 1998-01 which outlined the following procedure:
Section 8.4 Communal Forest
8.4.1 Existing Communal Forest
The devolution to and management of the communal forest by the city
and municipal governments shall be governed by the following general
procedures:
(a) DENR, through its CENRO, and the concerned LGU shall
undertake the actual identification and assessment of existing
communal forests. The assessment shall determine the suitability of
the existing communal forests. If these are no longer suitable, then
these communal forests may be disestablished. The Approval for
disestablishment shall be by the RED upon recommendation of the
DENR-LGU assessment Team through the PENRO and the RTD for
Forestry;
(b) Existing communal forest which are found and recommended by
the DENR-LGU Assessment Team as still suitable to achieve their
purpose shall be maintained as such. Thereafter, the Sangguniang
Panglungsod or Sangguniang Bayan where the communal forest is
located shall pass resolution requesting the DENR Secretary for the
turnover of said communal forest to the city or municipality. Upon
receipt of said resolution, the DENR Secretary shall issue an
Administrative Order officially transferring said communal forest to the
concerned LGU. The DENR RED shall effect the official transfer to the
concerned LGU within fifteen (15) days from the issuance of the
administrative order;
(c) Within twelve months from the issuance of the Administrative Order
and turnover of said communal forest to the city or municipality, the
LGU to which the communal forest was transferred shall formulate and
submit to the Provincial ENR Council for approval a management plan
governing the sustainable development of the communal forest.
For the purpose of formulating the communal forest management
plan, DENR shall, in coordination with the concerned LGU, undertake
a forest resource inventory and determine the sustainable level of
forest resource utilization and provide the LGU technical assistance in
all facets of forest management planning to ensure sustainable
development. The management plan should include provision for
replanting by the communities and the LGUs of the communal forests
to ensure sustainability.
8.4.2 Establishment of New Communal Forest
The establishment of new communal forests shall be governed by the
following guidelines:
(a) DENR, through its CENRO, together with the concerned
city/municipal LGU shall jointly identify potential communal forest
areas within the geographic jurisdiction of the concerned
city/municipality.
(b) Communal forests to be established shall be identified through a
forest land use planning to be undertaken jointly between the DENR
and the concerned LGU. The ensuing forest land use plan shall
indicate, among others, the site and location of the communal forests
within the production forest categorized as such in the forest land use
plan;
(c) Once the forest land use plan has been affirmed, the local chief
executive shall initiate the passage by the LGUs sanggunian of a
resolution requesting the DENR Secretary to issue an Administrative
Order declaring the identified area as a communal forest. The required
administrative order shall be issued within sixty (60) days after receipt
of the resolution;
(d) Upon acceptance of the responsibility for the communal forest, the
city/municipal LGU shall formulate the management plan and submit
the same to its ENR Council. The management plan shall include
provision for replanting by the communities and the LGUs of the
communal forests to ensure sustainability.
The communal forests of each municipality shall in no case exceed a
total of 5,000 hectares. (Emphasis Ours.)
It is clear, therefore, that before an area may be considered a
communal forest, the following requirements must be accomplished:
(1) an identification of potential communal forest areas within the
geographic jurisdiction of the concerned city/municipality; (2) a forest
land use plan which shall indicate, among other things, the site and
location of the communal forests; (3) a request to the DENR Secretary
through a resolution passed by the Sangguniang Bayan concerned;
and (4) an administrative order issued by DENR Secretary declaring
the identified area as a communal forest.
In the present case, the records are bereft of any showing that these
requirements were complied with. Thus, in the absence of an
established communal forest within the Municipality of General Nakar,
there was no way that the subject permits to transport were issued as
an incident to the management and control of a communal forest.
This is not to say, however, that compliance with abovementioned
statutory requirements for the issuance of permits to transport
foregoes the necessity of obtaining the Wood Recovery Permit from
the DENR. As earlier discussed, the permits to transport may be
issued to complement, and not substitute, the Wood Recovery Permit,
and may be used only as an additional measure in the regulation of
salvaged forest products. To elucidate, a person seeking to transport
salvaged forest products still has to acquire a Wood Recovery Permit
from the DENR as a prerequisite before obtaining the corresponding
permit to transport issued by the LGU.
Main Issue:
Whether Ruzol Is Guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions
The foregoing notwithstanding, Ruzol cannot be held guilty of
Usurpation of Official Functions as defined and penalized under Art.
177 of the RPC, to wit:
Art. 177. Usurpation of authority or official functions. Any person
who shall knowingly and falsely represent himself to be an officer,
agent or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine
Government or of any foreign government, or who, under pretense of
official position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in
authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign
government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to
do so, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
and medium periods. (Emphasis Ours.)
As the aforementioned provision is formulated, there are two ways of
committing this crime: first, by knowingly and falsely representing
himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or
agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government; or
second, under pretense of official position, shall perform any act
pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine
Government or any foreign government, or any agency thereof,
without being lawfully entitled to do so.32 The former constitutes the
crime of usurpation of authority, while the latter act constitutes the
crime of usurpation of official functions.33
In the present case, Ruzol stands accused of usurpation of official
functions for issuing 221 permits to transport salvaged forest products
under the alleged "pretense of official position and without being
lawfully entitled to do so, such authority properly belonging to the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources."34 The
Sandiganbayan ruled that all the elements of the crime were attendant
in the present case because the authority to issue the subject permits
belongs solely to the DENR.35
We rule otherwise.
First, it is settled that an accused in a criminal case is presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved and that to overcome the
presumption, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be
established by the prosecution.36As held by this Court in People v.
Sitco:37
The imperative of proof beyond reasonable doubt has a vital role in
our criminal justice system, the accused, during a criminal
prosecution, having a stake interest of immense importance, both
because of the possibility that he may lose his freedom if convicted
and because of the certainty that his conviction will leave a permanent
stain on his reputation and name. (Emphasis supplied.)
Citing Rabanal v. People,38 the Court further explained:
Law and jurisprudence demand proof beyond reasonable doubt before
any person may be deprived of his life, liberty, or even property.
Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the petitioner to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and to overcome the
presumption, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be
established by the prosecution. The constitutional presumption of
innocence requires courts to take "a more than casual consideration"
of every circumstance of doubt proving the innocence of petitioner.
(Emphasis added.)
Verily, an accused is entitled to an acquittal unless his or her guilt is
shown beyond reasonable doubt and it is the primordial duty of the
prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion, so that
conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion, with
moral certainty.39 As explained by this Court in People v. Berroya:40
The necessity for proof beyond reasonable doubt lies in the fact that
"(i)n a criminal prosecution, the State is arrayed against the subject; it
enters the contest with a prior inculpatory finding in its hands; with
unlimited means of command; with counsel usually of authority and
capacity, who are regarded as public officers, and therefore as
speaking semi-judicially, and with an attitude of tranquil majesty often
in striking contrast to that of defendant engaged in a perturbed and
distracting struggle for liberty if not for life. These inequalities of
position, the law strives to meet by the rule that there is to be no
conviction when there is a reasonable doubt of guilt."
Indeed, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree
of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty;
moral certainly only is required, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind.41 However, contrary to the ruling
of the Sandiganbayan, We find that a careful scrutiny of the events
surrounding this case failed to prove that Ruzol is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of committing the crime of usurpation of official
functions of the DENR.
We note that this case of usurpation against Ruzol rests principally on
the prosecutions theory that the DENR is the only government
instrumentality that can issue the permits to transport salvaged forest
products. The prosecution asserted that Ruzol usurped the official
functions that properly belong to the DENR.
But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is not the sole
government agency vested with the authority to issue permits relevant
to the transportation of salvaged forest products, considering that,
pursuant to the general welfare clause, LGUs may also exercise such
authority. Also, as can be gleaned from the records, the permits to
transport were meant to complement and not to replace the Wood
Recovery Permit issued by the DENR. In effect, Ruzol required the
issuance of the subject permits under his authority as municipal mayor
and independently of the official functions granted to the DENR. The
records are likewise bereft of any showing that Ruzol made
representations or false pretenses that said permits could be used in
lieu of, or at the least as an excuse not to obtain, the Wood Recovery
Permit from the DENR.
Second, contrary to the findings of the Sandiganbayan, Ruzol acted in
good faith.
It bears stressing at this point that in People v. Hilvano,42 this Court
enunciated that good faith is a defense in criminal prosecutions for
usurpation of official functions.43 The term "good faith" is ordinarily
used to describe that state of mind denoting "honesty of intention, and
freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the
holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to abstain from taking any
unconscientious advantage of another, even though technicalities of
law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief
of facts which render transaction unconscientious."44 Good faith is
actually a question of intention and although something internal, it can
be ascertained by relying not on ones self-serving protestations of
good faith but on evidence of his conduct and outward acts.45
In dismissing Ruzols claim of good faith, the Sandiganbayan necessarily mean that such mistakes automatically demand Us to rule
reasoned as follows: a conviction. This is in consonance with the settled principle that "all
If it is really true that Ruzol believed himself to be authorized under reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate error and not crime should
R.A. 7160 to issue the subject permits, why did he have to secure the be indulged in for the benefit of the accused."49
approval of the various NGOs, Peoples Organizations and religious Under our criminal judicial system, "evil intent must unite with the
organizations before issuing the said permits? He could very well have unlawful act for a crime to exist," as "there can be no crime when the
issued subject permits even without the approval of these various criminal mind is wanting."50 Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.
organizations if he truly believed that he was legally empowered to do In the present case, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond
so considering that the endorsement of these organizations is not reasonable doubt that Ruzol possessed that "criminal mind" when he
required by law. That Ruzol had to arm himself with their endorsement issued the subject permits. What is clear from the records is that
could only mean that he actually knew that he had no legal basis for Ruzol, as municipal mayor, intended to regulate and monitor salvaged
issuing the said permits; thus he had to look elsewhere for support forest products within General Nakar in order to avert the occurrence
and back-up.46 (Emphasis Ours.) of illegal logging in the area. We find that to hold him criminally liable
We, however, cannot subscribe to this posture as there is neither legal for these seemingly noble intentions would be a step backward and
basis nor established doctrine to draw a conclusion that good faith is would run contrary to the standing advocacy of encouraging people to
negated when an accused sought another persons approval. Neither take a pro-active stance in the protection of the environment and
is there any doctrine in law which provides that bad faith is present conservation of our natural resources.
when one seeks the opinion or affirmation of others. Incidentally, considering the peculiar circumstances of the present
Contrary to the conclusions made by the Sandiganbayan, We find that case and considering further that this case demands only the
the conduct of the public consultation was not a badge of bad faith, but determination of Ruzol's guilt or innocence for usurpation of official
a sign supporting Ruzols good intentions to regulate and monitor the functions under the RPC, for which the issue on the validity of the
movement of salvaged forest products to prevent abuse and subject Permits to Transport is only subsidiary, We hereby resolve this
occurrence of untoward illegal logging. In fact, the records will bear case only for this purpose and only in this instance, pro hac vice, and,
that the requirement of permits to transport was not Ruzols decision in the interest of justice, rule in favor of Ruzol' s acquittal.
alone; it was, as earlier narrated, a result of the collective decision of IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the December 19, 2008 Decision of
the participants during the Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly. As the Sandiganbayan First Division in Criminal Case Nos. SB-08-CRIM-
attested to by Bishop Julio Xavier Labayen, it was the participants who 0039 to 0259, finding Leovegildo R. Ruzol guilty of violating Art. 177 of
agreed that the subject permits be issued by the Office of the Mayor of the Revised Penal Code, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
General Nakar, through Ruzol, in the exercise of the latters authority Accused Leovegildo R. Ruzol is, thus, ACQUITTED on the basis of
as local chief executive.47 reasonable doubt of the crimes as charged.
The Sandiganbayan also posits the view that Ruzols good faith is SO ORDERED.
negated by the fact that if he truly believed he was authorized to issue
the subject permits, Ruzol did not have to request the presence and
obtain the permission of PENRO Rogelio Delgado Sr. during the Multi-
Sectoral Assembly.48
The graft courts above posture, however, does not commend itself for
concurrence. If, indeed, Ruzol willfully and deliberately intended to
usurp the official functions of the DENR as averred by the prosecution,
he would not have asked the presence of a DENR official who has the
authority and credibility to publicly object against Ruzols allegedly
intended usurpation. Thus, the presence of PENRO Delgado during
the Multi-Sectoral Assembly does not negate, but strengthens Ruzols
claim of good faith.
As a final note, We emphasize that the burden of protecting the
environment is placed not on the shoulders of DENR aloneeach and
every one of us, whether in an official or private capacity, has his or
her significant role to play. Indeed, protecting the environment is not
only a responsibility but also a right for which a citizen could and
should freely exercise. Considering the rampant forest denudation,
environmental degradation and plaguing scarcity of natural resources,
each of us is now obligated to contribute and share in the
responsibility of protecting and conserving our treasured natural
resources.
Ruzol chose to exercise this right and to share in this responsibility by
exercising his authority as municipal mayoran act which was
executed with the concurrence and cooperation of non-governmental
organizations, industry stakeholders, and the concerned citizens of
General Nakar. Admittedly, We consider his acts as invalid but it does
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 192565 February 28, 2012
UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES and DESI
TOMAS, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this Rule 45 petition, the decision1 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 65, Makati City (RTC-Makati City) in Civil Case No. 09-
1038. The petition seeks to reverse and set aside the RTC-Makati City
decision dismissing the petition for certiorari of petitioners Union Bank
of the Philippines (Union Bank) and Desi Tomas (collectively, the
petitioners). The RTC found that the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
63, Makati City (MeTC-Makati City) did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion in denying the motion to quash the information for perjury
filed by Tomas.
The Antecedents
Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) for making a false narration in a Certificate
against Forum Shopping. The Information against her reads:
That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon
a material matter before a competent person authorized to administer
oath which the law requires to wit: said accused stated in the
Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for sum of
money with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No.
342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union
Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency,
accused knowing well that said material statement was false thereby
making a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood.2
The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Banks two (2)
complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against
the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0717, was filed before the
RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 342-000, was filed on March
15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both
complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification
against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately
violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath in the
Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she
did not commence any other action or proceeding involving the same
issue in another tribunal or agency.
Tomas filed a Motion to Quash,3 citing two grounds. First, she argued
that the venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court
(where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and
used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against
Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury
case. Second, she argued that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense because: (a) the third element of perjury the willful and
deliberate assertion of falsehood was not alleged with particularity
without specifying what the other action or proceeding commenced
involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency; (b) there was
no other action or proceeding pending in another court when the
second complaint was filed; and (c) she was charged with perjury by
giving false testimony while the allegations in the Information make out
perjury by making a false affidavit.
The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has
jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate against Forum Shopping
was notarized in Makati City.4 The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that
the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with
perjury.5 The MeTC-Makati City subsequently denied Tomas motion
for reconsideration.6
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City
to annul and set aside the MeTC-Makati City orders on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion. The petitioners anchored their petition on
the rulings in United States v. Canet7 and Ilusorio v. Bildner8 which
ruled that venue and jurisdiction should be in the place where the false
document was presented.
The Assailed RTC Decision
In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the RTC-Makati City held:
[I]nsofar as the petitioners stance is concerned[,] the more recent
case of [Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy] (GR Nos. 174168 & 179438, March 30,
2009) however, reaffirms what has been the long standing view on the
venue with respect to perjury cases. In this particular case[,] the high
court reiterated the rule that the criminal action shall be instituted and
tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was
committed, or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. It went
on to declare that since the subject document[,] the execution of which
was the subject of the charge[,] was subscribed and sworn to in
Manila[,] then the court of the said territorial jurisdiction was the proper
venue of the criminal action[.]
xxxx
x x x Given the present state of jurisprudence on the matter, it is not
amiss to state that the city court of Makati City has jurisdiction to try
and decide the case for perjury inasmuch as the gist of the complaint
itself which constitute[s] the charge against the petitioner dwells solely
on the act of subscribing to a false certification. On the other hand, the
charge against the accused in the case of Ilusorio v. Bildner, et al.,
based on the complaint-affidavits therein[,] was not simply the
execution of the questioned documents but rather the introduction of
the false evidence through the subject documents before the court of
Makati City.9 (emphasis ours)
The RTC-Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City did not commit
grave abuse of discretion since the order denying the Motion to Quash
was based on jurisprudence later than Ilusorio. The RTC-Makati City
also observed that the facts in Ilusorio are different from the facts of
the present case. Lastly, the RTC-Makati City ruled that the Rule 65
petition was improper since the petitioners can later appeal the
decision in the principal case. The RTC-Makati City subsequently
denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.10
The Petition
The petitioners pray that we reverse the RTC-Makati City decision and
quash the Information for perjury against Tomas. The petitioners
contend that the Ilusorio ruling is more applicable to the present facts
than our ruling in Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim.11 They argued that the
facts in Ilusorio showed that the filing of the petitions in court
containing the false statements was the essential ingredient that
consummated the perjury. In Sy Tiong, the perjurious statements were
made in a General Information Sheet (GIS) that was submitted to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Interestingly, Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz shared the
petitioners view. In his Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment
(which we hereby treat as the Comment to the petition), the Solicitor
General also relied on Ilusorio and opined that the lis mota in the
crime of perjury is the deliberate or intentional giving of false evidence
in the court where the evidence is material. The Solicitor General
observed that the criminal intent to assert a falsehood under oath only
became manifest before the MeTC-Pasay City.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of what the proper venue of perjury
under Article 183 of the RPC should be Makati City, where the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City,
where the Certification was presented to the trial court.
The Courts Ruling
claim or relief; it may also be in a sworn certification annexed to the
We deny the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper
venue and the proper court to take cognizance of the perjury case
against the petitioners.
Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction
Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It
determines not only the place where the criminal action is to be
instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the
case. The reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial
courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court can
only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial
jurisdiction.12 Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is
grounded on the necessity and justice of having an accused on trial in
the municipality of province where witnesses and other facilities for his
defense are available.13
Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases
carries jurisdictional consequences. In determining the venue where
the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has
jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides:
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court or municipality or
territory where the offense was committed or where any of
its essential ingredients occurred. [emphasis ours]
The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:
Place of commission of the offense. The complaint or information is
sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that the offense
was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some
place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place
where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the
offense charged or is necessary for its identification.
Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over
criminal cases not only in the court where the offense was committed,
but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In other
words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently
alleged where the Information states that the offense was committed
or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Information Charging Perjury
Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
contains the requirement for a Certificate against Forum Shopping.
The Certificate against Forum Shopping can be made either by a
statement under oath in the complaint or initiatory pleading asserting a
complaint or initiatory pleading. In both instances, the affiant is
required to execute a statement under oath before a duly
commissioned notary public or any competent person authorized to
administer oath that: (a) he or she has not theretofore commenced
any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his or her
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if
there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of
the present status thereof; and (c) if he or she should thereafter learn
that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending,
he or she shall report that fact within five days therefrom to the court
wherein his or her aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed. In relation to the crime of perjury, the material matter in a
Certificate against Forum Shopping is the truth of the required
declarations which is designed to guard against litigants pursuing
simultaneous remedies in different fora.14
In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under Article
183 of the RPC for making a false Certificate against Forum Shopping.
The elements of perjury under Article 183 are:
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or
executed an affidavit upon a material matter.
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a
competent officer, authorized to receive and administer
oath.
(c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a
willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the
falsity is required by law or made for a legal
purpose.15(emphasis ours)
Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case
on the ground of improper venue, the allegations in the complaint and
information must be examined together with Section 15(a), Rule 110
of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this basis, we
find that the allegations in the Information sufficiently support a finding
that the crime of perjury was committed by Tomas within the territorial
jurisdiction of the MeTC-Makati City.
The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject
Certificate against Forum Shopping was alleged in the Information to
have been committed in Makati City. Likewise, the second and fourth
elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping to be
under oath before a notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the
Information to have been made in Makati City:
That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon
a material matter before a competent person authorized to administer
oath which the law requires to wit: said accused stated in the
Verification/Certification/Affidavit x x x.16
We also find that the third element of willful and deliberate falsehood
was also sufficiently alleged to have been committed in Makati City,
not Pasay City, as indicated in the last portion of the Information:
[S]aid accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit
of a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin
docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,]
Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not
commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues
in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that said material
statement was false thereby making a willful and deliberate assertion
of falsehood.17 (underscoring ours)
Tomas deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly
shown when she made the false declarations in the Certificate against
Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite her
knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to
were not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati
City is the proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant
to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure as all the essential elements constituting the crime of
perjury were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City,
not Pasay City.
Referral to the En Banc
The present case was referred to the En Banc primarily to address the
seeming conflict between the division rulings of the Court in the
Ilusorio case that is cited as basis of this petition, and the Sy Tiong
case that was the basis of the assailed RTC-Makati City ruling.
The Cited Ilusorio and Sy Tiong Cases
The subject matter of the perjury charge in Ilusorio involved false
statements contained in verified petitions filed with the court for the
issuance of a new owners duplicate copies of certificates of title. The
verified petitions containing the false statements were subscribed and
sworn to in Pasig City, but were filed in Makati City and Tagaytay City.
The question posed was: which court (Pasig City, Makati City and/or
Tagaytay City) had jurisdiction to try and hear the perjury cases?
We ruled that the venues of the action were in Makati City and
Tagaytay City, the places where the verified petitions were filed. The
Court reasoned out that it was only upon filing that the intent to assert
an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged
untruthful statement found relevance or materiality. We cited as
jurisprudential authority the case of United States. v. Caet18 which
ruled:
It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long
as it appears from the information that the defendant, by means of
such affidavit, "swore to" and knowingly submitted false evidence,
material to a point at issue in a judicial proceeding pending in the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province. The gist of the offense
charged is not the making of the affidavit in Manila, but the intentional declaration, disposition, or certificate by him subscribed is true, willfully
giving of false evidence in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter
by means of such affidavit. [emphasis and underscoring deleted] which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall be
punished by a fine of not more than two thousand pesos and by
imprisonment for not more than five years; and shall moreover,
In Sy Tiong, the perjured statements were made in a GIS which was
thereafter be incapable of holding any public office or of giving
subscribed and sworn to in Manila. We ruled that the proper venue for
testimony in any court of the Philippine Islands until such time as the
the perjury charges was in Manila where the GIS was subscribed and
judgment against him is reversed.
sworn to. We held that the perjury was consummated in Manila where
the false statement was made. As supporting jurisprudence, we cited
the case of Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice19 that, in turn, cited an This law was copied, with the necessary changes, from Sections
American case entitled U.S. v. Norris.20 We ruled in Villanueva that 539224 and 539325 of the Revised Statutes of the United States.26 Act
No. 1697 was intended to make the mere execution of a false affidavit
punishable in our jurisdiction.27
Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration well may affect the
dearest concerns of the parties before a tribunal. Deliberate material
falsification under oath constitutes the crime of perjury, and the crime In turn, Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 provided that
is complete when a witness' statement has once been made. the venue shall be the court of the place where the crime was
committed.
The Crime of Perjury: A Background
As applied and interpreted by the Court in Caet, perjury was
committed by the act of representing a false document in a judicial
To have a better appreciation of the issue facing the Court, a look at
proceeding.28 The venue of action was held by the Court to be at the
the historical background of how the crime of perjury (specifically,
place where the false document was presented since the presentation
Article 183 of the RPC) evolved in our jurisdiction.
was the act that consummated the crime.
The RPC penalizes three forms of false testimonies. The first is false
The annotation of Justices Aquino and Grio-Aquino in their textbook
testimony for and against the defendant in a criminal case (Articles
on the RPC29 interestingly explains the history of the perjury provisions
180 and 181, RPC); the second is false testimony in a civil case
of the present RPC and traces as well the linkage between Act No.
(Article 182, RPC); and the third is false testimony in other cases
1697 and the present Code. To quote these authors:30
(Article 183, RPC). Based on the Information filed, the present case
involves the making of an untruthful statement in an affidavit on a
material matter. Art. 180 was taken from art. 318 of the Old Penal Code and art. 154 of
Del Pans Proposed Correctional Code, while art. 181 was taken from
art. 319 of the old Penal Code and Art. 157 of Del Pans Proposed
These RPC provisions, however, are not really the bases of the rulings
Correctional Code. Said arts. 318 and 319, together with art. 321 of
cited by the parties in their respective arguments. The cited Ilusorio
the old Penal Code, were impliedly repealed by Act 1697, the Perjury
ruling, although issued by this Court in 2008, harked back to the case
Law, passed on August 23, 1907, which in turn was expressly
of Caet which was decided in 1915, i.e., before the present RPC took
repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916, Act 2657. In view of the
effect.21 Sy Tiong, on the other hand, is a 2009 ruling that cited
express repeal of Act 1697, arts. 318 and 321 of the old Penal Code
Villanueva, a 2005 case that in turn cited United States v. Norris, a
were deemed revived. However, Act 2718 expressly revived secs. 3
1937 American case. Significantly, unlike Canet, Sy Tiong is entirely
and 4 of the Perjury Law. Art. 367 of the Revised Penal Code repealed
based on rulings rendered after the present RPC took effect.22
Act Nos. 1697 and 2718.
The perjurious act in Caet consisted of an information charging
It should be noted that perjury under Acts 1697 and 2718 includes
perjury through the presentation in court of a motion accompanied by
false testimony, whereas, under the Revised Penal Code, false
a false sworn affidavit. At the time the Caet ruling was rendered, the
testimony includes perjury. Our law on false testimony is of Spanish
prevailing law on perjury and the rules on prosecution of criminal
origin, but our law on perjury (art. 183 taken from sec. 3 of Act 1697) is
offenses were found in Section 3, Act No. 1697 of the Philippine
derived from American statutes. The provisions of the old Penal Code
Commission, and in Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No.
on false testimony embrace perjury committed in court or in some
5823 for the procedural aspect.
contentious proceeding, while perjury as defined in Act 1697 includes
the making of a false affidavit. The provisions of the Revised Penal
Section 3 of Act No. 1697 reads: Code on false testimony "are more severe and strict than those of Act
1697" on perjury. [italics ours]
Sec. 3. Any person who, having taken oath before a competent
tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the Philippine With this background, it can be appreciated that Article 183 of the
Islands authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify, RPC which provides:
declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony,
The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person,
who knowingly makes untruthful statements and not being included in
the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or
make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent
person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so
requires. [emphasis supplied; emphases ours]
in fact refers to either of two punishable acts (1) falsely testifying
under oath in a proceeding other than a criminal or civil case; and (2)
making a false affidavit before a person authorized to administer an
oath on any material matter where the law requires an oath.
As above discussed, Sy Tiong decided under Article 183 of the RPC
essentially involved perjured statements made in a GIS that was
subscribed and sworn to in Manila and submitted to the SEC in
Mandaluyong City. Thus, the case involved the making of an affidavit,
not an actual testimony in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor
civil. From this perspective, the situs of the oath, i.e., the place where
the oath was taken, is the place where the offense was committed. By
implication, the proper venue would have been the City of
Mandaluyong the site of the SEC had the charge involved an
actual testimony made before the SEC.
In contrast, Caet involved the presentation in court of a motion
supported and accompanied by an affidavit that contained a falsity.
With Section 3 of Act No. 1697 as basis, the issue related to the
submission of the affidavit in a judicial proceeding. This came at a time
when Act No. 1697 was the perjury law, and made no distinction
between judicial and other proceedings, and at the same time
separately penalized the making of false statements under oath
(unlike the present RPC which separately deals with false testimony in
criminal, civil and other proceedings, while at the same time also
penalizing the making of false affidavits). Understandably, the venue
should be the place where the submission was made to the court or
the situs of the court; it could not have been the place where the
affidavit was sworn to simply because this was not the offense
charged in the Information.
The case of Ilusorio cited the Caet case as its authority, in a situation
where the sworn petitions filed in court for the issuance of duplicate
certificates of title (that were allegedly lost) were the cited sworn
statements to support the charge of perjury for the falsities stated in
the sworn petitions. The Court ruled that the proper venue should be
the Cities of Makati and Tagaytay because it was in the courts of
these cities "where the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became
manifest and where the alleged untruthful statement finds relevance or
materiality in deciding the issue of whether new owners duplicate
copies of the [Certificate of Condominium Title] and [Transfer
Certificates of Title] may issue."31 To the Court, "whether the perjurious
statements contained in the four petitions were subscribed and sworn
in Pasig is immaterial, the gist of the offense of perjury being the
intentional giving of false statement,"32citing Caet as authority for its
statement.
The statement in Ilusorio may have partly led to the present confusion containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized
on venue because of its very categorical tenor in pointing to the person.
considerations to be made in the determination of venue; it leaves the
impression that the place where the oath was taken is not at all a
Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is
material consideration, forgetting that Article 183 of the RPC clearly
more in accord with Article 183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule
speaks of two situations while Article 182 of the RPC likewise applies
110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To reiterate for
to false testimony in civil cases.
the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed
through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is
The Ilusorio statement would have made perfect sense had the basis committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her
for the charge been Article 182 of the RPC, on the assumption that the affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of
petition itself constitutes a false testimony in a civil case. The Caet perjury are executed. When the crime is committed through false
ruling would then have been completely applicable as the sworn testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil,
statement is used in a civil case, although no such distinction was venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu
made under Caet because the applicable law at the time (Act No. of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that
1697) did not make any distinction. is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted,
venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is
submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and
If Article 183 of the RPC were to be used, as what in fact appears in
the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed.
the Ilusorio ruling, then only that portion of the article, referring to the
In all cases, determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged
making of an affidavit, would have been applicable as the other portion
in the Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.
refers to false testimony in other proceedings which a judicial petition
for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of a Certificate of
Condominium Title is not because it is a civil proceeding in court. As a WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for
perjury based on the making of a false affidavit, what assumes lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.
materiality is the site where the oath was taken as this is the place
where the oath was made, in this case, Pasig City.
SO ORDERED.
Procedurally, the rule on venue of criminal cases has been subject to
various changes from the time General Order No. 58 was replaced by
Rules 106 to 122 of the Rules of Court on July 1, 1940. Section 14,
Rule 106 of the Rules of Court provided for the rule on venue of
criminal actions and it expressly included, as proper venue, the place
where any one of the essential ingredients of the crime took
place.1wphi1 This change was followed by the passage of the 1964
Rules of Criminal Procedure,33 the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure,34 and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which
all adopted the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedures expanded venue
of criminal actions. Thus, the venue of criminal cases is not only in the
place where the offense was committed, but also where any of its
essential ingredients took place.
In the present case, the Certification against Forum Shopping was
made integral parts of two complaints for sum of money with prayer for
a writ of replevin against the respondent spouses Eddie Tamondong
and Eliza B. Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a complaint-affidavit
against Tomas for violation of Article 183 of the RPC. As alleged in the
Information that followed, the criminal act charged was for the
execution by Tomas of an affidavit that contained a falsity.
Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the
applicable provision; thus, jurisdiction and venue should be
determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who
"make[s] an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent
person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so
requires." The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an
affidavit; thus, the criminal act is consummated when the statement
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 163972-77 March 28, 2008
JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Joselito Raniero J. Daan (petitioner), one of the accused in Criminal
Cases Nos. 24167-24170, 24195-24196,1questions the denial by
the Sandiganbayan of his plea bargaining proposal.
The antecedents facts are laid down by Sandiganbayan in its
Resolution dated March 25, 2004, as follows:
Said accused,2 together with accused Benedicto E. Kuizon, were
charged before this Court for three counts of malversation of public
funds involving the sums of 3,293.00, 1,869.00, and 13,528.00,
respectively, which they purportedly tried to conceal by falsifying the
time book and payrolls for given period making it appear that some
laborers worked on the construction of the new municipal hall building
of Bato, Leyte and collected their respective salaries thereon when, in
truth and in fact, they did not. Thus, in addition to the charge for
malversation, the accused were also indicted before this Court for
three counts of falsification of public document by a public officer or
employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of
"not guilty" and substitute the same with a plea of "guilty", provided,
the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and
voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor. In the alternative,
if such proposal is not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to
substitute their plea of "not guilty" to the crime of falsification of public
document by a public officer or employee with a plea of "guilty", but to
the lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a private
individual. On the other hand, in the malversation cases, the accused
offered to substitute their plea of "not guilty" thereto with a plea of
"guilty", but to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to
render accounts.
Insofar as the falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found
as acceptable the proposal of the accused to plead "guilty" to the
lesser crime of falsification of public document by a private individual.
The prosecution explained:
"With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it appears
that the act of the accused in pleading guilty for a lesser offense of
falsification by a private individual defined and penalized under Article
172 of the Revised Penal code will strengthen our cases against the
principal accused, Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to
be the master mind of these criminal acts."
Insofar as the malversation cases are concerned, the prosecution was
likewise amenable to the offer of said accused to plead "guilty" to the
lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts
because:
"x x x JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the total
amount of 18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the provincial
government of Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In short, the damage
caused to the government has already been restituted x x x.3
The Sandiganbayan, in the herein assailed Resolution,4 dated March
25, 2004, denied petitioners Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable
recommendation by the prosecution, on the main ground that no
cogent reason was presented to justify its approval.5
The Sandiganbayan likewise denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration in a Resolution dated May 31, 2004.
This compelled petitioner to file the present case for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/ or writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying his plea bargaining offer on the following
grounds: first, petitioner is not an accountable officer and he merely
affixed his signature on the payrolls on a "routinary basis," negating
any criminal intent; and that the amount involved is only 18,860.00,
which he already restituted.6
The petition is meritorious.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused
and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the
case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's
pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts
of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for
the graver charge.7
Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. At arraignment, the
accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor,
may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense
which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After
arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead
guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No
amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (sec. 4, cir.
38-98)
Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the
proceedings. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, require
plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the pre-trial
conference,8 viz:
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. In all criminal cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and
within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over
the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in
special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial
conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
bargaining.15 (Emphasis supplied)
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits
the charge but interposes a lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial
of the criminal and civil aspects of the case.
SEC. 2. Pre-trial agreement. All agreements or admissions made or
entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and
signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used
against the accused. The agreements covering the matters referred to
in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the court. (Emphasis
supplied)
But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the
prosecution has finished presenting its evidence and rested its case.
Thus, the Court has held that it is immaterial that plea bargaining was
not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was made only after the
prosecution already presented several witnesses.9
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites
upon which plea bargaining may be made, i.e., that it should be with
the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor,10 and that the
plea of guilt should be to a lesser offense which is necessarily
included in the offense charged. The rules however use word may in
the second sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of discretion
upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such
plea.11 Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for
a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be
allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience
of the accused.12
In People of the Philippines v. Villarama,13 the Court ruled that the
acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not
demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is
addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court,14 viz:
x x x In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and
the Office of the Prosecutor with a yardstick within which their
discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in People v. Kayanan (L-
39355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450), We held that the rules
allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient
evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. In his concurring
opinion in People v. Parohinog (G.R. No. L-47462, February 28, 1980,
96 SCRA 373, 377), then Justice Antonio Barredo explained clearly
and tersely the rationale or the law:
x x x (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only basis on
which the fiscal and the court could rightfully act in allowing the
appellant to change his former plea of not guilty to murder to guilty to
the lesser crime of homicide could be nothing more nothing less than
the evidence already in the record. The reason for this being that
Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule 116) under which a plea
for a lesser offense is allowed was not and could not have been
intended as a procedure for compromise, much less
However, Villarama involved plea bargaining after the prosecution had
already rested its case.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, as in the present
case, the trial court's exercise of its discretion should neither be
arbitrary nor should it amount to a capricious and whimsical exercise
of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction
or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and it
must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law.16
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's plea offer
on the ground that petitioner and the prosecution failed to demonstrate
that the proposal would redound to the benefit of the public.
The Sandiganbayanbelieves that approving the proposal would "only
serve to trivialize the seriousness of the charges against them and
send the wrong signal to potential grafters in public office that the
penalties they are likely to face would be lighter than what their
criminal acts would have merited or that the economic benefits they
are likely to derive from their criminal activities far outweigh the risks
they face in committing them; thus, setting to naught the deterrent
value of the laws intended to curb graft and corruption in
government."171avvphi1
Apparently, the Sandiganbayan has proffered valid reasons in
rejecting petitioner's plea offer. However, subsequent events and
higher interests of justice and fair play dictate that petitioner's plea
offer should be accepted. The present case calls for the judicious
exercise of this Court's equity jurisdiction -
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do
complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their
rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special
circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity regards the
spirit of and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the substance
rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different
courts.18
and of its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of
lower courts,19 in order to afford equal justice to petitioner.
In People of the Philippines v. Estrada,20 the Sandiganbayan, in its
Resolution dated March 14, 2007, approved the Plea Bargaining
Agreement entered into by the prosecution and one of the accused,
Charlie "Atong" Ang. The agreement provided that the accused
undertakes to assist in the prosecution of the case and promises to
return the amount of 25,000,000.00. In approving the Plea
Bargaining Agreement, the Sandiganbayan took into consideration the
timeliness of the plea bargaining and whether the agreement complied
with the requirements of Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court.
The Sandigabayan noted that the accused had already withdrawn his
earlier plea of "not guilty"; and that the prosecution consented to the
plea of guilt to a lesser offense; and the lesser offense, which is
Corruption of Public Officials in relation to Indirect Bribery, is
necessarily included in the offense charged, which is Plunder.21
The Court sees no reason why the standards applied by
the Sandiganbayan to Estrada should not be applied to the present
case. Records show that there was a favorable recommendation by
the Office of the Special Prosecutor to approve petitioner's motion to
plea bargain. Thus, in its Memorandum dated August 16, 2002, the
Office of the Special Prosecutor rationalized:
In the cases at bar, there is no dispute that JOSELITO RANIERO J.
DAAN has already restituted the total amount of 18,860.00 as per
official receipt issued by the provincial government of Leyte dated
February 26, 2002. In short, the damage caused to the government
has already been restituted by the accused.
There is also no dispute that accused DAAN voluntarily surrendered in
the instant cases. Moreover, the accused is also willing to plead guilty
to a lesser offense which to our mind, merits consideration.
With respect to the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it appears
that the act of the accused in pleading guilty for a lesser offense of
falsification by private individual defined and penalized under Article
172 of the Revised Penal Code will strengthen our cases against the
principal accused, the Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who
appears to be the master mind of these criminal acts. After all, the
movants herein JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN was merely
designated as draftsman detailed as foreman/timekeeper of the
Municipality of Bato, Leyte.22
Moreover, the lesser offenses of Falsification by Private Individuals
and Failure to Render Account by an Accountable Officer are
necessarily included in the crimes of Falsification of Public Documents
and Malversation of Public Funds, respectively, with which petitioner
was originally charged.
Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, for the
crime of Falsification of Public Documents through an untruthful
narration of facts to be established, the following elements must
concur: (a) the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in
a narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose
the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the offender
are absolutely false; and (d) the perversion of truth in the narration of
facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person.23
On the other hand, Falsification by Private Individuals penalized under
Article 172, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code has the following
elements: (a) the offender is a private individual or a public officer
or employee who did not take advantage of his official position;
(b) the offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated
under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code; and (c) the falsification
was committed in a public or official or commercial document.24
As regards the crime of Malversation of Public Funds defined and
penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, with which
petitioner was also charged, the elements are as follows: (a) the
offender is a public officer; (b) he has custody or control of funds or
property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) the funds or property
involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and
(d) he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented
to, or through abandonment or negligence permitted, the taking by
another person of such funds or property.25 Article 217 also provides
that the failure of the public officer to have duly forthcoming such
public funds or property, upon demand by a duly authorized officer,
"shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal use." In this regard, it has been ruled that once
such presumption is rebutted, then it is completely destroyed; in fact,
the presumption is never deemed to have existed at all.26
Meanwhile, under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code, Failure to
Render Account by an Accountable Officer, the lesser offense which
petitioner seeks to plead guilty of, the following elements must concur:
(a) the offender is a public officer; (b) the offender must be an
accountable officer for public funds or property; (c) the offender is
required by law or regulation to render accounts to the COA or to a
provincial auditor; and (d) the offender fails to render an account for a
period of two months after such accounts should be rendered.27
Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court states when an offense the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings in accordance with this
includes or is included in the other, to wit: Decision.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An SO ORDERED.
offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some
of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged
is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting
the latter.
An offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of
the essential elements or ingredients of the former as alleged in
the complaint or information constitute the latter. And vice versa,
an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those
constituting the latter.28
In this case, the allegations in the Informations filed against petitioner
are sufficient to hold petitioner liable for the lesser offenses. Thus, in
the charge for Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner may plead
guilty to the lesser offense of Falsification by Private Individuals
inasmuch as it does not appear that petitioner took advantage of his
official position in allegedly falsifying the timebook and payroll of the
Municipality of Bato, Leyte. In the same vein, with regard to the crime
of Malversation of Public Funds, while the Informations contain
allegations which make out a case for Malversation against petitioner,
nevertheless, absent the element of conversion, theoretically,
petitioner may still be held liable for Failure to Render Account by an
Accountable Officer if it is shown that the failure to render account was
in violation of a law or regulation that requires him to render such an
accounting within the prescribed period.
Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses
charged in this case likewise constitute the lesser offenses, then
petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser offenses.
Finally, as propounded by petitioner, indeed, he is not an accountable
officer in that the nature of his duty as foreman/timekeeper does not
permit or require possession or custody of local government
funds,29 not to mention that petitioner has already restituted the
amount of 18,860.00 involved in this case. Unlike Estrada which
involves a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death,30 and a
whopping 25,000,000.00 taken from the public coffers, this case
tremendously pales in comparison.
Under the peculiar circumstances of the present case, where gross
inequity will result in a discriminatory dispensation of justice, the Court
will not hesitate to intervene in order to equalize the imbalance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated
March 25, 2004 and May 31, 2004 are SETASIDE.
The Sandiganbayan is hereby ORDERED to grant petitioner's Motion
to Plea Bargain. Let records of this case be REMANDED to
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 143591 November 23, 2007
TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., CORAZON M. BEJASA,
ARTURO E. MANUEL, JR., ERIC L. LEE, P. SIERVO H. DIZON,
BENJAMIN DE LEON, DELFIN C. GONZALEZ, JR., and BEN YU
LIM, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
MAGDALENO M. PEA and HON. MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., as
Judge Designate of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bago
City, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
For review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated June
20, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 49666 dismissing the petition for certiorari
filed by petitioners Teodoro C. Borlongan, Jr., Corazon M. Bejasa,
Arturo Manuel, Jr., Benjamin de Leon, P. Siervo Dizon, Delfin C.
Gonzalez, Jr., Eric Lee and Ben T. Lim, Jr.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
Respondent Magdaleno Pea instituted a civil case for recovery of
agents compensation and expenses, damages, and attorneys
fees,2 against Urban Bank and the petitioners, before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bago City. The case was
raffled to Branch 62 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 754.
Respondent anchored his claim for compensation on the contract of
agency3 allegedly entered into with the petitioners wherein the former
undertook to perform such acts necessary to prevent any intruder and
squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban Banks property located
along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City. Petitioners filed a Motion to
Dismiss4 arguing that they never appointed the respondent as agent or
counsel. Attached to the motion were the following documents: 1) a
letter5 dated December 19, 1994 signed by Herman Ponce and Julie
Abad on behalf of Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI), the original
owner of the subject property; 2) an unsigned letter6 dated December
7, 1994 addressed to Corazon Bejasa from Marilyn G. Ong; 3) a
letter7 dated December 9, 1994 addressed to Teodoro Borlongan and
signed by Marilyn G. Ong; and 4) a Memorandum8 dated November
20, 1994 from Enrique Montilla III. Said documents were presented in
an attempt to show that the respondent was appointed as agent by
ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by the petitioners.
In view of the introduction of the above-mentioned documents,
respondent Pea filed his Complaint-Affidavit9 with the Office of the
City Prosecutor, Bago City.10 He claimed that said documents were
falsified because the alleged signatories did not actually affix their
signatures, and the signatories were neither stockholders nor officers
and employees of ISCI.11 Worse, petitioners introduced said
documents as evidence before the RTC knowing that they were
falsified.
In a Resolution12 dated September 23, 1998, the City Prosecutor
concluded that the petitioners were probably guilty of four (4) counts of
the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents penalized by the second
paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The City
Prosecutor concluded that the documents were falsified because the
alleged signatories untruthfully stated that ISCI was the principal of the
respondent; that petitioners knew that the documents were falsified
considering that the signatories were mere dummies; and that the
documents formed part of the record of Civil Case No. 754 where they
were used by petitioners as evidence in support of their motion to
dismiss, adopted in their answer and later, in their Pre-Trial
Brief.13 Subsequently, the corresponding Informations14were filed with
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bago City. The cases were
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685, and 6686.
Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the warrants15 for the arrest
of the petitioners.
On October 1, 1998, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash,
Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation.16 Petitioners
insisted that they were denied due process because of the non-
observance of the proper procedure on preliminary investigation
prescribed in the Rules of Court. Specifically, they claimed that they
were not afforded the right to submit their counter-affidavit. They then
argued that since no such counter-affidavit and supporting documents
were submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge merely relied on the
complaint-affidavit and attachments of the respondent in issuing the
warrants of arrest, also in contravention of the Rules. Petitioners
further prayed that the information be quashed for lack of probable
cause. Lastly, petitioners posited that the criminal case should have
been suspended on the ground that the issue being threshed out in
the civil case is a prejudicial question.
In an Order17 dated November 13, 1998, the court denied the omnibus
motion primarily on the ground that preliminary investigation was not
available in the instant case --- which fell within the jurisdiction of the
MTCC. The court, likewise, upheld the validity of the warrant of arrest,
saying that it was issued in accordance with the Rules. Besides, the
court added, petitioners could no longer question the validity of the
warrant since they already posted bail. The court also believed that
the issue involved in the civil case was not a prejudicial question, and
thus, denied the prayer for suspension of the criminal proceedings.
Lastly, the court was convinced that the Informations contained all the
facts necessary to constitute an offense.
Petitioners subsequently instituted a special civil action for Certiorari
and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and TRO,
before the CA ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the MTCC in issuing and not
recalling the warrants of arrest, reiterating the arguments in their
omnibus motion.18 They, likewise, questioned the courts conclusion
that by posting bail, petitioners already waived their right to assail the
validity of the warrant of arrest.
On June 20, 2000, the CA dismissed the petition.19 Hence, the instant
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners now raise before us the following issues:
A.
Where the offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable
by the Regional Trial Court and not covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure, is the finding of probable cause required for the filing of an
Information in court?
If the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do not establish probable
cause, should not the investigating prosecutor dismiss the complaint,
or at the very least, require the respondent to submit his counter-
affidavit?
B.
Can a complaint-affidavit containing matters which are not within the
personal knowledge of the complainant be sufficient basis for the
finding of probable cause?
C.
Where the offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable
by the Regional Trial Court and not covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure, and the record of the preliminary investigation does not
show the existence of probable cause, should not the judge refuse to
issue a warrant of arrest and dismiss the criminal case, or at the very
least, require the accused to submit his counter-affidavit in order to aid
the judge in determining the existence of probable cause?
D.
Can a criminal prosecution be restrained?
E.
Can this Honorable Court itself determine the existence of probable
cause?20
On August 2, 2000, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO)21 enjoining the judge of the MTCC from proceeding in any
manner with Criminal Cases Nos. 6683 to 6686, effective during the
entire period that the case is pending before, or until further orders of,
this Court.
With the MTCC proceedings suspended, we now proceed to resolve
the issues raised.
Respondents contend that the foregoing issues had become moot and
academic when the petitioners posted bail and were arraigned.
We do not agree.
It appears that upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners
immediately posted bail as they wanted to avoid embarrassment being
then the officers of Urban Bank. On the scheduled date for the
arraignment, despite the petitioners refusal to enter a plea, the court
entered a plea of "Not Guilty."
The earlier ruling of this Court that posting of bail constitutes a waiver
of the right to question the validity of the arrest has already been
superseded by Section 26,22 Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Furthermore, the principle that the accused is
precluded from questioning the legality of his arrest after arraignment
is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial,
without previously invoking his objections thereto.23
Records reveal that petitioners filed the omnibus motion to quash the
information and warrant of arrest, and for reinvestigation, on the same
day that they posted bail. Their bail bonds likewise expressly
contained a stipulation that they were not waiving their right to
question the validity of their arrest.24 On the date of the arraignment,
the petitioners refused to enter their plea, obviously because the issue
of the legality of the information and their arrest was yet to be settled
by the Court. This notwithstanding, the court entered a plea of "Not
Guilty." From these circumstances, we cannot reasonably infer a valid
waiver on the part of the petitioners, as to preclude them from raising
the issue of the validity of the arrest before the CA and eventually
before this Court.
In their petition filed before this Court, petitioners prayed for a TRO to
restrain the MTCC from proceeding with the criminal cases (which the
Court eventually issued on August 2, 2000). Thus, we confront the
question of whether a criminal prosecution can be restrained, to which
we answer in the affirmative.
As a general rule, the Court will not issue writs of prohibition or
injunction, preliminary or final, to enjoin or restrain criminal
prosecution. However, the following exceptions to the rule have been
recognized: 1) when the injunction is necessary to afford adequate
protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; 2) when it is
necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions; 3) when there is a prejudicial
question which is sub judice; 4) when the acts of the officer are without
or in excess of authority; 5) where the prosecution is under an invalid
law, ordinance or regulation; 6) when double jeopardy is clearly
apparent; 7) where the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense; 8)
where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; 9) where the
charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
and 10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused
and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.25
Considering that the issues for resolution involve the validity of the
information and warrant of arrest, and considering further that no
waiver of rights may be attributed to the petitioners as earlier
discussed, we issued a TRO on August 2, 2000 to give the Court the
opportunity to resolve the case before the criminal prosecution is
allowed to continue. The nature of the crime and the penalty involved
(which is less than 4 years of imprisonment), likewise, necessitate the
suspension of the case below in order to prevent the controversy from
being mooted.
We now proceed with the main issues, viz.: 1) whether petitioners
were deprived of their right to due process of law because of the
denial of their right to preliminary investigation and to submit their
counter-affidavit; 2) whether the Informations charging the petitioners
were validly filed and the warrants for their arrest were properly
issued; and 3) whether this Court can, itself, determine probable
cause.
As will be discussed below, the petitioners could not validly claim the
right to preliminary investigation. Still, petitioners insist that they were
denied due process because they were not afforded the right to submit
counter-affidavits which would have aided the court in determining the
existence of probable cause.26 Petitioners also claim that the
respondents complaint-affidavit was not based on the latters personal
knowledge; hence, it should not have been used by the court as basis
in its finding of probable cause.27 Moreover, petitioners aver that there
was no sufficient evidence to prove the elements of the crime.
Specifically, it was not established that the documents in question
were falsified; that petitioners were the ones who presented the
documents as evidence; and that petitioners knew that the documents
were indeed falsified.28 Petitioners likewise assert that at the time of
the filing of the complaint-affidavit, they had not yet formally offered
the documents as evidence; hence, they could not have "introduced"
the same in court.29 Considering the foregoing, petitioners pray that
this Court, itself, determine whether or not probable cause exists.30
The pertinent provisions of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure,31 namely, Sections 1, 3 (a) and 9(a) of Rule 112, are
relevant to the resolution of the aforesaid issues:
SECTION 1. Definition. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or
proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by
the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent
is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.32
SEC. 3. Procedure. Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no
complaint or information for an offense cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having
been first conducted in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and
be accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as
well as other supporting documents, in such number of copies as
there are respondents, plus two (2) copies of the official file. The said
affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or
government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence
or unavailability, a notary public, who must certify that he personally
examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily
executed and understood their affidavits.33
SEC. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Courts not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
(a) Where filed with the fiscal. If the complaint is filed directly with
the fiscal or state prosecutor, the procedure outlined in Section 3 (a) of
this Rule shall be observed. The Fiscal shall take appropriate action
based on the affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by
the complainant.34
Petitioners were charged with the offense defined and penalized by
the second paragraph of Article 17235 of the Revised Penal Code. The
penalty imposable is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, or four (4) months and one (1) day
to two (2) years and four (4) months. Clearly, the case is cognizable
by the Municipal Trial Court and preliminary investigation is not
mandatory.36
Records show that the prosecutor relied merely on the complaint-
affidavit of the respondent and did not require the petitioners to submit
their counter-affidavits. The prosecutor should not be faulted for taking
this course of action, because it is sanctioned by the Rules. To
reiterate, upon the filing of the complaint and affidavit with respect to
cases cognizable by the MTCC, the prosecutor shall take the
appropriate action based on the affidavits and other supporting
documents submitted by the complainant. It means that the prosecutor
may either dismiss the complaint if he does not see sufficient reason
to proceed with the case, or file the information if he finds probable
cause. The prosecutor is not mandated to require the submission of
counter-affidavits. Probable cause may then be determined on the
basis alone of the affidavits and supporting documents of the
complainant, without infringing on the constitutional rights of the
petitioners.
On the other hand, for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge
must personally determine the existence of probable cause. Again, the
petitioners insist that the trial judge erred in issuing the warrant of
arrest without affording them their right to submit their counter-
affidavits.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause. But the judge is not required to personally examine
the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and
procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the
existence of probable cause, and on the basis thereof, he may already
make a personal determination of the existence of probable cause;
and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may
disregard the prosecutors report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of probable cause.37
In determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest
in the case at bench, we find nothing wrong with the procedure
adopted by the trial judge --- he relied on the resolution of the
prosecutor, as well as the supporting documents submitted by the
respondent. There is no provision of law or procedural rule which
makes the submission of counter-affidavits mandatory before the
judge can determine whether or not there exists probable cause to
issue the warrant.
In light of the foregoing, it appears that the proper procedure was
followed by the prosecutor in determining probable cause for the filing
of the informations, and by the trial court judge in determining
probable cause for the issuance of the warrants of arrest. To reiterate,
preliminary investigation was not mandatory, and the submission of
counter-affidavit was not necessary.1wphi1
However, notwithstanding the proper observance of the procedure laid
down by the Rules, a closer scrutiny of the records reveals that the
Informations should not have been filed and the warrants of arrest
should not have been issued, because of lack of probable cause.
Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been
defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof.38 It is the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting
on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he is to be prosecuted.39 A
finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that,
more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was
committed by the accused.40
On the other hand, we have defined probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest as the existence of such facts and circumstances
that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe
that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested.41
To accord respect to the discretion granted to the prosecutor and for
reasons of practicality, this Court, as a rule, does not interfere with the
prosecutors determination of probable cause. Otherwise, courts would
be swamped with petitions to review the prosecutors findings in such
investigations.42 In the same way, the general rule is that this Court
does not review the factual findings of the trial court, which include the
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest.43 It is only in exceptional cases when this Court may set aside
the conclusions of the prosecutor and the trial judge on the existence
of probable cause, that is, when it is necessary to prevent the misuse
of the strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly administration of
justice.44 The facts obtaining in the present case warrant the
application of the exception.
Petitioners were charged with violation of par. 2, Article 172 of the
RPC or Introduction of Falsified Document in a Judicial Proceeding.
The elements of the offense are as follows:
1. That the offender knew that a document was falsified
by another person.
2. That the false document is embraced in Article 171 or
in any subdivisions No. 1 or 2 of Article 172.
3. That he introduced said document in evidence in any
judicial proceeding.45
The falsity of the document and the defendants knowledge of its They still could have affixed their signatures as authorized
falsity are essential elements of the offense.46 representatives of the corporation.
The Office of the City Prosecutor filed the Informations against the True, a finding of probable cause need not be based on clear and
petitioners on the basis of the complaint-affidavit of the respondent, convincing evidence, or on evidence beyond reasonable doubt. It does
together with the following attached documents: the motion to dismiss not require that the evidence would justify conviction. Nonetheless,
and answer filed by the petitioners in Civil Case No. 754; petitioners although the determination of probable cause requires less than
pre-trial brief in said case; the alleged falsified documents; a copy of evidence which would justify conviction, it should at least be more than
the minutes of the regular meeting of ISC during the election of the mere suspicion.51 While probable cause should be determined in a
board; and the list of stockholders of ISC.47 On the basis of these summary manner, there is a need to examine the evidence with care
documents and on the strength of the affidavit executed by the to prevent material damage to a potential accuseds constitutional right
respondent, the prosecutor concluded that probable cause exists. to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect
These same affidavit and documents were used by the trial court in the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting
issuing the warrant of arrest. alleged offenses and holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or
Contrary to the findings of the MTCC, as affirmed by the Court of groundless charges.52 It is, therefore, imperative for the prosecutor to
Appeals, we find the complaint-affidavit and attachments insufficient to relieve the accused from the pain and inconvenience of going through
support the existence of probable cause. Specifically, the respondent a trial once it is ascertained that no probable cause exists to form a
failed to sufficiently establish prima facie that the alleged documents sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused.53
were falsified. In support of his claim of falsity of the documents, the Considering that the respondent failed to adduce sufficient evidence to
private respondent stated in his complaint-affidavit that Herman support his claim that the documents were falsified, it follows that the
Ponce, Julie Abad and Marilyn Ong, the alleged signatories of the introduction of the questioned documents in Civil Case No. 754 is not
questioned letters, did not actually affix their signatures; and that they an offense punished by any provision of the Revised Penal Code or
were not actually officers or stockholders of ISCI.48 He further claimed any other law. The petitioners should not be burdened with court
that Enrique Montillas signature appearing in another memorandum proceedings, more particularly a criminal proceeding, if in the first
addressed to respondent was forged.49 These are mere assertions, place, there is no evidence sufficient to engender a well-founded belief
insufficient to warrant the filing of the complaint or the issuance of the that an offense was committed.
warrant of arrest. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
It must be emphasized that the affidavit of the complainant, or any of Appeals, dated June 20, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 49666 is
his witnesses, shall allege facts within their (affiants) personal REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Order
knowledge. The allegation of the respondent that the signatures of dated August 2, 2000 is hereby made permanent. Accordingly, the
Ponce, Abad, Ong and Montilla were falsified does not qualify as Municipal Trial Court in Cities, City of Bago, is ORDERED to DISMISS
personal knowledge. Nowhere in said affidavit did respondent state Criminal Case Nos. 6683-86.
that he was present at the time of the execution of the documents. SO ORDERED.
Neither did he claim that he was familiar with the signatures of the
signatories. He simply made a bare assertion that the signatories were
mere dummies of ISCI and they were not in fact officers, stockholders
or representatives of the corporation. At the very least, the affidavit
was based on respondents "personal belief" and not "personal
knowledge."50 Considering the lack of personal knowledge on the part
of the respondent, he could have submitted the affidavit of other
persons who are qualified to attest to the falsity of the signatures
appearing in the questioned documents. One cannot just claim that a
certain document is falsified without further stating the basis for such
claim, i.e., that he was present at the time of the execution of the
document or he is familiar with the signatures in question. Otherwise,
this could lead to abuse and malicious prosecution. This is actually the
reason for the requirement that affidavits must be based on the
personal knowledge of the affiant. The requirement assumes added
importance in the instant case where the accused were not made to
rebut the complainants allegation through counter-affidavits.
Neither can the respondent find support in the documents attached to
his complaint-affidavit. The minutes of the regular meeting, as well as
the list of stockholders, could have possibly shown that the signatories
were not officers or stockholders of the corporation. However, they did
not at all show that the questioned documents were falsified. In the
letter allegedly signed by Ponce and Abad, there was no
representation that they were the president and corporate secretary of
ISCI. Besides, the mere fact that they were not officers or stockholders
of ISCI does not necessarily mean that their signatures were falsified.
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 142011 March 14, 2003
ALFONSO C. CHOA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LENI CHOA, respondents.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Alfonso Chan Choa, petitioner, is a Chinese national. On April 25,
1989, he filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41, Bacolod
City, a verified petition for naturalization,1 docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 5395.
During the initial hearing of the case on August 27, 1990, petitioner
testified on direct examination but he was not able to finish the same.
On August 29, 1990, he filed a motion to withdraw his petition for
naturalization.2 The trial court granted the motion in its Resolution
dated September 28, 1990,3 which partly reads:
"The petitioner, Alfonso Chan Choa, has not yet finished
testifying on direct-examination. Although the petitioner
has not stated in his said Motion To Withdraw Petition
the reason why he is withdrawing his petition at this stage
of the proceedings, the petitioner can not be compelled to
continue with his petition for naturalization.
"In view thereof, the petitioner, Alfonso Chan Choa, is
allowed to withdraw his petition for naturalization.
"SO ORDERED."
Meanwhile, on August 5, 1992, State Prosecutor Pedro D. Delfin on
detail at Bacolod City, acting upon the complaint of petitioners wife,
Leni, filed an Information4 with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Branch 3, Bacolod City, charging petitioner with perjury
under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 50322. The Information reads:
"That on or about 30th day of March, 1989, in the City of
Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the herein accused did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly made
untruthful statements or falsehoods upon material matters
required by the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 473)
in his verified Petition for Naturalization dated April 13,
1989 (sic),5 subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public
Felomino B. Tan, Jr., who is authorized to administer
oath, which petition bears Doc. No. 140, Page No. 29,
Book No. XXIII, series of 1989, in the Notarial Register of
said Notary Public, by stating therein the following, to wit:
5.) I am married to a Filipino. My wifes name
is Leni Ong Choa and now resides at 46
Malaspina Street, Bacolod City. I have two (2)
children whose names, dates and places of
birth, and residence are as follows:
Name Date of Petitioner
ALBRYAN ONG CHOA July 19,two
CHERYL
May 5, 1983
LYNNE ONG
CHOA
xxx xxx xxx
10) I am of good moral character, I believe in
the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution. I have conducted myself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during the
entire period of my residence in the
Philippines in my relations with the
constituted government as well as with the
community in which I am living.
xxx xxx xxx
when in truth and in fact, said accused knew that his wife
Leni Ong Choa and their two (2) children were not then
residing at said address at # 46 Malaspina Street,
Villamonte, Bacolod City, having left the aforesaid
residence in 1984, or about five (5) years earlier and were
then residing at Hervias Subdivision, Bacolod City; that
contrary to his aforesaid allegation in his verified Petition
for Naturalization, accused, while residing at 211 106
Street, Greenplains Subdivision, Bacolod City, has been
carrying on an immoral and illicit relationship with one
Stella Flores Saludar, a woman not his wife since 1984,
and begetting two (2) children with her as a consequence,
as he and his wife, the private offended party herein, have
long been separated from bed and board since 1984;
which falsehoods and/or immoral and improper conduct
are grounds for disqualification to become a citizen of the
Philippines.
"Act contrary to law."
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued
thereafter.
After trial, the MTCC rendered a Decision6 dated February 21, 1995
finding petitioner guilty of perjury, as charged, thus:
"FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
which he is presently charged, and there being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstances that may be
considered, the accused is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional and to pay the costs."
Birth filed a motion
Place for a reconsideration,7Residence
of Birth contending, among
others, that there is no basis to convict him of perjury because almost
1981 Bacolod
years prior to the filing City
of the Information, 46
his Malaspina St., Bacolod
motion to withdraw
City false statements
the petition for naturalization containing the alleged
was granted by theBacolod
MTCC,Cityhence, the alleged46 false statements
Malaspina St., Bacolod
were no longer existing or had become functusCity officio.
The MTCC, in its Order8 dated March 31, 1995, denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 54, Bacolod City,
in a Decision dated September 12, 1996, affirmed the MTCC
judgment.9
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review,
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 19968. In his comment, the Solicitor
General recommended the acquittal of petitioner, contending that the
withdrawal of his petition for naturalization rendered the same functus
officio, thus making the questioned false statements inexistent.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated June 8, 1999,10 affirmed
the RTC Decision with modification, thus:
"WHEREFORE, finding the appealed decision of the
Regional Trial Court to be in accordance with law and
evidence, we AFFIRM the same with the modification that
petitioner-accused-appellant Alfonso Choa is sentenced
to suffer imprisonment, after applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law without any aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, for a period of three (3) months of arresto
mayor, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional.
"SO ORDERED."
In convicting petitioner, the Appellate Court adopted as its own the
RTCs findings as follows:
"Evidence presented clearly proved that all the above-
enumerated elements (of perjury) have been duly
executed by the accused. His allegations in his petition
regarding his, his wifes and childrens residences and his
positive averment of the fact that he is of good moral
character and had conducted himself in an irreproachable
manner during his stay in the Philippines are material
matters in connection with his petition for naturalization as
they are essential facts required by Sec. 7 of C.A. No. 473
for one to fulfill for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship. They are the very facts which would be the
subject of inquiry by the court hearing the petition and the
same would be the basis of the courts ruling whether one
is qualified and granted Philippine citizenship.
"Paragraph 2 of Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that the statement or affidavit is to be made
before a competent officer, authorized to receive and
administer oath. The information shows that the statement
was duly subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public
Felomino B. Tan, Jr., a person competent and authorized
by law to receive and administer oath and the same was
entered in his notary register as Doc. No. 140, Page No.
29, Book No. XXIII, Series of 1989.
"That the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion
of falsehood could be gleaned from the discrepancies in
his given addresses. In his petition for naturalization he
gave No. 46 Malaspina Street, Villamonte, Bacolod City
as his and his wifes residence, while in the birth
certificates and the affidavit of admission of paternity of
both Fonsella Kae Saludar and Steve Albert Saludar, he
gave No. 211, 106 Street, Greenplains Subdivision,
Bacolod City as his address besides from the fact that
while may have been residing in the above-stated
addresses, his wife and children have been staying at
Hervias Subdivision, Bacolod City since the latter part of
1984. Furthermore, cohabiting openly with another
woman not his wife and siring (2) children with the same,
in open defiance with the norm of morality of the
community where monogamy is the accepted practice, is
very inconsistent with his allegations of a moral life,
proper and irreproachable, considering that the accused,
by his own admission is a graduate of the University of St.
La Salle, a school known for its high academic and moral
standards. These assertions are not only willful and
deliberate but a perversion of truth which the law is
mandated to punish.
"Section 7 of C.A. 473 provides:
Any person desiring to acquire Philippine
citizenship shall file with the competent Court,
a petition in triplicate, accompanied by two (2)
photographs of the petitioner, setting forth his
name and surname; his present and former
residence, his occupation; the place and date
of his birth, whether single or married, the
name, age, birthplace and residence of the
wife and each of the childrenx x x.
(underscoring supplied)
"The above-cited provisions are the pertinent law which
specifically requires any person desiring to acquire
Philippine citizenship to accomplish, thus complying with
 the fourth element of the crime of perjury. (pp. 119-120,
Original Records, Vol. II)"11
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the
Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated February 22, 2000.12
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.13
Both the petitioner and the Solicitor General in their respective
pleadings contend that the challenged Decision of the Court of
Appeals should be reversed because: (a) not all the elements of the
crime of perjury are present; and (b) the withdrawal of the petition for
naturalization which contains the alleged untruthful statements bars
the prosecution of petitioner for perjury.
Thus, the issue here is whether petitioner may be convicted of perjury
based on the alleged false statements he stated in his petition for
naturalization withdrawn almost two years prior to the filing of the
Information for perjury.
The petition is unmeritorious.
Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code under which petitioner has
been charged and convicted, provides:
"Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in
solemn affirmation. The penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly
making untruthful statements and not being included in
the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify
under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter
before a competent person authorized to administer an
oath in cases in which the law so requires.
"Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in
lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods
mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this
section, shall suffer the respective penalties provided
therein."
The elements of perjury are:
1. The accused made a statement under oath or executed
an affidavit upon a material matter;
2. The statement or affidavit was made before a
competent officer authorized to receive and administer
oath;
3. In that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful
and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and
4. The sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is
required by law or made for a legal purpose.14
All these elements are present in the instant case. Petitioner willfully
and deliberately alleged false statements concerning his "residence"
and "moral character" in his petition for naturalization. This was
sufficiently proven by the prosecution, as succinctly noted by the Court
of Appeals in its assailed Decision.
The petition for naturalization was duly subscribed and sworn to by
petitioner before Notary Public Filomino B. Tan, Jr., a person
competent and authorized by law to receive and administer oath. Also,
petitioner started testifying under oath on his false allegations before
the trial court.
The allegations in the petition regarding "residence" and "moral
character" are material matters because they are among the very facts
in issue or the main facts which are the subject of inquiry15 and are the
bases for the determination of petitioner's qualifications and fitness as
a naturalized Filipino citizen. Thus, C.A. No. 473 provides:
"SEC. 2. Qualifications. Subject to section four of this
Act, any person having the following qualifications may
become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:
xxx xxx xxx
"Third. He must be of good moral character and believes
in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution,
and must have conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of his
residence in the Philippines in his relation with the
constituted government as well as with the community in
which he is living;
xxx xxx xxx
"SEC. 7. Petition for citizenship. Any person desiring to
acquire Philippine citizenship shall file with the competent
court, a petition in triplicate, accompanied by two
photographs of the petitioner, setting forth his name and
surname; his present and former places of residence; his
occupation; the place and date of his birth; whether single
or married and if the father of children, the name, age,
birthplace and residence of the wife and of the children; x
x x; a declaration that he has the qualifications required
by this Act, specifying the same, and that he is not
disqualified for naturalization under the provisions of this
Act; x x x." (italics supplied)
The necessity of declaring a truthful and specific information on the
"residence" and "moral character" in the petition for naturalization has
been underscored by this Court in Chua Kian Lai vs. Republic,16 thus:
"One qualification for Philippine citizenship is that the meaning, in connection withcivil actions for libel and slander." The
petitioner must be of good moral character. That purpose of the privilege is to ensure that "members of the legislature,
circumstance should be specifically alleged in the petition. judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak their minds
freely and exercise their respective functions without incurring the risk
of a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages. It is
xxx xxx xxx
granted in aid and for the advantage of the administration of
justice."23 Certainly, in the present case, petitioner cannot seek refuge
"The law explicitly requires that the applicant should under the absolutely privileged communication rule since the false
indicate in his petition his present and former places of statements he made in his petition for naturalization has instead made
residence (Sec. 7, Com. Act No. 473). That requirement a mockery of the administration of justice.
is designed to facilitate the verification of petitioners
activities which have a bearing on his petition for
The Flordelis case is likewise not in point. There, Flordelis was
naturalization, especially so as to
charged with perjury for having alleged false statements in his verified
his qualifications and moral character, either by private
answer. This Court held that no perjury could be committed by
individuals or by investigative agencies of the
Flordelis because "an answer to a complaint in an ordinary civil
government, by pointing to them the localities or places
action need not be under oath," thus, "it is at once apparent that
wherein appropriate inquiries may be made (Keng Giok
one element of the crime of perjury is absent x x x, namely, that the
vs. Republic, 112 Phil. 896). Moreover, the suppression of
sworn statement complained of must be required by law."24
that information might constitute falsehood which signifies
that the applicant lacks good moral character and is not,
therefore, qualified to be admitted as a citizen of the Anent the alleged violation of petitioner's constitutional right to equal
Philippines." (italics supplied) protection, suffice it to state that such right cannot be invoked to
protect his criminal act.
Fully cognizant of the truth surrounding his moral character and
residence, petitioner instead declared falsely in his verified petition for In People vs. Cainglet,25 this Court emphatically stressed that "every
naturalization that "he has all the qualifications and none of the interest of public policy demands that perjury be not shielded by
disqualification under C.A. No. 473."17 Clearly, he willfully asserted artificial refinements and narrow technicalities. For perjury strikes at
falsehood under oath on material matters required by law. the administration of the laws. It is the policy of the law that judicial
proceedings and judgments be fair and free from fraud, and that
litigants and parties be encouraged to tell the truth, and that they be
We cannot go along with the submission of the petitioner and the
punished if they do not."
Solicitor General that petitioner could no longer be prosecuted for
perjury in view of the withdrawal of the petition for naturalization
containing his false material statements. In this jurisdiction, it is not WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby
necessary that the proceeding in which the perjury is alleged to have DENIED. The appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
been committed be first terminated before a prosecution for the said AFFIRMED.
crime is commenced.18 At the time he filed his petition for
naturalization, he had committed perjury. As discussed earlier, all the
SO ORDERED.
elements of the crime were already present then. He knew all along
that he wilfully stated material falsities in his verified petition.
Surprisingly, he withdrew his petition without even stating any reason
therefor.19 But such withdrawal only terminated the proceedings for
naturalization. It did not extinguish his culpability for perjury he already
committed. Indeed, the fact of withdrawal alone cannot bar the State
from prosecuting petitioner, an alien, who made a mockery not only of
the Philippine naturalization law but the judicial proceedings as well.
And the petition for naturalization tainted with material falsities can be
used as evidence of his unlawful act.
Petitioner then claims that since the petition for naturalization is a
pleading, the allegations therein are absolutely privileged and cannot
be used for any criminal prosecution against him, citing Sison vs.
David,20 People vs. Aquino21 and Flordelis vs. Himalaloan.22
The argument is unavailing. Sison and Aquino both involve libel cases.
In Sison, this Court categorically stressed that the term "absolute
privilege" (or "qualified privilege") has an "established technical
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 164368-69 April 2, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and THE HONORABLE SPECIAL
DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN,Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
The People of the Philippines (the People) filed this Petition for
Review on Certiorari1 to seek the reversal of the Sandiganbayans
Joint Resolution dated July 12, 2004, granting respondent Joseph
Ejercito Estradas (Estrada) demurrer to evidence in Crim. Case No.
26565.2
THE FACTS
On April 4, 2001, an Information for plunder (docketed as Crim. Case
No. 26558) was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent
Estrada, among other accused. A separate Information for illegal use
of alias, docketed as Crim. Case No. 26565, was likewise filed against
Estrada. The Amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 reads:
That on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then President
of the Republic of the Philippines, without having been duly
authorized, judicially or administratively, taking advantage of his
position and committing the offense in relation to office, i.e., in order to
CONCEAL THE ill-gotten wealth HE ACQUIRED during his tenure and
his true identity as THE President of the Republic of the Philippines,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT
HIMSELF AS JOSE VELARDE IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND
use and employ the SAID alias "Jose Velarde" which IS neither his
registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents
with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26558 were subsequently consolidated
for joint trial. Still another Information, this time for perjury and
docketed as Crim. Case No. 26905, was filed with the Sandiganbayan
against Estrada. This was later consolidated, too, with Crim. Cases
No. 26558 and 26565.
Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest
that the Sandiganbayan issued.
On January 11, 2005, we ordered the creation of a Special Division in
the Sandiganbayan to try, hear, and decide the charges of plunder
and related cases (illegal use of alias and perjury) against respondent
Estrada.3
At the trial, the People presented testimonial and documentary
evidence to prove the allegations of the Informations for plunder,
illegal use of alias, and perjury. The Peoples evidence for the illegal
alias charge, as summarized by the Sandiganbayan, consisted of:
A. The testimonies of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
(PCIB) officers Clarissa G. Ocampo (Ocampo) and Atty. Manuel
Curato (Curato) who commonly declared that on February 4, 2000,
Estrada opened a numbered trust account (Trust Account C-163) with
PCIB and signed as "Jose Velarde" in the account opening
documents; both Ocampo and Curato also testified that Aprodicio
Lacquian and Fernando Chua were present on that occasion;
B. (1) The testimony of PCIB-Greenhills Branch Manager Teresa
Barcelan, who declared that a certain Baby Ortaliza (Ortaliza)
transacted several times with her; that Ortaliza deposited several
checks in PCIB Savings Account No. 0160-62502-5 under the account
name "Jose Velarde" on the following dates (as evidenced by deposit
receipts duly marked in evidence):
a. 20 October 1999 (Exh. "MMMMM")
b. 8 November 1999 (Exh. "LLLLL")
c. 22 November 1999 (Exh. "NNNNN")
d. 24 November 1999 (Exh. "OOOOO")
e. 25 November 1999 (Exh. "PPPPP")
f. 20 December 1999 (Exh. "QQQQQ")
g. 21 December 1999 (Exh. "RRRRR")
h. 29 December 1999 (Exh. "SSSSS")
i. 4 January 2000 (Exh. "TTTTT")
j. 10 May 2000 (Exh. "UUUUU")
k. 6 June 2000 (Exh. "VVVVV")
l. 25 July 2000 (Exh. "WWWWW")
(2) Documents duly identified by witnesses showing that Lucena
Ortaliza was employed in the Office of the Vice President and, later
on, in the Office of the President when Estrada occupied these
positions and when deposits were made to the Jose Velarde Savings
Account No. 0160-62502-5.
The People filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits in the consolidated cases,
which the Sandiganbayan admitted into evidence in a Resolution
dated October 13, 2003.4 The accused separately moved to
reconsider the Sandiganbayan Resolution;5 the People, on the other
hand, filed its Consolidated Comment/Opposition to the motions.6 The
Sandiganbayan denied the motions in its Resolution dated November
17, 2003.7
After the People rested in all three cases, the defense moved to be
allowed to file a demurrer to evidence in these cases.8 In its Joint
Resolution dated March 10, 2004,9 the Sandiganbayan only granted
the defense leave to file demurrers in Crim. Case Nos. 26565 (illegal
use of alias) and 26905 (perjury).
Estrada filed separate Demurrers to Evidence for Crim. Case Nos.
26565 and 26905.10 His demurrer to evidence for Crim. Case No.
26565 (illegal use of alias) was anchored on the following grounds11:
1. Of the thirty-five (35) witnesses presented by the
prosecution, only two (2) witnesses, Ms. Clarissa Ocampo
and Atty. Manuel Curato, testified that on one occasion (4
February 2000), they saw movant use the name "Jose
Velarde";
2. The use of numbered accounts and the like was legal
and was prohibited only in late 2001 as can be gleaned
from Bangko Sentral Circular No. 302, series of 2001,
dated 11 October 2001;
3. There is no proof of public and habitual use of alias as
the documents offered by the prosecution are banking
documents which, by their nature, are confidential and
cannot be revealed without following proper procedures;
and
4. The use of alias is absorbed in plunder.
The People opposed the demurrers through a Consolidated
Opposition that presented the following arguments:12
1. That the use of fictitious names in bank transaction was
not expressly prohibited until BSP No. 302 is of no
moment considering that as early as Commonwealth Act
No. 142, the use of alias was already prohibited. Movant
is being prosecuted for violation of C.A. No. 142 and not
BSP Circular No. 302;
2. Movants reliance on Ursua vs. Court of Appeals (256
SCRA 147 [1996]) is misplaced;
3. Assuming arguendo that C.A. No. 142, as amended,
requires publication of the alias and the habitual use
thereof, the prosecution has presented more than
sufficient evidence in this regard to convict movant for
illegal use of alias; and
4. Contrary to the submission of movant, the instant case
of illegal use of alias is not absorbed in plunder.
Estrada replied to the Consolidated Opposition through a
Consolidated Reply Opposition.
THE ASSAILED SANDIGANBAYANS RULING
The Sandiganbayan issued on July 12, 2004 the Resolution now
assailed in this petition. The salient points of the assailed resolution
are:
First the coverage of Estradas indictment. The Sandiganbayan
found that the only relevant evidence for the indictment are those
relating to what is described in the Information i.e., the testimonies
and documents on the opening of Trust Account C-163 on February 4,
2000. The Sandiganbayan reasoned out that the use of the disjunctive
"or" between "on or about 04 February 2000" and "sometime prior or
subsequent thereto" means that the act/s allegedly committed on
February 4, 2000 could have actually taken place prior to or
subsequent thereto; the use of the conjunctive was simply the
prosecutions procedural tool to guard against any variance between
the date stated in the Information and that proved during the trial in a
situation in which time was not a material ingredient of the offense; it
does not mean and cannot be read as a roving commission that
includes acts and/or events separate and distinct from those that took
place on the single date "on or about 04 February 2000 or sometime
prior or subsequent thereto." The Sandiganbayan ruled that the use of
the disjunctive "or" prevented it from interpreting the Information any
other way.
Second the Peoples failure to present evidence that proved
Estradas commission of the offense. The Sandiganbayan found that
the People failed to present evidence that Estrada committed the
crime punished under Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6085 (CA 142), as interpreted by the Supreme
Court in Ursua v. Court of Appeals.13 It ruled that there is an illegal use
of alias within the context of CA 142 only if the use of the alias
is public and habitual. In Estradas case, the Sandiganbayan noted,
the application of the principles was not as simple because of the
complications resulting from the nature of the transaction involved
the alias was used in connection with the opening of a numbered trust
account made during the effectivity of R.A. No. 1405, as
amended,14 and prior to the enactment of Republic R.A. No. 9160.15
Estrada did not publicly use the alias "Jose Velarde":
a. Estradas use of the alias "Jose Velarde" in his dealings
with Dichavez and Ortaliza after February 4, 2000 is not
relevant in light of the conclusion that the acts imputed to
Estrada under the Information were the act/s committed
on February 4, 2000 only. Additionally, the phrase,
"Estrada did represent himself as Jose Velarde in
several transactions," standing alone, violates Estradas
right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the
accusation, because it is very general and vague. This
phrase is qualified and explained by the succeeding
phrase "and use and employ the said alias Jose
Velarde" which "is neither his registered name at birth
nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with
Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities." Thus,
Estradas representations before persons other than
those mentioned in the Information are immaterial;
Ortaliza and Dichavez do not fall within the "Equitable PCI
Bank and/or other corporate entities" specified in the
Information. Estradas representations with Ortaliza and
Dichavez are not therefore covered by the indictment.
b. The Sandiganbayan rejected the application of the
principle in the law of libel that mere communication to a
third person is publicity; it reasoned out that that the
definition of publicity is not limited to the way it is defined
under the law on libel; additionally, the application of the
libel law definition is onerous to the accused and is
precluded by the ruling in Ursua that CA No. 142, as a
penal statute, should be construed strictly against the
State and favorably for the accused. It ruled that the
definition under the law on libel, even if it applies,
considers a communication to a third person covered by
the privileged communication rule to be non-actionable.
Estradas use of the alias in front of Ocampo and Curato
is one such privileged communication under R.A. No.
1405, as amended. The Sandiganbayan said:
Movants act of signing "Jose Velarde" in bank documents
being absolutely confidential, the witnessing thereof by
bank officers who were likewise sworn to secrecy by the
same law cannot be considered as public as to fall within
the ambit of CA 142 as amended. On account of the
absolute confidentiality of the transaction, it cannot be
said that movant intended to be known by this name in
addition to his real name. Confidentiality and secrecy
negate publicity. Ursua instructs:
Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name
belonging to another person in a single instance without
any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by
this name in addition to his real name from that day forth
does not fall within the prohibition in C.A. No. 142 as
amended.
c. The Sandiganbayan further found that the intention not
to be publicly known by the name "Jose Velarde" is shown
by the nature of a numbered account a perfectly valid
banking transaction at the time Trust Account C-163 was
opened. The opening, too, of a numbered trust account,
the Sandiganbayan further ruled, did not impose on
Estrada the obligation to disclose his real identity the
obligation R.A. No. 6713 imposes is to file under oath a
statement of assets and liabilities.16 Reading CA No. 142,
R.A. No. 1405 and R.A. No. 6713 together, Estrada had
the absolute obligation to disclose his assets including the
amount of his bank deposits, but he was under no
obligation at all to disclose the other particulars of the
bank account (such as the name he used to open it).
Third the effect of the enactment of R.A. No. 9160.17 The
Sandiganbayan said that the absolute prohibition in R.A. No. 9160
against the use of anonymous accounts, accounts under fictitious
names, and all other similar accounts, is a legislative acknowledgment
that a gaping hole previously existed in our laws that allowed
depositors to hide their true identities. The Sandiganbayan noted that
the prohibition was lifted from Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)
Circular No. 251 dated July 7, 2000 another confirmation that the
opening of a numbered trust account was perfectly legal when it was
opened on February 4, 2000.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the provisions of CA No. 142, as
interpreted in Ursua, must necessarily be harmonized with the
provisions of R.A. No.1405 and R.A. No. 9160 under the principle that
every statute should be construed in a way that will harmonize it with
existing laws. A reasonable scrutiny, the Sandiganbayan said, of all
these laws in relation to the present case, led it to conclude that the
use of an alias within the context of a bank transaction (specifically,
the opening of a numbered account made before bank officers) is
protected by the secrecy provisions of R.A. No. 1405, and is thus
outside the coverage of CA No. 142 until the passage into law of R.A.
No. 9160.
THE PETITION
The People filed this petition raising the following issues:
1. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its
discretion in dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in
holding that the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his
alias "Jose Velarde" was not public despite the presence
of Messrs. Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando Chua on 4
February 2000;
2. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its
discretion in dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in
holding that the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his
alias "Jose Velarde" was allowable under banking rules,
despite the clear prohibition under Commonwealth Act
No. 142;
3. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its
discretion in dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in
applying R.A. No. 1405 as an exception to the illegal use
of alias punishable under Commonwealth Act No. 142;
4. Whether the alleged harmonization and application
made by the court a quo of R.A. No.1405 and
Commonwealth Act No. 142 were proper;
5. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its
discretion in limiting the coverage of the amended
Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 to the use of the
alias "Jose Velarde" by respondent Joseph Estrada on
February 4, 2000;
6. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its
discretion in departing from its earlier final finding on the
non-applicability of Ursua v. Court of Appeals and forcing
its application to the instant case.
THE COURTS RULING
The petition has no merit.
The Law on Illegal Use of Alias and the Ursua Ruling
Sections 1 and 2 of CA No. 142, as amended, read:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema,
television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events
where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no
person shall use any name different from the one with which he was
registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which he
was baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which he
was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such
substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court:
Provided, That persons whose births have not been registered in any
local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year
from the approval of this act within which to register their names in the
civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the
patronymic name and one or two surnames.
Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority
therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial
authority for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to
secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for
an alias shall set forth the person's baptismal and family name and the
name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if
an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his
original or real name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired
alias. The judicial authority for the use of alias, the Christian name and
the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the proper local civil
registry, and no person shall use any name or names other than his
original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the
proper local civil registry.
How this law is violated has been answered by the Ursua definition of
an alias "a name or names used by a person or intended to be used
by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in
addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized
the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority."
There must be, in the words of Ursua, a "sign or indication that the
user intends to be known by this name (the alias) in addition to his real
name from that day forth [for the use of alias to] fall within the
prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended."18
Ursua further relates the historical background and rationale that led to
the enactment of CA No. 142, as follows:
The enactment of C.A. No. 142 was made primarily to curb the
common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different
names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of
trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious
names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully
maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they
possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized
the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized
by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register.19
Following the doctrine of stare decisis,20 we are guided by the Ursua
ruling on how the crime punished under CA No. 142 may be
committed. Close adherence to this ruling, in other words, is
unavoidable in the application of and the determination of criminal
liability under CA No. 142.
Among the many grounds the People invokes to avoid the application
of the Ursua ruling proceeds from Estradas position in the
government; at the time of the commission of the offense, he was the
President of the Republic who is required by law to disclose his true
name. We do not find this argument sufficient to justify a distinction
between a man on the street, on one hand, and the President of the
Republic, on the other, for purposes of applying CA No. 142. In the
first place, the law does not make any distinction, expressly or
impliedly, that would justify a differential treatment. CA No. 142 as
applied to Estrada, in fact allows him to use his cinema or screen
name of Joseph Estrada, which name he has used even when he was
already the President of the Philippines. Even the petitioner has
acquiesced to the use of the screen name of the accused, as shown
by the title of the present petition. Additionally, any distinction we
make based on the Peoples claim unduly prejudices Estrada; this is
proscribed by the Ursua dictum that CA No. 142, as a penal statute,
should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the
accused.21 The mode of violating CA No. 142 is therefore the same
whoever the accused may be.
The People also calls our attention to an earlier Sandiganbayan ruling
(Resolution dated February 6, 2002) denying Estradas motion to
quash the Information. This earlier Resolution effectively rejected the
application of Ursua under the following tenor:
The use of the term "alias" in the Amended Information in itself serves
to bring this case outside the ambit of the ruling in the case of Ursua v.
Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996]), on which the accused
heavily relies in his motion to quash. The term "alias" means
"otherwise known as" (Webster Third New International Dictionary,
1993 ed., p. 53). The charge of using an "alias" logically implies that
another name has been used publicly and habitually. Otherwise, he
will not be known by such name. In any case, the amended
information adverts to "several transactions" and signing of documents
with the Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities where the
above-mentioned alias was allegedly employed by the accused.
The facts alleged in the information are distinctly different from facts
established in the Ursua case where another name was used by the
accused in a single instance without any sign or indication that that
[sic] he intended to be known from that day by this name in addition to
his real name.22
The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in applying Ursua notwithstanding this earlier final ruling on
its non-applicability a ruling that binds the parties in the present
case. The People thus claims that the Sandiganbayan erred to the
point of gravely abusing its discretion when it resurrected the
application of Ursua, resulting in the reversal of its earlier final ruling.
We find no merit in this argument for two reasons. First, the cited
Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order a ruling
denying a motion to quash23 that cannot be given the attributes of
finality and immutability that are generally accorded to judgments or
orders that finally dispose of the whole, of or particular matters in, a
case.24 The Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order
because its effects would only be provisional in character, and would
still require the issuing court to undertake substantial proceedings in
order to put the controversy to rest.25 It is basic remedial law that an
interlocutory order is always under the control of the court and may be
modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time
before final judgment.26 Perez v. Court of Appeals,27 albeit a civil case,
instructively teaches that an interlocutory order carries no res
adjudicata effects. Says Perez:
The Decision in CA-G.R. No. 10415 having resolved only an
interlocutory matter, the principle of res judicata cannot be applied in
this case. There can be no res judicata where the previous order in
question was not an order or judgment determinative of an issue of
fact pending before the court but was only an interlocutory order
because it required the parties to perform certain acts for final
adjudication. In this case, the lifting of the restraining order paved the
way for the possession of the fishpond on the part of petitioners and/or
their representatives pending the resolution of the main action for
injunction. In other words, the main issue of whether or not private
respondent may be considered a sublessee or a transferee of the
lease entitled to possess the fishpond under the circumstances of the
case had yet to be resolved when the restraining order was lifted.28
Second, in the earlier motion to quash, the Sandiganbayan solely
looked at the allegations of the Information to determine the
sufficiency of these allegations and did not consider any evidence
aliunde. This is far different from the present demurrer to evidence
where the Sandiganbayan had a fuller view of the prosecutions case,
and was faced with the issue of whether the prosecutions evidence
was sufficient to prove the allegations of the Information. Under these
differing views, the Sandiganbayan may arrive at a different
conclusion on the application of Ursua, the leading case in the
application of CA 142, and the change in ruling is not per se indicative
of grave abuse of discretion. That there is no error of law is
strengthened by our consideration of the Sandiganbayan ruling on the
application of Ursua.
In an exercise of caution given Ursuas jurisprudential binding effect,
the People also argues in its petition that Estradas case is different
from Ursuas for the following reasons: (1) respondent Estrada used
and intended to continually use the alias "Jose Velarde" in addition to
the name "Joseph Estrada"; (2) Estradas use of the alias was not
isolated or limited to a single transaction; and (3) the use of the alias
"Jose Velarde" was designed to cause and did cause "confusion and
fraud in business transactions" which the anti-alias law and its related
statutes seek to prevent. The People also argues that the evidence it
presented more than satisfied the requirements of CA No. 142, as
amended, and Ursua, as it was also shown or established that
Estradas use of the alias was public.
In light of our above conclusions and based on the parties expressed
positions, we shall now examine within the Ursua framework the
assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution granting the demurrer to
evidence. The prosecution has the burden of proof to show that the
evidence it presented with the Sandiganbayan satisfied the Ursua
requirements, particularly on the matter of publicity and habituality in
the use of an alias.
What is the coverage of the indictment?
The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely erred and abused
its discretion in limiting the coverage of the amended Information in
Crim. Case No. 26565 to Estradas use of the alias "Jose Velarde" on
February 4, 2000. It posits that there was a main transaction one
that took place on February 4, 2000 but there were other
transactions covered by the phrase "prior to or subsequent thereto; the
Information specifically referred to "several transactions" "with
Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities." To the People,
the restrictive finding that the phrase "prior to or subsequent thereto"
is absorbed by the phrase "on or about 04 February 2000"
drastically amends the succeeding main allegations on the constitutive
criminal acts by removing the plurality of both the transactions
involved and the documents signed with various entities; there is the
undeniable essential relationship between the allegations of the
multiplicity of transactions, on one hand, and the additional antecedent
of "prior to or subsequent thereto," on the other. It argues that the
Sandiganbayan reduced the phrase "prior to or subsequent thereto"
into a useless appendage, providing Estrada with a convenient and
totally unwarranted escape route.
The People further argues that the allegation of time is the least
exacting in satisfying the constitutional requirement that the accused
has to be informed of the accusation against him. Section 6 of Rule
110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that an allegation of the
approximate date of the commission of the offense will suffice, while
Section 11 of the same Rule provides that it is not necessary to state
in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was
committed except when it is a material ingredient of the crime. This
liberality allegedly shaped the time-tested rule that when the "time"
given in the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, the time of
the commission of the offense does not need to be proven as alleged,
and that the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the
offense was committed at any time within the period of the statute of
limitations and before the commencement of the action (citing People
v. Bugayong [299 SCRA 528, 537] that in turn cited US v. Smith [3
Phil. 20, 22]). Since allegations of date of the commission of an
offense are liberally interpreted, the People posits that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in disregarding the
additional clause "prior to or subsequent thereto"; under the liberality
principle, the allegations of the acts constitutive of the offense finally
determine the sufficiency of the allegations of time. The People thus
claims that no surprise could have taken place that would prevent
Estrada from properly defending himself; the information fully notified
him that he was being accused of using the alias Jose Velarde in more
than just one instance.
We see no merit in these arguments.
At its core, the issue is constitutional in nature the right of Estrada to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Under the provisions of the Rules of Court implementing this
constitutional right, a complaint or information is sufficient if it states
the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense in the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.29 As to the cause of accusation, the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute, but
in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know the offense charged and the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances, and for the court to pronounce judgment.30 The date of
the commission of the offense need not be precisely stated in the
complaint or information except when the precise date is a material
ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been
committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its
commission.31
The information must at all times embody the essential elements of
the crime charged by setting forth the facts and circumstances that
bear on the culpability and liability of the accused so that he can
properly prepare for and undertake his defense.32 In short, the
allegations in the complaint or information, as written, must fully inform
or acquaint the accused the primary reader of and the party directly
affected by the complaint or information of the charge/s laid.
The heretofore cited Information states that " on or about 04
February 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused [did] willfully, unlawfully and criminally
REPRESENT HIMSELF AS JOSE VELARDE IN SEVERAL
TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID alias "Jose Velarde"
which IS neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name,
in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate
entities."
We fully agree with the disputed Sandiganbayans reading of the
Information, as this was how the accused might have similarly read
and understood the allegations in the Information and, on this basis,
prepared his defense. Broken down into its component parts, the
allegation of time in the Information plainly states that (1) ON February
4, 2000; (2) OR before February 4, 2000; (3) OR sometime prior or
subsequent to February 4, 2000, in the City of Manila, Estrada
represented himself as "Jose Velarde" in several transactions in
signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate
entities.
Under this analysis, the several transactions involving the signing of
documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities all
had their reference to February 4, 2000; they were all made on or
about or prior or subsequent to that date, thus plainly implying that all
these transactions took place only on February 4, 2000 or on another
single date sometime before or after February 4, 2000. To be sure, the
Information could have simply said "on or about February 4, 2000" to
capture all the alternative approximate dates, so that the phrase
"sometime prior or subsequent thereto" would effectively be a
surplusage that has no meaning separately from the "on or about"
already expressed. This consequent uselessness of the "prior or
subsequent thereto" phrase cannot be denied, but it is a direct and
necessary consequence of the use of the "OR" between the two
phrases and the "THERETO" that referred back to February 4, 2000 in
the second phrase. Of course, the reading would have been very
different (and would have been clearly in accord with the Peoples
present interpretation) had the Information simply used "AND" instead
of "OR" to separate the phrases; the intent to refer to various
transactions occurring on various dates and occasions all proximate to
February 4, 2000 could not be disputed. Unfortunately for the People,
the imprecision in the use of "OR" is the reality the case has to live
with. To act contrary to this reality would violate Estradas right to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him; the
multiple transactions on several separate days that the People claims
would result in surprise and denial of an opportunity to prepare for
Estrada, who has a right to rely on the single day mentioned in the
Information.
Separately from the constitutional dimension of the allegation of time
in the Information, another issue that the allegation of time and our
above conclusion raise relates to what act or acts, constituting a
violation of the offense charged, were actually alleged in the
Information.1avvphi1
The conclusion we arrived at necessarily impacts on the Peoples
case, as it deals a fatal blow on the Peoples claim that Estrada
habitually used the Jose Velarde alias. For, to our mind, the repeated
use of an alias within a single day cannot be deemed "habitual," as it
does not amount to a customary practice or use. This reason alone
dictates the dismissal of the petition under CA No. 142 and the terms
of Ursua.
The issues of publicity, numbered accounts, and
the application of CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405,
and R.A. No. 9160.
We shall jointly discuss these interrelated issues.
The People claims that even on the assumption that Ocampo and
Curato are bank officers sworn to secrecy under the law, the presence
of two other persons who are not bank officers Aprodicio Laquian
and Fernando Chua when Estradas signed the bank documents as
"Jose Velarde" amounted to a "public" use of an alias that violates CA
No. 142.
On the issue of numbered accounts, the People argues that to
premise the validity of Estradas prosecution for violation of CA No.
142 on a mere banking practice is gravely erroneous, improper, and
constitutes grave abuse of discretion; no banking law provision
allowing the use of aliases in the opening of bank accounts existed; at
most, it was allowed by mere convention or industry practice, but not
by a statute enacted by the legislature. Additionally, that Estradas
prosecution was supposedly based on BSP Circular No. 302 dated
October 11, 2001 is wrong and misleading, as Estrada stands charged
with violation of CA No. 142, penalized since 1936, and not with a
violation of a mere BSP Circular. That the use of alias in bank
transactions prior to BSP Circular No. 302 is allowed is
inconsequential because as early as CA No. 142, the use of an alias
(except for certain purposes which do not include banking) was
already prohibited. Nothing in CA No. 142 exempted the use of aliases
in banking transactions, since the law did not distinguish or limit its
application; it was therefore grave error for the Sandiganbayan to have
done so. Lastly on this point, bank regulations being mere issuances
cannot amend, modify or prevail over the effective, subsisting and
enforceable provision of CA No. 142.
On the issue of the applicability of R.A. No. 1405 and its relationship
with CA No. 142, that since nothing in CA No. 142 excuses the use of
an alias, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it
ruled that R.A. No. 1405 is an exception to CA No. 142s coverage.
Harmonization of laws, the People posits, is allowed only if the laws
intended to be harmonized refer to the same subject matter, or are at
least related with one another. The three laws which the
Sandiganbayan tried to harmonize are not remotely related to one
another; they each deal with a different subject matter, prohibits a
different act, governs a different conduct, and covers a different class
of persons,33 and there was no need to force their application to one
another. Harmonization of laws, the People adds, presupposes the
existence of conflict or incongruence between or among the provisions
of various laws, a situation not obtaining in the present case.
The People posits, too, that R.A. No. 1405 does not apply to trust
transactions, such as Trust Account No. C-163, as it applies only to
traditional deposits (simple loans). A trust account, according to the
People, may not be considered a deposit because it does not create
the juridical relation of creditor and debtor; trust and deposit
operations are treated separately and are different in legal
contemplation; trust operation is separate and distinct from banking
and requires a grant of separate authority, and trust funds are not
covered by deposit insurance under the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation law (R.A. No. 3591, as amended).
The People further argues that the Sandiganbayans conclusion that
the transaction or communication was privileged in nature was
erroneous a congruent interpretation of CA No. 142 and R.A. No.
1405 shows that a person who signs in a public or private transaction
a name or alias, other than his original name or the alias he is
authorized to use, shall be held liable for violation of CA No. 142, while
the bank employees are bound by the confidentiality of bank
transactions except in the circumstances enumerated in R.A. No.
1405. At most, the People argues, the prohibition in R.A. No. 1405
covers bank employees and officers only, and not Estrada; the law
does not prohibit Estrada from disclosing and making public his use of
an alias to other people, including Ocampo and Curato, as he did
when he made a public exhibit and use of the alias before Messrs.
Lacquian and Chua.
Finally, the People argues that the Sandiganbayan ruling that the use
of an alias before bank officers does not violate CA No. 142 effectively
encourages the commission of wrongdoing and the concealment of ill-
gotten wealth under pseudonyms; it sustains an anomalous and
prejudicial policy that uses the law to silence bank officials and
employees from reporting the commission of crimes. The People
contends that the law R.A. No. 1405 was not intended by the
Legislature to be used as a subterfuge or camouflage for the
commission of crimes and cannot be so interpreted; the law can only
be interpreted, understood and applied so that right and justice would
prevail.
We see no merit in these arguments.
We agree, albeit for a different reason, with the Sandiganbayan
position that the rule in the law of libel that mere communication to a
third person is publicity does not apply to violations of CA No. 142.
Our close reading of Ursua particularly, the requirement that there
be intention by the user to be culpable and the historical reasons we
cited above tells us that the required publicity in the use of alias is
more than mere communication to a third person; the use of the alias,
to be considered public, must be made openly, or in an open manner
or place, or to cause it to become generally known. In order to be held
liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias must have
held himself out as a person who shall publicly be known under that
other name. In other words, the intent to publicly use the alias must be
manifest.
To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada
signed as Jose Velarde and opened Trust Account No. C-163 does
not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth
as Jose Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not
part of the public who had no access to Estradas privacy and to the
confidential matters that transpired in Malacaan where he sat as
President; Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared
matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while Chua was a
lawyer-friend bound by his oath of office and ties of friendship to keep
and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada
could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be
for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were
also inside the room at that time. The same holds true for Estradas
alleged representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the
evidence for these representations to be admissible. All of Estradas
representations to these people were made in privacy and in secrecy,
with no iota of intention of publicity.
The nature, too, of the transaction on which the indictment rests,
affords Estrada a reasonable expectation of privacy, as the alleged
criminal act related to the opening of a trust account a transaction
that R.A. No. 1405 considers absolutely confidential in nature.34 We
previously rejected, in Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan,35 the Peoples
nitpicking argument on the alleged dichotomy between bank deposits
and trust transactions, when we said:
The contention that trust accounts are not covered by the term
"deposits," as used in R.A. 1405, by the mere fact that they do not
entail a creditor-debtor relationship between the trustor and the bank,
does not lie. An examination of the law shows that the term "deposits"
used therein is to be understood broadly and not limited only to
accounts which give rise to a creditor-debtor relationship between the
depositor and the bank.
The policy behind the law is laid down in Section 1:
SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government
to give encouragement to the people to deposit their money in banking
institutions and to discourage private hoarding so that the same may
be properly utilized by banks in authorized loans to assist in the
economic development of the country. (Underscoring supplied)
If the money deposited under an account may be used by bank for
authorized loans to third persons, then such account, regardless of
whether it creates a creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor
and the bank, falls under the category of accounts which the law
precisely seeks to protect for the purpose of boosting the economic
development of the country.
Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account. The Trust
Agreement between petitioner and Urban Bank provides that the trust
account covers "deposit, placement or investment of funds" by Urban
Bank for and in behalf of petitioner. The money deposited under Trust
Account No. 858, was, therefore, intended not merely to remain with
the bank but to be invested by it elsewhere. To hold that this type of
account is not protected by R.A. 1405 would encourage private
hoarding of funds that could otherwise be invested by bank in other
ventures, contrary to the policy behind the law.
Section 2 of the same law in fact even more clearly shows that the
term "deposits" was intended to be understood broadly:
SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with bank or banking
institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by
the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its
instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely
confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into
by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon
written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or
upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of
duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the litigation. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)1avvphi1
The phrase "of whatever nature" proscribes any restrictive
interpretation of "deposits." Moreover, it is clear from the immediately
quoted provision that, generally, the law applies not only to money
which is deposited but also to those which are invested. This further
shows that the law was not intended to apply only to "deposits" in the
strict sense of the word.lawphil.net Otherwise, there would have been
no need to add the phrase "or invested.
Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust Account
No. 858.36
We have consistently ruled that bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405
(the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are statutorily protected or
recognized zones of privacy.37 Given the private nature of Estradas
act of signing the documents as "Jose Velarde" related to the opening
of the trust account, the People cannot claim that there was already a
public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing.
We need not even consider here the impact of the obligations imposed
by R.A. No.1405 on the bank officers; what is essentially significant is
the privacy situation that is necessarily implied in these kinds of
transactions. This statutorily guaranteed privacy and secrecy
effectively negate a conclusion that the transaction was done publicly
or with the intent to use the alias publicly.
The enactment of R.A. No.9160, on the other hand, is a significant
development only because it clearly manifests that prior to its
enactment, numbered accounts or anonymous accounts were
permitted banking transactions, whether they be allowed by law or by
a mere banking regulation. To be sure, an indictment against Estrada
using this relatively recent law cannot be maintained without violating
the constitutional prohibition on the enactment and use of ex post
facto laws.38
We hasten to add that this holistic application and interpretation of
these various laws is not an attempt to harmonize these laws. A
finding of commission of the offense punished under CA No. 142 must
necessarily rest on the evidence of the requisites for culpability, as
amplified in Ursua. The application of R.A. No. 1405 is significant only
because Estradas use of the alias was pursuant to a transaction that
the law considers private or, at the very least, where the law
guarantees a reasonable expectation of privacy to the parties to the
transactions; it is at this point that R.A. No. 1405 tangentially
interfaces with an indictment under CA 142. In this light, there is no
actual frontal clash between CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405 that
requires harmonization. Each operates within its own sphere, but must
necessarily be read together when these spheres interface with one
another. Finally, R.A. No. 9160, as a law of recent vintage in relation
to the indictment against Estrada, cannot be a source or an influencing
factor in his indictment.
In finding the absence of the requisite publicity, we simply looked at
the totality of the circumstances obtaining in Estradas use of the alias
"Jose Velarde" vis--vis the Ursua requisites. We do not decide here
whether Estradas use of an alias when he occupied the highest
executive position in the land was valid and legal; we simply
determined, as the Sandiganbayan did, whether he may be made
liable for the offense charged based on the evidence the People
presented. As with any other accused, his guilt must be based on the
evidence and proof beyond reasonable doubt that a finding of criminal
liability requires. If the People fails to discharge this burden, as they
did fail in this case, the rule of law requires that we so declare. We do
so now in this review and accordingly find no reversible error of law in
the assailed Sandiganbayan ruling.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED

LEONILA BATULANON, G.R. No.
139857
This petition assails the October 30, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15221, affirming with modification the
April 15, 1993 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of General
Santos City, Branch 22 in Criminal Case Nos. 3453, 3625, 3626 and
3627, convicting Leonila Batulanon of estafa through falsification of
commercial documents, and the July 29, 1999 Resolution[3] denying
the motion for reconsideration.
Complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI)
employed Batulanon as its Cashier/Manager from May 1980 up to
December 22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving deposits from and
releasing loans to the member of the cooperative.
During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities
concerning the release of loans were discovered.[4]
Thereafter, four informations for estafa thru falsification of commercial
documents were filed against Batulanon, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 3625
That on or about the 2nd day of June, 1982 at Poblacion Municipality
of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court said accused being then the
manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI),
entrusted with the duty of managing the aff[a]irs of the cooperative,
receiving payments to, and collections of, the same, and paying out
loans to members, taking advantage of her position and with intent to
prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely:
Cash/Check Voucher No. 30-A of PCCI in the name of Erlinda
Omadlao by then and there making an entry therein that the said
Erlinda Omadlao was granted a loan of P4,160, Philippine Currency,
and by signing on the appropriate line thereon the signature of Erlinda
Omadlao showing that she received the loan, thus making it appear
that the said Erlinda Omadlao was granted a loan and received the
amount of P4,160 when in truth and in fact the said person was never
granted a loan, never received the same, and never signed the
cash/check voucher issued in her name, and in furtherance of her
criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did
then and there release to herself the same and received the loan of
P4,160 and thereafter misappropriate and convert to her own use and
benefit the said amount, and despite demands, refused and still
refuses to restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in
the aforementioned amount of P4,160, Philippine Currency.[5]
Criminal Case No. 3626
That on or about the 24th day of September, 1982 at Poblacion,
Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, said accused being
then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc.
(PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of the
cooperative, receiving payments to, and collections of, the same, and
paying out loans to members taking advantage of her position and
with intent to prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial
document, namely: Cash/Check Voucher No. 237 A of PCCI in the
name of Gonafreda Oracion by then and there making an entry therein
that the said Gonafreda Oracion was granted a loan of P4,000.00 and
by signals on the appropriate line thereon the signature of Gonafreda
Oracion showing that she received the loan, thus making it appear that
the said Gonafreda Oracion was granted a loan, received the loan of
P4,000.00 when in truth and in fact said person was never granted a
loan, never received the same, and never signed the Cash/Check
voucher issued in her name, and in furtherance of her criminal intent
and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and
there release to herself the same and received the amount of
P4,000.00 and thereafter misappropriate and convert to her own use
and benefit the said amount, and despite demands, refused and still
refuses to restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in
the aforementioned amount of P4,000, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
Criminal Case No. 3453
That on or about the 10th day of October 1982 at Poblacion,
Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused
being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc.,
(PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of the
cooperative, receiving payments to, and collection of the same and
paying out loans to members, taking advantage of her position and
with intent to prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial
document, namely: an Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of one
Ferlyn Arroyo with the PCCI by then and there entering on the
appropriate column of the ledger the entry that the said Ferlyn Arroyo
had a fixed deposit of P1,000.00 with the PCCI and was granted a
loan in the amount of P3,500.00, thus making it appear that the said
person made a fixed deposit on the aforesaid date with, and was
granted a loan by the PCCI when in truth and in fact Ferlyn Arroyo
never made such a deposit and was never granted loan and after the
document was so falsified in the manner set forth, said accused did
then and there again falsify the Cash/Check Voucher of the PCCI in
the name of Ferlyn Arroyo by signing therein the signature of Ferlyn
Arroyo, thus making it appear that the said Ferlyn Arroyo received the
loan of P3,500, Philippine Currency, when in truth and in fact said
Ferlyn Arroyo never received the loan, and in furtherance of her
criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did
then and there release to herself the same, and received the amount
of P3,500, and thereafter, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate and convert to her own personal use and
benefit the said amount, and despite demands, refused and still
refuses to restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of the
PCCI in the aforementioned amount of P3,500, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
Criminal Case No. 3627
That on or about the 7th day of December, 1982 at Poblacion,
Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused
being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc.,
(PCCI) entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of the
cooperative, receiving payments to, and collection of, the same and
paying out loans to members, taking advantage of her position and
with intent to prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial
document, namely: an Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of one
Dennis Batulanon with the PCCI by then and there entering on the
appropriate column of the ledger the entry that the said Dennis
Batulanon had a fixed deposit of P2,000.00 with the PCCI and was
granted a loan in the amount of P5,000.00 thus making it appear that
the said person made fixed deposit on the aforesaid date with, and
was granted a loan by the PCCI when in truth and in fact Dennis
Batulanon never made such a deposit and was never granted loan
and offer the document was so falsified in the manner set forth, said
accused did then and there again falsify the Cash/Check Voucher No.
374 A of PCCI in the name of Dennis Batulanon by signing therein the
signature of Dennis Batulanon, thus making it appear that the said
Dennis Batulanon received the loan of P5,000.00 when in truth and in
fact said Dennis Batulanon never received the loan and in furtherance
of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said
accused did then and there release to herself the same and receive
the loan of P5,000, and thereafter, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate and convert to her own
personal use and benefit the said amount, and [despite] demands,
refused and still refuses to restitute the same to the damage and
prejudice of the PCCI in the aforementioned amount of P5,000,
Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
The cases were raffled to Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court of
General Santos City and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 3453, 3625,
3626 and 3627.
Batulanon pleaded not guilty to the charges, afterwhich a joint trial on
the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented Maria Theresa Medallo, Benedicto Gopio,
Jr., and Bonifacio Jayoma as witnesses.
Medallo, the posting clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon in the
preparation of cash vouchers[9] testified that on certain dates in 1982,
Batulanon released four Cash Vouchers representing varying amounts
to four different individuals as follows: On June 2, 1982, Cash Voucher
No. 30A[10] for P4,160.00 was released to Erlinda Omadlao; on
September 24, 1982, Cash Voucher No. 237A[11] for P4,000.00 was
released to Gonafreda[12] Oracion; P3, 500.00 thru Cash Voucher No.
276A[13] was released to Ferlyn Arroyo on October 16, 1982 and on
December 7, 1982, P5,000.00 was released to Dennis Batulanon thru
Cash Voucher No. 374A.[14]
Medallo testified that Omadlao, Oracion, and Dennis Batulanon were
not eligible to apply for loan because they were not bona fide
members of the cooperative.[15] Ferlyn Arroyo on the other hand, was
a member of the cooperative but there was no proof that she applied
for a loan with PCCI in 1982. She subsequently withdrew her
membership in 1983.[16] Medallo stated that pursuant to the
cooperatives by-laws, only bona fide members who must have a fixed
deposit are eligible for loans.[17]
Medallo categorically stated that she saw Batulanon sign the names of
Oracion and Arroyo in their respective cash vouchers and made it
appear in the records that they were payees and recipients of the
amount stated therein.[18] As to the signature of Omadlao in Cash
Voucher No. 30A, she declared that the same was actually the
handwriting of appellant.[19]
Gopio, Jr. was a member of PCCI since 1975 and a member of its
board of directors since 1979. He corroborated Medallos testimony
that Omadlao, Arroyo, Oracion and Dennis Batulanon are not
members of PCCI. He stated that Oracion is Batulanons sister-in-law
while Dennis Batulanon is her son who was only 3 years old in 1982.
He averred that membership in the cooperative is not open to
minors.[20]
Jayoma was the Vice-Chairman of the PCCI Board of Directors in
1980 before becoming its Chairman in 1982 until 1983. He testified
that the loans made to Oracion, Omadlao, Arroyo and Dennis
Batulanon did not pass through the cooperatives Credit Committee
and PCCIs Board of Directors for screening purposes. He claimed that
Oracions signature on Cash Voucher No. 237A is Batulanons
handwriting.[21] Jayoma also testified that among the four loans
taken, only that in Arroyos name was settled.[22]
The defense presented two witnesses, namely, Maria Theresa
Medallo who was presented as a hostile witness and Batulanon.
Medallo was subpoenaed by the trial court on behalf of the defense
and was asked to bring with her the PCCI General Journal for the year
1982. After certifying that the said document reflected all the financial
transactions of the cooperative for that year, she was asked to identify
the entries in the Journal with respect to the vouchers in question.
Medallo was able to identify only Cash Voucher No. 237A in the name
of Gonafreda Oracion. She failed to identify the other vouchers
because the Journal had missing pages and she was not the one who
prepared the entries.[23]
Batulanon denied all the charges against her. She claimed that she
did not sign the vouchers in the names of Omadlao, Oracion and
Arroyo; that the same were signed by the loan applicants in her
presence at the PCCI office after she personally released the money
to them;[24] that the three were members of the cooperative as shown
by their individual deposits and the ledger; that the board of directors
passed a resolution in August 1982 authorizing her to certify to the
correctness of the entries in the vouchers; that it has become an
accepted practice in the cooperative for her to release loans and
dispense with the approval of Gopio Jr., in case of his absence;[25]
that she signed the loan application and voucher of her son Dennis
Batulanon because he was a minor but she clarified that she asked
Gopio, Jr., to add his signature on the documents to avoid suspicion of
irregularity;[26] that contrary to the testimony of Gopio, Jr., minors are
eligible for membership in the cooperative provided they are children
of regular members.
Batulanon admitted that she took out a loan in her sons name
because she is no longer qualified for another loan as she still has to
pay off an existing loan; that she had started paying off her sons loan
but the cooperative refused to accept her payments after the cases
were filed in court.[27] She also declared that one automatically
becomes a member when he deposits money with the
cooperative.[28] When she was Cashier/Manager of PCCI from 1980
to 1982, the cooperative did not have by-laws yet.[29]
On rebuttal, Jayoma belied that PCCI had no by-laws from 1980-1982,
because the cooperative had been registered since 1967.[30]
On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting
Batulanon as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the accused Leonila
Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt in all the above-entitled
case, she is sentenced in each of the four cases to 4 months of
ARRESTO MAYOR to 1 year and 2 months of PRISION
CORRECTIONAL, to indemnify the PCCI in the total sum of
P16,660.00 with legal interest from the institution of the complaints
until fully paid, plus costs.
SO ORDERED.[31]
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the
trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Appellant
LEONILA BATULANON is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Falsification of Private Documents under Par. 2, Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code; and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor maximum,
AS MINIMUM, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional medium, AS MAXIMUM; to pay a fine of five thousand
(P5,000.00) pesos; and to indemnify the Polomolok Cooperative
Credit , Inc. the sum of thirteen thousand one hundred sixty
(P13,160.00), plus legal interests from the filing of the complaints until
fully paid, plus costs.
SO ORDERED.[32]
The motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
Batulanon argues that in any falsification case, the best witness is the
person whose signature was allegedly forged, thus the prosecution
should have presented Erlinda Omadlao, Gonafreda Oracion and
Ferlyn Arroyo instead of relying on the testimony of an unreliable and
biased witness such as Medallo.[33] She avers that the crime of
falsification of private document requires as an element prejudice to a
third person. She insists that PCCI has not been prejudiced by these
loan transactions because these loans are accounts receivable by the
cooperative.[34]
The petition lacks merit.
Although the offense charged in the information is estafa through
falsification of commercial document, appellant could be convicted of
falsification of private document under the well-settled rule that it is the
allegations in the information that determines the nature of the offense
and not the technical name given in the preamble of the information. In
Andaya v. People,[35] we held:
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern
to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he
stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. x x x
That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above
all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The
real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some
technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the
body of the information in the manner therein set forth. x x x The real
and important question to him is, Did you perform the acts alleged in
the manner alleged? not, Did you commit a crime named murder? If
he performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law
determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty
therefor. x x x If the accused performed the acts alleged in the manner
alleged, then he ought to be punished and punished adequately,
whatever may be the name of the crime which those acts constitute.
The elements of falsification of private document under Article 172,
paragraph 2[36] of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that the offender
committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in paragraph 7,
Article 171; (2) that the falsification was committed in any private
document; and (3) that the falsification caused damage to a third party
or at least the falsification was committed with intent to cause such
damage.[37]
In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626, and 3453, Batulanons act[38] of
falsification falls under paragraph 2 of Article 171, i.e., causing it to
appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when
they did not in fact so participate. This is because by signing the name
of Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo in Cash Voucher Nos. 30A, 237A,
and 267A, respectively, as payee of the amounts appearing in the
corresponding cash vouchers, Batulanon made it appear that they
obtained a loan and received its proceeds when they did not in fact
secure said loan nor receive the amounts reflected in the cash
vouchers.
The prosecution established that Batulanon caused the preparation of
the Cash Vouchers in the name of Omadlao and Oracion knowing that
they are not PCCI members and not qualified for a loan from the
cooperative. In the case of Arroyo, Batulanon was aware that while the
former is a member, she did not apply for a loan with the cooperative.
Medallo categorically declared that she saw Batulanon forge the
signatures of Oracion and Arroyo in the vouchers and made it appear
that the amounts stated therein were actually received by these
persons. As to the signature of Arroyo, Medallos credible testimony
and her familiarity with the handwriting of Batulanon proved that it was
indeed the latter who signed the name of Arroyo. Contrary to
Batulanons contention, the prosecution is not duty-bound to present
the persons whose signatures were forged as Medallos eyewitness
account of the incident was sufficient. Moreover, under Section 22,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the handwriting of a person may be
proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such
person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing
purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been
charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such
person.
Her insistence that Medallo is a biased witness is without basis. There
is no evidence showing that Medallo was prompted by any ill motive.
The claim that Batulanons letter to the cooperative asking for a
compromise was not an admission of guilt is untenable. Section 27,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that in criminal cases, except
those involving quasi-offenses or criminal negligence or those allowed
by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused
may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
There is no merit in Batulanons assertion that PCCI has not been
prejudiced because the loan transactions are reflected in its books as
accounts receivable. It has been established that PCCI only grants
loans to its bona fide members with no subsisting loan. These alleged
borrowers are not members of PCCI and neither are they eligible for a
loan. Of the four accounts, only that in Ferlyn Arroyos name was
settled because her mother, Erlinda, agreed to settle the loan to avoid
legal prosecution with the understanding however, that she will be
reimbursed once the money is collected from Batulanon.[39]
The Court of Appeals[40] correctly ruled that the subject vouchers are
private documents and not commercial documents because they are
not documents used by merchants or businessmen to promote or
facilitate trade or credit transactions[41] nor are they defined and
regulated by the Code of Commerce or other commercial law.[42]
Rather, they are private documents, which have been defined as
deeds or instruments executed by a private person without the
intervention of a public notary or of other person legally authorized, by
which some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set
forth. [43]
In all criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof is on the prosecution
to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It has
the duty to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the
information to warrant a finding of guilt for the said crime or for any
other crime necessarily included therein.[44] The prosecution in this
case was able to discharge its burden completely.
As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private
document,[45] it is important to ascertain whether the offender is to be
charged with falsification of a private document or with estafa. If the
falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit
estafa, the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can
be committed without the necessity of falsifying a document, the
proper crime to be charged is estafa. Thus, in People v. Reyes,[46]
the accused made it appear in the time book of the Calamba Sugar
Estate that a laborer, Ciriaco Sario, worked 21 days during the month
of July, 1929, when in reality he had worked only 11 days, and then
charged the offended party, the Calamba Sugar Estate, the wages of
the laborer for 21 days. The accused misappropriated the wages
during which the laborer did not work for which he was convicted of
falsification of private document.
In U.S. v. Infante,[47] the accused changed the description of the
pawned article on the face of the pawn ticket and made it appear that
the article is of greatly superior value, and thereafter pawned the
falsified ticket in another pawnshop for an amount largely in excess of
the true value of the article pawned. He was found guilty of falsification
of a private document. In U.S. v. Chan Tiao,[48] the accused
presented a document of guaranty purportedly signed by Ortigas
Hermanos for the payment of P2,055.00 as the value of 150 sacks of
sugar, and by means of said falsified documents, succeeded in
obtaining the sacks of sugar, was held guilty of falsification of a private
document.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly
held Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of
Private Documents in Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453.
Article 172 punishes the crime of Falsification of a Private Document
with the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods with a duration of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day to six (6) years. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period,
which is three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days to
four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days. Taking into
consideration the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Batulanon is entitled
to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which must be within the
range of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in
its minimum period, or four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2)
years and four (4) months.[49] Thus, in Criminal Case Nos. 3625,
3626 and 3453, the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the penalty of
six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, which is within the
range of the allowed imposable penalty.
Since Batulanons conviction was for 3 counts of falsification of private
documents, she shall suffer the aforementioned penalties for each
count of the offense charged. She is also ordered to indemnify PCCI
the amount of P11,660.00 representing the aggregate amount of the 3
loans without deducting the amount of P3,500.00 paid by Ferlyn
Arroyos mother as the same was settled with the understanding that
PCCI will reimburse the former once the money is recovered. The
amount shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the filing
of the complaints on November 28, 1994 until the finality of this
judgment. From the time the decision becomes final and executory,
the interest rate shall be 12% per annum until its satisfaction.
However, in Criminal Case No. 3627, the crime committed by
Batulanon is estafa and not falsification. Under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code, the acts that may constitute falsification are the
following:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding
statements other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which
changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a
copy of an original document when no such original exists, or including
in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the
genuine original; or;
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof
in a protocol, registry, or official book.
In Criminal Case No. 3627, the trial court convicted petitioner
Batulanon for falsifying Dennis Batulanons signature in the cash
voucher based on the Information charging her of signing the name of
her 3 year old son, Dennis. The records, however, reveal that in Cash
Voucher No. 374A, petitioner Batulanon did not falsify the signature of
Dennis. What she did was to sign: by: lbatulanon to indicate that she
received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of Dennis. Said act does
not fall under any of the modes of falsification under Article 171
because there in nothing untruthful about the fact that she used the
name of Dennis and that as representative of the latter, obtained the
proceeds of the loan from PCCI. The essence of falsification is the act
of making untruthful or false statements, which is not attendant in this
case. As to whether, such representation involves fraud which caused
damage to PCCI is a different matter which will make her liable for
estafa, but not for falsification. Hence, it was an error for the courts
below to hold that petitioner Batulanon is also guilty of falsification of
private document with respect to Criminal Case No. 3627 involving the
cash voucher of Dennis.[50]
The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under
Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code are:
(1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the
offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the
same;
(2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt;
(3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another;
(4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.
(Note: The 4th element is not necessary when there is evidence of
misappropriation of the goods by the defendant)[51]
Thus in the case of U.S. v. Sevilla,[52] the Court convicted the
appellant of estafa by misappropriation. The latter, a treasurer of the
Manila Rail Road Company, took the sum of P8,330.00 out of the
funds of the company and used it for personal purposes. He replaced
said cash with his personal check of the same amount drawn on the
Philippine National Bank (PNB), with instruction to his cashier not to
deposit the same in the current account of the Manila Rail Road
Company until the end of the month. When an audit was conducted,
the check of appellant was discovered to have been carried in the
accounts as part of the cash on hand. An inquiry with the PNB
disclosed that he had only P125.66 in his account, although in the
afternoon of the same day, he deposited in his account with the PNB
sufficient sum to cover the check. In handing down a judgment of
conviction, the Court explained that:
Fraudulent intent in committing the conversion or diversion is very
evidently not a necessary element of the form of estafa here
discussed; the breach of confidence involved in the conversion or
diversion of trust funds takes the place of fraudulent intent and is in
itself sufficient. The reason for this is obvious: Grave as the offense is,
comparatively few men misappropriate trust funds with the intention of
defrauding the owner; in most cases the offender hopes to be able to
restore the funds before the defalcation is discovered. x x x
Applying the legal principles here stated to the facts of the case, we
find all of the necessary elements of estafa x x x. That the money for
which the appellant's checks were substituted was received by him for
safe-keeping or administration, or both, can hardly be disputed. He
was the responsible financial officer of the corporation and as such
had immediate control of the current funds for the purposes of safe-
keeping and was charged with the custody of the same. That he, in
the exercise of such control and custody, was aided by subordinates
cannot alter the case nor can the fact that one of the subordinates, the
cashier, was a bonded employee who, if he had acted on his own
responsibility, might also have misappropriated the same funds and
thus have become guilty of estafa.
Neither can there be any doubt that, in taking money for his personal
use, from the funds entrusted to him for safekeeping and substituting
his personal checks therefor with instructions that the checks were to
be retained by the cashier for a certain period, the appellant
misappropriated and diverted the funds for that period. The checks did
not constitute cash and as long as they were retained by the appellant
or remained under his personal control they were of no value to the
corporation; he might as well have kept them in his pocket as to
deliver them to his subordinate with instructions to retain them.
xxxx
But it is argued in the present case that it was not the intention of the
accused to permanently misappropriate the funds to himself. As we
have already stated, such intention rarely exists in cases of this nature
and, as we have seen, it is not a necessary element of the crime.
Though authorities have been cited who, at first sight, appear to hold
that misappropriation of trust funds for short periods does not always
amount to estafa, we are not disposed to extend this interpretation of
the law to cases where officers of corporations convert corporate
funds to their own use, especially where, as in this case, the
corporation is of a quasi-public character. The statute is clear and arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of
makes no distinction between permanent misappropriations and prision correccional, as maximum. She is likewise ordered to
temporary ones. We can see no reason in the present case why it indemnify Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated the sum of
should not be applied in its literal sense. P5,000.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from November
28, 1994 until finality of this judgment. The interest rate of 12% per
The third element of the crime with which the appellant is charged is annum shall be imposed from finality of this judgment until its
injury to another. The appellant's counsel argues that the only injury in satisfaction.
this case is the loss of interest suffered by the Railroad Company
during the period the funds were withheld by the appellant. It is, SO ORDERED.
however, well settled by former adjudications of this court that the
disturbance in property rights caused by the misappropriation, though
only temporary, is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the
meaning of paragraph 5, supra. (U.S. vs. Goyenechea, 8 Phil., 117
U.S. vs. Malong, 36 Phil., 821.)[53]
In the instant case, there is no doubt that as Cashier/Manager,
Batulanon holds the money for administration and in trust for PCCI.
Knowing that she is no longer qualified to obtain a loan, she
fraudulently used the name of her son who is likewise disqualified to
secure a loan from PCCI. Her misappropriation of the amount she
obtained from the loan is also not disputed as she even admitted
receiving the same for personal use. Although the amount received by
Batulanon is reflected in the records as part of the receivables of
PCCI, damage was still caused to the latter because the sum
misappropriated by her could have been loaned by PCCI to qualified
members, or used in other productive undertakings. At any rate, the
disturbance in property rights caused by Batulaonos misappropriation
is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of Article
315.
Considering that the amount misappropriated by Batulanon was
P5,000.00, the applicable provision is paragraph (3) of Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code, which imposes the penalty of arresto mayor
in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period,
where the amount defrauded is over P200.00 but does not exceed
P6,000.00. There being no modifying circumstances, the penalty shall
be imposed in its medium period. With the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, Batulaon is entitled to an indeterminate
penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1)
year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, Leonila Batulanon is
found GUILTY of three counts of falsification of private documents and
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, for each count, and to indemnify
complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated the amount of
P11,660.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from November
28, 1994 until finality of this judgment. The interest rate of 12% per
annum shall be imposed from finality of this judgment until its
satisfaction; and
(2) In Criminal Case No. 3627, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of
estafa and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of three (3) months of
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1600** February 1, 2011
VIVIAN T. DABU, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, Complainant,
vs.
EDUARDO RODEN E. KAPUNAN, Presiding Judge, Branch 51 and
Acting Judge, Branch 52,* MA. THERESA CORTEZ, LEILA O.
GALO, Both Court Stenographers, SUZETTE O. TIONGCO, Legal
Researcher, All of Regional Trial Court, Branch 51, Guagua,
Pampanga, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A.M. No. 01-3-138-RTC
RE: EVALUATION OF THE REPORT AND INVENTORY
SUBMITTED BY EXECUTIVE JUDGE ROGELIO C. GONZALES,
RTC, Guagua, Pampanga, ON ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
CASES IN BRANCHES 49, 50, 51, 52 and 53 OF THE GUAGUA
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to the powers vested in the Court under Section 6, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution,1 the Court acts upon these two
consolidated administrative cases against [1] Judge Eduardo Roden
E. Kapunan (Judge Kapunan), then presiding judge of Branch 51 and
acting judge of Branch 52, Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga
(RTC); [2] stenographer Ma. Theresa Cortez (Cortez); [3]
stenographer Leila O. Galo (Galo); and [4] Legal Researcher Suzette
Tiongco (Tiongco), all of Branch 51, RTC, Guagua, Pampanga.
In A.M. No. RTJ-00-1600, complainant Vivian T. Dabu (Dabu) claimed
that she was appointed 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecutor for
Pampanga sometime in June 1999. In October of the same year, from
her station in San Fernando, Pampanga, she was transferred and re-
assigned to Guagua, Pampanga, to serve Branches 50, 51 and 52 of
the RTC therein.
According to Dabu, just a few months into her assignment, she noticed
that unlike in Branch 50, she was not being called upon to intervene or
investigate cases involving annulment of marriages in Branches 51
and 52, both presided by Judge Kapunan, despite the fact that the
cases for annulment of marriage were being raffled equally among the
five (5) branches of the RTC, in Guagua, Pampanga.
Curious on what appeared to her as an oddity, and having previously
learned that cases for annulment of marriage were being "fixed" in the
said station, Dabu went to the Office of the Clerk of Court and got from
its docket the list of annulment cases raffled to Branches 51 and 52
pertaining to the period from August 1, 1999 to March 2000. She then
went to each branch and requested the records of the cases in the list.
She then found out that the records were being falsified and made to
appear that a prosecutor appeared during the supposed hearings of
the annulment cases, when, in truth, the prosecutors who supposedly
appeared were either on leave or had already been re-assigned to
another station.
The other case, A.M. No. 01-3-138, stemmed from an article written
by Atty. Emil P. Jurado (Atty. Jurado) in the November 1, 2000 issue
of the Manila Standard. It reported that an RTC branch in Guagua,
Pampanga, had been improperly disposing cases for annulment of
marriage in "syndicated efforts involving court personnel and a public
assistance office lawyer."
Determined to ascertain the truth of the allegations made in the article,
then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. instructed Executive Judge
Rogelio C. Gonzales (Judge Gonzales) of RTC, Guagua, Pampanga
to submit inventories of marriage annulment cases filed in the five (5)
branches of the RTC, Guagua, Pampanga, from January 1997 to
November 2000.
In theevaluation2of the report and inventory submitted by Judge
Gonzales, then Deputy Court Administrator Jose P.
Perez3 recommended that the matter be joined with the proceedings
in A.M. No. RTJ-00-1600 so that "a complete picture and history of the
anomalous treatment by Branches 51 and 52 of annulment of
marriage cases" would be made.
In its Resolution4 dated March 13, 2001, the Court ordered the
consolidation of A.M. No. 1-3-138-RTC and A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-
1028-RTJ.
During the hearing of these cases, only Judge Kapunan and Tiongco
participated. Cortez manifested that she would not adduce evidence in
her behalf and would submit the case for disposition/recommendation
on the basis of the records and evidence adduced during the
investigation. Respondent Galo, on the other hand, neither appeared
nor filed any comment or pleading.
The result of the investigation revealed something not expected of a
proper judicial office. As reported in detail by the Investigating Justice
Eliezer R. De Los Santos5 (Investigating Justice) of the Court of
Appeals:
On August 24, 2000, Complainant Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Vivian T. Dabu executed an Affidavit citing several incidents wherein
the court records of cases for annulment of marriage, lost titles and
declaration of presumptive death were being falsified. The Affidavit
was treated as a Complaint for falsification of court records against
Judge Eduardo Roden E. Kapunan and court stenographers Ma.
Theresa Cortez and Leila O. Galo. Respondent Suzette Tiongco was
not included in the charge of falsification of court records as
complainant ha[d] no evidence linking her thereto but the Office of the
Court Administrator included her with the charge of conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service.
Complainant alleged that during the period between November 1999
and August 2000, respondent Judge was the presiding judge of
Branch 51 and the acting judge of Branch 52, both of the Regional
Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, with three (3) of the personnel of
Branch 51, namely: Leila Galo, Ma. Theresa Cortez and Suzette
Tiongco.
Respondent Judge and Galo were detailed to the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 48, at the same time and were returned to their
original assignment at the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga
also at the same time x x x.
Respondents Galo and Cortez were appointed to the position of court
stenographers for Branch 51 x x x. However, respondent Galo, during
the said period, did not perform the duties of a stenographer but acted
as a secretary for respondent Judge x x x. She received all
communications pertaining to respondent Judge or to cases pending
before Branches 51 and 52 x x x. Respondent Judge gave specific
instruction on this matter to the Courts personnel x x x.
The other staff of Branch 51 (sic) holds office at the 3rd floor of
Goseco hall, which is located across the municipal hall of Guagua,
Pampanga. On the other hand, all of the staff of Branch 52 (sic) is
holding office at the 2nd floor of Goseco Hall.
All the records of Branches 51 and 52 are being kept at the Goseco
Hall except for the records of cases which have pending incidents to
be resolved, or an Order/Decision for signature, or to be heard, or is
needed by respondent Judge which are in the office of the
respondents at the municipal hall x x x.
Prior to November 1999, the assigned prosecutor for Branch 51 is
Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Domingo C. Pineda and for Branch 52 is
former Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Reyes D. Manalo. Beginning 10
November 1999 up to 31 August 2000, herein complainant was the
assigned prosecutor for Branches 51 and 52.
As evidence for the charge of falsification of court records,
complainant presented the following cases:
1. Civil Case No. G-3655
Nonito Vitug vs. Gracita Sangan
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-52, Guagua, Pampanga
On 3 November 1999, there was allegedly a hearing which was held in
the presence of former Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Reyes D. Manalo,
wherein the plaintiff and the psychologist testified and, thereafter, the
counsel of record, Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo, offered his evidence, and,
without the objection of the public prosecutor, the case was deemed
submitted for decision x x x. The minutes and transcript of
stenographic notes were prepared by respondent Cortez.
On 9 November 1999, a Decision was rendered, which states on
paragraph 3, page 1, thereof that "Prosecutor Reyes Manalo on
November 3, 1999 submitted his Report that no collusion exists
between the parties" but no such Report is attached to the records of
the case x x x.
Former Prosecutor Reyes D. Manalo testified that as early as 25
October 1999, when he filed his Application for Leave for the month of
November, he was already on leave and, from then on, has never
appeared before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Guagua,
Pampanga until his retirement in June 2000 x x x. This was
corroborated by the stenographer of said Court, Zenaida A.C. Caraan
x x x.
In the criminal cases heard on 3 November 1999, respondent Judge
issued Orders declaring the hearing on said date cancelled and
resetting the same to another date in view of the absence of the public
prosecutor x x x.
Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo, on the other hand, testified that none of the
parties is his client and that he never appeared in the said case x x x.
2. Civil Case No. G-3675
Meriam Vitug vs. Edgar Faeldon
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-51, Guagua, Pampanga
On 12 November 1999, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Domingo C.
Pineda allegedly issued a Manifestation finding no collusion between
the parties x x x. He, however, testified that he did not issue any
"Manifestation" in connection with this case x x x.
On 15 November 1999, a hearing was allegedly conducted in the
presence of the said public prosecutor wherein the plaintiff testified
and the case was re-set on 29 December 1999 for the presentation of
the psychologist x x x. The minutes and transcript of stenographic
notes were both prepared by respondent Cortez x x x.
However, the Orders in the criminal cases heard on the same date, 15
November 1999, which were also prepared by respondent Cortez and
signed by respondent judge, stated that the hearing was cancelled in
view of the absence of the public prosecutor x x x.
Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Domingo C. Pineda testified that he was,
as of 8 November 1999, assigned to Branches 54 and 55 of the
Regional [T]rial Court of Macabebe, Pampanga, and from then on,
never appeared before Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court of
Guagua, Pampanga x x x. This was corroborated by the OIC-Branch
Clerk of Court of the said Court, Eduardo P. Carlos x x x.
Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo again testified that none of the parties is his
client and he never appeared in such case x x x.
The Decision in this case was included in the cases reported as
having been decided or disposed of for the month of March 2000 x x x.
3. Civil Case No. G-3659
Ricardo Layug vs. Zerlina Arteta
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-52, Guagua, Pampanga
On 3 November 1999, a Manifestation was allegedly issued by former
Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Reyes D. Manalo x x x but he testified that
he did not issue the same x x x.
On 5 November 1999, a hearing was allegedly held in the presence of
the said public prosecutor wherein the plaintiff and a psychologist
testified, the counsel on record, Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo, offered his
evidence and without the objection of the public prosecutor, the case
was submitted for resolution x x x.
Again former Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Reyes D. Manalo and Atty.
Ponciano C. Lobo denied any participation in the case.
4. LRC Case No. G-73
In re: Petition for Issuance of
Owners Duplicate Copy of
TCT No. 217416-R,
Rev. Fr. Francisco R. Lansang,
Petitioner,
RTC-51, Guagua, Pampanga
5. LRC Case No. G-74
In re: Petition for Issuance of
Owners Duplicate Copy of
TCT Nos. 441074-R to 441089-R,
Beatriz Lansang, Petitioner.
RTC-51, Guagua, Pampanga
On 25 November 1999, a hearing was allegedly held wherein the
petitioners were presented, the counsel on record, Atty. Ponciano C.
Lobo offered his evidence, and, thereafter, these cases were deemed
submitted for resolution x x x. The minutes of hearing and transcript of
stenographic notes were prepared by respondent Cortez x x x.
On December 6, 1999 separate Orders were issued granting the
petitions favorably x x x. These cases were reported in June 2000 to
have been decided or disposed of x x x.
Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo proffered the same testimony x x x.
6. Civil Case No. G-2579
Benito Samia, Jr. vs. Josephine L. Lorenzo-Samia
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-51, Guagua, Pampanga
On 21 February 2000, a Decision was rendered stating therein that a
Psychological Evaluation Report was submitted but none appears on
the record x x x.
Likewise, between 13 December 1999 and 21 February 2000, no
other hearing was conducted despite the fact that the Order dated 13
December 1999 indicated the next hearing on 17 January 2000 and
the dorsal side of page 111 of the record states "Reset 2/21/00" x x x.
There was also no record that plaintiff offered his evidence, rested his
case, or submitted the case for resolution x x x.
The said Decision was included in the monthly report of cases
disposed of in June 2000 x x x.
7. Civil Case No. G-3717
Tomas Tamayo vs. Adoracion Sampang
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-52, Guagua, Pampanga
The plaintiff, Tomas Tamayo, testified that the case was filed by
respondent Cortez before the Regional Trial Court of Guagua,
Pampanga, after the latter agreed to help him in the "processing" of
the annulment of his marriage; that he never appeared before any
lawyer for the notarization of his Verified Petition; that he was initially
told that there would be no hearing in his annulment case and it will be
granted within three (3) months; that he gave the amount of Php
15,000.00 in connection thereto which was returned to him after he
withdrew his case; that respondent Galo took from him Php4000.00 in
payment of the "psychologist fee" which amount was not returned to
him; that he gave the amount to respondent Galo after she identified
herself as a court employee and even presented an identification card
of respondent Judge x x x.
On even date, 9 June 2000, a Decision was issued in favor of the
In his testimony, Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo stated that the plaintiff is not
his client x x x.
8. Civil Case No. G-3677
Joseph Voltaire Datu vs. Marissa S. Tamarez
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-52, Guagua, Pampanga
On 11 April 2000, a Manifestation and Motion was filed by Atty.
Ponciano C. Lobo denying his signature appearing on the said
Complaint and claiming it to be a forgery x x x.
On the witness stand, Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo reiterated that none of
the parties is his client and that the signature appearing in the
Complaint is not his x x x.
9. Sum. Proc. No. G-1205
In re: Petition for Summary Proceeding
For Declaration of Presumptive Death of
Absentee Felicitas Jabilona,
Joselito Flores, Petitioner.
RTC-51, Guagua, Pampanga
On 27 July 2000, a hearing was allegedly held wherein the counsel on
record, Atty. Romeo B. Torno offered his evidence x x x.
Atty. Romeo B. Torno, however, testified that he did not appear before
the said Court on the said time and date as he was then appearing
before Branch 50; that after his ex parte presentation of evidence, the
next hearing was scheduled on 27 July 2000 at 3:30 oclock in the
afternoon but the same was cancelled since he has no witness to
present; and that, thereafter, there was no other hearing held or
conducted in this case x x x.
On August 7, 2000, an Order was issued granting the Petition x x x.
Atty. Torno suspected that respondent Cortez prepared the same and
when he confronted her, she replied that "everything is okay" x x x.
10. Civil Case No. G-3730
Ofelia Enal vs. Francisco Enal Jr.
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-51, Guagua, Pampanga
On 30 June 2000, an Order was issued stating that a hearing was
allegedly held wherein the plaintiff testified, the Psychological
Evaluation Report filed, and the case deemed submitted for resolution
x x x. The records of the case, however, bear an Order dated 9 June
2000 with the same contents x x x.
plaintiff x x x.
Refuting the charges against him, respondent Judge averred in his
Comment6 that:
a) his signatures appearing in the records of "Ofelia Enal
vs. Francisco Enal, Jr., docketed as Civil Case Nos. G-
3730, and "Meriam Vitug vs. Edgar Faeldon," docketed as
Civil Case No. G-3675, were forgeries;
b) after the said cases were made known to him during
the latter part of July 2000 and since he received
complaints [from] litigants about the "activities" of
respondent Galo, he conducted a discreet investigation,
but stopped the same upon the filing of this complaint;
c) he is a victim of falsification and did not conspire or
connive with the other respondents in the commission
thereof.
On May 28, 2001, Judge Kapunan suffered from cardio-pulmonary
arrest and died at the age of fifty-four. According to his heirs, the
evidence of the complainant was insufficient to support the charges
against their late father and, thus, sought the dismissal of the
complaint.
From a mere examination of the signatures of Judge Kapunan on the
questioned court records, it is clear that his signatures were not
forged. As correctly pointed out by the complainant and the
Investigating Justice, except for the abovementioned cases of Enal
and Vitug, Judge Kapunan failed to specifically deny under oath his
participation in the anomalous cases or to challenge the genuineness
of his signature appearing in the court records of the questioned cases
enumerated by Dabu. Thus, following Section 8, Rule 8 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure,7 this amounts to an admission by Judge
Kapunan that he indeed signed the questioned orders, decisions and
court records.
Also, in all the questioned cases pointed out by Dabu, including the
cases of Enal and Vitug, Judge Kapunan failed to offer any evidence
to support his defense that his signatures therein were forged. The
rule is that he who disavows the authenticity of his signature on a
public document bears the responsibility of presenting evidence to that
effect.8 Mere disclaimer is not sufficient. Under Section 22, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court,9 the genuineness of handwriting may be proved in
the following manner: [1] by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write; or
he has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has
acted on or been charged; [2] by a comparison, made by a witness or
the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge. At the very least, he should present
corroborating witnesses to prove his assertion. At best, he should
present an expert witness.10 As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed
and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and
the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.11 This,
unfortunately, Judge Kapunan failed to do.
At any rate, contrary to the assertions of Judge Kapunan, in the case
of Vitug, the records show that as early as May 31, 2000, he already
issued an order granting the appeal of the Solicitor General. He could
not, therefore, claim that he was only made aware of the anomalies in
Vitug after it was decided.
Further, as noted by the Investigating Justice, Judge Kapunan himself
confirmed in his June 2000 report of decided cases that the cases of
Lansang and Samia were among those he had decided. Thus, he
could not claim that his signatures in the decisions of those cases
were forged.
The Court finds specious the allegation of Judge Kapunan that the Furthermore, falsification of an official document is punishable as a
"processing" of cases were committed by Galo all by herself, and that criminal offense under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and
he conducted a "discreet investigation" when he learned of her dishonesty is an impious act that has no place in the judiciary.
activities. Judge Kapunan offered no plausible reason why he failed to
finish his investigation other than the lame excuse that he stopped his
The penalty of dismissal, however, can no longer be imposed and
investigation due to the filing of the complaint. The reason is clear.
carried out with respect to the late Judge Kapunan. The administrative
There was no investigation conducted. As opined by the Investigating
complaints against him have become moot and academic and the
Justice,12 had there been an investigation, Judge Kapunan should
case should be deemed closed and terminated following our ruling in
have completed it, found the culprit, filed the appropriate charges, and
Loyao, Jr. v. Caube14 and Apiag v. Cantero.15
cleared his name.

WHEREFORE, finding respondents, Ma. Theresa Cortez and Leila O.

With respect to Galo, she failed to appear in the proceedings below or
Galo, GUILTY of falsification of official documents and dishonesty, the
file any comment, or any pleading. The proceedings below established
Court hereby orders their DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture
that she received payments from litigants as "psychologist fee." She
of all retirement benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits,
even admitted to Dabu on at least two occasions that she had
if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality
"processed" certain cases involving annulment of marriage with the
of the government, including government-owned or controlled
"go signal" of Judge Kapunan. In fact, she admitted to Dabu that she
corporations.1avvphi1
was "processing" one case where one of the parties was a friend of
Judge Kapunan, upon orders of the latter.
The case against respondent Judge Eduardo Roden E. Kapunan is
hereby dismissed for being moot and academic due to his untimely
On the other hand, Cortez admitted preparing the questioned orders,
demise.
decisions, minutes of hearings, and transcripts. She tried to justify her
actions by claiming that she only acted upon the instructions of Galo.
Unfortunately, these circumstances do not justify her acts at all. Respondent Suzette O. Tiongco is EXONERATED of the charges.

Taking all these into consideration, it is undeniable that Judge SO ORDERED.

Kapunan, Galo and Cortez acted together in issuing questionable
orders and decisions through falsification of public documents.

With regard to Tiongco, however, there is no evidence against her.

The inclusion of Tiongco in this case was only upon the initiative of the
Office of the Court Administrator. As the record is bereft of any
evidence to hold her liable, her exoneration is in order.

Court employees, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, being
public servants in an office dispensing justice, should always act with
a high degree of professionalism and responsibility. Their conduct
must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but must
also be in accordance with the law and court regulations. No position
demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its holder
than an office in the judiciary. Court employees should be models of
uprightness, fairness and honesty to maintain the people's respect and
faith in the judiciary. They should avoid any act or conduct that would
diminish public trust and confidence in the courts. Indeed, those
connected with dispensing justice bear a heavy burden of
responsibility.13

Falsification of an official document such as court records is

considered a grave offense. It also amounts to dishonesty. Under
Section 23, Rule XIV of the Administrative Code of 1987, dishonesty
(par. a) and falsification (par. f) are considered grave offenses
warranting the penalty of dismissal from service upon commission of
the first offense.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 200748 July 23, 2014
JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, filed by petitioner Jaime D.
dela Cruz, from the Decision1 dated 22 June 2011 issued by the
Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) and Resolution2 dated
2 February 2012 issued by the Former Twentieth Division of the CA in
CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00670.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section
15, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, or The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, by the Graft Investigation and
Prosecution Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman - Visayas, in an
Information3 dated 14 February 2006, which reads:
That on or about the 31st day of January 2006, at Cebu City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, JAIME D. DE LA CRUZ, a public officer,
having been duly appointed and qualified to such public position as
Police Officer 2 of the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned in the
Security Service Group of the Cebu City Police Office, after having
beenarrested by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
in an entrapment operation, was found positive for use of
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDEcommonly known as
"Shabu", the dangerous drug after a confirmatory test conducted on
said accused.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not
guilty to the charge. The records do not reveal whether De la Cruz
was likewise charged for extortion.
VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION
The evidence of the prosecution reveals that at 8:00 a.m. of 31
January 2006, the agents and special investigators of the National
Bureau of Investigation, Central Visayas Regional Office (NBI-
CEVRO) or simply NBI, received a Complaint from Corazon Absin
(Corazon) and Charito Escobido (Charito). The complainants claimed
that at 1:00 a.m. of that same day, Ariel Escobido (Ariel), the live-in
partner of Corazon and son of Charito, was picked up by several
unknown male persons believed to be police officers for allegedly
selling drugs. An errand boy gave a number to the complainants, and
when the latter gave the number a ring, they were instructed to
proceed to the Gorordo Police Office located along Gorordo Avenue,
Cebu City. In the said police office, they met "James" who demanded
from them 100,000, later lowered to 40,000, in exchange for the
release of Ariel. After the meeting, the complainants proceeded to the
NBI-CEVRO to file a complaint and narrate the circumstances of the
meeting to the authorities. While at the NBI-CEVRO, Charitoeven
received calls supposedly from "James" instructing her to bring the
money as soon as possible.
The special investigators at the NBI-CEVRO verified the text
messages received by the complainants.1wphi1 A team was
immediately formed to implement an entrapment operation, which took
place inside a Jollibee branch at the corner of Gen. Maxilom and
Gorordo Avenues, Cebu City. The officers were able to nab Jaime
dela Cruz by using a pre-marked 500 bill dusted with fluorescent
powder, which was made part of the amount demanded by "James"
and handed by Corazon. Petitioner was later brought to the forensic
laboratory of the NBI-CEVRO where forensic examination was done
by forensic chemist Rommel Paglinawan. Petitioner was required to
submit his urine for drug testing. It later yielded a positive result for
presence of dangerous drugs as indicated in the confirmatory test
result labeled as Toxicology (DangerousDrugs) Report No. 2006-TDD-
2402 dated 16 February 2006.
VERSION OF THE DEFENSE
The defense presented petitioner as the lone witness. He denied the
charges and testified that while eating at the said Jollibee branch, he
was arrested allegedly for extortion by NBI agents. When he was at
the NBI Office, he was required to extract urine for drug examination,
but he refused saying he wanted it to be done by the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the NBI. His
request was, however, denied. He also requested to be allowed to call
his lawyer prior to the taking of his urine sample, to no avail.
THE RULING OF THE RTC
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 58 of Cebu City, in its
Decision4 dated 6 June 2007, found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165 and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of compulsory rehabilitation for a
period of not less than six (6) months at the Cebu Center for the
Ultimate Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents located at Salinas, Lahug,
Cebu City.5
Petitioner filed an appeal assigning as error the RTCs validation of the
result of the urine test despite its dubiousness having been admitted in
spite of the lack of legal basis for itsadmission. First, he alleges that
the forensic laboratory examination was conducted despite the fact
that he was not assisted by counsel, in clear violation of his
constitutional right. Secondly, he was allegedly held guilty beyond
reasonable doubt notwithstanding the lack of sufficient basis to convict
him.
THE RULING OF THE CA
The CA found the appeal devoid of merit and affirmed the ruling of the
RTC.
Petitioner filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration. He argued that the
CA overlooked prevailing jurisprudence, which states that drug testing
conducted under circumstancessimilar to his would violate a persons
right to privacy. The appellate court nevertheless denied the motion.
Petitioner thus filed the present Petition for Review on certiorari. He
assigns as errors the use of hearsay evidence as basis for his
conviction and the questionable circumstances surrounding his arrest
and drug test.
Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its
Comment,6 saying that "petitioners arguments cannot be the subject
of a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45, as they involve
questions of facts which may not be the subject thereof; after his
arraignment, he can no longer contest the validity of his arrest, less so
at this stage of the proceedings; his guilt has been adequately
established by direct evidence; and the manner in which the laboratory
examination was conducted was grounded on a valid and existing law.
THE ISSUE
We deem it proper to give due course to this Petition by confronting
head-on the issue of whether or not the drug test conducted upon the
petitioner is legal.
OUR RULING
We declare that the drug testconducted upon petitioner is not
grounded upon any existing law or jurisprudence.
We gloss over petitioners non-compliance with the
Resolution7 ordering him to submit clearly legible duplicate originals or
certified true copies of the assailed Decision and Resolution. Petitioner
was charged with use of dangerous drugs in violation of the law, the
pertinent provision of which reads:
Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. A person apprehended or
arrested, who is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug,
after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of
six (6) months rehabilitation in a government center for the first
offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If
apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second time, he/she
shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand
pesos (50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00):
Provided,That this Section shall not be applicable where the person
tested is also found to have in his/her possession such quantity of any
dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of this Act, in which
case the provisions stated therein shall apply.8
The RTC subsequently convicted petitioner, ruling that the following
elements of Section 15 were established: (1) the accused was
arrested; (2) the accused was subjected to drug test; and (3) the
confirmatory test shows that he used a dangerous drug.
Disregarding petitioners objection regarding the admissibility of the
evidence, the lower court also reasoned that "a suspect cannot invoke
his right to counsel when he is required to extract urine because, while
he is already in custody, he is not compelled to make a statement or
testimony against himself. Extracting urine from ones body is merely a
mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial
investigation."
We find the ruling and reasoning of the trial court, as well as the
subsequent affirmation by the CA, erroneous on three counts.
The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or
arrested for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under
Article II of R.A. 9165.
First, "[a] person apprehended orarrested" cannot literally mean any
person apprehended or arrested for any crime.The phrase must be
read in context and understood in consonance with R.A. 9165. Section
15 comprehends persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts
listed under Article II of the law.
Hence, a drug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended
or arrested for, among others, the "importation,"9 "sale, trading,
administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and
transportation",10"manufacture"11 and "possession"12 of dangerous
drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals;
possession thereof "during parties, social gatherings or meetings"13 ;
being "employees and visitors of a den, dive or resort";14 "maintenance
of a den, dive or resort";15 "illegal chemical diversion of controlled
precursors and essential chemicals"16 ; "manufacture or delivery"17 or
"possession"18 of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and
essential chemicals; possession of dangerous drugs "during parties,
social gatherings or meetings"19 ; "unnecessary"20 or
"unlawful"21 prescription thereof; "cultivation or culture of
plantsclassified as dangerous drugs or are sources thereof";22 and
"maintenance and keeping of original records of transactions on
dangerous drugs and/orcontrolled precursors and essential
chemicals."23 To make the provision applicable to all persons arrested
or apprehended for any crime not listed under Article II is tantamount
to unduly expanding its meaning. Note thataccused appellant here
was arrested in the alleged act of extortion.
A charge for violation of Section 15 of R.A. 9165 is seen as expressive
of the intent of the law to rehabilitate persons apprehended or arrested
for the unlawful acts enumerated above instead of charging and
convicting them of other crimes with heavier penalties. The essence of
the provision is more clearly illustrated in People v. Martinez24 as
follows:
On a final note, this Court takes the opportunity to be instructive on
Sec. 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs) and Sec. 15 (Use of
Dangerous Drugs) of R.A. No. 9165, withregard to the charges that
are filed by law enforcers. This Court notes the practice of law
enforcers of filing charges under Sec. 11 in cases where the presence
of dangerous drugs as basis for possession is only and solely in the
form of residue, being subsumed under the last paragraph of Sec. 11.
Although not incorrect, it would be more in keeping withthe intent of
the law to file charges under Sec. 15 instead in order to rehabilitate
first time offenders of drug use, provided thatthere is a positive
confirmatory test result as required under Sec. 15.The minimum
penalty under the last paragraph of Sec. 11 for the possession of
residue isimprisonment of twelve years and one day, while the penalty
under Sec. 15 for first time offenders of drug use is a minimum of six
months rehabilitation in a government center. To file charges under
Sec. 11 on the basis of residue alone would frustrate the objective of
the law to rehabilitate drug users and provide them with an opportunity
to recover for a second chance at life.
In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the
form of residue on the drug paraphernalia, and the accused were
found positive for use of dangerous drugs. Granting that the arrest
was legal, the evidence obtained admissible, and the chain of custody
intact, the law enforcers should have filed charges under Sec. 15, R.A.
No. 9165 or for use of dangerous drugs and, if there was no residue at
all, they should have been charged under Sec. 14 (Possession of
Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings).
Sec. 14 provides that the maximum penalty under Sec. 12(Possession
of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs) shall be imposed on any person who shall possess
any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs. Under Sec. 12, the maximum penalty is
imprisonment of four years and a fine of 50,000.00. In fact, under the
same section, the possession of such equipment, apparatus or other
paraphernalia is prima facieevidence that the possessor has used a
dangerous drug and shall be presumed to have violated Sec. 15.
In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug
users, this Court thus calls on law enforcers and prosecutors in
dangerous drugs cases to exercise proper discretion in filing charges
when the presence of dangerous drugs isonly and solely in the form of
residue and the confirmatory test required under Sec. 15 is positive for
use of dangerous drugs.In such cases, to afford the accused a chance
to be rehabilitated, the filing of charges for or involving possession of
dangerous drugs should only be done when another separate quantity
of dangerous drugs, other than mere residue, is found in the
possession of the accused as provided for in Sec. 15. (Emphasis
supplied)
Furthermore, making the phrase "a person apprehended or arrested"
in Section 15 applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for
unlawful acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes, is
tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all persons apprehended or
arrested for any crime. To overextend the application of thisprovision
would run counter to our pronouncement in Social Justice Society v.
Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency,25 to wit:
x x x [M]andatory drug testing can never be random and
suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are
antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint.
They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.
When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are
singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus
charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutors office
and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the
case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive
their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the
accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for
criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 6195.
Drug testing in this case would violate a persons right to privacy
guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the
accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
(Emphasis supplied)
The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion.
We find that petitioner never raisedthe alleged irregularity of his arrest
before his arraignment and raises the issue only now before this
tribunal; hence, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the
validity of his arrest curing whatever defect may have attended his
arrest.26 However, "a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not
mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an
illegal warrantless arrest."27
We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial compulsion and
the allowable exceptions to such proscription. Cases where non-
testimonial compulsion has been allowed reveal, however, that the
pieces of evidence obtained were all material to the principal cause of
the arrest.
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination
proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in
evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not
included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his
guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand ofcounsel is not required.
(People vs. Olvis, 238 Phil. 513 [1987]) The essence of the right
against selfincrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of
evidence against himself through a testimonial act. (People vs.
Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777 [1992]; People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455
[1994]; People vs. Rondero, 378 Phil. 123 [1999]) Hence,it has been
held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit
to physical examination to determine her pregnancy; (Villaflor vs.
Summers, 41 Phil. 62 [1920]) and an accused may be compelled to
submit to physical examination and to have a substance taken from
his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering
from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim;(U.S. vs. Tan
Teng, 23 Phil. 145 [1912]) to expel morphine from his mouth; (U.S. vs.
Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 [1917]) to have the outline of his foot
traced todetermine its identity with bloody footprints; (U.S. vs. Salas,
25 Phil. 337 [1913]; U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308 [1921]) and to be
photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or
replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be
done.(People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244 [1950])28(Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, we fail to see howa urine sample could be material
to the charge of extortion.1wphi1 The RTC and the CA, therefore,
both erred when they held that the extraction of petitioners urine for
purposes of drug testing was "merely a mechanical act, hence, falling
outside the concept of a custodial investigation."
We note a case where a urine sample was considered as admissible.
In Gutang v. People,29 the petitioner therein and his companions were
arrested in connection with the enforcement of a search warrant in his
residence. A PNP-NARCOM team found and confiscated shabu
materials and paraphernalias. The petitioner and his companions in
that case were also asked to give urine samples, which yielded
positive results. Later, the petitioner therein was found guilty of the
crime of illegal possession and use of prohibited drugs. Gutang
claimed that the latters urine sample was inadmissible in evidence,
since it was derived in effect from an uncounselled extrajudicial
confession.
In the Gutang et al.case, the Court clarified that "what the Constitution
prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in
evidence, when it may be material." The situation in Gutangwas
categorized as falling among the exemptions under the freedom from
testimonial compulsion since what was sought tobe examined came
from the body of the accused. The Court said:
This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which
was not meant to unearth undisclosedfacts but to ascertain physical
attributes determinable by simple observation. In fact, the record
shows that petitioner and his co-accused were not compelled to give
samples of their urine but they in fact voluntarily gave the same when
they were requested to undergo a drug test.
Assuming arguendothat the urine samples taken from the petitioner
are inadmissible in evidence, we agree with the trial court that the
record is replete with other pieces of credible evidence including the
testimonial evidence of the prosecution which point to the culpability of
the petitioner for the crimes charged.
We emphasize that the circumstances in Gutangare clearly different
from the circumstances of petitioner in the instant
case.1awp++i1 First, Gutang was arrested in relation to a drug case.
Second, he volunteered to give his urine. Third, there were other
pieces of evidence that point to his culpability for the crimes charged.
In the present case, though, petitioner was arrested for extortion; he
resisted having his urine sample taken; and finally, his urine sample
was the only available evidencethat was used as basis for his
conviction for the use of illegal drugs.
The drug test was a violation of petitioners right to privacy and right
against self-incrimination.
It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted
and tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test.
He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved
futile, because he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug
testing under those circumstances.
The pertinent provisions in Article III of the Constitution are clear:
Section 2. The right of the people to be securein their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself.
In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone
drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense
for which the arrest is being made.
While we express our commendation of law enforcement agents as
they vigorously track down offenders intheir laudable effort to curb the
pervasive and deleterious effects of dangerous drugs on our society,
they must, however, be constantly mindful of the reasonable limits of
their authority, because it is not unlikely that in their clear intent to
purge society of its lawless elements, they may be knowingly or
unknowingly transgressing the protected rights of its citizens including
even members of its own police force.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 22
June 2011 issued by the Twentieth Division, and the Resolution dated
2 February 2012 issued by the former Twentieth Division of the Court
of Appeals, in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00670 are SET ASIDE. Petitioner is
hereby ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 170359 July 27, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
PHILIP DILAO y CASTRO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Under automatic review is the May 26, 2005 Decision1 and September
16, 2005 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. C.R.-
H.C. No. 00920, affirming in toto the February 27, 2003 Joint
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch
127, in Criminal Case Nos. C-65963 and C-65964, finding appellant
Philip Dilao y Castro guilty of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
The Case
On July 31, 2002, in the RTC of Caloocan City, two (2) separate
Informations were filed against accused-appellant charging him, in the
first, with violation of Section 5, Article II, of R.A. No. 9165. Docketed
in the same court as Criminal Case No. C-65963, the first
Information4 alleges, as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of July 2002, in Caloocan City, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without the authority of law, did then and there
wilfully(sic), unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to PO1
ROLANDO DE OCAMPO who posed as buyer,
METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU) weighing
0.06 grams, a dangerous drug, without the corresponding license or
prescription therefor, knowing the same to be such.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The other Information,5 docketed as Criminal Case No. C-65964,
charges accused-appellant with violation of Section 11, Article II, also
of R.A. No. 9165, allegedly committed in the following manner:
That on or about the 19th day of July 2002, in Caloocan City, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without the authority of law, did then and there
willfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control METHAMPHETAMINE (sic) HYDROCHLORIDE
(SHABU) weighing 0.07 grams, knowing the same to be a dangerous
drug under the provisions of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. C-65964 was originally raffled to Branch 120 of the
court, while Criminal Case No. C-65963 to Branch 127 thereof. On
arraignment, accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded "Not
Guilty" to both charges. Thereafter, and on motion of appellants
counsel, the two (2) cases were consolidated and assigned to Branch
127, after which a joint trial ensued.
Presented by the prosecution as its evidence were the testimonies of
four (4) police officers belonging to the Drug Enforcement Unit of
Caloocan City Police Station and that of the forensic chemist, plus the
marked money and the plastic sachets of "shabu."
The Evidence
The Peoples version of the incident is well laid out in the Peoples
Brief6 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, to wit:
On July 19, 2002, around nine oclock in the evening, a police informer
called up the [DEU] Unit, Caloocan City Police Station, and [spoke]
to PO2 Rolando de Ocampo [who was told] that an alias Philip was
rampantly selling shabu along Pangako St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan
City. The informer also identified the drug pusher as Philip Dilao y
Castro, herein appellant.
PO2 de Ocampo relayed the said information to their Chief, Captain
Jose Valencia, who told him to verify the information. PO2 de Ocampo
again spoke to the informer on the phone and asked how they could
entrap appellant. xxx.
PO3 Rodrigo Antonio informed Capt. Valencia about the conversation
between the informer and PO2 de Ocampo. Acting thereon, Capt.
Valencia instructed PO3 Antonio to form and head a team to conduct
a surveillance and "buy-bust" operation. Aside from PO3 Antonio, the
team was composed of PO2 Ferdinand Modina and PO1 Joel Rosales
as back-up, and PO2 de Ocampo as poseur-buyer. Capt. Valencia
provided the P100 bill to be used as "buy-bust" money with serial
number ZX 985203. PO2 de Ocampo marked the money with his
initials, RDO, and the date, 07/19/02. The team had their operation
blottered. Then, they proceeded to the target area and arrived
thereat around 10:15-10:20 p.m.
PO3 Antonios team was met by the informer at a burger machine
near the target area. PO2 de Ocampo was then accompanied by said
informer to appellant. Meanwhile, the rest of the members of the team
positioned themselves in strategic places nearby.
The informer pointed to appellant who was standing outside a billiard
court along Pangako St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. Then, they
approached appellant and PO2 de Ocampo was introduced to him as
a buyer of shabu. PO2 de Ocampo then addressed appellant, "Pare,
pa-iskor ng piso," and handed him the marked money. Appellant
seized him up and then got a plastic sachet containing a white
crystalline substance .
After the exchange, PO2 de Ocampo examined first the contents of
the plastic sachet and then gave the pre-arranged signal to show
that the "buy-bust" operation was completed. Thereafter, he
introduced himself to appellant as a police officer and told him: "Pare,
pong ka na," meaning he was already caught, while the rest of the
team closed in on them.
PO2 de Ocampo recovered the marked money and P200 more in
different denominations from appellant while PO2 Modina recovered
another plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance. PO2
de Ocampo asked appellant where he got the P200 but he was not
given a reply. He then informed appellant of his constitutional rights
.
Appellant was turned over to PO3 Fernando Moran, together with
the seized articles. In the presence of PO2 de Ocampo and PO2
Modina, PO3 Moran placed the initials "PCD" on the specimens.
On even date, Capt. Valencia requested for laboratory examination of
the seized articles. Subsequently, PO2 de Ocampo and PO2 Modina
executed a "Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay" about the incident.
P/Insp. Erickson Lualhati Calbocal, forensic chemist of the Philippine
National Police, Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, conducted a
laboratory examination on said specimens and found the same
positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride. His findings are
contained in Chemistry Report No. D-323-02. (Words in brackets
added.)
For its part, the defense presented the following: appellant himself and
Jose Bandico.
Denial and alleged frame-up were appellants main exculpating line. In
his Brief,7 appellant summarized the version of the defense as follows:
xxx. At about 8:00 to 9:00 oclock p.m. of July 19, 2002, he [appellant]
was playing billiard opposite alias "Joker" at the billiard hall xxx
located along Pangako St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. He and his
companions were surprised when police officers led by PO3
Antonio suddenly appeared [and] instructed all persons there
numbering [8] including his friend companion Socrates Manalad alias
"Sote". They told them, "WALANG TATAKBO MAY TAWAG SA AMIN
MAY NAGBEBENTA NG SHABU DITO", and individually frisked
them. Nothing illegal were recovered from all of them. Thereafter, six
(6) of them were allowed to leave, leaving behind himself and Manalad
who were handcuffed and made to board one of the two (2) owner-
type vehicles, parked near the North Diversion Road. While the jeep
was running, he and Manalad asked the operatives: "WALA KAMING
KASALANAN, ANO BANG KASALANAN NAMIN?" to which PO3
Antonio retorted: "KUNG GUSTO NINYONG MAKAWALA KAYO
MAGPALIT ULO KAYO". He initially protested but upon being told by
PO3 Antonio: "OKAY KAHIT WALA KAYONG KASALANAN
MATUTULUYAN KAYO, NGAYON KUNG AYAW NINYONG
MATULUYAN PALIT ULO NA LANG KAYO". He was made to
understand, that was an order for them to point to the police other
persons in exchange for their release .. He pretended to have
agreed to this proposal xxx. The police officers stopped the owner-
type vehicle at the corner of Evangelista St. and EDSA, Caloocan City,
near the Toyota Motors and let him alight. His handcuff was removed.
PO3 Antonio and PO2 Modina then asked him the name of the drug
pusher he was supposed to point. In response, he mentioned a
fictitious name, one alias "JETT" . Then, the police officers
remarked: "O SIGE PAGKATAPOS PAG NATAPOS ANG
TRABAHO NA TO PUWEDE NA KAYONG UMUWI". They made him
board again the vehicle and they proceeded to Katarungan Street.
Upon arrival thereat, his handcuff was removed. As he planned, he
immediately fled but the police officers pursued and cornered him .
His captors got provoked and took turns in slapping and mauling him.
He was brought first to the Ospital ng Kalookan where he was
supposedly physically examined [then] taken to the DEU, Caloocan
City Police Station. xxx. At the DEU, the police informed him that he
could have been freed if not for the fact that he fooled them (DAHIL
PINAGOD MO KAMI") hence, he was charged for Violation of
Sections 5 and 11 of the Dangerous Drugs Law. At around 11:00
oclock in the evening of the same date, while he was inside the DEU
detention cell, he was investigated by the police investigator. The next
day, July 20, 2002, Manalad, was released. At about 3:00 oclock
[p.m.] of that day, he was brought before the Inquest Prosecutor who
conferred only with PO2 Modina and PO2 De Ocampo without even
bothering to examine him about the incident.
He denied the charges leveled against him . He explained that he
first saw PO2 Modina when he was allowed to alight the jeep at
Toyota Motors, EDSA and that he saw PO2 De Ocampo only during
the inquest. He admitted that he had no previous quarrel or
misunderstanding with the arresting police officers who he came to
know only when he was arrested.
He was unable to file any complaint against the concerned police
officers for the physical injuries inflicted on him and for filing fabricated
charges against him as he has been detained since January [July] 19,
2002. (Word in bracket supplied).
JOSE BANDICO alias "Joker" substantially corroborated the testimony
of appellant on the ownership of the billiard hall, the fact of the latters
arrest on July 19, 2002 and that nothing illegal was taken from
appellant when frisked by the police in the hall. Alias "Joker" also
testified about the accused playing rotation billiard with him since 2:00
p.m. and how the police officers, after the arrest, even got the
260.00 bet.
The Trial Courts and the CAs Ruling
In its joint decision8 dated February 27, 2003, the trial court found
appellant guilty beyond moral certainty of doubt of the offenses
charged against him and accordingly sentenced him, thus:
THEREFORE, premises considered and the prosecution having
established to a moral certainty the guilt of Accused PHILIP DILAO y
CASTRO of the crimes charged, this Court hereby renders judgment
as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 65963 for Violations of Sec. 5, Art. II
of RA 9165 this Court, in the absence of any aggravating
circumstance, hereby sentences the aforenamed Accused
to LIFE IMPRISONMENT; and to pay the fine of five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) without any
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
2. In Crim. Case No. 65964 for Violation of Sec. 11, Art. II
of the same Act, this Court, in the absence of any
modifying circumstance, sentences the common Accused
to a prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and to pay the
fine of three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00),
without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED.
Therefrom, appellant came directly to this Court considering the
penalty imposed.
Per Resolution dated March 9, 2005,9 however, the Court, in line with
its ruling in People v. Mateo,10 referred the cases to the CA for
intermediate review, whereat it was docketed C.A.G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
00920.
On May 26, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision11 affirming in toto that
of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated February 27, 2003 of the
trial court is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, appellant sought reconsideration, which the CA denied in
its Resolution of September 16, 2005.12
The case is again with this Court pursuant to the Notice of Appeal filed
by appellant with the appellate court which has forwarded the entire
records of the case to this Court.
In its Resolution of February 20, 2006, the Court accepted the appeal
and required the parties to file their supplemental briefs, if they so
desire.
In his manifestation13 of March 21, 2006, appellant in effect waived the
filing of any supplemental brief and declared that he is adopting his
brief dated May 20, 2004, heretofore submitted before the Court,
wherein he raised the following matters:
1. The Court a quo gravely erred in giving weight and
credence to the incredible and inconsistent testimony of
the prosecution witnesses, and
2. The Court a quo gravely erred in convicting the
accused-appellant of the crime charged despite the fact
that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses on the
alleged buy-bust operation, particularly that of PO2 Rolando De
Ocampo, contending that there were discrepancies in the testimony of
PO2 De Ocampo, the poseur-buyer, and the affidavits submitted to the
trial court. He maintains being a victim of a frame-up operation of
police operatives who, in fact, recovered nothing illegal from him. He
urges the Court to take judicial notice of the reality that some law
enforcers in drug-related cases, in their quest to secure information
from suspected drug dealers, resort to numerous anomalous
practices, such as planting evidence, physical torture and extortion.
Moving on, appellant insists that the presumption on regularity in the
performance of an official duty, by itself, could not sustain a conviction,
let alone prevail over the presumption of innocence in his favor. On
these broad premises, appellant thus maintains that the prosecution
failed to adduce adequate evidence to prove his guilt.
The Courts Ruling
We AFFIRM.
Right off, the Court shall address appellants lament about the
credibility of witness PO2 De Ocampo. According to appellant, PO2
De Ocampos testimony should have altogether been discredited since
he, as poseur-buyer, cannot even remember ("Hindi ko gaanong
matandaan")14 the marking he allegedly placed on the 100.00-bill
marked money, albeit he did recall its serial number.
While indeed PO2 De Ocampo failed to remember early in his direct
testimony the markings placed on the marked money, he readily
identified the said markings during the latter part of the direct
examination. We quote from the transcripts of stenographic notes:
Q. I am showing to you a photo copy of a one hundred peso bill with
serial number ZX-985203, will you please go over it and tell the Court
its relation to the one which you used as buy bust money against the
accused?
A. this is it sir.
Q. Why did you say so?
A. This is what we entered in the blotter book sir.
Q. Will you please go over this photo copy and tell us if this is your
initial appearing immediately after the serial number ZX-985203 in the
lower part corner of this money?
A. Yes sir. There is.
Q. Can you explain to us what does that initial RDO mean?
A. Refers to my initial Rolando de Ocampo sir.
Q. How did that initial indicated there?
A. Because every time we conducted buy bust operation we always
put initial sir.
Q. If you recall where did you place that initial RDO in the original copy
of that buy bust money?
A. In our office sir.
Q. When?
A. At 9:45 p.m. July 19, 2002 sir.
Q. Also theres (sic) appear on the right side of this buy bust money a
figures 07/19/02 what does that mean?
A. We put that when we conducted the buy bust operation sir.
Q. Who was the one who placed that?
A. Me sir.
Q. When?
A. On that very day sir.
Q. Before or after the operation?
A. Before the operation sir.15
Moreover, the failure of PO2 De Ocampo to recall immediately the
markings on the buy-bust money only shows that he is an uncoached
witness. Such momentary lapse in memory does not detract from the
credibility of his testimony as to the essential details of the incident. As
the trial court aptly found, PO2 De Ocampo was candid, forthright and
categorical in his testimony:
xxx . In the first place, this Court has had the untrammeled opportunity
to observe the conduct and demeanor of poseur-buyer PO2 DE
OCAMPO while testifying on the witness stand and definitely he was
noted to testify in a candid, forthright and categorical manner which
are the earmarks of a truthful and credible witness.
The Court accords the highest degree of respect to the findings of the
lower court as to appellants guilt of the offenses charged against him,
particularly where such findings are adequately supported by
documentary as well as testimonial evidence. The same respect holds
too, as regards the lower courts evaluation on the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses. It is a settled policy of this Court, founded on
reason and experience, to sustain the findings of fact of the trial court
in criminal cases, on the rational assumption that it is in a better
position to assess the evidence before it, having had the opportunity to
make an honest determination of the witnesses deportment during the
trial.16
Furthermore, the well-entrenched rule is that the findings of facts of
the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on
this Court, absent any evidence that both courts ignored,
misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of
substance which, if considered, would warrant a modification or
reversal of the outcome of the case.17 And in the instant case, after a
careful evaluation of the records, we find no oversight committed by
the trial and appellate courts for us to disregard their factual findings
as to the fact of possession and selling by the appellant of "shabu."
As between appellants testimony and that of the arresting/entrapping
police officers as to what occurred in the evening of July 19, 2002, this
Court finds, as did the trial court, the accounts of the latter more
credible. For, aside from the presumption that they the police
operatives regularly performed their duties, we note that these
operatives, as prosecution witnesses, gave consistent and
straightforward narrations of what transpired on July 19, 2002. As
things stand, the police officers uniformly testified of having
apprehended the appellant in a buy-bust operation and upon being
frisked, was also found to be in possession of another sachet
containing a white crystalline substance later on found to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly known as "shabu."
It cannot be over-emphasized that a buy-bust operation is a legally
effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law at that, for
apprehending drug peddlers and distributors. It is often utilized by law
enforcers for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the
execution of their nefarious activities.18 Credence of the buy-bust
operators cannot be undermined by the mere fact that law enforcers
are perceived to resort to the practice of planting evidence to gain
favor from their superiors. In the absence of proof of motive to falsely
impute a serious crime against an accused, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of
the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over
appellants often self-serving and uncorroborated claim of having been
a victim of a frame-up.
It must be remembered that appellants defense of frame-up and
denial requires strong and convincing evidence to support them for the
incantation of such defense is nothing new to the Court.19 As it were,
appellant only offered an unsubstantiated tale that the police officers
asked, in police jargon, a "palit-ulo"20 and that he was a victim of a
frame-up. His allegations that the police officers likewise beat him up
in their attempt to extract information from him is belied by the
absence of any proof to that effect. And without so much of an
explanation, appellant did not even present as witness his companion
Socrates Manalad, alias "Sote," who was allegedly with him when the
apprehension was effected. If the police officers indeed tried to extort
information from appellant by beating him up, appellant could have
filed the proper charges against the erring police officers. The fact that
no administrative or criminal charges were filed lends cogency to the
conclusion that the alleged frame-up was merely concocted as a
defense ploy.
Clearly, as against the positive testimonies of the prosecution Since the appellant was found guilty of selling "shabu" weighing 0.06
witnesses that they red-handedly caught appellant in a buy-bust gram, absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the trial
operation selling "shabu," supported by other evidence, such as the court correctly sentenced him to life imprisonment and a fine of
two (2) sachets of the prohibited substance seized from him and the 500,000.00 in Criminal Case No. C-65963. Since he was also found
marked money, appellants negative testimony must necessarily fail. guilty of possession of "shabu" weighing 0.07 gram, absent any
An affirmative testimony coming from credible witnesses without aggravating or mitigating circumstance and in accordance with the
motive to perjure is far stronger than a negative testimony.21 Records Indeterminate Sentence Law, he was correctly meted a prison term of
show that appellant and the police officers are strangers to each other. twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
Thus, there is no reason to suggest that the police officers were ill- months and a fine of three hundred thousand pesos (300,000.00) in
motivated in apprehending appellant. Moreover, there is nothing in the Criminal Case No. C-65964.
records which shows even an iota of evidence that the prosecution
witnesses merely fabricated their testimonies to wrongly impute such a
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 26, 2005 of the CA in CA-G.R.
serious crime against the accused-appellant.
C.R.-H.C. No. 00920, as reiterated in its resolution of September 16,
2005, affirming in toto that of the trial court is AFFIRMED in all
All told, in Criminal Case No. C-65963, the Court is convinced that the respects.
prosecutions evidence more than proved beyond reasonable doubt all
the elements necessary in every prosecution for the illegal sale of
No pronouncement as to costs.
"shabu," to wit: (1) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and
the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer SO ORDERED.
and the receipt of the marked money successfully consummated the
buy-bust operation between the entrapping police officers and the
appellant. What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took
place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.

Likewise proven by the same quantum of evidence is the charge for

violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. No. 9165 (illegal possession of
shabu) in Criminal Case No. C-65964, appellant having knowingly
carried with him the plastic sachet of "shabu" without legal authority at
the time he was caught during the buy-bust operation.1avvphil

Anent the penalty thus imposed, the RTC, as did the CA, correctly
applied the provisions of Sections 5 and 11 (3) of R.A. No. 9165,
which respectively provide:

Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery,

Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals. The Penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand
pesos (500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell
any dangerous drugs, xxx.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs

(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos
(300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (400,000.00), if the
quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of x x x,
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" x x x. (Emphasis
supplied).
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 175222 July 27, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RAMON QUIAOIT, JR., Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 12
July 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00803 entitled, "People of the
Philippines v. Ramon Quiaoit, Jr. y De Castro," affirming the
Decision2 dated 1 December 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of
Tarlac City, Branch 65, in Criminal Case No. 13229, finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Article II, Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as "The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
The information against appellant reads as follows:
That at around 3:45 oclock in the morning of April 13, 2004, at Tarlac
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally sell,
dispense and deliver 0.851 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
known as Shabu, a dangerous drug, to poseur buyer PO1 Mark
Anthony Baquiran for P500.00, without being authorized by law.3
Appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned on 5 May 2004.4
During the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses:
P/Sr. Insp. Ma. Luisa G. David, a Forensic Chemical Officer of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory assigned at the
Tarlac Provincial Crime Laboratory; PO2 Ronnie Duea, a member of
the buy-bust operation team and the one who arrested appellant; and
PO1 Mark Anthony Baquiran, a member of the PNP and the
designated poseur-buyer.
The prosecutions version of the case is as follows:
At around 11:00 oclock in the evening of 12 April 2004, the Tarlac
PNP received a report from a confidential informant that someone was
selling shabu at the Golden Miles,5 a videoke bar located in Barangay
San Roque, Tarlac City. Acting on said information, a team was
immediately organized by PNP Provincial Director Rudy Gamido
Lacadin to conduct a surveillance in order to verify the information and
perform a buy-bust operation.
Shortly thereafter, the team went to Golden Miles where they initially
observed the movements of appellant who was with the confidential
informant at that time. Later, the informant introduced PO1 Baquiran to
appellant and the two negotiated the sale of shabu. According to PO1
Baquirans testimony, appellant handed to him a plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance in front of The Golden Miles
comfort room which was located at the back of said establishment.6 In
return, he gave appellant a marked 500.00 bill. As soon as the
exchange between appellant and PO1 Baquiran took place, the latter
gave his companions the pre-arranged signal by scratching his head.
PO2 Dueas and PO1 Cabradilla moved in to arrest appellant. The
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance was later marked
RID 1 by PO2 Dueas.
On their way back to Camp Makabulos, the informant allegedly told
the buy-bust team, through a text message, that appellant still had in
his possession illegal drugs other than that which he had sold to PO1
Baquiran. Thus, upon reaching the camp, they frisked appellant and
this yielded six more plastic sachets, the contents of which were
similar to those earlier bought by PO1 Baquiran.
All seven pieces of the plastic sachets were then forwarded to the
Provincial Crime Laboratory for examination. The test was conducted
by P/Sr. Insp. David, and her report7 contained the following pertinent
information:
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Seven (7) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets with markings "RID-
1" through "RID-7" and marked as specimen "A" through "G,"
respectively, each containing white crystalline substance having a total
weight of 0.851 gram. x x x.
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of dangerous drugs xxx
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen
gave POSITIVE results to the tests for the presence of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. x x x.
CONCLUSION:
Specimen "A" through "G" contain Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride,
a dangerous drug. x x x.8
Expectedly, appellant presented a disparate narration of the incident:
Appellant claimed that at around 1:00 oclock in the morning of 13
April 2004, he went to the Golden Miles in order to meet a friend of
his. While he was having drinks, PO1 Baquiran saw him and asked if
he had company and he replied that he was by himself. He alleged
that he knew PO1 Baquiran as he used to be a police asset. PO1
Baquiran then inquired if he was familiar with a certain August
Medrano who was a drug pusher in their place. When he answered in
the affirmative, PO1 Baquiran supposedly instructed him to buy
500.00 worth of shabu from Medrano. He was also allegedly ordered
by PO1 Baquiran to bring Medrano with him to Golden Miles. He
initially declined to follow PO1 Baquirans instructions since he no
longer worked with the police. PO1 Baquiran, however, represented
that he was the one who would buy shabu from Medrano and not
appellant. Despite this, appellant alleged that he was "forced"9 to buy
shabu himself after PO1 Baquiran told him that "(they) need August
Medrano."10
And so, from Golden Miles, appellant proceeded to Medranos house.
He informed Medrano that someone was interested in buying shabu
but the prospective buyer wanted to talk to him in person. Medrano
refused appellants invitation claiming that he had to go somewhere
else; instead, he gave the plastic sachet containing shabu to appellant
and the latter gave him the 500.00 earlier given by PO1 Baquiran.
After this, appellant went back to Golden Miles to inform PO1
Baquiran of what had just transpired between him and Medrano
including the latters refusal to go with him. He also handed over to
said police officer the plastic sachet containing shabu which he bought
from Medrano. All of a sudden, PO1 Baquiran placed his hand over
appellants shoulder and the latter was then taken to Camp
Makabulos.
At the camp, PO2 Dueas called for a certain PO4 Donato for whom
appellant used to act as a police asset. PO4 Donato allegedly asked
appellant if it was possible for him to buy some more shabu from
Medrano. Appellant purportedly replied in the negative claiming that
the personnel at Golden Miles already knew about his arrest. To this,
PO4 Donato reportedly retorted, "How could we release you when this
August Medrano is not yet arrested."11Appellant claimed that he was
surprised by PO4 Donatos statement since he was only doing the
police force a favor.
Appellant also denied having possessed the other six plastic sachets
of shabu, insisting that he bought only one heat-sealed plastic sachet
from Medrano which he turned over to PO1 Baquiran.
After trial, the court a quo found appellant guilty as charged. The
dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision reads:
Wherefore, the prosecution having established the guilt of the
[appellant] beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec.
5, Art. II of RA 9165, the accused RAMON QUIAOIT JR. y DE
CASTRO is sentenced to undergo a prison term of life imprisonment,
to pay a fine of Php500,000.00 and to pay the cost.12
On 8 February 2005, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.13 The Court of
Appeals, in its Decision dated 12 July 2006, affirmed the findings and
conclusion of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, the present appeal is DENIED. The December 1, 2004
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 65, in
Criminal Case No. 13229, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.14
Aggrieved, appellant is now before us assailing the above-mentioned
Decision of the Court of Appeals. In our Resolution of 21 January
2007, we required the parties to file their respective supplemental
briefs if they so desired. Appellant manifested that he was adopting
the Appellants Brief dated 7 September 2005 which he previously
filed before the Court of Appeals in order to avoid the repetition of
substantially the same arguments.15 Similarly, the Office of the
Solicitor General manifested that it was no longer filing a supplemental
brief.16
In his brief, appellant impugns the trial courts decision on the following
grounds:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT TAKING
INTO CONSIDERATION THE ABSOLUTORY
CIRCUMSTANCE OF INSTIGATION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
DISREGARDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
DEFENSE OF FRAME-UP.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE
PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO IDENTIFY THE
CORPUS DELICTI.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF VIOLATION OF
SECTION 5, ARTICLE II, OF REPUBLIC ACT 9165,
WHEN THE LATTERS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.17
In essence, appellant contends that the trial court erred in not finding
that the buy-bust team instigated him into buying shabu from Medrano
and that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt by its failure to
properly identify the sachet of shabu allegedly bought from him by
PO1 Baquiran.
In support of the first error, appellant argues that the facts obtaining in
this case reveal that he was a victim of instigation perpetrated by PO1
Baquiran. He emphasizes that despite his initial resistance to
participate in the police operation that night, PO1 Baquiran,
nevertheless, insisted that he purchase shabu from Medrano with the
specific instruction to bring the latter to Golden Miles. Appellant,
likewise, points out that the money he used in acquiring shabu was
supplied by PO1 Baquiran himself, thus, proving that it was said police
officer who initiated the events which led to his eventual arrest.
Appellant further assails the existence of a valid buy-bust operation on
the ground that the buy-bust team was composed of untrained and
incompetent police officers. He claims that it was "inconceivable"18 for
such a team to be made up of police officers who had insufficient
knowledge of how to properly conduct a buy-bust operation as shown
by their failure to frisk appellant at the scene of the crime.
The demarcation line distinguishing "instigation" from "entrapment" is
clearly drawn. In the case of People v. Quintana,19 we explained the
distinction between the two, to wit
There is a wide difference between entrapment and instigation, for
while in the latter case the instigator practically induces the will be
accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes a
co-principal, in entrapment ways and means are resorted to for the
purpose of trapping and capturing the law breaker in the execution of
his criminal plan.
Instigation and inducement must be distinguished from entrapment.
The general rule is that instigation and inducement to commit a crime,
for the purpose of filing criminal charges, is to be condemned as
immoral, while entrapment, which is the employment of means and
ways for the purpose of trapping and capturing the law breaker, is
sanctioned and permissible. And the reason is obvious. Under the first
instance, no crime has been committed, and to induce one to commit
it makes of the instigator a co-criminal. Under the last instance, the
crime has already been committed and all that is done is to entrap and
capture the law breaker.20
In the case at bar, we find appellants claim of instigation to be
baseless. To recall appellants version of the story, PO1 Baquiran
approached him that night inquiring about Medrano, the alleged object
of the buy-bust operation. PO1 Baquiran then gave him a 500.00 bill
to be used for purchasing shabu from Medrano; but PO1 Baquiran had
an additional instruction for appellant which was to bring along
Medrano to Golden Miles. While appellant was able to talk with
Medrano, he was unable to convince the latter to accompany him back
to Golden Miles. Such being the case, we fail to see anymore reason
for him to still buy shabu considering that he knew fully well that he
would be unable to fully abide by PO1 Baquirans instructions.
Furthermore, we scrutinized the records of this case and failed to
discern any "force" that was exerted upon him by PO1 Baquiran. In
fact, nowhere in appellants testimony did he aver that PO1 Baquiran
insisted that he buy shabu from Medrano. We note that after appellant
had initially refused to take part in the buy-bust operation that night,
PO1 Baquiran merely told him that "(they) needed August Medrano"
and nothing more.
THE COURT:
Q: What will you buy?
A: Shabu worth 5 hundred pesos, sir.
Q: Did he give you the money?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. ABELLERA:
Q: What again PO1 Baquiran says to buy and what else?
A: "Take him along with you".
Q: Where?
A: At GMA Golden Miles, sir.
Q: And how much money did he hand to you?
A: Five hundred, sir.
Q: And how many items will you buy?
A: One sachet, sir.
Q: And how much is one sachet?
A: Five Hundred, sir.
Q: Now, you said that he asked you to buy from this Medrano, did you
comply?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: By the way, what did you tell PO1 Baquiran concerning the task
that he is asking you to do?
A: I told him I was already passed on that matter, I am now working.
Then he told me that he will be the one to buy but I was forced to buy,
sir.
Q: How did he force you, Mr. Witness?
A: He told me, "We need that August Medrano."
Q: And how did you find this August Medrano?
A: I went to his house in Suizo, sir.
Q: Who told you that he lives in Suizo at that time?
A: My friend, sir.
Q: What is the name of your friend?
A: Noel Mallari, sir.
Q: What did you use in going there?
A: Single motorcycle, sir.
Q: And were you able [to] purchase a sachet of shabu from Medrano?
A: Yes, sir.21
To our mind, such innocuous statement on the part of PO1 Baquiran is
inadequate to lead to the conclusion that appellant was "forced" by the
police to procure shabu. Moreover, appellant himself admitted that he
was all alone when he went to see Medrano at the latters house, far
from the prying eyes and the perceived influence of PO1 Baquiran.
Clearly, at that point, he could have easily desisted from buying shabu
from Medrano and chosen instead to go back to Golden Miles empty
handed for he already knew before he bought the illegal drug that
Medrano could not accompany him back to the said videoke bar. The
fact that he persisted in buying shabu despite the absence of PO1
Baquiran betrays his contention that said police officer "forced" him to
purchase shabu.
In challenging the existence of a legitimate buy-bust operation,
appellant casts questionable, if not improper, motive on the part of the
police officers. Unfortunately for appellant, jurisprudence instructs us
that in cases involving the sale of illegal drugs, credence is given to
prosecution witnesses who are police officers, for they are presumed
to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is
evidence to the contrary.22 Where there is nothing to indicate that the
witnesses for the prosecution were moved by improper motives, the
presumption is that they were not so moved and their testimony,
therefore, is entitled to full faith and credit.23 In this case, the records
are bereft of any indication which even remotely suggests ill motive on
the part of the police officers. The following observation of the Court of
Appeals is indeed appropriate, thus:
In this case, the policemen categorically identified Quiaoit as the one
subject of the "buy-bust" operation who agreed to sell to PO1
Baquiran a sachet of "shabu" in front of the restroom of Golden Miles
Beerhouse after he was being introduced by the informant. As police
officers, PO1 Baquiran and PO2 Dueas had in their favor the
presumption of regularity of performance of duty. Furthermore, the
defense failed to present any evidence to show that the police officers
were improperly motivated to bear false witness against Quiaoit. While
Quiaoit claimed that he was a former asset of the police and he knew
the police officers who arrested him, yet, he did not impute any ill-
motive as to why the police officers would implicate him to drug
pushing. This fact bolsters the police officers claim that Quiaoit was,
indeed, arrested in a buy-bust operation.
Quiaoits claim that he was just being framed-up by the arresting
officers does not inspire belief. Appellant failed to show any motive
why the policemen would implicate him in a crime for illegal
possession of prohibited drugs. It is the settled rule that where there is
nothing to indicate that a witness was actuated by improper motives,
his/her positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand
made under solemn oath, should be given full faith and credence.
(People vs. Dela Torre, 373 SCRA 104).
Moreover, there is nothing in the record that the police officers were
trying to extort money from Quiaoit during his apprehension up to the
time he was brought to the police station. If Quiaoit was really a victim
of frame-up, then he should have filed an administrative or criminal
case against these policemen. But he did not. Hence, his defense of
frame-up must fail.
Finally, Quiaoits defense of denial is a weak defense. Unless
substantiated by clear and convincing proof, it is self-serving and
undeserving of any weight in law (see People v. Hampton, 395 SCRA
156). It cannot prevail over the positive identification by PO1 Baquiran
that it was Quiaoit who sold to him a sachet of "shabu" in the early
morning of April 13, 2004 at Golden Miles Beerhouse.24
Neither can we give credence to appellants contention that the
existence of a valid buy-bust operation was betrayed by the
inadequate training of the members of the team for, it must be stated
here, there is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations.
The Court has left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of
effective means to apprehend drug dealers.25
Anent the second issue, appellant maintains that the prosecution
failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt by its failure to
properly identify the sachet of shabu which he sold to PO1 Baquiran.
Again, we disagree with appellants proposition.
In order to successfully prove the existence of the illegal sale of
regulated or prohibited drugs, the prosecution must be able to
establish the following elements of the crime: (1) the identity of the
buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment therefor.26
In the case of People v. Mala,27 we held that what is material is the
proof that the transaction actually took place, coupled with the
presentation before the court of the corpus delicti. It bears
emphasizing that neither the law nor jurisprudence requires the
presentation of any of the money used in a buy-bust operation, for the
only elements necessary to consummate the crime is proof that the
illicit transaction took place, coupled with the presentation in court of
the illicit drug as evidence.28 In the present case, appellant insists that
the prosecution failed to properly identify the sachet of shabu sold by
appellant to PO1 Baquiran because of the buy-bust teams failure to
segregate the said sachet from those confiscated from him at Camp
Makabulos.
The pertinent portions of the testimony of PO1 Baquiran belies
appellants claim:
ATTY. ABELLERA:
Q Mr. Witness did Dueas mark these RID before Quiaoit was
frisked?
FISCAL
No basis.
ATTY. ABELLERA
Q Mr. Witness, you said that this RID 1, these RID 2 and series where
they mark these (sic)?
A RID 2 and series were marked in Camp Makabulos.
Q Did he marked (sic) them simultaneously or one at a time?
A One at a time sir.
Q He was already marking after you handed this to him?
A The RID 1 was marked before Quiaoit was frisked.29
It is clear from PO1 Baquirans declaration that, contrary to appellants
assertion, the packet of shabu sold to PO1 Baquiran by appellant
during the buy-bust operation was properly identified and marked as
RID 1 by PO2 Dueas even before the police frisked appellant for
more illegal drugs. With PO1 Baquirans testimony, there can no
longer be any basis for vacillation with respect to the identity of the
object which he, acting as poseur buyer, obtained from appellant. And,
as the laboratory examination would later confirm, the contents of the
sachet bearing the mark RID 1 was positive for shabu.
All told, as the illegal sale of drugs had been established beyond
reasonable doubt, this Court is constrained to uphold appellants
conviction.

We shall now determine the proper imposable penalty.

The sale of shabu is penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic

Act No. 9165. It reads:

SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery,

Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals. The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand
pesos (500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and
all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity
involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

Under the law, the sale of any dangerous drug, regardless of its
quantity and purity, is punishable by life imprisonment to death and a
fine of 500,000.00 to 10,000,000.00. The statute, in prescribing the
range of penalties imposable, does not concern itself with the amount
of dangerous drug sold by an accused. With the effectivity, however,
of Republic Act No. 9346, otherwise known as "An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," the imposition of the
supreme penalty of death has been proscribed. Consequently, the
penalty to be meted to appellant shall only be life imprisonment and
fine. In this regard, this Court likewise sustains the penalty imposed by
the court a quo and which was subsequently affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is

DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 00803 dated 12 July 2006 which affirmed in toto the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 65, in Criminal Case
No. 13229, finding appellant Ramon Quiaoit, Jr. y de Castro guilty of
violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 171019 February 23, 2007
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
RAFAEL STA. MARIA y INDON, Appellant.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Under consideration is this appeal by Rafael Sta. Maria y Indon from
the Decision1 dated November 22, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00802, denying his earlier appeal from and
affirming the May 5, 2004 decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Bulacan, Branch 20, which found him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of violation of Section 5,3 Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002.
The indicting Information,4 docketed in the RTC as Criminal Case No.
3364-M-2002, alleges:
That on or about the 29th day of November, 2002, in the municipality
of San Rafael, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without authority of law and legal justification, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, trade, deliver, give away,
dispatch in transit and transport dangerous drug consisting of one (1)
heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing methylampetamine
hydrochloride weighing 0.041 gram.
Contrary to law.
Duly arraigned on January 23, 2003, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to
the crime charged. Trial ensued thereafter.
The prosecutions version of events which led to appellants arrest and
subsequent prosecution under the aforementioned Information is as
follows:
On November 27, 2002, at around 10:00 oclock in the morning,
P/Chief Insp. Noli Pacheco, Chief of the Provincial Drug Enforcement
Group of the Bulacan Provincial Office based at Camp Alejo Santos,
Malolos, Bulacan received an intelligence report about the illegal drug
activities in Sitio Gulod, Barangay Pantubig, San Rafael, Bulacan of a
certain "Fael," who later turned out to be appellant Rafael Sta. Maria.
P/Chief Insp. Pacheco formed a surveillance team to look for a police
asset to negotiate a drug deal with appellant. In the morning of
November 29, 2002, the surveillance team reported to P/Chief Insp.
Pacheco that a confidential asset found by the team had already
negotiated a drug deal for the purchase of 200 worth of shabu from
appellant at the latters house at No. 123 Sitio Gulod, Barangay
Pantubig, San Rafael, Bulacan between 7:00 and 7:30 in the evening
of November 29, 2002. The surveillance team then prepared for a buy-
bust operation, with PO3 Enrique Rullan as team leader, and PO1
Rhoel Ventura, who was provided with two (2) marked 100-bills, as
poseur-buyer. At the appointed time and place, PO1 Ventura and the
confidential informant proceeded to appellants house and knocked at
the door. Appellant opened the door and the confidential informant
introduced to him PO1 Ventura as a prospective buyer. PO1 Ventura
later handed the two (2) marked 100-bills to appellant who, in turn,
gave him a plastic sachet of shabu. Thereupon, PO1 Ventura sparked
his cigarette lighter, which was the pre-arranged signal to the other
members of the buy-bust team that the sale was consummated.
Appellant was arrested and the two marked 100-bills recovered from
him. Also arrested on that occasion was one Zedric dela Cruz who
was allegedly sniffing shabu inside appellants house and from whom
drug paraphernalia were recovered. Upon laboratory examination of
the item bought from appellant, the same yielded positive for
methylampetamine hydrochloride or shabu weighing 0.041 gram.
The defense gave an entirely different account of what allegedly
transpired prior to and at the time of appellants arrest on that evening
of November 29, 2002.1awphi1.net
Appellant testified that on November 29, 2002, he was at home with a
certain Zedric dela Cruz who was allegedly offering him a cellphone
for sale and collecting payment on a loan of his wife. At that time, his
wife was out of the house to pay their electric bill. While waiting for his
wife, he and Zedric watched television when they heard the barking of
dogs. Immediately, three (3) men suddenly barged into the house and
announced that they were police officers while three other men stayed
outside the house. The police officers frisked him and Zedric and
searched the house. He tried to complain about what they were doing
but the police officers got mad and accused him of selling shabu. He
replied that he does not know anything about drugs. Afterwards, he
and Zedric were brought out of the house and handcuffed. While on
board the police vehicle, the police officers warned them to cooperate.
The police officers also asked him to be their asset and when he said
that he does not know anything about it, they told him that they could
file a case against him. The police officers also offered to buy drugs
from him but he refused the offer because he knows that it is only a
plan for them to arrest him.
In a decision5 dated May 5, 2004, the trial court found appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, and accordingly
sentenced him, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1). xxx
2). xxx
3). In Criminal Case No. 3264-M-2002, the Court finds
accused RAFAEL STA. MARIA Y INDON guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act 9165. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and is ordered to pay a fine of
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (500,000.00).
The dangerous drug and drug paraphernalia submitted as evidence in
these cases are hereby ordered to be transmitted to the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).
SO ORDERED.
From the aforesaid decision, appellant went directly to this Court.
Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo,6 which
modified the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court insofar as
they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to the Supreme
Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the Court transferred the appeal to
the CA for appropriate action and disposition, whereat it was
docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00802.
On November 22, 2005, the CA promulgated the herein assailed
Decision7 denying the appeal and affirming that of the trial court,
to wit:
xxx The Court sees no reason to disturb the finding of trial court.
The evidence presented by the prosecution proves to a moral
certainty appellants guilt of the crime of selling illegal drugs.
What is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took
place, coupled with the presentation in court of the substance
seized as evidence.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
The case is again with this Court following its elevation from the
CA, together with the case records.
In his Brief, appellant contends that the trial court erred in
convicting him because his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. He maintains that instigation, not entrapment,
preceded his arrest. He also faults the appellate court in not
finding that the evidence adduced by the prosecution was
obtained in violation of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No.
9165.
It is appellants submission that what transpired on that fateful
evening of November 29, 2002 was instigation and not a valid
buy-bust operation. He would make much of the fact that the
transaction between him and the police informant occurred on
November 27, 2002, while the buy-bust operation took place on
November 29, 2002. To appellant, the informant, by pretending
that he was in need of shabu, instigated or induced him to violate
the anti-dangerous drugs law. He adds that the prosecution was
not able to prove that at the time of the police surveillance, he
was indeed looking for buyers of shabu, and that were it not for
the inducement of the informant that the latter would buy shabu,
he would not have produced the same on November 29, 2002.
We are not persuaded.
In entrapment, the entrapper resorts to ways and means to trap
and capture a lawbreaker while executing his criminal plan. In
instigation, the instigator practically induces the would-be-
defendant into committing the offense, and himself becomes a
co-principal. In entrapment, the means originates from the mind
of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime
come from him. In instigation, the law enforcer conceives the
commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who
adopts the idea and carries it into execution. The legal effects of
entrapment do not exempt the criminal from liability. Instigation
does.8
Here, the mere fact that the agreement between appellant and the
police informant for the purchase and sale of illegal drugs was
made on November 27, 2002, while the buy-bust operation was
conducted on November 29, 2002, is of no moment. Without
more, it does not prove that said informant instigated appellant
into committing the offense. If at all, the earlier agreement and
the subsequent actual sale suggest that appellant was habitually
dealing in illegal drugs.
It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its
commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the
criminal act was done at the "decoy solicitation" of persons
seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning
complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting its
commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where
the offense is one habitually committed, and the solicitation
merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct.9
As here, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the informant
utilized by the police merely furnishes evidence of a course of
conduct. The police received an intelligence report that appellant
has been habitually dealing in illegal drugs. They duly acted on it
by utilizing an informant to effect a drug transaction with
appellant. There was no showing that the informant induced
appellant to sell illegal drugs to him.
It is a basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his
affirmative allegation.10 In this case, apart from appellants self-
serving declaration that he was instigated into committing the
offense, he did not present any other evidence to prove the same.
A perusal of the records readily reveals that the police operatives
who took part in the buy-bust operation, namely, PO1 Alexander
Ancheta, PO1 Rhoel Ventura and PO3 Enrique Rullan, clearly and
convincingly testified on the circumstances that led to
appellants arrest. In a credible manner, they narrated in open
court the details of the buy-bust operation they conducted on
November 29, 2002 in Sitio Gulod, Barangay Pantubig, San
Rafael, Bulacan. We thus quote with approval the trial courts
findings on this matter:
PO1 Ancheta, PO1 Ventura and PO2 Rullan testified on the
aforementioned circumstances concerning the drug buy-bust
operation that led to the arrest of accused Sta. Maria, following
the purchase from him of 200 worth of shabu by PO1 Ventura
posing as poseur-buyer. The testimonies of these officers, as
summarized above, are essentially clear credible and convincing.
Notwithstanding minor inconsistencies, their declarations in
Court dovetail and corroborated one another on material points,
and are generally consistent with the narrations contained in
their "Joint Affidavit of Arrest" (Exh. "D") executed on December
2, 2002. More significantly, there is no credible showing that the
aforementioned police officers were impelled by any improper
motive or intention in effecting the arrest of accused Sta. Maria
and in testifying against him in Court.
The Court also takes judicial notice of the fact that accused Sta.
Maria had other criminal cases before other branches of this
Court for involvement in drug activities. He was charged with and
convicted by Branch 21 of this Court of Violation of Section 16,
Article III of the Republic Act of 6425, as amended, also known as
the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," following a voluntary plea of
guilty in Criminal Case No. 341-M-2001. He was likewise charged
with Violation of Sections 15 and 16 of the same law before
Branch 81 under Criminal Cases Nos. 59-M-2000 and 60-M-2000,
which were dismissed on mere technicality because of non-
appearance of the arresting officers.
The Court is not persuaded by the defense of denial interposed
by accused Sta. Maria. According to him, the police officers just
barged into his house on November 29, 2002 while he was
watching television together with co-accused Dela Cruz. He said,
he was frisked and his place searched, and he was arrested for
no reason at all by the police officers.
The Court rules that the version bandied about by accused Sta.
Maria is purely self-serving. It cannot prevail over the positive
declarations of the police officers regarding the drug buy-bust
operation and purchase from him of shabu. To reiterate, there is
no showing that said police officers were actuated by any ill or
improper motive or intention in effecting the arrest of the
accused Sta. Maria and in testifying against him in Court. (See
People v. Dela Cruz, 229 SCRA 754; People v. Persiano, 233
SCRA 393). 11
Appellant would next argue that the evidence against him was
obtained in violation of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No.
9165 because the buy-bust operation was made without any
involvement of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).
Prescinding therefrom, he concludes that the prosecutions
evidence, both testimonial and documentary, was inadmissible
having been procured in violation of his constitutional right
against illegal arrest.
The argument is specious.
Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 reads:
SEC. 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating
Units on Illegal Drugs into the PDEA and Transitory Provisions.
The Narcotics Group of the PNP, the Narcotics Division of the
NBI and the Customs Narcotics Interdiction Unit are hereby
abolished; however they shall continue with the performance of
their task as detail service with the PDEA, subject to screening,
until such time that the organizational structure of the Agency is
fully operational and the number of graduates of the PDEA
Academy is sufficient to do the task themselves: Provided, That
such personnel who are affected shall have the option of either
being integrated into the PDEA or remain with their original
mother agencies and shall, thereafter, be immediately reassigned
to other units therein by the head of such agencies. Such
personnel who are transferred, absorbed and integrated in the
PDEA shall be extended appointments to positions similar in
rank, salary, and other emoluments and privileges granted to
their respective positions in their original mother agencies.
The transfer, absorption and integration of the different offices
and units provided for in this Section shall take effect within
eighteen (18) months from the effectivity of this Act: Provided,
That personnel absorbed and on detail service shall be given
until five (5) years to finally decide to join the PDEA.
Nothing in this Act shall mean a diminution of the investigative
powers of the NBI and the PNP on all other crimes as provided
for in their respective organic laws: Provided, however, That
when the investigation being conducted by the NBI, PNP or any
ad hoc anti-drug task force is found to be a violation of any of the
provisions of this Act, the PDEA shall be the lead agency. The
NBI, PNP or any of the task force shall immediately transfer the
same to the PDEA: Provided, further, That the NBI, PNP and the
Bureau of Customs shall maintain close coordination with the
PDEA on all drug related matters.
Cursory read, the foregoing provision is silent as to the
consequences of failure on the part of the law enforcers to
transfer drug-related cases to the PDEA, in the same way that the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No.
9165 is also silent on the matter. But by no stretch of imagination
could this silence be interpreted as a legislative intent to make an
arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal nor evidence
obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible.
It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that where
great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or
great public interests would be endangered or sacrificed, or great
mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court
ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the
makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal
words.12
As we see it, Section 86 is explicit only in saying that the PDEA
shall be the "lead agency" in the investigations and prosecutions
of drug-related cases. Therefore, other law enforcement bodies
still possess authority to perform similar functions as the PDEA
as long as illegal drugs cases will eventually be transferred to the
latter. Additionally, the same provision states that PDEA, serving
as the implementing arm of the Dangerous Drugs Board, "shall
be responsible for the efficient and effective law enforcement of
all the provisions on any dangerous drug and/or controlled
precursor and essential chemical as provided in the Act." We find
much logic in the Solicitor Generals interpretation that it is only
appropriate that drugs cases being handled by other law
enforcement authorities be transferred or referred to the PDEA as
the "lead agency" in the campaign against the menace of
dangerous drugs. Section 86 is more of an administrative
provision. By having a centralized law enforcement body, i.e., the
PDEA, the Dangerous Drugs Board can enhance the efficacy of
the law against dangerous drugs. To be sure, Section 86 (a) of
the IRR emphasizes this point by providing:
(a) Relationship/Coordination between PDEA and Other Agencies
The PDEA shall be the lead agency in the enforcement of the
Act, while the PNP, the NBI and other law enforcement agencies
shall continue to conduct anti-drug operations in support of the
PDEA xxx. Provided, finally, that nothing in this IRR shall deprive
the PNP, the NBI, other law enforcement personnel and the
personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from
effecting lawful arrests and seizures in consonance with the
provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
Appellant next argues that the prosecution failed to show
compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 regarding
the custody and disposition of the evidence against him.
Appellant demands absolute compliance with Section 21 and
insists that anything short of the adherence to its letter, renders
the evidence against him inadmissible. Pertinently, Section 21 of
the law provides:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered,
for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of
the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Regrettably, the pertinent implementing rules, Section 21 of the
IRR, states:
Section 21. a. xxx Provided further, that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items.
It is beyond quibbling then that the failure of the law enforcers to
comply strictly with Section 21 was not fatal. It did not render
appellants arrest illegal nor the evidence adduced against him
inadmissible.
The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds.
However, whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police
officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from
complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because
appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of the
items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers alleged
violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were
not raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the
first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at
the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized
items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection
to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a
party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so
state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot
raise the question for the first time on appeal.13
To recapitulate, the challenged buy-bust operation, albeit made
without the participation of PDEA, did not violate appellants
constitutional right to be protected from illegal arrest. There is
nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 which even remotely indicate
the intention of the legislature to make an arrest made without
the participation of the PDEA illegal and evidence obtained
pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible. Moreover, the law did
not deprive the PNP of the power to make arrests.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the appealed decision of
the CA, affirmatorary of that of the trial court, is AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 192235 July 6, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ROLANDO LAYLO y CEPRES, Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision1 dated 28
January 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
03631. The CA affirmed the Decision2 dated 16 September 2008 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 67, in
Criminal Case No. 06-017, convicting appellant Rolando
Laylo y Cepres (Laylo) of violation of Section 26(b), Article II
(Attempted Sale of Dangerous Drugs)3 of Republic Act No. 91654 (RA
9165) or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
On 21 December 2005, two separate Informations against appellant
Laylo and Melitona Ritwal (Ritwal) were filed with the RTC of
Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 67, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 06-
017 and 06-018, respectively. The information against Laylo states:
Criminal Case No. 06-017
That on or about the 17th day of December, 2005, in the Municipality
of Binangonan, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not
being authorized by law to sell any dangerous drug, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly attempt to sell, deliver, and give
away shabu to PO1 Angelito G. Reyes, 0.04 gram of white crystalline
substance contained in two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets
which were found positive to the test for Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride, also known as shabu, a dangerous drug, thus
commencing the commission of the crime of illegal sale but did not
perform all the acts of execution which would produce such crime by
reason of some cause or accident other than the accuseds own
spontaneous desistance, that is, said PO1 Angelito G. Reyes
introduced himself as policeman, arrested the accused and
confiscated the two (2) above-mentioned sachets from the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty. Joint trial on the
merits ensued. However, during the trial, Ritwal jumped bail and was
tried in absentia. Thus, Ritwal was deemed to have waived the
presentation of her evidence and the case was submitted for decision
without any evidence on her part.
The prosecution presented two witnesses: Police Officer 1 (PO1)
Angelito G. Reyes (PO1 Reyes) and PO1 Gem A. Pastor (PO1
Pastor), the poseur-buyers in the attempted sale of illegal drugs.
The prosecution summed up its version of the facts: In the afternoon
of 17 December 2005, PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor, both wearing
civilian clothes, were conducting anti-drug surveillance operations at
Lozana Street, Calumpang, Binangonan, Rizal. While the police
officers were in front of a sari-sari store at around 5:40 p.m., appellant
Laylo and his live-in partner, Ritwal, approached them and asked,
"Gusto mong umiskor ng shabu?" PO1 Reyes replied, "Bakit mayroon
ka ba?" Laylo then brought out two plastic bags containing shabu and
told the police officers, "Dos (200.00) ang isa." Upon hearing this,
the police officers introduced themselves as cops. PO1 Reyes
immediately arrested Laylo. Ritwal, on the other, tried to get away but
PO1 Pastor caught up with her. PO1 Pastor then frisked Ritwal and
found another sachet of shabu in a SIM card case which Ritwal was
carrying.
PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor marked the three plastic sachets of
shabu recovered from Laylo and Ritwal and forwarded them to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for forensic testing.
Forensic Chemist Police Inspector Yehla C. Manaog conducted the
laboratory examination on the specimens submitted and found the
recovered items positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a dangerous drug.
The police officers charged Laylo for attempted sale of illegal drugs
and used the two plastic sachets containing shabu as basis while
Ritwal was charged for possession of illegal drugs using as basis the
third sachet containing 0.02 grams of shabu.
The defense, on the other hand, presented different versions of the
facts. The witnesses presented were: appellant Laylo; Laylos three
neighbors namely Rodrigo Panaon, Jr., Marlon de Leon, and Teresita
Marquez.
Laylo testified that while he and his common-law wife, Ritwal, were
walking on the street, two men grabbed them. The two men, who they
later identified as PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor, dragged them to their
house. Once inside, the police officers placed two plastic sachets in
each of their pockets. Afterwards, they were brought to the police
station where, despite protests and claims that the drugs were planted
on them, they were arrested and charged.
To corroborate Laylos testimony, the defense presented Laylos three
neighbors. Marlon de Leon (de Leon), also a close friend of the
couple, testified that he was taking care of the Laylo and Ritwals child
when he heard a commotion. He saw men, whom de Leon identified
as assets, holding the couple and claimed that he saw one of them put
something, which he described as "plastic," in the left side of Laylos
jacket.
Rodrigo Panaon, Jr. (Panaon) narrated that on 17 December 2005, at
around 5:00 or 6:00 p.m., he was on his way home when he saw Laylo
arguing with three men in an alley. He overheard Laylo uttering, "Bakit
ba? Bakit ba?" Later, Panaon saw a commotion taking place at Laylos
backyard. The three men arrested Laylo while the latter shouted, "Mga
kapitbahay, tulungan ninyo kami, kamiy dinadampot." Then Panaon
saw someone place something inside the jacket of Laylo as he heard
Laylo say, "Wala kayong makukuha dito."
Teresita Marquez (Marquez) testified that while she was fetching
water from the well on 17 December 2005, at around 5:00 or 6:00
p.m., she heard Laylos son shouting, "Amang, Amang." Marquez then
saw the child run to his father, who was with several male
companions. Then someone pulled Laylos collar and frisked him.
Marquez overheard someone uttering, "Wala po, wala po." Marquez
went home after the incident. At around 9:00 in the evening, Ritwals
daughter visited her and borrowed money for Laylo and Ritwals
release. Marquez then accompanied Ritwals daughter to the
municipal hall, where a man demanded 40,000.00 for the couples
release.
In its Decision dated 16 September 2008, the RTC found Laylo and
Ritwal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violations of RA 9165. The
RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the police officers, who were
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner. The
RTC stated that Reyes and Pastor were straightforward and candid in
their testimonies and unshaken by cross-examination. Their
testimonies were unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in their
material points. The RTC added that the denial of appellant Laylo is
weak and self-serving and his allegation of planting of evidence or
frame-up can be easily concocted. Thus, Laylos defense cannot be
given credence over the positive and clear testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
We thus find accused Rolando Laylo GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 26(b) of R.A. No. 9165 and sentence him to
suffer a penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of 500,000.00.
We also find accused Melitona Ritwal GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 and illegally possessing
a total of 0.02 grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu
and accordingly sentence her to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 12
years and one day as minimum to 13 years as maximum and to pay a
fine of 300,000.00.
Let the drug samples in this case be forwarded to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition. Furnish PDEA
with a copy of this Decision per OCA Circular No. 70-2007.
SO ORDERED.6
Laylo filed an appeal with the CA. Laylo imputed the following errors
on the RTC:
I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION
WITNESS PATENTLY FABRICATED ACCOUNTS.
II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
OFFENSE CHARGED WHEN HIS GUILT WAS NOT
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE
THE APPREHENDING OFFICERS FAILURE TO
PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF THE ALLEGED
SEIZED SHABU.7
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In a Decision dated 28 January 2010, the CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The challenged decision of the court a quo is
AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.8
Hence, this appeal.
The Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs
are: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.9
In the present case, PO1 Reyes narrated in court the circumstances of
the illegal sale:
PROS. ARAGONES:
Q: What time did you proceed to that place of surveillance?
A: 5:40 p.m., Maam.
Q: And what happened when you and PO1 Gem Pastor went there?
A: When we were making standby at a nearby store there was a man
talking with a woman, the man asked me if we want to have a shot of
shabu.
Q: What was your reply?
A: "Bakit, meron ka ba?"
Q: How did that other person react to that question, what did he tell
you, if any?
A: "Gusto mong umiskor ng shabu?"
Q: What happened after that?
A: I replied, "Bakit meron ka ba?" then he showed me two small plastic
bags containing shabu, Maam.
Q: How big is that bag, Mr. Witness?
A: Small, Maam.
Q: Can you tell us the size?
A: (Demonstrating) Almost one inch the size of a cigarette, Maam.
COURT: It was in a plastic not in foil?
A: Yes, your Honor.
PROS. ARAGONES:
Q: After showing you two plastic bags, what happened?
A: I introduced myself as a police officer then I caught this man and
confiscated the two small plastic bag containing shabu.
Q: How about the lady?
A: My partner caught the woman because she was intending to run
away and he got from her right hand Smart SIM card case containing
one small plastic.10
PO1 Pastor corroborated the testimony of PO1 Reyes:
PROS. ARAGONES:
Q: Mr. Witness, while you were conducting surveillance on December
17, 2005, what happened?
A: While we were conducting surveillance at Lozana Street,
Calumpang, Binangonan, Rizal, while we were at the store, two (2)
persons approached us, one male and one female, Maam.
Q: Who were those persons? Did you come to know the name of
those persons?
A: At that time I dont know the names but when they were brought to
the police station I came to know their names, Maam.
Q: What are the names of these two persons?
A: Rolando Laylo and Melitona Ritwal, Maam.
Q: At that time they approached you during the time you were
conducting surveillance at Lozana Street, what happened?
A: The male person approached PO1 Reyes and asked if "iiskor",
Maam.
Q: What was the reply of PO1 Reyes?
A: He answered "Bakit meron ka ba?"
Q: When that answer was given by Reyes, what did that male person
do?
A: He produced two (2) small plastic sachets containing allegedly
shabu and he said "dos ang isa."
COURT: What do you mean by "dos ang isa"?
A: Php 200.00, Your Honor.
PROS. ARAGONES:
Q: Where were you when that male person produced two (2) small
plastic sachets?
A: I was beside PO1 Reyes, Maam.
Q: After he showed the plastic sachets containing drugs, what
happened next?
A: We introduced ourselves as policemen, Maam.
Q: After you introduced yourselves, what happened next?
A: PO1 Reyes arrested the male person while I arrested the female
person, Maam.
Q: Why did you arrest the woman?
A: At that time, she was about to run I confiscated from her a SIM card In sum, we see no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and
case, Maam. CA.1avvphi1 Appellant was correctly found to be guilty beyond
COURT: What was the contents of the SIM card case? reasonable doubt of violating Section 26(b), Article II of RA 9165.
A: One (1) piece of alleged shabu, Your Honor.11 WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal. We AFFIRM the Decision
From the testimonies given, PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor testified that dated 28 January 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
they were the poseur-buyers in the sale. Both positively identified No. 03631.
appellant as the seller of the substance contained in plastic sachets SO ORDERED.
which were found to be positive for shabu. The same plastic sachets
were likewise identified by the prosecution witnesses when presented
in court. Even the consideration of 200.00 for each sachet had been
made known by appellant to the police officers. However, the sale was
interrupted when the police officers introduced themselves as cops
and immediately arrested appellant and his live-in partner Ritwal.
Thus, the sale was not consummated but merely attempted. Thus,
appellant was charged with attempted sale of dangerous drugs.
Section 26(b), Article II of RA 9165 provides:
Section 26. Attempt or Conspiracy. Any attempt or conspiracy to
commit the following unlawful acts shall be penalized by the same
penalty prescribed for the commission of the same as provided under
this Act:
xxx
(b) Sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution
and transportation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor
and essential chemical;
xxx
Here, appellant intended to sell shabu and commenced by overt acts
the commission of the intended crime by showing the substance to
PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor.12 The sale was aborted when the police
officers identified themselves and placed appellant and Ritwal under
arrest. From the testimonies of the witnesses, the prosecution was
able to establish that there was an attempt to sell shabu. In addition,
the plastic sachets were presented in court as evidence of corpus
delicti. Thus, the elements of the crime charged were sufficiently
established by evidence.
Appellant claims that he was a victim of a frame up. However, he
failed to substantiate his claim. The witnesses presented by the
defense were not able to positively affirm that illegal drugs were
planted on appellant by the police officers when they testified that
"they saw someone place something inside appellants jacket."
In Quinicot v. People,13 we held that allegations of frame-up and
extortion by police officers are common and standard defenses in
most dangerous drugs cases. They are viewed by the Court with
disfavor, for such defenses can easily be concocted and fabricated.
Appellant asserts that it is unbelievable that he would be so foolish
and reckless to offer to sell shabu to strangers. In People v. de
Guzman,14 we have ruled that peddlers of illicit drugs have been
known, with ever increasing casualness and recklessness, to offer and
sell their wares for the right price to anybody, be they strangers or not.
What matters is not the existing familiarity between the buyer and the
seller, or the time and venue of the sale, but the fact of agreement as
well as the act constituting the sale and delivery of the prohibited
drugs.
Further, appellant did not attribute any ill-motive on the part of the
police officers. The presumption of regularity in the performance of the
police officers official duties should prevail over the self-serving denial
of appellant.15
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 170234 February 8, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BERNARDO F. NICOLAS, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 01191 dated 23 August 2005 which affirmed in toto the
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 164,
in Criminal Case No. 11566-D, finding accused-appellant Bernardo
Felizardo Nicolas, a.k.a. Bernie, guilty of violation of Section 5,3Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
In an Information dated 7 August 2002, accused-appellant Bernardo
Felizardo Nicolas, a.k.a. Bernie, was charged with Violation of Section
5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the accusatory portion thereof
reading:
On or about August 6, 2002, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused, who is not being authorized by law,
did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and
give away to PO2 Danilo S. Damasco, one (1) heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing 0.42 gram of white crystalline substance
which was found positive to the test for methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.4
The case was raffled to Branch 164 of the RTC of Pasig City and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 11566-D.
When arraigned on 30 September 2002, appellant, assisted by
counsel de oficio, pleaded "Not Gulity" to the charge.5 The Pre-Trial
Conference of the case was terminated on the same day. Thereafter,
the case was heard.
The prosecution presented two witnesses: PO2 Danilo S.
Damasco6 and SPO2 Dante Zipagan,7 both members of the Station
Drug Enforcement Unit of the Pasig Police Station. The testimony of
Police Inspector Delfin A. Torregoza, Forensic Chemical Officer,
Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory Office, was, however,
dispensed with after both prosecution and defense stipulated that the
specimen8 submitted in court is the same one mentioned in the
Request for Laboratory Examination9 and in Chemistry Report No. D-
1501-02E,10 and that same was regularly examined by said forensic
chemical officer.
For the defense, appellant11 took the witness stand together with his
common-law wife, Susan dela Cruz Villasoto,12 and brother, Jose
Nicolas.13
The diametrical versions of the People and the accused are narrated
by the trial court as follows:
VERSION OF THE PEOPLE
On August 6, 2002, at about 9:30 oclock in the evening, a confidential
informant stepped inside the office of the Station Drug Enforcement
Unit of the Pasig Police Station, Pasig City and informed SPO4
Numeriano S. De Lara, Officer In-Charge of that unit, that a certain
alias Bernie was selling shabu at his place along Santiago Street, in
Barangay Bagong Ilog, Pasig City. Immediately, SPO4 De Lara
organized a team to conduct a surveillance operation and the
entrapment of alias Bernie, if warranted by the situation. The team
was composed of PO2 Danilo S. Damasco, PO2 Montefalcon, PO2
Orig and SPO2 Zipagan who was the team leader. PO2 Damasco was
designated to act as poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation while the
other police officers would serve as his back-ups to assist in the
possible apprehension of alias Bernie. After a short briefing, the team
of police operatives, including the confidential informant, proceeded to
the target place at Santiago Street, Bagong Ilog, Pasig City. SPO2
Dante Zipagan, the team leader, instructed the confidential informant
to first check and look for the whereabouts of alias Bernie. The
informant, after five minutes, returned and informed the team that he
found alias Bernie in front of his house and the team decided to
proceed with the planned entrapment of alias Bernie. PO2 Damasco
and the informant then walked towards the house of alias Bernie while
the back-up police officers placed themselves strategically in different
positions where they could see PO2 Damasco and the informant in the
act of negotiating with alias Bernie. PO2 Damasco and the informant
saw alias Bernie conversing with a male person in front of his house.
After the informant greeted alias Bernie, he introduced PO2 Damasco
to alias Bernie whose real name is Bernardo Nicolas, the accused
herein, as a user of shabu and would like now to buy some Php500.00
worth of the substance from him. Alias Bernie, responded that he still
had one piece of that stuff and was willing to sell it to poseur-buyer
Damasco. Accused asked for the money which was pre-marked by
Damasco with initials DSD (Exh. D-1) which stands for the name of
Danilo S. Damasco. Damasco then handed the five hundred peso bill
(Exh. D) to accused who accepted it. Accused, in return, gave
Damasco one plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance
which looked like that of shabu. For a moment, PO2 Damasco
examined the plastic sachet and its content and then announced to
the accused he was a police officer and arresting him for violation of
the drugs law. Accused Bernardo Nicolas alias Bernie got shocked
and surprised. As Damasco was holding the accused, the back-up
officers arrived and assisted him in handling the accused. Damasco
recovered the buy-bust money and the police team took him away to
their station, where he was turned over to a police investigator
together with the small plastic sachet of suspected shabu that
Damasco had purchased from the accused. SPO4 Numeriano S. De who arrested him for allegedly selling shabu were the John Does
Lara sent the small plastic sachet containing white crystalline mentioned in the complaint he and his wife filed with the NAPOLCOM.
substance which was then marked with EXH.-A BFN/080602 to the
Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory Office at St. Francis St.,
In its decision dated 8 October 2003, the trial court found appellant
Mandaluyong City, as per his letter memorandum dated August 6,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentenced
2002 (Exhs. B and B-1). The specimen was received at the EPD
him to life imprisonment. The dispositve portion of the decision reads:
Crime Laboratory office by P/Insp. Delfin Torregoza, a Forensic
Chemical Officer, who weighed and examined the specimen which he
found to contain 0.42 gram of white crystalline substance which was WHEREFORE, the court finds accused BERNARDO F. NICOLAS
tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride as per his GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, as principal of violation of Section
Chemistry Report No. D-1501-02E (Exhs. C and C-1). Accused 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of life
Bernardo F. Nicolas was consequently charged with Violation of imprisonment and a fine of five hundred thousand pesos
Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165. (500.00),14 with the accessory penalties provided under Section 35
thereof.15
VERSION OF DEFENSE
From the decision, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal informing the
court that he is appealing the same to the Court of Appeals.16 Though
xxxx
the Notice of Appeal specified that the decision is being appealed to
the Court of Appeals, the trial court nonetheless forwarded the records
[Appellant] testified that on August 6, 2002 at about 10:00 oclock in of the case to the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 3, Rule 122 of
the evening, he was outside of his house conversing with his brother, the Rules of Court.17
Jose Nicolas, and a friend named Arnold Mendez. He had just came
(sic) out of his house in order to close the billiard salon that he owned.
On 22 November 2004, appellant filed an appellants brief before the
As they were then huddled in animated conversation, two motor
Supreme Court. On 31 March 2005, the Office of the Solicitor General
vehicles stopped in front of his billiard parlor, a car and a van. The
filed the Peoples brief.18
passengers of the van alighted and one of them pointed a gun at him.
As accused was not familiar with the men, he could not recognize
them. He learned, later on, that the man who poked a gun at him was Since the penalty imposed by the trial court was life imprisonment, the
PO2 Danilo Damasco who was accompanied by other persons case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and
numbering about four or five of them. Damasco warned him not to disposition pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.19
move, holding and waiving in his hand a plastic sachet which
Damasco said he bought from accused Bernardo Nicolas. The police
On 23 August 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision
officers then proceeded to put handcuffs on the hands of the accused,
affirming in full the decision of the trial court.20Appellant filed a Notice
in spite of his protest denying anything to do with the plastic sachet of
of Appeal assailing the decision before the Supreme Court.21
alleged shabu being displayed by Damasco. The police officers also
handcuffed and arrested Arnold Mendez. Jose Nicolas did not allow
himself to be arrested and handcuffed. When he sensed that he would With the elevation of the records of the case to the Supreme Court,
be handcuffed, he immediately fled and ran into his house, locking the parties were required to submit their respective supplemental
himself in. Luckily for him, the police officers did not pursue him any briefs, if they so desire, within 30 days from notice.22 The parties opted
longer. He just watched the incident by peeping through the window of not to file supplemental briefs on the ground that they have fully
his house. Accused Bernardo Nicolas alias Bernie and Arnold argued their positions in their respective briefs.23
Mendez, were then forced into the police vehicle and taken to the
police station, although Nicolas showed resistance which forced the
Appellant assigns as errors the following:
police officers to physically carry him into their vehicle. Accused
Bernard Nicolas was then charged with Violation of Section 5, Article
II, R.A. 9165. I.
Appellant denies the charge. He insists that there was no buy-bust THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FAITH AND
operation and that the shabu (methamphetamine hydrochloride) CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE TESTIMONIES OF THE
allegedly sold by him to the poseur buyer was planted evidence. He PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING
claims that the trumped-up charge is a way of getting even with him THE VERSION OF THE DEFENSE.
because he, together with his wife, had filed a case before the
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) for grave misconduct
against several policemen (PO2 Joel Tapec, PO1 Christopher II.
Semana and five John Does) assigned at the Station Drug
Enforcement Unit of the Pasig Police Station, for entering and robbing THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
their house on 5 February 2002. He further claims that the policemen APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellant observed that (1) the policemen did not conduct surveillance
first; (2) they did not have any agreement as regards the money to be
used in buying the shabu; and (3) they failed to talk about any signal
to inform the back-up policemen that the transaction has been
consummated. He contends that the absence of these things is
unusual and that it made even more doubtful that the buy-bust
operation really took place. 1avvphi1.net
These observations will not purge him of the charge.
Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test-buy
does not affect the legality of the buy-bust operation. There is no
textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The Court has left
to the discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means
to apprehend drug dealers.24 A prior surveillance, much less a lengthy
one, is not necessary especially where the police operatives are
accompanied by their informant during the entrapment.25 Flexibility is a
trait of good police work.26 In the case at bar, the buy-bust operation
was conducted without need of any prior surveillance for the reason
that the informant accompanied the policemen to the person who is
peddling the dangerous drugs.
Appellant faults the policemen because there was no agreement or
discussion among themselves as regards the marked money and the
pre-arranged signal.
From the records, it is clear that it was PO2 Damasco who prepared
the marked money27 as shown by his initials on the top right corner of
the 500.00 bill that was used in purchasing the shabu from
appellant.28 The fact that the team leader and the other members of
the team did not discuss or talk about the marked money does not
necessarily mean that there was no buy-bust operation. As explained
by SPO2 Zipagan, since PO2 Damasco was the designated poseur
buyer it was the latters discretion as to how to prepare the marked
money. It is not required that all the members of the buy-bust team
know how the marked money is to be produced and marked inasmuch
as they have their respective roles to perform in the operation. As this
Court sees it, the other members of the team left the matter of the
marked money to one person the poseur buyer because it was he
who was to deal directly with the drug pusher.
As to the absence of a pre-arranged signal, same is not fatal to the
cause of the prosecution. The employment of a pre-arranged signal, or
the lack of it, is not indispensable in a buy-bust operation. What
determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs is proof of
the concurrence of all the elements of the offense. A buy-bust
operation is a form of entrapment which has repeatedly been accepted
to be a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs
Law.29 The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of
drugs are (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefore.30 What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took
place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus
delicti.31
In the case under consideration, all these elements have been
established. The witnesses for the prosecution clearly showed that the
sale of the drugs actually happened and that the shabu subject of the
sale was brought and identified in court. The poseur buyer (PO2
Damasco) categorically identified appellant as the seller of the shabu.
His testimony was corroborated by SPO2 Zipagan. Per Chemistry
Report No. D-1501-02E of Police Inspector Delfin A. Torregoza, the
substance, weighing 0.42 gram, which was bought by PO2 Damasco
from appellant in consideration of 500.00, was examined and found
to be methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
We quote the material portions of the testimony of the poseur buyer
that detailed the apprehension of appellant, as follows:
A: And we briefed and after a short briefing we proceeded to the
alleged residence of Bernie and when we reached the place, I
particularly saw the subject person in front of the alleged house.
Q: You said we, whom are you referring to as those who went with you
to the house of Bernie?
A: The confidential informant.
Q: After reaching the house of Bernie, what happened there?
A: I saw the subject person infront of his alleged house talking to
another male person.
Q: What was the general condition of that place outside the house of
Bernie when you saw him?
A: Dim light, sir.
Q: After you first saw Bernie talking with somebody else, what did you
do?
A: The confidential informant greeted alias Bernie and after greeting
said person the other male person he was talking to went farther from
us and they conversed.
Q: And after that conversation between your informant and Bernie,
what happened?
A: The confidential informant introduced me as a shabu user and as a
customer.
Q: How far were you from Bernie when you were introduced?
A: Only two (sic) away.
Q: Less than a meter?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was the response of Bernie as you were introduced as a
shabu user?
A: He checked my personality first and he asked me if I will get the
stuff, he asked me in tagalog, kukuha ka ba?
Q: And what did you tell him?
A: I answered him, kung mayroon kukuha ako.
Q: And what was his answer?
A: He answered me that, mayroon kaya tamang-tama kasi isa na lang
itong natitira sa akin panggamit ko sana.
Q: At that very moment, after you were told by Bernie isa na lang ang
natitira, what did you?
A: I asked him kung puwede pang bilhin and then he told me, isa na
lang ito panggamit ko, magkano ba ang kukunin mo?
Q: What was your answer?
A: I told him, 500.00 worth.
Q: And what is [his] reply?
A: Okay, ibibigay ko na lang sa inyo.
Q: And what happened next?
A: He asked my payment first.
Q: And what did you do after he asked your payment?
A: I gave him the pre-marked money.
Q: What (sic) that bill made off?
A: 500.00 bill.
Q: Where did you put that marking in that bill?
A: I put the marking on the upper right portion of the bill inside the 500.
Q: What are the markings did you put there?
A: I put my initials DSD.
Q: Now after you gave him that 500.00 marked money, what else
happened?
A: After he received the pre-marked money then he gave me one (1)
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance after receiving
said I examined the plastic sachet.
Q: After that examination of yours, what did you do?
A: After a brief examination immediately I introduced myself as a
police officer and subsequently, arrested alias Bernie.
Q: After you introduced yourself as a police officer, what was the
reaction of alias Bernie?
A: He was shocked, sir.
Q: Did he tell you anything?
A: None, sir.
Q: And what did you do after arresting him immediately?
A: After informing his constitutional right I recovered the pre-marked
money.
Q: You mean, you frisked him, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What else did you recover from him aside from the mark money?
A: Nothing more.32
Appellant tries to discredit PO2 Damasco and SPO2 Zipagan by
showing an inconsistency in their testimonies regarding the condition
of the scene of the incident. He points out that PO2 Damasco stressed
that the place was dark while SPO2 Zipagan said that the area was
well-lighted.33
After going over the testimonies of the two police operatives, we find
no inconsistency in their testimonies. When asked about the general
condition of the place outside the house of appellant, PO2 Damasco
answered "dim light."34 On the other hand, SPO2 Zipagan said the
place was "a lighted area."35 PO2 Damasco did not say that the place
was dark nor did SPO2 Zipagan say that the place was well-lighted.
What is clear is that the place was lighted. Thus, since both witnesses
said that the place was lighted, the inconsistency is more apparent
than real. Even assuming ad arguendo that this can be considered an
inconsistency, same is trivial to adversely affect their credibility.
We now go to appellants contention that the policemen who arrested
him were impelled by improper motive. He argues that he was merely
talking to his brother and a friend when the policemen suddenly
arrived and insisted that he had sold shabu to PO2 Damasco. He
claims that the charge against him was driven by the policemens
desire to get even with him for filing a case for grave misconduct
against the said policemen with the NAPOLCOM. He added that the
trial court should have considered the motive as to why he was
charged and that the possibility of vengeance is not remote.
We find appelants imputation of ill motive on the police officers to be
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence. We agree in the
trial courts ruling when it said:
The evidence does not show that Damasco and Zipagan were moved
by ill-will in testifying against the accused. There was no ill feeling or
personal animosity existing between the police officers and the
accused at the time of the latters arrest. It is true that accused
Bernardo F. Nicolas and his common-law wife Susan Dela Cruz
Villasoto filed an administrative case against PO2 Joel Tapec and
PO1 Christopher Semana, both of the Pasig City Police Station for
grave misconduct before the National Police Commission which is
docketed as ADM CASE No. 2003-008 (NCR). But the filing of this
case against Tapec and Semana is not enough reason for Damasco
and Zipagan to fabricate or plant evidence against the accused. There
was absolutely no reason at all for them to risk their lives and career to
go and plant evidence against the accused which is in violation of
Section 29 of R.A. 9165 that imposes upon any person found guilty of
planting any dangerous drug regardless of quantity and purity, the
penalty of death. These police officers are presumed to know this law
and the court believes that these police officers do not wish to lose
their lives by fabricating evidence against innocent individuals.
Accused Bernardo Nicolas, naturally, was expected to deny the
accusation against him, for admission would automatically result in
conviction. The testimony of his common-law wife, Susan Dela Cruz
Villasoto is not much of help to the accused[s] defense. Since she did
not witness what transpired when accused went out of the house in
the evening of August 6, 2002. All that she substantially testified to
was that she heard shouting outside of their house and saw three
persons forcibly carrying her husband to the other side of the road.
(TSN, July 7, 2003, p. 4). Witness Jose F. Nicolas, to the mind of the
court is not a credible witness. He claimed he was present at the time
accused was arrested. He said he fled in order to avoid being
handcuffed and arrested by the police when his brother alias Bernie
was arrested. He did not even visit his brother in jail. He talked to him
only on August 25, 2003 to discuss with him his testimony in court.
(TSN, September 15, 2003, p. 13). Being accuseds close relative,
Jose Nicolas is expected to testify favorably in behalf of the accused
whose testimony, of course, is not sufficient to overthrow the strength
and weight of the testimonies of the police officers Damasco and
Zipagan.36
We likewise find appellants declaration that the policemen who
arrested him were the very same ones who robbed his house on 5
February 2002 to be a mere afterthought in order that he may justify
his claim of improper motive on the part of the policemen. How
convenient, indeed, it is for him to make such a declaration. From the
time of the alleged break-in in his house on 5 February 2002 until the
time he was arrested on 6 August 2002 for selling shabu, he never
lifted a finger to try and find out the identities of the alleged five John
Does mentioned in his complaint with the NAPOLCOM. He could have
easily gone to the Station Drug Enforcement Unit of the Pasig Police
Station, but this he did not do. Only when he was arrested during an
entrapment operation did he make such a claim. The timing thereof 500,000.00 in accordance with Article 63(2)42 of the Revised Penal
renders such declaration very dubious and unreliable. Code.

Appellants contention that he was framed-up is made even more Section 98 of Republic Act No. 9165, however, provides for the limited
suspect by the fact that the statement37 of his common-law wife that application of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on said law.
he had gone out of the house for only two minutes when the This Section reads:
policemen arrived and took him away is belied by the statement38 of
his brother that he had been outside the house for 30 minutes and
SEC. 98. Limited Applicability of the Revised Penal Code.
was talking with his brother and Arnold Mendez when the policemen
Notwithstanding any law, rule or regulation to the contrary,
arrived.
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815), as
amended, shall not apply to the provisions of this Act, except in the
Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by this Court, case of minor offenders. Where the offender is a minor, the penalty for
because it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. Moreover, it is a acts punishable by life imprisonment to death provided herein shall be
common and standard line of defense in prosecutions of violations of reclusion perpetua to death. (Underscoring supplied.)
the Dangerous Drugs Act.39 For this claim to prosper, the defense
must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the
With the aforesaid section, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
presumption that government officials have performed their duties in a
shall no longer apply to the provisions of the Drugs law except when
regular and proper manner.40 In the case at bar, the presumption
the offender is a minor. Thus, Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code
remained uncontradicted because the defense failed to present clear
shall not be used in the determination of the penalty to be imposed on
and convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly
the accused. Since Section 98 of the Drugs Law contains the word
perform their duty or that they were inspired by an improper motive.
"shall," the non-applicability of the Revised Penal Code provisions is
mandatory, subject only to the exception in case the offender is a
Prosecutions involving illegal drugs largely depend on the credibility of minor.
the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. Considering
that this Court has access only to the cold and impersonal records of
In the imposition of the proper penalty, the courts, taking into account
the proceedings, it generally relies upon the assessment of the trial
the circumstances attendant in the commission of the offense, are
court, which had the distinct advantage of observing the conduct and
given the discretion to impose either life imprisonment or death, and
demeanor of the witnesses during trial. Hence, factual findings of the
the fine as provided for by law. In light, however, of the effectivity of
trial courts are accorded respect absent any showing that certain facts
Republic Act No. 9346 entitled, "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
of weights and substance bearing on the elements of the crime have
Death Penalty in the Philippines," the imposition of the supreme
been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied.41 We have no
penalty of death has been prohibited. Consequently, the penalty to be
reason to deviate from this rule. We affirm the factual findings of the
meted on appellant shall only be life imprisonment and fine. Hence,
trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The evidence
the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of 500,000.00 were
presented by the prosecution proves to a moral certainty petitioners
properly imposed on the accused-appellant.
guilt of the crime of selling dangerous drugs.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is

The sale of shabu is penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic
DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
Act No. 9165. Said section reads:
H.C. No. 01191 dated 23 August 2005 which affirmed in toto the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 164, in
SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Criminal Case No. 11566-D, finding accused-appellant Bernardo
Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Felizardo Nicolas, a.k.a. Bernie, guilty of violation of Section 5, Article
Precursors and Essential Chemicals. The penalty of life II of Republic Act No. 9165, is hereby AFFIRMED.
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand
pesos (500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (10,000,000.00) shall be
SO ORDERED.
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and
all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity
involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

Under said law, the sale of any dangerous drug, regardless of its
quantity and purity, is punishable by life imprisonment to death and a
fine of 500,000.00 to 10,000,000.00. For selling 0.42 gram of
shabu to PO2 Damasco, the trial court, as sustained by the Court of
Appeals, imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 157870 November 3, 2008
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner
vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA),respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 158633 November 3, 2008
ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., petitioner
vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 161658 November 3, 2008
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioner
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug
testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and
tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices,
and persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certain
offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.
As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug
testing shall be done by any government forensic
laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories
accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the
quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall
employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the
screening test which will determine the positive result as
well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test
which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The
following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
xxxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students
of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the
related rules and regulations as contained in the school's
student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo
a random drug testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. -
Officers and employees of public and private offices,
whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to
undergo a random drug test as contained in the
company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes
of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or
employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall
be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for
suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of
Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of
the Civil Service Law;
xxxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with
a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1)
day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or
elected both in the national or local government shall
undergo a mandatory drug test.
In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to
be positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions
of Section 15 of this Act.
G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections)
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on
the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in
connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local
elections. The pertinent portions of the said resolution read as follows:
WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165
provides:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - x x x
xxxx
(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the
national or local government shall undergo a mandatory
drug test.
WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
provides that public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency;
WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo
mandatory drug test, the public will know the quality of
candidates they are electing and they will be assured that
only those who can serve with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency would be elected x x x.
NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the
authority vested in it under the Constitution, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), [RA] 9165
and other election laws, RESOLVED to promulgate, as it
hereby promulgates, the following rules and regulations
on the conduct of mandatory drug testing to candidates
for public office[:]
SECTION 1. Coverage. - All candidates for public
office, both national and local, in the May 10, 2004
Synchronized National and Local Elections shall
undergo mandatory drug test in government forensic
laboratories or any drug testing laboratories monitored
and accredited by the Department of Health.
SEC. 3. x x x
On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates
filed with their respective offices, the Comelec Offices and
employees concerned shall submit to the Law Department
two (2) separate lists of candidates. The first list shall
consist of those candidates who complied with the
mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of
those candidates who failed to comply x x x.
SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of
candidates. - Before the start of the campaign period, the
[COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of
candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates
who complied with the mandatory drug test while the
second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to
comply with said drug test. x x x
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test
and file drug test certificate. - No person elected to any
public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until
he has undergone mandatory drug test and filed with the
offices enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test
certificate herein required. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a
candidate for re - election in the May 10, 2004 elections,1 filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1)
to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they
impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those
already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the
COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the
Constitution, which states:
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a
natural - born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of
the election, is at least thirty - five years of age, able to
read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the
Philippines for not less than two years immediately
preceding the day of the election.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of
five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a
member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and
COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a
senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory
drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for
senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no
provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to
expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice
Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the
Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec.
36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For
one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power
when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to
determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions
trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to
harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third,
a person's constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also
breached by said provisions.
G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also
seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that
Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as
unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the
right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against
self - incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and
equal protection guarantees.
The Issue on Locus Standi
First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and
the matter of the standing of petitioners SJS and Laserna to sue. As
respondents DDB and PDEA assert, SJS and Laserna failed to allege
any incident amounting to a violation of the constitutional rights
mentioned in their separate petitions.2
It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in
connection with a bona fidecontroversy which involves the statute
sought to be reviewed.3 But even with the presence of an actual case
or controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial review unless
the constitutional question is brought before it by a party having the
requisite standing to challenge it.4 To have standing, one must
establish that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened injury
as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury
is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.5
The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can
be relaxed for non - traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such
as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.6 There is no
doubt that Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and candidate for
the May 10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing since he
has substantial interests in the subject matter of the petition, among
other preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and Laserna, this
Court is wont to relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the
transcendental importance and the paramount public interest involved
in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.
The Consolidated Issues
The principal issues before us are as follows:
(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator?
Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for
candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the
Constitution? and
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165
unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to
privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the
equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of
legislative power?
Pimentel Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional
qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to
the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs
only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy,
(4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification
requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other
qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as
member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or
otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard,
evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate,7 or alter or
enlarge the Constitution.
Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic
that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The
Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act
shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.8 In the discharge of
their defined functions, the three departments of government have no
choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution.
Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.9
Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are
subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v.
Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on
legislative power in the following wise:
Someone has said that the powers of the legislative
department of the Government, like the boundaries of the
ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments,
however, as well as governments acting under delegated
authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are
limited and confined within the four walls of the
constitution or the charter, and each department can only
exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from the
given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative
authority against which the waves of legislative enactment
may dash, but over which it cannot leap.10
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to
substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the
exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of
legislation.11 The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found
in the Bill of Rights12 and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of
the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for
senators.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and
administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to
implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for
senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress
cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional
qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power.
The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not
be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise
specified in the Constitution.13
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed
COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification
requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As
couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for
senator to be certified illegal - drug clean, obviously as a pre -
condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with
like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be
proclaimed as senator - elect. The COMELEC resolution completes
the chain with the proviso that "[n]o person elected to any public office
shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test." Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add
another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the
minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the
drug - free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled
before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected
would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non -
compliance with the drug - testing requirement.
It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of
RA 9165, that the provision does not expressly state that non -
compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or
would work to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument may be
accorded plausibility if the drug test requirement is optional. But the
particular section of the law, without exception, made drug - testing on
those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate
ones shall have to suffer the adverse consequences for not adhering
to the statutory command. And since the provision deals with
candidates for public office, it stands to reason that the adverse
consequence adverted to can only refer to and revolve around the
election and the assumption of public office of the candidates. Any
other construal would reduce the mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of
RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and effect whatsoever.
While it is anti - climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 is no longer enforceable, for by its terms, it was
intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 synchronized elections and
the candidates running in that electoral event. Nonetheless, to obviate
repetition, the Court deems it appropriate to review and rule, as it
hereby rules, on its validity as an implementing issuance.
It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the
unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having
infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or
eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.
SJS Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)
The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for
secondary and tertiary level students and public and private
employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless
arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard
in the process "the well being of [the] citizenry, particularly the youth,
from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs." This statutory purpose,
per the policy - declaration portion of the law, can be achieved via the
pursuit by the state of "an intensive and unrelenting campaign against
the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through an integrated
system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti - drug
abuse policies, programs and projects."14 The primary legislative intent
is not criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug use
as a result of this random testing are not necessarily treated as
criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal liability should the
illegal drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of
RA 9165 are clear on this point:
Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to
Confinement, Treatment and Rehabilitation. - A drug
dependent or any person who violates Section 15 of this
Act may, by himself/herself or through his/her parent,
[close relatives] x x x apply to the Board x x x for
treatment and rehabilitation of the drug dependency.
Upon such application, the Board shall bring forth the
matter to the Court which shall order that the applicant be
examined for drug dependency. If the examination x x x
results in the certification that the applicant is a drug
dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the Court to
undergo treatment and rehabilitation in a Center
designated by the Board x x x.
xxxx
Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the
Voluntary Submission Program. - A drug dependent under
the voluntary submission program, who is finally
discharged from confinement, shall be exempt from the
criminal liability under Section 15 of this Act subject to the
following conditions:
xxxx
School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to
the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs. Maturing
nervous systems of the young are more critically impaired by
intoxicants and are more inclined to drug dependency. Their recovery
is also at a depressingly low rate.15
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction
as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure16 under Sec. 2, Art. III17 of the
Constitution. But while the right to privacy has long come into its own,
this case appears to be the first time that the validity of a state -
decreed search or intrusion through the medium of mandatory random
drug testing among students and employees is, in this jurisdiction,
made the focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these proceedings is
veritably one of first impression.
US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive
jurisprudence. With respect to random drug testing among school
children, we turn to the teachings of Vernonia School District 47J v.
Acton (Vernonia) and Board of Education of Independent School
District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al. (Board of
Education),18 both fairly pertinent US Supreme Court - decided cases
involving the constitutionality of governmental search.
In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to
address the drug menace in their respective institutions following the
discovery of frequent drug use by school athletes. After consultation
with the parents, they required random urinalysis drug testing for the
school's athletes. James Acton, a high school student, was denied
participation in the football program after he refused to undertake the
urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith sued, claiming that the school's
drug testing policy violated, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment19 of the
US Constitution.
The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised
in Vernonia, considered the following: (1) schools stand in loco
parentis over their students; (2) school children, while not shedding
their constitutional rights at the school gate, have less privacy rights;
(3) athletes have less privacy rights than non - athletes since the
former observe communal undress before and after sports events; (4)
by joining the sports activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected
themselves to a higher degree of school supervision and regulation;
(5) requiring urine samples does not invade a student's privacy since a
student need not undress for this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is
need for the drug testing because of the dangerous effects of illegal
drugs on the young. The US Supreme Court held that the policy
constituted reasonable search under the Fourth20 and 14th
Amendments and declared the random drug - testing policy
constitutional.
In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school in
Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a drug test for high school students
desiring to join extra - curricular activities. Lindsay Earls, a member of
the show choir, marching band, and academic team declined to
undergo a drug test and averred that the drug - testing policy made to
apply to non - athletes violated the Fourth and 14th Amendments. As
Earls argued, unlike athletes who routinely undergo physical
examinations and undress before their peers in locker rooms, non -
athletes are entitled to more privacy.
The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of
drug testing even among non - athletes on the basis of the school's
custodial responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said court made no
distinction between a non - athlete and an athlete. It ratiocinated that
schools and teachers act in place of the parents with a similar interest
and duty of safeguarding the health of the students. And in holding
that the school could implement its random drug - testing policy, the
Court hinted that such a test was a kind of search in which even a
reasonable parent might need to engage.
In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases
and applied to this jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their administrators
stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students
have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the
custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3)
schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health
and well - being of their students and may adopt such measures as
may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools
have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that
are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view
and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional.
Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require,
as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules
and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not
absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.
The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited
drugs in the country that threatens the well - being of the
people,21 particularly the youth and school children who usually end up
as victims. Accordingly, and until a more effective method is
conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing of students in
secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may even be
necessary if the safety and interest of the student population,
doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted
and protected. To borrow from Vernonia, "[d]eterring drug use by our
Nation's schoolchildren is as important as enhancing efficient
enforcement of the Nation's laws against the importation of drugs"; the
necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact that the effects of
a drug - infested school are visited not just upon the users, but upon
the entire student body and faculty.22 Needless to stress, the random
testing scheme provided under the law argues against the idea that
the testing aims to incriminate unsuspecting individual students.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the
mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for
officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit
not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that
petitioner SJS, other than saying that "subjecting almost everybody to
drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted
intrusion of the individual right to privacy,"23 has failed to show how the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c)
and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes
unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of
the Constitution.24 Petitioner Laserna's lament is just as simplistic,
sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration.
Consider what he wrote without elaboration:
The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals
have made various rulings on the constitutionality of
mandatory drug tests in the school and the workplaces.
 The US courts have been consistent in their rulings that
the mandatory drug tests violate a citizen's constitutional
right to privacy and right against unreasonable search and
seizure. They are quoted extensively hereinbelow.25
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.26 In context, the
right to privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted
exploitation of one's person or from intrusion into one's private
activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person's ordinary
sensibilities. 27 And while there has been general agreement as to the
basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search,
"translation of the abstract prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures' into workable broad guidelines for the decision of
particular cases is a difficult task," to borrow from C. Camara v.
Municipal Court.28 Authorities are agreed though that the right to
privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to
the state's exercise of police power.29
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is
couched and as has been held, "reasonableness" is the touchstone of
the validity of a government search or intrusion.30 And whether a
search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the
balancing of the government - mandated intrusion on the individual's
privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state
interest.31 In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of
probable cause to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the
drug - testing policy for employees--and students for that matter--
under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what
was referred to in Vernonia as "swift and informal disciplinary
procedures," the probable - cause standard is not required or even
practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the
reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the
nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which
effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as
the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the
employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The
employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent
circumscribed by the company's work policies, the collective
bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the
bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain
discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in
a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of
impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion
authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the
scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated
in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly
drawn" or "narrowly focused"?32
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of
RA 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as
couched, contain provisions specifically directed towards preventing a
situation that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them
under a humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a
private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or
she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled
out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by
not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as
may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what,
in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees
concerned shall be subjected to "random drug test as contained in the
company's work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing
the risk in the work place."
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under
conditions calculated to protect as much as possible the employee's
privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies
that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the
screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much
as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more important
consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained
professionals in access - controlled laboratories monitored by the
Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering
and to ensure an accurate chain of custody.33 In addition, the IRR
issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on
the "need to know" basis;34 that the "drug test result and the records
shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to
protect the confidentiality of the test results."35 Notably, RA 9165 does
not oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting
agencies any information or evidence relating to the violation of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the
operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the
employees' privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper
safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results,
and is relatively minimal.
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal
drug in the country and thus protect the well - being of the citizens,
especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs.
The law intends to achieve this through the medium, among others, of
promoting and resolutely pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the
workplace via a mandatory random drug test.36 To the Court, the need
for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial
enough to override the individual's privacy interest under the premises.
The Court can consider that the illegal drug menace cuts across
gender, age group, and social - economic lines. And it may not be
amiss to state that the sale, manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs,
with their ready market, would be an investor's dream were it not for
the illegal and immoral components of any of such activities. The drug
problem has hardly abated since the martial law public execution of a
notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid back
stance with respect to this modern - day scourge. Drug enforcement
agencies perceive a mandatory random drug test to be an effective
way of preventing and deterring drug use among employees in private
offices, the threat of detection by random testing being higher than
other modes. The Court holds that the chosen method is a reasonable
and enough means to lick the problem.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation
of privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern
likely to be met by the search, and the well - defined limits set forth in
the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random
testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the
limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and
employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions
imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all
enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public
service.37 And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for
private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil
servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus
accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office
responsibility and efficiency.38 and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the
Petitioner SJS' next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive
on the ground of undue delegation of power hardly commends itself their right to privacy.40 To impose mandatory drug testing on the
for concurrence. Contrary to its position, the provision in question is accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for
not so extensively drawn as to give unbridled options to schools and criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165.
employers to determine the manner of drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy
provides how drug testing for students of secondary and tertiary guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the
schools and officers/employees of public/private offices should be accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall undergo drug testing. WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No.
In the case of students, the testing shall be in accordance with the 161658 and declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
school rules as contained in the student handbook and with notice to Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY
parents. On the part of officers/employees, the testing shall take into GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by
account the company's work rules. In either case, the random declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but
procedure shall be observed, meaning that the persons to be declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned
subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an unplanned agencies are, accordingly, permanently enjoined from
way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. No costs.
the confidentiality of the test results are established. SO ORDERED.
Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue,
in consultation with the DOH, Department of the Interior and Local
Government, Department of Education, and Department of Labor and
Employment, among other agencies, the IRR necessary to enforce the
law. In net effect then, the participation of schools and offices in the
drug testing scheme shall always be subject to the IRR of RA 9165. It
is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools and employers have
unchecked discretion to determine how often, under what conditions,
and where the drug tests shall be conducted.
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the
constitutional landscape.39 In the face of the increasing complexity of
the task of the government and the increasing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its
attention, resort to delegation of power, or entrusting to administrative
agencies the power of subordinate legislation, has become imperative,
as here.
Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d],
[f], and [g] of RA 9165)
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the
Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons
accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability
of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students
emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to
privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily
submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities.
In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional
soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and
requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged
before the public prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable
with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative
concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and
"suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a crime before
the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random
or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless
are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint.
They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.
When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 184181 November 26, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOSEPH ROBELO y TUNGALA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is another instance where we are called upon to resolve an issue
concerning the constitutional presumption of innocence accorded to
an accused vis--vis the corresponding presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duties of police officers involved in a drug
buy-bust operation.
Assailed in this appeal interposed by appellant Joseph Robelo y
Tungala is February 27, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02711, which affirmed the January 26, 2007
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the City of Manila,
Branch 2, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
Illegal Possession and Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs under
Sections 11(3) and (5) in relation to Section 26, Article II, respectively,
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Factual Antecedents
At about 10:00 a.m. of March 26, 2004, the Station of Anti-Illegal
Drugs Special Operation Task Force (SAID), Police Station 2 in
Moriones, Tondo, Manila received information from a civilian informer
that a certain alias "Kalbo" (appellant) is involved in the sale of illegal
drugs in Parola Compound. Forthwith, the Chief of SAID organized a
team composed of eight police officers to conduct a "buy-bust"
operation to entrap appellant. PO2 Arnel Tubbali (PO2 Tubbali) was
designated as the poseur-buyer and was thus handed a 100 peso bill
which he marked with his initials. The rest of the team were to serve
as back-ups.
The civilian asset led PO2 Tubbali to the target area while others
positioned themselves in strategic places. Not long after, appellant
came out from Gate 16, Area 1-b with a companion who was later
identified as Teddy Umali (Umali). Upon approaching the two, the
civilian informer introduced to them PO2 Tubbali as a friend and a
prospective buyer of shabu. PO2 Tubbali then conveyed his desire to
buy P100.00 worth of shabu and handed Umali the marked P100.00
bill. After accepting the money, Umali ordered appellant to give PO2
Tubbali one plastic sachet of shabu to which the latter readily
complied. PO2 Tubbali then looked at the plastic sachet, placed it in
his pocket, and made the pre-arranged signal by scratching his butt.
Whereupon, the rest of the team rushed to the scene and arrested
appellant and Umali. When frisked by PO2 Conrado Juano, one
plastic sachet suspected to contain shabu was found inside
appellants pocket. He and Umali were afterwards brought to the
precinct where the investigator marked the seized items with the
initials "JRT-1" and "JRT-2". The investigator then prepared the
Laboratory Request,3 Booking Sheet,4 Arrest Report,5 Joint Affidavit of
Apprehension6 and a referral letter for inquest.7
After qualitative examination, the forensic chemist found the items
positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous
drug.
Appellant was accordingly charged with illegal sale and illegal
possession of shabu in two separate Informations while Umali was
indicted in another Information raffled to a different branch of the RTC.
The Informations against appellant read as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 04-225284
That on or about March 26, 2004, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, without being authorized by law to possess any
dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1)
transparent plastic sachet containing ZERO POINT ZERO NINETEEN
(0.019) gram of white crystalline substance known as shabu,
containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 04-225285
That on or about March 26, 2004, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, conspiring and confederating with one whose true
name, identity and present whereabouts are still unknown and
mutually helping each other, not having been authorized by law to sell,
trade, deliver or give away to another any dangerous drug, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell or offer for sale one
(1) transparent plastic sachet containing ZERO POINT ZERO
THIRTEEN (0.013) gram of white crystalline substance known as
shabu, containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.9
During arraignment, appellant, assisted by his counsel, pleaded "not
guilty" in the two cases. After the termination of the pre-trial, trial on
the merits immediately ensued.
Appellant denied being a drug pusher and claimed complete I
ignorance as to why he was being implicated in the said crimes. He
averred that he was repairing the floor of his mothers house when two
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING A
police officers in civilian clothes went inside the house, ransacked the
VERDICT OF CONVICTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE GUILT
closet and without any reason handcuffed and brought him to the
OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND
precinct. At the precinct, the police officers demanded from him
REASONABLE DOUBT.
P10,000.00 in exchange for his liberty.
II
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
After trial, the RTC rendered a verdict of conviction on January 26,
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASOANBLE DOUBT
2007,10 viz:
OF THE CRIME CHARGED NOTWITHSTANDING THE POLICE
OFFICERS FAILURE TO REGULARLY PERFORM THEIR OFFICIAL
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows, to wit: FUNCTIONS.14
1. In Criminal Case No. 04-225284, finding accused, Joseph Robelo y Our Ruling
Tungala @ "Kalbo", GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
The appeal has no merit.
12 years and 1 day as minimum to 17 years and 4 months as
maximum; to pay a fine of P300,000,00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. Appellants first assignment of error basically hinges on the credibility
of the prosecution witnesses, particularly in their conduct of the buy-
bust operation. He asserts that the alleged buy-bust operation is
2. In Criminal Case No. 04-225285, finding accused, Joseph Robelo y
tainted with infirmity due to the absence of a prior surveillance or
Tungala @ "Kalbo", GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
investigation. Moreover, per the testimony of PO2 Tubbali, appellant
charged, he is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay the
did not say anything when the former was introduced to him as an
fine of P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
interested buyer of shabu. Appellant points out that it is contrary to
insolvency and to pay the costs.
human nature that the seller would say nothing to the buyer who is a
complete stranger to him.
The specimens are forfeited in favor of the government and the
Branch Clerk of Court, accompanied by the Branch Sheriff, is directed
We sustain the validity of the buy-bust operation.
to turn over with dispatch and upon receipt the said specimen to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposal in
accordance with the law and rules. A buy-bust operation has been proven to be an effective mode of
apprehending drug pushers. In this regard, police authorities are given
a wide latitude in employing their own ways of trapping or
SO ORDERED.11
apprehending drug dealers in flagrante delicto. There is no prescribed
method on how the operation is to be conducted. As ruled in People v.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals Garcia,15 the absence of a prior surveillance or test-buy does not affect
the legality of the buy-bust operation as there is no text book method
of conducting the same. As long as the constitutional rights of the
On appeal, the CA concurred with the RTCs findings and conclusions
suspected drug dealer are not violated, the regularity of the operation
and, consequently, affirmed the said lower courts judgment in its
will always be upheld. Thus, in People v. Salazar,16 we ruled that "if
assailed Decision12 of February 27, 2008, the dispositive portion of
carried out with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards, buy-
which reads:
bust operation deserves judicial sanction."
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed
Neither impressive is appellants contention that it is contrary to
Decision dated January 26, 2007 is hereby AFFIRMED.
human nature to sell the illegal stuff to a complete stranger. The law
does not prescribe as an element of the crime that the vendor and the
SO ORDERED.13 vendee be familiar with each other. As aptly held by the CA, peddlers
of illicit drugs have been known with ever increasing casualness and
recklessness to offer and sell their wares for the right price to
Still undeterred, appellant is now before us and by way of assignment anybody, be they strangers or not.
of errors reiterates the grounds and arguments raised in his Brief filed
before the CA, to wit:
While indeed there was little or no exchange between the poseur-
buyer and the appellant as it was the former and Umali who
negotiated for the sale, he still cannot escape liability because of his
passive complicity therein. Simply stated, there was conspiracy
between appellant and Umali as can be deduced from the testimony of
PO2 Tubbali, to wit:
Q. So when Teddy Umali received this One Hundred Peso-bill
(P100.00), what happened next, Mr. Witness?
A. Then he talked to Joseph Robelo alias "Kalbo" to give me a shabu,
one
(1) plastic sachet, sir.
Q. Did Robelo comply?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How did, this Joseph
A. And then Joseph handed me one (1) plastic sachet, sir.17
Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime suggesting concerted
action and unity of purpose among them. In this case, the testimony of
the poseur-buyer clearly shows a unity of mind between appellant and
Umali in selling the illegal drugs to him. Hence, applying the basic
principle in conspiracy that the "act of one is the act of all" appellant is
guilty as a co-conspirator and regardless of his participation, is liable
as co-principal. Appellants silence when the poseur-buyer was
introduced to him as an interested buyer of shabu is non-sequitur.
Appellant denies his complicity in the crime by invoking alibi and
frame-up. He claims that in the morning of March 26, 2004, he was at
his mothers house doing some repair job and was just suddenly
arrested and brought to the precinct where the arresting officers
demanded P10,000.00 for his liberty.
We, however, find that the RTC correctly rejected this defense of the
appellant.
Time and again, we have stressed virtually to the point of repletion
that alibi is one of the weakest defenses that an accused can invoke
because it is easy to fabricate. In order to be given full faith and credit,
an alibi must be clearly established and must not leave any doubt as
to its plausibility and veracity. Here, appellants claim that he was at
his mothers house at the time of the incident cannot stand against the
clear and positive identification of him by the prosecution witnesses.
As aptly held by the RTC, "[t]he portrayal put forward by appellant
remained uncorroborated. The testimonies of the witnesses presented
by the defense do not jibe with one another and that of the claim of the
appellant himself. x x x Lastly, the demand for money worth
P10,000.00 remained unsubstantiated. x x x If indeed appellant is ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million irrespective of the quantity
innocent he or his family who were his witnesses should have filed a and purity of the substance.
case of planting of evidence against the police which is now
punishable by life imprisonment."18
On the other hand, Section 11(3), Article II of the same law provides
that illegal possession of less than five grams of shabu is penalized
In fine, no error was committed by the RTC and the CA in giving with imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The general years plus a fine ranging from P300,000.00 to P400,000.00.
rule is that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
deserve great weight, and are generally not disturbed, on appeal. We
Appellant was found guilty of selling 0.019 gram of shabu and of
find no reason to depart from such old-age rule as there are no
possessing another 0.013 gram. Hence, applying the above
compelling reasons which would warrant the reversal of the verdict.
provisions, we find the penalties imposed by the RTC as affirmed by
the CA to be in order.
In his second assignment of error, appellant draws attention to the
failure of the apprehending officers to comply with Section 21 of R.A.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed February 27,
No. 9165 regarding the physical inventory and photocopy of the seized
2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02711
items. He asserts that this failure casts doubt on the validity of his
is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
arrest and the identity of the suspected shabu allegedly bought and
confiscated from him.
SO ORDERED.
Appellants contention fails to convince us.
It should be noted that the alleged non-compliance with Section 21 of
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was not raised before the trial court but only
for the first time on appeal. This cannot be done. In People v. Sta.
Maria,19 People v. Hernandez,20 and People v. Lazaro, Jr.,21 among
others, in which the very same issue was belatedly raised, we ruled:
x x x Indeed the police officers alleged violations of Sections 21 and
86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial court but
were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did
appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the
safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary
value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered,
he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection, he
cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.
Moreover, "non-compliance with Section 21 does not render an
accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible. What is essential is the preservation of the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items as the same would be utilized
in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused."22 The
records reveal that at no instance did appellant hint a doubt on the
integrity of the seized items.
Undoubtedly, therefore, the suspected illegal drugs confiscated from
appellant were the very same substance presented and identified in
court. This Court, thus, upholds the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties by the apprehending police officers.
The Penalty
Under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, illegal sale of shabu
carries with it the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 185163 January 17, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CARLO MAGNO AURE y ARNALDO and MELCHOR AUSTRIACO
y AGUILA, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This is an appeal from the May 12, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 02600 entitled People of the
Philippines v. Carlo Magno Aure and Melchor Austriaco, which
affirmed the September 1, 2006 Decision2 in Criminal Case Nos. 03-
3296, 03-3297, and 03-4210 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 64 in Makati City. The RTC found accused Carlo Magno Aure
(Aure) and Melchor Austriaco (Austriaco) guilty of violating Sections 5,
11, and 15, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
The Information in Criminal Case No. 03-3296 charged Aure and
Austriaco with violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165. The Information
reads:
That on or about the 26th day of August, 2003, in the City of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating and
both of them mutually helping and aiding with one another, without the
necessary license or prescription and without being authorized by law,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver, and
give away P6,000.00 worth of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride
(Shabu) weighing three point ninety-one (3.91) grams, a dangerous
drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
In Criminal Case No. 03-3297, the Information charged Aure with
violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165, as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of August, 2003, in the City of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to
possess and/or use regulated drugs and without any license or proper
prescription, did then and there willingly, unlawfully, feloniously have in
his possession, custody and control Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu) weighing eighty six point twenty-three (86.23)
grams, which is a dangerous drug, in violation of the aforesaid law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
And the Information in Criminal Case No. 03-4210 charged Austriaco
with violation of Sec. 15, Art. II of RA 9165, as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of August, 2003, in the City of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to use
any dangerous drug, and having been arrested and found positive for
the use of Methylamphetamine after a confirmatory test, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use Methylamphetamine, a
dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
When arraigned in Criminal Case Nos. 03-3296 and 03-3297 on
September 9, 2003, Aure and Austriaco entered their negative pleas.6
Meanwhile, during the arraignment on February 19, 2004, Austriaco
pleaded guilty in Criminal Case No. 03-4210. The promulgation of the
decision in this case was deferred pending submission by the defense
counsel of a certification that he had not been convicted of the same
offense.7
Thereafter, a consolidated trial of Criminal Case Nos. 03-3296 and 03-
3297 ensued.
During trial, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, to wit: (1)
Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC) operative Norman Bilason
(Bilason), the designated poseur-buyer; (2) Police Officer 3 Jay
Lagasca (PO3 Lagasca), the buy-bust team leader; and (3) MADAC
operative Rogelio Flores (Flores), one of the back-up operatives. On
the other hand, the defense presented Aure and Austriaco as its
witnesses.8
The Prosecutions Version of Facts
At around 4:00 in the afternoon of August 26, 2003, an informant
came to the Office of MADAC Cluster 2 and reported that a certain
Carlo, later identified as Carlo Magno Aure, was rampantly selling
illegal drugs along F. Nazario Street, Barangay Singkamas, Makati
City.9 Aure was reportedly armed with a handgun and was using his
car in his illegal transactions.10
Upon being apprised of the ongoing drug peddling, the Chief of the
Drug Enforcement Unit of the Makati City Police Station immediately
created a group of officers which would conduct a buy-bust
operation.11 Composing this team was PO3 Lagasca, as the team
leader, with operatives from both the police stations Anti-Illegal Drug
Special Operation Task Force (AIDSOTF) and MADACs Clusters 2
and 3 as members.
When a briefing was conducted, MADAC operative Bilason was
assigned as the poseur-buyer to be provided with 12 marked five
hundred peso (PhP 500) bills, amounting to six thousand pesos (PhP
6,000).
After marking the 12 PhP 500 bills, the team, with the informant, went
to the place where Aure was reported to be conducting his trade.
When they reached a point along Primo Rivera Street, about 30
meters away from F. Nazario Street, they alighted from their vehicles.
MADAC operative Bilason and the informant walked towards F.
Nazario Street, while the rest of the team members followed them.
Thereafter, when Bilason and the informant saw Aure and a certain
"Buboy," who turned out to be Austriaco, seating inside a car parked
along F. Nazario Street, they approached the latter. In the meantime,
the other team members strategically positioned themselves within the
area to monitor the transaction.
Bilason was introduced by the informant as a buyer of shabu. Aure
initially expressed his apprehension that Bilason could be an
operative. Nevertheless, when the informant assured him that Bilason
is his friend from the province, Aure asked Bilason how much he
needed. To this, Bilason replied "Isang bolto, pare,"12 which meant six
thousand pesos (PhP 6,000) worth of shabu. When demanded by
Aure, Bilason handed the previously marked money to him. The latter
then placed the marked money inside his right front pocket.
Afterwards, Aure secured from Austriaco a small brown bag and a
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, suspected as
shabu, taken from the same bag. Aure then handed over the same
plastic sachet with its contents to Bilason.
After ascertaining that what Aure gave him was shabu, Bilason lighted
his cigarette to signal to his team members that the transaction with
Aure was already consummated. Immediately, PO3 Lagasca and
MADAC operative Flores closed in.13 After introducing themselves as
AIDSOTF and MADAC operatives, Bilason and his team members
placed Aure and Austriaco under arrest, and ordered them to get out
of the car.14
Subsequently, Bilason seized the small brown bag from Aure. When
inspected, said bag yielded another plastic sachet containing
substantial amount of suspected shabu wrapped in red wrapping
paper, empty plastic sachets, and glass pipe tooter. Also seized was a
.45 caliber pistol with one magazine and five live bullets found inside
the car near the place where Aure was seated. Flores also recovered
the marked money from Aure. The recovered items were marked by
Bilason in the presence of Aure and Austriaco. PO3 Lagasca likewise
explained to the two suspects the cause of their arrest and apprised
them of their constitutional rights.
Eventually, Aure and Austriaco were brought to the AIDSOTF office.
The examinations conducted by the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory on the plastic sachets of suspected shabu and the glass
pipe tooter yielded positive results for Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride.15 This was indicated in Chemistry Report No. D-1068-
0316issued by Police Inspector Alejandro C. de Guzman.
Version of the Defense
Aure and Austriaco interposed the defense of denial.
Aure testified that on August 26, 2003, at around 8:00 in the evening,
he fetched Austriaco in Pasay City.17 The latter was referred to him by
his compadre18 to repair the cabinet in the house he intended to lease
on F. Nazario Street, Barangay Singkamas, Makati City. They
proceeded to the said house in Makati City on board Aures Toyota
Celica.
At around 8:30 in the evening, while Austriaco was estimating the cost
of materials to be used for the repair of the cabinet, Aure heard knocks
on the door. When he opened the door, he saw 10 men in civilian
clothes who immediately grabbed him and made him lie face down for
about three minutes.
This group of men allegedly began to search the house and seized the
money amounting to PhP 200,000 which Aure intended to use for
purchasing a taxi cab, among other things. During this time, Austriaco
was standing beside the cabinet near the lavatory when someone
ordered, "Kunin niyo na rin yung isa."19
Thereafter, Aure was handcuffed and was subsequently brought to the
office of the Drug Enforcement Unit.20 After about five to 10 minutes,
he saw Austriaco, who was also handcuffed, being brought inside the
said office.21
Aure further testified that a plastic sachet of shabu was shown to him,
and when he denied that the item came from him despite the arresting
mens insistence that this was in his possession, he was punched by a
police officer. He also averred that a certain Rogelio Flores tried to
extort money from him. His wallet and license were allegedly taken
from him by the persons who arrested him.
For his part, Austriaco recounted that in the evening of August 26,
2003, he was fetched by a certain Benjamin Zaide from his house in
Pasay City to repair the cabinet of Aure. Together, they proceeded to
the house of Benjamin Zaide, also in Pasay City, where Aure was
waiting. Thereafter, they proceeded to Aures house in Makati City.
Upon arriving at Aures house, Austriaco immediately attended to the
cabinet he was supposed to repair. A few minutes later, he heard
some noise coming from the direction of the stairs of the house.
Nonetheless, he went on with his work and just focused his attention
on the cabinet he was estimating.22
Austriaco further narrated that when Aure opened the door, he saw
several men wearing civilian clothes enter the house and forcibly grab
Aure. The latter stumbled and fell to the floor with his face down. The
group of men began to search the house. Eventually, Austriaco saw
Aure being brought outside of Aures house. After two to three
minutes, he was also taken out of the house and was brought to the
Criminal Investigation Division.23
Ruling of the Trial Court
After trial, the RTC convicted Aure and Austriaco. The dispositive
portion of its Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing judgment is rendered as
follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 03-3296, for Violation of Section
5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the accused CARLO
MAGNO AURE y ARNALDO and MELCHOR
AUSTRIACO y AGUILA are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged and both are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT
and each one to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (PHP 500,000.00) PESOS.
2. In Criminal Case No. 03-3297 for Violation of Section
11, Article II Republic Act No. 9165, the accused CARLO
MAGNO AURE y ARNALDO is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged and considering
the quantity of shabu recovered from his possession
which is 86.23 grams, is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand (Php 500,000.00) [Pesos].
3. In Criminal Case No. 03-4210, for Violation of Section
15 Article II, Republic Act No. 9165, the accused
MELCHOR AUSTRIACO y AGUILA having pleaded
GUILTY to the charge is sentenced to undergo drug
rehabilitation for at least six (6) months in a government
rehabilitation center under the auspices of the Bureau of
Corrections subject to the provisions of Article VIII of
Republic Act No. 9165.
The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to transmit to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the two (2) plastic sachets of shabu with
a combined weight of 90.14 grams subject matter of Criminal Cases
Nos. 03-3296 and 03-3297 for said agencys appropriate disposition.
SO ORDERED.24
On appeal to the CA, Aure and Austriaco questioned the trial courts
decision in convicting them despite their claim that the prosecution
failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.25
Ruling of the Appellate Court
On May 12, 2008, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC. It ruled
that all the elements necessary to establish the fact of sale or delivery
of illegal drugs were aptly established by the prosecution, to wit:
In the present controversy, the elements of the crimes charged were
amply proven not only by the categorical and materially consistent
declarations of the poseur-buyer and two other members of the buy-
bust team, but also by laboratory examinations of the substance
seized, drug test of one of the accused-appellants, affidavits, marked
bills, and other reports which were all submitted in court. Taken
collectively, these pieces of evidence bear out that the accused-
appellants indeed sold a packet of white crystalline substance to
MADAC operative and poseur-buyer Norman Bilason in exchange for
P6,000 and that the substance seized eventually tested positive for
shabu. In the prosecution of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited
drugs, what is essential is the proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti as evidence.26 (Citations omitted.)
The CA held also that in the absence of proof to suggest that the
arresting officers were moved by improper motives, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of
the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over the self-
serving claim of having been framed.27 Further, the appellate court
ruled that the statutory burden of guilt beyond reasonable doubt was
ably discharged by the prosecution. After all, it ratiocinated that "proof
beyond reasonable doubt" does not necessarily contemplate "absolute
certainty" but that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.
The fallo of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing discussion, the present
appeal is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the decision of the court a
quo dated 01 September 2006 is perforce affirmed in its entirety.
SO ORDERED.28
On June 3, 2008, accused-appellants filed their Notice of Appeal.29
In our Resolution dated January 14, 2009,30 We notified the parties
that they may file their respective supplemental briefs if they so
desired. On March 19, 2009, the People of the Philippines manifested
delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it.36 What is material to
that it was no longer filing a supplemental brief, as it believed that the
Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee dated November 6, 2007 had thoroughly
refuted and discussed the lone issue raised by accused-appellants in
the instant case.31 Similarly, accused-appellants, on April 8, 2009,
manifested that they were no longer filing a supplemental brief, as
they are adopting all the arguments contained in their Brief for the
Accused-Appellants dated June 15, 2007.32
The Issues
Accused-appellants contend in their Brief for the Accused-Appellants
dated June 15, 200733 that:
the court A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED
GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED NOTWITHSTANDING THE
FAILURE OF the PROSECUTION TO PROVE their GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
Our Ruling
We sustain accused-appellants conviction.
Proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt adequately established
by the prosecution
After a careful examination of the records of this case, We are
satisfied that the prosecutions evidence established the guilt of
accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
In deciding this appeal, this Court is guided by the legal aphorism that
factual findings of the CA, affirming those of the trial court, are binding
on this Court, unless there is a clear showing that such findings are
tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness, or palpable error.34 As this
Court held in People v. Lusabio, Jr.:35
All in all, we find the evidence of the prosecution to be more credible
than that adduced by accused-appellant. When it comes to credibility,
the trial courts assessment deserves great weight, and is even
conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is
obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses
deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better
position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence
properly. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
Here, accused-appellants failed to show any palpable error,
arbitrariness, or oversight on the findings of fact of the trial and
appellate courts as to warrant a review of such findings.1avvphi1
In the prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs under
Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165, the following elements must concur: (1) the
identities of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the
the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually occurred, coupled with the presentation in
court of the substance seized as evidence.37 In the instant case, all
these were sufficiently established by the prosecution.
MADAC operative Bilason, the poseur-buyer, testified on the first
element, thus:
Q: On August 26, 2003 at around 9:05 in the evening,
where were you Mr. Witness?
A: Im at F. Nazario St., Brgy. Singkamas, Makati City, sir.
Q: What were you doing in the said place?
A: We were conducting buy bust operation against a
certain Carlo, sir.
Q: What was your participation in that buy bust operation
that you were then conducting?
A: I was the poseur buyer.
xxxx
Q: Could you tell us what happened to the buy bust
operation that you conducted at F. Nazario St., Brgy.
Singkamas, Makati City?
A: We successfully apprehended Carlo together with his
companion Melchor Austriaco.
Q: If this alias Carlo is present in court, will you be able to
identify him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you please point him out to us?
A: (The witness pointed to a man who identified himself
as Carlo Magno Aure y Arnaldo)
Q: How about Melchor Austriaco Mr. Witness, will you
please point him out to us?
A: (The witness pointed to a man who identified himself
as Melchor Austriaco y Aguila)
xxxx
Q: What happened Mr. Witness after the operation was
coordinated with the PDEA?
A: PO3 Jay Lagasca prepared the buy bust money, sir.
Q: And how much were you supposed to buy in the buy
bust operation?
A: Worth P6,000.00 pesos, sir.
Q: And what were you supposed to buy?
A: Shabu, sir.
Q: You said that PO3 Jay Lagasca prepared the buy bust
money?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where were you when it was given to you?
A: I was present, sir, beside PO3 Jay Lagasca, sir.
Q: If the buy bust money that was given to you by PO3
Jay Lagasca will be shown to you, will you be able to
identify the same?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: By the way, how much was given to you by PO3 Jay
Lagasca?
A: Worth P6,000.00 pesos, sir.
Q: And could you tell us in what denomination were those
P6,000.00 pesos are?
A: Twelve (12) pieces of P500.00 peso bills, sir.
Q: If this [sic] twelve (12) pieces of P500.00 peso bills
given to you by PO3 Jay Lagasca to be used in that
operation will be shown to you, will you be able to identify
the same?
A: I am very sure, sir.
Q: Im showing to you Mr. Witness twelve (12) pieces of
P500.00 peso bills. Will you please go over the same and
tell us what relation does that have to the money that was
given to you by PO3 Jay Lagasca?
A: This is the same buy bust money that we used in the
buy bust operation.
Q: x x x Why are you certain Mr. Witness that these are
the same buy bust money that were given to you by PO3
Jay Lagasca?
A: Because of the marking above the serial number C2,
sir.
Q: What does this marking C2 stands for?
A: Cluster 2, sir.
Q: Who placed these markings above the serial numbers
of the P500.00 peso bills?
A: Our team leader, PO3 Jay Lagasca, sir.
Q: Where were you when these markings were placed?
A: Im just in front of him, sir.
Q: x x x Mr. Witness, what did you do next after the
P500.00 peso bills were given to you by PO3 Jay
Lagasca?
A: After receiving the money, we proceeded to the area,
sir.
Q: Who was with you when you proceeded to the area?
A: The confidential informant together with the buy bust
team, sir.
xxxx
Q: You said that while you were walking at F. Nazario
Street, you saw the [sic]?
A: The informant told me that that is the accused, sir.
Q: And what was the accused doing when you saw him?
A: He was seated inside the car and beside him on the
driver side is a male person.
xxxx
Q: And what was the other male person doing at that time
that you saw accused Carlo Magno Aure?
A: They were talking to each other, sir.
Q: Where was this other man at that time?
A: Beside him, sir, at the other side, sir.
Q: What happened after you saw the two men, Mr.
Witness?
A: The confidential informant introduced me to the subject
alias Carlo and told him that I am in need of shabu.
Q: So Mr. Witness, you said that you were introduced by
the informant to accused Carlo Magno Aure?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How were you introduced by the informant?
A: That I was in need of shabu, sir.
Q: And what was the reply of accused Carlo Magno Aure?
A: Carlo Magno Aure said that pare "parang parak yata
yan tol?"
Q: And when he said "parang parak yata yan tol?" to
whom was he addressing this statement?
A: To the informant.
Q: And what happened after he uttered those words Mr.
Witness?
A: Sumagot yung informant "barkada ko yan, taga
probinsya."38
The second elementthe delivery of the thing sold and
the payment for itwas satisfied through the testimony of
witness Bilason:
Q: And what happened after that?
A: "Tinanong ako ni Carlo Magno Aure kung magkano
ang kukunin ko, sabi ko sa kanya isang bolto pare."
Q: When you said "isang bolto" what exactly do you
mean?
A: According to the informant worth P6,000.00 pesos
"isang bolto."
Q: And what happened after you said "isang bolto?"
A: He got the money from me and put it inside his right
front pocket, sir.
Q: And what happened after that?
A: He ordered his companion alias Buboy to get the
brown bag and took out one plastic sachet, sir.
Q: And what did he do with this plastic sachet?
A: Alias Buboy handed to Carlo Magno Aure one plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance, the
suspected shabu and the brown bag.
Q: After the plastic sachet and the brown bag were
handed to accused Carlo Magno Aure what happened
next?
A: Alias Carlo gave me the one piece of transparent
plastic sachet containing crystalline substance, the
suspected shabu.
Q: If the male companion of Carlo Magno is inside the
courtroom, will you be able to identify him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you please point him out to us.
A: (The witness pointed to a man who identified himself
as Melchor Austriaco y Aguila)
Q: So, you are referring to accused Melchor Austriaco y
Aguila?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened next Mr. Witness after accused Carlo
Magno Aure handed to you this plastic sachet?
A: When I got the plastic sachet and I was convinced that
it was shabu then I gave the pre-arranged signal, sir.
Q: What convinced you that the sachet contained shabu?
A: Because of [sic] the appearance consist of white
crystalline substance, sir.
Q: What was the pre-arranged signal that you gave?
A: By lighting my cigarette, sir.
Q: And what happened after the pre-arranged signal was
given?
A: Our team leader and my back up Rogelio Flores
approached us and helped me in arresting the suspect,
sir.
Q: What happened Mr. Witness after you arrested the two
accused?
A: I got hold of Carlo Magno and I introduced myself as
MADAC operative and we asked him to go outside the
vehicle, sir.
Q: And what happened after you ordered the two to get
off the car?
A: Narecover ko po yung isang brown bag na naglalaman
ng nakabot [sic] na kulay pulang birthday wrapping paper
na shabu at glass tooter at saka may lamang mga plastic
po.
Q: Mr. Witness, if the item that you bought from the
accused will be shown to you, will you be able to identify
the same?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Im showing to you Mr. Witness several pieces of
object evidence. Will you please go over these and
identify the item that you bought from the accused?
A: Sir, ito po mismo yung nabili ko kay Carlo Magno Aure
worth P6,000.00 pesos.
Q: x x x Why are you certain that this is the same item
that you bought?
A: Because of the marking CAA 8/26/03.
Q: Who placed the markings on the sachet?
A: I was the one, sir.
Q: Where were you when you placed this marking?
A: In front of the accused, in the area where we arrested
the accused.
Q: What does the initial CAA stands for?
A: Carlo Magno Aure y Arnaldo, sir.
Q: How did you come to know that the initial of accused
Carlo Magno Aure was CAA at the time that you made
this marking?
A: After arresting them and after confiscating all the items
PO3 Jay Lagasca asked his name.
xxxx
Q: By the way Mr. Witness, earlier you identified these
pieces of evidence contained in this brown plastic bag.
Why are you certain Mr. Witness that these are the same
evidence, which you recovered from the possession of
accused Carlo Magno Aure?
A: I was the one who marked that evidence that we
recovered from Carlo Magno Aure, sir.
Q: What happened to the buy bust money, Mr. Witness?
A: MADAC Rogelio Flores recovered the buy bust money
from the front pocket of his worn pants.
Q: From whom was it recovered?
A: From Carlo Magno Aure, sir.
Q: Where were you when MADAC Flores recovered the
money?
A: I was beside him, sir.
Q: After you have arrested the two accused where did you
go?
A: We [went] to the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Makati
Police Station.
Q: And what happened at the Drug Enforcement Unit?
A: To give the evidence to the duty investigator PO1 Alex
Inopia and PO1 Alex Inopia made a request for laboratory
examination of the specimen recovered from Carlo Magno
Aure and drug test as well.
Q: Who brought the two accused to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for drug testing and the shabu for laboratory
examination?
A: I was the one together with my group, sir.
Q: Did you come to know the result of the drug test
conducted from the two accused?
A: Im not aware, sir. I have not seen the result.
Q: How about the drug that were subject of these cases?
A: It gave positive result for Methlyamphetamine [sic]
Hydrochloride, sir.39
As shown in Bilasons testimony, a buy-bust operation took place.
Being the poseur-buyer, he positively identified accused-appellants as
the sellers of a sachet containing a white crystalline substance for a
sum of PhP 6,000. The sachet was confiscated and marked with the
initials "CAA" and was subsequently taken to the crime laboratory for
examination, where a chemical analysis on its contents confirmed that
the substance is indeed Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu.
Moreover, the testimonies of the other members of the buy-bust team,
PO3 Lagasca and MADAC operative Flores, substantially
corroborated Bilasons testimony.
As regards the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under
Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165 against accused-appellant Aure, We also
find that the elements of the offense have been established by the
evidence of the prosecution.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or
object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession
is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.40
In the instant case, a brown bag was found inside the car of accused-
appellant Aure. It yielded a plastic sachet of shabu weighing 86.23
grams wrapped in red wrapping paper, small plastic sachets, and an
improvised plastic tooter. Considering that during the sale to Bilason, it
was from the same bag that accused-appellant Austriaco took the
sachet of shabu, per order of accused-appellant Aure, the owner-
possessor of said bag and its contents is no other than accused-
appellant Aure, who has not shown any proof that he was duly
authorized by law to possess them or any evidence to rebut his
animus possidendi of the shabu found in his car during the buy-bust
operation.
Defense of denial is inherently weak
The sachet containing the dangerous drug was positively identified by
MADAC operative Bilason during the trial as the very sachet with white
crystalline substance sold and delivered to him by accused-appellants.
Thus, accused-appellants denial is self-serving and has little weight in
law. A bare denial is an inherently weak defense,41 and has been
invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can be easily
concocted but difficult to prove, and is a common standard line of
defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of RA 9165.42
Time and again, We have held that "denials unsubstantiated by
convincing evidence are not enough to engender reasonable doubt
particularly where the prosecution presents sufficiently telling proof of
guilt."43

In the absence of any intent on the part of the police authorities to

falsely impute such crime against the accused-appellants, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty
stands.44 Especially here, where an astute analysis of MADAC
operative Bilasons testimony does not indicate any inconsistency,
contradiction, or fabrication.

Considering the foregoing disquisitions, We uphold the presumption of

regularity in the performance of official duty and find that the
prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the guilt of accused-
appellants beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R.

CR No. 02600 finding accused-appellants Carlo Magno Aure and
Melchor Austriaco guilty of the crimes charged is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 195419 October 12, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
HADJA JARMA LALLI y PURIH, RONNIE ARINGOY y MASION,
and NESTOR RELAMPAGOS (at large),Accused.
HADJA JARMA LALLI y PURIH and RONNIE ARINGOY Accused-
Appellants.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a consolidated criminal case filed against the accused-
appellants for the crimes of Illegal Recruitment (Criminal Case No.
21930) and Trafficking in Persons (Criminal Case No. 21908).
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City, in its Decision
dated 29 November 2005 (RTC Decision),1 found accused-appellants
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Illegal Recruitment
and Trafficking in Persons committed by a syndicate, and sentenced
each of the accused to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment plus
payment of fines and damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA)
in Cagayan de Oro, in its Decision dated 26 February 2010 (CA
Decision),2 affirmed in toto the RTC Decision. The accused-appellants
appealed to this Court by filing a Notice of Appeal3 in accordance with
Section 3(c), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.
The Facts
The findings of fact of the RTC, which were affirmed in toto by the CA,
are as follows:
In the evening of June 3, 2005, while Lolita Sagadsad Plando, 23
years old, single, was in Tumaga, Zamboanga City on her way to the
house of her grandfather, she met Ronnie Masion Aringoy and Rachel
Aringoy Caete. Ronnie greeted Lolita, "Oy, its good you are here"
("oy, maayo kay dia ka"). Rachel asked Lolita if she is interested to
work in Malaysia. x x x Lolita was interested so she gave her
cellphone number to Ronnie. After their conversation, Lolita
proceeded to her grandfathers house.
xxx
On June 4, 2005, at about 7:00 oclock in the morning, Lolita received
a text message from Ronnie Aringoy inviting her to go to the latters
house. At 7:30 in the morning, they met at Tumaga on the road near
the place where they had a conversation the night before. Ronnie
brought Lolita to the house of his sister in Tumaga. Lolita inquired
what job is available in Malaysia. Ronnie told her that she will work as
a restaurant entertainer. All that is needed is a passport. She will be
paid 500 Malaysian ringgits which is equivalent to 7,000.00 pesos in
Philippine currency. Lolita told Ronnie that she does not have a
passport. Ronnie said that they will look for a passport so she could
leave immediately. Lolita informed him that her younger sister, Marife
Plando, has a passport. Ronnie chided her for not telling him
immediately. He told Lolita that she will leave for Malaysia on June 6,
2005 and they will go to Hadja Jarma Lalli who will bring her to
Malaysia. Ronnie sent a text message to Lalli but the latter replied that
she was not in her house. She was at the city proper.
On June 5, 2005, at about 6:00 oclock in the evening, Ronnie Aringoy
and Rachel Aringoy Caete arrived on board a tricycle driven by
Ronnie at the house where Lolita was staying at Southcom Village.
Ronnie asked if Lolita already had a passport. Lolita said that she will
borrow her sisters passport. Ronnie, Rachel and Lolita went to
Buenavista where Lolitas other sister, Gina Plando was staying. Her
sister Marife Plando was there at that time. Lolita asked Marife to let
her use Marifes passport. Marife refused but Lolita got the passport.
Marife cried. Ronnie, Rachel and Lolita proceeded to Tumaga.
Ronnie, Rachel and Lolita went to the house of Hadja Jarma Lalli just
two hundred meters away from the house of Ronnie in Tumaga.
Ronnie introduced Lolita to Hadja Jarma, saying "Ji, she is also
interested in going to Malaysia." Lolita handed a passport to Hadja
Jarma telling her that it belongs to her sister Marife Plando. Hadja
Jarma told her it is not a problem because they have a connection with
the DFA (Department of Foreign Affairs) and Marifes picture in the
passport will be substituted with Lolitas picture. Nestor Relampagos
arrived driving an owner-type jeep. Hadja Jarma introduced Nestor to
Lolita as their financier who will accompany them to Malaysia. x x x
Lolita noticed three other women in Hadja Jarmas house. They were
Honey, about 20 years old; Michele, 19 years old, and another woman
who is about 28 years old. The women said that they are from Ipil,
Sibugay Province. Ronnie told Lolita that she will have many
companions going to Malaysia to work. They will leave the next day,
June 6, and will meet at the wharf at 2:30 in the afternoon.
On June 6, 2005, Lolita went to Zamboanga City wharf at 2:00 oclock
in the afternoon bringing a bag containing her make-up and powder.
She met at the wharf Hadja Jarma Lalli, Ronnie Aringoy, Honey and
Michele. Ronnie gave to Lolita her boat ticket for the vessel M/V Mary
Joy bound for Sandakan, Malaysia; a passport in the name of Marife
Plando but with Lolitas picture on it, and 1,000.00 in cash. Hadja
wall. Lolita felt dizzy. The man opened the shower and said that both
Jarma, Lolita, Honey, Michele and two other women boarded the boat
M/V Mary Joy bound for Sandakan. Ronnie Aringoy did not go with
them. He did not board the boat. x x x After the boat sailed, Hadja
Jarma Lalli and Nestor Relampagos approached Lolita and her
companions. Nestor told them that they will have a good job in
Malaysia as restaurant entertainers. They will serve food to
customers. They will not be harmed.
M/V Mary Joy arrived at the port of Sandakan, Malaysia at 10:00
oclock in the morning of June 7, 2005. After passing through the
immigration office, Hadja Jarma Lalli, Nestor Relampagos, Lolita,
Honey, Michele and two other women boarded a van for Kota
Kinabalu. x x x At the hotel, Nestor Relampagos introduced to Lolita
and her companions a Chinese Malay called "Boss" as their employer.
After looking at the women, "Boss" brought Lolita, Honey, Diane and
Lorraine to a restaurant near the hotel. Diane and Lorraine were also
on baord M/V Mary Joy when it left the port of Zamboanga for
Sandakan on June 6, 2005. When they were already at the restaurant,
a Filipina woman working there said that the place is a prostitution den
and the women there are used as prostitutes. Lolita and her
companions went back to the hotel. They told Hadja Jarma and Nestor
that they do not like to work as prostitutes. x x x After about five
minutes, another person called "boss" arrived. x x x [T]hey were
fetched by a van at about 7:00 oclock in the evening and brought to
Pipen Club owned by "Boss Awa", a Malaysian. At the club, they were
told that they owe the club 2,000 ringgits each as payment for the
amount given by the club to Hadja Jarma Lalli and Nestor
Relampagos. They will pay for the said amount by entertaining
customers. The customers will pay 300 ringgits for short time services
of which 50 ringgits will go to the entertainer, and 500 ringgits for over
night service of which 100 ringgits will be given to the entertainer.
Pipen Club is a big club in a two-storey building. There were about
100 women working in the club, many of them were Filipina women.
Lolita Plando was forced to work as entertainer at Pipen Club. She
started working at 8:30 in the evening of June 14, 2005. She was
given the number 60 which was pinned on her. That night, she had her
first customer who selected her among the other women at the club.
He was a very big man, about 32 years old, a Chinese-Malay who
looked like a wrestler. The man paid for short time service at the
counter. Lolita was given by the cashier a small pink paper. She was
instructed to keep it. A small yellow paper is given to the entertainer
for overnight services. The customer brought Lolita to a hotel. She did
not like to go with him but a "boss" at the club told her that she could
not do anything. At the hotel, the man poked a gun at Lolita and
instructed her to undress. She refused. The man boxed her on the
side of her body. She could not bear the pain. The man undressed her
and had sexual intercourse with her. He had sexual intercourse with
her every fifteen minutes or four times in one hour. When the
customer went inside the comfort room, Lolita put on her clothes and
left. The customer followed her and wanted to bring her back to the
hotel but Lolita refused. At about 1:00 oclock in the morning of June
15, 2005, Lolita was chosen by another customer, a tall dark man,
about 40 years old. The customer paid for an overnight service at the
counter and brought Lolita to Mariner Hotel which is far from Pipen
Club. At the hotel, the man told Lolita to undress. When she refused,
the man brought her to the comfort room and bumped her head on the
of them will take a bath. Lolitas clothes got wet. She was crying. The
man undressed her and had sexual intercourse with her. They stayed
at the hotel until 11:00 oclock in the morning of June 15, 2005. The
customer used Lolita many times. He had sexual intercourse with her
every hour.
Lolita worked at Pipen Club from June 14 to July 8, 2005. Every night,
a customer used her. She had at least one customer or more a night,
and at most, she had around five customers a night. They all had
sexual intercourse with her. On July 9, 2005, Lolita was able to contact
by cellphone at about 10:00 oclock in the morning her sister Janet
Plando who is staying at Sipangkot Felda x x x. Janet is married to
Said Abubakar, an Indonesian national who is working as a driver in
the factory. x x x Lolita told Janet that she is in Labuan, Malaysia and
beg Janet to save her because she was sold as a prostitute. Janet told
Lolita to wait because her husband will go to Pipen Club to fetch Lolita
at 9:00 oclock that evening of that day. x x x She told Janet to instruct
her husband to ask for No. 60 at Pipen Club. x x x At 9:00 oclock in
the evening, Lolita was told by Daddy Richard, one of the bosses at
the club, that a customer requested for No. 60. The man was seated
at one of the tables. Lolita approached the man and said, "good
evening." The man asked her is she is the sister of Janet Plando.
Lolita replied that she is, and asked the man if he is the husband of
her sister. He said, "yes." The man had already paid at the counter.
He stood up and left the place. Lolita got her wallet and followed him.
x x x Lolita told her sister about her ordeal. She stayed at her sisters
house until July 22, 2005. On July 21, 2005 at 7:00 oclock in the
evening, a policeman went to her sisters house and asked if there is a
woman staying in the house without a passport. Her sister told the
policeman that she will send Lolita home on July 22. At dawn on July
22, Lolita and her brother-in-law took a taxi from Sipangkot Felda to
Mananamblas where Lolita will board a speedboat to Sibuto, Tawi-
Tawi. x x x
Upon arrival in Zamboanga City on July 24, 2005, Lolita went directly
to the house of her eldest sister Alejandra Plando Maywila at Sta.
Catalina, Zamboanga City. She left her things at her sisters house
and immediately went to the sister of Ronnie Aringoy in Tumaga.
Ronnie was not there. She asked Russel, niece of Ronnie, to call for
the latter. Ronnie arrived and said to her, "so you are here, you arrived
already." He said he is not involved in what happened to her. Lolita
asked Ronnie to accompany her to the house of Nestor Relampagos
because she has something to get from him. Ronnie refused. He told
Lolita not to let them know that she had already arrived from Malaysia.
Lolita was advised to file a complaint with the police regarding her
ordeal in Malaysia. On August 2, 2005, at past 9:00 oclock in the
morning, Lolita Plando went to Zamboanga Police Office at Gov. Lim
Avenue to file her complaint. x x x
In her Counter-Affidavit (Exh. "1"; "1-A"-Lalli), Hadja Jarma Lalli
admitted that she met Lolita Plando on June 6, 2005 on board M/V
Mary Joy while the said vessel was at sea on its way to Sandakan,
Malaysia. The meeting was purely coincidental. By coincidence also,
Hadja Jarma, Nestor Relampagos and Lolita Plando boarded the
same van for Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia. Upon arrival, they parted ways.
They did not see each other anymore at Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia. She
did not know what happened to them. She went to Kota Kinabalu to
visit his son-in-law. She denied having recruited Lolita Plando for
employment abroad (Exh. "1"; "1-A"). x x x
In his Counter-Affidavit (Exh. "1"-Aringoy), Ronnie Aringoy affirmed
that he personally knows Lolita Plando since she was a teenager and
he knows for a fact that her name is Cristine and not Marife "as she
purports it to appear." Sometime in the first week of June 2005, Lolita
borrowed 1,000.00 from Ronnie because she wanted to go to
Malaysia to work as a guest relation officer (GRO). Ronnie lent her
1,000.00. He told her that he knows "a certain Hadja Jarma Lalli,
distant neighbor, who frequents to Malaysia and with whom she can
ask pertinent information on job opportunities." The entries in
Philippine Passport No. MM401136 issued to Hadja Jarma Lalli on
January 29, 2004 (Exh. "2"; "2-A" to "2-Q") showed that she traveled
to Malaysia no less than nine (9) times within the period from March
2004 to June 2005.
xxx
Nora Mae Adling, ticketing clerk of Aleson Shipping Lines, owner of
the vessel M/V Mary Joy 2 plying Zamboanga City to Sandakan,
Malaysia route and of M/V Kristel Jane 3, testified that Hadja Jarma
Lalli bought passenger tickets for her travel to Sandakan, not only for
herself but also for other women passengers.
xxx
Ronnie Aringoy submitted the Affidavit of his witness Rachel Caete
(Exh. "2") and the Joint Affidavits of witnesses Mercedita Salazar and
Estrella Galgan. Rachel Canete declared that Lolita Plando whom she
knows as Cristine Plando worked as a GRO (guest relation officer)
and massage attendant at Magic 2 Videoke and Massage Parlor, that
Lolita Plando has four children sired by different men; and that she
knows for a fact that Lolita Plando has been going to and from
Malaysia to work in bars. When she testified in court, Rachel did not
present other evidence to substantiate her allegations. Mercedita
Salazar and Estrella Galgan declared in their Joint Affidavit that Lolita
Plando who is known to them as Marife Plando was their co-worker as
massage attendant and GRO (guest relation officer) at Magic 2
Massage Parlor and Karaoke bar where she used the names Gina
Plando and Cristine Plando. She worked in the said establishment for
nine months from February to October 2002. She has four children
from four different men. No other evidence was submitted in court to
prove their assertions.4
The Decision of the Trial Court
The Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision on 29 November 2005,
with its dispositive portion declaring:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused HADJA JARMA LALLI y
PURIH and RONNIE ARINGOY y MASION GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 21908 of the Crime of
Trafficking in Persons defined in Section 3(a) and penalized under
Section 10(c) in relation to Sections 4(a) and 6(c) of Republic Act No.
9208 known as the "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003" and in
Criminal Case No. 21930 of the crime of Illegal Recruitment defined in
Section 6 and penalized under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042
known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995"
and SENTENCES each of said accused:
1. In Criminal Case No. 21908, to suffer the penalty of
LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of
2,000,000.00 pesos;
2. In Criminal Case No. 21930, to suffer the penalty of
LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of 500,000.00
pesos;
3. To pay the offended party Lolita Plando y Sagadsad,
jointly and severally, the sum of 50,000.00 as moral
damages, and 50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
4. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.5
The trial court did not find credible the denials of the accused-
appellants over the candid, positive and convincing testimony of
complainant Lolita Plando (Lolita). The accused, likewise, tried to
prove that Lolita was a Guest Relations Officer (GRO) in the
Philippines with four children fathered by four different men. However,
the trial court found these allegations irrelevant and immaterial to the
criminal prosecution. These circumstances, even if true, would not
exempt or mitigate the criminal liability of the accused. The trial court
found that the accused, without a POEA license, conspired in
recruiting Lolita and trafficking her as a prostitute, resulting in crimes
committed by a syndicate.6 The trial court did not pronounce the
liability of accused-at-large Nestor Relampagos (Relampagos)
because jurisdiction was not acquired over his person.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
On 26 February 2010, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC
Decision and found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of Illegal Recruitment and Trafficking in Persons.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed
a reversible error in affirming in toto the RTC Decision.
The Ruling of this Court
We dismiss the appeal for lack of merit.
We modify and increase the payment of damages in the crime of
Trafficking in Persons from 50,000 to 500,000 for moral damages
and 50,000 to 100,000 for exemplary damages.
Grounds for Appeal
In his Appeal Brief,7 Ronnie Aringoy (Aringoy) admits that he referred
Lolita to a certain Hadja Jarma Lalli (Lalli), Aringoys neighbor who
frequents Malaysia and from whom Lolita could ask pertinent
information on job opportunities.8 Aringoy claims that he learned later
that Lolita left for Malaysia.9 He denies knowing Relampagos to whom
Lolita paid 28,000 as placement fee for finding her work in
Malaysia.10
Aringoy presented three witnesses: his niece Rachel Aringoy Caete
(Rachel), Mercedita Salazar (Mercedita), and Estrella Galgan
(Estrella). In her testimony, Rachel declared that: (1) Lolita is a GRO
and Massage Attendant at Magic 2 Videoke and Massage Parlor; (2)
Lolita has four children sired by different men; and (3) Lolita has been
travelling to Malaysia to work in bars. Mercedita and Estrella, on the
other hand, declared in their testimonies that Lolita was their co-
worker as Massage Attendant and GRO in Magic 2 Massage Parlor
and Karaoke Bar from February to October 2002.11
Aringoy assailed the credibility of Lolitas testimony because of
inconsistencies with regard to: (1) Lolitas grandfathers status and
name; (2) the persons (Ronnie and Rachel) who approached Lolita to
talk about the job opportunity in Malaysia; (3) certain statements in
Lolitas testimony that were not alleged in her Sworn Statement; (4)
payment of placement fee of 28,000; and (5) names of the other
female recruits who were with Lolita in the boat going to Sandakan
and Kota Kinabalu.12 Aringoy likewise claims that he was never
included in the initial complaint filed by Lolita, and Lolitas statements
about her meetings with him, Lalli and Relampagos on 3, 4, 5 and 6
June 2005 were not corroborated by any witness.13
On the other hand, in her Appeal Brief,14 Lalli claims that she simply
met Lolita on 6 June 2005 on board the ship M/V Mary Joy bound for
Sandakan, Malaysia.15 Lalli denies having met Lolita prior to their
meeting on board M/V Mary Joy.16 Lalli claims she was going to
Malaysia to visit her daughter and son-in-law who was a Malaysian
national.17 Lalli further claims that she only spoke to Lolita aboard the
ship for idle conversation to pass away the time.18 In this conversation,
she learned that Lolita was with a party of girls accompanied by
Relampagos, and the latter was bringing them to Malaysia to work as
sales ladies.19 Lalli admits that Lolita, Relampagos and the other girls
rode in Lallis van in Sandakan, driven by a friend of Lallis son-in-
law.20 They all rode together because Relampagos talked to the van
driver, requesting if he and his party of girls could board the van and
pay their fare when they reach the city proper of Kota Kinabalu.21 Lalli
boarded the van with Lolita, Relampagos and their
companions.22 Upon reaching her destination, Lalli got off the van,
leaving Lolita, Relampagos and their other companions to continue
their journey towards the city proper of Kota Kinabalu.23 After spending
several days in Malaysia with her daughter and son-in-law, Lalli went
to Brunei to visit a cousin on 12 June 2005, and headed back to
Malaysia on 14 June 2005.24
Lalli assails the credibility of Lolita due to inconsistencies in her
testimony with regard to: (1) Lolita not being in Southcom Village on 5
June 2005 at 6:00 p.m., as she claimed, but in Buenavista Village; and
(2) Lolitas claim that Lalli and Relampagos on 12 June 2005 brought
the girls to Labuan, when in fact, Lalli was already in Brunei on 12
June 2005, as evidenced by the stamp in her passport.25
Credibility of Testimonies
Both Aringoy and Lalli, in their respective Appeal Briefs, assail the
testimony of Lolita due to its alleged inconsistency on immaterial facts,
such as the status of Lolitas grandfather, the name of the village she
was in, the date she was brought to Labuan, Malaysia, and the like. In
a long line of cases, the Court has ruled that inconsistencies pointed
out by the accused in the testimony of prosecution witnesses relating
to minor details do not destroy the credibility of witnesses.26 On the
contrary, they indicate that the witnesses were telling the truth and not
previously rehearsed.27
The clear material inconsistency in this case, however, lies in the
testimonies of accused Aringoy and Lalli. Aringoy admitted that he
referred Lolita to a certain Hadja Jarma Lalli, his neighbor who
frequents Malaysia and with whom Lolita could ask pertinent
information on job opportunities.28 Lalli, on the other hand, denies
having met Lolita prior to their meeting on board M/V Mary Joy on 6
June 2005,29 and claims that her meeting with Lolita was purely
coincidental.30 Lalli admits that, even if she met Relampagos, Lolita
and their companions only on that day on board M/V Mary Joy, she
allowed these people to ride with her in Malaysia using the van driven
by the friend of Lallis son-in-law.31 Lastly, Lalli claims that she often
goes to Malaysia to visit her daughter and son-in-law.32 However, this
does not explain why Lalli purchased boat tickets, not only for herself,
but for the other women passengers going to Malaysia.33 From March
2004 to June 2005, Lalli traveled to Malaysia no less than nine (9)
times.34 Nora Mae Adling, ticketing clerk of Aleson Shipping Lines,
owner of the vessel M/V Mary Joy 2 plying Zamboanga City to
Sandakan, Malaysia route and of M/V Kristel Jane 3, testified in open
court that "Hadja Jarma Lalli bought passenger tickets for her travel to
Sandakan, not only for herself but also for other women
passengers."35 Clearly, it is not Lolitas testimony that is materially
inconsistent, but the testimonies of Lalli and Aringoy.
Aringoy presented his witnesses Rachel, Mercedita and Estrella to
impeach the credibility of Lolita by alleging that Lolita was a Massage
Attendant and GRO in a massage parlor and videoke bar. His witness
Rachel further declared that Lolita, at the young age of 23 years,
already had four children sired by four different men, and had been
previously travelling to Malaysia to work in bars. These bare
allegations were not supported by any other evidence. Assuming, for
the sake of argument, that Lolita previously worked in a Karaoke Bar
and Massage Parlor and that she had four children from different men,
such facts cannot constitute exempting or mitigating circumstances to
relieve the accused from their criminal liabilities. It does not change
the fact that the accused recruited Lolita to work in Malaysia without
the requisite POEA license, thus constituting the crime of illegal
recruitment. Worse, the accused deceived her by saying that her work
in Malaysia would be as restaurant entertainer, when in fact, Lolita
would be working as a prostitute, thus, constituting the crime of
trafficking.
The facts found by the trial court, as affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals, are, as a general rule, conclusive upon this Court, in the
absence of any showing of grave abuse of discretion.36 The Court,
however, may determine the factual milieu of cases or controversies
under specific circumstances, such as:
(1)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd orone another. (Emphasis supplied)
(2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
(4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary committed
(8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record.37
In this case, none of these exceptions to the general rule on
conclusiveness of facts are applicable. The Court gives weight and
respect to the trial courts findings in criminal prosecution because the
latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the
witnesses in person and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial.38 For this reason, the Court adopts the
findings of fact of the trial court, as affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals, there being no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
lower courts.
Criminal Case No. 21930 (Illegal Recruitment)
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 (RA 8042) defines illegal
recruitment, as follows:
[I]llegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and
includes referring, contact services, promising or advertising for
employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by
a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under
Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise
known as the Labor Code of the Philippines.
xxx
Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale
shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.
xxx
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out
by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating
with
impossible;
Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise
known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, defines "authority" as
follows:
"Authority" means a document issued by the Department of Labor
authorizing a person or association to engage in recruitment and
placement activities as a private recruitment entity.
Section 7 of RA 8042 provides for the penalty of illegal recruitment
to those of by
theatrial
syndicate
court; (which constitutes economic sabotage), as
follows:
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five
relevant facts notpesos
disputed by the parties
hundred thousand (500,000.00) norand
morewhich,
than ifOne million
pesos
constitutes economic sabotage as defined therein.
It is clear that a person or entity engaged in recruitment and
placement activities without the requisite authority from the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), whether for profit or
not, is engaged in illegal recruitment.39 The Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), an agency under DOLE created
by Executive Order No. 797 to take over the duties of the Overseas
Employment Development Board, issues the authority to recruit under
the Labor Code. The commission of illegal recruitment by three or
more persons conspiring or confederating with one another is deemed
committed by a syndicate and constitutes economic sabotage,40 for
which the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than
500,000 but not more than 1,000,000 shall be imposed.41
The penalties in Section 7 of RA 8042 have already been amended by
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 10022, and have been increased to a
fine of not less than 2,000,000 but not more than 5,000,000.
However, since the crime was committed in 2005, we shall apply the
penalties in the old law, RA 8042.
In People v. Gallo,42 the Court enumerated the elements of syndicated
illegal recruitment, to wit:
1. the offender undertakes either any activity within the
meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under
Article 13(b), or any of the prohibited practices
enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code;
2. he has no valid license or authority required by law to
enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and
placement of workers; and
3. the illegal recruitment is committed by a group of three
(3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one
another.43
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code of the Philippines defines recruitment
and placement as "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not, provided, that any person or
entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee, employment
to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement."
Clearly, given the broad definition of recruitment and placement, even
the mere act of referring someone for placement abroad can be
considered recruitment. Such act of referral, in connivance with
someone without the requisite authority or POEA license, constitutes
illegal recruitment. In its simplest terms, illegal recruitment is
committed by persons who, without authority from the government,
give the impression that they have the power to send workers abroad
for employment purposes.44
In this case, the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, found
Lalli, Aringoy and Relampagos to have conspired and confederated
with one another to recruit and place Lolita for work in Malaysia,
without a POEA license. The three elements of syndicated illegal
recruitment are present in this case, in particular: (1) the accused have
no valid license or authority required by law to enable them to lawfully
engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; (2) the accused
engaged in this activity of recruitment and placement by actually
recruiting, deploying and transporting Lolita to Malaysia; and (3) illegal
recruitment was committed by three persons (Aringoy, Lalli and
Relampagos), conspiring and confederating with one another.
Aringoy claims and admits that he only referred Lolita to Lalli for job
opportunities to Malaysia. Such act of referring, whether for profit or
not, in connivance with someone without a POEA license, is already
considered illegal recruitment, given the broad definition of recruitment
and placement in the Labor Code.
Lalli, on the other hand, completely denies any involvement in the
recruitment and placement of Lolita to Malaysia, and claims she only
met Lolita for the first time by coincidence on board the ship M/V Mary
Joy. Lallis denial does not deserve credence because it completely
conflicts with the testimony of Aringoy who claims he referred Lolita to
Lalli who had knowledge of the job opportunities in Malaysia.
The conflicting testimonies of Lalli and Aringoy on material facts give
doubt to the truth and veracity of their stories, and strengthens the
credibility of the testimony of Lolita, despite allegations of irrelevant
inconsistencies.
No improper motive could be imputed to Lolita to show that she would
falsely testify against the accused. The absence of evidence as to an
improper motive entitles Lolitas testimony to full faith and credit.45
Aringoy claims that no conspiracy existed in illegal recruitment, as he
denies even knowing Relampagos, who is currently at-large. Lalli
denies any involvement in the illegal recruitment, and claims that she
only met Relampagos through Lolita on board the ship M/V Mary Joy
on 6 June 2005, and learned that Relampagos was bringing Lolita and
their other girl companions to Malaysia to work as sales ladies.
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy "when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it."
In People v. Lago,46 the Court discussed conspiracy in this wise:
The elements of conspiracy are the following: (1) two or more persons
came to an agreement, (2) the agreement concerned the commission
of a felony, and (3) the execution of the felony was decided upon.
Proof of the conspiracy need not be based on direct evidence,
because it may be inferred from the parties conduct indicating a
common understanding among themselves with respect to the
commission of the crime. Neither is it necessary to show that two or
more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement
setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or objective to be carried
out. The conspiracy may be deduced from the mode or manner in
which the crime was perpetrated; it may also be inferred from the acts
of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interest. 47
In this case, Lolita would not have been able to go to Malaysia if not
for the concerted efforts of Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos. First, it was
Aringoy who knew Lolita, since Aringoy was a neighbor of Lolitas
grandfather. It was Aringoy who referred Lolita to Lalli, a fact clearly
admitted by Aringoy. Second, Lolita would not have been able to go to
Malaysia if Lalli had not purchased Lolitas boat ticket to Malaysia.
This fact can be deduced from the testimony of Nora Mae Adling
(Nora), ticketing clerk of Aleson Shipping Lines, owner of the vessel
M/V Mary Joy 2 plying Zamboanga City to Sandakan, Malaysia route
and of M/V Kristel Jane 3. Nora testified in open court that "Hadja
Jarma Lalli bought passenger tickets for her travel to Sandakan, not
only for herself but also for other women passengers." Lallis claim that
she only goes to Malaysia to visit her daughter and son-in-law does
not explain the fact why she bought the boat tickets of the other
women passengers going to Malaysia. In fact, it appears strange that
Lalli visited Malaysia nine (9) times in a span of one year and three
months (March 2004 to June 2005) just to visit her daughter and son-
in-law. In Malaysia, it was Relampagos who introduced Lolita and her
companions to a Chinese Malay called "Boss" as their first employer.
When Lolita and her companions went back to the hotel to tell
Relampagos and Lalli that they did not want to work as prostitutes,
Relampagos brought Lolita and the girls on board a van to Sangawan
China Labuan, where they stayed in a room for one night. The next
day, they were picked up by a van and brought to Pipen Club, where
Lolita and her companions worked as prostitutes. To date, accused
Relampagos is at large and has not been brought under the
jurisdiction of the courts for his crimes.
Flight in criminal law is the evading of the course of justice by
voluntarily withdrawing oneself in order to avoid arrest or detention or
the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings.48 The
unexplained flight of an accused person may as a general rule be
taken into consideration as evidence having a tendency to establish
his guilt.49 Clearly, in this case, the flight of accused Relampagos, who
is still at-large, shows an indication of guilt in the crimes he has been
charged.
It is clear that through the concerted efforts of Aringoy, Lalli and
Relampagos, Lolita was recruited and deployed to Malaysia to work as
a prostitute. Such conspiracy among Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos
could be deduced from the manner in which the crime was perpetrated
each of the accused played a pivotal role in perpetrating the crime of
illegal recruitment, and evinced a joint common purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interest.
For these reasons, this Court affirms the CA Decision, affirming the
RTC Decision, declaring accused Ronnie Aringoy y Masion and Hadja
Jarma Lalli y Purih guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate in Criminal Case No.
21930, with a penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of 500,000
imposed on each of the accused.
Criminal Case No. 21908 (Trafficking in Persons)
Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208 (RA 9208), otherwise known as
the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003, defines Trafficking in
Persons, as follows:
Trafficking in Persons refers to the recruitment, transportation,
transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the
victims consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by
means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction,
fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of
the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a
minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of
sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the
removal or sale of organs. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4 of RA 9208 enumerates the prohibited acts of Trafficking in
Persons, one of which is:
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or receive a person
by any means, including those done under the pretext of domestic or
overseas employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of
prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery,
involuntary servitude or debt bondage.
The crime of Trafficking in Persons is qualified when committed by a
syndicate, as provided in Section 6(c) of RA 9208:
(c) When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale.
Trafficking is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with
one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed
against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.
Section 10(c) of RA 9208 provides for the penalty of qualified
trafficking:
(c) Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two
million pesos (2,000,000.00) but not more than Five million pesos
(5,000,000.00).
The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act is a new law passed last 26 May
2003, designed to criminalize the act of trafficking in persons for
prostitution, sexual exploitation, foced labor and slavery, among
others.
In this case, Aringoy claims that he cannot be convicted of the crime of
Trafficking in Persons because he was not part of the group that
transported Lolita from the Philippines to Malaysia on board the ship
M/V Mary Joy. In addition, he presented his niece, Rachel, as witness
to testify that Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars. On
the other hand, Lalli denies any involvement in the recruitment and
trafficking of Lolita, claiming she only met Lolita for the first time on
board M/V Mary Joy going to Malaysia.
The testimony of Aringoys niece, Rachel, that Lolita had been
travelling to Malaysia to work in bars cannot be given credence. Lolita
did not even have a passport to go to Malaysia and had to use her
sisters passport when Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos first recruited
her. It is questionable how she could have been travelling to Malaysia
previously without a passport, as Rachel claims. Moreover, even if it is
true that Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars, the
crime of Trafficking in Persons can exist even with the victims consent
or knowledge under Section 3(a) of RA 9208.
Trafficking in Persons under Sections 3(a) and 4 of RA 9208 is not
only limited to transportation of victims, but also includes the act of
recruitment of victims for trafficking. In this case, since it has been
sufficiently proven beyond reasonable doubt, as discussed in Criminal
Case No. 21930, that all the three accused (Aringoy, Lalli and
Relampagos) conspired and confederated with one another to illegally
recruit Lolita to become a prostitute in Malaysia, it follows that they are
also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
Trafficking in Persons committed by a syndicate under RA 9208 analogous cases:
because the crime of recruitment for prostitution also constitutes
trafficking.
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
When an act or acts violate two or more different laws and constitute
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
two different offenses, a prosecution under one will not bar a
prosecution under the other.50 The constitutional right against double
jeopardy only applies to risk of punishment twice for the same offense, (3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
or for an act punished by a law and an ordinance.51 The prohibition on
double jeopardy does not apply to an act or series of acts constituting
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
different offenses.
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
DAMAGES
Lolita claimed actual damages of 28,000, which she allegedly paid (6) Illegal search;
to the accused as placement fee for the work of restaurant entertainer
in Malaysia. The trial court did not award this amount to Lolita. We (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
agree and affirm the trial courts non-award due to Lolitas inconsistent
statements on the payment of placement fee. In her sworn statement,
(8) Malicious prosecution;
Lolita alleged that she paid 28,000 as placement fee to Lalli.52 On
cross-examination, however, she admitted that she never paid
28,000 to the accused.53 (9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
We, however, modify and increase the payment of damages in the (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28,
crime of Trafficking in Persons from 50,000 to 500,000 as moral 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
damages and 50,000 to 100,000 as exemplary damages.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused,
The Civil Code describes moral damages in Article 2217: referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.
Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are
the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act for The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an
analogous case to the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other
omission.1avvphi1
lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse. To be trafficked as a prostitute
without ones consent and to be sexually violated four to five times a
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are awarded in addition to the day by different strangers is horrendous and atrocious. There is no
payment of moral damages, by way of example or correction for the doubt that Lolita experienced physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
public good, as stated in the Civil Code: serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, and social humiliation when she was trafficked as a prostitute
in Malaysia. Since the crime of Trafficking in Persons was aggravated,
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of
being committed by a syndicate, the award of exemplary damages is
example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
likewise justified.
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the
civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one dated 26 February 2010, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Zamboanga City dated 29 November 2005, finding accused
or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and
Lalli and Aringoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
Illegal Recruitment and Trafficking in Persons committed by a
syndicate, with the following MODIFICATIONS:
The payment of 500,000 as moral damages and 100,000 as
exemplary damages for the crime of Trafficking in Persons as a
Prostitute finds basis in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which states:
 1. In Criminal Case No. 21908, each of the accused is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of 2,000,000;

2. In Criminal Case No. 21930, each of the accused is

sentenced to suffer the penalty of
LIFEIMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of 500,000;

3. Each of the accused is ordered to pay the offended

party Lolita Plando y Sagadsad, jointly and severally, the
sum of 500,000 as moral damages, and 100,000 as
exemplary damages for the crime of Trafficking in
Persons; and to pay the costs.

The Court cannot pronounce the liability of accused-at-large Nestor

Relampagos as jurisdiction over his person has not been acquired.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 138298. November 29, 2000]
RAOUL B. DEL MAR, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT
AND GAMING CORPORATION, BELLE JAI-ALAI
CORPORATION, FILIPINAS GAMING
ENTERTAINMENT TOTALIZATOR
CORPORATION, respondents.
[G.R. No. 138982. November 29, 2000]
FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL II and MICHAEL T.
DEFENSOR, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT
AND GAMING CORPORATION, respondent.
JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, intervenor.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
These two consolidated petitions concern the issue of whether
the franchise granted to the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) includes the right to manage and operate jai-
alai.
First, we scour the significant facts. The Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation is a government-owned and controlled
corporation organized and existing under Presidential Decree No. 1869
which was enacted on July 11, 1983. Pursuant to Sections 1 and 10 of
P.D. No. 1869, respondent PAGCOR requested for legal advice from
the Secretary of Justice as to whether or not it is authorized by its
Charter to operate and manage jai-alai frontons in the country. In its
Opinion No. 67, Series of 1996 dated July 15, 1996, the Secretary of
Justice opined that the authority of PAGCOR to operate and maintain
games of chance or gambling extends to jai-alai which is a form of sport
or game played for bets and that the Charter of PAGCOR amounts to
a legislative franchise for the purpose.[1] Similar favorable opinions were
received by PAGCOR from the Office of the Solicitor General per its
letter dated June 3, 1996 and the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel under its Opinion No. 150 dated June 14, 1996.[2] Thus,
PAGCOR started the operation of jai-alai frontons.
On May 6, 1999, petitioner Raoul B. del Mar initially filed in
G.R. No. 138298 a Petition for Prohibition to prevent respondent
PAGCOR from managing and/or operating the jai-alai or Basque pelota
games, by itself or in agreement with Belle Corporation, on the ground
that the controverted act is patently illegal and devoid of any basis either
from the Constitution or PAGCORs own Charter.
However, on June 17, 1999, respondent PAGCOR entered into
an Agreement with private respondents Belle Jai Alai Corporation
(BELLE) and Filipinas Gaming Entertainment Totalizator Corporation
(FILGAME) wherein it was agreed that BELLE will make available to
PAGCOR the required infrastructure facilities including the main
fronton, as well as provide the needed funding for jai-alai operations
with no financial outlay from PAGCOR, while PAGCOR handles the
actual management and operation of jai-alai.[3]
Thus, on August 10, 1999, petitioner Del Mar filed
a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari questioning the validity of said
Agreement on the ground that PAGCOR is without jurisdiction,
legislative franchise, authority or power to enter into such Agreement
for the opening, establishment, operation, control and management of
jai-alai games.
A little earlier, or on July 1, 1999, petitioners Federico S.
Sandoval II and Michael T. Defensor filed a Petition for Injunction,
docketed as G.R. No. 138982, which seeks to enjoin respondent
PAGCOR from operating or otherwise managing the jai-alai or Basque
pelota games by itself or in joint venture with Belle Corporation, for
being patently illegal, having no basis in the law or the Constitution, and
in usurpation of the authority that properly pertains to the legislative
branch of the government. In this case, a Petition in Intervention was
filed by Juan Miguel Zubiri alleging that the operation by PAGCOR of
jai-alai is illegal because it is not included in the scope of PAGCORs
franchise which covers only games of chance.
Petitioners Raoul B. del Mar, Federico S. Sandoval II, Michael
T. Defensor, and intervenor Juan Miguel Zubiri, are suing as
taxpayers and in their capacity as members of the House of
Representatives representing the First District of Cebu City, the Lone
Congressional District of Malabon-Navotas, the Third Congressional
District of Quezon City, and the Third Congressional District of
Bukidnon, respectively.
The bedrock issues spawned by the petitions at bar are:
G.R. No. 138298
Petitioner Del Mar raises the following issues:
I. The respondent PAGCOR has no jurisdiction or
legislative franchise or acted with grave abuse of
discretion, tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, in arrogating unto itself the authority or
power to open, pursue, conduct, operate, control
and manage jai-alai game operations in the
country.
II. x x x Respondent PAGCOR has equally no jurisdiction
or authority x x x in executing its agreement with co-
respondents Belle and Filgame for the conduct and
management of jai-alai game operations, upon
undue reliance on an opinion of the Secretary of
Justice.
III. x x x Respondent PAGCOR has equally no
jurisdiction or authority x x x in entering into a
partnership, joint venture or business arrangement
with its co-respondents Belle and Filgame, through
their agreement x x x. The Agreement was entered
into through manifest partiality and evident bad faith
(Sec. 3 (e), RA 3019), thus manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government [Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, RA 3019, Sec. 3 (g)].
IV. x x x Respondent PAGCOR has equally no
jurisdiction or authority x x x to award to its co-
respondents Belle and Filgame the right to avail of
the tax benefits which, by law, inures solely and
exclusively to PAGCOR itself.
V. x x x Respondent PAGCOR has equally no
jurisdiction or authority x x x to cause the
disbursement of funds for the illegal establishment,
management and operation of jai-alai game
operations.
VI. x x x Respondent PAGCOR has equally no
jurisdiction or authority x x x to award or grant
authority for the establishment, management and
operation of off-fronton betting stations or bookies.
VII. The respondent PAGCOR has no jurisdiction or
authority x x x in awarding unto its co-respondents
Belle and Filgame, without public bidding, the
subject agreement.
In defense, private respondents BELLE and FILGAME assert:
1. The petition states no cause of action and must be
dismissed outright;
2. The petitioner has no cause of action against the
respondents, he not being a real party in interest;
3. The instant petition cannot be maintained as a
taxpayer suit, there being no illegal disbursement of
public funds involved;
4. The instant petition is essentially an action for quo
warranto and may only be commenced by the
Solicitor General;
5. The operation of jai-alai is well within PAGCORs
authority to operate and maintain. PAGCORs
franchise is intended to be wide in its coverage, the
underlying considerations being, that: (1) the
franchise must be used to integrate all gambling
operations in one corporate entity (i.e. PAGCOR);
and (2) it must be used to generate funds for the
government to support its social impact projects;
6. The agreement executed by, between and among
PAGCOR, BJAC and FILGAME is outside the
coverage of existing laws requiring public bidding.
Substantially the same defenses were raised by respondent
PAGCOR in its Comment.
G.R. No. 138982
Petitioners contend that:
I. The operation of jai-alai games by PAGCOR is illegal
in that:
1) the franchise of PAGCOR does not include the
operation of jai-alai since jai-alai is a prohibited
activity under the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by P.D. No. 1602 which is otherwise
known as the Anti-Gambling Law;
2) jai-alai is not a game of chance and therefore
cannot be the subject of a PAGCOR franchise.
II. A franchise is a special privilege that should be
construed strictly against the grantee.
III. To allow PAGCOR to operate jai-alai under its charter
is tantamount to a license to PAGCOR to legalize
and operate any gambling activity.
In its Comment, respondent PAGCOR avers that:
1. An action for injunction is not among the cases or
proceedings originally cognizable by the Honorable
Supreme Court, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 56 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. Assuming, arguendo, the Honorable Supreme Court
has jurisdiction over the petition, the petition should
be dismissed for failure of petitioners to observe the
doctrine on hierarchy of courts.
3. x x x Petitioners have no legal standing to file a
taxpayers suit based on their cause of action nor
are they the real parties-in-interest entitled to the
avails of the suit.
4. Respondents franchise definitely includes the
operation of jai-alai.
5. Petitioners have no right in esse to be entitled to a
temporary restraining order and/or to be protected
by a writ of preliminary injunction.
The Solicitor General claims that the petition, which is actually
an action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, against
an alleged usurpation by PAGCOR of a franchise to operate jai alai,
should be dismissed outright because only the Solicitor General or
public prosecutor can file the same; that P.D. No. 1869, the Charter of
PAGCOR, authorizes PAGCOR to regulate and operate games of
chance and skill which include jai-alai; and that P.D. No. 1602 did not
outlaw jai-alai but merely provided for stiffer penalties to illegal or
unauthorized activities related to jai-alai and other forms of gambling.
We shall first rule on the important procedural issues raised by
the respondents.
Respondents in G.R. No. 138982 contend that the Court has no
jurisdiction to take original cognizance of a petition for injunction
because it is not one of those actions specifically mentioned in Section
1 of Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, they urge
that the petition should be dismissed for failure of petitioners to observe
the doctrine on hierarchy of courts.
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action and
hence, the jurisdiction of the court, are the allegations of the pleading
and the character of the relief sought.[4] A cursory perusal of the petition
filed in G.R. No. 138982 will show that it is actually one for Prohibition
under Section 2 of Rule 65 for it seeks to prevent PAGCOR from
managing, maintaining and operating jai-alai games. Even
assuming, arguendo, that it is an action for injunction, this Court has the
discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition at bar if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction.[5] It cannot be gainsaid
that the issues raised in the present petitions have generated an oasis
of concern, even days of disquiet in view of the public interest at
stake. In Tano, et al. vs. Socrates, et al.,[6] this Court did not hesitate to
treat a petition for certiorari and injunction as a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition to resolve an issue of far-reaching impact
to our people. This is in consonance with our case law now accorded
near religious reverence that rules of procedure are but tools designed
to facilitate the attainment of justice such that when its rigid application
tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court has
the duty to suspend their operation.[7]
Respondents also assail the locus standi or the standing of
petitioners to file the petitions at bar as taxpayers and as
legislators. First, they allege that petitioners have no legal standing to
file a taxpayers suit because the operation of jai-alai does not involve
the disbursement of public funds.
Respondents' stance is not without oven ready legal support. A
party suing as a taxpayer must specifically prove that he has sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation.[8] In essence, taxpayers are allowed to sue where there is a
claim of illegal disbursement of public funds,[9] or that public money is
being deflected to any improper purpose,[10] or where petitioners seek
to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.[11]
In the petitions at bar, the Agreement entered into between
PAGCOR and private respondents BELLE and FILGAME will show that
all financial outlay or capital expenditure for the operation of jai-alai
games shall be provided for by the latter. Thus, the Agreement
provides, among others, that: PAGCOR shall manage, operate and
control the jai-alai operation at no cost or financial risk to it (Sec. 1[A][1]);
BELLE shall provide funds, at no cost to PAGCOR, for all capital
expenditures (Sec. 1[B][1]); BELLE shall make available to PAGCOR,
at no cost to PAGCOR, the use of the integrated nationwide network of
on-line computerized systems (Sec. 1[B][2]); FILGAME shall make
available for use of PAGCOR on a rent-free basis the jai-alai fronton
facilities (Sec. 1 [C][1]); BELLE & FILGAME jointly undertake to provide
funds, at no cost to PAGCOR, for pre-operating expenses and working
capital (Sec. 1 [D][1]); and that BELLE & FILGAME will provide
PAGCOR with goodwill money in the amount of P 200 million (Sec. 1
[D][2]). In fine, the record is barren of evidence that the operation and
management of jai-alai by the PAGCOR involves expenditure of public
money.
Be that as it may, in line with the liberal policy of this Court
on locus standi when a case involves an issue of overarching
significance to our society,[12] we find and so hold that as members of
the House of Representatives, petitioners have legal standing to file the
petitions at bar. In the instant cases, petitioners complain that the
operation of jai-alai constitutes an infringement by PAGCOR of the
legislatures exclusive power to grant franchise. To the extent the
powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member
thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of
the powers of that institution, so petitioners contend. The contention
commands our concurrence for it is now settled that a member of the
House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his
office.[13] As presciently stressed in the case of Kilosbayan, Inc., viz:
We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the
public. The issues it raised are of paramount public interest and of a
category even higher than those involved in many of the aforecited
cases. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the
social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the
remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and
retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as
staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal
standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition x x x.
After hurdling the threshold procedural issues, we now come to
the decisive substantive issue of whether PAGCOR's legislative
franchise includes the right to manage and operate jai-alai.[14] The issue
is of supreme significance for its incorrect resolution can dangerously
diminish the plenary legislative power of Congress, more especially its
exercise of police power to protect the morality of our people. After a
circumspect consideration of the clashing positions of the parties, we
hold that the charter of PAGCOR does not give it any franchise to
operate and manage jai-alai.
FIRST. A franchise is a special privilege conferred upon a
corporation or individual by a government duly empowered legally to
grant it.[15] It is a privilege of public concern which cannot be
exercised at will and pleasure, but should be reserved for public
control and administration, either by the government directly, or by
public agents, under such conditions and regulations as the government
may impose on them in the interest of the public.[16] A franchise thus
emanates from a sovereign power[17] and the grant is inherently a
legislative power. It may, however, be derived indirectly from the
state through an agency to which the power has been clearly and
validly delegated.[18] In such cases, Congress prescribes
the conditions on which the grant of a franchise may be made.[19] Thus,
the manner of granting the franchise, to whom it may be granted,
the mode of conducting the business, the character and quality of
the service to be rendered and the duty of the grantee to the public in
exercising the franchise are almost always defined in clear and
unequivocal language. In the absence of these defining terms, any
claim to a legislative franchise to operate a game played for bets
and denounced as a menace to morality ought to be rejected.
SECOND. A historical study of the creation, growth and
development of PAGCOR will readily show that it was never given a
legislative franchise to operate jai-alai.
(2.a) Before the creation of PAGCOR, a 25-year right to
operate jai-alai in Manila was given by President Marcos to
the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation then
controlled by his in-laws, the Romualdez family. The franchise was
granted on October 16, 1975 thru P.D. No. 810 issued by President
Marcos in the exercise of his martial law powers. On that very date,
the 25-year franchise of the prior grantee expired and was not
renewed. A few months before, President Marcos had issued P.D. No.
771 dated August 20, 1975, revoking the authority of local government
units to issue jai-alai franchises. By these acts, the former President
exercised complete control of the sovereign power to grant franchises.
(2.b) Almost one year and a half after granting the Philippine
Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation a 25-year franchise to operate jai-
alai in Manila, President Marcos created PAGCOR on January 1,
1977 by issuing P.D. No. 1067-A. The decree is entitled Creating the
Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, Defining Its Powers
and Functions, Providing Funds therefor and for Other Purposes.
Its Declaration of Policy[20] trumpeted the intent that PAGCOR was
created to implement the policy of the State to centralize and
integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing
franchises or permitted by law x x x. One of its whereas clauses
referred to the need to prevent the proliferation of illegal casinos or
clubs conducting games of chance x x x.[21] To achieve this objective,
PAGCOR was empowered to establish and maintain clubs, casinos,
branches, agencies or subsidiaries, or other units anywhere in the
Philippines x x x.[22]
(2.c) On the same day after creating PAGCOR, President
Marcos issued P.D. No. 1067-B granting PAGCOR x x x
a Franchise to Establish, Operate, and Maintain Gambling
Casinos on Land or Water Within the Territorial Jurisdiction of the
Republic of the Philippines. Obviously, P.D. No. 1067-A which created
the PAGCOR is not a grant of franchise to operate the game of jai-
alai. On the other hand, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1067-B provides
the nature and term of PAGCORS franchise to maintain gambling
casinos (not a franchise to operate jai-alai), viz:
SECTION 1. NATURE AND TERM OF FRANCHISE. Subject to the
terms and conditions established in this Decree, the Philippine
Amusements and Gaming Corporation is hereby granted for a period
of twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another 25 years, the right,
privilege, and authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos,
clubs and other recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming
pools, i.e., basketball, football, etc., whether on land or sea, within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2 of the same decree spells out the scope of the
PAGCOR franchise to maintain gambling casinos (not a franchise to
operate jai-alai), viz:
SEC. 2. SCOPE OF FRANCHISE. In addition to the right and
privileges granted it under Sec. 1, this Franchise shall entitle the
franchise holder to do and undertake the following:
(1) Enter into operators and/or management contracts with duly
registered and accredited company possessing the knowledge, skill,
expertise and facilities to insure the efficient operation of gambling
casinos; Provided, That the service fees of such management and/or
operator companies whose services may be retained by the franchise
holder of this Franchise shall not in the aggregate exceed ten (10%)
percent of the gross income.
(2) Purchase foreign exchange that may be required for the
importation of equipment, facilities and other gambling paraphernalia
indispensably needed or useful to insure the successful operation
of gambling casinos.
(3) Acquire the right of way, access to or thru public lands, public
waters or harbors, including the Manila Bay Area; such right to
include, but not limited to, the right to lease and/or purchase public
lands, government reclaimed lands, as well as land of private
ownership or those leased from the government. This right shall carry
with it the privilege of the franchise holder to utilize piers, quays, boat
landings, and such other pertinent and related facilities within these
specified areas for use as landing, anchoring, or berthing sites in
connection with its authorized casino operations.
(4) Build or construct structures, buildings, coastways, piers, docks, as
well as any other form of land and berthing facilities for its
floating casinos.
(5) To do and perform such other acts directly related to the efficient
and successful operation and conduct of games of chance in
accordance with existing laws and decrees.
(2.d) Still on the day after creating PAGCOR, President Marcos
issued P.D. No. 1067-C amending P.D. Nos. 1067-A and B. The
amendment provides that PAGCORs franchise to maintain gambling
casinos x x x shall become exclusive in character, subject only to
the exception of existing franchises and games of chance heretofore
permitted by law, upon the generation by the franchise holder of gross
revenues amounting to P1.2 billion and its contribution therefrom of the
amount of P720 million as the governments share.
(2.e) On June 2, 1978, President Marcos issued P.D. No.
1399 amending P.D. Nos. 1067-A and 1067-B. The amendments did
not change the nature and scope of the PAGCOR franchise to
maintain gambling casinos. Rather, they referred to the Composition
of the Board of Directors,[23] Special Condition
Franchise,[24]` Exemptions,[25] and Other Conditions.[26]
(2.f) On August 13, 1979, President Marcos issued P.D. No.
1632. Again, the amendments did not change a comma on the
nature and scope of PAGCORs franchise to maintain gambling
casinos. They related to the allocation of the 60% share of the
government where the host area is a city or municipality other than
Metro Manila,[27] and the manner of payment of franchise tax of
PAGCOR.[28]
(2.g) On July 11, 1983, President Marcos issued P.D. No.
1869 entitled Consolidating and Amending P.D. Nos. 1067-A, 1067-B,
1067-C, 1399 and 1632 Relative to the Franchise and Power of the
PAGCOR. As a consolidated decree, it reiterated the nature and
scope of PAGCORs existing franchise to maintain gambling
casinos (not a franchise to operate jai-alai), thus:
SEC. 10. Nature and term of franchise. Subject to the terms and
conditions established in this Decree, the Corporation is hereby
granted for a period of twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another
twenty-five (25) years, the rights, privilege and authority to operate
and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or
amusement places, sports, gaming pools, i.e. basketball, football,
lotteries, etc., whether on land or sea, within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Republic of the Philippines.
SEC. 11. Scope of Franchise. In addition to the rights and privileges
granted it under the preceding Section, this Franchise shall entitle the
corporation to do and undertake the following:
(1) Enter into operating and/or management contracts with any
registered and accredited company possessing the knowledge, skill,
expertise and facilities to insure the efficient operation of gambling
casinos; provided, that the service fees of such management and/or
operator companies whose services may be retained by the
Corporation shall not in the aggregate exceed ten (10%) percent of the
gross income;
(2) Purchase foreign exchange that may be required for the
importation of equipment, facilities and other gambling paraphernalia
indispensably needed or useful to insure the successful operation
of gambling casinos;
(3) Acquire the right of way or access to or thru public land, public
waters or harbors, including the Manila Bay Area; such right shall
include, but not be limited to, the right to lease and/or purchase public
lands, government reclaimed lands, as well as lands of private
ownership or those leased from the Government. This right shall carry
with it the privilege of the Corporation to utilize piers, quays, boat
landings, and such other pertinent and related facilities within these
specified areas for use as landing, anchoring or berthing sites in
connection with its authorized casino operations;
(4) Build or construct structures, buildings, castways, piers, decks, as
well as any other form of landing and boarding facilities for its floating
casinos; and
(5) To do and perform such other acts directly related to the efficient
and successful operation and conduct of games of chance in
accordance with existing laws and decrees.
(2.h) Then came the 1986 EDSA revolution and the end of the
Marcos regime. On May 8, 1987, President Corazon
Aquino issued Executive Order No. 169 repealing P.D. Nos. 810,
1124 and 1966 thus revoking the franchise of the Philippine Jai-
Alai and Amusement Corporation controlled by the Romualdezes
to operate jai-alai in Manila. PAGCORs franchise to operate
of gambling casinos was not revoked. Neither was it given a
franchise to operate jai-alai.
THIRD. In light of its legal history, we hold that PAGCOR
cannot maintain that section 10 of P.D. No. 1869 grants it a
franchise to operate jai-alai. Section 10 provides:
SEC. 10 Nature and term of franchise. Subject to the terms and
conditions established in this Decree, the Corporation is hereby
granted for a period of twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another
twenty-five (25) years, the rights, privilege and authority to operate
and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or
amusement places, sports, gaming pools, i.e., basketball, football,
lotteries, etc., whether on land or sea, within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Republic of the Philippines.
(3.a) P.D. No. 1869 is a mere consolidation of previous
decrees dealing with PAGCOR. PAGCOR cannot seek comfort in
section 10 as it is not a new provision in P.D. No. 1869 and, from the
beginning of its history, was never meant to confer it with a franchise to
operate jai-alai. It is a reiteration of section 1 of P.D. No. 1067-B which
provides:
SECTION 1. Nature and Term of Franchise. Subject to the terms and
conditions established in this Decree, the Philippine Amusements and
Gaming Corporation is hereby granted for a period of twenty-five (25)
years, renewable for another 25 years, the right, privilege, and
authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs and other
recreation or amusement places, sports gaming pools, i.e., basketball,
football, etc., whether on land or sea, within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Republic of the Philippines.
(3.b) Plainly, section 1 of P.D. No. 1067-B which was reenacted
as section 10 of P.D. No. 1869 is not a grant of legislative franchise to
operate jai-alai. P.D. No. 1067-B is a franchise to maintain gambling
casinos alone. The two franchises are as different as day and night and
no alchemy of logic will efface their difference.
(3.c) PAGCOR's stance becomes more sterile when we
consider the law's intent. It cannot be the intent of President Marcos
to grant PAGCOR a franchise to operate jai-alai because a year and
a half before it was chartered, he issued P.D. No. 810 granting
Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation a 25-year franchise to
operate jai-alai in Manila. This corporation is controlled by his in-laws,
the Romualdezes.[29] To assure that this Romualdez corporation would
have no competition, President Marcos earlier revoked the power of
local governments to grant jai-alai franchises. Thus, PAGCORs stance
that P.D. No. 1067-B is its franchise to operate jai-alai, which would
have competed with the Romualdezes franchise, extends credulity
to the limit. Indeed, P.D. No. 1067-A which created PAGCOR made it
crystal clear that it was to implement "the policy of the State to centralize
and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by
existing franchises or permitted by law," which included the
Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation.
(3.d) There can be no sliver of doubt that under P.D. No. 1869,
PAGCORs franchise is only to operate gambling casinos and not jai-
alai. This conclusion is compelled by a plain reading of its various
provisions, viz:
"SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared to be the
policy of the State to centralize and integrate all games of chance not
heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law in
order to attain the following objectives:
xxxxxx
(b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for
amusement and recreation, including sports, gaming pools (basketball,
football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement and
recreation including games of chance, which may be allowed by law
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will: x x x
(3) minimize, if not totally eradicate, the evils, malpractices and
corruptions that are normally prevalent in the conduct and
operation of gambling clubs and casinos without direct
government involvement.
xxxxxx
TITLE IV GRANT OF FRANCHISE
SEC. 10. Nature and term of franchise. Subject to the terms and
conditions established in this Decree, the Corporation is hereby
granted for a period of twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another
twenty-five (25) years, the rights, privileges and authority to
operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation
or amusement places, sports, gaming pools, i.e. basketball, football,
lotteries, etc. whether on land or sea, within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Republic of the Philippines.
SEC. 11. Scope of Franchise. In addition to the rights and privileges
granted it under the preceding Section, this Franchise shall entitle the
Corporation to do and undertake the following:
(1) Enter into operating and/or management contracts with any
registered and accredited company possessing the knowledge, skill,
expertise and facilities to insure the efficient operation of gambling
casinos; provided, that the service fees of such management and/or
operator companies whose services may be retained by the
Corporation shall not in the aggregate exceed ten (10%) percent of the
gross income;
(2) Purchase foreign exchange that may be required for the
importation of equipment, facilities and other gambling paraphernalia
indispensably needed or useful to insure the successful operation
of gambling casinos;
(3) Acquire the right of way or access to or thru public land, public
waters or harbors x x x. This right shall carry with it the privilege of the
Corporation to utilize x x x such other pertinent and related facilities
within these specified areas x x x in connection with its authorized
casino operations;
(4) Build or construct structures, building castways, piers, decks, as
well as any other form of landing and boarding facilities for its
floating casinos;
xxxxxx
SEC. 13. Exemptions.
(1) Customs duties, taxes and other imposts on importations. All
importations of equipment, vehicles, automobiles, boats, ships,
barges, aircraft and such other gambling paraphernalia, including
accessories or related facilities, for the sole and exclusive use of
the casinos, the proper and efficient management and administration
thereof, and such other clubs. Recreation or amusement places to be
established under and by virtue of this Franchise shall be exempt from
the payment of all kinds of customs duties, taxes and other imposts,
including all kinds of fees, levies, or charges of any kind or nature,
whether National or Local.
Vessels and/or accessory ferry boats imported or to be imported by
any corporation having existing contractual arrangements with the
Corporation, for the sole and exclusive use of the casino or to be
used to service the operations and requirements of the
casino, shall likewise be totally exempt from the payment of all
customs duties, x x x.
(2) Income and other taxes. (a) x x x
(b) Others: The exemption herein granted for earnings derived from
the operations conducted under the franchise x x x shall inure to the
benefit of and extend to corporation(s) x x x with whom the
Corporation or operator has any contractual relationship in
connection with the operations of the casino(s) authorized to be
conducted under this Franchise x x x.
(3) Dividend Income. x x x The dividend income shall not in such case
be considered as part of beneficiaries taxable income; provided,
however, that such dividend income shall be totally exempted from
income or other forms of taxes if invested within six (6) months from
date the dividend income is received, in the following:
(a) operation of the casino(s) or investments in any affiliate activity
that will ultimately redound to the benefit of the Corporation or any
other corporation with whom the Corporation has any existing
arrangements in connection with or related to the operations of
the casino(s);
xxxxxx
(4) Utilization of Foreign Currencies. The Corporation shall have the
right and authority, solely and exclusively in connection with the
operations of the casino(s), to purchase, receive, exchange and
disburse foreign exchange, subject to the following terms and
conditions:
(a) A specific area in the casino(s) or gaming pit shall be put up solely
and exclusively for players and patrons utilizing foreign currencies;
(b) The Corporation shall appoint and designate a duly accredited
commercial bank agent of the Central Bank, to handle, administer and
manage the use of foreign currencies in the casino(s);
(c) The Corporation shall provide an office at casino(s) for the
employees of the designated bank, agent of the Central Bank, where
the Corporation will maintain a dollar account which will be utilized
exclusively for the above purpose and the casino dollar treasury
employees;
xxxxxx
(f) The disbursement, administration, management and recording
of foreign exchange currencies used in the casino(s) shall be
carried out in accordance with existing foreign exchange regulations x
x x.
SEC. 14. Other Conditions.
(1) Place. The Corporation shall conduct the gambling activities or
games of chance on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Republic of the Philippines. When conducted on water, the
Corporation shall have the right to dock the floating casino(s) in any
part of the Philippines where vessels/boats are authorized to dock
under the Customs and Maritime Laws.
(2) Time. Gambling activities may be held and conducted at anytime of
the day or night; provided, however, that in places where curfew hours
are observed, all players and personnel of gambling casinos shall
remain within the premises of the casinos.
(3) Persons allowed to play. x x x
(4) Persons not allowed to play. -
xxxxxx
From these are excepted the personnel employed by the
casinos, special guests, or those who at the discretion of the
Management may be allowed to stay in the premises.
TITLE VI EXEMPTION FROM CIVIL SERVICE LAW
SEC. 16. Exemption. All position in the Corporation, whether technical,
administrative, professional or managerial are exempt from the
provisions of the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations, and shall be
governed only by the personnel management policies set by the Board
of Directors. All employees of the casinos and related services shall
be classified as Confidential appointees.
TITLE VII TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
SEC. 17. Transitory Provisions. x x x
SEC. 18. Exemption from Labor Laws. No union or any form of
association shall be formed by all those working as employees of the
casino or related services whether directly or indirectly. For such
purpose, all employees of the casinos or related services shall be
classified as confidential appointees and their employment thereof,
whether by the franchise holder, or the operators, or the managers,
shall be exempt from the provisions of the Labor Code or any
implementing rules and regulations thereof.
From its creation in 1977 and until 1999, PAGCOR never
alleged that it has a franchise to operate jai-alai. Twenty-two years
is a long stretch of silence. It is inexplicable why it never claimed
its alleged franchise for so long a time which could have allowed
it to earn billions of pesos as additional income.
(3.e) To be sure, we need not resort to intellectual jujitsu to
determine whether PAGCOR has a franchise to operate jai-alai. It
is easy to tell whether there is a legislative grant or not. Known as the
game of a thousand thrills, jai-alai is a different game, hence, the
terms and conditions imposed on a franchisee are spelled out in
standard form. A review of some laws and executive orders granting a
franchise to operate jai-alai will demonstrate these standard terms and
conditions, viz:
(3.e.1) Commonwealth Act No. 485 (An Act to Permit Bets in
the Game of Basque Pelota) June 18, 1939
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
SECTION 1. Any provision of existing law to the contrary
notwithstanding, it shall be permissible in the game of Basque pelota,
a game of skill (including the games of pala, raqueta, cestapunta,
remonte and mano), in which professional players participate, to make
either direct bets or bets by means of a totalizer; Provided, That no
operator or maintainer of a Basque pelota court shall collect as
commission a fee in excess of twelve per centum on such bets, or
twelve per centum of the receipts of the totalizer, and of such per
centum three shall be paid to the Government of the Philippines, for
distribution in equal shares between the General Hospital and the
Philippine Anti-tuberculosis Society.
SEC. 2. Any person, company or corporation, that shall build a court
for Basque pelota games with bets within eighteen months from the
date of the approval of this Act, shall thereunder have the privilege to
maintain and operate the said court for a term of twenty-five years
from the date in which the first game with bets shall have taken
place. At the expiration of the said term of twenty-five years, the
buildings and the land on which the court and the stadium shall be
established, shall become the property of the Government of the
Philippines, without payment.
SEC. 3. The location and design of the buildings that shall be used for
the same games of Basque pelota, shall have prior approval of the
Bureau of Public Works and the operator shall pay a license fee of five
hundred pesos a year to the city or municipality in which the
establishment shall be situated, in addition to the real-estate tax due
on such real property.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
ENACTED, without Executive approval, June 18, 1939.
(3.e.2) Executive Order No. 135 (Regulating the Establishment,
Maintenance and Operation of Frontons and Basque Pelota Games [Jai
Alai]) May 4, 1948
By virtue of the powers vested in me by Commonwealth Act No. 601,
entitled An Act to regulate the establishment, maintenance and
operation of places of amusements in chartered cities, municipalities
and municipal districts, the following rules and regulations governing
frontons and basque pelota games are hereby promulgated:
SECTION 1. Definitions. Whenever used in this Order and unless the
context indicates a different meaning, the following terms shall bear
the meaning indicated herein:
(a) Basque pelota game shall include the pelota game with the use of
pala, raqueta, cesta punta, remonte and mano, in which professional
players participate.
(b) Fronton comprises the court where basque pelota games are
played, inlcuding the adjoining structures used in connection with such
games, such as the betting booths and galleries, totalizator
equipment, and the grandstands where the public is admitted in
connection with such games.
(c) Pelotari is a professional player engaged in playing basque pelota.
(d) Professional player is one who plays for compensation.
SEC. 2. Supervision over the establishment and operation of frontons
and basque pelota games. Subject to the administrative control and
supervision of the Secretary of the Interior, city or municipal mayors
shall exercise supervision over the establishment, maintenance and
operation of frontons and basque pelota games within their respective
territorial jurisdiction, as well as over the officials and employees of
such frontons and shall see to it that all laws, orders and regulations
relating to such establishments are duly enforced. Subject to similar
approval, they shall appoint such personnel as may be needed in the
discharge of their duties and fix their compensation which shall be
paid out of the allotment of one-half per centum (1/2%) out of the total
bets or wager funds set aside and made available for the purpose in
accordance with Section 19 hereof. The Secretary of the Interior shall
have the power to prohibit or allow the operation of such frontons on
any day or days, or modify their hour of operation and to prescribe
additional rules and regulations governing the same.
SEC. 3. Particular duties of city or municipal mayors regarding
operation of basque pelota games and frontons. In connection with
their duty to enforce the laws, orders, rules and regulations relating to
frontons and basque pelota games, the city or municipal mayor shall
require that such frontons shall be properly constructed and
maintained in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act
No. 485; shall see that the proper sanitary accommodations are
provided in the grandstands and other structures comprising such
frontons; and shall require that such frontons be provided with a
properly equipped clinic for the treatment of injuries to the pelotaris.
SEC. 4. Permits. In the absence of a legislative franchise, it shall be
unlawful for any person or entity to establish and/or operate frontons
and conduct basque pelota games without a permit issued by the
corresponding city or municipal mayor, with the approval of the
provincial governor in the latter case. Any permit issued hereunder
shall be reported by the provincial governor or city mayor, as the case
may be, to the Secretary of the Interior.
SEC. 5. License fees. The following license fees shall be paid:
(a) For each basque pelota fronton, five hundred pesos (P500)
annually, or one hundred and twenty-five pesos (P125) quarterly.
(b) For pelotaris, judges or referees and superintendents (intendentes)
of basque pelota games, eighteen pesos (P18) each annually.
The above license fees shall accrue to the funds of the city or
municipality where the fronton is operated.
SEC. 6. Location. Except in the case of any basque pelota fronton
licensed as of December 8, 1941, no basque pelota fronton shall be
maintained or operated within a radius of 200 lineal meters from any
city hall or municipal building, provincial capitol building, national
capitol building, public playa or park, public school, church, hospital,
athletic stadium, or any institution of learning or charity.
SEC. 7. Buildings, sanitary and parking requirements. No permit or
license for the construction or operation of a basque pelota fronton
shall be issued without proper certificate of the provincial or city
engineer and architect certifying to the suitability and safety of the
building and of the district or city health officer certifying to the sanitary
condition of said building. The city or municipal mayor may, in his
discretion and as circumstances may warrant, require that the fronton
be provided with sufficient space for parking so that the public roads
and highways be not used for such purposes.
SEC. 8. Protest and complaint. Any person who believes that any
basque pelota fronton is located or established in any place not
authorized herein or is being operated in violation of any provision of
this order may file a protest or complaint with the city or municipal
mayor concerned, and after proper investigation of such complaint the
city or municipal mayor may take such action as he may consider
necessary in accordance with the provisions of section 10 hereof. Any
decision rendered on the matter by the city or municipal mayor shall
be appealable to the Secretary of the Interior.
SEC. 9. Persons prohibited admission. Persons under 16 years of
age, persons carrying firearms or deadly weapons of any description,
except government officials actually performing their official duties
therein, intoxicated persons, and persons of disorderly nature and
conduct who are apt to disturb peace and order, shall not be admitted
or allowed in any basque pelota fronton: Provided, That persons under
16 years of age may, when accompanied by their parents or
guardians, be admitted therein but in no case shall such minors be
allowed to bet.
SEC. 10. Gambling prohibited. No card games or any of the prohibited
games shall be permitted within the premises of any basque pelota
fronton; and upon satisfactory evidence that the operator or entity
conducting the game has tolerated the existence of any prohibited
game within its premises, the city or municipal mayor may take the
necessary action in accordance with the provisions of section 11
hereof.
SEC. 11. Revocation or suspension of permits and licenses. The city
or municipal mayor, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the
Interior, may suspend or revoke any license granted under this Order
to any basque pelota fronton or to any official or employee thereof, for
violation of any of the rules and regulations provided in this Order or
those which said city or municipal mayor may prescribe, or for any just
cause. Such suspension or revocation shall operate to forfeit to the
city or municipality concerned all sums paid therefor.
SEC. 12. Appeals. Any action taken by the city or municipal mayor
under the provisions of this Order shall stand, unless modified or
revoked by the Secretary of the Interior.
SEC. 13. Books, records and accounts. The city or municipal mayor,
or his duly authorized representative, shall have the power to inspect
at all times the books, records, and accounts of any basque pelota
fronton. He may, in his discretion and as the circumstances may
warrant, require that the books and financial or other statements of the
person or entity operating the game be kept in such manner as he
may prescribe.
SEC. 14. Days and hours of operation. Except as may otherwise be
provided herein, basque pelota games with betting shall be allowed
every day, excepting Sundays, from 2 oclock p.m. to not later than 11
oclock p.m.
SEC. 15. Pelotaris, judges, referees, etc. shall be licensed. No person
or entity operating a basque pelota fronton, wherein games are played
with betting, shall employ any pelotari, judge or referee,
superintendent of games (intendente), or any other official whose
duties are connected with the operation or supervision of the games,
unless such person has been duly licensed by the city or municipal
mayor concerned. Such license shall be granted upon satisfactory
proof that the applicant is in good health, know the rules and usages
of the game, and is a person of good moral character and of
undoubted honesty. In the case of pelotaris, such license shall be
granted only upon the further condition that they are able to play the
game with reasonable skill and with safety to themselves and to their
opponents. The city or municipal mayor may further require other
reasonable qualifications for applicants to a license, not otherwise
provided herein. Such license shall be obtained yearly.
SEC. 16. Installation of automatic electric totalizator. Any person or
entity operating a fronton wherein betting in any form is allowed shall
install in its premises within the period of one year from the date this
Order takes effect, an automatic electrically operated indicator system
and ticket selling machine, commonly known as totalizator, which shall
clearly record each ticket purchased on every player in any game, the
total number of tickets sold on each event, as well as the dividends
that correspond to holders of winning numbers. This requirement shall,
however, not apply to double events or forecast pools or to any betting
made on the basis of a combination or grouping of players until a
totalizator that can register such bets has been invented and placed
on the market.
SEC. 17. Supervision over sale of betting tickets and payment of
dividends. For the purpose of verifying the accuracy of reports in
connection with the sale of betting tickets and the computation of
dividends awarded to winners on each event, as well as other
statements with reference to the betting in the games played, the city
or municipal mayor shall assign such number of auditing officers and
checkers as may be necessary for the purpose. These auditing
officers and checkers shall be placed in the ticket selling booths,
dividend computation booths and such other parts of the fronton,
where betting tickets are sold and dividends computed. It shall be their
duty to check up and correct any irregularity or any erroneous report
or computation that may be made by officials of the fronton, in
connection with the sale of tickets and the payment of dividends.
SEC. 18. Wager tickets and dividends. The face value of the wager
tickets for any event shall not exceed P5 whether for win or place, or
for any combination or grouping of winning numbers. The face value of
said tickets, as the case may be, shall be the basis for the
computation of the dividends and such dividends shall be paid after
eliminating fractions of ten centavos (P0.10); for example: if the
resulting dividend is P10.43, the dividend that shall be paid will be
only P10.40.
SEC. 19. Distribution of wager funds. The total wager funds or gross
receipts from the sale of the betting tickets shall be apportioned as
follows: a commission not exceeding ten and one-half per centum (10
%) on the total bets on each game or event shall be set aside for the
person or entity operating the fronton and four and one-half per
centum (4 %) of such bets shall be covered into the National Treasury
for disposition as may be authorized by law or executive order; and
the balance or eighty-five per centum (85%) of the total bets shall be
distributed in the form of dividends among holders of win or place
numbers or holders of the winning combination or grouping of
numbers, as the case may be: Provided, however, That of the ten and
one-half per centum (10 %) representing the commission of the
person or entity operating the fronton, an amount equivalent to one-
half per centum (1/2%) of the total bets or wager funds shall be set
aside and made available to cover the expenses of the personnel
assigned to supervise the operation of basque pelota games and
frontons, including payment of salaries of such personnel, purchase of
necessary equipment and other sundry expenses as may be
authorized by competent authority.
SEC. 20. Supervision over the conduct of games; enforcement of rules
and regulations. The city or municipal mayor is authorized to place
within the premises of the fronton such number of inspectors and
agents as may be deemed necessary to supervise the conduct of the
games to see that the rules of the games are strictly enforced, and to
carry out the provisions of this Order as well as such other regulations
as may hereafter be prescribed.
SEC. 21. Rules governing the games and personnel of the fronton.
The rules and regulations that have been adopted by any fronton to
govern the operation of its games and the behavior, duties and
performance of the officials and personnel connected therewith, such
as pelotaris, judges, referees or superintendents of games
(intendentes) and others, shall be the recognized rules and regulations
of such fronton until the same are altered or repealed by the Secretary
of the Interior; and any fronton may introduce any type or form of
games or events, provided they are not contrary to the provisions of
this Order or any rule or regulation hereafter issued by the Secretary
of the Interior.
SEC. 22. Regulations governing pelotaris. Any rule or regulation
adopted by any established fronton governing the conduct or
performance of pelotaris to the contrary notwithstanding, the following
regulations shall be observed:
(a) The pelotaris who are participating in the games shall not be
allowed to communicate, talk or make signs with any one in the public
or with any official or employee of the fronton during the games,
except with the judges or referees or the superintendent (intendente)
in charge of the games;
(b) The program of games or events, as well as the line-up or order of
playing of the pelotaris in each event shall be determined by the
superintendent of the games (intendente), subject to the approval of
the city or municipal mayor, or his authorized representatives;
(c) Pelotaris shall be in good physical condition before participating in
any game and shall be laid off from playing at least two days in a
week. Every pelotari shall once a month secure a medical certificate
from a government physician to be designated by the city or municipal
mayor concerned certifying to his physical fitness to engage in the
games; and
(d) The amount of dividends computed for any event shall not be
posted within the view of the pelotaris participating in the event until
after the termination of said event.
(3.e.3) Presidential Decree No. 810 (An Act Granting the Philippine
Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation a Franchise to Operate, Construct
and Maintain a Fronton for Basque Pelota and Similar Games of Skill in
the Greater Manila Area) October 16, 1975
WHEREAS, by virtue of the provisions of Commonwealth Act
Numbered 485 the franchise to operate and maintain a fronton for the
Basque pelota and similar games of skill in the City of Manila, shall
expire on October, 1975 whereupon the ownership of the land,
buildings and improvements used in the said game will be transferred
without payment to the government by operation of law;
WHEREAS, there is a pressing need not only to further develop the
game as a sport and amusement for the general public but also to
exploit its full potential in support of the governments objectives and
development programs;
WHEREAS, Basque pelota is a game of international renown, the
maintenance and promotion of which will surely assist the tourism
industry of the country;
WHEREAS, the tourism appeal of the game will be enhanced only
with the governments support and inducement in developing the sport
to a level at par with international standards;
WHEREAS, once such tourism appeal is developed, the same will
serve as a stable and expanding base for revenue generation for the
governments development projects.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution,
hereby decree as follows:
SECTION 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
there is hereby granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement
Corporation, a corporation duly organized and registered under the
laws of the Philippines, hereinafter called the grantee or its
successors, for a period of twenty-five years from the approval of this
Act, extendable for another twenty-five years without the necessity of
another franchise, the right, privilege and authority to construct,
operate and maintain a court for Basque Pelota (including the games
of pala, raqueta, cestapunta, remonte and mano) within the Greater
Manila Area, establish branches thereof for booking purposes and
hold or conduct Basque pelota games therein with bettings either
directly or by means of electric and/or computerized totalizator.
The games to be conducted by the grantee shall be under the
supervision of the Games and Amusements Board, hereinafter
referred to as the Board, which shall enforce the laws, rules and
regulations governing Basque pelota as provided in Commonwealth
Act numbered four hundred and eighty-five, as amended, and all the
officials of the game and pelotaris therein shall be duly licensed as
such by the Board.
SEC. 2. The grantee or its duly authorized agent may offer, take or
arrange bets within or outside the place, enclosure or court where the
Basque pelota games are held: Provided, That bets offered, taken or
arranged outside the place, enclosure or court where the games are
held, shall be offered, taken or arranged only in places duly licensed
by the corporation; Provided, however, That the same shall be subject
to the supervision of the Board. No person other than the grantee or
its duly authorized agents shall take or arrange bets on any pelotari or
on the game, or maintain or use a totalizator or other device, method
or system to bet on any pelotari or on the game within or without the
place, enclosure or court where the games are held by the
grantee. Any violation of this section shall be punished by a fine of not
more than two thousand pesos or by imprisonment of not more than
six months, or both in the discretion of the Court. If the offender is a
partnership, corporation, or association, the criminal liability shall
devolve upon its president, directors or any other officials responsible
for the violation.
SEC. 3. The grantee shall provide mechanical and/or computerized
devices, namely: a) electric totalizator; b) machine directly connected
to a computer in a display board, for the sale of tickets, including,
those sold from the off-court stations; c) modern sound system and
loud speakers; d) facilities that bring safety, security, comfort and
convenience to the public; e) modern intercommunication devices; and
f) such other facilities, devices and instruments for clean, honest and
orderly Basque pelota games, within three years from the approval of
this Act.
The Board shall assign its auditors and/or inspectors to supervise and
regulate the placing of bets, proper computation of dividends and the
distribution of wager funds.
SEC. 4. The total wager fund or gross receipts from the sale of betting
tickets will be apportioned as follows: eighty-five per centum (85%)
shall be distributed in the form of dividends among the holders of win
or place numbers or holders of the winning combination or grouping of
numbers as the case may be. The remaining balance of fifteen per
centum (15%) shall be distributed as follows: eleven and one-half per
centum (11 %) shall be set aside as the commission fee of the
grantee, and three and one-half per centum (3 %) thereof shall be set
aside and alloted to any special health, educational, civic, cultural,
charitable, social welfare, sports, and other similar projects as may be
directed by the President. The receipts from betting corresponding to
the fraction of ten centavos eliminated from the dividends paid to the
winning tickets, commonly known as breakage, shall also be set aside
for the above-named special projects.
SEC. 5. The provision of any existing law to the contrary
notwithstanding, the grantee is hereby authorized to hold Basque
pelota games (including the games of pala, raqueta, cestapunta,
remonte and mano) on all days of the week except Sundays and
official holidays.
SEC. 6. The provisions of Commonwealth Act numbered four hundred
and eighty-five as amended, shall be deemed incorporated herein,
provided that the provisions of this Act shall take precedence over the
provisions thereof and all other laws, executive orders and regulations
which are inconsistent herewith.
SEC. 7. The grantee shall not lease, transfer, grant the usufruct of, sell
or assign this franchise permit, or the rights or privileges acquired
thereunder to any person, firm, company, corporation or other
commercial or legal entity, nor merge with any other person, company
or corporation organized for the same purpose, without the previous
approval of the President of the Philippines.
SEC. 8. For purposes of this franchise, the grantee is herein
authorized to make use of the existing fronton, stadium and facilities
located along Taft Avenue, City of Manila, belonging to the
government by virtue of the provisions of Commonwealth Act
numbered four hundred and eighty-five.
It is abundantly clear from the aforequoted laws, executive
orders and decrees that the legislative practice is that a franchise
to operate jai-alai is granted solely for that purpose and the terms
and conditions of the grant are unequivocably defined by the
grantor. Such express grant and its conditionalities protective of
the public interest are evidently wanting in P.D. No. 1869, the
present Charter of PAGCOR. Thus, while E.O. 135 and P.D. No. 810
provided for the apportionment of the wager funds or gross receipts
from the sale of betting tickets, as well as the distribution of dividends
among holders of win or place numbers or holders of the winning
combination or grouping of numbers, no such provisions can be found
in P.D. No. 1869. Likewise, while P.D. No. 810 describes where and
how the games are to be conducted and bettings to be made, and
imposes a penalty in case of a violation thereof, such provisions are
absent in P.D. No. 1869.
In fine, P.D. No. 1869 does not have the standard marks of
a law granting a franchise to operate jai-alai as those found under
P.D. No. 810 or E.O. 135. We cannot blink away from the stubborn
reality that P.D. No. 1869 deals with details pertinent alone to the
operation of gambling casinos. It prescribes the rules and regulations
concerning the operation of gambling casinos such as the place, time,
persons who are and are not entitled to play, tax exemptions, use of
foreign exchange, and the exemption of casino employees from the
coverage of the Civil Service Law and the Labor Code. The short point
is that P.D. No. 1869 does not have the usual provisions with
regards to jai-alai. The logical inference is that PAGCOR was not
given a franchise to operate jai-alai frontons. There is no reason to
resist the beguiling rule that acts of incorporation, and statutes granting
other franchises or special benefits or privileges to corporations, are to
be construed strictly against the corporations; and whatever is not given
in unequivocal terms is understood to be withheld.[30]
FOURTH. The tax treatment between jai-alai operations and
gambling casinos are distinct from each other. Letters of Instruction No.
1439 issued on November 2, 1984 directed the suspension of the
imposition of the increased tax on winnings in horse races and jai-alai
under the old revenue code, to wit:
WHEREAS, the increased tax on winnings on horse races and jai-alai
under Presidential Decree 1959 has already affected the holding of
horse races and jai-alai games, resulting in government revenue loss
and affecting the livelihood of those dependent thereon;
WHEREAS, the manner of taxation applicable thereto is unique and its
effects and incidence are in no way similar to the taxes on casino
operation or to any shiftable tax;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution,
do hereby order and instruct the Minister of Finance, the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the Chairman,
Games & Amusements Board, to suspend the implementation of the
increased rate of tax winnings in horse races and jai-alai games and
collect instead the rate applicable prior to the effectivity of PD 1959.
Similarly, under Republic Act No. 8424, or the Tax Reform Act
of 1997, there is an amusement tax imposed on operators of jai-alai
(Section 125) and a stamp tax on jai-alai tickets (Section 190). There is
no corresponding imposition on gambling casinos. Well to note, section
13 of P.D. No. 1869 grants to the franchise holder and casino operators
tax exemptions from the payment of customs duties and income tax,
except a franchise tax of five (5%) percent which shall be in lieu of all
kinds of taxes, levies, fees or assessments of any kind, nature or
description, levied, established or collected by any municipal, provincial,
or national government authority. No similar exemptions have been
extended to operators of jai-alai frontons.
FIFTH. P.D. No. 1869, the present Charter of PAGCOR, is
a consolidation of P.D. Nos. 1067-A, 1067-B and 1067-C all issued on
January 1, 1977. P.D. No. 1067-A created the PAGCOR and defined its
powers and functions; P.D. No. 1067-B granted to PAGCOR
a franchise to establish, operate, and maintain gambling
casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic
of the Philippines; and P.D. No. 1067-C granted PAGCOR
the exclusive right, privilege and authority to operate and maintain
gambling casinos, subject only to the exception of existing franchises
and games of chance permitted by law.
Beyond debate, P.D. No. 1869 adopted substantially the
provisions of said prior decrees, with some additions which,
however, have no bearing on the franchise granted to PAGCOR to
operate gambling casinos alone, such as the Affiliation Provisions
under Title III and the Transitory Provisions under Title VII. It also added
the term lotteries under Section 1 (b) on Declaration of Policy and
Section 10 on the Nature and Term of Franchise. It ought to follow that
P.D. No. 1869 carries with it the same legislative intent that infused P.D.
Nos. 1067-A, 1067-B and 1067-C. To be sure, both P.D. No. 1067-A
and P.D. No. 1869 seek to enforce the same avowed policy of the State
to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the evils, malpractices and
corruptions that normally are found prevalent in the conduct and
operation ofgambling clubs and casinos without direct government
involvement. It did not address the moral malevolence of jai-alai
games and the need to contain it thru PAGCOR. We cannot deface
this legislative intent by holding that the grant to PAGCOR under P.D.
Nos. 1067-A and 1067-B to establish, operate, and maintain gambling
casinos, has been enlarged, broadened or expanded by P.D. No. 1869
so as to include a grant to operate jai-alai frontons. Then and now, the
intention was merely to grant PAGCOR a franchise to operate gambling
casinos, no more, no less.
SIXTH. Lest the idea gets lost in the shoals of our
subconsciousness, let us not forget that PAGCOR is engaged in
business affected with public interest. The phrase affected with public
interest means that an industry is subject to control for the public
good;[31] it has been considered as the equivalent of subject to the
exercise of the police power.[32] Perforce, a legislative franchise to
operate jai-alai is imbued with public interest and involves an
exercise of police power. The familiar rule is that laws which grant
the right to exercise a part of the police power of the state are to
be construed strictly and any doubt must be resolved against the
grant.[33]The legislature is regarded as the guardian of society, and
therefore is not presumed to disable itself or abandon the
discharge of its duty. Thus, courts do not assume that the
legislature intended to part away with its power to regulate public
morals.[34] The presumption is influenced by constitutional
considerations. Constitutions are widely understood to withhold from
legislatures any authority to bargain away their police power[35] for the
power to protect the public interest is beyond abnegation.
It is stressed that the case at bar does not involve a franchise to
operate a public utility (such as water, transportation, communication or
electricity) the operation of which undoubtedly redounds to the benefit
of the general public. What is claimed is an alleged legislative grant of
a gambling franchise a franchise to operate jai-alai. A statute which
legalizes a gambling activity or business should be strictly construed
and every reasonable doubt must be resolved to limit the powers and
rights claimed under its authority.[36]
The dissent would like to make capital of the fact that the cases
of Stone vs. Mississippi and Aicardi vs. Alabama are not on all fours
to the cases at bar and, hence, the rulings therein do not apply. The
perceived incongruity is more apparent than real.
Stone[37] involves a contract entered into by the State of
Mississippi with the plaintiffs which allowed the latter to sell and dispose
of certificates of subscription which would entitle the holders thereof to
such prizes as may be awarded to them, by the casting of lots or by lot,
chance or otherwise. The contract was entered into by plaintiffs
pursuant to their charter entitled An Act Incorporating the Mississippi
Agricultural, Educational and Manufacturing Aid Society which
purportedly granted them the franchise to issue and sell lottery
tickets.However, the state constitution expressly prohibits the
legislature from authorizing any lottery or allowing the sale of lottery
tickets.Mississippi law makes it unlawful to conduct a lottery.
The question raised in Stone concerned the authority of the
plaintiffs to exercise the franchise or privilege of issuing and selling
lottery tickets. This is essentially the issue involved in the cases at bar,
that is, whether PAGCORs charter includes the franchise to operate jai-
alai frontons. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the facts in the
cases at bar are not identical, the principles of law laid down
in Stone are illuminating. For one, it was held in Stone that:
Experience has shown that the common forms of gambling are
comparatively innocuous when placed in contrast with the wide-spread
pestilence of lotteries. The former are confined to a few persons and
places, but the latter infests the whole community; it enters every
dwelling; it reaches every class; it preys upon the hard earnings of the
poor; and it plunders the ignorant and simple. x x x[38]
The verity that all species of gambling are pernicious prompted the
Mississippi Court to rule that the legislature cannot bargain away public
health or public morals. We can take judicial notice of the fact that jai-
alai frontons have mushroomed in every nook and corner of the
country. They are accessible to everyone and they specially mangle the
morals of the marginalized sector of society. It cannot be gainsaid that
there is but a miniscule of a difference between jai-alai and lottery with
respect to the evils sought to be prevented.
In the case of Aicardi vs. Alabama, Moses & Co. was granted
a legislative franchise to carry on gaming in the form specified therein,
and its agent, Antonio Aicardi, was indicted for keeping a gaming
table. In ascertaining whether the scope of the companys franchise
included the right to keep a gaming table, the Court there held that such
an Act should be construed strictly. Every reasonable doubt should be
so resolved as to limit the powers and rights claimed under its
authority. Implications and intendments should have no place except as
they are inevitable from the language or the context.
The view expressed in the dissent that the aforequoted ruling
was taken out of context is perched on the premise that PAGCORs
franchise is couched in a language that is broad enough to cover the
operations of jai-alai. This view begs the question for as shown in our
disquisition, PAGCOR's franchise is restricted only to the operation of
gambling casinos. Aicardi supports the thesis that a gambling
franchise should be strictly construed due to its ill-effects on public order
and morals.
SEVENTH. The dissent also insists that the legislative intent
must be sought first of all in the language of the statute itself. In applying
a literal interpretation of the provision under Section 11 of P.D. 1869
that x x x the Corporation is hereby granted x x x the rights, privileges,
and authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and
other recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming pools, i.e.,
basketball, football, lotteries, etc. x x x, it contends that the extent and
nature of PAGCORs franchise is so broad that literally all kinds of sports
and gaming pools, including jai-alai, are covered therein. It concluded
that since under Section 11 of P.D. No. 1869, games of skill like
basketball and football have been lumped together with the word
lotteries just before the word etc. and after the words gaming pools, it
may be deduced from the wording of the law that when bets or stakes
are made in connection with the games of skill, they may be classified
as games of chance under the coverage of PAGCORs franchise.
We reject this simplistic reading of the law considering the
social, moral and public policy implications embedded in the cases at
bar.The plain meaning rule used in the dissent rests on the assumption
that there is no ambiguity or obscurity in the language of the law. The
fact, however, that the statute admits of different interpretations is the
best evidence that the statute is vague and ambiguous.[39] It is widely
acknowledged that a statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being
understood by reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or
more senses.[40] In the cases at bar, it is difficult to see how a literal
reading of the statutory text would unerringly reveal the legislative
intent.To be sure, the term jai-alai was never used and is nowhere to be
found in the law. The conclusion that it is included in the franchise
granted to PAGCOR cannot be based on a mere cursory perusal of and
a blind reliance on the ordinary and plain meaning of the statutory terms
used such as gaming pools and lotteries. Sutherland tells us that a
statute is ambiguous, and so open to explanation by extrinsic aids, not
only when its abstract meaning or the connotation of its terms is
uncertain, but also when it is uncertain in its application to, or effect
upon, the fact-situation of the case at bar.[41]
Similarly, the contention in the dissent that :
x x x Even if the Court is fully persuaded that the legislature really
meant and intended something different from what it enacted, and that
the failure to convey the real meaning was due to inadvertence or
mistake in the use of the language, yet, if the words chosen by the
legislature are not obscure or ambiguous, but convey a precise and
sensible meaning (excluding the case of obvious clerical errors or
elliptical forms of expression), then the Court must take the law as it
finds it, and give it its literal interpretation, without being influenced by
the probable legislative meaning lying at the back of the words. In that
event, the presumption that the legislature meant what it said, though
it be contrary to the fact, is conclusive.
cannot apply in the cases at bar considering that it has not been shown
that the failure to convey the true intention of the legislature is
attributable to inadvertence or a mistake in the language used.
EIGHTH. Finally, there is another reason why PAGCOR's claim
to a legislative grant of a franchise to operate jai-alai should be
subjected to stricter scrutiny. The so-called legislative grant to
PAGCOR did not come from a real Congress. It came from President
Marcos who assumed legislative powers under martial law. The grant is
not the result of deliberations of the duly elected representatives of our
people.
This is not to assail President Marcos legislative powers granted
by Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution, as the dissent would put
it. It is given that in the exercise of his legislative power, President
Marcos legally granted PAGCOR's franchise to operate gambling
casinos. The validity of this franchise to operate gambling casinos is
not, however, the issue in the cases at bar. The issue is whether this
franchise to operate gambling casinos includes the privilege to operate
jai-alai. PAGCOR says it does. We hold that it does not. PAGCOR's
overarching claim should be given the strictest scrutiny because it was
granted by one man who governed when the country was under martial
law and whose governance was repudiated by our people in EDSA
1986. The reason for this submission is rooted in the truth
thatPAGCOR's franchise was not granted by a real Congress where the
passage of a law requires a more rigorous process in terms of floor
deliberations and voting by members of both the House and the
Senate. It is self-evident that there is a need to be extra cautious in
treating this alleged grant of a franchise as a grant by the
legislature, as a grant by the representatives of our people, for
plainly it is not. We now have a real Congress and it is best to let
Congress resolve this issue considering its policy ramifications on
public order and morals.
In view of this ruling, we need not resolve the other issues raised
by petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Respondents
PAGCOR, Belle Jai Alai Corporation and Filipinas Gaming
Entertainment Totalizator Corporation are ENJOINED from managing,
maintaining and operating jai-alai games, and from enforcing the
agreement entered into by them for that purpose.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 180363 April 28, 2009
EDGAR Y. TEVES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HERMINIO G.
TEVES, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution is whether the crime of which petitioner Edgar
Y. Teves was convicted in Teves v. Sandiganbayan1 involved moral
turpitude.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd
legislative district of Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007
elections. On March 30, 2007, respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a
petition to disqualify2petitioner on the ground that in Teves v.
Sandiganbayan,3 he was convicted of violating Section 3(h), Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for
possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which is
prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC)
of 1991, and was sentenced to pay a fine of P10,000.00. Respondent
alleged that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office
because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude which
carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public
office.4 The case was docketed as SPA No. 07-242 and assigned to
the COMELECs First Division.
On May 11, 2007, the COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner
from running for the position of member of House of Representatives
and ordered the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy.5
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en
banc which was denied in its assailed October 9, 2007 Resolution for
being moot, thus:
It appears, however, that [petitioner] lost in the last 14 May 2007
congressional elections for the position of member of the House of
Representatives of the Third district of Negros Oriental thereby
rendering the instant Motion for Reconsideration moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for
Reconsideration dated 28 May 2007 filed by respondent Edgar Y.
Teves challenging the Resolution of this Commission (First Division)
promulgated on 11 May 2007 is hereby DENIED for having been
rendered moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.6
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:
I.
THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN THE COMELEC EN BANC
DEMURRED IN RESOLVING THE MAIN ISSUE RAISED IN
PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, WHETHER
PETITIONER IS DISQUALIFIED TO RUN FOR PUBLIC OFFICE
TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE DECISION OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO. 154182.
II.
THE MAIN ISSUE IS NOT RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC AS
THE RESOLUTION THEREOF WILL DETERMINE PETITIONERS
QUALIFICATION TO RUN FOR OTHER PUBLIC POSITIONS IN
FUTURE ELECTIONS.
III.
THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN THE COMELEC EN BANC IN
EFFECT AFFIRMED THE FINDINGS OF THE FIRST DIVISION
WHICH RULED THAT PETITIONERS CONVICTION FOR
VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(H) OF R.A. 3019 AND THE IMPOSITION
OF FINE IS A CONVICTION FOR A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL
TURPITUDE.
A.
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED OF A
CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE SHOULD BE RESOLVED
TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE FINDINGS OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO. 154182.
B.
THERE IS NOTHING IN THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT
THAT SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF THE FIRST DIVISION OF
THE COMELEC, THAT BASED ON THE "TOTALITY OF FACTS"
DOCTRINE, PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED OF A CRIME
INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.7
The petition is impressed with merit.
The fact that petitioner lost in the congressional race in the May 14,
2007 elections did not effectively moot the issue of whether he was
disqualified from running for public office on the ground that the crime
he was convicted of involved moral turpitude. It is still a justiciable
issue which the COMELEC should have resolved instead of merely
declaring that the disqualification case has become moot in view of
petitioners defeat.
Further, there is no basis in the COMELECs findings that petitioner is
eligible to run again in the 2010 elections because his disqualification
shall be deemed removed after the expiration of a period of five years
from service of the sentence. Assuming that the elections would be
held on May 14, 2010, the records show that it was only on May 24,
2005 when petitioner paid the fine of P10,000.00 he was sentenced to
pay in Teves v. Sandignbayan.8 Such being the reckoning point, thus,
the five-year disqualification period will end only on May 25, 2010.
Therefore he would still be ineligible to run for public office during the
May 14, 2010 elections.
Hence, it behooves the Court to resolve the issue of whether or not
petitioners violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves moral
turpitude.1avvphi1
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by
final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense
for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen
months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to
be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given
plenary pardon or granted amnesty.lawphil.net
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be
deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that
said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the
expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless
within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis
supplied)
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary
to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general.9
Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 of which petitioner was convicted, reads:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract or transaction in connection with which he
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is
prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows:
1) The accused is a public officer; 2) he has a direct or indirect
financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction;
3) he either: a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in
connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited from having such
interest by the Constitution or by law.10
Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct
or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or
transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The first mode is
when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity
in connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any business,
contract, or transaction. The second mode is when he is prohibited
from having such an interest by the Constitution or by law.11
In Teves v. Sandiganbayan,12 petitioner was convicted under the
second mode for having pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit
which is prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the Local Government Code of
1991. The Court held therein:
However, the evidence for the prosecution has established that
petitioner Edgar Teves, then mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental,
owned the cockpit in question. In his sworn application for registration
of cockpit filed on 26 September 1983 with the Philippine Gamefowl
Commission, Cubao, Quezon City, as well as in his renewal
application dated 6 January 1989 he stated that he is the owner and
manager of the said cockpit. Absent any evidence that he divested
himself of his ownership over the cockpit, his ownership thereof is
rightly to be presumed because a thing once proved to exist continues
as long as is usual with things of that nature. His affidavit dated 27
September 1990 declaring that effective January 1990 he "turned over
the management of the cockpit to Mrs. Teresita Z. Teves for the
reason that [he] could no longer devote a full time as manager of the
said entity due to other work pressure" is not sufficient proof that he
divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit. Only the
management of the cockpit was transferred to Teresita Teves effective
January 1990. Being the owner of the cockpit, his interest over it was
direct.
Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were
transferred to his wife, still he would have a direct interest thereon
because, as correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan, they
remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as such
their property relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal
partnership of gains in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Article
160 of the Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. And Section
143 of the Civil Code declares all the property of the conjugal
partnership of gains to be owned in common by the husband and wife.
Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and is, therefore,
prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which reads:
Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. (a) It shall
be unlawful for any local government official or employee, directly or
indirectly, to:
xxxx
(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a
local government unit. [Emphasis supplied].
The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is possession of a prohibited
interest.13
However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically
mean that the same involved moral turpitude. A determination of all
surrounding circumstances of the violation of the statute must be
considered. Besides, moral turpitude does not include such acts as
are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being
positively prohibited, as in the instant case.
Thus, in Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections,14 the Court clarified
that:
Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this
reason that "as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the
Supreme Court to determine." In resolving the foregoing question, the
Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se
involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, the
rationale of which was set forth in "Zari v. Flores," to wit:
"It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless of
the fact that it is punishable by law or not. It must not be merely mala
prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of
the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude.
Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are not of
themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively
prohibited."
This guideline nonetheless proved short of providing a clear-cut
solution, for in "International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC, the
Court admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral
turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying a crime as
malum in se or as malum prohibitum. There are crimes which are mala
in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes
which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. In the final
analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately
a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances
surrounding the violation of the statute. (Emphasis supplied)1awphi1
Applying the foregoing guidelines, we examined all the circumstances
surrounding petitioners conviction and found that the same does not
involve moral turpitude.
First, there is neither merit nor factual basis in COMELECs finding
that petitioner used his official capacity in connection with his interest
in the cockpit and that he hid the same by transferring the
management to his wife, in violation of the trust reposed on him by the
people.
The COMELEC, in justifying its conclusion that petitioners conviction
involved moral turpitude, misunderstood or misapplied our ruling in
Teves v. Sandiganbayan. According to the COMELEC:
In the present case, while the crime for which [petitioner] was
convicted may per se not involve moral turpitude, still the totality of
facts evinces [his] moral turpitude. The prohibition was intended to
avoid any conflict of interest or any instance wherein the public official
would favor his own interest at the expense of the public interest. The
[petitioner] knew of the prohibition but he attempted to circumvent the
same by holding out that the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center
is to be owned by a certain Daniel Teves. Later on, he would aver that
he already divested himself of any interest of the cockpit in favor of his
wife. But the Supreme Court saw through the ruse and declared that
what he divested was only the management of the cockpit but not the
ownership. And even if the ownership is transferred to his wife, the
respondent would nevertheless have an interest thereon because it
would still belong to the conjugal partnership of gains, of which the
[petitioner] is the other half.
[Petitioner] therefore maintained ownership of the cockpit by deceit.
He has the duty to divest himself but he did not and instead employed
means to hide his interests. He knew that it was prohibited he
nevertheless concealed his interest thereon. The facts that he hid his
interest denotes his malicious intent to favor self-interest at the
expense of the public. Only a man with a malevolent, decadent,
corrupt and selfish motive would cling on and conceal his interest, the
acquisition of which is prohibited. This plainly shows his moral
depravity and proclivity to put primacy on his self interest over that of
his fellowmen. Being a public official, his act is also a betrayal of the
trust reposed on him by the people. Clearly, the totality of his acts is
contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, honesty and good
morals. The crime, as committed by the [petitioner], plainly involves
moral turpitude.15
On the contrary, the Courts ruling states:
The Sandiganbayan found that the charge against Mayor Teves for
causing the issuance of the business permit or license to operate the
Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center is "not well-founded." This it
based, and rightly so, on the additional finding that only the
Sangguniang Bayan could have issued a permit to operate the
Valencia Cockpit in the year 1992. Indeed, under Section 447(3) of the
LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1 January 1992, it is the
Sangguniang Bayan that has the authority to issue a license for the
establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits. Unlike in the
old LGC, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, wherein the municipal mayor was
the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, under the LGC of
1991, the mayor is not so anymore and is not even a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, Mayor Teves could not have intervened
or taken part in his official capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license
during the material time, as alleged in the information, because he
was not a member of the Sangguniang Bayan.16
Thus, petitioner, as then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his influence,
authority or power to gain such pecuniary or financial interest in the
cockpit. Neither did he intentionally hide his interest in the subject
cockpit by transferring the management thereof to his wife considering
that the said transfer occurred before the effectivity of the present LGC
prohibiting possession of such interest.
As aptly observed in Teves v. Sandiganbayan:
As early as 1983, Edgar Teves was already the owner of the Valencia
Cockpit. Since then until 31 December 1991, possession by a local
official of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not yet prohibited. It was
before the effectivity of the LGC of 1991, or on January 1990, that he
transferred the management of the cockpit to his wife Teresita. In
accordance therewith it was Teresita who thereafter applied for the
renewal of the cockpit registration. Thus, in her sworn applications for
renewal of the registration of the cockpit in question dated 28 January
1990 and 18 February 1991, she stated that she is the
Owner/Licensee and Operator/Manager of the said cockpit. In her
renewal application dated 6 January 1992, she referred to herself as
the Owner/Licensee of the cockpit. Likewise in the separate Lists of
Duly Licensed Personnel for Calendar Years 1991 and 1992, which
she submitted on 22 February 1991 and 17 February 1992,
respectively, in compliance with the requirement of the Philippine
Gamefowl Commission for the renewal of the cockpit registration, she
signed her name as Operator/Licensee.17 (Emphasis supplied)
Second, while possession of business and pecuniary interest in a
cockpit licensed by the local government unit is expressly prohibited
by the present LGC, however, its illegality does not mean that violation
thereof necessarily involves moral turpitude or makes such
possession of interest inherently immoral. Under the old LGC, mere
possession by a public officer of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was
not among the prohibitions. Thus, in Teves v. Sandiganbayan, the
Court took judicial notice of the fact that:
x x x under the old LGC, mere possession of pecuniary interest in a
cockpit was not among the prohibitions enumerated in Section 41
thereof. Such possession became unlawful or prohibited only upon the
advent of the LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1 January 1992.
Petitioner Edgar Teves stands charged with an offense in connection
with his prohibited interest committed on or about 4 February 1992,
shortly after the maiden appearance of the prohibition. Presumably, he
was not yet very much aware of the prohibition. Although ignorance
thereof would not excuse him from criminal liability, such would justify
the imposition of the lighter penalty of a fine of P10,000 under Section
514 of the LGC of 1991.18 (Italics supplied)
The downgrading of the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of nine
years and twenty-one days as minimum to twelve years as maximum
to a lighter penalty of a fine of P10,000.00 is a recognition that
petitioners violation was not intentionally done contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals but due to his lack of awareness or
ignorance of the prohibition.
Lastly, it may be argued that having an interest in a cockpit is
detrimental to public morality as it tends to bring forth idlers and
gamblers, hence, violation of Section 89(2) of the LGC involves moral
turpitude.
Suffice it to state that cockfighting, or sabong in the local parlance, has
a long and storied tradition in our culture and was prevalent even
during the Spanish occupation.19 While it is a form of gambling, the
morality thereof or the wisdom in legalizing it is not a justiciable issue.
In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., it was held that:
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not
illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests
of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically
proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning
it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the
exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling
altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of
gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider
sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits
lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices,
Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no
authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that
courts do no sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the
prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions
regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are not
addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative
and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our
scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way
these branches decide, they are answerable only to their own
conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts,
and not to the courts of justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of
the Commission on Elections dated May 11, 2007 and October 9,
2007 disqualifying petitioner Edgar Y. Teves from running for the
position of Representative of the 3rd District of Negros Oriental, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring that
the crime committed by petitioner (violation of Section 3(h) of R.A.
3019) did not involve moral turpitude.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. RTJ-93-1062 August 25, 1994
ELIZA RATILLA DE LA CRUZ, assisted by Enriqueta R. de la
Cruz, EDELINE CUISON, assisted by Estrella Cuison, ANA MARIA
CRUZ, assisted by Nieves Cruz and LOLITA SANTIAGO, assisted
by Epifania del Rosario, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE CRISANTO C. CONCEPCION, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 12, Malolos, Bulacan, respondent.
DECISION1
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a case of a judge being made to account for his acquittal of an
accused on reasonable doubt.
Respondent Judge Crisanto C. Concepcion of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 12, Malolos, Bulacan, is administratively indicted for
gross ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment for acquitting the accused who was charged before his court
with acts of lasciviousness. Parenthetically, respondent is not accused
of rendering an erroneous judgment spawned in bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption; much less is immorality imputed to him.
Complainants Eliza Ratilla de la Cruz, 13, Edeline Cuison, 11, Ana
Maria Cruz, 12, and Lolita Santiago, 12,2 alleged before the trial court
that they were summoned by their coach, accused Loreto Estrella, Jr.,
together with other volleyball players, to his classroom at about five
o'clock in the afternoon of 16 November 1988. He told them that he
had to inspect their private parts for the presence of public hair as
required by MEC (now DECS) memorandum circulars. In three (3)
groups, two (2) of threes and one (1) of two, their coach told them to
enter the "health corner room" where they removed their shorts and
panties and showed their private parts to him which he touched and
stroked.
Eliza, Edeline, Ana Maria and Lolita, with the assistance of their
guardians, charged their coach in four (4) separate criminal complaints
commonly alleging that he
. . . . being a public school teacher and in
relation to the discharge of his duties as the
coach of the girls volleyball team of Bustos
Central School, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd designs,
commit an act of lasciviousness upon the
person of (complainant) by then and there
touching her private parts against the latter's
will and by means of force.
In the joint trial that ensued, the four (4) girls testified almost identically
that upon instruction of the accused they reluctantly pulled down their
shorts and panties and when their private parts were already
uncovered, the accused in kneeling or squatting position touched their
exposed private parts. They described on the witness stand the
expression on the face of the accused while allegedly stroking their
private parts several times which lasted for about five minutes each as
that of elation, "with his eyes wide open in wild excitement."
The accused on his part admitted having examined the pubic hair of
the girls, particularly to be sure that as members of his volleyball team
not one of them was above 13 in strict compliance with specific school
directives and guidelines. He however denied that he touched their
private parts and threatened them afterwards.
Upon hearing the prosecution and the defense, respondent Judge
observed that the girls consented, without any force employed upon
them, to strip themselves from waist down although with
understandable reluctance because of their desire to be in the team
considering that according to MEC Regional Memorandum No. 90,
Series of 1981, in relation to MEC Order No. 66, Series of 1979,
failure to submit to physical examination would automatically disqualify
a candidate from the volleyball team. Respondent Judge was
convicted that
. . . what he (accused) did touch was only what is called the mons
veneris or that part of the female sexual organ where pubic hair could
grow. No one of these complainants said that accused also touched
the inner part or genital orifice of their private parts. If he did, it is
inconceivable that not one of them made any outcry from that health
corner room where they were inspected inside in groups of three or
two, one group at a time. The Court also refuses to believe that
accused touched each one of them several times for about five
minutes. That is very unlikely and improbable, not to mention that they
never said that before in the police investigation, as well as what they
now say the wild excitement on the face of accused while touching
them.
To better understand and appreciate the rationale of respondent's
decision in the light of the charges hurled against him, i.e., gross
ignorance of the law, and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it is
imperative to quote from his decision which we find exhaustively
argued
Understandably, the accused now denies touching the private parts of
the four private complainants. That touching is the very accusation of
lascivious act imputed against him. He could have very well said that,
no matter how improper and humiliating for the girls it would seem to
be, it was part of the necessary inspection he was assigned to do as
their coach by the guidelines provided by the then Ministry of
Education and Culture Order No. 66, Series of 1979 (Exh. "1"), and its
implementing rules and guidelines (Exhs. "2" to "8"), in determining the
age eligibility and qualification of would-be young athletes to
participate in the forthcoming provincial sports event, taking into
consideration, among other things, "breast enlargement" and
"presence of pubic hair." Growing pubic hair on young girls just above
13 years of age might still be hardly traceable and accused could
probably say that he had to feel it with his fingers to be sure that his
very eyes were not deceiving him, but he should have used his better
sense of propriety and kind consideration to save the girls from the
anguish and humiliation of being touched on the most delicate parts of
their bodies. There seemed to be no urgency for that in the fulfillment
of his duty as a coach and in obedience to the MEC directive, to see to
it that ineligible over-aged players are not allowed to play in the
athletic meet then forthcoming, lest he be found responsible and "be
suspended from athletic meets throughout his life, without prejudice to
the filing of administrative charges against him even after the athletic
meet is over" (Exh. "3-A").
To repeat, the Court is inclined to entertain doubt if the act of accused
complained of was a manifestation of his lewd designs and not just his
repulsive way of following the silly MEC guideline of determining the
age qualification of prospective young athletes which did not even
discriminate that female athletes should be inspected for the presence
of pubic hair or enlarged breasts by a female coach. First of all, if his
real motivation was just to satisfy his lust it was unnatural for him to do
that by inspecting the girls eight in all of their private parts one group
of three at a time, the last of which was a group of two. In other words,
he did not inspect any of the girls alone in the secrecy of the health
corner room inside his classroom, in which situation he could have
taken liberties with the girl(s) unwitnessed by a third person. Added to
this, as already noted, is the fact that he did not touch any of the girls
on any other part of her body, like her chest for example, to find out if
she already had enlarged breasts. The act of the accused subject of
the present accusation seems to the Court not the product of a
criminal mind, so much so that he deserves to be exonerated from the
charge in each of the four informations. However, for such act of
indiscretion, though not felonious but still wrongful, which directly
resulted to the mental anguish and humiliation of each of the four
young complainants in these cases, the accused must answer for
such moral damages they suffered.
A careful analysis of the decision of respondent Judge fails to
persuade us that for rendering such well-reasoned verdict he is guilty
of gross ignorance of the law and/or knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment. In Revita v. Rimando 3 we said
. . . . ( i )t may be argued that the respondent committed an error of
judgment in dismissing the complaint for grave slander and thus
causing (at least in complainant's opinion) a miscarriage of justice.
However, there is no proof that the error was attributable to a
conscious and deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice (In
re Climaco, Adm. Case No. 134-J, January 21, 1974, 55 SCRA 107,
119). "As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty,
or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject
to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous" (48 C.J.S.
974).
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the subject decision, order or
actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties must not
only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most
importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or
corruption. In the case before us, the administrative complaint does
not even allege that the erroneous decision of respondent was thus
motivated.
Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is both a criminal and an
administrative charge. As a crime, it is punished under Art. 204 of the
Revised Penal Code the elements of which are: (a) the offender is a
judge; (b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for
decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; and, (d) the judge knows that his
judgment is unjust. 4 The gist of the offense therefore is that an unjust
judgment be rendered maliciously or in bad faith, that is, knowing it to
be unjust. 5
An unjust judgment is one which is contrary to law or is not supported
by the evidence, or both. The source of an unjust judgment may be
error or ill-will. There is no liability at all for a mere error. It is well
settled that a judicial officer, when required to exercise his judgment or
discretion, is not liable criminally for any error which he commits,
provided he acts in good faith. Bad faith is therefore the ground of
liability. If in rendering judgment the judge fully knew that the same
was unjust in the sense aforesaid, then he acted maliciously and must
have been actuated and prevailed upon by hatred, envy, revenge,
greed, or some other similar motive. 6 As interpreted by Spanish
courts, the term "knowingly" means sure knowledge, conscious and
deliberate intention to do an injustice. 7 Mere error therefore in the
interpretation or application of the law does not constitute the crime.
The nature of the administrative charge of knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment is the same as the criminal charge. Thus, in this
particular administrative charge, it must be established that
respondent Judge rendered a judgment or decision not supported by
law and/or evidence and that he must be actuated by hatred, envy,
revenge, greed, or some other similar motive. In the case at bench,
the motive of respondent Judge is not even alleged.
May it be asked: Of what law was respondent Judge grossly ignorant
when he acquitted the accused? Corollarily, did he knowingly render
an unjust judgment when he extensively discussed and satisfactorily
explained his decision?
If we hold respondent guilty as charged, then we might be
telegraphing the wrong signals to our trial judges. For then, where
administrative sanctions are imposed on them for rendering judgments
of acquittal based on reasonable doubt or on difficult questions of law,
they would be inclined, and not without practical reason, to hand down
verdicts of conviction, in case of doubt. For that course would be safer
for them to pursue since, after all, erroneous convictions may still be
corrected on appeal. But that would be disregarding the true concept
and judicial implication of "reasonable doubt" in criminal cases, under
which judges are directed according to the Rules of Court to render a
judgment of acquittal. 8 Reasonable doubt is
. . . . that state of the case which, after full consideration of all the
evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in such a condition that they
cannot say that they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of
the truth of the charge. Every person is presumed to be innocent until
he is proved guilty. If, upon such proof, there is reasonable doubt
remaining, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of it by acquittal. It is
not sufficient to establish a probability, though a strong one, that the
fact charged is more likely to be true than otherwise, but the evidence
must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty,
a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding, and satisfies
the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act
conscientiously upon it, and, in order to find the defendant guilty, the
evidence must be such as to exclude every single reasonable
hypothesis, except that of the guilt of the defendant. In other words, all
of the facts proved must be consistent with, and point to, the guilt of
the defendant, not only, but the facts must be inconsistent with her
innocence. It matters not how clearly the circumstances point to guilt,
still, if they are reasonably explainable on a theory which excludes
guilt, then it cannot be said that the facts in the case are sufficient to
satisfy the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the guilt of the
defendant, and in that event she should be acquitted. If, after
consideration of the whole case, any one of the jury should entertain a
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, it is the duty of such
juror not to vote for a verdict of guilty, and if after a consideration of
the whole case, fully, carefully, and honestly made after comparison,
still one of the jury should entertain a reasonable doubt of the guilt of
the defendant, it would then be the duty of such juror not to vote for a
verdict of guilty.9
If for every error of a judge although we do not find any in the case
of respondent he should be punished, then perhaps no judge,
however good, competent and dedicated he may be, can ever hope to
retire from the judicial service without a tarnished image. Somehow
along the way he may commit mistakes, however honest. This does
not exclude members of appellate courts who are not always in
agreement in their views. Any one belonging to the minority opinion
may generally be considered in error, and yet, he is not punished
because each one is entitled to express himself. This privilege should
extend to trial judges so long as the error is not motivated by fraud,
dishonesty, corruption, 10 or any other evil motive.
Ordinarily, the act of a man in touching and stroking the private parts
of a woman is, by itself, lewd for no hand of a man would wander or
venture near her manzanas prohibidas if not for a lascivious
motivation. But even if the accused stroked and touched the girls on
their montes veneris, 11 respondent nevertheless absolved the
accused of criminal liability on the theory that the complained acts may
no longer be considered lascivious in view of the directives and
implementing rules and guidelines of the then Ministry (now SCRA 236 [1990]; Pilipinas Bank vs. Tirona-Liwag, 190 SCRA 834
Department) of Education, Culture and Sports which imposed on the [1990]).
coaches of boys' and girls' volleyball teams the responsibility of
excluding overaged players from their teams using as one of the
Mere errors in the appreciation of such evidence, unless so gross and
criteria the presence of pubic hair. In other words, since the
patent as to produce an inference of ignorance or bad faith, or that the
complained acts may be considered lawful under MECS orders, rules
judge knowingly rendered an unjust decision, are irrelevant and
and guidelines, respondent Judge may have had reason to conclude
immaterial in an administrative proceeding against him. No one, called
that lewdness could no longer be merely presumed.
upon to try facts or interpret the law in the process of administering
justice, can be infallible in his judgment. All that is expected of him is
Although we are not supposed to pass upon the merits of the case, a that he follow the rules prescribed to ensure a fair and impartial
cursory discussion thereon is deemed necessary for the purpose of hearing, assess the different factors that emerge therefrom and bear
establishing that respondent, in rendering a judgment of acquittal, did on the issues presented, and on the basis of the conclusions he finds
not disregard, much less violate, any law or known jurisprudence. established, with only his conscience and knowledge of the law to
In People v. Balbar 12 we ruled that the presence or absence of lewd guide him, adjudicate the case accordingly (Vda. de Zabala vs.
designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the Pamaran, 39 SCRA 430 [1971])."
environmental circumstances. This supports our conviction that in the
case at bench the accused did not have a criminal mind at all, hence,
Pertinently, it may be mentioned that on 26 February 1992, or almost
his acquittal by the respondent. After all, in the face of two plausible
a year before respondent Judge handed down his subject decision on
self-sustaining theories, albeit contradictory, one for conviction and the
8 January 1993, then Judge Narciso T. Atienza of the Regional Trial
other for acquittal, the latter prevails under the constitutional
Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 16, likewise acquitted the same
presumption of innocence, applying as our parameter the test spelled
accused on a similar charge of acts of lasciviousness committed on
out in the preceding paragraphs.
one Sarah Jane Lapuz, an aspirant to the track and field team
coached by the accused. His decision was never questioned.
We reiterate that "mere errors in the appreciation of evidence, unless Incidentally, Judge Atienza was later elevated to the Sandiganbayan.
so gross and patent as to produce an inference of ignorance or bad
faith, or that the judge knowingly rendered an unjust decision, are
WHEREFORE, the administrative charges of gross ignorance of the
irrelevant and immaterial in an administrative proceeding against
law and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment against respondent
him." 13 In Ad Hoc Committee Report re Judge Silverio S. Tayao, RTC,
JUDGE CRISANTO C. CONCEPCION of the Regional Trial Court of
Branch 143, Makati, and Morada v. Judge Tayao, 14 this Court through
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 12, are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Mr. Justice Feliciano incisively and appropriately explained
SO ORDERED.
. . . . By its nature, judicial discretion involves the exercise of judgment
on the part of the judge. The judge must be allowed a reasonable
latitude for the operation of his own individual view of the case, his
appreciation of the facts, and his understanding of the applicable law
on the matter. Judicial discretion is, of course, not unlimited; it must be
guided and controlled by well-known rules and principles . . . .
If Judge Tayao committed any error at all, it was an error of judgment
and it is important to recall the firmly established principle that a judge
may not be administratively charged for mere errors of judgment, in
the absence of a showing of any bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose:
"A Judge cannot be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly, or
administratively, for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good
faith (In re: Petition for the Dismissal from Service and/or Disbarment
of Judge Baltazar R. Dizon, 173 SCRA 719 [1989]).
1. As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or
corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous (Revita vs.
Rimando, 98 SCRA 619 [1980]; Ubongon vs. Mayo, 99 SCRA 30
[1980]; Ramirez vs. Corpuz-Macandog, 144 SCRA 462 [1986]; Abad
vs. Bleza, 145 SCRA 1 [1986]; Heirs of Julio Rosas vs. Reyes, 188
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-58889 July 31, 1986
NATHANIEL S. MANIPON, JR., petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, Second Division composed of HON.
BERNARDO P. FERNANDEZ as Acting Presiding Justice and
HON. BUENAVENTURA J. GUERRERO and HON. MOISES C.
KALLOS, as Associate Justices, respondents.
Guillermo B. Bandonill for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
FERNAN, J.:
This is a case of direct bribery penalized under Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code.
In its decision dated September 30, 1981, the Sandiganbayan found
accused Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr., 31, guilty of direct bribery,
sentenced him to four months and twenty days of arresto mayor with
temporary special disqualification for eight years and one day and a
fine of P2,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to pay the costs.
Manipon came to this Court on petition for review on certiorari seeking
the reversal of the judgment of conviction. The Court dismissed the
petition, "the question raised being factual and for lack of
merit." 1 However, upon motion for reconsideration, the Court
reconsidered its resolution and gave due course to the petition. 2
The facts of this case are as follows:
Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr., a deputy sheriff of the Court of First
Instance of Baguio City and Benguet, Branch IV, was assigned to
enforce an order of the Minister of Labor dated October 31, 1979
directing the Sheriff of Baguio City or his deputy to execute the
decision of the labor arbiter in NLRC Case No. RB-1-C-1428-79
entitled "Longog Tabek, et al vs. Harry Dominguez et al" and to make
a return within thirty (30) days from said date. 3 The labor arbiter's
decision ordered Harry Dominguez, a building contractor and the then
municipal mayor of Tadian, to pay Longog Tabek and the other
judgment creditors the amount of P2,720.00 with interest, as the
balance of their work contract. 4
Pursuant to that assignment, Manipon on November 9, 1979 sent a
notice to the Commercial Bank and Trust branch [Comtrust] in Baguio
City garnishing the bank accounts of Dominguez. 5 The bank agreed
to hold the accounts. For one reason or another, Manipon did not
inform the labor arbiter of the garnishment nor did he exert efforts to
immediately satisfy the judgment under execution.
On November 12, 1979, Dominguez sought Manipon's help in the
withdrawal of the garnished account. Manipon told Dominguez that the
money could not be withdrawn.
However, on December 27, 1979 when the two met again at the Office
of the National Intelligence and Security Authority [NISA] in Baguio
City, Manipon told Dominguez that he "can remedy the withdrawal so
they will have something for the New Year." 6 Dominguez interpreted
this to mean that Manipon would withdraw the garnished amount for a
consideration. Dominguez agreed and they arranged to meet at the
bank later in the afternoon. After Manipon left, Dominguez confided
the offer to NISA Sub-Station Commander Luisito Sanchez. They then
hatched up a plan to entrap Manipon by paying him with marked
money the next day. Col. Sanchez and a Col. Aguana were able to put
up P700.00 in fifty-peso bills which were then authenticated, xeroxed
and dusted with fluorescent powder. 7
Thus, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 28, 1979,
Dominguez went to Comtrust as planned. Manipon showed up with
two companions, named Deputy Sheriff Crisanto Flora and Baltazar
Pacis. Manipon delivered his letter to the bank lifting the
garnishment. 8 Then Dominguez prepared a withdrawal slip for
P2,500.00. 9 As soon as Dominguez received the money from the
teller, he took out P300.00 therefrom added it to the P 700.00 in
marked bills and handed the total amount of P l,000.00 to Manipon.
Then they all left the bank. Dominguez walked over to his car and
drove off. Manipon and his two companions walked down Session
Road. Moments later, PC and NISA operatives accosted them, seized
the P1,000.00 from the left breast pocket of Manipon and thereafter
brought them to Camp Dangwa for questioning. Manipon was
subjected to an ultraviolet light test and found positive for fluorescent
powder. However, after executing a certification relative to the money
recovered, he refused to give any statement. 10 He filed his sheriff's
return unsatisfied on February 20, 1980 or after 114 days. 11
Originally, Manipon was charged with violation of Presidential Decree
No. 46 for having demanded and received P l,000.00 from
Dominguez, a private individual, for a favor extended by him to the
latter, i.e., by not enforcing the garnishment order issued to Comtrust
which was his official duty. However, in an amended information dated
February 16, 1981, the charge was changed to direct bribery under
the Revised Penal Code. 12
Manipon was released on bail. When arraigned, he pleaded not
guilty. 13
In his brief, Manipon contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in
convicting him of direct bribery, in not giving credence to the defense
theory that there was novation of the money judgment and in admitting
illegally-obtained evidence.
The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised
Penal Code consists of the following elements: (1) that the accused is
a public officer; (2) that he received directly or through another some
gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise
has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or
any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing something
which it is his official duty to do, and (4) that the crime or act relates to
the exercise of his functions as a public officer.14 The promise of a
public officer to perform an act or to refrain from doing it may be
express or implied. 15
It is not disputed that at the time of the commission of the crime
Manipon was the deputy sheriff of the Court of First Instance of
Benguet and Baguio assigned to implement the execution order
issued in NLRC Case No. RB-1-C-1428-79. It is also not disputed that
Manipon garnished the bank accounts of Dominguez at Comtrust and
that he lifted the same on December 28, 1979 after which he received
P l,000.00 from Dominguez.
It is the theory of the defense that the P1,000.00 Manipon collected
from Dominguez on December 28, 1979 was not a bribe but a
payment in partial satisfaction of the judgment under execution to
which the judgment creditors headed by Longog Tabek had agreed.
Manipon narrates that during his meeting with Dominguez at the NISA
office on December 27, 1979, Dominguez requested Manipon to
convey to the creditors that he was only willing to pay for the time
being a partial amount of P1,000.00, the balance of P 1,720. 00 to be
paid after the New Year. 16 So he visited Longog Tabek who was the
"lead man." Tabek, an illiterate, consented to the lesser amount
because he needed money badly. 17 His arrangements with Tabek and
Dominguez were all verbal. At that time he found no reason to have
some written memorandum for his own protection.
At Comtrust after Dominguez had given him the P1,000.00 Manipon
made a move to hand him a temporary receipt but Dominguez
brushed it aside and said he was in a
hurry. 18
Manipon maintains that Dominguez had framed him up because of a
grudge. He said that in 1978 he and Flora had levied execution
against several vehicles owned by Dominguez, an act which the latter
had openly resented. 19
The defense theory is so incredible that it leaves no doubt whatsoever
in the Court's mind that Manipon is guilty of the crime charged.
It is very strange indeed that for such an important agreement that
would modify a final judgment, no one took the bother of putting it
down on paper. Of course Manipon would have us believe that there
was no need for it because he trusted Dominguez and Tabek. And yet
did he not also claim that Dominguez had framed him up because of a
grudge? And if there was really an agreement to alter the judgment,
why did he not inform the labor arbiter about it considering that it was
the labor arbiter who had issued the order of execution? Manipon
could not give satisfactory explanations because there was no such
agreement in the first place.
The temporary receipt 20 adduced by Manipon, as correctly pointed out
by the Solicitor General, is a last-minute fabrication to provide proof of
the alleged agreement for the trial payment of the judgment debt.
Contrary to Manipon's claim, it is hard to believe that Dominguez was
not interested in getting said temporary receipt because precisely that
was the proof he needed to show that he had partially complied with
his legal obligation.
The testimonies of Crisanto Flora and Longog Tabek are of no help
either to the defense. Flora is Manipon's co-sheriff and is therefore
biased. On the other hand, Tabek, on several occasions on the
witness stand, answered with obvious hesitation, betraying himself to
be a rehearsed witness. While he claimed that he was the supposed
headman of the other creditors, he could not present any authority that
would allow him to speak for them, let alone agree to receive a lesser
amount in their behalf. He even admitted that he did not know their
names. 21
Indeed, Manipon's behavior at the very outset, had been marked with
irregularities. As early as November 9, 1979, he had already
garnished the bank accounts of Dominguez at Comtrust, but he did
not notify the labor arbiter so that the corresponding order for the
payment by the bank of the garnished amount could be made and the
sum withdrawn immediately to satisfy the judgment under execution.
His lame excuse was that he was very busy in the sheriff's office,
attending to voluminous exhibits and court proceedings. That was also
the same excuse he gave for not informing the labor arbiter of the
novation. In fact he candidly admitted that he never communicated
with the NLRC concerning the garnishment. He returned the writ
unsatisfied only on February 20, 1980 although by its express terms, it
was returnable within thirty days from October 29, 1979. 22 Clearly,
Manipon had planned to get Dominguez to acquiesce to a
consideration for lifting the garnishment order.
Manipon was also asked about the affidavit he executed during the
preliminary investigation. 23 That affidavit contained two annexes but
the temporary receipt which he allegedly prepared on December 28,
1979 was not included. He said he misplaced it in his office and found
it only several weeks after he had made the affidavit. 24 This leads us
to strongly suspect there was actually no temporary receipt at all at the
time of payment on December 28 and that it was concocted by the
defense as a last-ditch effort to make the authorities believe that what
had transpired was not a payoff but a legitimate partial satisfaction of a
judgment debt.
In the final analysis, it all boils down to credibility. In this regard, the
prosecution witnesses have acquitted themselves welt The
Sandiganbayan did not err in giving weight and credence to their
version instead of Manipon's. Indeed, Manipon's guilt for the crime of
direct bribery has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Dwelling on one last point, Manipon has pointed out that the person arrested from destroying evidence within his
P1,000.00 was illegally seized because there was no valid March reach. 31
warrant and therefore inadmissible.
Since the other issues raised by Manipon are factual they need not be
The argument is untenable. The rule that searches and seizures must discuss here.
be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at
least three exceptions to the rule recognized in this jurisdiction. These WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is denied
are: 1) search incidental to an arrest, 2) search of a moving vehicle, for lack of merit, with costs against petitioner-accused Nathaniel
and 3) seizure of evidence in plain view. 25 Manipon, Jr. The decision of the Sandiganbayan dated September 30,
1981 is affirmed.
In the case at bar, the records show that at about 2:00 p.m. on
December 28,1979, NISA Sub-Station Commander Colonel Luisito SO ORDERED.
Sanchez held a final briefing among his men and some operatives
from the Benguet Philippine Constabulary concerning the planned
entrapment. He had earlier received word from Dominguez that the
lifting of the garnishment would be effected that afternoon and he
informed them that Manipon was asking money from Dominguez. 26 As
Colonel Sanchez earlier testified, part of the money to be withdrawn
after lifting the garnishment was to be given to the accused 27 for
agreeing to lift the order of garnishment. After the briefing which lasted
from ten to fifteen minutes, they an headed for the Comtrust bank.

NISA Agent Caesar Murla stationed himself near the door of the bank
so that he could observe what transpired inside the bank. 28 He
testified that he saw Dominguez give the marked money to Manipon
which the latter accepted and counted. Upon seeing Manipon take the
money from Dominguez, Agent Murla gave a signal to some of the
agents positioned nearby by placing his right hand on his head to
indicate that the money had changed hands. Immediately thereafter,
Dominguez left the bank, Manipon placed the money in his left breast
pocket and followed suit. As Manipon walked past Murla on his way
out, the latter gave another signal by putting his hand on his left breast
to indicate that Manipon had placed the money in his left breast
pocket. 29

Upon noticing the second signal, the NISA agents and the PC
operatives approached Manipon and his two companions. After
Identifying themselves as peace officers, they retrieved the P l,000.00
from Manipon. Through it all, Manipon remained amazingly silent and
voiced no protest. 30

The search and seizure of the P1,000.00 from Manipon would

therefore fall within the first exception. The search was made as an
incident to a lawful arrest, in accordance with our pronouncement
in Moreno v. Ago Chi 12 Phil. 439, reiterated in Alvero v. Dizon 76
Phil. 637, to wit:

An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any
money or property found upon his person which was used in the
commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might
furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or
escaping, or which may be used in evidence in the trial of the case.

The evident purpose of this exception is both to protect the arresting

officer against physical harm from the person being arrested who
might be armed with a concealed weapon and also to prevent the
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 75160 March 18, 1988
LEONOR FORMILLEZA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
K.V. Faylona & Associates for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a Petition for review of a Decision of the Sandiganbayan.
The records of the case disclose that petitioner Leonor Formilleza has
been with the government service for around 20 years. She was the
personnel supervisor of the regional office of the National Irrigation
Administration (NIA) in Tacloban City, Leyte since October 1, 1982.
Her duties include the processing of the appointment papers of
employees.
On the other hand, a certain Mrs. Estrella Mutia was an employee of
the NIA from February, 1978 up to March, 1985. Her appointment was
coterminous with a project of the NIA. On December 31, 1983, her
appointment wag terminated. This notwithstanding, she continued
working for the NIA pursuant to the verbal instructions of the regional
director of the Administration.
Mrs. Mutia testified that she took steps to obtain either a permanent or
at the least a renewed appointment; that when she approached the
regional director about the matter she was advised to see the
petitioner who was to determine the employees to be appointed or
promoted; and that the petitioner refused to attend to her appointment
papers unless the latter were given some money.
On February 27, 1984, Mrs. Mutia reported her problem to the
Philippine Constabulary (PC) authorities in the province. The PC
officials told her that steps were to be taken to entrap the petitioner.
The entrapment equipment consisted of marked paper money bills
worth P100.00. The PC officials concerned were colleagues of the
husband of Mrs. Mutia in the PC.
The first attempt to entrap the petitioner was on February 28, 1984.
The plan did not materialize as the petitioner did not show up at the
designated rendezvous at the NIA building canteen.
The second attempt was on February 29,1984, this time with results.
That morning, the petitioner and Mrs. Mutia met in their service bus on
their way to work. The two women supposedly agreed to meet at the
canteen later that morning at 9:00 o'clock. Thereafter, Mrs. Mutia
notified the PC authorities who were to arrange the entrapment. The
PC soldiers involved in the arrangement were Identified as Sergeants
Eddie Bonjoc, Efren Abanes and Ignacio Labong.
Everyone who was to participate in the entrapment was ready. Mrs.
Mutia went to see the petitioner in her office after which the two of
them proceeded to the canteen. Some of their officemates Mrs.
Florida Sevilla and a certain Mrs. Dimaano joined them in the
canteen. They occupied two squareshaped tables joined together. The
petitioner sat at the head of the table with Mrs. Mutia seated at her left,
Mrs. Dimaano at her (the petitioner's) right and Mrs. Sevilla at the right
of Mrs. Dimaano. Sergeants Bonjoc and Labong sat at another table
while Sergeant Abanes was alone in still another table. The latter
brought along a camera in order to take photographs of the
entrapment. The marked money was folded altogether.
Mrs. Mutia maintains that after they had finished taking their snacks,
she handed the marked money bills under the table with her right hand
to the petitioner who received the same with her left hand. At that
moment, Sergeant Bonjoc approached the petitioner and held her
hand holding the money bills. Sergeant Abanes brought out his
camera and took photo. graphs of the sequence of events. He was
able to take seven photographs. 1
The petitioner was arrested by the soldiers despite her objections to
the entrapment. She was brought to the PC crime laboratory in the
locality where she was found positive for ultra-violet powder. In the
presence of the corporate counsel of the NW the petitioner denied
accepting any bribe money from Mrs. Mutia.
The case was brought to the Sandiganbayan where it was docketed
as Criminal Case No. 9634. Arraigned on January 1 0, 1985, the
petitioner entered a plea of not guilty and went to trial on May 13,
1985.
In the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution argued
that the entrapment arranged by the PC operatives was n because the
petitioner was asking money from Mrs. Mutia in consideration for
having the appointment papers of the latter facilitated. On the other
hand, the petitioner maintains her innocence that there was no
entrapment; the scenario was but a scheme set up by Mrs. Mutia and
her husband's colleagues in the PC. The petitioner denies having
accepted the supposed bribe money.
The Sandiganbayan relying on the theory of the prosecution observed
in a decision promulgated on July 14, 1986, 2as follows
Upon consideration of the evidence. We find the p petitions version
credible.
Two days before the entrapment, Mrs. Mutia complained to the PC
authorities about the inaction of the on her appointment papers due to
her failure to give Mm money. She executed a sworn statement to that
effect, ... It was the PC who planned the entrapment and supplied the
marked money. Sgt. Efren Abanes who dusted the money bills with
fluoresence powder and who was a member of the entrapment team,
witnessed the delivery and receipt of the money by the accused and
the complainant and he saw how the folded money was handed by
Mrs. Mutia with her right hand underneath the table and received by
the with her left hand. That was also how Mrs. Mutia described the
manner she delivered the money to the accused the money bills
were rolled winch she handed to with her right hand underneath the
table. Although Sgt. Abanes had a camera with him to photograph the
entrapment, he could not prematurely expose the camera to allow a
shot of the actual giving of the money lest the notice his presence and
intention and thereby thwart the operation. But after the money had
been delivered and received, he immediately took out his camera and
snapped pictures, one of them depicting the accused held by Sgt.
Bonjoc and Labong on the left hand ..., and another showing the
accused also held on the left hand by one of the PC men, and the
complainant, Mrs. Mutia, drinking from a glass ...
The fact that Mrs. Mutia's husband is a PC -An himself does not
detract from the credibility of Sgt. Abanes who took part in the Sgt.
Abanes entrapment, took pictures, and testified about the incident in
court. Sets. Abanes Bonjoc and Labong were not the only public
authorities privy to the operation. Capt. Pedro Pates was the one to
whom Mrs. Mutia reported the accused demand for money; it was he
who broached the Idea of entrapping the accused; and it was Mador
Fernando Pace who supplied the money and caused it to be marked
with powder. It is inconceivable that an these commissioned and non-
commissioned officers had lent themselves to take part in an unholy
cabal of falsely incriminating a female government employee on the
mere urging of one of their associates.
Just as unreasonable is the insinuation that Mrs. Mutia had inveigled
the accused to the canteen and resorted to the insidious machination
of planting money in her hand in a simulated entrapment simply
because she thought the accused was not helping her in her
application for appointment to a regular item.
Mrs. Florida Sevilla's presence on the same table with the complainant
and the accused may be conceded. But her testimony that she did not
see anything that took place between the complainant and the
accused before the PC operative pounced upon the accused, and the
latter angrily asked the complainant what she was trying to do to her,
does not improve the cause of the defense. As portrayed by the
accused, she was at the head of the rectangular table with the
complainant at her left: Mrs. Dimaano at her right, and Mrs. Sevilla
next to Mrs. Dimaano. Since the money, according to the complainant
and Sgt. Abanes was handed to and received by the accused
underneath the table, it is not surprising that Mrs. Sevilla who was two
seats away from the accused did not see it. 3
The respondent court ruled that the crime committed by the petitioner
was not Direct Bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal
Code cited in the Information but Indirect Bribery as defined under
Article 211 of the same code. Citing the case of People v.
Abesamis, 4 the respondent court was of the opinion that she could be
convicted for Indirect Bribery under the Information for Direct Bribery
to which she pleaded and entered into trial inasmuch as it is the
allegation of facts rather than the denomination of the offense by the
provincial fiscal that determines the crime charged.
Thus, the respondent court found the petitioner guilty of Indirect
Bribery and sentenced her to four months of arresto mayor,
suspension from public office, profession or calling, including the right
of suffrage, and public censure.
On August 23, 1986, the petitioner elevated the case to this Court by
way of the instant Petition for Review. The thrust of the Petition is that
the conclusions reached by the Sandiganbayan are not supported by
the evidence. Moreover, the petitioner disputes the applicability and/or
correctness of the ruling of this Court in People v. Abesamis relied
upon by the respondent court.
As instructed by this Court, the Office of the Solicitor General
submitted its Comment on the Petition. In opposing the Petition, the
Solicitor General maintains that only questions of law may be raised in
the instant case and the respondent court did not commit any error of
law. The Solicitor General also stresses therein that the findings of fact
made by the Sandiganbayan are supported by the evidence on record
and deserve full faith and credit. The Solicitor General adds that the
question of credibility is addressed mainly to the trier of facts, in this
case, the Sandiganbayan.
The parties submitted subsequent pleadings in support of their stand.
Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for decision.
We find merit in the Petition.
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, governs the procedure
through which cases originating from the Sandiganbayan are elevated
to this Court.5 Under Section 7 thereof, the decisions and final orders
of the Sandiganbayan are subject to review on certiorari by the
Supreme Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This
Court has ruled that only questions of law may be raised in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 45, subject to certain rare
exceptions. 6 Simply stated, one way 7 through which a decision or
final order of the Sandiganbayan can be elevated to the Supreme
Court is a Petition for certiorari under Rule 45 and, as a general rule,
only questions of law may be raised therein. The Solicitor General
cites the case of Peaverde v. Sandiganbayan 8 in support of this
view.
Going now to the question of law raised in the instant Petition, We
believe that the ruling in People v. Abesamis, contrary to the
contention of the petitioner, is authority for the view that the allegation
of facts, not the denomination of the offense by the prosecutor,
determines the crime charged. Anent the argument on the correctness
of the ruling, the petitioner had not succeeded in showing any cogent
basis for reversing or modifying the same.
The remaining argument that the judgment of conviction is not
supported by the evidence raises a question of fact inasmuch as the
resolution of the issue would require this Court to sort out and re-
examine the evidence presented in the trial. Invoking the ruling of this
Court in Peaverde v. Sandiganbayan, the Solicitor General moves for
the denial of the Petition. The Solicitor General adds that the credibility
of witnesses is a matter better left to the appreciation of the trial court,
in this case, the Sandiganbayan.
Indeed, the general rule is that only questions of law may be raised in
a petition of this character. The general rule admits exceptions, one of
which is when the findings of fact made by the trial court overlooked
certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect
the result of the case. This observation was made by this court
in Peaverde v. Sandiganbayan, cited by the Solicitor General, to wit
With respect to the allegation that there was error on the part of
respondent Sandiganbayan in concluding that petitioners conspired in
the commission of the offense, suffice it to say that the basis of its
finding was the credibility of witnesses. Pursuant to Section 7 of
Presidential Decree No. 1606, in relation to Section 2, Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are entitled
to great respect and only questions of laws (sic) may be raised to the
Supreme Court. Besides, well settled is the rule that the findings of
(the) trial court on credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed unless
much findings overlook certain facts of substance and value which, if
considered might affect (the) results of (the) case. 9
We believe that the exception to the general rule calls for application
in this case.
The fundamental axiom underlying a criminal prosecution is that
before the accused may be convicted of any crime, his guilt must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, if there are substantial facts
which were overlooked by the trial court but which could alter the
results of the case in favor of the accused, then such facts should be
carefully taken into account by the reviewing tribunal.
In the case before Us, there are substantial facts and circumstances
Which appear to be favorable to the accused but which were not
carefully considered by the Sandiganbayan. The failure to do so is
most unfortunate considering that the Sandiganbayan is the first and
last recourse of the accused before her case reaches the Supreme
Court where findings of fact are generally conclusive and binding.
The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of
the Revised Penal Code 10 is that the public officer concerned must
have accepted the gift or material consideration. There must be a
clear intention on the part of the public officer to take the gift so offered Sandiganbayan, these facts and circumstances make out a good case
and consider the same as his own property from then on, such as for the petitioner.
putting away the gift for safekeeping or pocketing the same. Mere Accordingly, the Court holds that the guilt of the petitioner in Criminal
physical receipt unaccompanied by any other sign, circumstance or Case No. 9634 has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. She is,
act to show such acceptance is not sufficient to lead the court to therefore, entitled to an acquittal.
conclude that the crime of indirect bribery has been committed. To WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the
hold otherwise will encourage unscrupulous individuals to frame up Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 9634 is hereby SET ASIDE. The
public officers by simply putting within their physical custody some gift, petitioner Leonor Formilleza is hereby ACQUITTED on the basis of
money or other property. reasonable doubt. We make no pronouncement as to costs. This
Did the petitioner accept the supposed bribe money? Decision is immediately executory.
The Sandiganbayan noted that the photographs of the entrapment SO ORDERED.
show that the petitioner was accosted by the PC soldiers after she
accepted the marked money. Against the evidence of the pro petition
that the money was handed to petitioner by Mrs. Mutia under the table
is the assertion of petitioner that it was when she stood up that Mrs.
Mutia suddenly placed something in her hand which she did not know
to be money and when she saw that it was money she threw it
away. 11 An examination of the seven photographs that were allegedly
taken immediately after the passing of the money shows that the
petitioner was standing up when the PC agents apprehended her. This
corroborates petitioner's story. There was no picture showing
petitioner to be seated which should be her position immediately after
the money was handed to her under the table, which should be the
case according to the version of the prosecution.12 None of the
photographs show the petitioner in the process of appropriating or
keeping the money after it was handed to her. Two of the seven
photographs that were taken outside the canteen appear to be of no
relevance to the operation.
As the petitioner was admittedly handed the money, this explains why
she was positive for ultra-violet powder. It is possible that she intended
to keep the supposed bribe money or may have had no intention to
accept the same. These possibilities exist but We are not certain.
However, what is revealing is that Mrs. Sevilla and Mrs. Dimaano were
present around the table in the canteen with the petitioner and Mrs.
Mutia when the latter allegedly handed the money to the petitioner.
There were other persons in the premises like the PC agents whose
Identities petitioner possibly did not know. Under the circumstances
and in such a public place it is not probable that petitioner would have
the nerve to accept bribe money from Mrs. Mutia even under the table.
If the petitioner knew and was prepared to accept the money from
Mrs. Mutia at the canteen, the petitioner would not have invited her
officemate Mrs. Sevilla to join them. Mrs. Sevilla stated she did not
see the alleged passing of the money. She could not have seen the
money as it was passed on under the table or when, as petitioner said
it was quickly placed in her hand when she stood up. What Mrs.
Sevilla is sure of is that when they were about to leave the canteen,
two (2) men approached petitioner, one of whom took pictures, and
the petitioner shouted at Mrs. Mutia, "What are you trying to do to
me?" 13 The reaction of petitioner is far from one with a guilty
conscience.
Moral certainty, not absolute certainty, is needed to support a
judgment of conviction, Moral certainty is a certainty that convinces
and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon
a given matter. 14 Without this standard of certainty, it may not be said
that the guilt of the accused in a criminal proceeding has been proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
With all these circumstances taken into account altogether, We are left
at a loss as to the guilt of the accused. Overlooked by the
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 112761-65. February 3, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PORFERIO
M. PEPITO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Accused-appellant PORFERIO PEPITO appeals from the
Decision of the trial court convicting him of Malversation of Public Funds
through Falsification of Official Documents on five (5) counts.
Appellant, as Acting Postmaster of Iligan City, was charged with
misappropriating government funds by manipulating his records and
making it appear that he paid a number of postal money orders although
no such payments were made. Appellant was found short in his cash
accounts, as follows: (a) P23,643.73 for October 1975;[1] (b) P11.07 for
December 1975;[2] (c)P7,283.59 for the month of January
1976;[3] (d) P30,052.25 for April 1976, and;[4] (e) P42,302.97 for May
1976.[5]
Except for the dates and amounts involved, appellant was
similarly charged in five (5) separate Informations[6] as follows:
That sometime during the month of ________________, in the City of
Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused Porferio Pepito, Acting Postmaster of Iligan City, with
official station thereat, and as such accountable officer, responsible for
funds collected and received by him by reason of his position, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and fraudulently and with grave abuse of
confidence, misappropriate, embezzle and take away government
funds in his possession in the amount of ____________ accused
employing deceit, false manifestation and fraudulent
misrepresentations, manipulated his records to make it appear that on
the month of ____________ , the Money Order Paid by him was
___________ , although his payments amounted only to
____________, making untruthful statements in a narration of facts
and that by virtue of such falsification in his record of payments, the
said accused successfully appropriated and converted to his own
personal use and benefit the sum of ___________, to the damage and
prejudice of the Bureau of Post, Manila, Philippines, in the
aforementioned amount of ___________.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 217 and Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code.
First, the facts. In a letter,[7] dated August 5, 1976, CESAR L.
JUAN, Regional Director of the Bureau of Posts, Region X, Cagayan de
Oro City, requested the Office of the City Auditor, Iligan City, to audit
the accounts of appellant PORFERIO PEPITO, Acting Postmaster of
Iligan City. Earlier, an audit team from the Office of Regional Director
Juan uncovered certain anomalies regarding appellants postal money
order transactions at the Iligan City Post Office. However, due to lack of
time, the team failed to determine the exact figure involved in the
anomaly. Hence, their request for assistance from the City Auditors
Office.[8]
Iligan City Auditor FRANCISCO APARECE immediately formed
an audit team composed of Assistant City Auditor HONORIO N.
PABLICO and Auditor ROMULO ORBE.[9] They started their audit on
August 19, 1976 and concentrated on the postal money order
transactions of appellant. They examined the cash in appellants
possession and verified the records of the postal money orders (PMOs),
the payment of these checks, and all depository funds of said post office
in government banks and in the Bureau of Posts, Manila, covering the
period from July 1, 1975 to August 9, 1976.[10]
Asst. Auditor Pablico outlined the procedure for payment of
postal money orders, thus: The postmaster pays the postal money
order (PMO) upon presentation to him. The PMO paid cards, evidencing
payment of the PMOs, are then kept by the postmaster
as custodian.The postmaster then prepares a list of the PMOs he paid
for a period of fifteen (15) days. Hence, in a month, the postmaster
prepares two (2) lists or records of payment: one for the first fifteen days
of the month, and another list for the next fifteen days. The PMO paid
cards and the lists are then sent to the central office of the Bureau of
Posts in Manila for safekeeping. A copy of each list is sent to the
Regional Office of the Bureau of Posts, another copy is sent to the City
Auditors Office and the last copy is retained by the Postmaster
himself.[11]
The audit team verified the total amount of PMO payments
appearing on the lists or records prepared by appellant. They totalled
the daily PMO payments of appellant and cross-checked them with
appellants entry on the cash book. These reveal the total money order
payments of appellant for the month. After totalling the PMO payments
of the postmaster per month, the audit team requested the Central
Office of the Bureau of Posts in Manila, through its regional office, to
furnish them the PMO paid cards, evidencing payments of the PMOs
during the period covered by their audit.[12]
Upon receipt of the PMO paid cards, the audit team cross-
checked the paid cards with the record of the PMOs allegedly paid by
appellant. They discovered that some PMOs were listed as paid but
were not supported by paid cards. The audit team uncovered these
discrepancies for the months of October and December, 1975 and for
the months of January, April and May, all of 1976. Based on the records,
the total PMOs paid by appellant during the period covered by the audit
was P494,720.85, but only P250,090.60 was supported by PMO paid
cards. The balance of two hundred forty-four thousand six hundred
thirty pesos and twenty-five centavos (P244,630.25) was disallowed in
audit for lack of supporting documents. Hence, the cash shortage in
appellants account.[13] Appellant asked the auditors to double-check
their findings but the audit team came out with the same result.
In a letter[14] dated February 25, 1977, the audit team informed
appellant of the shortage in his cash accounts. They demanded from
appellant the immediate restitution of the missing funds and an
explanation why no criminal and administrative sanctions should be
taken against him.[15] No action was taken by appellant to restore and
explain his shortage of funds. Hence, five (5) criminal Informations for
malversation of public funds through falsification of official documents
were filed against him.
After the prosecution formally offered its evidence and rested its
case on December 18, 1978, the continuation of the hearing for the
presentation of the defense evidence was suspended due to the
transfer of then Presiding Judge Leonardo I. Cruz to Angeles City.
It was only after two (2) years, or on August 13, 1982, that
continuation of the trial resumed for the presentation of the defense
evidence. However, on the scheduled date of hearing, appellant,
through counsel, filed a motion to suspend the trial[16] on the ground that
he has applied for and was conditionally granted an amnesty under P.D.
1082 by the 11th Amnesty Commission of Marawi City, Lanao del Sur,
for said cases. Appellant prayed that pursuant to Section 6 of P.D. 1082,
further proceedings in his cases be held in abeyance pending final
approval of his conditional amnesty by the President of the Philippines.
The fiscal opposed[17] the motion on the ground that the
conditional amnesty of appellant was spurious for it was issued by a
person not duly authorized for the purpose.
Resolution of this motion was deferred for six (6) years with the
subsequent reorganization of the judiciary and the re-raffling of
appellants cases. Finally, in an Order,[18] dated September 9, 1988,
appellants motion to suspend the trial of the cases was set for hearing
by the new presiding Judge Tago M. Bantuas. However, on the date
set, appellants counsel failed to appear. Judge Bantuas continued with
the hearing of appellants motion and denied appellants motion to
suspend the trial. The continuation of the hearing of the cases was set
on January 10, 1989. Upon receipt of the Order and Notice of Hearing,
appellants counsel, Atty. Dimnatang T. Saro, filed a motion to postpone
the hearing due to conflict of schedule.[19] Hearing was thus reset to
February 7, 1989.[20]
Again, a series of motions to defer the hearing was filed at
appellants instance and granted by the trial court. It was only on
January 24, 1992 that the new presiding Judge Maximino Magno-Libre
issued an Order admitting the evidence offered by the
prosecution.[21] On July 14, 1992, the defense commenced to adduce
its evidence and presented appellant as its lone witness.
On the stand, appellant denied there was shortage in his cash
accounts. After he was informed of the missing funds, he asked the
audit team to re-examine the records for his cash on hand has always
tallied with his cashbook. His office had been subjected to various
regular audit examinations by different offices, namely: the Bureau of
Treasury, the District Postal Inspector, the Postal Audit Examiners and
the Iligan City Auditors Office. None of these offices found any
irregularity in his accountabilities. He urged that there must have been
some error or inaccuracy in the conduct of the audit. He further charged
that the malversation cases were filed against him for political reasons
for the late Governor Arsenio Quibranza had a grudge against his son-
in-law.[22]
Appellant admitted that when he was found short in his cash
accounts, he applied for amnesty under P.D. 1082. When he was
informed by then Presiding Judge Dalisay and Prosecutor Lagcao that
he would have to admit his guilt in his application for amnesty since
amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, he still proceeded
with his application for his friends in Lanao del Sur assured him that his
amnesty would be immediately processed and approved. His
conditional amnesty has been granted but it is still pending final
approval by the President for allegedly there is someone in Manila who
is blocking the grant of his amnesty.[23]
After trial, the court rendered judgment[24] on September 8, 1993
finding appellant guilty of the crime charged. The dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, in accordance with the provisions of Article(s)
217, 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court
finds accused guilty on all the five (5) counts he is charged (with) and is
hereby sentenced, to wit:
1. As to Criminal Case No. 277, since the amount misappropriated
is P23,643.73, accused should be penalized according to the penalty
provided in Paragraph No. 4 of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
which is reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua. Since
according to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the
most serious crime shall be applied in its maximum period, accused is
meted out a penalty of reclusion perpetua.
2. As to Criminal Case No. 278, considering that the amount
misappropriated was P11.07, according to Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed
in its maximum period, thus, accused should be meted out the penalty
prescribed in Article 171 and in applying the provisions of the
indeterminate sentence law, accused should be meted
the indeterminate prison terms of six (6) years prision correccional to
twelve (12) years prision mayor.
3. As to Criminal Case No. 274, since the amount malversed was
P7,283.79, accused should be penalized according to Paragraph No.
3 of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code and should be meted out
an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal.
4. As to Criminal Case No. 275, considering that the amount
misappropriated is P30,052.20, the penalty imposed should be akin to
the penalty prescribed in Criminal Case No. 277 mentioned in
Paragraph 1 hereof, which is reclusion perpetua; and
5. As to Criminal Case No. 276, considering that the amount subject of
malversation is P37,558.30, then the necessary penalty of reclusion
perpetuashould also be meted out against accused.
Finally, accused is also hereby ordered to pay the government the
total sum of P98,549.99, which is the aggregate government funds
actually misappropriated, for restitution in accordance with Article 104
of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.
Hence this appeal where appellant contends that:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS MOTION TO
SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CASES
PENDING FINAL ACTION ON THE
CONDITIONAL AMNESTY GRANTED TO THE
APPELLANT;
II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES OF
MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS THRU
FALSIFICATION OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS;
AND
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER VOLUNTARY SURRENDER IN
FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
First. Appellant charges that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suspend the proceedings in these cases pursuant to Section
6 of P.D. 1082.[25] Hence, the proceedings of the trial court are null and
void and the judgment of conviction against him should be vacated.
We do not subscribe to appellants contention. On the date
scheduled for hearing of his motion, appellants counsel failed to appear
and substantiate the allegations in his motion. The trial court proceeded
with the hearing of the motion, found no merit thereto and denied the
same. Appellants counsel received a copy of the Order of denial and
was notified of the continuation of the hearing of said cases. Appellant
did not challenge the correctness of this ruling by way of a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals.[26] Instead, he
proceeded to adduce evidence in his defense. After more than fifteen
(15) years of trial of his cases, appellant cannot now impugn the Order
of the court denying his motion to suspend his prosecution.[27]
Second. Appellant contends that there was no clear showing
that he misappropriated the missing funds. Allegedly, his office has
been regularly audited by different agencies and none has found him Marawi City for the crimes charged upon the issuance of the Order[33] for
short in his accountabilities. He insists on the inaccuracy of the audit his arrest on February 9, 1978. Appellant was only released from
report of the City Auditors Office which examined his cash and custody[34] upon the approval of his bailbond on March 27, 1978. Under
accounts. the circumstances, appellant cannot be credited with the mitigating
We find no merit in the contention. It is settled that in cases of circumstance of voluntary surrender.
malversation of public funds, the mere failure of a public officer to have IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the trial court convicting
duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is appellant PORFERIO M. PEPITO for five (5) counts of Malversation of
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, is prima Public Funds Through Falsification of Official Documents is
facieevidence that he has put such funds or property to personal AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
use.[28] An accountable officer may be convicted of malversation even SO ORDERED.
in the absence of direct proof of misappropriation so long as there is
evidence of shortage in his accounts which he is unable to
explain.[29] Indeed, to justify conviction for malversation of public funds,
the prosecution has only to prove that the accused received public funds
or property and that he could not account for them or did not have them
in his possession and could not give a reasonable excuse for the
disappearance of the same.[30]
In the case at bar, all the elements of malversation of public
funds are present, viz: (a) the offender is a public officer, (b) he had
custody or control of the funds or property by reason of the duties of his
office, (c) these funds or property were public funds or property for
which he was accountable, and (d) that he appropriated, took,
misappropriated or consented, or through abandonment or negligence
permitted another person to take them.[31] Appellant, as Acting
Postmaster of Iligan City has custody of the funds of his Office. A portion
of these funds was used in the payment of postal money orders (PMOs)
presented to him. As evidence of these payments, the Postmaster
accomplishes the PMO paid cards and makes a list of the PMOs he
paid for a given period. These lists and paid cards are then sent to the
Central Office of the Bureau of Post for safekeeping. An audit of the
PMO transactions of appellant, however, disclosed that some of his
PMO payments were not supported by PMO paid cards.
Appellants assertion that the audit made by the Office of Iligan
City Auditor was inaccurate remains an unsubstantiated
allegation.Although appellant insisted on this alleged inaccuracy during
the trial, he cannot point to the specific procedure where the auditors
erred in examining his accountabilities.[32] Noticeably, appellant did not
present any document to show that the audit of other government
agencies covered also the PMO transactions of the post office for the
same period covered by the audit of the City Auditor.
Appellant also faults the trial court for considering as an
admission of guilt his application for amnesty under P.D.
1082. Regardless of this consideration, however, the totality of the
prosecution evidence has proved the guilt of appellant beyond
reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the auditors and the documentary
evidence adduced clearly proved appellants shortage of funds and his
corresponding liability therefor as an accountable officer. The
testimonial and documentary evidence of the prosecution were not
successfully rebutted by the defense.
Finally, appellant contends that the trial court failed to consider
in his favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. Allegedly, he voluntarily surrendered to the court of justice
and posted bail for his provisional liberty before a warrant for his arrest
could be issued.
The rule is clear that for the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender to be appreciated, it must be proven that the accused freely
placed himself at the disposal of law enforcing authorities. The records
confirm that appellant was arrested and detained by the INP Station of
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. NO. 150129 April 6, 2005
NORMA A. ABDULLA, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Convicted by the Sandiganbayan1 in its Crim. Case No. 23261 of the
crime of illegal use of public funds defined and penalized under Article
220 of the Revised Penal Code, or more commonly known
as technical malversation, appellant Norma A. Abdulla is now before
this Court on petition for review under Rule 45.
Along with Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, appellant was charged
under an Information which pertinently reads:
That on or about November, 1989 or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Jolo, Sulu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused: NORMA A. ABDULLA
and NENITA P. AGUIL, both public officers, being then the President
and cashier, respectively, of the Sulu State College, and as such by
reason of their positions and duties are accountable for public funds
under their administration, while in the performance of their functions,
conspiring and confederating with MAHMUD I. DARKIS, also a public
officer, being then the Administrative Officer V of the said school, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without lawful
authority, apply for the payment of wages of casuals, the amount of
FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00), Philippine Currency,
which amount was appropriated for the payment of the salary
differentials of secondary school teachers of the said school, to the
damage and prejudice of public service.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Appellants co-accused, Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both
acquitted. Only appellant was found guilty and sentenced by the
Sandiganbayan in its decision2 dated August 25, 2000 (promulgated
on September 27,2000), as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Mahmud Darkis and
Nenita P. Aguil are hereby acquitted of the crime charged. The cash
bond posted by each of the said accused for their provisional liberty
are hereby ordered returned to each of them subject to the usual
auditing and accounting procedures.
Accused Norma Abdulla is hereby convicted of the crime charged and
is hereby meted a fine of three thousand pesos, pursuant to the
second paragraph of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. She is
further imposed the penalty of temporary special disqualification for a
period of six (6) years. She shall also pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
Upon motion for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended
appellants sentence by deleting the temporary special disqualification
imposed upon her, thus:
Premises considered, the decision of this Court dated August 25,
2000, is hereby amended to the effect that the penalty of temporary
special disqualification for six (6) years is hereby cancelled and set
aside. Hence, the last paragraph of said decision shall read as follows:
Accused Abdulla is hereby convicted of the crime charged and is
hereby meted a fine of three thousand pesos, pursuant to the second
paragraph of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. She shall also
pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.3
Still dissatisfied, appellant, now before this Court, persistently pleas
innocence of the crime charged.
Thereafter, the prosecution immediately made its Formal Offer of
Evidence, and, with the admission thereof by the court, rested its
case.
The defense proceeded to adduce its evidence by presenting four (4)
witnesses, namely, accused Mahmud Darkis, who was the
Administrative Officer of Sulu State College, Jolo, Sulu; accused
Nenita Aguil, the Cashier of the same College; appellant Norma
Abdulla herself, who was the College President; and Gerardo
Concepcion, Jr., Director IV and Head of the Department of Budget
and Management, Regional Office No. 9, Zamboanga City.
The undisputed facts, as found by the Sandiganbayan itself:
The evidence on record xxx show that the request for the conversion
of thirty-four (34) secondary school teachers to Instructor I items of the
Sulu State College, through its former president, accused Abdulla,
was approved by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM);
that consequent to the approval of the said request, was the allotment
by the DBM of the partial funding for the purpose of paying the salary
differentials of the said thirty-four (34) secondary school teachers in
the amount of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) sourced from the
"lump sum appropriation authorized on page 370 of R.A. 6688 [should
be page 396 of RA 6688 (General Appropriations Act January 1
December 31, 1989)] and the current savings under personal services
of said school (Exhibits `B, `C and `C-1; Exhibit `18, pp. 32-35; tsn,
hearing of September 22, 1998, pp. 6 to 25 and 26); that out of the
thirty-four (34) secondary school teachers, only the six (6) teachers
were entitled and paid salary differentials amounting to P8,370.00, as
the twenty-eight (28) teachers, who were occupying Teacher III
positions, were no longer entitled to salary differentials as they were
already receiving the same salary rate as Instructor I (Exhibit `A, p. 4,
par. 1; Exhibits `1 to `6, inclusive; Exhibit `14-A; tsn, hearing of
September 22, 1998, pp. 6 to 8; tsn, hearing of September 23, 1998,
pp. 10-11); and that the amount of P31,516.16, taken from the
remaining balance of the P40,000.00 allotment, was used to pay the
terminal leave benefits of the six (6) casuals (Exhibits `D and `E;
Exhibits `7 to `12, inclusive; tsn, hearing of September 22, 1998, pp.
13 and 34; tsn, hearing of September 23, 1998, p. 13).
Accused Abdulla was able to sufficiently justify the payment of the
salary differentials of only six (6), out of the thirty-four (34) teachers,
when she testified that out of the thirty-four (34) teachers, twenty-eight
(28) were already holding the position of Secondary School Teacher III
receiving the salary of Instructor I; and that the remaining six (6) were
still holding Secondary Teacher II positions and therefore receiving a
salary lower than that of Instructor I so they were paid salary
differentials (tsn, hearing of September 23, 1998, pp. 8, 10 and 11). In
fact, the notarized audit investigation report (Exhibit `A, p. 4, 1st par.)
and the Joint Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao
(Exhibit `14-a), also point that said act of the accused is justified.
In this recourse, appellant questions the judgment of conviction
rendered against her, claiming that the Sandiganbayan erred:
"I
XXX ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN INVOKING THE PRESUMPTION
OF UNLAWFUL INTENT DESPITE EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY.
II
XXX ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PROVE THAT PETITIONER
COMMITTED TECHNICAL MALVERSATION UNDER ARTICLE 220
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE".
The Court grants the appeal.
So precious to her is the constitutional right of presumption of
innocence unless proven otherwise that appellant came all the way to
this Court despite the fact that the sentence imposed upon her by the
Sandiganbayan was merely a fine of three thousand pesos, with no
imprisonment at all. And recognizing the primacy of the right, this
Court, where doubt exists, has invariably resolved it in favor of an
accused.
In a judgment of acquittal in favor of two (2) accused charged of
murder in People vs. Abujan,5 the Court wrote:
We are enraged by the shocking death suffered by the victim and we
commiserate with her family. But with seeds of doubt planted in our
minds by unexplained circumstances in this case, we are unable to
accept the lower courts conclusion to convict appellants. We cannot in
conscience accept the prosecutions evidence here as sufficient proof
required to convict appellants of murder. Hence, here we must reckon
with a dictum of the law, in dubilis reus est absolvendus. All doubts
must be resolved in favor of the accused. Nowhere is this rule more
compelling than in a case involving the death penalty for a truly
humanitarian Court would rather set ten guilty men free than send one
innocent man to the death row. Perforce, we must declare both
appellants not guilty and set them free.
Similarly, the Court had to acquit an accused charged of rape
in People vs. De Jesus6 on ground of reasonable doubt, to wit:
With seeds of doubt planted in our minds by the conduct of
proceedings on record, we are unable to accept the lower courts
conclusion to convict appellant. His conviction is founded on the sole
testimony of Agnes, but though a credible witness despite her mental
retardation, she showed unnecessary dependence on her mother
when identifying the father of her child. Maternal coaching taints her
testimony. That her mother had to be ordered by the judge to go
outside the courtroom impresses us as significant. We are unable to
accept as sufficient the quantum of proof required to convict appellant
of rape based on the alleged victims sole testimony. Hence, here we
must fall back on a truism of the law, in dubilis reus est
absolvendus. All doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated May 26, 2000, of the
Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Appellant RUBEN LUMIBAO is ACQUITTED of the
charge of rape on reasonable doubt.
The Courts faithful adherence to the constitutional directive imposes
upon it the imperative of closely scrutinizing the prosecutions
evidence to assure itself that no innocent person is condemned and
that conviction flows only from a moral certainty that guilt has been
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the words of People
vs. Pascua7 :
Our findings in the case at bar should not create the mistaken
impression that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses should
always be looked at with askance. What we are driving at is that every
accused is presumed innocent at the onset of an indictment. But, it
has often happened that at the commencement of a trial, peoples
minds, sometimes judges too, would have already passed sentence
against the accused. An allegation, or even any testimony, that an act
was done should never be hastily accepted as proof that it was really
done. Proof must be closely examined under the lens of a judicial
microscope and only proof beyond reasonable doubt must be allowed
to convict. Here, that quantum of proof has not been satisfied.
We shall now assay appellants guilt or innocence in the light of the
foregoing crucibles.
In her first assigned error, appellant contends that the prosecution
failed to adduce evidence to prove criminal intent on her part. When
she raised this issue in her Motion for Reconsideration before the
Sandiganbayan, that court, invoking Section 5 (b), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court, ruled in a Resolution8 promulgated on September 17,
2001, as follows:
Anent the allegation of the movant/accused that good faith is a valid
defense in a prosecution for malversation as it would negate criminal
intent on the part of the accused which the prosecution failed to prove,
attention is invited to pertinent law and rulings of the Supreme Court
on the matter.
Sec. 5(b) of the Rule 131, Rules of Court, provides, `That an unlawful
act was done with an unlawful intent. Hence, dolo may be inferred
from the unlawful act. In several cases (Tria, 17 Phil. 303; Ballesteros,
25 Phil. 634; Sia Tioan, 54 Phil. 52; Cueto, 38 Phil. 935; Cubelo, 106
Phil. 496), the Supreme Court ruled that `When it has been proven
that the appellants committed the unlawful acts alleged, it is properly
presumed that they were committed with full knowledge and with
criminal intent, `and it is incumbent upon them to rebut such
presumption. Further, the same court also ruled that when the law
plainly forbids an act to be done, and it is done by a person, the law
implies the guilty intent, although the offender was honestly mistaken
as to the meaning of the law which he had violated (State vs.
McBrayer, 98 NIC 619; Sing Cong Bieng and Co Kong, 30 Phil. 577,
580; Hermenigildo Bautista, CA 40 O.G. 5th Supp. 139). If the act is
criminal, then criminal intent is presumed (Francisco y Martin, CA 53
O.G. 1450).
In the case at bar, inasmuch as the prosecution had proved that a
criminal act was committed by the accused under Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code, criminal intent was presumed. The accused did
not present any evidence to prove that no such criminal intent was
present when she committed the unlawful act of technical
malversation. Hence, the presumption that the unlawful act of the
accused was done with criminal intent had been satisfactorily proven
by the prosecution (Sec. 5[b], Rule 131).
The Court must have to part ways with the Sandiganbayan in its
reliance on Section 5 (b) of Rule 131 as basis for its imputation of
criminal intent upon appellant.
For sure, the procedural rule relied upon does not apply at all to this
case. Indeed, clear it is from its very language that the disputable
presumption of the existence of unlawful or criminal intent
presupposes the commission of an unlawful act. Thus, intent to kill is
presumed when the victim dies because the act of killing clearly
constitutes an unlawful act. In People vs. Gemoya,9 the Court held:
The intent to kill is likewise presumed from the fact of death, unless
the accused proves by convincing evidence that any of the justifying
circumstances in Article 11 or any of the exempting circumstances in
Article 12, both of the Revised Penal Code, is present.
In fact, in a Resolution penned by Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr.
in People vs. Delim, 10 the Court en banc categorically stated:
If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent
to kill is conclusively presumed. (Emphasis supplied).
Similarly, intent to gain or animus lucrandi is presumed when one is
found in possession of stolen goods precisely because the taking of
anothers property is an unlawful act. So it is that in People vs.
Reyes,11 the Court held:
Accused-appellants contention that the animus lucrandi was not
sufficiently established by the prosecution is devoid of merit. Animus
lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act which can be established
through the overt acts of the offender. Although proof of motive for the
crime is essential when the evidence of the robbery is circumstantial,
intent to gain or animus lucrandi may be presumed from the furtive
taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special
circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator.
The intent to gain may be presumed from the proven unlawful taking.
In the case at bar, the act of taking the victims wristwatch by one of
the accused Cergontes while accused-appellant Reyes poked a knife
behind him sufficiently gave rise to the presumption.
The presumption of criminal intent will not, however, automatically
apply to all charges of technical malversation because disbursement
of public funds for public use is per se not an unlawful act. Here,
appellant cannot be said to have committed an unlawful act when she
paid the obligation of the Sulu State College to its employees in the
form of terminal leave benefits such employees were entitled to under
existing civil service laws. Thus, in a similar case,12 the Court reversed
a conviction for technical malversation of one who paid out the wages
of laborers:
There is no dispute that the money was spent for a public purpose
payment of the wages of laborers working on various projects in the
municipality. It is pertinent to note the high priority which laborers
wages enjoy as claims against the employers funds and resources.
In the absence of any presumption of unlawful intent, the burden of
proving by competent evidence that appellants act of paying the
terminal leave benefits of employees of the Sulu State College was
done with criminal intent rests upon the prosecution.
The Court notes the odd procedure which the prosecution took in
discharging its undertaking to prove the guilt of appellant beyond
reasonable doubt. As it is, the prosecution did not present any single
witness at all, not even for the purpose of identifying and proving the
authenticity of the documentary evidence on which it rested its case.
The prosecution definitely failed to prove unlawful intent on the part of
appellant.
Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of
evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense.
The weakness of the defense does not relieve it of this responsibility.
And when the prosecution fails to discharge its burden of establishing
the guilt of an accused, an accused need not even offer evidence in
his behalf. A judgment of conviction must rest on nothing less than
moral certainty. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his
innocence must be duly taken into account. The proof against him
must survive the test of reason and the strongest suspicion must not
be permitted to sway judgment. There must be moral certainty in an
unprejudiced mind that it was accused-appellant who committed the
crime. Absent this required quantum of evidence would mean
exoneration for accused-appellant.13
The Sandiganbayans improper reliance on Sec. 5(b) of Rule 131 does
not save the day for the prosecutions deficiency in proving the
existence of criminal intent nor could it ever tilt the scale from the
constitutional presumption of innocence to that of guilt. In the absence
of criminal intent, this Court has no basis to affirm appellants
conviction.
x x x. This calls to mind the oft-repeated maxim `Actus non facit reum,
nisi mens sit rea, which expounds a basic principle in criminal law that
a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act
complained of be innocent. Thus, to constitute a crime, the act must,
except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a
criminal intent. It is true that a presumption of criminal intent may arise
from proof of the commission of a criminal act; and the general rule is
that if it is proved that the accused committed the criminal act charged,
it will be presumed that the act was done with criminal intention and
that it is for the accused to rebut this presumption. But it must be
borne in mind that the act from which such presumption springs must
be a criminal act In the case at bar, the act is not criminal. Neither can
it be categorized as malum prohibitum, the mere commission of which
makes the doer criminally liable even if he acted without evil intent.14
The second assigned error refers to the failure of the prosecution to
prove the existence of all the essential elements of the crime of
technical malversation defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code, which are:
"1. That the offender is a public officer;
"2. That there is public fund or property under his administration;
"3. That such public fund or property has been appropriated by law or
ordinance;
"4. That he applies the same to a public use other than that for which
such fund or property has been appropriated by law or ordinance."15
Appellant contends that the prosecution was unable to prove the
second and third elements of the crime charged. 16She argued that the
public funds in question, having been established to form part of
savings, had therefore ceased to be appropriated by law or ordinance
for any specific purpose.
The Court finds merit in appellants submission.
As found by the Sandiganbayan no less, the amount of forty thousand
pesos (P40,000.00) originally intended to cover the salary differentials
of thirty four (34) secondary school teachers whose employment
status were converted to Instructor I, were sourced from the "lump
sum appropriation" authorized on page 370 (should be page 396) of
R.A. 6688 and the current savings under personal services of said
school.17
The pertinent portions of RA 6688
The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary
differentials of secondary school teachers of the Sulu State College in
RA 6688. The third element of the crime of technical malversation
which requires that the public fund used should have been
appropriated by law, is therefore absent. The authorization given by
the Department of Budget and Management for the use of the forty
thousand pesos (P40,000.00) allotment for payment of salary
differentials of 34 secondary school teachers is not an ordinance or
law contemplated in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Court has unequivocably ruled in Parungao vs.
Sandiganbayan18 that in the absence of a law or ordinance
appropriating the public fund allegedly technically malversed (in that
case, the absence of any law or ordinance appropriating the CRBI
fund for the concreting of Barangay Jalung Road), the use thereof for
another public purpose (there, for the payment of wages of laborers
working on projects other than the Barangay Jalung Road) will not
make the accused guilty of violation of Article 220 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the forty thousand pesos
(P40,000.00) released by the DBM for salary differentials, for the
payment of the terminal leave benefits of other school teachers of the
Sulu State College, cannot be held guilty of technical malversation in
the absence, as here, of any provision in RA 6688 specifically
appropriating said amount for payment of salary differentials only. In
fine, the third and fourth elements of the crime defined in Article 220 of
the Revised Penal Code are lacking in this case. Acquittal is thus in
order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the
appealed decision and resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 23261 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
appellant ACQUITTED of the crime charged against her. The cash
bond posted by appellant for her provisional liberty, if any, is ordered
returned to her subject to the usual auditing and accounting
procedures.
SO ORDERED
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-65952 July 31, 1984
LAURO G. SORIANO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Dakila F. Castro for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
The principal issue in this petition to review a decision of the
Sandiganbayan is whether or not the preliminary investigation of a
criminal complaint conducted by a Fiscal is a "contract or transaction"
so as to bring it within the ambit of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The factual background is as follows:
Thomas N. Tan was accused of qualified theft in a complaint lodged
with the City Fiscal of Quezon City. The case was docketed as I.S. No.
82-2964 and assigned for investigation to the petitioner who was then
an Assistant City Fiscal. In the course of the investigation the
petitioner demanded P4,000.00 from Tan as the price for dismissing
the case. Tan reported the demand to the National Bureau of
Investigation which set up an entrapment. Because Tan was hard put
to raise the required amount only P2,000.00 in bills were marked by
the NBI which had to supply one-half thereof. The entrapment
succeeded and an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 7393 which reads as follows:
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses LAURO G.
SORIANO, for Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of March 1983, at Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, a public officer, being then and still is an
Assistant City Fiscal of the Quezon City Fiscal's Office, detailed as the
Investigating Fiscal in the case of MARIANNE Z. LACAMBRA versus
THOMAS N. TAN, docketed as I.S. No. 82-2964, for Qualified Theft,
taking advantage of his official position and with grave abuse of
authority, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
demand and request from Thomas N. Tan the amount of FOUR
THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) Philippine Currency, and actually
received from said Thomas N. Tan the amount of TWO THOUSAND
PESOS (P2,000.00) Philippine Currency, in consideration for a
favorable resolution by dismissing the abovementioned case, wherein
said accused has to intervene in his official capacity as such
Investigating Fiscal.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila, Philippines, March 22, 1983.
After trial the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision with the following
dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Lauro G. Soriano, Jr.,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, as Principal in the Information, for
Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b), of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH, as
minimum, to NINE (9) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, as maximum; to
suffer perpetual disqualification from public office; to suffer loss of all
retirement or gratuity benefits under any law; and, to pay costs.
Of the sum of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) used in the
entrapment operations, and which was fully recovered from the
accused, One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) shall be returned to
private complainant Thomas N. Tan, and the other half, to the National
Bureau of Investigation, National Capital Region.
A motion to reconsider the decision was denied by the
Sandiganbayan; hence the instant petition.
The petitioner has raised several legal questions plus one factual
question. The latter is to the effect that the Sandiganbayan convicted
him on the weakness of his defense and not on the strength of the
prosecution's evidence. This claim is not meritorious not only because D The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under
it is not for Us to review the factual findings of the court a quo but also . the Revised Penal Code because to do so would be violative of as
because a reading of its decision shows that it explicitly stated the
facts establishing the guilt of the petitioner and the competence of the E accusation against him. Wrong. A reading of the information which has
witnesses who testified against him. D been reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of bribery so that
As stated above, the principal issue is whether or not the investigation G the petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be informed.
conducted by the petitioner can be regarded as a "contract or A IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the
transaction" within the purview of Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019. On this R Sandiganbayan is modified in that the petitioner is deemed guilty of
issue the petition is highly impressed with merit. D bribery as defined and penalized by Article 210 of the Revised Penal
The afore-mentioned provision reads as follows: O Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or C six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the . of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay a fine of Two
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are L Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos. The rest of the judgment is hereby
hereby declared to be unlawful: A affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.
(a) ... B SO ORDERED.
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, E
share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in L
connection with any contract or transaction between the Government L
and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity A
has to intervene under the law. S
The petitioner states: p
Assuming in gratia argumenti, petitioner's guilt, the facts make out a e
case of Direct Bribery defined and penalized under the provision of c
Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and not a violation of Section 3, i
subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended. a
The evidence for the prosecution clearly and undoubtedly support, if at l
all the offense of Direct Bribery, which is not the offense charged and P
is not likewise included in or is necessarily included in the offense r
charged, which is for violation of Section 3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. o
Act 3019, as amended. The prosecution showed that: the accused is a s
public officer; in consideration of P4,000.00 which was allegedly e
solicited, P2,000.00 of which was allegedly received, the petitioner c
undertook or promised to dismiss a criminal complaint pending u
preliminary investigation before him, which may or may not constitute t
a crime; that the act of dismissing the criminal complaint pending o
before petitioner was related to the exercise of the function of his r
office. Therefore, it is with pristine clarity that the offense proved, if at
all is Direct Bribery. (Petition, p. 5.)
Upon the other hand, the respondents claim:
A reading of the above-quoted provision would show that the term
'transaction' as used thereof is not limited in its scope or meaning to a
commercial or business transaction but includes all kinds of
transaction, whether commercial, civil or administrative in nature,
pending with the government. This must be so, otherwise, the Act
would have so stated in the "Definition of Terms", Section 2 thereof.
But it did not, perforce leaving no other interpretation than that the
expressed purpose and object is to embrace all kinds of transaction
between the government and other party wherein the public officer
would intervene under the law. (Comment, p. 8.)
It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not
a contract. Neither was it a transactionbecause this term must be
construed as analogous to the term which precedes it. A transaction,
like a contract, is one which involves some consideration as in credit
transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the
investigation conducted by the petitioner.
( In the light of the foregoing, We agree with the petitioner that it was
S error for the Sandiganbayan to have convicted him of violating Sec. 3
G (b) of R.A. No. 3019.
) constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 147333 August 12, 2004
ROSALIA* M. DUGAYON, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioner Rosalia Dugayon seeks the review of the Decision1 dated
November 24, 2000 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
20344, convicting her and her co-accused, Jessie2 Callangan, of
violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
The following facts, as summarized by the Sandiganbayan, are
undisputed:3
Sometime in July 1989, the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), Region 2, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, embarked
on a P239,4604 project involving the procurement of 19 typewriters. A
Procurement Board was formed, composed of Assistant Regional
Director Rosalia Dugayon as Chairman, Supply Officer Rogelio
Hipolito and Carlito Catabay as authorized canvasser.
The Board prepared the Requisition for Equipment and Supplies
(RES) for the 19 typewriters indicating their specifications. The RES
was submitted to Regional Director Consolacion Arafiles for signature
and approval. Upon approval of the RES, petitioner Dugayon released
letters of canvass (similar to an invitation to bid) addressed to dealers
in Tuguegarao and Manila. From four proposals, San Sebastian
Marketing, represented by Jessie Callangan, won the bid. When State
Auditor Judy Singson, resident auditor of DSWD, Region 2,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, learned about the opening of the bids, she
sent a letter dated July 21, 1989 to Regional Director Consolacion
Arafiles about the deficiencies in the bidding. In her letter, Auditor
Singson observed that the Auditor's Office was not informed of the
opening of the bids, in violation of Section 3915 of the Government
Accounting and Auditing Manual; that the Auditor was not furnished
with copies of bid invitations at least two weeks ahead of the opening
date; that bidder's bonds were not imposed; and that the bidders were
not required to submit or present their License/Accreditation before the
opening of the bid proposals. She recommended that the bidding be
cancelled and another one be conducted.
In a letter dated July 25, 1989, Director Arafiles responded that the
opening of the bids was done in good faith.
Auditor Singson6 sent another letter dated July 28, 1989 advising
Director Arafiles to require the winning bidder to post a performance
bond instead, to ensure the delivery of the equipment since it was
already late to impose a bidder's bond.
Thereafter, the Procurement Board prepared the Purchase Order
specifying the brands and specifications of the 19 typewriters to be
delivered and addressed to San Sebastian Marketing c/o Jessie
Callangan.
San Sebastian made three partial deliveries on August 14, 16 and 21,
1989. Upon delivery, the Inspection and Acceptance Committee
headed by Supply Officer Rogelio Hipolito, inspected and tested the
typewriters and certified in the Reports of Inspection7 that the
deliveries were in accordance with the specifications in the Purchase
Order.
Subsequently, Supply Officer Hipolito prepared the voucher for
payment attaching therein the supporting documents including the
Reports of Inspection dated August 14, 16 and 21, 1989. San
Sebastian Marketing was paid with three checks in the amounts
of P92,880, P88,560 and P58,050, as evidenced by three official
receipts, all dated August 24, 1989.
Upon post-audit, acting on the Inspection Report dated November 15,
1989 by Agapito Malaki, Technical Audit Specialist of the COA,
Regional Office No. 2, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, the Commission on
Audit (COA) disallowed the vouchers/checks. The Inspection Report
stated, among others, that all the 19 typewriters were not brand new,
but merely rebuilt and reconditioned.
In notices dated November 29, 1989, the COA informed petitioner
Dugayon, Director Arafiles, Supply Officer Hipolito and San Sebastian
Marketing of the report.
The petitioner, Arafiles, Hipolito and Callangan were indicted for
violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
before the Sandiganbayan. Quoted below is the Amended Information
dated June 17, 1994:
That for the period July 25 to August 24, 1989 or
immediately prior and subsequent thereto, in Tuguegarao,
Cagayan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, CONSOLACION ARAFILES,
ROSALIA DUGAYON, ROGELIO D. HIPOLITO
and JESSEE CALLANGAN, Regional Director, Asst.
Regional Director, Supply Officer III, all of
DECS8 and Supplier, respectively, the said public officers
in the discharge of their duties as such, conspiring and
confederating with one another and with JESSEE
CALLANGAN as supplier, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, with evident bad faith, purchase, pay and
accept nineteen (19) second-hand rebuilt and
reconditioned typewriters from Jessee Callangan of San
Sebastian Marketing, contrary to the intention to purchase
brand new units of typewriters only, for a total cost
of P239,490.00, when in truth and in fact, the total and
actual cost of the said nineteen (19) units of second-hand,
rebuilt and reconditioned typewriters at the time of
purchase was only P141,800.00 or a difference
of P97,690.00 to the damage and prejudice of the
government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.9
On July 6, 1994, the Sandiganbayan ordered the immediate arrest of
the accused. Except for Hipolito, who remains at-large, all of the
accused were arrested and later released on bail.
After the trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered its assailed Decision on
November 24, 2000, convicting petitioner and Callangan, acquitting
Arafiles and ordering the archiving of the case against Hipolito. The
decretal portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, under the premises, this Court finds accused
ROSALIA M. DUGAYON and JESSEE G. CALLANGAN "GUILTY"
beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, and are hereby sentenced to suffer each
an indeterminate prison term of Six (6) years and One (1) day,
as minimum, to Nine (9) years and One (1) day, as maximum; to
indemnify the government jointly and severally, in the amount of
Ninety-Seven Thousand Six Hundred and Ninety Pesos (P97,690.00),
with costs; and accused Dugayon to further suffer perpetual
disqualification from public office.
On the other hand, in view of the above findings, accused
CONSOLACION D. ARAFILES, is hereby ACQUITTED of the charge.
Accordingly, the Clerk of Court of the Fifth Division of this Court is
ordered to release Original Receipt No. 4193001 dated July 18, 1994,
in the amount of P15,000.00 covering her cash bond, upon proper
receipt therefor, subject to the usual auditing and accounting
procedures.
As far as accused ROGELIO D. HIPOLITO is concerned, who is still
at-large up to this time, the case against him is hereby ordered
archived until the Court shall have obtained jurisdiction over his
person. Correspondingly, let an alias warrant of arrest be issued
against him.
SO ORDERED.10
The Sandiganbayan denied the respective motions for reconsideration
of the petitioner and Callangan in its Resolution11 dated February 26,
2001. Callangan's petition for review on certiorari was denied by the
Supreme Court in a resolution dated August 8, 2001 for his failure to
file the same within the reglementary period.
Here, before us, petitioner Dugayon assigns to the Sandiganbayan the
following errors:
(1) THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION)
GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING AND DECLARING ON THE
EXISTENCE OF A CONSPIRACY AMONG PETITIONER-
APPELLANT ROSALIA M. DUGAYON, ACCUSED (AT-LARGE)
ROGELIO D. HIPOLITO, AND JESSEE CALLANGAN.
(2) THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION) IN
CONVICTING PETITIONER-APPELLANT ROSALIA M. DUGAYON,
FOR THE OFFENSE CHARGED FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE
FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION
ARE NOT SUFFICIENT AND ADEQUATE TO ESTABLISH HER
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.12
In our view, the following issues must be resolved: (1) Was there a
conspiracy to defraud the government? and (2) Is the evidence
sufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt?
On the first issue, petitioner avers that conspiracy is not presumed and
that the elements of conspiracy, like the physical acts constituting the
crime itself, must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. She notes that
the Sandiganbayan could only point to her having signed the
certification portion of the disbursement vouchers that states,
3. CERTIFIED: Expenses necessary, lawful and incurred under my
direct supervision. Additional in case of contracts, or purchases of
goods or services prices reasonable and not in excess of the current
rates in the locality.
(Sgd.) ROSALIA M. DUGAYON
ARD FOR Admin.13
While she admits being the Chairman of the Procurement Board, she
denies being a member of the Inspection and Acceptance Committee.
She argues that, as Assistant Regional Director of the DSWD, she
relies entirely on the recommendations of her subordinates, on the
recommendation of the accountant with respect to the Purchase
Order, and on the signatures and recommendations of four
subordinates who process the documents with respect to the
disbursement vouchers. She likewise denies she conspired with her
co-accused. Petitioner submits that the elements of conspiracy were
not established beyond reasonable doubt and she should be
acquitted.14
On the issue of conspiracy, petitioner relies on Magsuci v.
Sandiganbayan,15 which cited Arias v. Sandiganbayan,16as precedent
to prove the high improbability of her conspiring with her co-accused.
She quotes,
" [the Court] would be setting a bad precedent if a head of
office plagued by all too common problemsdishonest or negligent
subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain
incompetenceis suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply
because he did not personally examine every single detail,
painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the
motives of every person involved in a transaction before affixing his
signature as the final approving authority. (Underscoring ours.)
...
All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their
subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids,
purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations."
...
When, however, that infraction consists in the reliance in good
faith, albeit misplaced, by a head of office on a subordinate upon
whom the primary responsibility rests, absent a clear case of
conspiracy, the Arias doctrinemust be held to prevail.
Respondent, on the other hand, insists that petitioner was evidently
part of the conspiracy considering that she certified the disbursement
vouchers when she very well knew that the typewriters were not brand
new. Respondent offers as basis People v. Geronimo17 which
cited People v. Carbonel,18 and quotes,
when the defendants by their acts aimed at the same object, one
performing one part and another performing another part so as to
complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object, and their
acts, though apparently independent were in fact concerted and
cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted
action and concurrence of sentiments, the court will be justified in
concluding that said defendants were engaged in a conspiracy. . . .
Respondent notes that the Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioner
certified the disbursement vouchers; she chaired the Procurement
Board, and she signed the report of the Inspection and Acceptance
Committee. On the whole, she had an extensive and active
participation in this transaction for which she cannot disclaim
responsibility and liability. She could not have been unaware that the
19 typewriters were secondhand, rebuilt and reconditioned.
In the recent case of Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan,19 we said,
Direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. It need not be shown
that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to
enter into and pursue a common design. The existence of the assent
of minds which is involved in a conspiracy may be, and from the
secrecy of the crime, usually must be, inferred by the court from proof
of facts and circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate
that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that
two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment
of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts,
though apparently independent, were in fact connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiments, then a conspiracy may be inferred though
no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. Thus, the
proof of conspiracy, which is essentially hatched under cover and out
of view of others than those directly concerned, is perhaps most findings of fact are binding on us.24 We find no reason to reject these
frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances only. findings as these were based on the Inspection Report of the COA.
It is not correct for the petitioner to say that the Sandiganbayan could Without hesitation we find that this transaction defrauded and caused
only point to her having signed and certified the disbursement injury to the government. The Sandiganbayan reported that based on
vouchers for her involvement in the conspiracy. Other circumstances the Prices Comparison of Agency Purchase Price Against Re-
point to a finding of conspiracy. Among them, she was the Chairman canvassed Prices on Re-conditioned Items, the government
of the Procurement Board and member/signatory of the Inspection and paid P239,490 for the deliveries or P97,690 more than the actual cost
Acceptance Committee. Moreover, despite patent and glaring defects of P141,800 of the rebuilt/reconditioned typewriters, giving
in the typewriters which could be determined by a reasonable unwarranted benefits to San Sebastian Marketing and Jessie
inspection of the units, petitioner signed the Reports of Inspection that Callangan. The amount of P97,690 represents the actual damage
mentioned only that the delivered typewriters met the quantity ordered. suffered by the government in this anomalous transaction.
The report was silent on the quality of the typewriters. Yet, she hastily In our view, petitioner not only failed in her duty as Chairman of the
signed it, conveniently overlooking the deficiencies in the transaction. Procurement Board and member/signatory of the Inspection and
Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of Magsuci and Arias when Acceptance Committee, she also clearly acted with evident bad faith.
she relied on the recommendations of her subordinates. Petitioner is Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It
an Assistant Regional Director, not the head of office or the final imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
approving authority on whom the Arias doctrine is applicable. That is wrongdoing. It partakes the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of
the reason why the Sandiganbayan acquitted Regional Director mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive,
Arafiles, who was the head of office. self-interest or ill will, or for ulterior purposes.25 Verily, petitioner must
Moreover, petitioner's denial of her membership in the Inspection and answer for her acts and omissions.
Acceptance Committee is belied by the records of this case. The WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision
records show she signed the Reports of Inspection as a dated November 24, 2000 of the Sandiganbayan is
member/signatory of the Acceptance Committee. In her testimony, she hereby AFFIRMED.
also admitted inspecting the three deliveries20 and supervising three SO ORDERED.
subordinates.21
On the sufficiency of the evidence to prove petitioner was guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of graft and corruption, Section 3(e) of Rep.
Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) is pertinent. It
provides,
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
...
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
The essential elements of this crime are: (1) the accused are public
officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) said
public officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of
their official duties or in relation to their public position; (3) they caused
undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party;
(4) such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to such parties; and (5) the public officers have acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.22
Recall that at the time of purchase of the typewriters, the petitioner
was then the Assistant Regional Director of DSWD Region 2,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan. She was Chairman of the Procurement Board
and member/signatory of the Inspection and Acceptance Committee.
She accepted the secondhand typewriters, contrary to the requirement
to buy brand new units, and allowed payment for them at the price of
brand new units. She admitted that the specification for the typewriters
should be brand new.23 The Sandiganbayan found the typewriters that
were paid for were secondhand, rebuilt and reconditioned. These
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001]
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
(Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full
fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the individual from the vast
powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as
he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality
beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting that "individual
spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social
interference - he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights and
liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is justified in
enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor to withhold
fulfillment. Thus he says -
The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection.The only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against
his will, is to prevent harm to others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of
the State to self-preservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity
and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate
a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its collective wisdom
and inflict punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic
collectivism wrought changes in the social order, carrying with it a new
formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the
imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process,
the web of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured,
enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular
and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law as the
expression of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its
members to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably
followed. It is when individual rights are pitted against State authority
that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to
be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the
Crime of Plunder),[1] as amended by RA 7659,[2] wishes to impress upon
us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that
thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally
infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the
Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because,
according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it
dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes
already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are
purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to
due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by
petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1,
par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property,
business, enterprise or material possession of any person within the
purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or
indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or
business associates by any combination or series of the following
means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of
public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any
person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or
project or by reason of the office or position of the public office
concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise
or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or
other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and
the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public
officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-
gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or
total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be
guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public
officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition
of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by
the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The court
shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other
incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks
derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the
State (underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime
of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal
act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it
being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern
of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme
or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the
Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim.
Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b)
Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3,
par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for
violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case
No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e)
Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as
amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the
remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with
respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Crim.
Case No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the
offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an
opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to
prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only
lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of
offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The
purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under
which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus
indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a
Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause for
the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for
the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in
Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did
not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based
was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information
for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the
Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5)
days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the
Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied
petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments
on 18 September 2001, the issues for resolution in the instant petition
for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being
vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the
predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the
accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA
7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of
Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the
validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a legislative
measure is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution.[3] Courts
invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a
legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of
constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionality
takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the
government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus
it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the
judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch - the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may
firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious
of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law
with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what
is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining
whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law,
courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and
forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the
courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last
resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must
first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the
question of constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon[4] we held that
as long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the
constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the case
will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of the
presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law
into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the law
clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic
law, it must be struck down on sight lest the positive commands of the
fundamental law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs
heavily on the party challenging the validity of the statute. He must
demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an
infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can
be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will
hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to
sustain."[5] And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to
discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality
of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable
standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the
accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is
sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions
required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with
reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through
a combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a)
through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of
public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or
indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any
other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the
office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent
conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the
National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or
indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural,
industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular
persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official
position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly
enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines;
and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth
amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule
that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render
them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must
sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending
one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in
identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be
understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is
the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth
of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts
enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the
language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various
elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB,
Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,'
together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward
Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a.
Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a.
Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder,
defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12
of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-
accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY
AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES,
SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE
ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY,
RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and
acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth
in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION
NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS(P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY
UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE
EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR
A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR
SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL
INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE
HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00),
MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF
GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with co-
accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL
GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,
converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR
THEIR PERSONALgain and benefit, public funds in the amount of
ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more
or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION
PESOS (P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the
province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in
connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN
DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia
Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN
AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE
OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS),
329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE
BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS
ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED
SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND
FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS
SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED
TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
(P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR
LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION
FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN
PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY
COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID
PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE
CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME'JOSE
VELARDE;'
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS,
SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION
TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING
THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT
THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous
- as there is obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his
defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly
show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide
adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon
such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the
accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent
defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for
the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the
key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in
Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec.
4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny
him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute
is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are
used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining
them;[6] much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides,
there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the
legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is
not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so
define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the
vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear,
or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly
expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that
words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification,[7] unless it is evident that the legislature
intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.[8] The
intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists
and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is
always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains
the following commonly accepted definition of the words
"combination" and "series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of
combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to
obscure individual characters.
Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one
after another in spatial and temporal succession.
That Congress intended the
words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular
meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the
bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:
DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE,
7 May 1991
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of
plunder. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF
OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE
HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if
there are two or more means, we mean to say that number one and
two or number one and something else are included, how about a
series of the same act? For example, through misappropriation,
conversion, misuse, will these be included also?
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.
REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -
REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the
enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination,
two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say
combination, we mean, two different acts. It cannot be a
repetition of the same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there
are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when
we say combination or series, we seem to say that two or
more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary
crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion
because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary
crime but we have here a combination or series of overt
or criminal acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term series?
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two
misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be
combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that
sometimes one or maybe even two acts may already
result in such
a big amount, on line 25, would theSponsor consider
deleting the words a series of overt or, to read, therefore:
or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as.
Remove the idea of necessitating a series. Anyway, the
criminal acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or
more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because a series implies several or
many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be
prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say
acts of plunder there should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by
existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is
referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of
enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public
treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of
assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d),
subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2)
or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of
enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation,
malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under
Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a
technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would
have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the
Sandiganbayan[9] that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in
relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -
x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in
subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the
law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common
purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either
be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said
common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful
scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the
principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him
follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if
there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods
used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form
part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not
give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to
penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-
for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been
formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect
that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense
with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can
understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be
invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face,
i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by
construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing
of the Government muscle.[10] But the doctrine does not apply as against
legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which
nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those
that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of
activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no
challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed
against such activities.[11] With more reason, the doctrine cannot be
invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as
in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice.[12] It must be stressed, however, that the
"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty
for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical
exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.Flexibility, rather than
meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds
of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid
merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or
detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the
act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all
other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of
Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court
that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not
justify a facial review of its validity -
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of
law."[13] The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a
governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms."[14]
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one
which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected
speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe
speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a
vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute
drawn with narrow specificity."[15] The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed
by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred
and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory
effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have
general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if
facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be
prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the
area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special
application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the
validity of penal statutes.As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an
'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment."[16] In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,[17] the Court ruled that
"claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words"
and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought
to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held
that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish
that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid."[18] As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may
challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly
proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to
the conduct of others."[19]
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness
are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in
free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First
Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the
established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that
impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other
situations in which its application might be unconstitutional."[20] As has
been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment
context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial
invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process
typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular
defendant."[21] Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim
that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its
entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them
down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not
before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected.[22] It
constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of
the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete
factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts.[23] But, as the U.S.
Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris[24]
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies,
and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put
into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The
combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact
on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis
of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is
wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever
way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been
described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly
and only as a last resort,"[25] and is generally disfavored.[26] In
determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions
which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined
in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged.[27]
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the
purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and
argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity,
where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in
the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific
precision in the law. Every provision of the law should be construed in
relation and with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take
more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched presumption of
constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner
cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one
of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that
the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its
appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his
affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound
constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan[28] must be
mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the point that courts are
loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is
so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no
reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. In that case,
petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality of
Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being
vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that the term "unwarranted"
is highly imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning or settled
definition by prior judicial or administrative precedents; that, for its
vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does not give
fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners
further argued that the Information charged them with three (3) distinct
offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest
partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith;
and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable
negligence while in the discharge of their official function and that their
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
them was violated because they were left to guess which of the three
(3) offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e),
of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the
constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality,"
"evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely
describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3,
par. (e), of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these
phrases in the same Information does not mean that the indictment
charges three (3) distinct offenses.
The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or
official support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third International
Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or adequate reason
(Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa., 405
F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol.
43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful the act of the public
officer in:
x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as
amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal
provisions penalize is the act of a public officer, in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving any private party
benefits, advantage or preference which is unjustified, unauthorized or
without justification or adequate reason, through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or
ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e),
of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood in
its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case,
petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section
unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched
theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable
obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only
proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or
conspiracy -
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of
plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act
done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the
simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other
crimes, the accusedalways has in his favor the presumption of
innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the
State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt
that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.[29] The use of
the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the
respect and confidence of the community in the application of criminal
law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a
standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are
being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every
individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his
government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without
convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost
certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted
stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due
Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except
upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged.[30] The following
exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on
this score during the deliberations in the floor of the House of
Representatives are elucidating -
DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA
7080, 9 October 1990
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our
criminal law that what is alleged in the information must
be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only
one act and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in
the information, does that not work against the right of the
accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by
falsification is less than P100 million, but the totality of the
crime committed is P100 million since there is
malversation, bribery, falsification of public document,
coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the
information needs to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt is every element of the crime charged. For
example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the
things taken by the robber in the information three pairs of
pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved
beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the
conviction of a crime for which he was charged just
because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the
prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the
offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering
that in the crime of plunder the totality of the amount is
very important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal
acts has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of
bribery, he was able to accumulate only P50,000 and in
the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate P1
million. Now, when we add the totality of the other acts as
required under this bill through the interpretation on the
rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so how can we
now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of
proving an essential element of the crime, there is a need
to prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. For
example, one essential element of the crime is that the
amount involved is P100 million. Now, in a series of
defalcations and other acts of corruption in the
enumeration the total amount would be P110 or P120
million, but there are certain acts that could not be proved,
so, we will sum up the amounts involved in those
transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount
involved in these transactions, proved beyond reasonable
doubt, is P100 million, then there is a crime of
plunder (underscoring supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in
any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of
plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond
any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the
crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every
component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of the
import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond
reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a
combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an
amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and
every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by
the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy
to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate,
supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder with
having committed fifty (50) raids on the public
treasury. Theprosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it
being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond
reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at
least P50,000,000.00.[31]
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the
logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of
accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise,
such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par.
(d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate
acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and common
sense. There would be no other explanation for a combination or series
of
overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme
or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The
prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and
conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the
establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of
Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a very important element of
the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a
rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that
without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder -
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be
convicted under the Plunder Law without applying Section
4 on the Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts
complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual
crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not
plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the
crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt without
applying Section 4, can you not have a conviction under
the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of
Sec. 4 in convicting an accused charged for violation of
the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays
down a substantive element of the law x x x x
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of
Section 4 when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt
on the acts charged constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two
pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it contains a
substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is
no way by which we can avoid Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable
doubt insofar as the predicate crimes charged are
concerned that you do not have to go that far by applying
Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4
contains a very important element of the crime of plunder
and that cannot be avoided by the prosecution.[32]
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the
essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its
definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not
one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is
clear and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of
establishing the crime of plunder x x x x
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for
the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural
measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in
favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is
only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even
without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what
is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to
engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.Thus, even granting
for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the
reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest
of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law;
after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than
enough.Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause -
Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the
application thereof to any person or circumstance
is held invalid, the remainingprovisions of this Act and the application
of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be
affected thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act
from being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its
provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all
the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated independently of
each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can
best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza
that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal
intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion -
x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the
element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is
noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of
plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus
alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement
of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void,
petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator Taada made during
the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to
convict him would not be evidence for each and every individual
criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or
scheme to commit this crime of plunder.[33]
However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the
succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it
is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's
view, would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to
this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .[34]
Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to
commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every
criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough
if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or ciminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the
acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of
the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, 2 provides that -
Any person who participated with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties,
the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code,
shall be considered by the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the
Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law
indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the
degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal
intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any person who participates with the
said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the
crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does
not apply as well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As
Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not
supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no canon
against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they
obviously mean."[35]
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in
se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the
decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are
punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring
to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v.
Echegaray:[36]
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are,
by their very nature, despicable, either because life was callously
taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized
as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a
human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the
victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing
acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses involving
minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other
crimes; as well as murder, rape,
parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where
the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical
injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or
the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional
mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal
or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are statute. This continuing
penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may
very nature. linger for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge
significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme triumphant in the midst of ferment.
of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080
finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is
underprivileged masses.Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law
rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
the Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle SO ORDERED.
the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality
that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the
psyche of the populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the
money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form
of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates
to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn,
the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context,
no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like
qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug
offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that
their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and
damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous
offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished
are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se[37] and
it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law,
especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are
mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for
plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the
Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against
jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the
amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say
however that it is now too late in the day for him to
resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally
consigned by People v. Echegaray[38] to the archives of jurisprudential
history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is
constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes,
by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral
part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and
obscene profligacy of officials in high places which have shaken its very
foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more
elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people
relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers
of the government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight
the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and
economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the
Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues
of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a
malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber
of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will
of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure
society against the avarice and other venalities in public office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of
this nation, few issues of national importance can equal the amount of
interest and passion generated by petitioner's ignominious fall from the
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 160211 August 28, 2006
VENANCIO R. NAVA, Petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable Justices RODOLFO G. PALATTAO, GREGORY S.
ONG, and MA. CRISTINA G. CORTEZ-ESTRADA as Members of
the Sandiganbayans Fourth Division, and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, CJ:
A meticulous review of the records and the evidence establishes the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, the prosecution
was able to prove all the elements of the crime charged. Hence, the
conviction of petitioner is inevitable.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari 1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the June 2, 2003 Decision 2 and September 29, 2003
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23627. The
dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
convicting accused VENANCIO NAVA Y RODRIGUEZ of the crime of
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act particularly
Section 3(g) thereof, or entering on behalf of government in any
contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
same whether or not the pubic officer profited or will profit thereby. In
the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years, and one (1) day as
minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day as maximum and to
suffer perpetual disqualification from public office. Accused Nava is
further ordered to pay the government the amount of P380,013.60
which it suffered by way of damages because of the unlawful act or
omission committed by the herein accused Venancio Nava.
"From the narration of facts, there hardly appears any circumstance
that would suggest the existence of conspiracy among the other
accused in the commission of the crime.
"Thus in the absence of conspiracy in the commission of the crime
complained of and as the herein other accused only acted upon the
orders of accused Venancio Nava, in the absence of any criminal
intent on their part to violate the law, the acts of the remaining
accused are not considered corrupt practices committed in the
performance of their duties as public officers and consequently,
accused AJATIL JAIRAL Y PONGCA, ROSALINDA MERKA Y
GUANZON & JOSEPH VENTURA Y ABAD are hereby considered
innocent of the crime charged and are hereby acquitted." 3
The assailed Resolution dated September 29, 2003, denied
reconsideration.
The Facts
and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Digos, Davao Del Sur
The Sandiganbayan narrated the facts of this case as follows:
"The complaint involving the herein accused was initiated by the COA,
Region XI, Davao City, which resulted from an audit conducted by a
team which was created by the COA Regional Office per COA
Regional Assignment Order No. 91-74 dated January 8, 1991. The
objective of the team [was] to conduct an audit of the 9.36 million
allotment which was released in 1990 by the DECS, Region XI to its
Division Offices.
"In the Audit Report, the amount of P603,265.00 was shown to have
been released to the DECS Division of Davao del Sur for distribution
to the newly nationalized high schools located within the region.
Through the initiative of accused Venancio Nava, a meeting was
called among his seven (7) schools division superintendents whom he
persuaded to use the money or allotment for the purchase of Science
Laboratory Tools and Devices (SLTD). In other words, instead of
referring the allotment to the one hundred fifty-five (155) heads of the
nationalized high schools for the improvement of their facilities,
accused Nava succeeded in persuading his seven (7) schools division
superintendents to use the allotment for the purchase of science
education facilities for the calendar year 1990.
"In the purchase of the school materials, the law provides that the
same shall be done through a public bidding pursuant to Circular No.
85-55, series of 1985. But in the instant case, evidence shows that
accused Nava persuaded his seven (7) schools division
superintendents to ignore the circular as allegedly time was of the
essence in making the purchases and if not done before the calendar
year 1990, the funds allotted will revert back to the general fund.
"In the hurried purchase of SLTDs, the provision on the conduct of a
public bidding was not followed. Instead the purchase was done
through negotiation. Evidence shows that the items were purchased
from Jovens Trading, a business establishment with principal address
at Tayug, Pangasinan; D[I]mplacable Enterprise with principal
business address at 115 West Capitol Drive, Pasig, Metro Manila and
from Evelyn Miranda of 1242 Oroqueta Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. As
disclosed by the audit report, the prices of the [SLTDs] as purchased
from the above-named sellers exceeded the prevailing market price
ranging from 56% to 1,175% based on the mathematical computation
done by the COA audit team. The report concluded that the
government lost P380,013.60. That the injury to the government as
quantified was the result of the non-observance by the accused of the
COA rules on public bidding and DECS Order No. 100 suspending the
purchases of [SLTDs]." 4
The Commission on Audit (COA) Report recommended the filing of
criminal and administrative charges against the persons liable,
including petitioner, before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.
Petitioner was subsequently charged in an Information 5 filed on April
8, 1997, worded as follows:
"That on or about the period between November to December 1990,
and/or Davao City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused Venancio R. Nava (DECS-Region XI
Director) and Ajatil Jairal (Division Superintendent, DECS, Davao del
Sur), both high[-]ranking officials and Rosalinda Merka, and Teodora
Indin (Administrative Officer and Assistant Division Superintendent,
respectively of DECS-Division of Davao Del Sur), all low ranking
officials, while in the discharge of their respective official functions,
committing the offense in relation to their office and with grave abuse
[of] authority, conniving and confederating with one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter, on behalf of the
government, into transactions with DImplacable Enterprise and
Jovens Trading, respectively, represented by accused Antonio S. Tan
and Evelyn Miranda and Joseph Ventura for the purchase of Science
Laboratory Tools and Devices (SLTD) intended for use by the public
high schools in the area amounting to [P603,265.00], Philippine
currency, without the requisite public bidding and in violation of DECS
Order No. 100, Series of 1990, which transaction involved an
overprice in the amount of P380,013.60 and thus, is manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government." 6
Special Prosecution Officer II Evelyn T. Lucero-Agcaoili recommended
the dismissal of the foregoing Information on the ground, among
others, that there was no probable cause. She argued that only
estimates were made to show the discrepancy of prices instead of a
comparative listing on an item to item basis. 7 The recommendation
was disapproved, however, by then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
After due trial, only petitioner was convicted, while all the other
accused were acquitted. 8
Petitioner was found guilty of violating Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, or entering on behalf of the government
any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the latter, whether or not the public officer profited or would profit
thereby.
The Sandiganbayan (SBN) said that, in the purchase of the Science
Laboratory Tools and Devices (SLTDs), petitioner had not conducted
a public bidding in accordance with COA Circular No. 85-55A. As a
result, the prices of the SLTDs, as purchased, exceeded the prevailing
market price from 56 percent to 1,175 percent, based on the
mathematical computations of the COA team. 9 In his defense,
petitioner had argued that the said COA Circular was merely directory,
not mandatory. Further, the purchases in question had been done in
the interest of public service.10
The Sandiganbayan did not give credence to the foregoing defenses
raised by petitioner. On the contrary, it found the evidence adduced by
petitioners co-accused, Superintendent Ajatil Jairal, to be
"enlightening," manifesting an intricate web of deceit spun by
petitioner and involving all the other superintendents in the process. 11
The graft court did not accept the claim of petitioner that he signed the
checks only after the other signatories had already signed them. The
evidence showed that blank Philippine National Bank (PNB) checks
had been received by Nila E. Chavez, a clerk in the regional office, for
petitioners signature. The
Sandiganbayan opined that the evidence amply supported Jairals
testimony that the questioned transactions had emanated from the
regional office, as in fact, all the documents pertinent to the
transaction had already been prepared and signed by petitioner when
the meeting with the superintendents was called sometime in August
1990.12
In that meeting, the superintendents were given prepared documents
like the Purchase Orders and vouchers, together with the
justification. 13 This circumstance prompted Jairal to conduct his own
canvass. The Sandiganbayan held that this act was suggestive of the
good faith of Jairal, thereby negating any claim of conspiracy with the
other co-accused and, in particular, petitioner.
In its assailed Resolution, the SBN denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. It held that the series of acts culminating in the
questioned transactions constituted violations of Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) Order No. 100; and COA
Circular No. 85-55A. Those acts, ruled the SBN, sufficiently
established that the contract or transaction entered into was manifestly
or grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Hence, this Petition. 14
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
"I. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to a lack of or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the
findings of the Special Audit Team that irregularly conducted the audit
beyond the authorized period and which team falsified the Special
Audit Report.
"II. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack of or excess of jurisdiction in upholding
the findings in the special audit report where the Special Audit Team
egregiously failed to comply with the minimum standards set by the
Supreme Court and adopted by the Commission on Audit in violation
of petitioners right to due process, and which report suppressed
evidence favorable to the petitioner.
"III. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack of or excess of jurisdiction in upholding
the findings in the Special Audit Report considering that none of the
allegedly overpriced items were canvassed or purchased by the
Special Audit Team such that there is no competent evidence from
which to determine that there was an overprice and that the
transaction was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government.
"IV. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack of or excess of jurisdiction in finding that
there was an overprice where none of the prices of the questioned
items exceeded the amount set by the Department of Budget and
Management.
"V. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack of or excess of jurisdiction in selectively
considering the findings in the decision in Administrative Case No. XI-
91-088 and failing to consider the findings thereon that petitioner was
justified in undertaking a negotiated purchase and that there was no
overpricing.
"VI. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack of or excess of jurisdiction in selectively
considering the findings of XI-91-088 and failing to consider the
findings thereon that petitioner was justified in undertaking a
negotiated purchase, there was no overpricing, and that the purchases
did not violate DECS Order No. 100.
"VII. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack of or excess of jurisdiction in failing to
absolve the petitioner where conspiracy was not proven and the
suppliers who benefited from the alleged overpricing were acquitted.
"VIII. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack of or excess of jurisdiction in admitting
in evidence and giving probative value to Exhibit 8 the existence and
contents of which are fictitious.
"IX. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack of or excess of jurisdiction in giving
credence to the self-serving and perjurious testimony of co-accused
Ajatil Jairal that the questioned transactions emanated from the
regional office [in spite] of the documentary evidence and the
testimony of the accused supplier which prove that the transaction
emanated from the division office of Digos headed by co-accused
Ajatil Jairal.
"X. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack of or excess of jurisdiction in finding that
the petitioner entered into a transaction that was manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government where the evidence
clearly established that the questioned transactions were entered into
by the division office of Digos through co-accused Ajatil Jairal.
"XI. Whether the public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack of or excess of jurisdiction in convicting
the petitioner in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt." 15
All these issues basically refer to the question of whether the
Sandiganbayan committed reversible errors (not grave abuse of
discretion) in finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 3(g), Republic Act No. 3019.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Procedural Issue:
Propriety of Certiorari
At the outset, it must be stressed that to contest the Sandiganbayans
Decision and Resolution on June 2, 2003 and September 29, 2003,
respectively, petitioner should have filed a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45, not the present Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65. Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, 16 as amended by
Republic Act No. 8249, 17 provides that "[d]ecisions and final orders of
the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court." Section 1 of Rule 45
of the Rules of Court likewise provides that "[a] party desiring to
appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the x
x x Sandiganbayan x x x whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition
shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth."
Basic is the principle that when Rule 45 is available, recourse under
Rule 65 cannot be allowed either as an add-on or as a substitute for
evidence and given probative value;
appeal. 18 The special civil action for certiorari is not and cannot be a
substitute for an appeal, when the latter remedy is available. 19
This Court has consistently ruled that a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 20 A remedy is
considered plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the
petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the
lower court or agency or as in this case, the Sandiganbayan. 21 Since
the assailed Decision and Resolution were dispositions on the merits,
and the Sandiganbayan had no remaining issue to resolve, an appeal
would have been the plain, speedy and adequate remedy for
petitioner.
To be sure, the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or successive. 22 For this procedural
lapse, the Petition should have been dismissed outright.
Nonetheless, inasmuch as it was filed within the 15-day period
provided under Rule 45, the Court treated it as a petition for review
(not certiorari) under Rule 45 in order to accord substantial justice to
the parties. Thus, it was given due course and the Court required the
parties to file their Memoranda.
Main Issue:
Sufficiency of Evidence
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting him,
because the pieces of evidence to support the charges were not
convincing. Specifically, he submits the following detailed
argumentation:
"1. the Special Audit Report was fraudulent, incomplete, irregular,
inaccurate, illicit and suppressed evidence in favor of the Petitioner;
"2. there was no competent evidence to determine the overprice as
none of the samples secured by the audit team from the Division of
Davao del Sur were canvassed or purchased by the audit team;
"3. the allegedly overpriced items did not exceed the amount set by
the Department of Budget and Management;
"4. the decision in an administrative investigation were selectively lifted
out of context;
"5. the administrative findings that Petitioner was justified in
undertaking a negotiated purchase, that there was no overpricing, and
that the purchases did not violate DECS Order No. 100 were
disregarded;
"6. Exhibit 8, the contents of which are fictitious, was admitted in
"7. The suppliers who benefited from the transactions were acquitted,
along with the other accused who directly participated in the
questioned transactions; and
"8. The self-serving and perjury-ridden statements of co-accused
Jairal were given credence despite documentary and testimonial
evidence to the contrary." 23
Petitioner further avers that the findings of fact in the Decision dated
October 21, 1996 in DECS Administrative Case No. XI-91-
088 24 denied any overpricing and justified the negotiated purchases in
lieu of a public bidding. 25 Since there was no overpricing and since he
was justified in undertaking the negotiated purchase, petitioner
submits that he cannot be convicted of violating Section 3(g) of
Republic Act No. 3019.
Validity of Audit
The principal evidence presented during trial was the COA Special
Audit Report (COA Report). The COA is the agency specifically given
the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts
pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of
fund and property owned by or pertaining to the government.26 It has
the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination
and to establish the required techniques and methods. 27
Thus, COAs findings are accorded not only respect but also finality,
when they are not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 28 Only upon
a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion may the courts set aside
decisions of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under their special technical knowledge and
training. 29 In this case, the SBN correctly accorded credence to the
COA Report. As will be shown later, the Report can withstand legal
scrutiny.
Initially, petitioner faults the audit team for conducting the investigation
beyond the twenty-one day period stated in the COA Regional Office
Assignment Order No. 91-174 dated January 8, 1991. But this delay
by itself did not destroy the credibility of the Report. Neither was it
sufficient to constitute fraud or indicate bad faith on the part of the
audit team. Indeed, in the conduct of an audit, the length of time the
actual examination occurs is dependent upon the documents involved.
If the documents are voluminous, then it necessarily follows that more
time would be needed. 30 What is important is that the findings of the
audit should be sufficiently supported by evidence.
Petitioner also imputes fraud to the audit team for making "it appear
that the items released by the Division Office of Davao Del Sur on 21
February 1991 were compared with and became the basis for the
purchase of exactly the same items on 20 February 1991." 31
The discrepancy regarding the date when the samples were taken and
the date of the purchase of the same items for comparison was not
very material. The discrepancy per se did not constitute fraud in the
absence of ill motive. We agree with respondents in their claim of
clerical inadvertence. We accept their explanation that the wrong date
was written by the supplier concerned when the items were bought for
comparison. Anyway, the logical sequence of events was clearly
indicated in the COA Report:
"1.5.1. Obtained samples of each laboratory tools and devices
purchased by the Division of Davao del Sur, Memorandum Receipts
covering all the samples were issued by the agency to the audit team
and are marked as Exhibits 1.2 and 3 of this Report."
"1.5.2. Bought and presented these samples to reputable business
establishments in Davao City like Mercury Drug Store, Berovan
Marketing Incorporated and [A]llied Medical Equipment and Supply
Corporation (AMESCO) where these items are also available, for price
verification.
"1.5.3. Available items which were exactly the same as the samples
presented were purchased from AMESCO and Berovan Marketing
Incorporated, the business establishments which quoted the lowest
prices. Official receipts were issued by the AMESCO and Berovan
Marketing Incorporated which are hereto marked as Exhibits 4,5,6 and
7 respectively." 32
The COA team then tabulated the results as follows: 33
What is glaring is the discrepancy in prices. The tabulated figures are
supported by Exhibits "E-1," "E-2," "E-3," and "E-4," the Official
Receipts evidencing the equipment purchased by the audit team for
purposes of comparison with those procured by petitioner. 34 The
authenticity of these Exhibits is not disputed by petitioner. As the SBN
stated in its Decision, the fact of overpricing -- as reflected in the
aforementioned exhibits -- was testified to or identified by Laura S.
Soriano, team leader of the audit team. 35 It is hornbook doctrine that
the findings of the trial court are accorded great weight, since it was
able to observe the demeanor of witnesses firsthand and up
close. 36 In the absence of contrary evidence, these findings are
conclusive on this Court.
It was therefore incumbent on petitioner to prove that the audit team or
any of its members thereof was so motivated by ill feelings against him
that it came up with a fraudulent report. Since he was not able to show
any evidence to this end, his contention as to the irregularity of the
audit due to the discrepancy of the dates involved must necessarily
fail.
An audit is conducted to determine whether the amounts allotted for
certain expenditures were spent wisely, in keeping with official
guidelines and regulations. It is not a witch hunt to terrorize
accountable public officials. The presumption is always that official
duty has been regularly performed 37 -- both on the part of those
involved with the expense allotment being audited and on the part of
the audit team -- unless there is evidence to the contrary.
Due Process
Petitioner likewise invokes Arriola v. Commission on Audit 38 to
support his claim that his right to due process was violated. In that
case, this Court ruled that the disallowance made by the COA was not
sufficiently supported by evidence, as it was based on undocumented
claims. Moreover, in Arriola, the documents that were used as basis of
the COA Decision were not shown to petitioners, despite their
repeated demands to see them. They were denied access to the
actual canvass sheets or price quotations from accredited suppliers.
As the present petitioner pointed out in his Memorandum, the
foregoing jurisprudence became the basis for the COA to issue
Memorandum Order No. 97-012 dated March 31, 1997, which states:
"3.2 To firm up the findings to a reliable degree of certainty, initial
findings of overpricing based on market price indicators mentioned in
pa. 2.1 above have to be supported with canvass sheet and/or price
quotations indicating:
a) the identities of the suppliers or sellers;
b) the availability of stock sufficient in quantity to meet the
requirements of the procuring agency;
c) the specifications of the items which should match those involved in
the finding of overpricing;
d) the purchase/contract terms and conditions which should be the
same as those of the questioned transaction"
Petitioners reliance on Arriola is misplaced. First, that Decision, more
so, the COA Memorandum Order that was issued pursuant to the
former, was promulgated after the period when the audit in the present
case was conducted. Neither Arriola nor the COA Memorandum Order
can be given any retroactive effect.
Second and more important, the circumstances in Arriola are different
from those in the present case. In the earlier case, the COA merely
referred to a cost comparison made by the engineer of COA-Technical
Services Office (TSO), based on unit costs furnished by the Price
Monitoring Division of the COA-TSO. The COA even refused to show
the canvass sheets to the petitioners, explaining that the source
document was confidential.
In the present case, the audit team examined several documents
before they arrived at their conclusion that the subject transactions
were grossly disadvantageous to the government. These documents
were included in the Formal Offer of Evidence submitted to the
Sandiganbayan. 39 Petitioner was likewise presented an opportunity to
controvert the findings of the audit team during the exit conference
held at the end of the audit, but he failed to do so. 40
Further, the fact that only three canvass sheets/price quotations were
presented by the audit team does not bolster petitioners claim that his
right to due process was violated. To be sure, there is no rule stating
that all price canvass sheets must be presented. It is enough that
those that are made the basis of comparison be submitted for scrutiny
to the parties being audited. Indubitably, these documents were
properly submitted and testified to by the principal prosecution
witness, Laura Soriano. Moreover, petitioner had ample opportunity to
controvert them.
Public Bidding
Petitioner oscillates between denying that he was responsible for the
procurement of the questioned SLTDs, on the one hand; and, on the
other, stating that the negotiated purchase was justifiable under the
circumstances.
On his disavowal of responsibility for the questioned procurement, he
claims that the transactions emanated from the Division Office of
Digos headed by Jairal. 41 However, in the administrative case 42 filed
against petitioner before the DECS, it was established that he "gave
the go signal" 43 that prompted the division superintendents to procure
the SLTDs through negotiated purchase. This fact is not disputed by
petitioner, who quotes the same DECS Decision in stating that his
"acts were justifiable under the circumstances then obtaining at that
time and for reasons of efficient and prompt distribution of the SLTDs
to the high schools." 44
In justifying the negotiated purchase without public bidding, petitioner
claims that "any delay in the enrichment of the minds of the public high
school students of Davao del Sur is detrimental and antithetical to
public service." 45Although this reasoning is quite laudable, there was
nothing presented to substantiate it.
Executive Order No. 301 states the general rule that no contract for
public services or for furnishing supplies, materials and equipment to
the government or any of its branches, agencies or instrumentalities
may be renewed or entered into without public bidding. The rule
however, is not without exceptions. Specifically, negotiated contracts
may be entered into under any of the following circumstances:
"a. Whenever the supplies are urgently needed to meet an emergency
which may involve the loss of, or danger to, life and/or property;
"b. Whenever the supplies are to be used in connection with a project
or activity which cannot be delayed without causing detriment to the
public service;
"c. Whenever the materials are sold by an exclusive distributor or
manufacturer who does not have subdealers selling at lower prices
and for which no suitable substitute can be obtained elsewhere at
more advantageous terms to the government;
"d. Whenever the supplies under procurement have been
unsuccessfully placed on bid for at least two consecutive times, either
due to lack of bidders or the offers received in each instance were
exorbitant or non-conforming to specifications;
"e. In cases where it is apparent that the requisition of the needed
supplies through negotiated purchase is most advantageous to the
government to be determined by the Department Head concerned;
"f. Whenever the purchase is made from an agency of the
government." 46
National Center for Mental Health v. Commission on Audit 47 upheld
the validity of the negotiated contracts for the renovation and the
improvement of the National Center for Mental Health. In that case,
petitioners were able to show that the long overdue need to renovate
the Center "made it compelling to fast track what had been felt to be
essential in providing due and proper treatment and care for the
centers patients." 48
This justification was likewise accepted in Baylon v. Ombudsman 49 in
which we recognized that the purchases were made in response to an
emergency brought about by the shortage in the blood supply
available to the public. The shortage was a matter recognized and
addressed by then Secretary of Health Juan M. Flavier, who attested
that "he directed the NKTI [National Kidney and Transplant Institute] to
do something about the situation and immediately fast-track the
implementation of the Voluntary Blood Donation Program of the
government in order to prevent further deaths owing to the lack of
blood." 50
Unfortunately for petitioner, there was no showing of any immediate
and compelling justification for dispensing with the requirement of
public bidding. We cannot accept his unsubstantiated reasoning that a
public bidding would unnecessarily delay the purchase of the SLTDs.
Not only would he have to prove that indeed there would be a delay
but, more important, he would have to show how a public bidding
would be detrimental and antithetical to public service.
As the COA Report aptly states, the law on public bidding is not an
empty formality. It aims to secure the lowest possible price and obtain
the best bargain for the government. It is based on the principle that
under ordinary circumstances, fair competition in the market tends to
lower prices and eliminate favoritism. 51
In this case, the DECS Division Office of Davao del Sur failed to
conduct public bidding on the subject transactions. The procurement
of laboratory tools and devices was consummated with only the
following documents to compensate for the absence of a public
bidding:
"1.13.a Price lists furnished by the Supply Coordination Office
1.13.b. Price lists furnished by the Procurement Services of the
Department of Budget and Management
1.13.c. Price lists of Esteem Enterprises" 52
The COA Report states that the Division Office merely relied on the
above documents as basis for concluding that the prices offered by
DImplacable Enterprises and Jovens Trading were reasonable. But
as found by the COA, reliance on the foregoing supporting documents
was completely without merit on the following grounds:
"a. The Supply Coordination Office was already dissolved or abolished
at the time when the transactions were consummated, thus, it is
illogical for the management to consider the price lists furnished by the
Supply Coordination Office.
"b. The indorsement letter made by the Procurement Services of the
Department of Budget and Management containing the price lists
specifically mentions Griffin and George brands, made in England.
However, the management did not procure these brands of [SLTDs].
"c. The price lists furnished by the Esteem Enterprises does not
deserve the scantest consideration, since there is no law or regulation
specifically mentioning that the price lists of the Esteem Enterprises
will be used as basis for buying [SLTDs]." 53
Granting arguendo that petitioner did not have a hand in the
procurement and that the transactions emanated from the Division
Office of Davao del Sur, we still find him liable as the final approving
authority. In fact, Exhibit "B-2" -- Purchase Order No. 90-024,
amounting to P231,012 and dated December 17, 1990 -- was
recommended by Jairal and approved by petitioner. 54 This exhibit was
part of the evidence adduced in the Sandiganbayan to prove that the
purchase of the SLTDs was consummated and duly paid by the DECS
without any proof of public bidding.
Although this Court has previously ruled 55 that all heads of offices
have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the
good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies or enter into
negotiations, it is not unreasonable to expect petitioner to exercise the
necessary diligence in making sure at the very least, that the proper
formalities in the questioned transaction were observed -- that a public
bidding was conducted. This step does not entail delving into intricate
details of product quality, complete delivery or fair and accurate
pricing.
Unlike other minute requirements in government procurement,
compliance or non-compliance with the rules on public bidding is
readily apparent; and the approving authority can easily call the
attention of the subordinates concerned. To rule otherwise would be to
render meaningless the accountability of high-ranking public officials
and to reduce their approving authority to nothing more than a mere
rubber stamp. The process of approval is not a ministerial duty of
approving authorities to sign every document that comes across their
desks, and then point
to their subordinates as the parties responsible if something goes
awry.
Suspension of Purchases
Obviously working against petitioner is DECS Order No. 100 dated
September 3, 1990 which states thus:
"In view of the Governments call for economy measures coupled with
the deficiency in allotments intended for the payment of salary
standardization, retirement benefits, bonus and other priority items,
the procurement of reference and supplementary materials, tools and
devices equipment, furniture, including land acquisition and land
improvement shall be suspended for CY 1990. However, the following
items shall be exempted from the said suspension:
a) textbooks published by the Instructional Materials Corporation and
its commercial edition;
b) elementary school desks and tablet arm chairs[.]"
As the COA Report succinctly states, the Administrative Order is
explicit in its provisions that tools and devices were among the items
whose procurement was suspended by the DECS for the year 1990.
Petitioner claims that in the administrative case against him, there was
no mention of a violation of DECS Order No. 100. 56 He alleges that
the purchases of SLTDs by the division superintendents were entered
into and perfected on July 1, 1990; that is, more than two (2) months
before the issuance of DECS Order No. 100. He also alleged that the
Sub-Allotment Advice (SAA) to the DECS Regional Office No. XI in the
amount of P9.36M -- out of which P603,265.00 was used for the
procurement of the questioned SLTDs -- had been released by the
DECS Central Office in August 1990, a month before the issuance of
DECS Order No. 100.
The Court notes that these arguments are mere assertions bereft of
any proof. There was no evidence presented to prove that the SAA
was issued prior to the effectivity of DECS Order No. 100. On the
other hand, the COA Report states that the DECS Division of Davao
del Sur received the following Letters of Advice of Allotments (LAA): 57
"LAA NO. AMOUNT DATE OF LAA
DO CO471-774-90 P141,956.00 October 24, 1990
DO-CO471-797-90 P161,309.00 November 16, 1990
DO-CO471-1007-90 P300,000.00 December 14, 1990"
The foregoing LAAs were attached as annexes to the COA Report
58
and were presented during trial in the Sandiganbayan. 59
Also, Schools Division Superintendent Jairal had sent a letter to
petitioner, requesting favorable consideration of a forthcoming release
of funding for the different barangay and municipal high schools. The
letter was dated October 16, 1990, 60 and was made well within the
effectivity of the DECS Order. In that letter, Jairal mentioned the
receipt by his office of DECS Order No. 100, albeit wrongly
interpreting it as suspending only the purchases of reference books,
supplementary readers, and so on, but allegedly silent on the
purchase of laboratory supplies and materials.61
Finally, the SLTDs were purchased within the covered period of DECS
Order No. 100, as evidenced by the following relevant
documents adduced by the COA audit team, among others:
1) Disbursement Voucher dated November 27, 1990 for the payment
of various laboratory supplies and materials by DECS, Davao del Sur
in the amount of P303,29.40 62
2) Official Receipt No. 455 dated January 7, 1991 amounting
to P68,424.00 issued by Jovens Trading 63
3) Report of Inspection dated November 26, 1990 signed by Jacinta
Villareal and Felicisimo Canoy 64
4) Sales Invoice No. 044 dated November 26, 1990 issued by Jovens
Trading in favor of DECS amounting to P303,259.40 65
5) Certificate of Acceptance dated November 27, 1990 signed by
Felicismo Canoy 66
6) Purchase Order No. 90-021 in favor of Jovens Trading dated
November 26, 1990 recommended for approval by Ajatil Jairal 67
7) Official Receipt No. 92356 dated January 7, 1991 issued by
DImplacable Enterprises amounting to P231,012.0068
8) Purchase Order No. 90-024 dated December 17, 1990
recommended for approval by Ajatil Jairal and approved Director
Venancio Nava amounting to P231,012.00." 69
The confluence of the foregoing circumstances indubitably establishes
that petitioner indeed wantonly disregarded regulations. Additionally,
DECS Order No. 100 negates his claim that the negotiated transaction
-- done instead of a public bidding -- was justified. If that Order
suspended the acquisition of tools and devices, then there was all the
more reason for making purchases by public bidding. Since the buying
of tools and devices was specifically suspended, petitioner cannot
argue that the purchases were done in the interest of public service.
Proof of Guilt
To sustain a conviction under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, it
must be clearly proven that 1) the accused is a public officer; 2) the
public officer entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government; and 3) the contract or transaction was grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government. 70
From the foregoing, it is clear that the Sandiganbayan did not err in
ruling that the evidence presented warranted a verdict of conviction.
Petitioner is a public officer, who approved the transactions on behalf
of the government, which thereby suffered a substantial loss. The
discrepancy between the prices of the SLTDs purchased by the DECS
and the samples purchased by the COA audit team clearly established
such undue injury. Indeed, the discrepancy was grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.
We must emphasize however, that the lack of a public bidding and the
violation of an administrative order do not by themselves satisfy the
third element of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3(g); namely, that the
contract or transaction entered into was manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government, as seems to be stated in the
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying the Motion for
Reconsideration. 71 Lack of public bidding alone does not result in a
manifest and gross disadvantage. Indeed, the absence of a public
bidding may mean that the government was not able to secure the
lowest bargain in its favor and may open the door to graft and
corruption. Nevertheless, the law requires that the disadvantage must
be manifest and gross. Penal laws are strictly construed against the
government. 72
If the accused is to be sent to jail, it must be because there is solid
evidence to pin that person down, not because of the omission of a
procedural matter alone. Indeed, all the elements of a violation of
Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 should be established to prove
the culpability of the accused. In this case, there is a clear showing
that all the elements of the offense are present. Thus, there can be no
other conclusion other than conviction.
We note, however, that petitioner was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of six (6) years and one (1) day as minimum to twelve (12) years and
one (1) day as maximum. Under Section 9 of Republic Act 3019,
petitioner should be punished with imprisonment of not less than six
(6) years and one (1) month nor more than fifteen years. Thus, we
adjust the minimum penalty imposed on petitioner in accordance with
the law.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution are AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the
minimum sentence imposed shall be six (6) years and one (1) month,
not six (6) years and one (1) day. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 205316 June 29, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ROMEO DE CASTRO and RANDOLF1 PABANIL, Accused-
Appellants.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal is the May 23, 2012 Decision2
of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04343 affirming appellants' conviction for the
crime of murder.
The factual antecedents:
Eric De Castro (Eric), Roland Pabanil (Roland) and appellants Romeo
De Castro (Romeo) and Randolf Pabanil (Randolf) were charged with
Murder under the following Information:
That on or about the 16th day of August, 2006, in the City of Makati,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with LPG tank, conspiring and
confederating together and all of them mutually helping and aiding one
another, with intent to kill, abuse of superior strength and insult or in
disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and hit on the head with the said LPG Tank one Senior Police Officer
II (SPOII)
Orlando De Leon, a police officer, while in the performance of his
official duties, thereby inflicting upon the latter traumatic and fatal
injuries which caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
When arraigned, the four accused pleaded not guilty. Trial on the
merits ensued.
Evidence for the prosecution established that at around 3 :00 a.m. of
August 16, 2006, Edwin Lonzame (Lonzame ), who works as a baker
at AMM Bakery at Apolinario Street, Bangkal, Makati City, saw the
victim SPOII Orlando De Leon (De Leon) at their bakery buying milk
and bread. A man later identified as Randolf also came to buy from
the bakery. Shortly, another man arrived and punched Randolf. De
Leon pacified them until the man ran away but he continued talking
with Randolf and they had an altercation. At this point, another man,
later identified as Romeo, arrived and hit De Leon on the head. De
Leon fell and was mauled by Randolf, Romeo, Eric and Roland, the
latter two are familiar with Lonzame as they used to stand-by at the
bakery almost everyday being car wash boys in the car wash area
near the bakery.4
While pinned down, De Leon was hit on the face by Randolf with a
stove and gas tank he took from a nearby store. De Leon tried to
stand up but Romeo prevented him from doing so and they grappled
for possession of De Leon's service firearm. The said gun went off,
and shortly Romeo again took it and pointed the gun at De Leon.
When the gun did not fire, Romeo hit De Leon's head with the gun,
dragged him to the street and left. De Leon was again mauled by
Randolf, Eric and Roland who took turns in hitting him with a gas
stove. When Romeo returned, he picked up the gas tank and dropped
it on De Leon's face.5
In the morning of the same day, all four accused were arrested and De
Leon's service firearm was surrendered to the arresting officer, Randy
Laman Ozo.6
In the meantime, Eric died and the case against him was dismissed.7
Dr. Voltaire Nulud of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory
testified that, based on his autopsy and medico-legal report, De Leon
died of intracranial hemorrhages and sustained traumatic head injuries
caused by a heavy, solid material.8
The defense gave a different version of the incident. Randolf testified
that in the morning of August 16, 2006, he was drinking with his
brother, Roland and cousins Romeo and Eric, and with another friend
they call "Kabayo" in the interior of Apolinario Street. Around 2:30
a.m., he went out to buy cigarettes at AMM Bakery and saw a man
(De Leon) talking to Liezl, the bakery's saleslady who is his (Randolfs)
textmate. When Liezl finally attended to him, another man in white
sando approached and hit him at the back of his ear and ran away. He
went after said man but he met De Leon who told him "Siga ka ba
rito?" De Leon then poked his gun at him, kicked him and told him to
go home. He went back to his drinking session and told Romeo that
he was punched at the bakery. Romeo went to the place of the
punching incident and he tried to stop Romeo, warning the latter that
one of the men at the bakery had a gun. After five minutes, he
followed Romeo and saw him in front of the bakery having an
altercation with De Leon who was trying to draw his gun. He then
approached De Leon slowly from the side so De Leon would not see
him, thinking that De Leon would shoot Romeo. De Leon fell after he
hit him. Romeo then held De Leon's hand and he punched the man
three times. The gun fired and he hit De Leon with a gas tank. When
he was about to hit De Leon a third time, Roland arrived, took the gas
tank from him, and told him to go home.9 He then stood up and took
the gun from Eric. They left De Leon unconscious and bloodied.
Romeo gave similar statements as that of Randolf. He had a heated punched him and not because he was threatened by De Leon's gun.
conversation with De Leon, they were hurling invectives.1wphi1 He And if it was indeed the threat of a gun which prompted appellants to
testified that Randolf approached De Leon as the latter was trying to hit De Leon, there was no more unlawful aggression when Randolf
pull his gun.10 repeatedly attacked De Leon. The CA also said that Romeo admitted
he already had possession of the gun when appellant Randolf
repeatedly hit De Leon with a gas tank. If De Leon was the aggressor,
On the part of Roland, he testified that he had nothing to do with the
De Leon's aggression ceased the moment he was disarmed. When
killing but merely pacified De Leon and his brother Randolf whom he
Randolf repeatedly hit De Leon who had no more weapon and had
saw trying to hit De Leon with a gas tank. However, he failed to submit
fallen, there is thus no more self-defense or defense of a relative, said
his counter-affidavit during the preliminary investigation.
the CA. The CA further noted that De Leon's skull was broken into
small pieces and held that the severity of De Leon's injuries reveals
In its Decision11 dated December 4, 2009 in Criminal Case No. 06- that the force used against him by appellants was not reasonable to
1675, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 66, found disarm him or prevent him from harming others.
appellants guilty of murder. They were sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay De Leon's heirs 12,000 as
But while the CA agreed with appellants that the prosecution failed to
burial expenses, 50,000 as life indemnity, 50,000 as moral and
prove the circumstance of disregard of the respect due on account of
exemplary damages, and costs. Roland Pabanil was acquitted.12
De Leon's rank, it nevertheless ruled that abuse of superior strength is
present in this case. The CA said that De Leon was already helpless
In their appeal before the CA, appellants argued that the R TC erred in when he was repeatedly attacked with a gas tank.
considering the qualifying circumstances of abuse of superior strength
and disregard of the respect due on account of De Leon's rank.13 They
Hence, this appeal. Appellants filed a manifestation in lieu of
pointed out that the prosecution failed to prove the qualifying
supplemental brief.16
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. They claimed that Randolf
punched De Leon as he thought the latter was about to shoot Romeo.
When De Leon fell and drew his gun, Randolf was forced to get the Did the CA err in affirming appellants' conviction for the crime of
LPG tank and hit De Leon with it. Appellants also argue that at the murder?
time of the incident, they did not know that De Leon is a police
officer.14
We rule in the negative.
The CA denied the appeal and affirmed with modification the RTC
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, defines the crime
Decision. Thefallo of the assailed CA Decision reads:
of murder, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision
ART. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions
dated December 4, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be
Branch 66 in Crim. Case No. 06-1675, which found ROMEO DE
punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the
CASTRO alias "Omeng" and RANDOLF PABANIL alias "Oloy"
following attendant circumstances:
GUILTY of MURDER and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION in that the amount of 12,000.00 as interment and 1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid
burial expenses to be awarded [to] the heirs of Sr. Police Officer II of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of
Orlando De Leon shall be DELETED. The amount of civil indemnity to means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
be awarded [to] the heirs of SPO II De Leon shall also be increased
from 50,000.00 to 75,000.00. In addition, Appellants ROMEO DE
CASTRO and RANDOLF P ABANIL are ORDERED to pay the heirs of x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
SPO II De Leon moral damages in the amount of 50,000.00,
exemplary damages in the amount of 30,000.00 and temperate To be convicted of murder, the following must be established: (1) a
damages in the amount of 25,000.00. All awards shall further incur person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was with
interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date the attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances under Article
of finality of this Decision until fully paid. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; and ( 4) the killing
neither constitutes parricide nor infanticide.17
SO ORDERED.15
In this case, the foregoing elements of the crime of murder were duly
established. De Leon was killed. Appellants killed him. De Leon's
The CA agreed with the R TC that appellants failed to prove the
elements of defense of a relative. The CA noted that there was no killing was attended by abuse of superior strength, one of the
qualifying circumstances under Article 248 ( 1) of the Revised Penal
unlawful aggression on the part of De Leon. In fact, Randolf hit De
Leon because he thought that De Leon was with the man who Code, as amended. De Leon's killing is not parricide or infanticide. In
fact, appellants do not dispute the first, second and fourth elements.
They merely questioned the second element, the presence of the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
To take advantage of superior strength is to purposely use excessive
force, out of proportion to the means of defense available to the
person attacked. Is We agree with the CA that the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present in this case. As
aptly pointed out by the CA, De Leon was already helpless when he
was repeatedly attacked with a gas tank. Appellants clearly used
excessive force against the already unarmed and defenseless De
Leon. This is clear from Romeo's own testimony:
Q - You said that your cousin Randolf Pabanil came, where did he
come from?
A - From behind, sir.
Q - From behind of whom?
A - Behind the man wearing leather jacket, sir.
xxxx
Q - x x x what did Randolf do to this man?
A - He suddenly punched the man behind his ear, sir.
Q - So what happened to the man wearing leather jacket?
A - He went off balance but he was able to draw his gun.
Q - Now, what did you do next, Mr. Witness?
A - I was able to grab the gun and then Randolf punched the man 3
times.
Q - You said you were able to get hold the gun and you also said that
Randolf was able to punch that man, how many times he punched that
man?
A - Two or three times, sir.
Q - Now what happened after Mr. Randolf Pabanil punched him 2 to 3
times, what happened next, Mr. Witness?
A - Nabitawan ko yong baril.
Q - Mr. Witness, you said that the man wearing leather jacket was
able to draw the gun and you said that you were able to get hold of
this, you likewise stated that Mr. Randolf Pabanil punched him while
he was still holding the gun, now what happened after this?
A - The gun went-off sir.
Q - Now, was there anything that was hit by this gunshot?
A - None, sir.
Q - Now, after the gun went-off what happened next?
A - The man dropped his gun and then Randolf got the gas tank and
hit him on his neck.
Q - After the gun was dropped what did you do next Mr. Witness?
A - I took the gun, sir.
Q- Now, while you are holding the gun what was Mr. Randolf Pabanil
doing?
A - He hit the man another (sic) times, sir.
Q - What did he hit the man with?
A - LPG gas tank, sir.
Q - So all in all how many time[s] did Randolf Pabanil hit the man with
the LPG gas tank?
A - Twice, sir.19 (Emphasis supplied)
And as testified to by Lonzame, after the accused left, appellant
Romeo returned, picked up the gas tank and dropped it to De Leon.20
Indeed, the justifying circumstances of self-defense or defense of a
relative cannot be appreciated in favor of appellants. Article 11 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, reads: ART. 11. Justifying
circumstances. - The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that
the following circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse,
ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural, or adopted brothers
or sisters or of his relatives by affinity in the same degrees, and those
by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first
and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstance
are present, and the further requisite, in case the provocation was
given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no
part therein.
xxxx
Unlawful aggression is the condition sine qua non for the justifying
circumstances of self-defense and defense of a relative.21 Here, we
agree with the CA that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of
De Leon. Randolf himself testified that he hit De Leon because he
thought that De Leon was with the man who punched him and not
because he was threatened by De Leon's gun, to wit:
Atty. Villalon:
Why did you hit him, Mr. Witness?
Witness:
Because I thought he was with the guy who punched me, sir.
xxxx
Atty. Villalon:
So what did you think when you saw Mr. Orlando de Leon holding his
gun and cursing your cousin and telling him not to come near him,
what did you think?
Witness:
Nothing, sir, I just thought of hitting him, sir.
Atty. Villalon:
Why?
Witness:
Because I thought that he was the one who ordered that I would be
hit, sir.22
As to the award of damages, the CA correctly awarded 75,000 as
civil indemnity, 50,000 as moral damages, 30,000 as exemplary
damages and 25,000 as temperate damages. The award of 6%
interest per annum on the monetary awards from the date of finality of
this Decision until fully paid is also correct.23
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal and AFFIRM the May 23,
2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
04343.
With costs against the accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 208623 July 23, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
VIRGILIO ANTONIO y RIVERA, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
For review1 is the Decision2 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) on
October 8, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04149 affirming, albeit with
modification8 as to the damages imposed, the Judgment3 dated
September 4, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao
City, Branch 4, in Criminal Case Nos. 10244-10245, convicting Virgilio
Antonio y Rivera (accused-appellant) of two counts of Rape committed
against AAA,4 a minor.
Antecedents
Two separate informations for rape were filed against the accused-
appellant before the RTC, viz:
Criminal Case No. 10244
That on or about and sometime in the year 2001, in the Municipality of
Alcala, Cagayan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, VI[R]GILIO ANTONIO, with lewd design and by the use
of force, threat, and intimidation, did [then] and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the offended
party, [AAA], a minor 14 years of age5 against her will.
That in the commission of the offense[,] the aggravating circumstance
of uninh[a]bited place was present.
Contrary [to law].6
Criminal Case No. 10245
That on or about August 26, 2003, in the Municipality of Alcala,
Province of Cagayan[,] within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, VIRGILIO ANTONIO,being then the guardian of the
private complainant [AAA], a minor 14 years of age[,] who was then
under his care and custody[,] with lewddesign and by the use of force,
threat and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with the offended party, [AAA], a
minor 14 years of [age] against her will.
Contrary to law.7
The accused-appellant entered a not guilty plea during the
arraignment.
On February 23, 2005, pre-trial was conducted. The prosecution
proposed for the parties to stipulate on the following, which the
defense admitted: (a) the identity of the accused-appellant; (b) his
relationship as AAAs godfather; (c) the dates, times and places of the
commission of rape; and (d) AAAs minority at the time the crimes
were allegedly perpetrated.8
The prosecution marked and offered: (a) AAAs birth certificate
indicating that she was born on May 28,1989; (b) the medicolegal
certificate dated September 2,2003, which was preparedby Dr. Rafael
Sumabat (Dr. Sumabat); and (c) AAAs affidavit. The defense, on its
part, offered no documentary evidence.9
In the joint trial that ensued, the prosecution offered the testimonies of
AAA and Dr. Sumabat. On the other hand, the accused-appellant was
the defenses lone witness.
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) aptly summed up the
prosecutions version of the events as follows:
In March of 2001, eleven[-]year old [AAA] began living with [accused-
appellants] family in Maraburab, Alcala, Cagayan Province after her
parents had separated. [Accused-appellant] and his wife, Rose, are
[AAAs] godparents[,] who treated her as one of their own children x x
x. Sometime in April 2001, [accused-appellant], who maintains a farm
in the highlands of Cagayan, asked [AAA] to help him harvest palay
there. Alone together, [accused-appellant] and [AAA], started for the
farm very early that April morning. After an hours walk, they reached
the place and immediately began to harvest palay x x x.
Just before lunch time, [accused-appellant] led [AAA] to a bamboo
grove within the farm. Once there, hethreatened to kill her if she told
anyone regarding what he was about to do. [Accused-appellant] lost
no time in making [AAA] lie down. After which, he took off her shorts
and underwear. Although very much alarmed, he likewise removed his
own shorts and underwear. [AAA] could not do anything as she was
afraid because they were alone x x x.
With both their private parts now uncovered, [accused-appellant]
inserted his penis into [AAAs] vagina. She felt pain course through her
genitals. Helpless, [AAA] could only cry and mutter "aray". After
awhile, she felt liquid emitting from [accused-appellants] penis.
Satiated, [accused-appellant] threatened [AAA] with death once again
if she reveals to anyone that he had abused her. They went home
later that afternoon. Fearful of [accused-appellants] threat, [AAA] did
not dare to reveal to anyone regarding her ordeal and went on to stay
with [accused-appellant] and his family x x x.
On the evening of August 26, 2003, Rose Antonio, together with her
two children with [accused-appellant], went to the town proper of
Alcala to celebrate its fiesta. [AAA]and [accused-appellant] were left
alone in the house on that night. She went to bed around eight in the
evening. However, around 10PM, she was awakened by the weight of
[accused-appellant] bearing down on her body. [Accused-appellant]
was wearing a shirt and nothing else. She realized to her horror that
her shorts and underwear had already been removed. [Accused-
appellant] soon began to insert his penis into her vagina. He made a
push-pull movement for awhile. [AAA] was not able to shout a single
word inside the room which had no light on x x x.
[In] the morning of August 27, 2003, May Dumalay, [accused-
appellants] niece, confronted[AAA] regarding her suspicions that
something happened between her and [accused-appellant]. [AAA]
finally admitted that [accused-appellant] had raped her. May Dumalay
then told [accused-appellants] wife, Rose Antonio what [AAA] related
to her. In turn, Rose Antonio told [AAAs] father regarding the
unfortunate developments. When her father and the barangay captain
of Maraburab confronted [AAA], she told all the incidents of sexual
abuse committed by [accused-appellant] x x x.
On August 28, 2003, Barangay Captain Rey De Luna of Maraburab
accompanied [AAA] to the local office of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD). After being interviewed, [AAA]
was brought to the police station in Alcala[,] Cagayan x x x.
Eventually, she was examined by the Medico-legal Officer of Alcala,
Dr. Rafael Sumabat x x x. His findings on [AAA] were: 1) On
examination[,] abdomen is soft, palpable mass noted. External
genitalia and thighs are normal. No evidence of trauma; 2) On
examination of genitalia, there are old lacerations of hymen at 3-6-9
oclock respectively; 3) Vagina admits one finger easily and presence
of whitish secretions inside vagina. Pregnancy test negative x x x.10
Version of the Defense
The accused-appellant was vehement in denying the charges against
him. He insisted that AAA only started living with them in May of 2002.
Hence, he could not have perpetrated the rape ascribed to him which
allegedly occurred in April of 2001. As to what transpired in August of
2003, he narrated that Rose, his wife, and AAA left their house to
attend a town fiesta on August 25, 2003. The two returned home
drunk on August 28, 2003. Rose and the accused-appellant then had
a fight because the latter received an information that the former and
AAA had a male companion while attending the town festivities. Rose
and AAA denied the accusation, which irked the accused-appellant,
who in turn ordered the two to leave their house.11
Ruling of the RTC
On September 4, 2009, the RTC rendered a Judgment12 convicting the
accused-appellant of two counts of rape. The trial court found that
AAA had no ill motive to testify against the accused-appellant, whom
she had considered as her guardian or foster father. Further, AAAs
testimony as to the sordid acts committedby the accused-appellant
was spontaneous and categorical, and her statements were
corroborated by Dr. Sumabats medical findings. On the other hand,
the accused-appellants defenses of denial and alibiwere weak and
could not prevail over AAAs positive testimony. The dispositive
portion of the RTC decision thus reads:
ACCORDINGLY, accused VIRGILIO ANTONIOy Rivera is hereby
found GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape for two
(2) counts, in Criminal Case Nos. 10244 and 10245 defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act 7659 and further amended by Republic Act No. 8353;
and Article 266 (A) No. 1 in relation to Article 266 (B) No. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in
each case; to pay [AAA] the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND ([P]150,000[.00]) PESOS as civil indemnity,
ONEHUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND ([P]150,000.00) PESOS as moral
damages and FIFTY THOUSAND ([P]50,000.00) PESOS as
exemplary damages.
The preventive imprisonment of the accused shall be credited in full in
his favor if he abided in writing by the rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.13
The Contending Parties Arguments Before the CA
The accused-appellant challenged the above disquisition before the
CA. He pointed out that according to AAA herself, Dr. Sumabat
performed a physical examination on her on August 29, 2003, or three
days after the alleged second rape incident occurred. However, this
did not complement Dr. Sumabats explanation that the healed
lacerations at "3-6-9 oclock" positions could have been inflicted at
least seven days prior to the examination. The accused-appellant
further claimed that it was unusual for a rape victim, whose virtue was
allegedly at stake, not to have (a) shouted at all to repel the sexual
advances, (b) tried to escape when she had the chance to do so, and
(c) prevented at all cost that she be left alone in the company of her
assailant.14
The OSG, on its part, argued that AAAs failure to shout during the
rape incidents should not affect the credibility of her claims. AAA was
then a minor, and understandably, she must have been overcome by
feelings of helplessness especially since her assailant is her godfather
and de facto guardian. AAA likewise cried during the trial dispelling
insinuations that her testimony was rehearsed.15
Ruling of the CA
On October 8, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision16 affirming the
accused-appellants conviction and imposing upon him the penalty of
reclusion perpetuafor each of the two counts ofrape. However, for
each count, the CA reduced the award of (a) civil indemnity to
50,000.00, (b) moral damages to 50,000.00, and (c) exemplary
damages to 30,000.00.
The CA declared that any inconsistency in AAAs testimony anent the
date she was examined by Dr. Sumabat was not enough to destroy
her credibility. As a child witness, she cannot be expected to perfectly
remember all the details of her harrowing experience. Besides, Dr.
Sumabat merely made nothing more but a rough estimate that AAAs
hymenal lacerations could have been inflicted at least seven days
prior to the examination. Citing People v. Corpuz,17 the CA
emphasized that AAA was intimidated by the accused-appellant and
her alleged lack of resistance did not signify voluntariness or consent
to the sexual advances.
Anent the appreciation of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the
informations, the CA slightly differed from the RTC in the following
wise:
In Our review of the penalty imposed on [accused-appellant], We have
noted that the trial court considered the qualifying aggravating
circumstance of relationship, since [accused-appellant] is supposedly
the guardian of [AAA].
In People v. Flores, the Supreme Court held that the guardian must be
a person who has legal relationship with his ward. The court adhered
to the theory that a guardian must beone who has been legally
appointed.
In this case, however, We note withgreat significance that the fact of
being a guardian was not alleged inthe Informations as a qualifying
aggravating circumstance. Instead, there was merely a stipulation
during the pre-trial hearing that accused-appellant was the "godfather"
of [AAA], without showing that accused-appellantwas legally
constituted in law as the "guardian" of [AAA]. On the other hand, the
factof minority of [AAA] has been proven by her birth certificate and
confirmed by her physical appearance.
Consequently, on the first count of rape, We find the existence of the
aggravating circumstances of minority of [AAA] and commission of the
sexual abuse in an uninhabited place. On the second count of rape,
We find the fact of minority of [AAA] as the sole aggravating
circumstance. Both crimes are penalized by Reclusion Perpetua.
However, We shall reduce the award of civil indemnity from
75,000.00 to 50,000.00 and moral damages from 75,000.00 to
50,000.00, for each count of rape since accused-appellantis only
guilty of simple rape. On the other hand, the award of exemplary
damages in the amount of 25,000.00 should be increased to
30,000.00, for each count of rape in line with the recent
jurisprudence, to set an example for public good.18 (Citations omitted)
Issue
Aggrieved, the accused-appellant is now before this Court once again
insisting on his innocence and reiterating the issue of whether or not
his guilt for allegedly having raped AAA on two separateoccasions
was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The accused-appellant and the OSG both dispensed with the filing of
supplemental briefs and merely adoptedtheir respective arguments
raised before the CA.
 Ruling of the Court
The Court affirms the CAs verdict, but modifies the same by imposing
interests upon the damages awarded to AAA.
"It is a fundamental rule that the trial courts factual findings, especially
its assessment of the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great
weight and respect and binding upon thisCourt, particularly when
affirmed by the [CA]. This Court has repeatedly recognized that the
trial court is in the best position to assess the credibilityof witnesses
and their testimonies because of its unique position of having
observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses
deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied
tothe appellate courts. Only the trial judge can observe the furtive
glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering
tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath. These
are significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses, in the
process of unearthing the truth. The appellate courts will generally not
disturb such findings unless it plainly overlooked certain facts of
substance and value that, if considered, mightaffect the result of the
case."19
"For conviction to be had in the crime of rape, the following elements
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that the accused had
carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished
(a) through the use of force or intimidation; or (b) when the victim is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) when the victim is
twelve years of age, or is demented."20
"[I]n rape through force or intimidation, the force employed by the
guilty party need not be irresistible. Itis only necessary that such force
is sufficient to consummate the purpose for which it was inflicted.
Similarly, intimidation should be evaluated in light of the victims
perception at the time of the commission of the crime. Itis enough that
it produced the fear in the mind of the victim that if she did not yield to
the bestial demands of her ravisher, some evil would happen to her at
that moment or even thereafter. Hence, what is important is that
because of force and intimidation, the victim was made to submit to
the will of the appellant."21
In the case at bar, the Court findsthe RTC and CAs factual findings as
sufficiently supported by evidence and jurisprudence.
The following is AAAs account of the rape incident which happened in
April of 2001:
Q: What was that incident thathappened while you and your ninong
were in the mountain?
A: We went in the bamboo groves, sir.
Q: And when you reached the bamboo groves, what happened there[,]
madam witness?
COURT: Make it of record that the witness started crying.
A: My ninong threatened me, sir.
Q: How did he threaten you?
A: He told me that he will kill me if I will report the matter to anybody,
sir.
Q: After he uttered those threatening words to you, what happened
next if there was any?
A: He laid me down, sir.
Q: After that[,] what happened next when he laid you down?
A: After he laid me down, he removed my short pants and my
underwear and after that[,] he removed his pants and brief, sir.
Q: When he was removing his pants and brief, why did you not ran
(sic) away?
A: Because I was afraid because nobody was there[.] [W]e do (sic) not
have any companion, sir.
Q: After removing his pants and brief, what happened next?
A: He inserted his private part into my vagina, sir.
Q: What was your position when he inserted his penis in your
vagina[?]
A: I was lying down, sir.22
AAA likewise recounted the second rape incident, which occurred on
August 26, 2003, viz:
Q: You said that you were left behind in the house of your uncle the
night of August 26, 2003[.][W]hat time[,] if you can still recall[,] when
you went to bed to sleep?
A: 8:00 oclock, sir.
Q: How about your ninong Virgilio Antonio[?] [W]here was he when
you went to sleep[,] madam witness?
A: He also went to sleep, sir.
Q: Do you recall if your sleep was interrupted?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What time [was that] when you were awaken? (sic)
A: About 10:00 oclock in the evening, sir.
Q: Why, what happened during that night?
A: When I woke up, I noticed thatmy ninong was on top of me, sir.
Q: Can you describe his appearance when he was on top of you?
A: He moved in a push and pull position.
Q: Was he with his pants at that time?
A: He has (sic) his t-shirt but he was naked down.
Q: What were you wearing when you slept that night?
A: T-shirt and underwear, sir.
Q: What about your clothing[?] [W]hat happened with your clothing?
A: When I woke up[,] I [no longer had] my short[s] and panty.
Q: When you noticed that you werealready naked, did you not shout?
A: I shouted, sir.
Q: What did you utter when you shouted?
A: I did not shout, sir.
Q: Aside from noticing that you were naked down, what did you
notice?
A: He inserted his penis in my vagina, sir.
Q: How long did he insert his penis in your vagina?
A: I cannot remember because I was sleeping at that time, sir.
Q: Can you describe his body movementwhen he inserted his penis in
your vagina?
A: He was doing the push and pull movement[,] sir.23
"The eloquent testimony of the victim, coupled with the medical
findings attesting to her non-virgin state, should be enough to confirm
the truth of her charges."24
AAAs testimonies on the two rape incidents were impressively
straightforward and categorical.1wphi1 In April of 2001, while in the
farm up in the mountain, the accused-appellant threatened her with
death. Against her will, he succeeded in having carnal knowledge of
her. In her statements regarding the second rape incident on August
26, 2003, AAA did not mention that the accused-appellant threatened
to kill her. Nonetheless, the accused-appellants moral ascendancy
over AAA takes the place of the force and intimidation that is required
in rape cases.25 It is expected that for a minor like AAA, fear and
memories from her previous harrowing experience already loomed
over her. They weremore than enough to cow her to submission at the
time of the second rapeincident. This is especially true here where the
accused-appellant is AAAs own godfather and de facto guardian.
In the physical examination performed after the second rape incident, with MODIFICATION that Virgilio Antonio y Rivera is directed to pay
Dr. Sumabat found lacerations in AAAs hymen.1wphi1 The accused- interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum on all the damages
appellant alleged that there were inconsistencies in the dates of the awarded to AAA, to be computed from the date of the finality of this
commission of the crime, on one hand, and the conduct of the physical judgment until fully paid.
examination, on the other. However, this stance, taken together with SO ORDERED.
the accused-appellants uncorroborated defenses of denial and alibi,
pales vis--visAAAs positive testimony and the medical evidence
which prove that, indeed, AAAs hymen sustained lacerations, albeit
healed. As we held in People v. Laog,26
Discrepancies referring only to minordetails and collateral matters
not to the central fact of the crimedo not affect the veracity or detract
from the essential credibility of witnesses declarations, as long as
these are coherent and intrinsically believable on the whole. For a
discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as
a basis for acquittal, it must establish beyond doubt the innocence of
the appellant for the crime charged. It cannot be overemphasized that
the credibility of a rape victim is not diminished, let alone impaired, by
minor inconsistencies in her testimony.27 (Citations omitted)
The Court agrees with the CAs findings that only the generic
aggravating circumstances of commission of the crime in an
uninhabited place and minority can be appreciated relative to the first
rape incident. As regards the second rape incident, guardianship was
alleged in the information28 and was not assailed by the defense. The
Court notes, too, that the parties stipulated during the pre-trial that the
accused-appellant was AAAs godfather.29 Notwithstanding the
foregoing, jurisprudence strictly dictates that the guardian must be a
person who has a legal relationship with his ward,30 which does not
obtain in the case before this Court. Ineluctably, guardianship cannot
be considered as a qualifying circumstance and the accused-appellant
can only be convicted of simple rape.
Nonetheless, this Court sustains the penalty of reclusion perpetua
imposed by the RTC and CA on the accused-appellant for each of the
two counts of rape which he committed. The aggravating
circumstances of minority31 and commission of the crime in an
uninhabited place were present as regards the first rape incident. The
second rape was,on the other hand, aggravated by minority alone
since legal guardianship was not proven. The aggravating
circumstances attendant in the instant case are all merely generic and
not qualifying. Generic aggravating circumstances increase the
penalty for the crime to its maximum period, but it cannot increase the
same o the next higher degree.32 In the accused-appellant's case, the
two counts of rape were committed through the use of force and
intimidation. The crime falls under Article 266-A(l)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code. Article 266-B of the same code provides that the said
crime is punishable by reclusion perpetua, which is an indivisible
penalty. Therefore, despite the attendance of generic aggravating
circumstances, the penalty imposable upon the accused-appellant for
each count of rape remains the same.
In precis, the Court finds no compelling ground to reverse the
accused-appellant's conviction for two counts of simple rape by both
the RTC and the CA. The Court likewise finds proper the CA's
modification of the amount of civil indemnity and damages imposed by
the RTC. However, to conform to prevailing jurisprudence, an interest
of six percent (6%) per annum on all the damages awarded shall be
imposed, to be computed from the date of the finality of this judgment
until fully paid.33
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated October 8, 2012, in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04149, is AFFIRMED
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
"Among the duties assumed by the husband are his duties to love,
cherish and protect his wife, to give her a home, to provide her with
the comforts and the necessities of life within his means, to treat her
kindly and not cruelly or inhumanely. He is bound to honor her x x x; it
is his duty not only to maintain and support her, but also to protect her
from oppression and wrong."1
REYES, J.:
Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies. Sexual
intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is
rape. This is the clear State policy expressly legislated in Section 266-
A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
The Case
This is an automatic review2 of the Decision3 dated July 9, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353, which affirmed
the Judgment4 dated April 1, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, in Criminal Case Nos. 99-668 and
99-669 convicting him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count.
The Facts
Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK,5 were married on October 18,
1975. They Ii ved together since then and raised their four (4)
children6 as they put up several businesses over the years.
On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit,7 alleging
that her husband, the accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of
December 3, 1998 at their residence in Phase 2, Villa Ernesto, Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-
appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.
On June 11, 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de
Oro City issued a Joint Resolution,8 finding probable cause for grave
threats, less serious physical injuries and rape and recommending that
the appropriate criminal information be filed against the accused-
appellant.
On July 16, 1999, two Informations for rape were filed before the RTC
respectively docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-6689 and Criminal
Case No. 99-669.10 The Information in Criminal Case No. 99-668
charged the accused-appellant as follows:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 9,
1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by
means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, her
[sic] wife, against the latter[']s will.
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
Meanwhile the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-669 reads:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 10,
1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by
means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, her
[sic] wife, against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
The accused-appellant was arrested upon a warrant issued on July
21, 1999.11 On August 18, 1999, the accused-appellant filed a Motion
for Reinvestigation,12 which was denied by the trial court in an
Order13 dated August 19, 1999. On even date, the accused-appellant
was arraigned and he entered a plea of not guilty to both charges.14
On January 10, 2000, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit
Amended Information15 averring that the name of the private
complainant was omitted in the original informations for rape. The
motion also stated that KKK, thru a Supplemental Affidavit dated
November 15, 1999,16 attested that the true dates of commission of
the crime are October 16, 1998 and October 1 7, 1998 thereby
modifying the dates stated in her previous complaint-affidavit. The
motion was granted on January 18, 2000.17 Accordingly, the criminal
informations were amended as follows:
Criminal Case No. 99-668:
That on or about October 16, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
the private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.18
Criminal Case No. 99-669:
That on or about October 17, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
the private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.19
The accused-appellant was thereafter re-arraigned. He maintained his
not guilty plea to both indictments and a joint trial of the two cases
forthwith ensued.
Version of the prosecution
The prosecution's theory was anchored on the testimonies of KKK,
and her daughters MMM and 000, which, together with pertinent
physical evidence, depicted the following events:
KKK met the accused-appellant at the farm of her parents where his
father was one of the laborers. They got married after a year of
courtship.20 When their first child, MMM, was born, KKK and the
accused-appellant put up a sari-sari store.21 Later on, they engaged in
several other businesses -trucking, rice mill and hardware. KKK
managed the businesses except for the rice mill, which, ideally, was
under the accused-appellant's supervision with the help of a trusted
employee. In reality, however, he merely assisted in the rice mill
business by occasionally driving one of the trucks to haul goods.22
Accused-appellant's keenness to make the businesses flourish was
not as fervent as KKK's dedication. Even the daughters observed the
disproportionate labors of their parents.23 He would drive the trucks
sometimes but KKK was the one who actively managed the
businesses.24
She wanted to provide a comfortable life for their children; he, on the
other hand, did not acquiesce with that objective.25
In 1994, KKK and the accused-appellant bought a lot and built a
house in Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.26 Three of the
children transferred residence therein while KKK, the accused-
appellant and one of their sons stayed in Dangcagan, Bukidnon. She
shuttled between the two places regularly and sometimes he
accompanied her.27 In 1998, KKK stayed in Gusa, Cagayan De Oro
City most of the days of the week.28 On Wednesdays, she went to
Dangcagan, Bukidnon to procure supplies for the family store and then
returned to Cagayan de Oro City on the same day.29
Conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between KKK
and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling.
He treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal degree
of enthusiasm.30However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He
would immediately remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert
her penis in her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was
physically painful for her so she would resist his sexual ambush but he
would threaten her into submission.31
In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started quarrelling usually
upon his complaint that she failed to attend to him. She was
preoccupied with financial problems in their businesses and a bank
loan. He wanted KKK to stay at home because "a woman must stay in
the house and only good in bed (sic) x x x." She disobeyed his wishes
and focused on her goal of providing a good future for the children.32
Four days before the subject rape incidents or on October 12, 1998,
KKK and the accused-appellant slept together in Cebu City where the
graduation rites of their eldest daughter were held. By October 14,
1998, the three of them were already back in Cagayan de Oro City.33
On October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant, his wife KKK and their
children went about their nightly routine. The family store in their
residence was closed at about 9:00 p.m. before supper was taken.
Afterwards, KKK and the children went to the girls' bedroom at the
mezzanine of the house to pray the rosary while the accused-
appellant watched television in the living room.34 OOO and MMM then
prepared their beds. Soon after, the accused-appellant fetched KKK
and bid her to come with him to their conjugal bedroom in the third
floor of the house. KKK complied.35
Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the
matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant
and instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive
behavior prompted him to ask angrily: "[W]hy are you lying on the
c{o]t[?]", and to instantaneously order: "You transfer here [to] our
bed."36
KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache
and abdominal pain due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons
did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted
the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor.
Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and
transferred to the bed.37
The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long,
expressed his desire to copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her
lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and reiterating that
she was not feeling well.38
The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when
KKK tried to resist by holding on to her panties, he pulled them down
so forcefully they tore on the sides.39 KKK stayed defiant by refusing to
bend her legs.40
The accused-appellant then raised KKK's daster,41 stretched her legs
apart and rested his own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away
but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As he was
carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by
desperately shouting: "[D]on 't do that to me because I'm not feeling
well."42
With a concrete wall on one side and a mere wooden partition on the
other enclosing the spouses' bedroom,43KKK's pleas were audible in
the children's bedroom where MMM lay awake.
Upon hearing her mother crying and hysterically shouting: "Eddie,
don't do that to me, have pity on me,"44 MMM woke up 000 who
prodded her to go to their parents' room.45 MMM hurriedly climbed
upstairs, vigorously knocked on the door of her parents' bedroom and
inquired: "Pa, why is it that Mama is crying?"46 The accused-appellant
then quickly put on his briefs and shirt, partly opened the door and
said: "[D]on 't interfere because this is a family trouble," before closing
it again.47 Since she heard her mother continue to cry, MMM ignored
his father's admonition, knocked at the bedroom door again, and then
kicked it.48 A furious accused-appellant opened the door wider and
rebuked MMM once more: "Don't interfere us. Go downstairs because
this is family trouble!" Upon seeing KKK crouching and crying on top of
the bed, MMM boldly entered the room, approached her mother and
asked: "Ma, why are you crying?" before asking her father: "Pa, what
happened to Mama why is it that her underwear is torn[?]"49
When MMM received no definite answers to her questions, she helped
her mother get up in order to bring her to the girls' bedroom. KKK then
picked up her tom underwear and covered herself with a
blanket.50 However, their breakout from the room was not easy. To
prevent KKK from leaving, the accused-appellant blocked the doorway
by extending his arm towards the knob. He commanded KKK to
"[S]tay here, you sleep in our room," when the trembling KKK pleaded:
"Eddie, allow me to go out." He then held KKK's hands but she pulled
them back. Determined to get away, MMM leaned against door and
embraced her mother tightly as they pushed their way out.51
In their bedroom, the girls gave their mother some water and queried
her as to what happened.52 KKK relayed: "[Y]our father is an animal, a
beast; he forced me to have sex with him when I'm not feeling well."
The girls then locked the door and let her rest."53
The accused-appellant's aggression recurred the following night. After
closing the family store on October 17, 1998, KKK and the children
took their supper. The accused-appellant did not join them since,
according to him, he already ate dinner elsewhere. After resting for a
short while, KKK and the children proceeded to the girls' bedroom and
prayed the rosary. KKK decided to spend the night in the room's small
bed and the girls were already fixing the beddings when the accused-
appellant entered.
"Why are you sleeping in the room of our children", he asked KKK,
who responded that she preferred to sleep with the children.54 He then
scoffed: "Its alright if you will not go with me, anyway, there are
women that could be paid [P] 1,000.00." She dismissed his comment
by turning her head away after retorting: "So be it." After that, he left
the room.55
He returned 15 minutes later56 and when KKK still refused to go with
him, he became infuriated. He lifted her from the bed and attempted to
carry her out of the room as he exclaimed: "Why will you sleep here[?]
Lets go to our bedroom." When she defied him, he grabbed her short
pants causing them to tear apart.57 At this point, MMM interfered, "Pa,
don't do that to Mama because we are in front of you."58
The presence of his children apparently did not pacify the accused-
appellant who yelled, "[E]ven in front of you, I can have sex of your
mother [sic J because I'm the head of the family." He then ordered his
daughters to leave the room. Frightened, the girls obliged and went to
the staircase where they subsequently heard the pleas of their
helpless mother resonate with the creaking bed.59
The episodes in the bedroom were no less disturbing. The accused-
appellant forcibly pulled KKK's short pants and panties. He paid no
heed as she begged, "[D]on 't do that to me, my body is still aching
and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do
[sic]. I cannot withstand sex."60
After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed her legs, held
her hands, mounted her and forced himself inside her. Once gratified,
the accused-appellant put on his short pants and briefs, stood up, and
went out of the room laughing as he conceitedly uttered: "[I]t s nice,
that is what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex." He
then retreated to the masters' bedroom.61
Sensing that the commotion in their bedroom has ceased, MMM and
OOO scurried upstairs but found the door locked. MMM pulled out a
jalousie window, inserted her arm, reached for the doorknob inside
and disengaged its lock. Upon entering the room, MMM and OOO
found their mother crouched on the bed with her hair disheveled. The
girls asked: "Ma, what happened to you, why are you crying?" KKK
replied: "[Y}our father is a beast and animal, he again forced me to
have sex with him even if I don't feel well. "62
Version of the defense
The defense spun a different tale. The accused-appellant's father
owned a land adjacent to that of KKK's father. He came to know KKK
because she brought food for her father's laborers. When they got
married on October 18, 1975, he was a high school graduate while
she was an elementary graduate.
Their humble educational background did not deter them from
pursuing a comfortable life. Through their joint hard work and efforts,
the couple gradually acquired personal properties and established
their own businesses that included a rice mill managed by the
accused-appellant. He also drove their trucks that hauled coffee,
copra, or com.63
The accused-appellant denied raping his wife on October 16 and 17,
1998. He claimed that on those dates he was in Dangcagan,
Bukidnon, peeling com. On October 7, his truck met an accident
somewhere in Angeles Ranch, Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. He
left the truck by the roadside because he had to attend MMM's
graduation in Cebu on October 12 with KKK. When they returned to
Bukidnon on October 14, he asked KKK and MMM to proceed to
Cagayan de Oro City and just leave him behind so he can take care of
the truck and buy some com.64
Ryle Equia (Equia), the spouses' driver from January 1996 until June
1999 corroborated the above claims. According to him, on October 16,
1998, the accused-appellant was within the vicinity of the rice mill's
loading area in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, cleaning a pick-up truck. On
October 17, 1998, he and the accused-appellant were in Dangcagan,
Bukidnon, loading sacks of com into the truck. They finished loading at
3 :00 p.m. The accused-appellant then instructed Equia to proceed to
Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon while the former attended a fiesta in
New Cebu, Kianggat, Dangcagan, Bukidnon. At around 4:00 p.m.,
Equia, together with a helper and a mechanic, left for Maluko in order
to tow the stalled truck left there by the accused-appellant in October 7
and thereafter, bring it to Cagayan de Oro City together with the
separate truck loaded with com.
They arrived in Maluko at 7:00 p.m. and it took them three hours to
turn the truck around and hoist it to the towing bar of the other truck.
At around 10:00 p.m., the accused-appellant arrived in Maluko. The
four of them then proceeded to Cagayan de Oro City where they
arrived at 3 :00 a.m. of October 18, 1998. The accused-appellant went
to Gusa while the other three men brought the damaged truck to
Cugman.65
The accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely fabricated the rape
charges as her revenge because he took over the control and
management of their businesses as well as the possession of their
pick-up truck in January 1999. The accused-appellant was provoked
to do so when she failed to account for their bank deposits and
business earnings. The entries in their bank account showed the
balance of 3,190,539.83 on October 31, 1996 but after only a month
or on November 30, 1996, the amount dwindled to a measly
9,894.88.66 Her failure to immediately report to the police also belies
her rape allegations.67
KKK wanted to cover-up her extra-marital affairs, which the accused-
appellant gradually detected from her odd behavior. While in Cebu on
October 12, 1998 for MMM's graduation rites, the accused-appellant
and KKK had sexual intercourse. He was surprised when his wife
asked him to get a napkin to wipe her after having sex. He tagged her
request as "high-tech," because they did not do the same when they
had sex in the past. KKK had also become increasingly indifferent to
him. When he arrives home, it was an employee, not her, who opened
the door and welcomed him. She prettied herself and would no longer
ask for his permission whenever she went out.68
Bebs,69 KKK's cousin and a cashier in their Bukidnon store, gave the
accused-appellant several love letters purportedly addressed to Bebs
but were actually intended for KKK.70
KKK had more than ten paramours some of whom the accused-
appellant came to know as: Arsenio, Jong-Jong, Joy or Joey,
somebody from the military or the Philippine National Police, another
one is a government employee, a certain Fernandez and three other
priests.71 Several persons told him about the paramours of his wife but
he never confronted her or them about it because he trusted her.72
What further confirmed his suspicions was the statement made by
OOO on November 2, 1998. At that time, OOO was listening loudly to
a cassette player. Since he wanted to watch a television program, he
asked OOO to tum down the volume of the cassette player. She got
annoyed, unplugged the player, spinned around and hit the accused-
appellant's head with the socket. His head bled. An altercation
between the accused-appellant and KKK thereafter followed because
the latter took OOO's side. During the argument, OOO blurted out that
KKK was better off without the accused-appellant because she had
somebody young, handsome, and a businessman unlike the accused-
appellant who smelled bad, and was old, and ugly.73
KKK also wanted their property divided between them with three-
fourths thereof going to her and one-fourth to the accused-appellant.
However, the separation did not push through because the accused-
appellant's parents intervened.74 Thereafter, KKK pursued legal
separation from the accused-appellant by initiating Barangay Case
No. 00588-99 before the Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa of Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City and thereafter obtaining a Certificate to File
Action dated February 18, 1999.75
Ruling of the RTC
In its Judgment76 dated April 1, 2002, the RTC sustained the version
proffered by the prosecution by giving greater weight and credence to
the spontaneous and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution's
witnesses. The trial court also upheld as sincere and genuine the two
daughters' testimonies, as it is not natural in our culture for daughters
to testify against their own father for a crime such as rape if the same
was not truly committed.
The trial court rejected the version of the defense and found
unbelievable the accused-appellant's accusations of extra-marital
affairs and money squandering against KKK. The trial court shelved
the accused-appellant's alibi for being premised on inconsistent
testimonies and the contradicting declarations of the other defense
witness, Equia, as to the accused-appellant's actual whereabouts on
October 16, 1998. Accordingly, the RTC ruling disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Edgar Jumawan
"GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of the two (2) separate charges of
rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each, to pay complainant [P]50,000.00 in each case as
moral damages, indemnify complainant the sum of (P]75,000.00 in
each case, [P]50,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.77
Ruling of the CA
In its Decision78 dated July 9, 2008, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC
ruling. The CA held that Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, sanctioned the amendment of the original informations.
Further, the accused-appellant was not prejudiced by the amendment
because he was re-arraigned with respect to the amended
informations.
The CA found that the prosecution, through the straightforward
testimony of the victim herself and the corroborative declarations of
MMM and OOO, was able to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, all
the elements of rape under R.A. No. 8353. The accused-appellant had
carnal knowledge of KKK by using force and intimidation.
The CA also ruled that KKK's failure to submit herself to medical
examination did not negate the commission of the crime because a
medical certificate is not necessary to prove rape.
The CA rejected the accused-appellant's argument that since he and
KKK are husband and wife with mutual obligations of and right to
sexual intercourse, there must be convincing physical evidence or
manifestations of the alleged force and intimidation used upon KKK
such as bruises. The CA explained that physical showing of external
injures is not indispensable to prosecute and convict a person for
rape; what is necessary is that the victim was forced to have sexual
intercourse with the accused.
In addition, the CA noted that the fact that KKK and the accused-
appellant are spouses only reinforces the truthfulness of KKK's
accusations because no wife in her right mind would accuse her
husband of having raped her if it were not true.
The delay in the filing of the rape complaint was sufficiently explained
by KKK when she stated that she only found out that a wife may
charge his husband with rape when the fiscal investigating her
separate complaint for grave threats and physical injuries told her
about it.
Finally, the CA dismissed the accused-appellant's alibi for lack of
convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be at
his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the commission of
the crimes, considering that Dangcagan, Bukidnon, the place where
he allegedly was, is only about four or five hours away. Accordingly,
the decretal portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed Judgment is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.79
Hence, the present review. In the Court Resolution80 dated July 6,
2009, the Court notified the parties that, if they so desire, they may file
their respective supplemental briefs. In a Manifestation and
Motion81 dated September 4, 2009, the appellee, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, expressed that it intends to adopt its Brief before
the CA. On April 16, 2012, the accused-appellant, through counsel,
filed his Supplemental Brief, arguing that he was not in Cagayan de
Oro City when the alleged rape incidents took place, and the presence
of force, threat or intimidation is negated by: (a) KKK's voluntary act of
going with him to the conjugal bedroom on October 16, 1998; (b)
KKK's failure to put up resistance or seek help from police authorities;
and ( c) the absence of a medical certificate and of blood traces in
KKK's panties.82
Our Ruling
I. Rape and marriage: the historical connection
The evolution of rape laws is actually traced to two ancient English
practices of 'bride capture' whereby a man conquered a woman
through rape and 'stealing an heiress' whereby a man abducted a
woman and married her.83
The rape laws then were intended not to redress the violation of the
woman's chastity but rather to punish the act of obtaining the heiress'
property by forcible marriage84 or to protect a man's valuable interest
in his wife's chastity or her daughter's virginity.85
If a man raped an unmarried virgin, he was guilty of stealing her
father's property and if a man raped his wife, he was merely using his
property.86
Women were subjugated in laws and society as objects or goods and
such treatment was justified under three ideologies.
Under the chattel theory prevalent during the 6th century, a woman
was the property of her father until she marries to become the property
of her husband.87 If a man abducted an unmarried woman, he had to
pay the owner, and later buy her from the owner; buying and marrying
a wife were synonymous.88
From the 11th century to the 16th century, a woman lost her identity
upon marriage and the law denied her political power and status under
the feudal doctrine of coverture.89
A husband had the right to chastise his wife and beat her if she
misbehaved, allowing him to bring order within the family.90
This was supplanted by the marital unity theory, which espoused a
similar concept. Upon marrying, the woman becomes one with her
husband. She had no right to make a contract, sue another, own
personal property or write a will.91
II. The marital exemption rule
In the 17th century, Sir Matthew Hale (Hale), a Chief Justice in
England, conceived the irrevocable implied consent theory that would
later on emerge as the marital exemption rule in rape. He stated that:
[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon
his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract
the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she
cannot retract.92
The rule was observed in common law countries such as the United
States of America (USA) and England. It gives legal immunity to a
man who forcibly sexually assaults his wife, an act which would be
rape if committed against a woman not his wife.93 In those
jurisdictions, rape is traditionally defined as "the forcible penetration of
the body of a woman who is not the wife of the perpetrator."94
The first case in the USA that applied the marital exemption rule was
Commonwealth v. Fogerty95 promulgated in 1857. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts pronounced that it would always be a
defense in rape to show marriage to the victim. Several other courts
adhered to a similar rationale with all of them citing Hale's theory as
basis.96
The rule was formally codified in the Penal Code of New York in 1909.
A husband was endowed with absolute immunity from prosecution for
the rape of his wife.97 The privilege was personal and pertained to him
alone. He had the marital right to rape his wife but he will be liable
when he aids or abets another person in raping her.98
In the 1970s, the rule was challenged by women's movements in the
USA demanding for its abolition for being violative of married women's
right to be equally protected under rape laws.99
In 1978, the rule was qualified by the Legislature in New York by
proscribing the application of the rule in cases where the husband and
wife are living apart pursuant to a court order "which by its terms or in
its effects requires such living apart," or a decree, judgment or written
agreement of separation.100
In 1983, the marital exemption rule was abandoned in New York when
the Court of Appeals of New York declared the same unconstitutional
in People v. Liberta101 for lack of rational basis in distinguishing
between marital rape and non-marital rape. The decision, which also
renounced Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory, ratiocinated as
follows:
We find that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between
marital rape and nonmarital rape. The various rationales which have
been asserted in defense of the exemption are either based upon
archaic notions about the consent and property rights incident to
marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny.
We therefore declare the marital exemption for rape in the New York
statute to be unconstitutional.
Lord Hale's notion of an irrevocable implied consent by a married
woman to sexual intercourse has been cited most frequently in
support of the marital exemption. x x x Any argument based on a
supposed consent, however, is untenable. Rape is not simply a sexual
act to which one party does not consent. Rather, it is a degrading,
violent act which violates the bodily integrity of the victim and
frequently causes severe, long-lasting physical and psychic harm x x
x. To ever imply consent to such an act is irrational and absurd. Other
than in the context of rape statutes, marriage has never been viewed
as giving a husband the right to coerced intercourse on demand x x x.
Certainly, then, a marriage license should not be viewed as a license
for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married woman
has the same right to control her own body as does an unmarried
woman x x x. If a husband feels "aggrieved" by his wife's refusal to
engage in sexual intercourse, he should seek relief in the courts
governing domestic relations, not in "violent or forceful self-help x x x."
The other traditional justifications for the marital exemption were the
common-law doctrines that a woman was the property of her husband
and that the legal existence of the woman was "incorporated and
consolidated into that of the husband x x x." Both these doctrines, of
course, have long been rejected in this State. Indeed, "[nowhere] in
the common-law world - [or] in any modem society - is a woman
regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity
and the dignity associated with recognition as a whole human being x
x x."102 (Citations omitted)
By 1993, marital rape was a crime in all 50 states, with 17 of them, as
well as the District of Columbia, outlawing the act without exemptions.
Meanwhile, the 33 other states granted some exemptions to a
husband from prosecution such as when the wife is mentally or
physically impaired, unconscious, asleep, or legally unable to
consent.103
III. Marital Rape in the Philippines
Interestingly, no documented case on marital rape has ever reached
this Court until now. It appears, however, that the old provisions of
rape under Article 335 of the RPC adhered to Hale's irrevocable
implied consent theory, albeit in a limited form. According to Chief
Justice Ramon C. Aquino,104 a husband may not be guilty of rape
under Article 335 of Act No. 3815 but, in case there is legal
separation, the husband should be held guilty of rape if he forces his
wife to submit to sexual intercourse.105
In 1981, the Philippines joined 180 countries in ratifying the United
Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (UN-CEDAW).106 Hailed as the first international
women's bill of rights, the CEDAW is the first major instrument that
contains a ban on all forms of discrimination against women. The
Philippines assumed the role of promoting gender equality and
women's empowerment as a vital element in addressing global
concerns.107 The country also committed, among others, to condemn
discrimination against women in all its forms, and agreed to pursue, by
all appropriate means and without delay, a policy of eliminating
discrimination against women and, to this end, undertook:
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their
national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet
incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate
means, the practical realization of this principle;
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including
sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against
women;
xxxx
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or
abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which
constitute discrimination against women;
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute
discrimination against women.108
In compliance with the foregoing international commitments, the
Philippines enshrined the principle of gender equality in the 1987
Constitution specifically in Sections 11 and 14 of Article II thereof,
thus:
Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights.
xxxx
Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building,
and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women
and men. The Philippines also acceded to adopt and implement the
generally accepted principles of international law such as the CEDA W
and its allied issuances, viz:
Article II, Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument
of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with
all nations. (Emphasis ours)
The Legislature then pursued the enactment of laws to propagate
gender equality. In 1997, R.A. No. 8353 eradicated the stereotype
concept of rape in Article 335 of the RPC.109 The law reclassified rape
as a crime against person and removed it from the ambit of crimes
against chastity. More particular to the present case, and perhaps the
law's most progressive proviso is the 2nd paragraph of Section 2
thereof recognizing the reality of marital rape and criminalizing its
perpetration, viz:
Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage
between the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the
penalty imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent
forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall extinguish the
criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be
extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void
ab initio.
Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses the
term "man" in defining rape, it is unmistakable that R.A. No. 8353
penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist's legal relationship with
his victim, thus:
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any
of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above
be present.
The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the records
of the deliberations of the 10th Congress on the law's progenitor's,
House Bill No. 6265 and Senate Bill No. 650. In spite of qualms on
tagging the crime as 'marital rape' due to conservative Filipino
impressions on marriage, the consensus of our lawmakers was clearly
to include and penalize marital rape under the general definition of
'rape,' viz:
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, one more point
of clarification in the House version on Anti-Rape Bill, House Bill No.
6265, we never agreed to marital rape. But under Article 266-C, it says
here: "In case it is the legal husband who is the offender... " Does this
presuppose that there is now marital rape? x x x.
MR. LARA: x x x [I]n this jurisdiction, well, I only have a limited, very
limited 17 years of private practice in the legal profession, Madam
Speaker, and I believe that I can put at stake my license as a lawyer in
this jurisdiction there is no law that prohibits a husband from being
sued by the wife for rape. Even jurisprudence, we don't have any
jurisprudence that prohibits a wife from suing a husband. That is why
even if we don't provide in this bill expanding the definition of crime
that is now being presented for approval, Madam Speaker, even if we
don't provide here for marital rape, even if we don't provide for sexual
rape, there is the right of the wife to go against the husband. The wife
can sue the husband for marital rape and she cannot be prevented
from doing so because in this jurisdiction there is no law that prohibits
her from doing so. This is why we had to put second paragraph of
266-C because it is the belief of many of us. x x x, that if it is true that
in this jurisdiction there is marital rape even if we don't provide it here,
then we must provide for something that will unify and keep the
cohesion of the family together that is why we have the second
paragraph.
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, under the House
version specifically House Bill No. 6265 our provision on a husband
forcing the wife is not marital rape, it is marital sexual assault.
MR. LARA: That is correct, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING: But here it is marital rape because there is no crime
of sexual assault. So, Your Honor, direct to the point, under Article
266-C, is it our understanding that in the second paragraph, quote: "In
case it is the legal husband who is the offender, this refers to marital
rape filed against the husband? Is that correct?
MR. LARA: No, Madam Speaker, not entirely, no. The answer is no.
MR. DAMASING: So if the husband is guilty of sexual assault, what do
you call- it?
MR. LARA: Sexual assault, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING: There is no crime of sexual assault, Your Honor, we
have already stated that. Because under 1 and 2 it is all denominated
as rape, there is no crime of sexual assault. That is why I am sorry
that our House version which provided for sexual assault was not
carried by the Senate version because all sexual crimes under this
bicameral conference committee report are all now denominated as
rape whether the penalty is from reclusion perpetua to death or
whether the penalty is only prision mayor. So there is marital rape,
Your Honor, is that correct?
xxxx
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, I am in favor of this. I
am in favor of punishing the husband who forces the wife even to 30
years imprisonment. But please do not call it marital rape, call it
marital sexual assault because of the sanctity of marriage. x x
x.110 (Emphasis ours)
HON. APOSTOL: In our version, we did not mention marital rape but
marital rape is not excluded.
HON. ROCO: Yeah. No. But I think there is also no specific mention.
HON. APOSTOL: No. No. No. Silent lang 'yung marital rape.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: xx x [I]f we can retain the effect of pardon, then this
marital rape can be implicitly contained in the second paragraph. x x x
So marital rape actually was in the House version x x x. But it was not
another definition of rape. You will notice, it only says, that because
you are the lawful husband does not mean that you cannot commit
rape. Theoretically, I mean, you can beat up your wife until she's blue.
And if the wife complains she was raped, I guess that, I mean, you just
cannot raise the defense x x x[:] I am the husband. But where in the
marriage contract does it say that I can beat you up? That's all it
means. That is why if we stop referring to it as marital rape,
acceptance is easy. Because parang ang marital rape, married na nga
kami. I cannot have sex. No, what it is saying is you're [the] husband
but you cannot beat me up. x x x. That's why to me it's not alarming. It
was just a way of saying you're [the] husband, you cannot say when I
am charged with rape x x x.
PRESIDING OFFICER SHAHAN!: All right, so how do you propose it if
we put it in[?]
HON. ROCO: x x x [A]ll we are saying [is] that if you are the lawful
husband does not mean you can have carnal knowledge by force[,]
threat or intimidation or by depriving your wife reason, a grave abuse
of authority, I don't know how that cannot apply. Di ba yung, or putting
an instrument into the, yun ang sinasabi ko lang, it is not meant to
have another classification of rape. It is all the same definition x x x.
xxxx
HON.ROCO: What is 266-F? x x x. Now if we can retain 266-F x x x,
we can say that this rule is implicit already in the first proviso. It implies
na there is an instance when a husband can be charged [with] rape x
x x.
HON. ROXAS: Otherwise, silent na.
HON. ROCO: Otherwise, we are silent na. So parang i-delete natin ito.
But it is understood that this rule of evidence is now transport[ed], put
into 266-F, the effect of pardon.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: We will retain this effect of pardon.
We will remove marital rape.
HON. ROCO: No, yun ang, oo we will remove this one on page 3 but
we will retain the one on page 8, the effect of pardon. x x x [I]t is
inferred but we leave it because after all it is just a rule of evidence.
But I think we should understand that a husband cannot beat at his
wife to have sex. Di ha? I think that should be made clear. x x x.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: x x x [W]e are not defining a crime of marital rape. All
we are saying is that if you're [the] legal husband, Jesus Christ, don't
beat up to have sex. I almost want, you are my wife, why do you have
to beat me up.
So, ganoon. So, if we both justify it that way in the Report as inferred
in proviso, I mean, we can face up, I hope, to the women and they
would understand that it is half achieved.
HON. ZAMORA: I think, Raul, as long as we understand that we are
not defining or creating a new crime but instead, we are just defining a
rule of evidence. x x x.
HON. ROCO: Then, in which case we may just want to clarify as a rule
of evidence the fact that he is husband is not, does not negate.111
CHAIRMAN LARA: x x x We all agree on the substance of the point in
discussion. The only disagreement now is where to place it. Let us
clear this matter. There are two suggestions now on marital rape. One
is that it is rape if it is done with force or intimidation or any of the
circumstances that would define rape x x x immaterial. The fact that
the husband and wife are separated does not come into the picture.
So even if they are living under one roof x x x for as long as the
attendant circumstances of the traditional rape is present, then that is
rape.112
PRESIDING OFFICER ANGARA-CASTILLO: Mr. Chairman, x x x
[t]his provision on marital rape, it does not actually change the
meaning of rape. It merely erases the doubt in anybody's mind,
whether or not rape can indeed be committed by the husband against
the wife. So the bill really says, you having been married to one
another is not a legal impediment. So I don't really think there is any
need to change the concept of rape as defined presently under the
revised penal code. This do[es] not actually add anything to the
definition of rape. It merely says, it is merely clarificatory. That if
indeed the wife has evidence to show that she was really brow beaten,
or whatever or forced or intimidated into having sexual intercourse
against her will, then the crime of rape has been committed against
her by the husband, notwithstanding the fact that they have been
legally married. It does not change anything at all, Mr. Chairman.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: Yes, I think, there is no change on
this x x x.113
The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is
further affirmed by R.A. No. 9262,114 which regards rape within
marriage as a form of sexual violence that may be committed by a
man against his wife within or outside the family abode, viz:
Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series
of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife,
former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the
family abode, which result in or is likely to result in. physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats
of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following
acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical
harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature,
committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited
to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman
or her child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually
suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the
victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and
indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts
and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in
the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the
abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any
sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat
of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
Statistical figures confirm the above characterization. Emotional and
other forms of non-personal violence are the most common type of
spousal violence accounting for 23% incidence among ever-married
women. One in seven ever-married women experienced physical
violence by their husbands while eight percent (8%) experienced
sexual violence.115
IV. Refutation of the accused-appellant's arguments
The crux of the accused-appellant's plea for acquittal mirrors the
irrevocable implied consent theory. In his appeal brief before the CA,
he posits that the two incidents of sexual intercourse, which gave rise
to the criminal charges for rape, were theoretically consensual,
obligatory even, because he and the victim, KKK, were a legally
married and cohabiting couple. He argues that consent to copulation is
presumed between cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is
proved.
The accused-appellant further claims that this case should be viewed
and treated differently from ordinary rape cases and that the standards
for determining the presence of consent or lack thereof must be
adjusted on the ground that sexual community is a mutual right and
obligation between husband and wife.116
The contentions failed to muster legal and rational merit.
The ancient customs and ideologies from which the irrevocable
implied consent theory evolved have already been superseded by
modem global principles on the equality of rights between men and
women and respect for human dignity established in various
international conventions, such as the CEDAW. The Philippines, as
State Party to the CEDAW, recognized that a change in the traditional
role of men as well as the role of women in society and in the family is
needed to achieve full equality between them. Accordingly, the country
vowed to take all appropriate measures to modify the social and
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to
achieving the elimination of prejudices, customs and all other practices
which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either
of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.117 One of
such measures is R.A. No 8353 insofar as it eradicated the archaic
notion that marital rape cannot exist because a husband has absolute
proprietary rights over his wife's body and thus her consent to every
act of sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least,
presumed.
Another important international instrument on gender equality is the
UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, which
was Promulgated118 by the UN General Assembly subsequent to the
CEDA W. The Declaration, in enumerating the forms of gender-based
violence that constitute acts of discrimination against women,
identified 'marital rape' as a species of sexual violence, viz:
Article 1
For the purposes of this Declaration, the term "violence against
women" means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is
likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to
women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.
Article 2
Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not
be limited to, the following:
(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family,
including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household,
dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and
other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence
and violence related to exploitation;119 (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual
violence, exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife
without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon
her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDA W and its
accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape
under R.A. No. 8353.
A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to
be. A husband who has sexual intercourse with his wife is not merely
using a property, he is fulfilling a marital consortium with a fellow
human being with dignity equal120 to that he accords himself. He
cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by coercing her to engage in
a sexual act without her full and free consent. Surely, the Philippines
cannot renege on its international commitments and accommodate
conservative yet irrational notions on marital activities121 that have lost
their relevance in a progressive society.
It is true that the Family Code,122 obligates the spouses to love one
another but this rule sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as
expressions of love, that are both spontaneous and mutual123 and not
the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or coercion.
Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a
husband and wife excludes cruelty and coercion. Sexual intimacy
brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It is a gift and a participation
in the mystery of creation. It is a deep sense of spiritual communion. It
is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations. It is an expressive interest in each
other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other and it can go a long
way in deepening marital relationship.124 When it is egoistically utilized
to despoil marital union in order to advance a felonious urge for coitus
by force, violence or intimidation, the Court will step in to protect its
lofty purpose, vindicate justice and protect our laws and State policies.
Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by his indifferent or
uninterested wife's absolute refusal to engage in sexual intimacy may
legally seek the court's intervention to declare her psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill an essential marital obligation.125 But he cannot
and should not demand sexual intimacy from her coercively or
violently.
Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape
cases in terms of the elements that constitute the crime and in the
rules for their proof, infringes on the equal protection clause. The
Constitutional right to equal protection of the laws126 ordains that
similar subjects should not be treated differently, so as to give undue
favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others; no person or
class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws, which is
enjoyed, by other persons or other classes in like circumstances.127
As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No.
8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally known; (b) sexual assault;
and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the perpetrator's own
spouse. The single definition for all three forms of the crime shows
that the law does not distinguish between rape committed in wedlock
and those committed without a marriage. Hence, the law affords
protection to women raped by their husband and those raped by any
other man alike.
The posture advanced by the accused-appellant arbitrarily
discriminates against married rape victims over unmarried rape victims
because it withholds from married women raped by their husbands the
penal redress equally granted by law to all rape victims.
Further, the Court adheres to and hereby adopts the rationale in
Liberta in rejecting the argument akin to those raised by herein
accused-appellant. A marriage license should not be viewed as a
license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married
woman has the same right to control her own body, as does an
unmarried woman.128 She can give or withhold her consent to a sexual
intercourse with her husband and he cannot unlawfully wrestle such
consent from her in case she refuses.
Lastly, the human rights of women include their right to have control
over and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their
sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion,
discrimination and violence.129 Women do not divest themselves of
such right by contracting marriage for the simple reason that human
rights are inalienable.130
In fine, since the law does not separately categorize marital rape and
non-marital rape nor provide for different definition or elements for
either, the Court, tasked to interpret and apply what the law dictates,
cannot trudge the forbidden sphere of judicial legislation and
unlawfully divert from what the law sets forth. Neither can the Court
frame distinct or stricter evidentiary rules for marital rape cases as it
would inequitably burden its victims and unreasonably and irrationally
classify them differently from the victims of non-marital rape.
Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the Court to apply
the law and the evidentiary rules on rape any differently if the
aggressor is the woman's own legal husband. The elements and
quantum of proof that support a moral certainty of guilt in rape cases
should apply uniformly regardless of the legal relationship between the
accused and his accuser.
Thus, the Court meticulously reviewed the present case in accordance
with the established legal principles and evidentiary policies in the
prosecution and resolution of rape cases and found that no reversible
error can be imputed to the conviction meted the accused-appellant.
The evidence for the prosecution was
based on credible witnesses who gave
equally credible testimonies
In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the
credibility of the victim. Hence, the strict mandate that all courts must
examine thoroughly the testimony of the offended party. While the
accused in a rape case may be convicted solely on the testimony of
the complaining witness, courts are, nonetheless, duty-bound to
establish that their reliance on the victim's testimony is justified. Courts
must ensure that the testimony is credible, convincing, and otherwise
consistent with human nature. If the testimony of the complainant
meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the
basis thereof.131
It is settled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect.
This is in view of its inimitable opportunity to directly observe the
witnesses and their deportment, conduct and attitude, especially
during cross-examination. Thus, unless it is shown that its evaluation
was tainted with arbitrariness or certain facts of substance and value
have been plainly overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied, the same
will not be disturbed on appeal.132
After approximating the perspective of the trial court thru a meticulous
scrutiny of the entire records of the trial proceedings and the transcript
of each witnesses' testimony, the Court found no justification to disturb
its findings.
Rather, the Court observed that KKK and her testimony were both
credible and spontaneous. Hailed to the witness stand on six separate
occasions, KKK never wavered neither did her statements vacillate
between uncertainty and certitude. She remained consistent,
categorical, straightforward, and candid during the rigorous cross-
examination and on rebuttal examination, she was able to convincingly
explain and debunk the allegations of the defense.
She vividly recounted how the accused-appellant forced her to have
sex with him despite her refusal on October 16, 1998. He initially
ordered her to sleep beside him in their conjugal bed by violently
throwing the cot where she was resting. In order not to aggravate his
temper, KKK obeyed. On the bed, he insinuated for them to have sex.
When she rejected his advances due to abdominal pain and
headache, his request for intimacy transformed into a stubborn
demand. Unyielding, KKK held her panties but the accused-appellant
forcibly pulled them down. The tug caused the small clothing to tear
apart. She reiterated that she was not feeling well and begged him to
stop. But no amount of resistance or begging subdued him. He flexed
her two legs apart, gripped her hands, mounted her, rested his own
legs on hers and inserted his penis into her vagina. She continued
pleading but he never desisted.133
Her accurate recollection of the second rape incident on October 1 7,
1998 is likewise unmistakable. After the appalling episode in the
conjugal bedroom the previous night, KKK decided to sleep in the
children's bedroom. While her daughters were fixing the beddings, the
accused-appellant barged into the room and berated her for refusing
to go with him to their conjugal bedroom. When KKK insisted to stay in
the children's bedroom, the accused-appellant got angry and pulled
her up. MMM's attempt to pacify the accused-appellant further
enraged him. He reminded them that as the head of the family he
could do whatever he wants with his wife. To demonstrate his role as
patriarch, he ordered the children to go out of the room and thereafter
proceeded to force KKK into sexual intercourse. He forcibly pulled
down her short pants and panties as KKK begged "Dont do that to me,
my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what
you wanted me to do. I cannot withstand sex."134 But her pleas fell on
deaf ears. The accused-appellant removed his shorts and briefs,
spread KKK's legs apart, held her hands, mounted her and inserted
his penis into her vagina. After gratifying himself, he got dressed, left
the room as he chuckled: "Its nice, that is what you deserve because
you are [a] flirt or fond of sex."135
Entrenched is the rule that in the prosecution of rape cases, the
essential element that must be proved is the absence of the victim's
consent to the sexual congress.136
Under the law, consent is absent when: (a) it was wrestled from the
victim by force, threat or intimidation, fraudulent machinations or grave
abuse of authority; or (b) the victim is incapable of giving free and
voluntary consent because he/she is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious or that the offended party is under 12 years of age or is
demented.
Contrary to the accused-appellant's asseverations, KKK's consent was
wrestled from her through force and intimidation both of which were
established beyond moral certainty by the prosecution through the
pertinent testimony of KKK, viz:
On the October 16, 1998 rape incident:
(Direct Examination)
ATTY. LARGO:
Q So, while you were already lying on the bed together with your
husband, do you remember what happened?
A He lie down beside me and asked me to have sex with him.
Q How did he manifest that he wanted to have sex with you?
A He put his hand on my lap and asked me to have sex with him but I
warded off his hand.
Q Can you demonstrate to this Court how did he use his hand?
A Yes. "witness demonstrating on how the accused used his finger by
touching or knocking her lap which means that he wanted to have
sex."
Q So, what did you do after that?
A I warded off his hand and refused because I was not feeling well. (at
this juncture the witness is sobbing)
Q So, what did your husband do when you refused him to have sex
with you?
A He insisted and he pulled my pantie forcibly, that is why my pantie
[sic] was tom.
Q Why, what did you do when he started to pull your pantie [sic]?
A I resisted and tried to hold my pantie [sic] but I failed, because he is
so strong.
xx xx
Q So, when your pantie [sic] was tom by your husband, what else did
he do?
A He flexed my two legs and rested his two legs on my legs.
Q So after that what else did he do?
A He succeeded in having sex with me because he held my two hands
no matter how I wrestled but I failed because he is stronger than me.
COURT: Make it of record that the witness is sobbing while she is
giving her testimony.
ATTY. LARGO: (To the witness cont'ng.)
Q So, what did you do when your husband already stretched your two
legs and rode on you and held your two hands?
A I told him, "don't do that because I'm not feeling well and my whole
body is aching."
Q How did you say that to your husband?
A I told him, "don't do that to me because I'm not feeling well."
Q Did you say that in the manner you are saying now?
A I shouted when I uttered that words.
Q Was your husband able to consummate his desire?
A Yes, sir, because I cannot do anything.137
(Cross-Examination)
ATTY. AMARGA;
Q Every time you have sex with your husband it was your husband
normally remove your panty?
A Yes, Sir.
Q It was not unusual for your husband then to remove your panty
because according to you he normally do that if he have sex with you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And finally according to you your husband have sex with you?
A Yes, Sir because he forcibly used me in spite of holding my panty
because I don't want to have sex with him at that time.
Q You did not spread your legs at that time when he removed your
panty?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Meaning, your position of your legs was normal during that time?
A I tried to resist by not flexing my legs.
Q At that time when your husband allegedly removed your panty he
also remove your nightgown?
A No, Sir.
Q And he did pull out your duster [sic] towards your face?
A He raised my duster [sic] up.
Q In other words your face was covered when he raised your duster
[sic]?
A No, only on the breast level.138
On the October 17, 1998 rape incident:
(Direct Examination)
ATTY. LARGO
Q So, after your children went out of the room, what transpired?
A He successfully having sex with me because he pulled my short
pant and pantie forcible.
Q So, what did you say when he forcibly pulled your short and pantie?
A I told him, "don't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my
abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I cannot
withstand sex."
Q So, what happened to your short when he forcibly pulled it down?
A It was tom.
Q And after your short and pantie was pulled down by your husband,
what did he do?
A He also removed his short and brief and flexed my two legs and
mounted on me and succeeded in having sex with me.139
The accused-appellant forced his wife when he knowingly
overpowered her by gripping her hands, flexing her legs and then
resting his own legs thereon in order to facilitate the consummation of
his much-desired non-consensual sexual intercourse.
Records also show that the accused-appellant employed sufficient
intimidation upon KKK. His actuations prior to the actual moment of
the felonious coitus revealed that he imposed his distorted sense of
moral authority on his wife. He furiously demanded for her to lay with
him on the bed and thereafter coerced her to indulge his sexual
craving.
The fury the accused-appellant exhibited when KKK refused to sleep
with him on their bed, when she insisted to sleep in the children's
bedroom and the fact that he exercises dominance over her as
husband all cowed KKK into submission.
The fact that KKK voluntarily went with the accused-appellant to their
conjugal bedroom on October 16, 1998 cannot be stretched to mean
that she consented to the forced sexual intercourse that ensued. The
accused-appellant was KKK's husband and hence it was customary
for her to sleep in the conjugal bedroom. No consent can be deduced
from such act of KKK because at that juncture there were no
indications that sexual intercourse was about to take place. The issue
of consent was still irrelevant since the act for which the same is
legally required did not exist yet or at least unclear to the person from
whom the consent was desired. The significant point when consent
must be given is at that time when it is clear to the victim that her
aggressor is soliciting sexual congress. In this case, that point is when
the accused-appellant tapped his fingers on her lap, a gesture KKK
comprehended to be an invitation for a sexual intercourse, which she
refused.
Resistance, medical certificate and blood traces.
We cannot give credence to the accused-appellant's argument that
KKK should have hit him to convey that she was resisting his sexual
onslaught. Resistance is not an element of rape and the law does not
impose upon the victim the burden to prove resistance140 much more
requires her to raise a specific kind thereof.
At any rate, KKK put up persistent, audible and intelligible resistance
for the accused-appellant to recognize that she seriously did not
assent to a sexual congress. She held on to her panties to prevent him
from undressing her, she refused to bend her legs and she repeatedly
shouted and begged for him to stop.
Moreover, as an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be
irresistible; it may be just enough to bring about the desired result.
What is necessary is that the force or intimidation be sufficient to
consummate the purpose that the accused had in mind141 or is of such
a degree as to impel the defenseless and hapless victim to bow into
submission.142
Contrary to the accused-appellant's allusions, the absence of blood
traces in KKK's panties or the lack of a medical certificate do not
negate rape. It is not the presence or absence of blood on the victim's
underwear that determines the fact of rape143 inasmuch as a medical
certificate is dispensable evidence that is not necessary to prove
rape.144These details do not pertain to the elements that produce the
gravamen of the offense that is -sexual intercourse with a woman
against her will or without her consent.145
The accused-appellant harps on the acquittal ruling in People v.
Godoy,146 the evidentiary circumstances of which are, however,
disparate from those in the present case. In Godoy, the testimony of
the complainant was inherently weak, inconsistent, and was
controverted by the prosecution's medico-legal expert witness who
stated that force was not applied based on the position of her hymenal
laceration. This led the Court to conclude that the absence of any sign
of physical violence on the victim's body is an indication of
consent.147 Here, however, KKK's testimony is, as discussed earlier,
credible, spontaneous and forthright.
The corroborative testimonies of
MMM and OOO are worthy of credence.
The accused-appellant's assertion that MMM and OOO's testimonies
lacked probative value as they did not witness the actual rape is bereft
of merit. It must be stressed that rape is essentially committed in
relative isolation, thus, it is usually only the victim who can testify with
regard to the fact of the forced sexual intercourse.148 Hence, the
probative value of MMM and OOO's testimonies rest not on whether
they actually witnessed the rape but on whether their declarations
were in harmony with KKK's narration of the circumstances,
preceding, subsequent to and concurrent with, the rape incidents.
MMM and OOO's testimonies substantiated significant points in KKK's
narration. MMM heard KKK shouting and crying: "Eddie, dont do that
to me, have pity on me"149 on the night of October 16, 1998 shortly
after KKK and the accused-appellant went to their conjugal bedroom.
When MMM went upstairs to check on her mother, the accused-
appellant admonished her for meddling. Frustrated to aid her mother
who persistently cried, MMM kicked the door so hard the accused-
appellant was prompted to open it and rebuke MMM once more. OOO
heard all these commotion from the room downstairs.
MMM then saw her mother crouched on the bed, crying, with her hair
disheveled while her tom panty lay on the floor. After a brief struggle
with the accused-appellant, MMM and KKK were finally able to escape
and retreat to the children's bedroom where KKK narrated to her
daughters: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have
sex with him when I'm not feeling well. "
KKK gave a similar narration to MMM and OOO the following night
after the accused-appellant barged inside the children's bedroom. The
couple had an argument and when MMM tried to interfere, the
accused-appellant ordered her and OOO to get out after bragging that
he can have sex with his wife even in front of the children because he
is the head of the family. The girls then stayed by the staircase where
they afterwards heard their mother helplessly crying and shouting for
the accused-appellant to stop.
Indeed, the testimonies of KKK, MMM and OOO coherently depicted
that the accused-appellant, through the use of force and intimidation,
had non-consensual and forced carnal knowledge of his wife, KKK on
the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998.
KKK's helpless screams and pleas from inside the bedroom coupled
with her verbal and physical resistance were clear manifestations of
coercion. Her appearance when MMM saw her on the bed after the
accused appellant opened the door on October 16, 1998, her conduct
towards the accused-appellant on her way out of the room, and her
categorical outcry to her children after the two bedroom episodes - all
generate the conclusion that the sexual acts that occurred were
against her will.
Failure to immediately report to the
police authorities, if satisfactorily
explained, is not fatal to the
credibility of a witness.
The testimonies of KKK and her daughters cannot be discredited
merely because they failed to report the rape incidents to the police
authorities or that KKK belatedly filed the rape charges. Delay or
vacillation by the victims in reporting sexual assaults does not
necessarily impair their credibility if such delay is satisfactorily
explained.150
At that time, KKK and her daughters were not aware that a husband
forcing his wife to submit to sexual intercourse is considered rape. In
fact, KKK only found out that she could sue his husband for rape when
Prosecutor Benjamin Tabique, Jr. (Prosecutor Tabique) told her about
it when she filed the separate charges for grave threats and physical
injuries against the accused-appellant.151
It must be noted that the incidents occurred a year into the effectivity
of R.A. No. 8353 abolishing marital exemption in rape cases hence it
is understandable that it was not yet known to a layman as opposed to
legal professionals like Prosecutor Tabique. In addition, fear of reprisal
thru social humiliation which is the common factor that deter rape
victims from reporting the crime to the authorities is more cumbersome
in marital rape cases. This is in view of the popular yet outdated belief
that it is the wife's absolute obligation to submit to her husband's
carnal desires. A husband raping his own wife is often dismissed as a
peculiar occurrence or trivialized as simple domestic trouble.
Unfamiliarity with or lack of knowledge of the law criminalizing marital
rape, the stigma and public scrutiny that could have befallen KKK and
her family had the intervention of police authorities or even the
neighbors been sought, are acceptable explanations for the failure or
delay in reporting the subject rape incidents.
The victim -S testimony on the
witness stand rendered
unnecessary the presentation of her
complaint-affidavit as evidence.
The failure of the prosecution to present KKK's complaint-affidavit for
rape is not fatal in view of the credible, candid and positive testimony
of KKK on the witness stand. Testimonial evidence carries more
weight than the affidavit since it underwent the rudiments of a direct,
cross, re-direct and re-cross examinations. Affidavits or statements
taken ex parte are generally considered incomplete and inaccurate.
Thus, by nature, they are inferior to testimony given in court.152
Ill motive imputed to the victim
The ill motive, which the accused-appellant imputed to KKK, does not
inspire belief as it is riddled with loopholes generated by incongruent
and flimsy evidence. The prosecution was able to establish that the
3 Million deposit in the spouses' bank account was the proceeds of
their loan from the Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI). Exhibit J, which is
a BPI ML instruction sheet dated October 31, 1996 in the amount of
3,149,840.63 is the same amount the accused-appellant claimed to
have entrusted to her wife. Although the accused-appellant denied
being aware of such loan, he admitted that approximately 3 Million
was spent for the construction of their house. These pieces of
evidence effectively belie the accused appellant's allegation that KKK
could not account for the money deposited in the bank.153
Anent, KKK's alleged extra-marital affairs, the accused-appellant failed
to explain how Bebs could be his wife KKK when the letter-sender
greeted Bebs a "happy birthday" on October 28 while KKK's birthday
is June 23. The accused-appellant also did not present Bebs herself,
being a more competent witness to the existence of the alleged love
letters for KKK. He likewise failed, despite promise to do so, to present
the original copies of such love letters neither did he substantiate
KKK's supposed extra-marital affairs by presenting witnesses who
could corroborate his claims. Further, the Court finds it unbelievable
that an able man would not have the temerity to confront his wife who
has fooled around with 10 men - some of whom he has even met. The
accused-appellant's erratic statements on the witness stand are
inconsistent with the theory of extra-marital romance making it
reasonable to infer that he merely made up those malicious stories as
a desperate ploy to extricate himself out of this legal quandary.
At best, the basis of the alleged illicit affairs of KKK were the accused-
appellant's unfounded suspicions that hold no evidentiary weight in
law and thus incompetent to destroy KKK's credibility and that of her
testimony. In sum, the defense failed to present sufficiently convincing
evidence that KKK is a mere vindictive wife who is harassing the
accused-appellant with fabricated rape charges.
Alibi
It must be stressed that in raising the irrevocable implied consent
theory as defense, the accused-appellant has essentially admitted the
facts of sexual intercourse embodied in the two criminal informations
for rape. This admission is inconsistent with the defense of alibi and
any discussion thereon will thus be irrelevant.
At any rate, the courts a quo correctly rejected his alibi.
Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is inherently
frail and unreliable, but also because it is easy to fabricate and difficult
to check or rebut. It cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
accused by eyewitnesses who had no improper motive to testify
falsely.154
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only
that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the
crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. Physical impossibility
refers not only to the geographical distance between the place where
the accused was and the place where the crime was committed when
the crime transpired, but more importantly, the facility of access
between the two places.155
Even granting in arguendo that the accused-appellant had indeed
attended a fiesta in Dangcagan, Bukidnon or was hauling com with
Equia on the dates of commission of the crime, the same will not
easily exonerate him. The accused-appellant failed to adduce clear
and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be
at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the commission
of the crime. Dangcagan, Bukidnon can be traversed by about four or
five hours from Cagayan de Oro City, and even less by private vehicle
which was available to the accused appellant at any time.156 Thus, it
was not physically impossible for him to be at the situs criminis at the
dates and times when the two rape incidents were committed.
Between the accused-appellant's alibi and denial, and the positive
identification and credible testimony of the victim, and her two
daughters, the Court must give weight to the latter, especially in the
absence of ill motive on their part to falsely testify against the
accused-appellant.
Conclusion
All told, the presumption of innocence endowed an accused-appellant
was sufficiently overcome by KKK's clear, straightforward, credible,
and truthful declaration that on two separate occasions, he succeeded
in having sexual intercourse with her, without her consent and against
her will. Evidence of overwhelming force and intimidation to
consummate rape is extant from KKK's narration as believably
corroborated by the testimonies of MMM and OOO and the physical
evidence of KKK's tom panties and short pants. Based thereon, the
reason and conscience of the Court is morally certain that the
accused-appellant is guilty of raping his wife on the nights of October
16 and 17, 1998.
Penalties
The Court affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for each count of
rape, meted upon the accused-appellant for being in accord with
Article 266-A in relation to 266-B of the RPC. Further, he shall not be
eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346, which states
that "persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua,
or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason
of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."157
The Court sustains the moral damages awarded in the amount of
50,000.00. Moral damages are granted to rape victims without need
of proof other than the fact of rape under the assumption that the
victim suffered moral injuries from the experience she underwent.158
The award of civil indemnity is proper; it is mandatory upon the finding
that rape took place.1wphi1 Considering that the crime committed is
simple rape, there being no qualifying circumstances attendant in its
commission, the appropriate amount is 50,000.00159 and not
75,000.00 as awarded by the RTC.
To serve as an example for public good and in order to deter a similar
form of domestic violence, an award of 30,000.00 as exemplary
damages is imperative.160
The damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum to be reckoned from the date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid.161
A Final Note
Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it is an
abhorrence to a woman's value and dignity as a human being. It
respects no time, place, age, physical condition or social status. It can
happen anywhere and it can happen to anyone. Even, as shown in the
present case, to a wife, inside her time-honored fortress, the family
home, committed against her by her husband who vowed to be her
refuge from cruelty. The herein pronouncement is an affirmation to
wives that our rape laws provide the atonement they seek from their
sexually coercive husbands.
Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to
forcibly rape their wives. A husband does not own his wife's body by
reason of marriage. By marrying, she does not divest herself of the
human right to an exclusive autonomy over her own body and thus,
she can lawfully opt to give or withhold her consent to marital coitus. A
husband aggrieved by his wife's unremitting refusal to engage in
sexual intercourse cannot resort to felonious force or coercion to make
her yield. He can seek succor before the Family Courts that can
determine whether her refusal constitutes psychological incapacity
justifying an annulment of the marriage.
Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the
spiritual and biological communion that achieves the marital purpose
of procreation. It entails mutual love and self-giving and as such it
contemplates only mutual sexual cooperation and never sexual
coercion or imposition.
The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the herein
pronouncement, menacing personalities may use this as a tool to
harass innocent husbands. In this regard, let it be stressed that
safeguards in the criminal justice system are in place to spot and
scrutinize fabricated or false marital rape complaints and any person
who institutes untrue and malicious charges will be made answerable
under the pertinent provisions of the RPC and/or other laws.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Decision dated July
9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Edgar
Jumawan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts
of RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
for each count, without eligibility for parole. He is further ordered to
pay the victim, KKK, the amounts of PS0,000.00 as civil indemnity,
50,000.00 as moral damages, and 30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, for each count of rape. The award of damages shall earn
legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality
of this judgment until fully paid.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 183094 September 22, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
REYNALDO BARDE, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated 24 September 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01245, which affirmed with
modifications, the Decision2 dated 29 January 2005 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City, 5th Judicial Region, Branch 1, in
Criminal Case No. 8661, finding herein appellant Reynaldo Barde
(appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
multiple murder with multiple frustrated murder. The appellate court,
however, increased the penalty imposed upon the appellant by the
court a quo from reclusion perpetua to the ultimate penalty of death,
being the maximum penalty prescribed by law, for the crime of murder.
In view, however, of the subsequent passage of Republic Act No.
93463 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the appellate
court reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua. The appellate court
further increased the amount of moral and temperate damages
awarded by the court a quo to the heirs of each of the deceased
victims from 30,000.00 to 50,000.00 and from 5,000.00 to
25,000.00, respectively. The heirs of each of the deceased victims
were also awarded exemplary damages of 25,000.00. With respect
to the surviving victims, Purisima Dado (Purisima) and Ligaya Dado
(Ligaya), the appellate court similarly increased the temperate
damages awarded to them by the court a quo from 5,000.00 to
25,000.00 each. They were also awarded exemplary damages of
25,000.00 each.
On the other hand, appellants co-accused and brother, Jimmy Barde
(Jimmy), was acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove
conspiracy and for insufficiency of evidence to prove his guilt for the
crime charged. No civil liability has been adjudged against him as
there was no preponderance of evidence to prove the same.
Appellant and Jimmy were charged in an Information4 dated 13 August
1999 with the complex crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated
murder, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 15th day of April, 1999 at more or less 12:30
oclock in the morning, at Sitio Santo Nio, Barangay Liguan,
Municipality of Rapu-Rapu, Province of Albay, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named [appellant
and Jimmy], conspiring and confederating and acting in concert to
achieve a common purpose, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to kill and committed with the qualifying circumstances of
treachery (alevosia), evident premeditation, and by means of
explosion, did then and there roll and explode a hand grenade (M26-
A1 Fragmentation grenade) inside the dance area which exploded and
resulted to the instantaneous deaths of the following persons,
This single act of exploding the hand grenade (M26-A1 Fragmentation
grenade) by the above-named [appellant and Jimmy] also caused and
resulted in the injuries and wounding on the different and various parts
of the bodies of at least seventy six (76) persons, namely, to wit:
these wounds and injuries caused being fatal and mortal; and thus the
above-named [appellant and Jimmy] have already performed all the
acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Multiple
Murder but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the [appellant and Jimmy], that is, the able
and timely medical assistance given to these victims which prevented
their deaths, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of those
who died herein and also those who suffered injuries on the various
parts of their bodies.16 [Emphasis supplied].
Upon arraignment,17 appellant and Jimmy, assisted by counsels de
oficio, pleaded NOT GUILTY to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial on
the merits ensued.
As culled from the records and testimonies of prosecution witnesses,
the facts of this case are as follows:
On 14 April 1999, at around 9:00 p.m., Elmer Oloroso (Elmer), one of
the prosecution witnesses and first cousin of appellant and Jimmy,
was at a dancing place18 at Sitio Sto. Nio, Liguan, Rapu-Rapu, Albay,
to attend a dance held in connection with the feast day celebration
thereat. The dancing place, which was more or less ten (10) meters
long and eight (8) meters wide, was enclosed by bamboo fence and
properly equipped with long benches. It was well-lighted by the
fluorescent lights surrounding it and an oscillating light located at the
center thereof. While sitting on the bench inside the dancing place,
near the front gate thereof, Elmer saw appellant and Jimmy outside
holding flashlights and focusing the same toward the people inside.19
At around 11:00 p.m., Jimmy entered the dancing place and
approached the person sitting beside Elmer. The latter overheard
Jimmy telling the person beside him to go out and look for their
companions. Not long after, Jimmy went out of the dancing place and
it was the last time Elmer saw him on that particular day.20
Then, at around 12:00 midnight, which was already 15 April 1999,
Elmer spotted appellant, who was wearing maong pants and maong
jacket with a belt bag tied around his waist, entered the dancing place
and walked towards the people who were dancing. At that time, Jimmy
was no longer there. Elmer, who was only more or less three (3)
meters away from the appellant, saw the latter get a rounded object
from his belt bag, which he believed to be a hand grenade as he has
previously seen one from military men when he was in Manila. Later,
appellant pulled something from that rounded object, rolled it to the
ground towards the center of the dancing place where the people were
dancing, and left immediately. Five seconds thereafter, the rounded
object exploded. At that moment, appellant was already one-half
meter away from the gate of the dancing place.21
The lights went off, people scampered away, and many died and were
seriously injured as a result of the said explosion. Elmer went out of
the dancing place, together with the crowd, through the destroyed
bamboo fence. Realizing his brothers and sisters might still be inside
the dancing place, Elmer went back, together with the people carrying
flashlights and torches, to look for his siblings. There he saw the
lifeless body of his brother, Nicanor Oloroso (Nicanor). His other
brother, Luis Oloroso (Luis), on the other hand, was seriously injured.
Elmers two other siblings, Jenny and Edwin, both surnamed Oloroso,
was slightly injured. Elmer immediately brought Luis at Bicol Regional
Training and Teaching Hospital (BRTTH), Albay Provincial Hospital,
where the latter was confined for almost three months.22
The second prosecution witness, Antonio Barcelona (Antonio),
corroborated Elmers testimony on material points. Antonio first met
appellant on 20 March 1999 as the latters brother, Rafael Barde
(Rafael), invited him to their house to attend a dance in Mancao,
Rapu-Rapu, Albay. There they had a little conversation and appellant
told Antonio that he would not enter any dancing place without
creating any trouble. On 14 April 1999 at around 9:30 p.m., Antonio
again met appellant at the dancing place at Sitio Sto. Nio, Liguan,
Rapu-Rapu, Albay. While Antonio was inside the dancing place,
appellant saw him and summoned him to go out. Then, Antonio and
appellant, who was then with his brothers, Jimmy and Joel, both
surnamed Barde, conversed about their work.23 Suddenly, appellant
uttered, "Diyan lang kamo, dai kamo maghale sa Tokawan na iyan, to
kong may ribok man, yaon kami sa likod lang."24 Appellant told
Antonio that he would just be behind him and his companions because
there might be a trouble. Thereafter, Antonio went inside the dancing
place. 25
At about 11:30 p.m., the dance was declared open to all. At this
juncture, appellant and his two brothers went inside the dancing place.
Jimmy then approached Antonio. Then, at around 12:30 a.m. of 15
April 1999, Antonio noticed appellant walking slowly towards the
crowd inside the dancing place with his hands partly hidden inside his
maong jacket with an eagle figure at the back thereof. Suddenly,
appellant stopped, looked around, got something from his waist line,
rolled it to the ground towards the crowd and hastily left. Antonio
confirmed that what was rolled to the ground by appellant was a
grenade because after more or less four seconds that thing exploded.
Appellant was already in front of the gate of the dancing place when
the explosion occurred. Antonio was not injured as he was more or
less four (4) meters away from the place where the explosion
occurred. Darkness followed after the explosion as the lights went off.
People bustled. Many died and were injured.26
Upon reaching the dancing place, they stayed outside as they had no
Other prosecution witnesses, Alexander Basallote (Alexander) and
Nilda Yasol (Nilda) - the Barangay Captain of Liguan, Rapu-Rapu,
Albay, also corroborated the testimonies of Elmer and Antonio.
The prosecution likewise presented Senior Police Officer 2 Hipolito
Talagtag (SPO2 Talagtag),27 who was assigned at R-4 Division,
Explosive and Ordinance Disposal, Police Regional Office 5 at Camp
Simeon Ola, Legazpi City. On 15 April 1999, SPO2 Talagtag received
a call from Colonel Delos Santos (Col. Delos Santos), Chief of R-4
Division, Supply of RECOM 5, informing him about the explosion
incident happened in a dancing place at Sitio Sto. Nio, Liguan, Rapu-
Rapu, Albay, and asking assistance from them. In response thereto, a
team was organized composed of members from the Crime
Laboratory, IID Investigators, CIS Investigating Agents and the
Explosive Ordinance Team. Thereafter, the team proceeded to the
scene of the crime. They reached the place at more or less 11:00 a.m.
of 16 April 1999. The team found a crater inside the dancing place that
served as their lead in determining the kind of explosive used. In the
course of their investigation, they interviewed people living nearby who
told them that the explosion was loud. Later, SPO2 Talagtag placed a
magnet in the crater inside the dancing place and recovered several
shrapnels similar to those that can be found in an M26-A1
fragmentation grenade. By reason thereof, SPO2 Talagtag concluded
that the explosion was caused by an M26-A1 fragmentation grenade.
Thereafter, the recovered shrapnels were turned over to the crime
laboratory at Camp Simeon Ola, Legazpi City, for
examination.281avvphi1
Engineer Ma. Julieta Razonable (Engr. Razonable), Police Senior
Inspector and Forensic Chemical Officer assigned at Camp Simeon
Ola, Legazpi City, received the specimen, i.e., the shrapnels
recovered at the scene of the crime, for physical examination. Her
examination yielded positive result, meaning, the specimen submitted
to her were part of a hand grenade fragmentation, M26-A1.29 This
result was subsequently reduced into writing as evidenced by Physical
Identification Report No. PI-601-A-99 dated 16 April 1999.30
In his defense, appellant vehemently denied the charge against him
and offered a different version of the incident.
Appellant asseverated that at around 7:00 p.m. on 14 April 1999 he
was at home in Mancao, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, organizing the plates,
spoons, forks and other kitchen utensils that they were about to bring
to the house of Teodora Arsenue (Teodora) at Sitio Sto. Nio, Liguan,
Rapu-Rapu, Albay, in connection with the feast day celebration in the
said place. Then, at around 7:30 p.m., the appellant, together with his
mother Gloria Barde (Gloria) and brothers Jimmy, Joel, Rafael, Jovito,
Jr., all surnamed Barde, proceeded to the house of Teodora and
reached the same before 9:00 p.m. Teodora offered them food. After
eating, they acceded to the suggestion of Jovito, Jr., to go to the
dancing place also located at Sitio Sto. Nio, Liguan, Rapu-Rapu,
Albay, only a ten minute-walk away from the house of Teodora.31
tickets. At around 11:30 p.m., through the help of William Gutchal
(William),32 appellant and his brothers Joel and Jimmy, both surnamed
Barde, were able to enter the dancing place while his mother and
other brothers remained outside. They immediately proceeded to the
left side of the dancing place near the baffles of the sound system and
stood behind the benches as the same were already occupied. The
three of them remained in that place until the explosion occurred
inside the dancing place, which was more or less twenty-five (25)
meters away from them. The people dancing in the area of the
explosion died and some were injured.33
Appellant claimed that he had no idea how the explosion started
because at that time he and his brother Jimmy were talking to Roger
Springael (Roger), who was standing outside the bamboo fence
surrounding the dancing place, as the latter was interested in buying a
fighting cock from him. His other brother, Joel, was also with them, but
he was sleeping. In the course of their conversation, he suddenly
heard an explosion. All lights went off and there was a total blackout
inside the dancing place. People were then pushing each other in
order to get out. Appellant was able to go out and run towards a
lighted place nearby. When the people carrying torches came,
appellant went back to the dancing place to look for his mother and
brothers. It was already 2:00 a.m. of 15 April 1999, when he saw his
mother and brothers. They went home afterwards. When they reached
their house, appellant and his father went to the house of his injured
cousin to inform the latters family of what happened.34
The following day, or on 16 April 1999, appellant and Jimmy were
invited by Police Officer, Efren Cardeo (Cardeo), at Camp Simeon
Ola, Legazpi City, to be utilized as witnesses to the explosion incident
happened on 15 April 1999. They refused the invitation as they did not
actually witness the explosion. But, Cardeo insisted. On 17 April
1999, appellant and Jimmy went with Cardeo at Camp Simeon Ola,
Legazpi City. Thereafter, they did not see Cardeo anymore.35
While appellant was at Camp Simeon Ola, Legazpi City, he was
brought in one of the offices there and was told to be a witness to the
explosion incident happened at Sitio Sto. Nio, Liguan, Rapu-Rapu,
Albay. Shortly thereafter, the investigator showed him a typewritten
document and was ordered to sign the same but, he refused because
he did not understand its contents. Appellant maintained that he was
even promised money and work should he sign it and testify but, once
again, he refused. Due to his incessant refusal, he was ordered to go
out. There he saw Jimmy who told him that he was also made to sign
a certain document but, he also refused.36
Between 10:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. of 17 April 1999, appellant and
Jimmy were awakened but the latter continued sleeping. As such, it
was only appellant who was brought in another room and was made to
drink wine by persons in civilian clothes. When appellant declined, he
was then accused as the person responsible for the explosion
incident. Appellant, however, strongly denied the accusation. At this
instance, appellant was kicked and boxed and was ordered to admit
the accusation but he refused to admit it. Appellant was subsequently
brought inside a detention cell. When he met Jimmy, the latter told him
that he was also tortured.37
The next day, or on 18 April 1999, appellant and Jimmy were brought
at the office of a certain General Navarro and they were ordered to
stand up with more than 30 people. Later, Antonio arrived. Appellant
avowed that a certain person in civilian clothes instructed Antonio to
point at them as the perpetrators of the explosion incident, which
Antonio did. When they were pinpointed as the authors of the crime,
they neither reacted nor denied the accusations. Afterwards, appellant
and Jimmy were brought back inside their detention cell.38
Appellant similarly denied having met Antonio on 20 March 1999 at a
dance in Mancao, Rapu-Rapu, Albay. Appellant likewise denied
having told Antonio that whenever he enters a dance hall he would
always create trouble. Appellant maintained that he saw Antonio for
the first time when the latter pinpointed him and Jimmy at the office of
a certain General Navarro. The second time was when Antonio
testified in court. Appellant, however, confirmed that Elmer is his first
cousin and he did not know any reason why he would accuse him with
such a grave offense. 39
Other defense witnesses, Roger, Jimmy and Gloria corroborated
appellants testimony.
Wilfredo Echague (Wilfredo), a radio broadcaster at Radio Filipino,
DWRL, since 19 February 1991, testified that on 11 August 2001 while
conducting series of interviews in relation to the explosion incident that
happened on 15 April 1999 at Sitio Sto. Nio, Liguan, Rapu-Rapu,
Albay, he met Violeta Buemia (Violeta) at the latters residence in
Cabangan, Villa Hermosa, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, who claimed personal
knowledge about the explosion incident. Wilfredos interview on
Violeta was recorded by the former. On 17 August 2001, he
accompanied Violeta to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
Legazpi City, where she executed her sworn statement before Atty.
Raymundo D. Sarga, Jr. (Atty. Sarga), Head Agent of NBI, Legazpi
City.40
Violeta affirmed that Wilfredo had interviewed her regarding the
explosion incident and he had also accompanied her in executing her
sworn statement before the NBI, Legazpi City.41 During her testimony,
she disclosed that at around 10:00 p.m. of 14 April 1999, she and her
daughter entered the dancing place at Sto. Nio, Liguan, Rapu-Rapu,
Albay. Her daughter sat down while she stood near the gate. At round
12:00 a.m., which was already 15 April 1999, she went out to urinate.
In a distance of more or less two (2) meters, she saw Eddie Oloroso
(Eddie) standing outside the dancing place and then throw something
inside that hit the wire beside a fluorescent bulb causing some sparks.
The place became very bright and she confirmed that it was really
Eddie who threw that something. Eddie then ran away. The thing
exploded when it fell on the ground. The place became dark
thereafter. She was hit by the flying pebbles coming from the
explosion. She then looked for her daughter and was able to find her.
Many died and seriously injured in the said explosion incident.42
Violeta also explained that it took her more than two years after the
incident happened to come out and testify because she was afraid.
Her conscience, however, kept bothering her so she decided to
divulge what she knew about the incident.43 Later in her testimony,
Violeta admitted that she saw Eddie outside the dancing place and it
was appellant and Jimmy, whom she saw sitting inside the dancing
place at the far end of the fence.44
Finding the defense of appellant and Jimmy unmeritorious vis-a-vis
the evidence proffered by the prosecution, the trial court rendered its
Decision on 29 January 2005 finding appellant guilty of the complex
crime of multiple murder with multiple frustrated murder and imposing
upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to
pay the legal heirs of each of the deceased victims the amount of
50,000.00 as civil indemnity, 30,000.00 as moral damages, and
5,000.00 as temperate damages, as well as each of the surviving
victims, Purisima and Ligaya, the amount of 20,000.00 as moral
damages and 5,000.00 as temperate/actual damages. Jimmy, on
the other hand, was acquitted of the crime charged for the
prosecutions failure to prove conspiracy and for insufficiency of
evidence. No civil liability was adjudged against him there being no
preponderance of evidence to prove the same.45
Aggrieved, appellant moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid
RTC Decision but it was denied in an Order46dated 15 June 2005 for
lack of merit.
Accordingly, appellant elevated the 29 January 2005 RTC Decision to
the Court of Appeals with the lone assignment of error, thus:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING [APPELLANT]
GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.47
On 24 September 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision,
disposing:
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is Denied. The Decision dated [29 January
2005] of the [RTC] of Lega[z]pi City, Branch 1, in Criminal Case No.
8661, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that:
1. The [appellant] shall suffer the penalty of Death.
However, in view of the subsequent passage of R.A. No.
9346, which was approved on [24 June 2006], which
repealed R.A. No. 817748 and R.A. No. 7659,49 the
penalty of Death is REDUCED to RECLUSION
PERPETUA.
2. The [appellant] is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased the amount of 50,000.00, as moral
damages, 25,000.00, as temperate damages
and 25,000.00 as exemplary damages. [Appellant] is
also ordered to pay each Purisima Dado and Ligaya Dado
temperate damages in the amount of 25,000.00 and
exemplary damages in the amount of
25,000.00.50 [Emphasis supplied].
Appellant moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid Court of
Appeals Decision, but to no avail.51
Unable to accept his conviction, appellant appeals to this Court
reiterating the same assignment of error he raised before the Court of
Appeals, to wit: the trial court gravely erred in finding appellant guilty
of the crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to establish his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant asserts that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt because the evidence presented by the prosecution was not
sufficient to overcome his constitutionally enshrined right to be
presumed innocent. He casts doubts on the credibility of prosecution
witness Elmer because his statements were replete with
inconsistencies. According to appellant, Elmer, at first, declared that
after the explosion, lights went off and he saw appellant leave the
dancing place but Elmer later stated that immediately after appellant
threw the grenade, the latter went out and upon reaching the gate, the
explosion occurred. These inconsistent statements of Elmer allegedly
created doubts as to what actually transpired and who the real culprit
was. Appellant then claims that there is a possibility that Elmer is a
rehearsed witness as such inconsistencies relate to material points.
Appellants contentions are not well-founded, thus, his conviction must
stand.
Primarily, it has been jurisprudentially acknowledged that when the
issues revolve on matters of credibility of witnesses, the findings of
fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses,
and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if
not conclusive effect. This is because the trial court has the unique
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best
position to discern whether they are telling the truth.52 In this case, it is
notable that the Court of Appeals affirmed the factual findings of the
trial court, according credence and great weight to the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses. Settled is the rule that when the trial court's
findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are
generally conclusive and binding upon this Court,53 unless the trial
court had overlooked, disregarded, misunderstood, or misapplied
some fact or circumstance of weight and significance which if
considered would have altered the result of the case.54 None of these
circumstances is attendant in this case. This Court, thus, finds no
cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings arrived at by the trial
court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Prosecution witnesses, Elmer and Antonio, actually witnessed the
explosion incident. Both of them narrated in detail the events that
transpired prior, during and after the explosion. They had a vivid
recollection of how appellant entered the dancing place, walked
towards the people who were dancing, got a rounded object from the
belt bag tied on his waist, pulled something from it, rolled it to the
ground towards the people who were dancing and left the place
rapidly. Immediately thereafter, the explosion occurred. The trial court
characterized their testimonies as candid, spontaneous and
straightforward that despite rigid cross-examination their testimonies
on who and how the crime was committed remained unshaken and
undisturbed.55
With certainty, these prosecution witnesses positively identified
appellant as the person who rolled a rounded object, which was later
confirmed as an M26-A1 fragmentation grenade, towards the people
who were dancing, the explosion killing and causing injuries to many.
The identity of appellant was clear to the prosecution witnesses
because the dancing place where the explosion occurred was well
lighted. Besides, Elmer and Antonio knew the appellant well. Elmer is
appellants first cousin. Antonio met appellant prior to the explosion
incident at a dance in Mancao, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, where they
engaged in some conversations. Given these circumstances, the
prosecution witnesses could not have been mistaken as to appellants
identity.
The records were also wanting in evidence that would show that these
witnesses were impelled by improper motive to impute such a grave
offense against the appellant. Even appellant himself admitted that he
did not know any reason why Elmer would accuse him with such an
offense with pernicious consequences on his life and liberty,
considering the fact that they are relatives.
It bears stressing that Elmers brother, Nicanor, died, his other brother,
Luis, was seriously injured and almost died and his two other siblings
were also injured because of the explosion. Elmer had more than
enough reason to identify the appellant.56 Indeed, his relationship to
the victims cannot be taken against him and it does not automatically
impair his credibility and render his testimony less worthy of credence
since that no improper motive can be ascribed to him for testifying.57 It
would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in seeking justice
for the victims to testify against an innocent person and allow the guilty
one to go unpunished.58 Rather, his inherent desire to bring to justice
those whom he personally knew committed a crime against his close
relative makes his identification of the appellant all the more credible.59
In comparison with the clear and straightforward testimony of
prosecution witnesses, all that appellant could muster is the defense
of denial and alibi. It is well-entrenched that alibi and denial are
inherently weak and have always been viewed with disfavor by the
courts due to the facility with which they can be concocted. They
warrant the least credibility or none at all and cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the appellant by the prosecution
witnesses.60 For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that
appellant was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he
must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is
negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law.61 Denial,
like alibi, as an exonerating justification is inherently weak and if
uncorroborated regresses to blatant impotence. Like alibi, it also
constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded
greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses
who testify on affirmative matters.62
In this case, appellant himself and all his witnesses admitted that
appellant was at the scene of the crime until the explosion occurred.
With that, the defense ultimately failed to meet the necessary
requisites for the proper invocation of alibi as a defense.
Appellants defense of denial cannot also be given any considerable
weight as it was unsubstantiated. The testimony of Violeta pointing at
Eddie as the real culprit is intended to bolster appellants defense of
denial. However, it cannot be given credence. Her testimony was
given only after more than two years from the time the incident
happened, and she failed to offer any convincing evidence to justify
such delay. Records do not show that there was any threat on
Violetas life that might have prevented from coming out to testify. She
herself admitted that after the explosion incident she did not see Eddie
anymore. Eddie then could not have possibly threatened her. She
could freely testify on what she knew about the explosion incident had
she wanted to. Her alleged fear is unfounded. It cannot justify her long
delay in disclosing it before the court a quo. Moreover, if she was,
indeed, afraid, she would not have allowed herself to be interviewed
by a radio broadcaster and would not have divulged to him all that she
knew about the incident. Instead of directly disclosing it to the proper
authorities, she had chosen to tell it first to a radio broadcaster.
Further, the only reason she gave the court for her silence of more
than two years was that she began to be bothered by her conscience
as she recently kept on dreaming of those who died in the explosion
incident especially during "All Souls Day." Violeta, in other words,
cannot rely on the doctrine that delay of witnesses in revealing what
they know about a crime is attributable to their natural reticence
against involvement therein.63
More telling is Violetas categorical admission that Eddie was outside
the dancing place and it was appellant whom she saw inside the
dancing place prior to the explosion incident. With this testimony,
Violeta made appellants defense of denial even weaker.
In light of the categorical and positive identification of the appellant by
prosecution witnesses, without any showing of ill-motive on the part of
the latter testifying on the matter, appellant's defense of bare denial
and alibi cannot prosper.64
As regards the alleged inconsistencies on Elmers narration of events,
this Court considers the same trivial, inconsequential and do not affect
the credibility of the statement that it was appellant who rolled the
hand grenade towards the people dancing inside the dancing place,
the explosion killing and injuring scores of victims. Furthermore, the
alleged inconsistencies pointed to by appellant have been properly
clarified in the course of Elmers testimony. As the Court of Appeals
stated in its Decision, thus:
Records reveal that during the direct examination, Elmer testified that
immediately after the [appellant] rolled the grenade, he went out and
when he was about to reach the gate the grenade exploded, while on
cross-examination, Elmer testified that he saw [appellant] leave the
[dancing place] after the explosion. However, when the trial court and
[appellants counsel] asked him about the inconsistency, Elmer
clarified and confirmed that [appellant] left the dance place before the
explosion.65
Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses which refer to minor
and insignificant details do not destroy their credibility. They, instead,
manifest truthfulness and candor and erase any suspicion of
rehearsed testimony.66
All told, this Court affirms the findings of the trial court and the
appellate court that, indeed, appellant was the author of the explosion
incident that happened on 15 April 1999 inside the dancing place
at Sitio Sto. Nio, Liguan, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, which took away the
lives and caused injuries to the people thereat.
As to the crime committed. The trial court and the appellate court
convicted appellant of the complex crime of multiple murder with
multiple frustrated murder. This Court believes, however, that
appellant should only be convicted of the complex crime of multiple
murder with double attempted murder.
Appellants act of detonating a hand grenade, particularly an M26-A1
fragmentation grenade, inside the dancing place at Sitio Sto. Nio,
Liguan, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, resulted in the death of 15 people, namely:
Francisco Biago, Jr., Roger Siso, Nicanor Oloroso, Margie Baadera,
Victor Baadera, Bienvenido Baadera, Diosdado Baadera, William
Butial, Maryjane Bechayda, Richard Blansa, Efren Yasul, Jose
Bombales, Deony Balidoy, Daisy Olorozo and Rolly Belga. The fact of
death of these deceased victims was evidenced by their respective
certificates of death and testimonies of their respective relatives. The
defense similarly admitted that these victims died as a result of the
explosion incident.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions
of article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength,
with the aid of armed men, or employing means to
weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or
afford impunity.
xxxx
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion,
shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault
upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor
vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving
great waste and ruin. [Emphasis supplied].
From the afore-quoted provision of law, the killing of the aforesaid
deceased victims with the use of explosive, i.e., hand grenade
particularly M26-A1 fragmentation grenade, certainly qualifies the
crime to murder.
Treachery, which was alleged in the Information, also attended the
commission of the crime. Time and again, this Court, in a plethora of
cases, has consistently held that there is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and
specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the
defense that the offended party might make. There are two (2)
conditions that must concur for treachery to exist, to wit: (a) the
employment of means of execution gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means or
method of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted.67 "The
essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without
warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner, affording the
hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape."68
As elucidated by the trial court in its Decision:
The victims were completely unaware of the danger forthcoming to
them as they were in the midst of enjoying a dance. The [appellant]
who caused the rolling of the hand grenade was at a complete
advantage knowing that no risk to his life was involved as he can
immediately fled [and] run away from the scene of the crime before
any explosion could occur. There was no defense so to speak of that
may came from the victims because they were completely unaware of
the danger about to happen in their midst resulting as it did to deaths
and injuries to many people among the crowd dancing. The act of
rolling the hand grenade is unpardonable. It is a treacherous heinous
act of the highest order. The victims can do nothing but to cry to high
heavens for vengeance.
xxxx
As supported by the evidence adduced at the trial, [it] is fully
convinced that the crime charge was committed under a cloak of
treachery, and there is no doubt about it. The attacker suddenly came
armed with a live fragmentation grenade, removed its pin and threw it
towards the crowd who were enjoying a dance, unsuspecting of any
danger that larks in their midst, thereby depriving them of any real
opportunity to defend themselves. The attacker has employed a swift
and unexpected attack to insure its execution without risk to himself x
x x.69
As the killing, in this case, is perpetrated with both treachery and by
means of explosives, the latter shall be considered as a qualifying
circumstance since it is the principal mode of attack. Reason dictates
that this attendant circumstance should qualify the offense while
treachery will be considered merely as a generic aggravating
circumstance.70
The Information also alleged that evident premeditation attended the
commission of the crime. For evident premeditation to be appreciated,
the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the time when
the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act showing
that the accused clung to their determination to commit the crime; and
(3) the lapse of a period of time between the decision and the
execution of the crime sufficient to allow the accused to reflect upon
the consequences of the act.71 However, none of these elements
could be gathered from the evidence on record.
Appellants act of detonating a hand grenade, particularly M26-A1
fragmentation grenade, inside the dancing place at Sitio Sto. Nio,
Liguan, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, likewise resulted in the wounding of
several persons. But, out of the 76 injured victims named in the
Information, only Purisima and Ligaya, both surnamed Dado,
appeared personally in court to testify on the injuries and damages
sustained by them by reason thereof.
Purisima affirmed that after the explosion she was brought to the
hospital because she suffered punctured wounds on her legs and
forehead by reason thereof. Also, she was not able to walk for two (2)
weeks. She was not confined though.72 She was issued medical
certificate73 dated 23 April 1999 in relation thereto stating that her
injuries will incapacitate her or will require medical assistance for one
to two weeks. Her testimony, as well as her medical certificate,
however, never mentioned that the wounds or injuries sustained by
her were fatal or mortal and had it not for the timely medical
assistance accorded to her she would have died. In the same way,
Ligaya stated that because of the explosion she suffered blasting
injuries on her chest and right forearm. She was confined and treated
for five days at BRTTH, Legazpi City,74 as evidenced by her medical
certificate75 dated 26 April 1999. There was also no mention that her
injuries and wounds were mortal or fatal.
Despite the fact that the injuries sustained by Purisima and Ligaya
were not mortal or fatal, it does not necessarily follow that the crimes
committed against them were simply less serious physical
injuries,76 because appellant was motivated by the same intent to kill
when he detonated the explosive device inside the dancing
place.77 Since the injuries inflicted upon them were not fatal and there
was no showing that they would have died if not for the timely medical
assistance accorded to them, the crime committed against them is
merely attempted murder.
As this Court has previously stated, the rest of the injured victims
named in the Information failed to testify. Though their medical
certificates were attached in the records, they were not marked as
exhibits and were not formally offered as evidence by the prosecution.
Consequently, this Court cannot consider the same to hold that the
crime committed as to them is frustrated murder and to grant damages
in their favor. This Court has held in People v. Franco,78 thus:
We thus reiterate the rule that the court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered. So fundamental is this injunction
that litigants alike are corollarily enjoined to formally offer any
evidence which they desire the court to consider. Mr. Chief Justice
Moran explained the rationale behind the rule in this wise:
The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his
findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence
offered by the parties to the suit.79 [Emphasis supplied].
Without the testimonies of the other injured victims or their medical
certificates, the court will have no basis to hold that appellant
committed the crime of frustrated murder as to them.
Given the foregoing, it is clear that this case falls under the first clause
of Article 4880 of the Revised Penal Code because by a single act, that
of detonating an explosive device inside the dancing place, appellant
committed two grave felonies, namely, (1) murder as to the 15
persons named in the Information; and (2) attempted murder as to
Purisima and Ligaya.
Therefore, this Court holds appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the complex crime of multiple murder with double attempted
murder.
As to penalty. Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code explicitly states:
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period. [Emphasis supplied].
A complex crime is committed when a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies. Appellants single act of detonating
an explosive device may quantitatively constitute a cluster of several
separate and distinct offenses, yet these component criminal offenses
should be considered only as a single crime in law on which a single
penalty is imposed because the offender was impelled by a single
criminal impulse which shows his lesser degree of perversity.81 Thus,
applying the aforesaid provision of law, the maximum penalty for the
most serious crime, which is murder, is death. Pursuant, however, to
Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty, the appellate court properly reduced the penalty of death,
which it previously imposed upon the appellant, to reclusion perpetua.
As to damages. Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that when
death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are
entitled to be indemnified for the death of the victim without need of
any evidence or proof thereof.82 Moral damages like civil indemnity, is
also mandatory upon the finding of the fact of murder.83 To conform
with recent jurisprudence on heinous crimes where the proper
imposable penalty is death, if not for Republic Act No. 9346, the award
of civil indemnity and moral damages to the heirs of each of the
deceased victims are both increased to 75,000.00 each.84
It is settled that exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal of civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages to the heirs of each
cases as part of civil liability if the crime was committed with one or of the deceased victims are hereby increased to 75,000.00,
more aggravating circumstances.85 In this case, the generic 75,000.00, and 30,000.00, respectively. The surviving victims,
aggravating circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the Purisima and Ligaya, are also awarded moral damages of 40,000.00
crime. The award of exemplary damages, therefore, is in order. To each. The award of exemplary damages to these surviving victims is
conform to current jurisprudence, this Court likewise increased the likewise increased to 30,000.00 each.
award of exemplary damages given by the appellate court to the heirs
of each of the deceased victims to 30,000.00 each.86
SO ORDERED.
Actual damages cannot be awarded for failure to present the receipts
covering the expenditures for the wake, coffin, burial and other
expenses for the death of the victims. In lieu thereof, temperate
damages may be recovered where it has been shown that the victims
family suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot be
proved with certainty as provided for under Article 2224 of the Civil
Code.87 This Court finds the award of 25,000.00 each to the heirs of
each of the deceased victims proper.
The surviving victims, Purisima and Ligaya, are also entitled to moral,
temperate and exemplary damages.
Ordinary human experience and common sense dictate that the
wounds inflicted upon the surviving victims, Purisima and Ligaya
would naturally cause physical suffering, fright, serious anxiety, moral
shock, and similar injuries. It is only justifiable to grant them moral
damages in the amount of 40,000.00 each in conformity with this
Courts ruling in People v. Mokammad.88
This Court affirms the appellate courts award of 25,000.00 as
temperate damages to each of the surviving victims, Purisima and
Ligaya. It is beyond doubt that these two surviving victims were
hospitalized and spent money for their medication. However, Purisima
failed to present any receipt for her hospitalization and medication.
Nevertheless, it could not be denied that she suffered pecuniary loss;
thus, it is only prudent to award 25,000.00 to her as temperate
damages.89 Ligaya, on the other hand, presented receipts for her
hospitalization and medication but the receipts were less than
25,000.00. In People v. Magdaraog90 citing People v. Andres,
Jr.,91 when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount
to less than 25,000.00 as in this case, the award of temperate
damages for 25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual damages of a
lesser amount.
Finally, the award of exemplary damages is also in order considering
that the crime was attended by the qualifying circumstance of
treachery.92 The award of exemplary damages to Purisima and Ligaya
is increased to 30,000.00 to conform to current jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01245 dated 24 September 2007 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant is found guilty of
the complex crime of multiple murder with double attempted murder.
In view, however, of Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition
of the death penalty, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without the benefit of parole. The award
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 137347 March 4, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
PO3 FERDINAND FALLORINA Y FERNANDO, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
For automatic review is the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 95, convicting appellant PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina
y Fernando of murder for the killing of eleven-year-old Vincent
Jorojoro, Jr. while the latter was flying his kite on top of a roof. The
court a quo sentenced the appellant to suffer the death penalty.
The accusatory portion of the Information charging the appellant with
murder reads:
That on or about the 26th day of September 1998, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to
kill, by means of treachery and taking advantage of
superior strength, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal
violence upon the person of VINCENT JOROJORO, JR. y
MORADAS, a minor, eleven (11) years of age, by then
and there, shooting him with a gun, hitting him on the
head, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal
wound which was the direct and immediate cause of his
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
said offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Upon arraignment on October 20, 1998, the appellant, with the
assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued.
Case for the Prosecution3
Eleven-year-old Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. was the third child of Vicente and
Felicisima Jorojoro. The family lived at Sitio Militar, Barangay Bahay
Toro, Project 8, Quezon City. Vincent, nicknamed "Hataw," was a
grade three pupil whose education was sponsored by the Spouses
Petinato, an American couple, through an educational foundation.4
The appellant was an officer of the Philippine National Police detailed
in the Traffic Management Group (TMG) based in Camp Crame,
Quezon City, but was on detached service with the Motorcycle Unit of
the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA).
At about 2:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, Vincent asked permission
from his mother Felicisima if he could play outside. She
agreed.5 Together with his playmate Whilcon "Buddha" Rodriguez,
Vincent played with his kite on top of the roof of an
abandoned carinderia beside the road in Sitio Militar, Barangay Bahay
Toro. Beside this carinderiawas a basketball court, where fourteen-
year-old Ricardo Salvo and his three friends, nicknamed L.A., Nono
and Puti, were playing backan, a game of basketball.
Ricardo heard the familiar sound of a motorcycle coming from the
main road across the basketball court. He was nonplussed when he
looked at the person driving the motorcycle and recognized the
appellant. Ricardo knew that the appellant abhorred children playing
on the roof of the carinderia and berated them for it. His friend Ong-
ong had previously been scolded by the appellant for playing on the
roof.
Ricardo called on Vincent and Whilcon to come down from the roof.
When the appellant saw Vincent and Whilcon, the former stopped his
motorcycle and shouted at them, "Putang inang mga batang ito, hindi
kayo magsibaba d'yan!" After hearing the shouts of the appellant,
Whilcon immediately jumped down from the roof.6 Vincent, meanwhile,
was lying on his stomach on the roof flying his kite. When he heard the
appellant's shouts, Vincent stood up and looked at the latter. Vincent
turned his back, ready to get down from the roof. Suddenly, the
appellant pointed his .45 caliber pistol7 towards the direction of Vincent
and fired a shot. Vincent was hit on the left parietal area. He fell from
the roof, lying prostrate near the canal beside the
abandoned carinderia and the basketball court.8
Whilcon rushed to help Vincent up but was shocked when he saw
blood on the latter's head. Whilcon retreated and left his friend.9 The
appellant approached Vincent and carried the latter's hapless body in
a waiting tricycle and brought him to the Quezon City General
Hospital. Vincent was pronounced dead on arrival.
Meantime, word reached Vincent's parents that their son was shot and
brought to the hospital. They rushed to the hospital, only to see their
son's already lifeless body. The appellant was nowhere to be found.
Dr. Ravell Ronald R. Baluyot of the Medico-Legal Division of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an autopsy where he
made the following findings:
Cyanosis, lips and nailbeds.
Abrasion, 7.0 x 2.0 cms., right arm, middle third, postero-
lateral aspect.
Contused-abrasion, 14.5 x 2.5 cms., postero-lateral chest
wall, right side.
Gunshot Wound, Entrance, 3.0 x 0.8 cms., roughly
ovaloid, with irregular edges, abrasion collar widest
postero-inferiorly, located at the head, left parietal area,
9.0 cms. above and 8.0 cms. behind the left external
auditory meatus, directed forward upward and from left to
right, involving the scalp, fracturing the left parietal bone
(punched-in), lacerating the left and right cerebral
hemispheres of the brain, fracturing the right parietal bone
(punched-out), lacerating the scalp, making an Exit
wound, 3.3 x 1.0 cms., stellate with everted and irregular
edges, 12.0 cms. above and 2.0 cms. in front of the right
external auditory meatus.
Intracranial hemorrhage, subdural and subarachnoid,
extensive, bilateral.
Scalp hematoma, fronto-parietal areas, bilateral.
Visceral organs, congested.
Stomach, one-fourth (1/4) filled with partially digested
food particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH: GUNSHOT WOUND, HEAD.10
Dr. Baluyot testified that the victim died from a single gunshot wound
in the head. The bullet entered the left upper back portion of the head
(above the level of the left ear)11 and exited to the right side.12 Dr.
Baluyot signed Vincent's certificate of death.13
At about 3:00 p.m., SPO2 Felix Pajarillo and Police Inspector Abelardo
P. Aquino proceeded to the scene of the shooting but failed to find the
victim and the appellant. They proceeded to the Quezon City General
Hospital where they heard that the victim had died. They returned to
the crime scene and recovered an empty shell from a .45 caliber
gun.14
On September 28, 1998, Major Isidro Suyo, the Chief of the MMDA
Motorcycle Unit to which the appellant was assigned on detached
service, reported to the Sangandaan Police Station that the appellant
had not reported for duty.15 At 2:10 p.m. of September 29, 1998, Police
Senior Superintendent Alfonso Nalangan, the Regional Director of the
PNP-TMG, NCR, surrendered the appellant to the Sangandaan Police
Station together with his .45 caliber pistol bearing Serial No. AOC-
38701.16
Meantime, upon the urging of Vicente Jorojoro, Ricardo was brought
to the Department of Justice where he was enrolled under its Witness
Protection Program. He gave his sworn statement to NBI Special
Agent Roberto Divinagracia on September 29, 1998.17 On the same
date, P/Insp. Abelardo Aquino wrote the Chief of the PNP Crime
Laboratory Examination Unit requesting for the ballistic examination of
the .45 caliber pistol with Serial No. AOC-38701 and the empty shell of
a .45 caliber gun found at the scene of the shooting.18 Before noon on
September 30, 1998, Divinagracia arrived at the station and turned
over two witnesses, Raymond Castro and Ricardo Salvo. He also
turned over the witnesses' sworn statements.19 On October 2, 1998,
on orders of the police station commander,20 Pajarillo took pictures of
the crime scene, including the carinderia and the roof with a bullet hole
as part of the office filing.21 He did not inform the prosecution that he
took such pictures, nor did he furnish it with copies thereof. However,
the appellant's counsel learned of the existence of the said pictures.
On October 5, 1998, P/Insp. Mario Prado signed Firearms
Identification Report No. FAIB-124-98 stating that:
FINDINGS:
Microscopic examination and comparison of
the specimen marked "FAP" revealed the
same individual characteristics with cartridge
cases fired from the above-mentioned
firearm.
CONCLUSION:
The specimen marked "FAP" was fired from
the above-mentioned caliber .45 Thompson
Auto Ordnance pistol with serial number
AOC-38701.22
Vincent's family suffered mental anguish as a result of his death. As
evidenced by receipts, they spent P49,174 for the funeral.23
Case for the Appellant
The appellant denied shooting Vincent. He testified that at about 1:30
p.m. of September 26, 1998, Macario Ortiz, a resident of Sitio San
Jose, Quezon City, asked for police assistance; Macario's brother-in-
law was drunk and armed with a knife, and was creating trouble in
their house. The appellant's house was located along a narrow alley
(eskinita) perpendicular to the main road. It was 200 meters away from
Macario's house.24 Responding to the call, the appellant took his .45
service revolver, cocked it, put the safety lock in place and tucked the
gun at his right waistline. He brought out his motorcycle from the
garage and slowly negotiated the bumpy alley leading to the main
road. Macario, who was waiting for him at the main road, called his
attention to his revolver which was about to fall off from his waist. The
appellant got distracted and brought his motorcycle to the right side of
the road, near the abandoned carinderia where he stopped. As he
stepped his right foot on the ground to keep himself from falling, the
appellant lost his balance and slipped to the right. At this point, the
revolver fell to the ground near his foot and suddenly went off.
Bystanders shouted, "Ano yon, ano yon, mukhang may tinamaan." He
picked up his gun and examined it. He put the safety latch back on
and tucked it at his right waistline. He then told Macario to wait for a
while to check if somebody was really hit. He went near the
abandoned carinderia and saw Vincent sprawled to the ground. He
picked up the bloodied child, boarded him on a tricycle on queue and
instructed its driver, Boy Candaje, to bring the boy to the hospital.25 On
board the tricycle were Jeffrey Dalansay and Milbert Doring.
The appellant rode his motorcycle and proceeded to his mother's
house in Caloocan City but did not inform her of the incident. He then
called his superior officer, Major Isidro Suyo, at the Base 103, located
at Roces Avenue, Quezon City. The appellant informed Major Suyo
that he met an accident; that his gun fell and fired; and, that the bullet
accidentally hit a child. He also told his superior that he might not be
able to report for work that day and the following day. He assured his
superior that he would surrender later. He then went to Valenzuela
City to the house of his friend PO3 Angelito Lam, who was a
motorcycle unit cop. The appellant stayed there for three days. He
also visited friends during that time.
On September 29, 1998, he went to the office of Major Suyo and
surrendered his .45 caliber pistol. Major Suyo accompanied and
turned over the appellant to the commanding officer at Camp Crame,
Quezon City. The appellant was subjected to a neuro and drug test.
He stated that the results of the drug test were negative. The appellant
was then referred to the Sangandaan Police Station for
investigation.26 The pictures27 of the crime scene were given to him by
Barangay Tanod Johnny Yaket, shown in one of the pictures pointing
to a bullet hole. The appellant's testimony was corroborated in pari
materia by Macario Ortiz.
Leonel Angelo Balaoro, Vincent's thirteen-year-old playmate, testified
that at 1:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, he was playing basketball at
Barangay Bahay Toro, at the basketball court along the road beside
the chapel. With him were Ricardo, Puti and Nono. Vincent was on the
rooftop of the carinderia with Whilcon. While Puti was shooting the
ball, an explosion ensued. He and Ricardo ran beside the chapel near
the basketball court. He looked back towards the basketball court and
saw the appellant, about 15 meters away from the canal, holding the
prostrate and bloodied Vincent. He did not see the appellant shoot
Vincent. He did not report what he saw to the police authorities. He
was ordered by his father to testify for the appellant. He also testified
that his mother was related to Daniel, the appellant's brother.
On January 19, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the
appellant of murder, qualified by treachery and aggravated by abuse
of public position. The trial court did not appreciate in favor of the
appellant the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina y Fernando GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined
in and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and in view
of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of taking
advantage by the accused of his public position (par. 1,
Art. 14, Revised Penal Code), is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of DEATH.
The accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of
the late Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. the amounts of P49,174.00,
as actual damages; P50,000.00, as moral damages;
 P25,000.00, as exemplary damages; and, P50,000.00, as
death indemnity.
The accused is to pay the costs.
The .45 caliber pistol, service firearm (Exh. "R") of the
accused, shall remain under the custody of the Court and
shall be disposed of in accordance with the existing rules
and regulations upon the finality of this decision.28
The appellant assigned the following errors for resolution:
1. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
GIVING DUE CREDENCE TO RELEVANT PHYSICAL
EVIDENCE, WHICH IF CONSIDERED COULD HAVE
ALTERED THE CONCLUSIONS ARRIVED AT BY THE
COURT AND THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.
2. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED BY
OVERSTEPPING THE LINE OF JUDGING AND
ADVOCACY, AND GOING INTO THE REALM OF
SPECULATION, PATENTLY DEMONSTRATING BIAS
AND PARTIALITY.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF RICARDO
SALVO, ALLEGED PROSECUTION EYEWITNESS,
WHOSE TESTIMONY IS WANTING IN PROBABILITY,
AS IT IS CONTRARY TO THE COMMON EXPERIENCE
OF MANKIND.
4. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
INEQUITABLY APPRECIATING EXCULPATORY AND
INCULPATORY FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH
SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN FAVOR OF
THE ACCUSED.
5. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER IN FAVOR OF THE
ACCUSED.
6. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE
OF TAKING ADVANTAGE OF HIS POSITION BY
ACCUSED.29
The appellant asserts that the trial court failed to appreciate in his
favor the physical evidence, viz., the hole found on the rooftop of
the carinderia where Vincent was when he was shot. The appellant
contends that the picture30taken on October 2, 1998 by no less than
SPO2 Felix Pajarillo, one of the principal witnesses of the prosecution,
and the pictures31 showing Barangay Tanod Yaket pointing to a hole
on the roof buttress the defense of the appellant that the shooting was
accidental. The appellant maintains that his service revolver fell to the
ground, hit a hard object, and as the barrel of the gun was pointed to
an oblique direction, it fired, hitting the victim who was on the rooftop.
The bullet hit the back portion of the victim's head, before exiting and
hitting the rooftop. The appellant posits that the pictures belie
Ricardo's testimony that he deliberately shot the victim, and, instead,
complements Dr. Baluyot's testimony that the gunshot wound came
from somewhere behind the victim, somewhere lower than the point of
entrance. The appellant invokes P/Insp. Mario Prado's testimony that if
a gun hits the ground in an oblique position, the gun will fire and the
bullet will exit in the same position as the gun, that is, also in an
oblique position.
The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, asserts that the
contention of the appellant is based on speculations and surmises, the
factual basis for his conclusion not having been proven by competent
and credible evidence. There is no evidence on record that the hole
shown in the pictures32 was caused by a bullet from a .45 caliber pistol.
The appellant did not present Barangay Tanod Johnny Yaket, who
was shown in the pictures, to testify on the matter. The appellant failed
to prove that any slug was found on the rooftop or under the roof
which came from the appellant's .45 caliber pistol. According to the
Solicitor General, the pictures relied upon by the appellant cannot
overcome the positive and straightforward testimony of the young
eyewitness Ricardo Salvo.
We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General. Whether or not the
appellant is exempt from criminal liability is a factual issue. The
appellant was burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence,
his affirmative defense that the victim's death was caused by his gun
accidentally going off, the bullet hitting the victim without his fault or
intention of causing it; hence, is exempt from criminal liability under
Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code which reads
The following are exempt from criminal liability:
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due
care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or
intention of causing it.
The basis for the exemption is the complete absence of intent and
negligence on the part of the accused. For the accused to be guilty of
a felony, it must be committed either with criminal intent or with fault or
negligence.33
The elements of this exempting circumstance are (1) a person is
performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) he causes an injury to
another by mere accident; and (4) without any fault or intention of
causing it.34 An accident is an occurrence that "happens outside the
sway of our will, and although it comes about through some act of our
will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences." If
the consequences are plainly foreseeable, it will be a case of
negligence.
In Jarco Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals,35 this Court held
that an accident is a fortuitive circumstance, event or happening; an
event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or
partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstance
is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.
Negligence, on the other hand, is the failure to observe, for the
protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand
without which such other person suffers injury. Accident and
negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the
other.36 In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be
unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed
without malice.37 The appellant must rely on the strength of his
evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution because
by admitting having caused the death of the victim, he can no longer
be acquitted.
In this case, the appellant failed to prove, with clear and convincing
evidence, his defense.
First. The appellant appended to his counter-affidavit in the Office of
the Quezon City Prosecutor the pictures showing the hole on the roof
of the carinderia38 to prove that he shot the victim accidentally.
However, when the investigating prosecutor propounded clarificatory
questions on the appellant relating to the pictures, the latter refused to
answer. This can be gleaned from the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor, thus:
Classificatory questions were propounded on the
respondent but were refused to be answered. This
certainly led the undersigned to cast doubt on
respondent's allegations. The defenses set forth by the
respondent are evidentiary in character and best
appreciated in a full-blown trial; and that the same is not
sufficient to overcome probable cause.39
Second. The appellant did not see what part of the gun hit the
victim.40 There is no evidence showing that the gun hit a hard object
when it fell to the ground, what part of the gun hit the ground and the
position of the gun when it fell from the appellant's waist.
Third. In answer to the clarificatory questions of the court, the
appellant testified that the chamber of his pistol was loaded with
bullets and was cocked when he placed it on his right waistline.41 He
also testified that the gun's safety lock was on. He was asked if the
gun would fire if the hammer is moved backward with the safety lock in
place, and the appellant admitted that even if he pulled hard on the
trigger, the gun would not fire:
Q Is this your service firearm?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q So the chamber might have been loaded when you
went out of the house?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What about the hammer, how was the hammer at
that time when you tucked the gun in your waistline?
A The hammer was cocked like this.
COURT:
Can you not stipulate that the hammer is moved
backwards near the safety grip.
ATTY. AND PROS. SINTAY:
Admitted, Your Honor.
ATTY. PEREZ:
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q You are a policeman, if there is a bullet inside the
barrel of the gun and then the hammer is moved
backwards and therefore it is open, that means that if you
pull the trigger, the bullet will fire because the hammer will
move forward and then hit the base of the bullet?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Therefore, the gun was cocked when you came
out?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q You did not place the safety lock before you went
out of your house?
A I safety (sic) it, sir.
Q So when you boarded the motorcycle, the gun was
on a safety lock?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Will you please place the safety lock of that gun,
point it upwards.
(witness did as instructed)
It is now on a safety locked (sic)?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Pull the trigger if the hammer will move forward?
(witness did as instructed)
A It will not, Your Honor.
COURT: (to the parties)
Q Can you not admit that at this position, the accused
pulled the trigger, the hammer did not move forward?
PROS. SINTAY AND ATTY. PRINCIPE:
Admitted, Your Honor.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q And therefore at this position, even if I pull the
trigger many times, a bullet will not come out from the
muzzle of the gun because the hammer is on a safety
locked (sic)?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Even if I pushed it very hard, it will not fire the gun?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Alright, I will ask you again a question. If the
hammer of the gun is like this and therefore it is open but
it is on a safety lock, there is space between the safety
grip which is found below the hammer, there is a space, is
it not?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q That even if I pushed the safety grip forward, like
this.
The Court gave the gun to the accused for him to
demonstrate.
(to the witness)
You push it forward in order to push the hammer. Hard if
you want but do not remove the safety lock.
(witness did as instructed)
The witness tried to push the safety grip and it does not
touch the hammer even if the hammer is cocked.42
Fourth. The trial court was witness as the appellant's counsel himself
proved that the defense proffered by the appellant was incredible. This
can be gleaned from the decision of the trial court:
3. More importantly, and which the Court considers it as
providential, when the counsel of the accused was
holding the gun in a cocked position and the safety lock
put in place, the gun accidentally dropped on the
cemented floor of the courtroom and the gun did not fire
and neither was the safety lock moved to its unlock
position to cause the hammer of the gun to move forward.
The safety lock of the gun remained in the same position
as it was when it dropped on the floor.43
Fifth. After the shooting, the appellant refused to surrender himself
and his service firearm. He hid from the investigating police officers
and concealed himself in the house of his friend SPO3 Angelito Lam in
Valenzuela City, and transferred from one house to another for three
days to prevent his arrest:
Q So did you surrender that afternoon of September
26, 1998?
A No, Your Honor.
Q I thought you were surrendering to Major Suyo?
A I was but I was not able to surrender to Major Suyo,
Your Honor.
Q Why, you were already able to talk to Major Suyo?
A Because at that time I was already confused and
did not know what to do, Your Honor.
ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)
 Q What is your relation with PO3 Angelito Lam of
Valenzuela?
A Just my co-motorcycle unit cop in the TMG, sir.
Q Did I hear you right that you slept at the residence
of PO3 Lam for three days?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why instead of going home to your residence at
Bahay Toro?
A Because I am worried, sir.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q So what did you do for three days in the house of
PO3 Lam?
A During daytime, I go to my friends, other friends and
in the evening, I go back to the house of PO3 Lam, Your
Honor.
Q So if you were able to visit your friends on
September 27 or 28, 1998 and then returned to the house
of PO3 Lam in the evening, why did you not go to Major
Suyo or to your 103 Base?
A Your Honor, during those days I am really calling
Major Suyo.
Q Why did you not go to your office at Camp Crame,
Quezon City?
A At that time, I did not have money, Your Honor.
Q What is the connection of you having money to that
of informing your officer that you will surrender?
A What I know, Your Honor, is that if I do that I will
already be detained and that I will have no money to
spend.
ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)
Q Mr. Witness, from the time of the incident up to
Sept. 29, 1998, you did not even visit your family in
Barangay Bahay Toro?
A No, sir.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q Did you send somebody to visit your family?
A No, Your Honor.
ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)
Q Did you cause to blotter the shooting incident of
Vincent?
A I was not able to do that, sir.
Q You did not even talk to the Bgy. Officials in Bgy.
Bahay Toro?
A No sir, because I already brought the child to the
hospital.44
The conduct of the appellant after the shooting belies his claim that
the death of the victim was accidental and that he was not negligent.
We agree with the encompassing disquisitions of the trial court in its
decision on this matter:
The coup de grace against the claim of the accused, a
policeman, that the victim was accidentally shot was his
failure to surrender himself and his gun immediately after
the incident. As a police officer, it is hard to believe that
he would choose to flee and keep himself out of sight for
about three (3) days if he indeed was not at fault. It is
beyond human comprehension that a policeman, who
professes innocence would come out into the open only
three (3) days from the incident and claim that the victim
was accidentally shot. Human behavior dictates, Q: You also drew here a motorcycle already marked Q: Ricardo, you said that you have known Fallorina for
especially when the accused is a policeman, that when as Exhibit O-7. Why did you include the motorcycle? two (2) years and you saw him shot Vincent on
one is innocent of some acts or when one is in the A: Because Fallorina was riding on that motorcycle at September 26, 1998 at around 2:30 in the afternoon.
performance of a lawful act but causes injury to another that time. Please look around the courtroom now and point at the
without fault or negligence, he would, at the first moment, COURT: (to the witness) person of PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina?
surrender to the authorities and give an account of the Q: So when Ferdinand Fallorina shot the boy, the CT. INTERPRETER:
accident. His failure to do so would invite suspicion and motorcycle was moving? Witness is pointing to a male person the one seated at the
whatever account or statement he would give later on A: It was stationary, your Honor. back of the lady and wearing a yellow shirt and maong
becomes doubtful. Q: Did you see where he came from, I am referring to pants and when asked of his name, he stated his name
For the accused, therefore, to claim that Vincent was Fallorina before you saw him shot the boy? as Ferdinand Fallorina.
accidentally shot is odious, if not, an insult to human ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)
intelligence; it is incredible and unbelievable, and more of A: He came from their house, Your Honor. Q: Can you tell to the Court whether you heard
a fantasy than a reality. It was a deliberate and intentional Q: What was his attire, I am referring to Ferdinand utterances at that time that he shot the victim?
act, contrary to accused's claim, that it happened outside Fallorina?
the sway of his will.45 A: He was wearing white shirt and blue pants, Your A: Yes, sir.
It is a well-entrenched rule that findings of facts of the trial court, its Honor. Q: What was that?
calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, its assessment of the A: "Putang inang mga batang ito, hindi kayo
credibility of the said witnesses and the probative weight of their ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness) magsisibaba diyan!"
testimonies are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect by the Q: At that time that Fallorina shot the victim, was
appellate court, as the trial judge was in a better position to observe Buddha still there? Q: After Fallorina shot Vincent Jorojoro, you saw
the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses as they testified.46 We A: He ran, sir. He jumped in this place, sir. Vincent Jorojoro falling from the roof, what about
have carefully reviewed the records of the case and found no reason (Witness is pointing to a place near the canal already Fallorina, what did he do?
to deviate from the findings of the trial court. marked as Exhibit O-14). A: He was still on board his motorcycle and then he
The testimony of prosecution witness Ricardo Salvo deserves Q: Now from the witness stand that you are now went at the back of the karinderia where Vincent fell, Your
credence. He testified in a positive and straightforward manner, which seated. Can you tell the Court how far where (sic) you Honor.
testimony had the earmarks of truth and sincerity. Even as he was from Fallorina at that time of the shooting? Q: And after he went at the back of the karinderia and
subjected to a grueling cross-examination by the appellant's counsel, COURT: looked at Vincent Jorojoro, what did he do?
he never wavered in his testimony. He positively identified the Can the prosecution and the accused stipulate that the A: He carried Vincent, Your Honor.
appellant as the assailant and narrated in detail how the latter distance pointed to by the witness is more or less 7 Q: And after carrying Vincent, what did he do?
deliberately aimed his gun and shot the victim. The relevant portions meters. A: He boarded Vincent in the tricycle.
of his testimony are quoted: Q: What about the gun, what did he do with the gun?
Q: While playing basketball with Nono, LA and Puti, ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness) A: I do not know anymore.47
do you remember of any unusual incident which took Q: How about the distance of Fallorina from Vincent, The appellant even uttered invectives at the victim and Whilcon before
place? can you tell that? he shot the victim. In fine, his act was deliberate and intentional.
A: Yes, sir. COURT: (to the witness) It bears stressing that of the eyewitnesses listed in the Information as
Q: What was that unusual incident? Can you point a distance between Fallorina and the boy witnesses for the prosecution, only Ricardo Salvo remained steadfast
A: When Vincent was shot, sir. at that time the body (sic) was shot? after he was brought under the Witness Protection Program of the
Q: Who shot Vincent? COURT: Department of Justice. He explained that the reason why he testified
A: Ferdinand Fallorina, sir. 10 meters more or less? for the prosecution, despite the fact that the appellant was a
policeman, was because he pitied the victim's mother who was always
Q: And in what place that Vincent was shot by Q: How long have you known Ferdinand Fallorina crying,48 unable to obtain justice for her son. We find no ill motive why
Fallorina? before the incident? Ricardo would falsely testify against the appellant. It was only his
A: He was at the roof of the karinderia, sir. A: More or less two years, sir. purest intention of ferreting out the truth in this incident and that justice
Q: Was there any companion of Vincent? Q: Why do you know him? be done to the victim.49 Hence, the testimony of Ricardo is entitled to
A: Yes, sir. A: I usually see him in that place at Sitio Militar, full faith and credence.
Q: What was the position of Vincent at that time that especially on Sundays, sir. The Crime Committed by the Appellant
you saw him and Fallorina shot him? We agree with the trial court that the appellant committed murder
A: "Nakatalikod po siya." Q: How many shots did you hear? under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code qualified by treachery. As
A: Only one, sir. the trial court correctly pointed out, Vincent was shot intentionally
Q: You included in this Exhibit O your drawing the Q: Do you recognize the gun used by Fallorina? while his back was turned against the appellant. The little boy was
figure of a certain Jeffrey and you and his tricycle? Why A: Yes, sir. merely flying his kite and was ready to get down from the roof when
did you include this drawing? Q: What was that gun? the appellant fired a shot directed at him. The essence of treachery is
A: Because it was in the tricycle where Vincent was A: .45 cal., sir. the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without
boarded to and brought to the hospital. Q: Are you familiar with .45 cal.? the slightest provocation on his part.50 Nonetheless, Vincent was an
(Witness referring to Exhibit O-11) A: No, sir. eleven-year-old boy. He could not possibly put up a defense against
Q: And who was the driver of that tricycle? Q: Why do you know that it was .45 cal.? the appellant, a police officer who was armed with a gun. It is not so
A: It was Jeffrey who drove the tricycle, sir. A: Because that kind of gun, I usually see that in the much as to put emphasis on the age of the victim, rather it is more of a
movies, sir. description of the young victim's state of helplessness.51 Minor
children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to
put up a defense. When an adult person illegally attacks a child,
treachery exists.52 The abuse of superior strength as alleged in the
Information is already absorbed by treachery and need not be
considered as a separate aggravating circumstance.53
We, however, note that the trial court appreciated the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of public position in this case. We reverse the
trial court on this score.
There is no dispute that the appellant is a policeman and that he used
his service firearm, the .45 caliber pistol, in shooting the victim.
However, there is no evidence on record that the appellant took
advantage of his position as a policeman when he shot the
victim.54 The shooting occurred only when the appellant saw the victim
on the rooftop playing with his kite. The trial court erred in appreciating
abuse of public position against the appellant.
The trial court did not, however, err in ruling that the appellant is not
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Surrender is said to be voluntary when it is done by the accused
spontaneously and made in such a manner that it shows the intent of
the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either
because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the
trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture.55
In this case, the appellant deliberately evaded arrest, hid in the house
of PO3 Lam in Valenzuela City, and even moved from one house to
another for three days. The appellant was a policeman who swore to
obey the law. He made it difficult for his brother-officers to arrest him
and terminate their investigation. It was only after the lapse of three
days that the appellant gave himself up and surrendered his service
firearm.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is
reclusion perpetua to death. Since there is no modifying circumstance
in the commission of the crime, the appellant should be sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, conformably to Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. The appellant PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina y Fernando
is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying
circumstances in the commission of the crime, is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is also ordered to pay the
heirs of the victim Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. the amount of P49,174 as
actual damages; P50,000 as moral damages; P50,000 as civil
indemnity; and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 147932 January 25, 2006
LAILA G. DE OCAMPO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, MAGDALENA B.
DACARRA, and ERLINDA P. ORAYAN, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for certiorari1 assails the Resolutions dated 15 September
2000 and 19 April 2001 of the Secretary of the Department of Justice
("DOJ Secretary") in I.C. No. 99-6254.2 The DOJ Secretary3 denied
Laila G. De Ocampos ("petitioner") petition for review of the
investigating prosecutors finding of probable cause against her for
homicide4 in relation to Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No.
7610 ("RA 7610")5 and for violation of the same provision of RA 7610.
The DOJ Secretary6 also denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The Facts
The present case arose from a sworn statement of respondent
Magdalena B. Dacarra ("Magdalena") executed before the Womens
Desk of the CPD Police Station in Batasan Hills, Quezon City on 10
December 1999. Magdalena stated that on 4 December 1999, her
nine-year-old son Ronald complained of dizziness upon arriving home
at about six in the evening. Ronald then vomited, prompting
Magdalena to ask what happened. Ronald replied that petitioner, who
was Ronalds teacher, banged his head against that of his classmate
Lorendo Orayan ("Lorendo"). Magdalena inspected Ronalds head and
saw a woundless contusion. Due to Ronalds continued vomiting,
Magdalena brought him to a quack doctor (arbularyo) on 5 December
1999. The following morning, Magdalena brought Ronald to the East
Avenue Medical Center where he underwent an x-ray. The attending
physician informed Magdalena that Ronalds head had a fracture.
Blood oozed out of Ronalds nose before he died on 9 December
1999.
Lorendo also executed a sworn statement narrating how petitioner
banged his head against Ronalds.
During the inquest proceedings on 14 December 1999, Assistant
Quezon City Prosecutor Maria Lelibet Sampaga ("inquest prosecutor")
ruled as follows:
Evidence warrants the release of the respondent for further
investigation of the charges against her. The case is not proper for
inquest as the incident complained of happened on December 4,
1999. Further, we find the evidence insufficient to support the charge
for homicide against the respondent. There is no concrete evidence to
show proof that the alleged banging of the heads of the two minor
victims could be the actual and proximate cause of the death of minor
Ronald Dacarra y Baluton. Besides, the police report submitted by the
respondent in this case states that said victim bears stitches or
sutures on the head due to a vehicular accident. There is no certainty,
therefore, that respondents alleged wrongdoing contributed or caused
the death of said victim.7
Subsequently, the case was referred to Assistant Quezon City
Prosecutor Lorna F. Catris-Chua Cheng ("investigating prosecutor")
for preliminary investigation. She scheduled the first hearing on 6
January 2000.
Respondent Erlinda P. Orayan ("Erlinda"), Lorendos mother, attended
the hearing of 6 January 2000 and alleged that petitioner offered
her P100,000, which she initially accepted, for her and her sons non-
appearance at the preliminary investigation. Erlinda presented the
money to the investigating prosecutor.
On 7 January 2000, Jennilyn Quirong, who witnessed the head-
banging incident, and Melanie Lugales, who claimed to be another
victim of petitioners alleged cruel deeds, filed their sworn statements
with the Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor.
On 18 January 2000, petitioner submitted her counter-affidavit.
Petitioner invoked the disposition of the inquest prosecutor finding
insufficient evidence to support the charges against her. Petitioner
assailed the omission in Magdalenas sworn statement about Ronalds
head injury due to a vehicular accident in November 1997. Petitioner
pointed out the absence of damage or injury on Lorendo as borne out
by his medical certificate. Petitioner contended that the head-banging
incident was not the proximate cause of Ronalds death, but the failed
medical attention or medical negligence. Petitioner also alleged that
Jennilyn Quirong and Melanie Lugales have immature perception.
Petitioner further asserted that the causes of death stated in Ronalds
Death Certificate are hearsay and inadmissible in the preliminary
investigation.
Ronalds Death Certificate shows the immediate cause of his death as
"Cardio Pulmonary Arrest," the underlying cause as "Cerebral
Edema," and other significant conditions contributing to death as
"Electrolyte imbalance and vomiting." The Autopsy Report, obtained
by the investigating prosecutor from the PNP Crime Laboratory in
Camp Crame, states the cause of death as "Intracranial hemorrhage
secondary to traumatic injury of the head."
The investigating prosecutor issued a Resolution finding probable
cause against petitioner for the offenses charged. The dispositive
portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully
recommended that [petitioner] be charged with Homicide in relation to
Art. VI, Sec. 10 of R.A. 7610 and Violation of Art. VI, Sec. 10(a) of
R.A. 7610 with no bail recommended for the Homicide since par. 6 of
Art. VI of Sec. 10 of R.A. 7610 provides that:
"For purposes of this Act, the penalty for the commission of acts
punishable under Articles 248, 249, 262, par. 2 and 263, par. 1 Act
No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes of
murder, homicide, other intentional mutilation and serious physical
injuries, respectively, shall be reclusion perpetua when the victim
is under twelve (12) years of age."
Bail recommended: No bail recommended Homicide, in relation to
Art. VI, Sec. 10, R.A. 7610; and Twenty Thousand pesos (P20,000.00)
Viol. of Sec. 10(a) of R.A. 76108
Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for review with the DOJ.
In her appeal to the DOJ, petitioner contended that the investigating
prosecutor showed bias in favor of complainants Magdalena and
Erlinda ("complainants") for not conducting a clarificatory hearing and
unilaterally procuring the autopsy report. Petitioner argued that the
investigating prosecutor erred in concluding that her alleged act of
banging Ronald and Lorendos heads was the cause of Ronalds injury
and that such was an act of child abuse. Petitioner also alleged that it
is the Office of the Ombudsman which has jurisdiction over the case,
and not the Quezon City Prosecutors Office.
The Resolution of the DOJ Secretary
The DOJ Secretary denied the petition for review. The DOJ Secretary
held that there was no bias in complainants favor when the
investigating prosecutor did not conduct a clarificatory hearing and
unilaterally procured the autopsy report as nothing precluded her from
doing so.
The DOJ Secretary upheld the investigating prosecutors finding that
Ronalds injury was the direct and natural result of petitioners act of
banging Ronald and Lorendos heads. The DOJ Secretary stated that
petitioner never denied such act, making her responsible for all its
consequences even if the immediate cause of Ronalds death was
allegedly the failed medical attention or medical negligence. The DOJ
Secretary held that assuming there was failure of medical attention or
medical negligence, these inefficient intervening causes did not break
the relation of the felony committed and the resulting injury.
The DOJ Secretary rejected petitioners claim that she is innocent as
held by the inquest prosecutor. The inquest prosecutor did not dismiss
the case. She merely recommended petitioners release for further
investigation since the case was not proper for inquest and the
evidence was then insufficient.
The DOJ Secretary further stated that the omission in Magdalenas
sworn statement about Ronalds head injury due to a vehicular
accident in November 1997 and the absence of any injury on Lorendo
are inconsequential.
Moreover, the DOJ Secretary ruled that whether the statements of the
causes of death in the death certificate and autopsy report are
hearsay, and whether Jennilyn Quirong and Melanie Lugales have
immature perception, are evidentiary matters which should be
determined during trial. The DOJ Secretary also sustained the
investigating prosecutors conclusion that the banging of Ronald and
Lorendos heads is an act of child abuse.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration9 which the DOJ Secretary
denied in his Resolution dated 19 April 2001.10
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
1. Whether petitioner was denied due process during the
preliminary investigation; and
2. Whether there is probable cause against petitioner for
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610 and for
violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
Before resolving the substantive issues in this case, the Court will
address the procedural issue raised by the Office of the Solicitor
General ("OSG").11 The OSG contends that instead of Rule 65, Rule
43 is applicable to the present case. Thus, the OSG argues that the
petition should be dismissed outright for being filed with this Court,
instead of with the Court of Appeals, under a wrong mode of appeal.
On the other hand, assuming Rule 65 applies, the OSG points out that
the petition for certiorari should be filed with the Court of Appeals.
Based on Memorandum Circular No. 58,12 the resolution of the DOJ
Secretary is appealable administratively to the Office of the President
since the offenses charged in this case are punishable by reclusion
perpetua.13 From the Office of the President, the aggrieved party may
file an appeal with the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 43.14
Even assuming that the DOJ Secretary committed grave abuse of
discretion in rendering the assailed Resolutions amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, petitioner should have filed the instant petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Hence, on the issue alone of
the propriety of the remedy sought by petitioner, this petition
for certiorarimust fail. However, considering the gravity of the offenses
charged and the need to expedite the disposition of this case, the
Court will relax the rules and finally resolve this case in the interest of
substantial justice.
Whether petitioner was denied
due process during the preliminary investigation
Absence of a clarificatory hearing
The Court rejects petitioners contention that she was denied due
process when the investigating prosecutor did not conduct a
clarificatory hearing. A clarificatory hearing is not indispensable during
preliminary investigation. Rather than being mandatory, a clarificatory
hearing is optional on the part of the investigating officer as evidenced
by the use of the term "may" in Section 3(e) of Rule 112. This
provision states:
(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be
clarified, he may set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to
the parties or their witnesses, during which the parties shall be
afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine
or cross-examine. xxx15 (emphasis supplied)
The use of the word "may" in a statute commonly denotes that it is
directory in nature. The term "may" is generally permissive only and
operates to confer discretion.16 Under Section 3(e) of Rule 112, it is
within the discretion of the investigation officer whether to set the case
for further hearings to clarify some matters.
In this case, the investigating prosecutor no longer conducted
hearings after petitioner submitted her counter-affidavit. This simply
means that at that point the investigating prosecutor believed that
there were no more matters for clarification. It is only in petitioners
mind that some "crucial points" still exist and need clarification. In any
event, petitioner can raise these "important" matters during the trial
proper.
Petitioner was not deprived of due process since both parties were
accorded equal rights in arguing their case and presenting their
respective evidence during the preliminary investigation. Due process
is merely an opportunity to be heard.17 Petitioner cannot successfully
invoke denial of due process since she was given the opportunity of a
hearing.18 She even submitted her counter-affidavit to the investigating
prosecutor on 18 January 2000.
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the
case on the merits.19 Its sole purpose is to determine whether a crime
has been committed and whether the respondent is probably
guilty of the crime.20 It is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive
display of the parties evidence.21 Hence, if the investigating
prosecutor is already satisfied that he can reasonably determine the
existence of probable cause based on the parties evidence thus
presented, he may terminate the proceedings and resolve the case.
Obtaining a copy of the autopsy report
Petitioner argues that she was denied the right to examine evidence
submitted by complainants when the investigating prosecutor
unilaterally obtained a copy of the autopsy report from the PNP Crime
Laboratory.
Petitioner fails to persuade us. Though the autopsy report is not part of
the parties evidence, the Rules on preliminary investigation do not
forbid the investigating prosecutor from obtaining it. Neither is there a
law requiring the investigating prosecutor to notify the parties before
securing a copy of the autopsy report. The autopsy report, which
states the causes of Ronalds death, can either absolve or condemn
the petitioner. Unfortunately for petitioner, the investigating prosecutor
found that the autopsy report bolstered complainants allegations.
Moreover, there is nothing to support petitioners claim that the
investigating prosecutor was biased in favor of complainants. There
are other pieces of evidence aside from the autopsy report upon which
the investigating prosecutor based her finding of probable cause. The
autopsy report is not the sole piece of evidence against petitioner. The
sworn statement of the other victim, Lorendo, and the eyewitness
account of Jennilyn Quirong, substantiate the charges against
petitioner. Petitioners failure to deny the occurrence of the head-
banging incident also strengthened complainants allegations.
Petitioner mistakenly cites Section 3(d) of Rule 11222 in arguing that
the investigating prosecutor should not go beyond the evidence
presented by complainants in resolving the case. This provision
applies if the respondent cannot be subpoenaed or if subpoenaed fails
to submit her counter-affidavit within the prescribed period. Such is not
the case here where petitioner filed her counter-affidavit and both
parties presented their respective evidence.
Whether there is probable cause
for the offenses charged against petitioner
Existence of probable cause
Petitioner challenges the finding of probable cause against her for the
offenses charged arguing that the head-banging incident was not the
proximate cause of Ronalds death. Petitioner insists that efficient
intervening events caused Ronalds death.
We do not agree. There is probable cause for the offenses charged
against petitioner. Probable cause is the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind that a
crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty of the
crime.23
In the present case, Ronald, a nine-year-old student, died five days
after his teacher, petitioner in this case, allegedly banged his head
against that of his classmate Lorendo. There is nothing in the records
showing petitioners specific denial of the occurrence of such act.
Petitioner simply stated that "the head-banging incident happened but
[she] did not perpetrate it."24 In effect, petitioner admits the occurrence
of the head-banging incident but denies committing it.
The alleged intervening events before Ronald died, namely: (a) the
consultation with a quack doctor, and (b) the three-day confinement in
the East Avenue Medical Center, are not sufficient to break the
relation of the felony committed and the resulting injury. Were it not for
the head-banging incident, Ronald might not have needed medical
assistance in the first place.
These circumstances which allegedly intervened causing Ronalds
death are evidentiary matters which should be threshed out during the
trial. The following are also matters better left for the trial court to
appreciate: (a) the contents of the death certificate and autopsy report,
(b) the medical records of Ronalds accident in November 1997, (c)
the perception of witnesses Jennilyn Quirong and Melanie Lugales,
and (d) the alleged lack of medical assistance or medical negligence
which caused Ronalds death.
To repeat, what is determined during preliminary investigation is only
probable cause, not proof beyond reasonable doubt.25 As implied by
the words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with probability,
not absolute or moral certainty.26
Asserting her innocence, petitioner continues to invoke the disposition
of the inquest prosecutor finding insufficient evidence for the charges
against her. As correctly ruled by the DOJ Secretary, the inquest
prosecutor did not dismiss the case but merely recommended it for
further investigation since it was not proper for inquest and the
evidence was then insufficient. Moreover, petitioners active
participation in the preliminary investigation without questioning the
propriety of such proceedings indicates petitioners agreement with the
recommendation of the inquest prosecutor for the further investigation
of the case.
Charges of Homicide and Child Abuse
Petitioners single act of allegedly banging the heads of her students
had two distinct victims, namely Ronald and Lorendo. Therefore,
petitioner has to face prosecution for cruelty to each victim. For
Ronalds death, petitioner is being charged with homicide under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code27 in relation to Section 10(a), Article VI
of RA 7610 punishable by reclusion perpetua.28 However, this does
not mean that petitioner is being charged with the distinct offenses of
homicide and child abuse for Ronalds death. On the other hand, for
her cruelty to Lorendo, petitioner is being charged with violation of
Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610 punishable by prision mayor in its
minimum period.
Contrary to petitioners contention, Section 10(a), Article VI of RA
7610 is clear. This provision reads:
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty
or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the
childs development including those covered by Article 59 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period.
Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being
understood in more than one way, or of referring to two or more things
at the same time. A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more
than one interpretation.29 In the present case, petitioner fails to show
convincingly the ambiguity in Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610.
Section 3(b), Article VI of RA 7610 defines "child abuse" as the
maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes
physical abuse and cruelty. Petitioners alleged banging of the heads
of Ronald and Lorendo is clearly an act of cruelty.
In a petition for certiorari like this case, the primordial issue is whether
the DOJ Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court rules that the DOJ Secretary
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that there is
probable cause to charge petitioner of the crimes of homicide and
child abuse. The Court further rules that the investigating prosecutor
did not act with grave abuse of discretion in securing motu proprio the
autopsy report and in not calling for a clarificatory hearing. This ruling
does not diminish in any way the constitutional right of petitioner to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proven.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition. We AFFIRM the
Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice dated 15 September 2000 and
19 April 2001 in I.C. No. 99-6254. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 132875-76 February 3, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member
of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his
conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness
on six counts1is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this
motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense.
The issue raised is one of the first impression.
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and
rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? In
answering the query, we are called upon to balance relevant and
conflicting factors in the judicial interpretation of legislative privilege in
the context of penal law.
The accused-appellant's "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge
Mandate As Member of House of Representatives" was filed on the
grounds that
1. Accused-appellant's reelection being an expression of
popular will cannot be rendered inutile by any ruling,
giving priority to any right or interest not even the
police power of the State.
2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative
amounts to taxation without representation.
3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties
amounts to his suspension/removal and mocks the
renewed mandates entrusted to him by the people.
4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del
Norte wants their voice to be heard.
5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained
lawmaker to attend sessions of the U.S. Congress.
6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona
fide member thereof and urges a co-equal branch of
government to respect its mandate.
7. The concept of temporary detention does not
necessarily curtail the duty of accused-appellant to
discharge his mandate.
8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the
conditions/restrictions when allowed to leave jail.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign
will." He states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of
Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress.
Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform
the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his
constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds
that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising
from pending criminal cases.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people.
In the exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the
continuity of government and the perpetuation of its benefits.
However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising
from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our
first task is to ascertain the applicable law.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of
Government-executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the
majesty of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public
mind that election or appointment to high government office, by itself,
frees the official from the common restraints of general law. Privilege
has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In
fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience
rather than exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the
House of Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as
Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history
of the provision shows that privilege has always been granted in a
restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special
privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its
terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable
considerations.
The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative
Department.
Sec 15. The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony,
and breach of the peace be privileged from arrest during
their attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in
going to and returning from the same, . . .
Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the
exemption applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the
accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal
Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was
subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried
or whose convictions were pending appeal.
The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:
Art. VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa
shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six
years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his
attendance at its sessions and in going to and returning
from the same.
For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there
was no immunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity
and intent to confine it within carefully defined parameters is illustrated
by the concluding portion of the provision, to wit:
. . . but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the
member involved the custody of the law within twenty four
hours after its adjournment for a recess or for its next
session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its
failure to do so.
The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus
the obligation of Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to
the custody of the law. The requirement that he should be attending
sessions or committee meetings has also been removed. For relatively
minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is in session.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress' function to
attend sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution which states that
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to
do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day
to day and may compel the attendance of absent
Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as
such House may provide.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he
should be exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the
Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent
members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a
legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a
crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.
Accused-appellant's reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos2,
which states, inter alia, that
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts
done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise
would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their
officers. When a people have elected a man to office, it
must be assumed that they did this with the knowledge of
his life and character, and that they disregarded or
forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of
any. It is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or
misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in
the above-quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the
administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his
present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising from
the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that
preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is
not removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress
or, otherwise, disqualified.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after
final conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It
also serves as an example and warning to others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo,3 it is the
injury to the public which State action in criminal law seeks to redress.
It is not the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the Regional
Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus subjected to
incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.4
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which
voted him into office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he
might escape eventual punishment if permitted to perform
congressional duties outside his regular place of confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant's arrest
was issued, he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his
colleagues in the House of Representatives for him to attend the
sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is
now the same body whose call he initially spurned which accused-
appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This can not be
countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from its being contrary to
well-defined Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims
of the State's penal system.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions the Regional Trial
Court of Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at
the Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons, to wit:
a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics
held at the Batasan Complex, Quezon City, on the issue
of whether to expel/suspend him from the House of
Representatives;
b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the
clinic of his dentist in Makati City;
c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati
Medical Center, Makati City;
d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City.
In this case, accused-appellant commuted by chartered
plane and private vehicle.
He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the
New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise
allowed/permitted to leave the prison premises, to wit.
a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer
program" for the purpose of 1) establishing a mahogany
seedling bank and 2) planting mahogany trees, at the
NBP reservation. For this purpose, he was assigned one
guard and allowed to use his own vehicle and driver in
going to and from the project area and his place of
confinement.
b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his
dentist in Makati City.
c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati
City for his heart condition.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to
a member of Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves
from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the
authorities or upon court orders.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature.
Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and
committee meeting for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually
make him free man with all the privilege appurtenant to his position.
Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant's
status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the
purposes of the correction system. Of particular relevance in this
regard are the following observations of the Court in Martinez v.
Morfe:5
The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered
and fortified by policy considerations. There is, to be sure,
a full recognition of the necessity to have members of
Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional
Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them
to discharge their vital responsibilities, bowing to no other
force except the dictates of their conscience of their
conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech
should be accorded them. When it comes to freedom from
arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a
privileged class, without justification in reason, if
notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they
would be considered immune during their attendance in
Congress and in going to and returning from the same.
There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a
legislator or a delegate can perform his functions
efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression
of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event
come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen
considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing
to it that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that
may be expressed that the prosecuting arm of the
government might unjustly go after legislators belonging
to the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the
 safeguards thrown around an accused by the
Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an individual, would
constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of
power. The presumption of course is that the judiciary
would remain independent. It is trite to say that in each
and every manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue
is of the essence.
The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District
of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since
he is treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives,
the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his
mandate. He also claims that the concept of temporary detention does
not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and that he
has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when he is
allowed to leave jail.
We remain unpersuaded.1wphi1.nt
No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other
member of the House of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a
congressional office situated at Room N-214, North Wing Building,
House of Representatives Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City,
manned by a full complement of staff paid for by Congress. Through
[an] inter-department coordination, he is also provided with an office at
the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, where
he attends to his constituents." Accused-appellant further admits that
while under detention, he has filed several bills and resolutions. It also
appears that he has been receiving his salaries and other monetary
benefits. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has been discharging
his mandate as a member of the House of Representative consistent
with the restraints upon one who is presently under detention. Being a
detainee, accused-appellant should not even have been allowed by
the prison authorities at the National Penitentiary to perform these
acts.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to
Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his
freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could
achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within
the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect
a person with full knowledge that he suffering from a terminal illness,
they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full
term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question
of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of laws."6 This simply means that all persons similarly
situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed.7 The organs of government may not show
any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality not
prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that
allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial
differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner
from the same class as all persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public
officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.
The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious.
The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislative ranks
highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only
one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention
the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation.
Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or
a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that
has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be
deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a
function depends on the need to its exercise. The duty of a mother to
nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor
with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a
particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial
constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never
has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different
classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise,
insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or
types of individuals.8
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities
imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government
authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly
assert that their interests are disregarded.9
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not
a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions
and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him
from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted
in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to
the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same
class.10
Imprisonment is the restraint of a man's personal liberty; coercion
exercised upon a person to prevent the free exercise of his power of
locomotion.11
More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of
one's liberty. As a punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or
lawful tribunal, and is personal to the accused.12 The term refers to the
restraint on the personal liberty of another; any prevention of his
movements from place to place, or of his free action according to his
own pleasure and will.13 Imprisonment is the detention of another
against his will depriving him of his power of locomotion14 and it "[is]
something more than mere loss of freedom. It includes the notion of
restraint within limits defined by wall or any exterior barrier."15
It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature,
changes an individual's status in society.16 Prison officials have the
difficult and often thankless job of preserving the security in a
potentially explosive setting, as well as of attempting to provide
rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry into the social
mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment
and elimination of certain rights.17
Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-
appellant's claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any
other right or interest, including the police power of the State.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19069 October 29, 1968
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AMADEO PERALTA, ET AL., defendants,
ANDRES FACTORA, LEONARDO DOSAL, ANGEL PARUMOG,
AMADEO PERALTA, FLORENCIO LUNA and GERVASIO
LARITA, defendants-review.
Assistant Solicitors General Vicente A. Torres and Antonio Ibarra for
plaintiff-appellee.
J. R. Nuguid for defendants-review.
PER CURIAM:
In the decision in criminal case 7705 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal,subject of the present automatic review, Amadeo Peralta,
Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Parumog, Gervasio
Larita and Florencio Luna (six among the twenty-two
defendants1 charged therein with multiple murder) were pronounced
guilty, and all sentenced to death, to indemnify jointly and severally the
heirs of each of the victims, namely, Jose Carriego, Eugenio
Barbosaand Santos Cruz, in the sum of P6,000, and each to pay his
corresponding share of the costs.
The information recites:
That on or about the 16th day of February, 1958, in the
municipality of Muntinglupa, province of Rizal, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, who are convicts confined in the
New Bilibid Prisons by virtue of final judgments,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and aiding
one another, with evident premeditation and treachery, all
armed with deadly weapons, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kill Jose Carriego, Eugenio
Barbosa and Santos Cruz, also convicts confined in the
same institution, by hitting, stabbing and striking them
with ice picks, clubs and other improvised weapons,
pointed and/or sharpened, thereby inflicting upon the
victims multiple serious injuries which directly caused their
deaths.
That the aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism is
present in the commission of the crime in that the crime
was committed after the accused have been convicted by
final judgments and while they are serving the said
judgments in the New Bilibid Prisons.
Contrary to law with the following aggravating
circumstances:
1. That the crime was committed with insult to public
authorities;
2. That the crime was committed by a band;
3. That the crime was committed by armed men or
persons who insure or afford impunity;
4. That use of superior strength or means was employed
to weaken the defense;
5. That as a means to the commission of the crime doors
and windows have been broken;
6. That means was employed which add ignominy to the
natural effects of the act;
7. That the crime was committed where public authorities
were engaged in the discharge of their duties.
Upon motion of the provincial fiscal before trial, the lower court
dismissed the charge against one of the accused2for lack of evidence.
After the prosecution had rested its case, the charges against six of
the accused3 were dismissed for failure of the prosecution to establish
a prima facie case against them. One of the defendants died4during
the pendency of the case. After trial, the court a quo acquitted eight5 of
the remaining defendants.
As early as in 1956, a great number of inmates confined in the
national penitentiary at Muntinglupa arrayed themselves into two
warring gangs, the "Sigue-Sigue" and the "OXO", the former
composed predominantly of Tagalog inmates, the latter comprised
mainly of prisoners from the Visayas and Mindanao. Since then the
prison compound has been rocked time and time again by bloody riots
resulting in the death of many of their members and suspected
sympathizers. In an effort to avert violent clashes between the
contending groups, prison officials segrerated known members of the
"Sigue-Sigue" from those of the "OXO". Building 1 housed "Sigue-
Sigue" members, while a majority of the prisoners confined in Bldg. 4
belonged to the "OXO". Even in Bldg. 4, which is composed of four
brigades, namely, 4-A and 4-B (upper floor) and 4-C and 4-D (first
floor), inmates from Visayas and Mindanao, from whom the "OXO"
drew most of its members, were confined in 4-A.
It was at about 7:00 a.m. on February 16, 1958, while the inmates of
the penitentiary were preparing to attend Sunday mass, that a fight
between two rival members of the "Sigue-Sigue" and "OXO" gangs
occurred in the plaza where the prisoners were assembled, causing a
big commotion. The fight was, however, quelled, and those involved
were led away for investigation, while the rest of the prisoners were
ordered to return to their respective quarters. Hardly had conditions
returned to normal when a riot broke out in Bldg. 1, a known lair of the
"Sigue-Sigue". The inmates thereof tried to invade Bldg. 4, where
many members and sympathizers of the "OXO" gang were confined.
The timely arrival of the guards forced the invading inmates to retreat
and return to Bldg. 1. Moments later, another riot erupted in Bldg. 4,
as the inmates of brigade 4-A destroyed the lock of their door and then
rampaged from one brigade to another. The invading prisoners from 4-
A, mostly "OXO" members and sympathizers, clubbed and stabbed to
death Jose Carriego, an inmate of 4-B. Afterwards, they forcibly
opened the door of 4-C and killed two more inmates, namely, Eugenio
Barbosa and Santos Cruz.
The three victims sustained injuries which swiftly resulted in their
death before they could be brought to the hospital.
Jose Carriego: (a) lacerated wound on the lower lip, 5 cm. in length
and 3 cm.in depth; (b) contusion and hematoma of the back of the
neck, about 2 inches in diameter; and (c) five punctured wounds in the
chest, penetrating the lungs. Cause of death: internal hemorrhage
from multiple fatal wounds in the chest.
Eugenio Barbosa: (a) lacerated wound in the occipital region, 3 inches
in length and 1 cm. in depth; (b) two penetrating wounds in the
abdomen, puncturing the intestines; (c) lacerated wounds on the right
oxilla, 3 cm. in length and 2 cm. in depth; and (d) several bruises at
the right and left lower extremities. Cause of death: shock, secondary
to internal hermorrhage in the abdomen.
Santos Cruz: (a) lacerated wound on the head, 2 inches in length; (b)
fractured skull; (c) wound on the upper lip cutting the lip in two; (d)
seven punctured wounds in the chest, two of which were penetrating;
(e) hematoma on the right hand; and (f) three punctured wounds on
the left hand. Cause of death: fractured skull.
Romeo Pineda, an inmate and first quarter-in-charge of brigade 4-B,
testified that while he was taking his breakfast with Jose Carriego, who
was at the time the representative of the prisoners confined in 4-B to
the inmate carcel, he "suddenly heard commotion" near the door of
their brigade; that his fellow prisoners started shouting "pinapasok na
tayo," as the invading inmates from brigade 4-A stampeded into 4-B;
that he and Carriego took hold of their clubs and stood at the end of
the passageway; that he saw Carriego surrender his club to Andres
Factora, an "OXO" member from 4-A; that as Carriego started to walk
away, Factora clubbed Carriego on the nape causing the latter to fall;
that Factora turned up the face of his fallen victim and struck him
again in the face; that while Carriego was in this prostrate position,
Amadeo Peralta and Leonardo Dosal, companions of Factora,
repeatedly stabbed him.
The testimony of Pineda was corroborated in all its material points by
Juanito Marayoc and Avelino Sauza, both inmates of 4-B. These two
prosecution witnesses identified Factora, Peralta and Dosal as the
assailants of Carriego.
From 4-B, the invading inmates of 4-A went down and forcibly entered
4-C. According to Oscar Fontillas, an inmate of 4-C, he saw the
prisoners from 4-A rushing toward their brigade; that among the
invading inmates who forced open the door of 4-C, with help from the
inside provided by Visayan prisoners confined in 4-C, were Factora,
Dosal, Angel Parumog, Gervacio Larita, Ernesto Fernandez and Jose
Tariman; that he saw Factora, Larita and Fernandez kill Barbosa,
while the rest of their companies instructed the Visayans to leave their
cell and ordered the "Manila boys" (Tagalogs) to remain. Antonio
Pabarlan, another inmate of 4-C, declared that he saw Peralta stab
Barbosa, as Dosal, Larita, Florencio Luna, Parumog and Factora
clubbed the hapless victim. Another inmate of 4-C, Jose Halili, not only
corroborated the testimony of Fontillas and Pabarlan but as well
added grim details. He declared that while Barbosa was trying to hide
under a cot, he was beaten and stabbed to death by Dosal, Parumog,
Factora and Fernandez, with Luna, Larita, Pedro Cogol and Eilel
Tugaya standing guard, armed with clubs and sharp instruments, in
readiness to repel any intervention from the Tagalog inmates. Carlos
Espino, also confined in 4-C, declared that he saw Parumog, Peralta
Factora and Larita assault and kill Barbosa.
The same witnesses for the prosecution testifies that after killing
Barbosa, the invading "OXO" members and sympathizers proceeded
to hunt for Santos Cruz, another Tagalog like Carriego and Barbosa.
Halili testified, that he saw Peralta, Larita, Cogol and Tugaya take
Santos Cruz to 4-A from 4-C; that Santos Cruz knelt down and
pleaded for his life, saying, "Maawa kayo sa akin. Marami akong
anak;" that Luna and Peralta were unmoved as they stabbed Santos
Cruz to death. Pabarlan declared that after the death of Barbosa,
Santos Cruz was brought to 4-A by the invading inmates but Cruz was
able to slip back to his cell only to be recaptured by Factora, Dosal
and Luna and brought to near the fire escape where he was clubbed
and stabbed to death by Parumog, Dosal, Factora and Peralta.
Fontillas and Espino corroborated the declarations of Halili and
Pabarlan with respect to the killing of Santos Cruz, and both
mentioned Larita as one of the assailants of Cruz.
The trial judge summarized the evidence for the prosecution, thus:
"... it clearly appears that the three killings in question
were an offshoot of the rivalry between the two
organizations. All those who were killed, namely,
Barbosa, Carriego and Santos Cruz, were Tagalogs and
well known as members if not sympathizers of the Sigue
Sigue, while the accused so charged with their killing
were mostly members if not sympathizers of the Oxo
organization. These three killings were sparked by the
commotion that happened in the plaza between 8:00 and
9:00 in the morning, while the prisoners were preparing to
go the mass ... It was evident that the clash that occurred
in the plaza produced a chain reaction among the
members and followers of the two organizations. The
inmates of Building No. 1, known lair of the Sigue Sigues
bolted the door of their cells and tried to invade Building
No. 4 where a big number of the Oxo members and their
sympathizers were confined, but, however, were forced to
retreat by the timely arrival of the guards who sent them
back to their building. When the members of the Oxo in
Building No. 4 learned about this, they went on a rampage
looking for members of the Sigue Sigue or their
sympathizers who were confined with them in the same
building. As the evidence of the prosecution shows, the
accused who were confined in Brigade 4-A of Building No.
4 led the attack. They destroyed the lock of their
dormitories and with the help of their companions
succeeded in bolting the door of the different brigades,
and once they succeeded in bolting the doors of the
different brigades, they went inside and tried to segregate
the Tagalogs from their group; that as soon as they
discovered their enemies they clubbed and stabbed them
to death ...
Admitting that he was one among several who killed Jose Carriego,
Peralta nevertheless claims self-defense. He testified that on the
morning of the riot he was attacked by Carriego and Juan Estrella
near the door of 4-A while he was returning to his brigade from the
chapel with some companions; that Carriego clubbed him on the head;
that he was able to parry the second blow of Carriego and then
succeeded in squeezing Carriego's head with his hands; that forthwith
he whipped out an improvised ice pick and stabbed Carriego several
times; that when he (Peralta) was already dizzy due to the head
wound he sustained from the clubbing, Carriego managed to slip
away; that he then became unconscious, and when he regained
consciousness he found himself on a tarima with his head bandaged.
Peralta's declarations do not inspire belief. The impressive array of
prosecution witnesses who saw him actively participate in the killing of
the three victims pointed to him as the aggressor, not the aggrieved.
Pineda, Marayoc and Sauza positively identified him as one of the
assailants of Carriego. Contrary to the pretensions of Peralta, Carriego
an alleged "Sigue-Sigue" member, would not have attacked him,
knowing fully well that Building No. 4 was an "OXO" lair where the
"Sigue-Sigue" members were outnumbered. Anent the killing of
Barbosa and Santos Cruz, Peralta failed to offer any explicit defense
to rebut the inculpatory declarations of prosecution witnesses
Pabarlan and Espino who saw him participate in the killing of Barbosa
and those of Halili, Fontillas and Espino who identified him as one of
the murderers of Santos Cruz.
For his part, Leonardo Dosal stated that he killed Santos Cruz, but
also claims self-defense in exculpation. He declared that Santos Cruz,
Jose Carriego, Juanita Espino, Carlos Espino and Oscar Fontillas
invaded 4-A where he was confined; that a free-for-all forthwith
ensued; that he then heard Santos Cruz call Carlos Espino, and
advise the latter to go away as "I will be the one to kill that person
(Dosal);" that with a sharp instrument, Cruz hit him on the head and
then on the nose; that as Cruz was about to hit him again, he got hold
of his ice pick and stabbed Cruz repeatedly until the latter fell.
Dosal's avowal is clearly belied by the positive testimonies of
Pabarlan, Halili and Espino who saw him participate in the killing of
Santos Cruz. If it is true that Dosal killed Santos Cruz in self-defense
when the latter together with his companions supposedly invaded
Dosal's brigade (4-A), why is it that the body of Santos Cruz was found
at the fire escape near the pasillo between 4-C and 4-D of the first
floor of Bldg. 1 instead of in 4-A which is located in the upper floor?
Moreover, Dosal failed to explain why he was seen in 4-C, which he
does not deny, since he was an inmate of 4-A where he was allegedly
attacked. With respect to the murder of Carriego and Barbosa with
which Dosal was also charged, he did not offer any evidence in his
behalf. Hence, the testimonies of Pineda, Marayoc and Sauza
identifying him as one of the killers of Carriego and those of Pabarlan,
Halili and Espino implicating him in the death of Santos Cruz, stand
unrebutted.
Andres Factora declared that he clubbed Carriego and Santos Cruz
under compulsion of his co-accused who threatened to kill him if he
disobeyed their order; that he did not hit Barbosa anymore because
the latter was already dead; that it was his co-accused who actually
killed the three victims. Again, the declarations of the prosecution
witnesses, which were accorded full credence by the trial court,
expose the guilt of Factora beyond reasonable doubt. In fact,
according to Pineda, whose testimony was corroborated by Marayoc,
it was Factora who started the mass assault by clubbing Carriego
treacherously. Fontillas, Halili, Pabarlan and Espino pointed to Factora
as one of the killers of Barbosa, while at least three prosecution
witnesses, namely, Pabarlan, Fontillas and Espino, saw Factora
participate in the slaying of Santos Cruz. The active participation of
Factora in the killing, which is clear index of voluntariness, thus
negates his claim of compulsion and fear allegedly engendered by his
co-accused.
Angel Parumog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna take refuge in the
exculpatory device of alibi. Parumog testified that he did not
participate in the killing of the three inmates because he stayed during
that entire hapless day in the office of the trustees for investigation
after the fight in the plaza; that he was implicated in the killing by the
prosecution witnesses because of his refusal to accede to their
request to testify against his co-accused; that he is not a Visayan but a
Tagalog from Nueva Ecija. Larita claims that he did not know about
the killing until he was informed that three inmates had died; that on
the day in question he was brought to the police trustee brigade for
investigation after the incident in the plaza; that he was escorted back
to his brigade only in the afternoon. Luna likewise disclaims any
knowledge of the killing and asserts that for the entire duration of the
riot he remained in his cell (brigade 4-A).
The alibis of Parumog, Larita and Luna merit no credence when set
against the positive testimonies of prosecution witness identifying
them as participants in the killing of Barbosa and Santos Cruz.
Pabarlan, Espino and Fontillas declared that Larita was one of the
killers of Barbosa; Espino and Fontillas declared that they saw Larita
kill Santos Cruz; Pabarlan, Halili and Espino testified that they saw
Parumog participate in the murder of Barbosa; Espino, Fontillas and
Pabarlan stated that Parumog took part in the killing of Santos Cruz.
Pabarlan and Halili declared that Luna participated in the fatal assault
on Barbosa and Santos Cruz.
The alibis of the accused are thus sufficiently overcome by strong
evidence to the contrary. The defense of alibi is generally weak since
it is easy to concoct. For this reason, courts view it with no small
amount of caution, and accept it only when proved by positive, clear
and satisfactory evidence.6 In the case at bar, if Parumog and Larita
were really confined in the police trustee brigade for investigation on
the day of the incident, there should have been a record of the alleged
investigation. But none was presented. The testimony of Luna that
throughout the riot he stayed in his cell is quite unnatural. He claims
that he did not even help his cellmates barricade their brigade
with tarimas in order to delay if not prevent the entry of the invading
inmates. According to him, he "just waited in one corner."
The rule is settled that the defense of alibi is worthless in the face of
positive identification by prosecution witnesses pointing to the accused
as particeps criminis.7 Moreover, the defense of alibi is an issue of fact
the resolution of which depends almost entirely on the credibility of
witnesses who seek to establish it. In this respect the relative weight
which the trial judge accords to the testimony of the witnesses must,
unless patently inconsistent without evidence on record, be
accepted.8 In the case at bar, the trial court, in dismissing the alibis of
Parumog, Larita and Luna, said that "their mere denial cannot prevail
over the positive testimony of the witnesses who saw them participate
directly in the execution of the conspiracyto kill Barbosa, Carriego and
Santos Cruz."
The killing of Carriego constitutes the offense of murder because of
the presence of treachery as a qualifying circumstance: Carriego was
clubbed by Factora from behind, and as he lay prostrate and
defenseless, Peralta and Dosal stabbed him repeatedly on the chest.
The blow on the nape and the penetrating chest wounds were all fatal,
according to Dr. Bartolome Miraflor. Abuse of superior strength
qualified the killing of Barbosa and Santos Cruz to the category of
murder. The victims, who were attacked individually were completely
overwhelmed by their assailants' superiority in number and weapons
and had absolutely no chance at all to repel or elude the attack. All the
attackers were armed with clubs or sharp instruments while the victims
were unarmed, as so found by the trial court. In fact, Halili testified that
Barbosa was clubbed and stabbed to death while he was trying to hide
under a cot, and Santos Cruz was killed while he was on his knees
pleading for his life.
The essential issue that next confronts us is whether conspiracy
attended the commission of the murders. The resolution of this issue
is of marked importance because upon it depends the quantity and
quality of the penalties that must be imposed upon each of the
appellants.
For this purpose, it is not amiss to briefly restate the doctrine on
conspiracy, with particular emphasis on the facets relating to its
nature, the quantum of proof required, the scope and extent of the
criminal liability of the conspirators, and the penalties imposable by
mandate of applicable law.
Doctrine. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it.9 Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when the law
specifically provides a penalty therefor as in treason,10 rebellion11 and
sedition.12 The crime of conspiracy known to the common law is not an
indictable offense in the Philippines.13 An agreement to commit a
crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as
long as the conspirators do not perform overt acts in furtherance of
their malevolent design, the sovereignty of the State is not outraged
and the tranquility of the public remains undisturbed. However, when
in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by
two or more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes
pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of the
perpetrators. In stressing the significance of conspiracy in criminal law,
this Court in U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto14 opined that
While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for
the mere act of conspiring to commit a crime unless the
statute specifically prescribes a penalty therefor,
nevertheless the existence of a conspiracy to commit a
crime is in many cases a fact of vital importance, when
considered together with the other evidence of record, in
establishing the existence, of the consummated crime and
its commission by the conspirators.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the
conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and
character of their respective active participation in the commission of
the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy
because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all.15 The
foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two or
more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through
the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively,
each individual whose evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing
is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by
himself alone."16 Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts
other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to
commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done
in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy."17 The imposition of
collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one
case18 where this Court held that
... it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each
(conspirator) without taking into consideration the close
and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal
act, for the commission of which they all acted by
common agreement ... The crime must therefore in view
of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed
between the ... accused, be regarded as the act of the
band or party created by them, and they are all equally
responsible ...
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and
confederated in the commission of the felony proved, collective liability
of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and
the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual
degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene
of the crime. Of course, as to any conspirator who was remote from
the situs of aggression, he could be drawn within the enveloping ambit
of the conspiracy if it be proved that through his moral ascendancy
over the rest of the conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to
carry out the conspiracy.
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the
scheming and execution of the crime amply justifies the imputation to
all of them the act of any one of them. It is in this light that conspiracy
is generally viewed not as a separate indictable offense, but a rule for
collectivizing criminal liability.
The ensnaring nature of conspiracy is projected in bold relief in the
cases of malversation and rape committed in furtherance of a common
design.
The crime of malversation is generally committed by an accountable
public officer who misappropriates public funds or public property
under his trust.19 However, in the classic case of People vs.
Ponte20 this Court unequivocally held that a janitor and five municipal
policemen, all of whom were not accountable public officers, who
conspired and aided a municipal treasurer in the malversation of
public funds under the latter's custody, were principally liable with the
said municipal treasurer for the crime of malversation. By reason of
conspiracy, the felonious act of the accountable public officer was
imputable to his co-conspirators, although the latter were not similarly
situated with the former in relation to the object of the crime
committed. Furthermore, in the words of Groizard, "the private party
does not act independently from the public officer; rather, he knows
that the funds of which he wishes to get possession are in the latter's
charge, and instead of trying to abstract them by circumventing the
other's vigilance he resorts to corruption, and in the officer's
unfaithfulness seeks and finds the most reprehensible means of
accomplishing a deed which by having a public officer as its moral
instrument assumes the character of a social crime."21 In an earlier
case22 a non-accountable officer of the Philippine Constabulary who
conspired with his superior, a military supply officer, in the
malversation of public funds was adjudged guilty as co-principal in the
crime of malversation, although it was not alleged, and in fact it clearly
appeared, that the funds misappropriated were not in his custody but
were under the trust of his superior, an accountable public officer.
In rape, a conspirator is guilty not only of the sexual assault he
personally commits but also of the separate and distinct crimes of rape
perpetrated by his co-conspirators. He may have had carnal
knowledge of the offended woman only once but his liability includes
that pertaining to all the rapes committed in furtherance of the
conspiracy. Thus, in People vs. Villa,23 this Court held that
... from the acts performed by the defendants front the
time they arrived at Consolacion's house to the
consummation of the offense of rape on her person by
each and everyone of them, it clearly appears that they
conspired together to rape their victim, and therefore each
one is responsible not only for the rape committed
personally by him, but also that committed by the others,
because each sexual intercourse had, through force, by
each one of the defendants with the offended was
consummated separately and independently from that
had by the others, for which each and every one is also
responsible because of the conspiracy.
The rule enunciated in People vs. Villa was reiterated in People vs.
Quitain24 where the appellant Teofilo Anchita was convicted of forcible
abduction with double rape for having conspired and cooperated in the
sexual assault of the aggrieved woman, although he himself did not
actually rape the victim. This Court observed:
We have no doubt all in all that Teofilo Anchita took part
in the sexual assault ... the accused inserted his fingers in
the woman's organ, and widened it. Whether he acted out
of lewdness or to help his brother-in-law consummate the
act, is immaterial; it was both maybe. Yet, surely, by his
conduct, this prisoner conspired and cooperated, and is
guilty.
With respect to robbery in band, the law presumes the attendance of
conspiracy so much so that "any member of a band who is present at
the commission of a robbery by the band, shall be punished as
principal of any of the assaults committed by the band, unless it be
shown that he attempted to prevent the same."25 In this instance,
conspiracy need not be proved, as long as the existence of a band is
clearly established. Nevertheless, the liability of a member of the band
for the assaults committed by his group is likewise anchored on the
rule that the act of one is the act of all.
Proof of conspiracy. While conspiracy to commit a crime must be
established by positive evidence,26 direct proof is not essential to show
conspiracy.27 Since by it nature, conspiracy is planned in utmost
secrecy, it can seldom be proved by direct evidence.28 Consequently,
competent and convincing circumstantial evidence will suffice to
establish conspiracy. According to People vs. Cabrera,29 conspiracies
are generally proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, and
circumstances which vary according to the purposes to be
accomplished. If it be proved that the defendants pursued by their acts
the same object, one performing one part and another another part of
the same, so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the
same object, one will be justified in the conclusion that they were
engaged in a conspiracy to effect the object." Or as elucidated
in People vs. Carbonel30the presence of the concurrence of minds
which is involved in conspiracy may be inferred from "proofs of facts
and circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they
are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or
more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the
same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting
among to concert means is proved ..." In two recent cases,31 this Court
ruled that where the acts of the accused, collectively and individually,
clearly demonstrate the existence of a common design toward the
accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident.
Conspiracy presupposes the existence of a preconceived plan or
agreement; however, to establish conspiracy, "it is not essential that
there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime, it being
sufficient that the malefactors committed shall have acted in concert
pursuant to the same objective."32 Hence, conspiracy is proved if there
is convincing evidence to sustain a finding that the malefactors
committed an offense in furtherance of a common objective pursued in
concert.
Liability of conspirators. A time-honored rule in the corpus of our
jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators
who acted in furtherance of the common design are liable as co-
principals.33 This rule of collective criminal liability emanates from the
ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted action of the
conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent
display of their evil partnership, and for the consequences of such
criminal enterprise they must be held solidarity liable.
However, in order to hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason
of conspiracy, it must be established that he performed an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy, either by actively participating in the
actual commission of the crime, or by lending moral assistance to his
co-conspirators by being present at the scene of the crime, or by
exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to
move them to executing the conspiracy. The difference between an
accused who is a principal under any of the three categories
enumerated in Art. 17 of the Revised Penal Code and a co-conspirator
who is also a principal is that while the former's criminal liability is
limited to his own acts, as a general rule, the latter's responsibility
includes the acts of his fellow conspirators.
In People vs. Izon, et al.,34 this Court acquitted appellant Francisco
Robles, Jr., who was convicted by the trial court of robbery with
homicide as a conspirator, on the ground that although he may have
been present when the conspiracy to rob was proposed and made,
"Robles uttered not a word either of approval or disapproval. There are
authorities to the effect that mere presence at the discussion of a
conspiracy, even approval of it, without any active participation in the
same, is not enough for purposes of conviction." In a more recent
case,35this Court, in exonerating one of the appellants, said:
There is ample and positive evidence on record that
appellant Jose Guico was absent not only from the
second meeting but likewise from the robbery itself. To be
sure, not even the decision under appeal determined
otherwise. Consequently, even if Guico's participation in
the first meeting sufficiently involved him with the
conspiracy (as he was the one who explained the location
of the house to be robbed in relation to the surrounding
streets and the points thereof through which entrance and
exit should be effected), such participation and
involvement, however, would be inadequate to render him
criminally liable as a conspirator. Conspiracy alone,
without the execution of its purpose, is not a crime
punishable by law, except in special instances (Article 8,
Revised Penal Code) which, however, do not include
robbery.
Imposition of multiple penalties where conspirators commit more than
one offense. Since in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all, then,
perforce, each of the conspirators is liable for all of the crimes
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Consequently, if the
conspirators commit three separate and distinct crimes of murder in
effecting their common design and purpose, each of them is guilty of
three murders and shall suffer the corresponding penalty for each
offense. Thus in People vs. Masin,36 this Court held:
... it being alleged in the information that three crimes
were committed not simultaneously indeed but
successively, inasmuch as there was, at least, solution of
continuity between each other, the accused (seven in all)
should be held responsible for said crimes. This court
holds that the crimes are murder ... In view of all these
circumstances and of the frequently reiterated doctrine
that once conspiracy is proven each and every one of the
conspirators must answer for the acts of the others,
provided said acts are the result of the common plan or
purpose ... it would seem evident that the penalty that
should be imposed upon each of the appellants for each
of their crimes should be the same, and this is the death
penalty ... (emphasis supplied).
In the aforesaid case, however, the projected imposition of three death
penalties upon each of the conspirators for the three murders
committed was not carried out due to the lack of the then requisite
unanimity in the imposition of the capital penalty.
In another case,37 this Court, after finding that conspiracy attended the
commission of eleven murders, said through Mr. Justice Tuason:
Some members of this Court opine that the proper penalty
is death, under the circumstances of the case, but they
fall short of the required number for the imposition of this
punishment. The sentence consequently is reclusion
perpetua; but each appellant is guilty of as many crimes
of murder as there were deaths (eleven) and should be
sentenced to life imprisonment for each crime, although
this may be a useless formality for in no case can
imprisonment exceed forty years. (Emphasis supplied.)
In People vs. Masani,38 the decision of the trial court imposing only
one life imprisonment for each of the accused was modified by this
Court on appeal on the ground that "inasmuch as their (the
conspirators') combined attack resulted in the killing of three persons,
they should be sentenced to suffer said penalty (reclusion perpetua)
for each of the three victims (crimes)." (Emphasis supplied.)
It is significant to note that in the abovementioned cases, this Court
consistently stressed that once conspiracy is ascertained, the
culpability of the conspirators is not only solidary (all co-principals) but
also multiple in relation to the number of felonies committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy. It can also be said that had there been
a unanimous Court in the Masin and Macaso cases, multiple death
penalties would have been imposed upon all the conspirators.
Legality and practicality of imposing multiple death penalties upon
conspirators. An accused who was charged with three distinct crimes
of murder in a single information was sentenced to two death penalties
for two murders,39 and another accused to thirteen (13) separate death
penalties for the 13 killings he perpetrated.40 Therefore there appears
to be no legal reason why conspirators may not be sentenced to
multiple death penalties corresponding to the nature and number of
crimes they commit in furtherance of a conspiracy. Since it is the
settled rule that once conspiracy is established, the act of one
conspirator is attributable to all, then each conspirator must be held
liable for each of the felonious acts committed as a result of the
conspiracy, regardless of the nature and severity of the appropriate
penalties prescribed by law.
The rule on the imposition of multiple penalties where the accused is
found guilty of two or more separate and distinct crimes charged in
one information, the accused not having interposed any objection to
the multiplicity of the charges, was enunciated in the leading case
of U.S. vs. Balaba,41 thus: Upon conviction of two or more offenses
charged in the complaint or information, the prescribed penalties for
each and all of such offenses may be imposed, to be executed in
conformity with the provisions of article 87 of the Penal Code [now
article 70 of the Revised Penal Code]. In other words, all the penalties
corresponding to the several violations of law should be imposed.
Conviction for multiple felonies demands the imposition of multiple
penalties.
The two conceptual exceptions to the foregoing rule, are the complex
crime under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code and the special
complex crime (like robbery with homicide). Anent an ordinary
complex crime falling under article 48, regardless of the multiplicity of
offenses committed, there is only one imposable penalty the
penalty for the most serious offense applied in its maximum period.
Similarly, in special complex crimes, there is but a single penalty
prescribed by law notwithstanding the number of separate felonies
committed. For instance, in the special complex crime of robbery with
hommicide the imposible penalty is reclusion perpetua to
death42 irrespective of the number of homicides perpetrated by reason
or on occasion of the robbery.
In Balaba, the information charged the accused with triple murder. The
accused went to trial without objection to the said information which
charged him with more than one offense. The trial court found the
accused guilty of two murders and one homicide but it imposed only
one death penalty. In its review en consulta, this Court modified the
judgment by imposing separate penalties for each of the three
offenses committed. The Court, thru Mr. Justice Carson (with Mr.
Justice Malcolm dissenting with respect to the imposition of two death
penalties), held:
The trial judge was erroneously of the opinion that the
prescribed penalties for the offenses of which the accused
was convicted should be imposed in accord with the
provisions of article 89 of the Penal Code. That article is
only applicable to cases wherein a single act constitutes
two or more crimes, or when one offense is a necessary
means for committing the other. (U.S. vs. Ferrer, 1 Phil.
Rep., 56)
It becomes our duty, therefore, to determine what penalty
or penalties should have been imposed upon the accused
upon conviction of the accused of three separate felonies
charged in the information.
There can be no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
convict of two separate crimes of asesinato (murder)
marked with the generic aggravating circumstances
mentioned in the decision of the trial judge ... It follows
that the death penalty must and should be imposed for
each of these offenses ...
Unless the accused should be acquitted hereafter on
appeal of one or both the asesinatos with which he is
charged in the information, it would seem to be a useless
formality to impose separate penalties for each of the
offenses of which he was convicted, in view of the nature
of the principal penalty; but having in mind the possibility
that the Chief Executive may deem it proper to grant a
pardon for one or more of the offenses without taking
action on the others; and having in mind also the express
provisions of the above cited article 87 of the Penal Code,
we deem it proper to modify the judgment entered in the
court below by substituting for the penalty imposed by the
trial judge under the provisions of article 89 of the
Code, the death penalty prescribed by law for each of the
two separate asesinatos of which he stands convicted,
and the penalty of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day
of reclusion temporal (for the separate crime of homicide)
... these separate penalties to be executed in accord with
the provisions of article 87 of the Penal Code. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The doctrine in Balaba was reiterated in U.S. vs. Jamad43 where a
unanimous Court, speaking again thru Mr. Justice Carson (with Mr.
Justice Malcolm concurring in the result in view of the Balaba ruling),
opined:
For all the offenses of which the accused were convicted
in the court below, the trial judge imposed the death
penalty, that is to say the penalty prescribed for the most
serious crime committed, in its maximum degree, and for
this purpose made use of the provisions of article 89 of
 the Penal Code [now article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code]. But as indicated in the case of the United States
vs. Balaba, recently decided wherein the controlling facts
were substantially similar to those in the case at bar, "all
of the penalties corresponding to the several violations of
law" should have been imposed under the express
provisions of article 87 [now engrafted in article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code] and under the ruling in that case,
the trial court erred in applying the provision of article 89
of the code.
We conclude that the judgment entered in the court below
should be reversed, ... and that the following separate
penalties should be imposed upon him [the accused
Jamad], to be executed in accordance with article 87 of
the Penal Code: (1) The penalty of death for the parricide
of his wife Aring; (2) the penalty of life imprisonment for
the murder of Labonete; (3) the penalty of life
imprisonment for the murder of Torres; (4) the penalty of
12 years and one day of cadena temporal for the
frustrated murder of Taclind ...
The doctrine in Balaba was reechoed in People vs. Guzman,44 which
applied the pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code, where this
Court, after finding the accused liable as co-principals because they
acted in conspiracy, proceeded to stress that where an "information
charges the defendants with the commission of several crimes of
murder and frustrated murder, as they failed to object to the multiplicity
of the charges made in the information, they can be found guilty
thereof and sentenced accordingly for as many crimes the information
charges them, provided that they are duly established and proved by
the evidence on record." (Emphasis supplied.)
The legal and statutory justification advanced by the majority
in Balaba for imposing all the penalties (two deaths and one life
imprisonment) corresponding to the offense charged and proved was
article 87 of the old Penal Code which provided:
When a person is found guilty of two or more felonies or
misdemeanors, all the penalties corresponding to the
several violations of law shall be imposed, the same to be
simultaneously served, if possible, according to the nature
and effects of such penalties.
in relation to article 88 of the old Code which read:
When all or any of the penalties corresponding to the
several violations of the law can not be simultaneously
executed, the following rules shall be observed with
regard thereto:
1. In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their
respective severity shall be followed so that they may be
executed successively or as nearly as may be possible,
should a pardon have been granted as to the penalty or
penalties first imposed, or should they have been served
out.
The essence and language, with some alterations in form and in the
words used by reason of style, of the above-cited provisions have
been preserved in article 70 of the Revised Penal Code which is the
product of the merger of articles 87 and 88 of the old Penal Code.
Article 70 provides:
When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he
shall serve them simultaneously if the nature of the
penalties will so permit; otherwise, the following rules shall
be observed:
In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their
respective severity shall be followed so that they may be
executed successively or as nearly as may be possible,
should a pardon have been granted as to the penalty or
penalties first imposed, or should they have been served
out.
Although article 70 does not specifically command, as the former
article 87 clearly did, that "all the penalties corresponding to the
several violations of law shall be imposed," it is unmistakable,
however, that article 70 presupposes that courts have the power to
impose multiple penalties, which multiple penal sanctions should be
served either simultaneously or successively. This presumption of the
existence of judicial power to impose all the penalties corresponding to
the number and nature of the offenses charged and proved is manifest
in the opening sentence of article 70: "When the culprit has to serve
two or more penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously if the nature
of the penalties will so permit ..." (Emphasis supplied.) Obviously, the
two or more penalties which the culprit has to serve are those legally
imposed by the proper court. Another reference to the said judicial
prerogative is found in the second paragraph of article 70 which
provides that "in the imposition of the penalties, the order of their
respective severity shall be followed ..." Even without the authority
provided by article 70, courts can still impose as many penalties as
there are separate and distinct offenses committed, since for every
individual crime committed, a corresponding penalty is prescribed by
law. Each single crime is an outrage against the State for which the
latter, thru the courts ofjustice, has the power to impose the
appropriate penal sanctions.
With respect to the imposition of multiple death penalties, there is no
statutory prohibition or jurisprudential injunction against it. On the
contrary, article 70 of the Revised Penal Code presumes that courts
have the power to mete out multiple penalties without distinction as to
the nature and severity of the penalties. Moreover, our jurisprudence
supports the imposition of multiple death penalties as initially
advocated in Balaba and thunderously reechoed in Salazar where the
accused was sentenced on appeal to thirteen (13) death penalties.
Significantly, the Court in Balaba imposed upon the single accused
mixed multiple penalties of two deaths and one life imprisonment.
The imposition of multiple death penalties is decried by some as a
useless formality, an exercise in futility. It is contended, undeniably
enough, that a death convict like all mortals, has only one life to forfeit.
And because of this physiological and biological attribute of man, it is
reasoned that the imposition of multiple death penalties is impractical
and futile because after the service of one capital penalty, the
execution of the rest of the death penalties will naturally be rendered
impossible. The foregoing opposition to the multiple imposition of
death penalties suffers from four basic flaws: (1) it fails to consider the
legality of imposing multiple capital penalties; (2) it fails to distinguish
between imposition of penalty and service of sentence; (3) it ignores
the fact that multiple death sentences could be served simultaneously;
and (4) it overlooks the practical merits of imposing multiple death
penalties.
The imposition of a penalty and the service of sentence are two
distinct, though related, concepts. The imposition of the proper penalty
or penalties is determined by the nature, gravity and number of
offenses charged and, proved, whereas service of sentence is
determined by the severity and character of the penalty or penalties
imposed. In the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, the court
does not concern itself with the possibility or practicality of the service
of the sentence, since actual service is a contingency subject to varied
factors like successful escape of the convict, grant of executive
clemency or natural death of the prisoner. All that go into the
imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, to reiterate, are the
nature, gravity and number of the offenses charged and proved and
the corresponding penalties prescribed by law.
Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because they will
have to be executed simultaneously. A cursory reading of article 70
will show that there are only two modes of serving two or more
(multiple) penalties: simultaneously or successively. The first rule is
that two or more penalties shall be served simultaneously if the nature
of the penalties will so permit. In the case of multiple capital penalties,
the nature of said penal sanctions does not only permit but actually
necessitates simultaneous service.
The imposition of multiple death penalties, far from being a useless
formality, has practical importance. The sentencing of an accused to
several capital penalties is an indelible badge of his extreme criminal
perversity, which may not be accurately projected by the imposition of
only one death sentence irrespective of the number of capital felonies
for which he is liable. Showing thus the reprehensible character of the
convict in its real dimensions, the possibility of a grant of executive
clemency is justifiably reduced in no small measure. Hence, the
imposition of multiple death penalties could effectively serve as a
deterrent to an improvident grant of pardon or commutation. Faced
with the utter delinquency of such a convict, the proper penitentiary
authorities would exercise judicious restraint in recommending
clemency or leniency in his behalf.
Granting, however, that the Chief Executive, in the exercise of his
constitutional power to pardon (one of the presidential prerogatives
which is almost absolute) deems it proper to commute the multiple
death penalties to multiple life imprisonments, then the practical effect
is that the convict has to serve the maximum of forty (40) years of
multiple life sentences. If only one death penalty is imposed, and then
is commuted to life imprisonment, the convict will have to serve a
maximum of only thirty years corresponding to a single life sentence.
Reverting now to the case at bar, it is our considered view that the trial
court correctly ruled that conspiracy attended the commission of the
murders. We quote with approval the following incisive observations of
the court a quo in this respect:
Although, there is no direct evidence of conspiracy, the
Court can safely say that there are several circumstances
to show that the crime committed by the accused was
planned. The following circumstances show beyond any
doubt the acts of conspiracy: First, all those who were
killed, Barbosa, Santos Cruz and Carriego, were
Tagalogs. Although there were many Tagalogs like them
confined in Building 4, these three were singled out and
killed thereby showing that their killing has been
planned. Second, the accused were all armed with
improvised weapons showing that they really prepared for
the occasion. Third, the accused accomplished the killing
with team work precision going from one brigade to
another and attacking the same men whom they have
previously marked for liquidation and lastly, almost the
same people took part in the killing of Carriego, Barbosa
and Santos Cruz.
It is also important to note that all the accused were inmates of
brigade 4-A; that all were from either the Visayas or Mindanao except
Peralta who is from Masbate and Parumog who hails from Nueva
Ecija; that all were either "OXO" members or sympathizers; and that
all the victims were members of the "Sigue-Sigue" gang.
The evidence on record proves beyond peradventure that the accused
acted in concert from the moment they bolted their common brigade,
up until the time they killed their last victim, Santos Cruz. While it is
true that Parumog, Larita and Luna did not participate in the actual
killing of Carriego, nonetheless, as co-conspirators they are equally
guilty and collectively liable for in conspiracy the act of one is the act
of all. It is not indispensable that a co-conspirator should take a direct
part in every act and should know the part which the others have to
perform. Conspiracy is the common design to commit a felony; it is not
participation in all the details of the execution of the crime. All those
who in one way or another help and cooperate in the consummation of
a felony previously planned are co-principals.45 Hence, all of the six
accused are guilty of the slaughter of Carriego, Barbosa and Santos
Cruz each is guilty of three separate and distinct crimes of murder.
We cannot agree, however, with the trial court that evident
premeditation was also present. The facts on record and the
established jurisprudence on the matter do not support the conclusion
of the court a quo that evident premeditation "is always present and
inherent in every conspiracy." Evident premeditation is not inherent in
conspiracy as the absence of the former does not necessarily negate
the existence of the latter.46 Unlike in evident premeditation where a
sufficient period of time must elapse to afford full opportunity for
meditation and reflection for the perpetrator to deliberate on the
consequences of his intended deed, conspiracy arises at the very
instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony
and forthwith decide to commit it.47 This view finds added support
in People vs. Custodia,48 wherein this Court stated:
Under normal conditions, where the act of conspiracy is
directly established, with proof of the attendant
deliberation and selection of the method, time and means
of executing the crime, the existence of evident
premeditation can be taken for granted. In the case before
us, however, no such evidence exists; the conspiracy is
merely inferred from the acts of the accused in the
perpetration of the crime. There is no proof how and when
the plan to kill Melanio Balancio was hatched, or what
time elapsed before it was carried out; we are, therefore,
unable to determine if the appellants enjoyed "sufficient
time between its inception and its fulfillment
dispassionately to consider and accept the
consequences." (cf. People vs. Bangug, 52 Phil. 91.) In
other words, there is no showing of the opportunity of
reflection and the persistence in the criminal intent that
characterize the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation (People vs. Mendoza, 91 Phil. 58; People
vs. Iturriaga, 47 Off. Gaz., [Supp to No. 12] 166; People
vs. Lesada 70 Phil., 525.)
Not a single extenuating circumstance could be appreciated in favor of
any of the six accused, as they did neither allege nor prove any.
In view of the attendance of the special aggravating circumstance
of quasi-recidivism, as all of the six accused at the time of the
commission of the offenses were serving sentences49 in the New
Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa by virtue of convictions by final judgments
the penalty for each offense must be imposed in its maximum period,
which is the mandate of the first paragraph of article 160 of the
Revised Penal Code. Viada observes, in apposition, that the severe
penalty imposed on a quasi-recidivist is justified because of his
perversity and incorrigibility.50
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is hereby modified as follows:
Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Parumog,
Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna are each pronounced guilty of
three separate and distinct crimes of murder, and are each sentenced
to three death penalties; all of them shall, jointly and severally,
indemnify the heirs of each of the three deceased victims in the sum of
P12,000;51 each will pay one-sixth of the costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro,
Angeles, Fernando and Capistrano, JJ.,concur.
Zaldivar, J., is on leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20183 June 30, 1966
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO BERDIDA Y INGUITO, ET AL., defendants.
EDUARDO BERDIDA Y INGUITO, LORETO SABERON Y CASAS,
VICENTE ABERAS Y CORDERO and JESUS FELICIA Y
BALIDBID, defendants and appellants.
Senen S. Ceniza, Emilio G. Opinion and Agustin R. Romeras for
defendants and appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General A. A. Alafriz, Acting Assistant Solicitor
General I. C. Borromeo and Solicitor S. C. Jacob for plaintiff and
appellee.
PER CURIAM:
This is an automatic review of death sentence pursuant to the Rules of
Court.1
On 10 May 1960, an information for frustrated murder2 of Antonio
Maravilla and another information for murder3 of Federico Caalete,
were filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Said informations
were directed against the same eight accused: Eduardo Berdida y
Inguito, Jesus Felicia y Balidbid, Vicente Aberas y Cordero, Cristoto
Mitilla y Paral, Demetrio Garin y Payos, Protacio Libres y Corona,
Loreto Saberon y Casas and Mario Mustrado y Sumaya.
After the defendants pleaded not guilty at their arraignment on 16 May
1960, the two cases were tried jointly. Acting on a motion to dismiss
filed by defendants Cristoto Mitilla and Mario Mustrado, after the
prosecution rested its case, the court dismissed the charges against
Mario Mustrado, with costs de oficio. After the trial, the Court of First
Instance rendered on 27 July 1962 the decision now under review. Its
dispositive portion states:
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds
the defendants Eduardo Berdida, Loreto Saberon, Vicente
Aberas and Jesus Felicia guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder. This Court has in previous cases
endeavored to avoid the imposition of the capital
punishment. In the case at bar, however, where the
offenders, pretending to be police officers, kidnapped the
victims and mercilessly beat one of them to death, the
Court finds no other alternative, in pursuance to the
mandate of the law, but to impose, as it hereby imposes
upon the said defendants, the death penalty, to indemnify
jointly and severally the heirs of Federico Caalete in the
sum of P4,000.00 and to pay the costs. May God have
mercy on their souls.
In Criminal Case No. 52338, above-said defendants are
also hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of attempted murder and considering the
aggravating circumstances present, they are sentenced
each to suffer a maximum penalty of TEN (10) YEARS
of prision mayor and a minimum of SIX (6) YEARS
ofprision correccional, and to pay the costs, without
prejudice on the part of the complainant to institute a
separate civil action for the recovery of damages.
The defendants Garin, Mitilla and Libres are hereby
acquitted, in both cases, with costs de oficio, and their
immediate release is hereby ordered.
So ordered.
The records show the prosecution's evidence, as follows:
At about 10 o'clock in the evening of 7 May 1960, Antonio Maravilla,
Federico Caalete, Virgilio Haban and Pedrito Rapadas left the store
of one Mang Terio at Mabuhay Street, North Harbor, Tondo, Manila,
and proceeded walking towards their homes. They were met on their
way by Eduardo Berdida, Antonio Louie, one Tiquio and
one aliasIfugao, who identified themselves as detectives, told them not
to move, and pointed sharp and long bolos to them.4Antonio Maravilla
and Federico Caalete raised their hands, but Pedrito Rapadas and
Virgilio Haban were able to run away. Antonio Louie then dealt a fist
blow on Antonio Maravilla. After that, the group took Antonio Maravilla
and Federico Caalete along the rail tracks, telling them that they had
done something wrong.
At the end of the rail tracks, said group tied the hands of Antonio
Maravilla and Federico Caalete. After doing this, they dragged the
two and took them to a place in Pier 8 at the North Harbor near
Vicente Aberas' house. In said place, there were others who joined the
group, among them, Jesus Felicia, Loreto Saberon and Vicente
Aberas. At this point Eduardo Berdida told Antonio Maravilla and
Federico Caalete to dig their graves, but they refused. Arturo
Macabebe, who also joined the group, took two sticks of cigarettes
and told Antonio Maravilla and Federico Caalete to smoke. Antonio
Maravilla again refused. Following said refusal, the victims were hit
with a piece of wood. Eduardo Berdida and Jesus Felicia then held
Antonio Maravilla and Federico Caalete, respectively, by the hands
and from behind. As they were thus held, Vicente Aberas delivered fist
blows on them, first on Antonio Maravilla, then on Federico
Caalete.5 Furthermore, Loreto Saberon also held Federico Caalete
while others gave fist blows to the latter.6 At about 1 o'clock in the
morning of 8 May 1960, Antonio Maravilla lost consciousness, shortly
after hearing Loreto Saberon say that the group would cut off the ears
of Antonio Maravilla and Federico Caalete for appetizer or "pulutan".7
Antonio Maravilla's sister, Elizabeth, had meanwhile been informed by
Virgilio Haban, one of those who were able to run away, that her
brother and Federico Caalete were taken by armed men. She
therefore went out with some companions in search of her brother.
She asked the help of Patrolman Carlos Pili, who was then at the
corner of Kaguitingan and Lakandula Streets in front of Pier 6.
Patrolmen Amado Santos and Fabricante also joined them. As the
other policemen took to separate directions, Patrolman Pili and
Elizabeth Maravilla went along Mabuhay Street. They came upon a
group of men, between Piers 6 and 8, who were hesitant to answer
their inquiries. So they proceeded further, entering a small alley. As
they went on, Elizabeth found the shoes of her brother. So they
continued until they met Vicente Aberas, stripped to the waist, with
bloodstains on his hands.8 Patrolman Pili detained him. Since
somebody threatened them should they proceed any further,
Patrolman Pili and Elizabeth Maravilla went to Precinct 3, taking along
Vicente Aberas. Assistance from the Mobile Patrol was then
requested. Accompanied by her neighbors and more policemen,
Elizabeth, together with Patrolman Pili, returned and went further to
the interior of Mabuhay Street. Finally, they came upon Federico
Caalete and Antonio Maravilla, sprawled on the ground, the former
face down, the latter flat on his back. Federico Caalete was found
dead. Antonio Maravilla was alive, though his face was swollen,
rendering him barely recognizable. Antonio Maravilla was taken to the
North General Hospital.
Patrolman Pili, meanwhile, went still further to the interior and saw,
about 12 meters away from where they found the victims, a group
drinking liquor. At the approach of Patrolman Pili, about four men ran
away, leaving behind four men, namely, Loreto Saberon, Mario
Mustrado, Cristoto Mitilla and Protacio Libres, the last mentioned
being then drunk and asleep on a bamboo bed.9 A Mobile Patrol car
thereafter arrived and apprehended them, except Libres. Patrolman
Pili next went towards a house near Tagumpay Street in which
direction the others had fled. In said house, which was that of Crisanta
Melgar, the patrolman found some persons who pretended to be
sleeping, namely, Demetrio Garin, Jesus Felicia and Eduardo Berdida.
Patrolman Pili brought them outside and they were taken by the
Mobile Patrol to the Detective Bureau.
Furthermore, the body of Federico Caalete was examined at the
scene where it was found by officers of the Mobile Patrol. Detective
Bureau agents likewise went to said place. Finding bloodstains near
an a alley to Tagumpay Street, they went to a house thereat and found
Protacio Libres sleeping on a bamboo bed. Said detectives took Libres
to the headquarters.
At the police station, all the apprehended suspects were made to
mingle with other persons. Antonio Maravilla, who was fetched to point
out therefrom the persons who attacked him and Federico Caalete
identified Eduardo Berdida, Vicente Aberas, Loreto Saberon and
Jesus Felicia.
An autopsy was made on 8 May 1960 on the body of Federico
Caalete by Dr. Luis Larion, Medical Examiner of the Manila Police
Department. The post mortem findings in his report are as follows:
(Exh. M):
CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM:
Hemorrhage extensive, subarachnoid brain.
CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM:
Laceration, blood vessels, brain and spleen.
RESPIRATORY SYSTEM:
Contusion, posterior lung, bilateral.
Congestion, lungs, bilateral.
GASTROINTESTINAL SYSTEM:
About 150 cc. partially digested rice meal with
slight alcoholic odor.
Hemoperitoneum about 100 cc. blood,
abdominal cavity.
SPLEEN: Maceration spleen.
PANCREAS: Contusion, hemorrhagic, pancreas.
BONES AND JOINTS:
Fracture-separation, left parieto-occipital and
right fronto-temporal skull.
MISCELLANEOUS:
Wound, stab, non-penetrating, 1.3 x 0.5 cm. x
1.5 cm. deep, right lumbar region.
Wound, lacerated, 3 x 0.5 cm. occipital
region.
Wound, lacerated, 2.5 cm. x 1.5 cm. x 1 cm.
deep, non-penetrating, left abdomen.
Hematoma, frontal, right; left, parieto-
occipital, and occipital, scalp, head.
Contusion, multiple, left forehead; left lower
eyelids; left face; nose; lower lip; left lateral
neck; posterior neck; left shoulder; left and
right posterior chest.
Contused abrasion, anterior left lower chest
and right abdomen.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Shock and hemorrhage due to traumatic
fracture of the skull with maceration of
spleen, contusion of the lungs and extensive
subarachnoid hemorrhages in the brain.
Antonio Maravilla, as shown in the medico-legal certificate of Dr.
Cumalinga Espinosa of the North General Hospital (Exh. R), sustained
these injuries:
Contusion with abrasion, and periorbital hematoma, eye
right.
Contusion upper and lower lip.
Contusion 2" mental region.
Contusion with slight hematoma, malar right, and
mandible bilateral.
Abrasion, 3", lateral neck left.
Abrasion, 2" #2 level of the 10th rib right, along the MCL.
For the defense of herein appellants, the following evidence was
presented to establish alibi:
Sometime between 7 and 8 o'clock in the evening of 7 May 1960
Crisanta Melgar was filling drums with water in her house at 1205
Tagumpay Street, Tondo, Manila. Shortly thereafter, Eduardo Berdida,
Loreto Saberon and Jesus Felicia arrived. Since her husband was on
night duty and her brother- in-law was ill, Crisanta Melgar asked the
three to remain and help her fill up the drums with water, intending to
sell the same the next morning. Said defendants consented and for
some time helped Crisanta fill the drums with water. At about 9 o'clock
in the evening, however, said defendants went to sleep in the ground
floor of Crisanta's new house, still under construction, adjacent to the
house aforementioned. At about midnight a policeman and someone
in civilian clothes knocked at the door and inquired from Crisanta if
there were three persons sleeping in her house. She said yes, and
opened the door. The policeman then told Crisanta that a dead man
was found near their place. The one in civilian attire went to the back
of the house. Crisanta told the policeman she knew nothing of any
incident and that the three men had been in her house for some time.
She then awoke the defendants Berdida, Saberon and Felicia. The
policeman told them to stand up and the man in civilian was asked if
they were the ones involved. Said man looked at the defendants and
replied in the negative. The policeman and the civilian then left and the
defendants went back to sleep. After a while, Crisanta, who was
restless and could not sleep, went down, awoke the defendants, and
told them that it was better for them to leave. So, the said defendants
left, but a policeman stopped them at Tagumpay Street and took them
to the police headquarters.
As to the defendant Vicente Aberas, his defense of alibi is as follows:
In the evening of 7 May 1960, he was on board the fishing boat "Don
Paulino." At about 10:30 o'clock in the evening, after unloading their
catch of fish, he left for home, bringing with him a tulingan fish. Juan, a
co-worker of his, invited him to drink beer in a store near Pier 8. For
some time they stayed there, then he left for home. On the way he met
five men beating up somebody. Approaching them, he asked them to
have pity on the man and not to beat him. Someone in the group,
armed with a club, warned him not to interfere, so, becoming afraid, he
left. In reaching home, he took off his shirt, cut the fish he brought with
him in half, lengthwise, and took one of the halves to the house of
Emiliano Retone, another co-worker of his, who did not report for work
that day. Retone invited him to drink gin. After drinking, he headed for
home, but on his way he met two policemen and a woman. After being
asked where he came from, which he answered, and whether he had
seen a fight, to which he said yes, he was taken to Precinct 3.
Appellants would, first of all, assail Antonio Maravilla's testimony
identifying them as the assailants, for the reason that he lost
consciousness, and, therefore, could not be relied upon to make said
identification. Appellants would further insist on their defense of alibi.
Antonio Maravilla, it is true, lost consciousness' at about 1 o'clock in
the morning of 8 May 1960. It is however equally true that before his
sense faded out he saw herein appellants perform their atrocities on
himself as well as on Federico Caalete. It cannot therefore be
doubted that he made no mistake in pointing out to herein appellants
as definitely among their assailants. This he did, not only at the police
station but also in open court during the trial. It is furthermore not
disputed by defendants-appellants that Antonio Maravilla has no
reason or motive to falsely accuse them of murder and attempted
murder. The positive identification he made must therefore be given
credence.
It follows that the defense of alibi cannot be sustained. The rule is
settled, to the point of being trite, that the defense of alibi is worthless
in the face of positive identification by prosecution witnesses, pointing
to the accused as participants in the crime. 10
The trial court, moreover, found the above-related defenses of alibi not
credible. For, according to said court, if defendants Berdida, Felicia
and Saberon really went to help Crisanta Melgar, their provincemate,
fill drums with water at her house, it is rather unusual that they went to
sleep at about 9 o'clock in the evening. Furthermore, the policeman
who inquired about persons sleeping in Crisanta Melgar's house
strangely knew their number, that is, three persons. And, finally, it is
unbelievable that said policeman did not take them to the
headquarters for identification by Antonio Maravilla
himself.1wph1.t sufficient time for the offenders to meditate and reflect on the
And, with respect to the defendant-appellant Vicente Aberas, the trial
court found it too surprising to believe that he went to such lengths of
amiability, as to go, shirtless at that, to his friend Retone, at an unholy
hour, to share with him one-half of his tulingan fish. No previous
agreement, or urgent need for such an act obtained. It could have
waited for the next morning, especially since, having allegedly come
from work, defendant Aberas must have been tired.
As this Court stated in People vs. Constante, L-14639, December 28,
1964, the defense of alibi is an issue of fact that hinges on credibility;
that the credibility of an alibi depends so much on the credibility of the
witnesses who seek to establish it; and that, in this inspect, the relative
weight which the trial judge assigns to the testimony of said witnesses
must, unless patently and clearly inconsistent with the evidence on
record, be accepted. For, as is well recognized, his proximate contact
with those who take to the witness chair places him, compared to
appellate Justices, in the more competent position to discriminate be
between the true and the false.
And in the present appeal, we find no warrant to depart from the lower
court's finding on defendants-appellants' defense of alibi.
It is also contended by appellants that the aggravating circumstances
of nighttime, abuse of superior strength, and evident premeditation
should not be appreciated in fixing the penalty. Appellants would murder case in which the death penalty was imposed. It was only
argue that nighttime was not purposely sought to facilitate the offense because of the joint trial that the record of the attempted murder case
or to afford impunity. At any rate, they would further argue, nighttime was likewise elevated herein. Since no appeal was taken in the
as well as abuse of superior strength are deemed absorbed in attempted murder case, the judgment with respect thereto has
treachery. As to evident premeditation, they aver that the become final. It therefore cannot now be reviewed herein, as some of
premeditation, if any, is not evident, for lack of sufficient lapse of time the appellants would ask. And defendants-appellants, who are
between the execution of the offense and a previous showing of intent detained, should accordingly be deemed to have started serving their
to commit it, so as to show that the offenders clung to their respective sentence in said attempted murder case from the time the
determination to commit the crime. decision of the trial court became final as to said case.
The presence of one generic aggravating circumstance, apart from the Wherefore, the death penalty imposed on defendants-appellants is
qualifying circumstance of treachery, suffices to fix the penalty for hereby affirmed, and the indemnity to the heirs of Federico Caalete is
murder at the extreme punishment of death. For there is no mitigating hereby increased from P4,000 to P6,000, with costs. So ordered.
circumstance in the present case. From the facts and evidence of Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,
record in this case, it is clear that appellants took advantage of Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
nighttime in committing the felonies charged. For it appears that to
carry out a sentence they had pronounced upon Antonio Maravilla and
Federico Caalete for the death of one Pabling, they had evidently
chosen to execute their victims under cover of darkness, at the dead
of night, when the neighborhood was asleep. Inasmuch as the
treachery consisted in the fact that the victims' hands were tied at the
time they were beaten, the circumstance of nighttime is not absorbed
in treachery, but can be perceived distinctly therefrom, since the
treachery rests upon an independent factual basis. A special case
therefore is present to which the rule that nighttime is absorbed in
treachery does no apply. 11
In addition, the presence of evident premeditation is likewise borne out
by the record. For the victims were told at the start, when they were
taken captives, that they had done something wrong, that they were
the ones who stabbed and killed one Pabling, and that for this reason
they were to go with the group (T.s.n., 10 October 1960, pp. 20, 22;
Exh. D). Not only that; the victims were then taken to a spot where
they were ordered to dig their graves. The assailants were previously
armed with deadly weapons, and their assault was a concerted and
group action. From the time of apprehension of the victims, About 10
o'clock in the evening, to the time Antonio Maravilla lost
consciousness, about 1 o'clock early the following morning, is
consequences of their act.
In People vs. Lopez, 69 Phil. 298, this Court found the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation present, in view of the repeated
statements of the defendants that the hour of reckoning of the victim
would arrive, the existing enmity between them, the fact that they were
previously armed with deadly weapons, and the fact that the
aggression was simultaneous and continuous until the deceased was
left unconscious on the ground. And in People vs. Lazada, 70 Phil.
525, four hours was held sufficient lapse of time for purposes of the
presence of evident premeditation. Furthermore, sufficient lapse of
time in this regard is not simply a matter of the precise number of
hours, but of the reasonable opportunity, under the situation and
circumstances, to ponder and reflect upon the consequences. In the
present case, we find the facts and circumstances obtaining sufficient
to support the trial court's finding of the attendance of evident
premeditation.
Following previous instances, the indemnity to the heirs of the
deceased in this case should be increased to P6,000. 12
Anent the attempted murder case, no appeal therefrom was taken.
The record shows that defendants perfected no appeal from the
judgment below. The present automatic review is limited only to the
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 173793 December 4, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CONRADO M. GLINO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
BEWARE of drunk passengers. They pose danger to life and limb.
Merely talking to them or telling them to sit properly can be fatal, as
what happened to one of two victims in the case at bar.
The present law prohibits and punishes only drunk driving.1 There is
no law banning a drunk person from riding a public vehicle, or the
latter's driver from allowing a person who appears to be drunk to board
a public conveyance.2
A drunk passenger or one under the influence of liquor or drug poses
a veritable peril to the other passengers. He is prone to react
irrationally and violently, due to lack or diminution of self-control.
Senseless loss of lives and physical harm can be avoided, and the
riding public duly protected, if the potential danger posed by drunk
passengers can be addressed properly.
It is the duty of the court, whenever it has knowledge of any act which
it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, to
report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the
reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be
made the subject of legislation.3 We leave it to the authorities
concerned to do the needful as they see fit.
MAG-INGAT sa mga lasing na pasahero. Sila'y
mapanganib. Ang kausapin o sabihan lamang sila na
umupo nang maayos ay maaari mong ikasawi. Ganito
ang sinapit ng isa sa dalawang biktima sa kasong ito.
Ang kasalukuyang batas ay nagbabawal at nagpaparusa
lamang sa pagmamaneho ng lasing. Walang batas na
nagbabawal sa taong lasing na sumakay sa
pampublikong sasakyan, o sa drayber na payagan ang
taong sa kilos ay lasing na sumakay sa pampublikong
sasakyan.
Ang pasaherong lasing o sino man na nasa impluwensya
ng alak o droga ay may dalang panganib sa ibang
pasahero. Malamang na sila ay kumilos nang walang
katwiran o manakit dahil sa kabawasan ng pagwawari o
pagpipigil sa sarili. Maiiwasan ang walang kabuluhang
pagkitil ng buhay at pagkapinsala, at ang mga
namamasahe ay mapangangalagaan laban sa panganib,
kung ito'y mabibigyan ng karampatang lunas.
Tungkulin ng hukuman, kung alam nito na ang isang
gawa ay marapat supilin at hindi pa ipinagbabawal ng
batas, na ipagbigay-alam sa Pangulo, sa pamamagitan
ng Kagawaran ng Katarungan, ang mga dahilan na
pinaniniwalaan ng hukuman kung bakit ang nasabing
gawa ay dapat maging layon ng pagsasabatas.
Ipinapaubaya namin sa kinauukulang maykapangyarihan
kung ano ang dapat gawin.
Before the Court is an appeal under Rule 124, Section 13(c)4 of the
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-
SC, from the Judgment5 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming in toto
the Decision6of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Las Pias City,
Metro Manila, convicting accused-appellant Conrado Glino of murder
and attempted murder for the senseless killing of Domingo Boji and
the stabbing of his wife, Virginia Boji.
The Facts
On November 15, 1998, at around 7:20 p.m., in Moonwalk, Las Pias
City, husband and wife Domingo and Virginia Boji hailed a passenger
jeepney bound for Alabang-Zapote Road. The couple sat on the two
remaining vacant seats on opposing rows of the jeepney. Virginia
seated herself on the vehicle's left side while Domingo occupied the
vacant seat at the right row.7
Moments later, the woman seated next to Virginia alighted. Accused-
appellant Conrado Glino took her place. He was reeking of liquor. As
the jeepney ran its normal route, Virginia noticed accused-appellant
inching closer to her. His head eventually found its way on Virginia's
shoulder. Irked, Virginia sought accused-appellant's attention and
asked him to sit properly, citing adequate space. Accused-appellant
angrily replied, "Oh, kung ayaw mong may katabi, bumaba ka, at
magtaxi ka!" Virginia decided to ignore his snide remarks. She then
turned her back on him.8
Accused-appellant, however, persisted in violating Virginia's personal
space, leaning on the latter's shoulders. It was at this point that
Domingo decided to tell Glino to sit properly. Accused-appellant
arrogantly retorted, "Anong pakialam mo?" Domingo reasoned out that
he is Virginia's husband. Domingo further said, "Kasi lalasing-lasing
ka, hindi mo naman kaya!"9
Marvin Baloes, who, it turned out, was Glino's equally drunk
companion, cursed Domingo. Baloes then provokingly asked the
latter, "Anong gusto mo?" Domingo replied, "Wala akong sinabing
masama."10 After the heated verbal tussle, accused-appellant and
Baloes appeared to have calmed down, confining themselves to
whispering to one another.11
When the jeepney approached Casimiro Village, Baloes turned to the
driver and told him that he and Glino were about to alight. As the
jeepney ground to a halt, Baloes unexpectedly drew an improvised
knife and stabbed Domingo in the chest.12 Accused-appellant then
unfolded a 29-inch Batangas knife (balisong) and joined Baloes in
stabbing Domingo. Surprised and shocked at the sudden attack,
Domingo failed to offer any form of resistance to the duo's vicious
assault. In all, Domingo sustained nine stab wounds throughout his
body.13
Virginia tried vainly to shield Domingo from his assailants. She tightly
embraced Domingo. Virginia's efforts, however, all went for naught as
accused-appellant Glino and Baloes were unrelenting. When the
senseless assault ceased, Virginia found herself bloodied from incised
wounds in her fingers.14
The other passengers of the jeepney scampered for the nearest exit
immediately after the first blow was struck. Some of them had to resort
to jumping from the vehicle's window to avoid harm's way.15
Accused-appellant Glino and Baloes attempted to flee the scene of the
crime and ran towards Camella Center. Baloes, however, fell down to
the ground due to intoxication. Glino, unmindful of his companion, was
able to run a distance of 45 meters before he was apprehended by
traffic enforcers Alvin Cristobal and Ruben Ramirez. The two traffic
aides, who were the first to respond to the crime scene, caught sight
of the slow-moving jeepney and of the passengers jumping off it. With
the help of a concerned motorist, they were able to pin Baloes and
Glino to the ground. They later turned the two suspects over to the
police, who arrived shortly thereafter.16
Subsequently, Virginia and Domingo were brought to the University of
Perpetual Help, Rizal Medical Center in Las Pias City. Domingo was,
however, pronounced dead after a few minutes. Domingo's chest
wound proved mortal.17
On November 18, 1998, accused-appellant Glino and Baloes were
indicted for murder18 for the death of Domingo Boji and attempted
murder19 for the stabbing of Virginia Boji. The accusatory part of the
Information for murder reads:
Criminal Case No. 98-1310:
That on or about the 15th day of November 1998, in the
City of Las Pias, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and both of them
mutually helping and aiding each other, with intent to kill
by means of treachery and evident premeditation and
without any justifiable cause, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with
bladed weapons one Domingo Boji y Daza, suddenly and
without warning hitting him on the different parts of his
body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal stab
wounds which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.20
The indictment for attempted murder bears the following accusation:
Criminal Case No. 98-1311:
That on or about the 15th day of November 1998, in the
City of Las Pias, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together, acting in common
accord and mutually helping and aiding each other, with
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation,
and without any justifiable cause, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and
stab with bladed weapons one Virginia Boji y Revillas,
suddenly and without warning, thereby commencing the
commission of murder directly by overt acts but did not
perform all the acts of execution which would produce the
crime of murder as a consequence by reason of some
cause or accident other than their own spontaneous
desistance, that is, because the injury inflicted to Virginia
Boji y Revillas was not sufficient to cause her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.21
On June 15, 1999, accused Marvin Baloes succumbed to cardio-
pulmonary arrest while on detention.22Consequently, his name was
dropped from the information. Pre-trial commenced with respect only
to accused-appellant Glino. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The People's evidence, which essayed the foregoing facts, was
principally supplied by Enrique Villaruel, Virginia Boji, SPO2 Wilfredo
Dalawangbayan and Alvin Cristobal.
Villaruel testified that he was a co-passenger of the spouses Boji in
the jeepney where the gruesome stabbing incident took place.
Villaruel was then on his way home to Anabu I, Cavite. He witnessed
the crime as it unfolded. According to him, accused-appellant Glino
and Baloes both stabbed Domingo; that accused-appellant was armed
with a Batangas knife while Baloes used an improvised knife; that the
improvised knife was left on the floor of the jeepney as accused-
appellant and Baloes fled the scene of the crime.23
Virginia narrated that she distinctly saw Baloes stab Domingo in the
chest area. Glino was blocking her path, preventing her from giving aid
to her husband. When Domingo was about to fall down from where he
was seated, she embraced him. As she was holding Domingo, a knife
was thrusted into her, wounding her in the hands.24
On cross-examination, she disclosed she did not see who between
accused-appellant and Baloes caused her wounds; that she saw
accused-appellant Glino stab her husband; that they met accused-
appellant and Baloes only in the jeepney.25
SPO2 Dalawangbayan testified that he was the investigator assigned
to handle the case involving accused-appellant and Baloes. The two
suspects were turned over to him by traffic aides Cristobal and
Ramirez. Likewise turned over to him was a bladed weapon, a 12-inch
improvised knife, confiscated from the person of Baloes.26
At the hospital, he found Domingo in critical condition. He later learned
that the victim expired shortly after his visit. Virginia suffered from
incised wounds in her right hand.27 After concluding his investigation,
he prepared a report.28
Cristobal narrated that he is a traffic aide assigned at the Casimiro and
BF Resort intersection in Las Pias City. On the night in question, he
noticed a slow-moving passenger jeepney creeping onto the sidewalk.
Moments later, the jeepney's passengers were jumping out of its
windows.29
Suspecting a robbery, he and his partner Ramirez immediately gave
chase. A man with bloodied clothes, later identified as Baloes, ran
away from the vehicle but fell to the ground shortly after. Another man,
accused-appellant Glino, was able to run for more than five minutes
before they caught up with him.30 He and Ramirez later executed
a Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay.31
Upon the other hand, the trial court summed up accused-appellant's
defense, anchored on plain denial, in the following tenor:
The evidence for the defense consists mainly of the lone
testimony of accused Conrado Glino, who testified that he
is the same accused in this case for murder. He did not
know the other accused Marvin Baloes prior to November
15, 1998 whom he knew only at the UI for the first time.
On November 15, 1998, at around 7:20 in the evening, he
was inside the passenger jeepney which he boarded at
Equitable, Las Pias City near Moonwalk to go home at
Imus, Cavite. He did not have any companion. He rode on
a passenger jeep bound to Zapote. He could not recall the
number of people inside the jeepney because the seats
were all occupied. He occupied the right side seat of the
driver at the middle of the seat on the right side. Then he
saw the victim was stabbed by accused Baloes. He knew
the name of Baloes while they were detained at the UI.
He did not know who was stabbed. The stabbing took
place between the areas of Casimiro and Uniwide. The
person stabbed died. He was there watching while the
person was being stabbed by Baloes who was seated
also at the right side inside the jeep but seated at the rear
most portion of the jeep. The person stabbed seated at
the left seat inside the jeep and seating also at the rear
portion of the jeep. Baloes stabbed the person in his
body, started at the chest, stomach and other parts of the
body. He did not know how many times Baloes stabbed
the victim. There was an argument between Baloes and
the wife of the victim prior to the stabbing incident. They
had an argument for a short period of time which he did
not know what it was about. They were at the vicinity near
Uniwide when the argument started. He would not know
how long the argument lasted and would not recall the
statements of the lady. He said they were having an
argument because the lady seating beside Baloes and
after that lady was only a passenger away from him.
Victim said to Baloes while pointing his finger "Tumigil ka
dyan, susuntukin kita." Then Baloes suddenly drew a
bladed weapon and stabbed him. Together with other
passengers, they alighted from the vehicle because he
was afraid. He waited for another passenger jeep so he
could go home. He was not able to go home because he
was arrested by the police. He could not estimate how
many minutes lapsed after he was able to go down that
jeep when he was arrested as he had no wrist watch, but
that was for a short period of time. Ramirez, the not so tall
police officer, arrested them and they were brought to the
UI after he and Baloes were immediately handcuffed
using only 1 handcuff. Baloes hurriedly went down and
ran away after the incident, going back towards
Moonwalk. He was not arrested at the same place where
Baloes was arrested. He denied the testimony of Mrs. Boji
that he and Baloes had an argument inside the jeepney
they were riding regarding some space and requested
that he move a bit which caused the commotion resulting
to this incident. While they were having an argument, he
was seated inside the jeep and he just looked at them. He
denied having argued with Mrs. Boji and said that none
argued with him. He knows that Baloes died already
(TSN, 1 September 2004).
On cross-examination, he declared that his complete
name is Conrado Montes Glino. Her mother's name is
Juliana Montes Glino. He denied knowing the middle
name of co-accused Marvin, Montes Baloes. Shown a
copy of the Information where it appeared that the middle
name of Marvin Baloes is also Montes, he agreed that the
middle name is Montes. His place of residence is
Malagasan 1st, Imus, Cavite. Baloes did not tell him while
they were under the custody of the police that he is also a
resident of Malagasan 1st, Imus, Cavite. He did not ask
Baloes where he was from while they were together at the
UI. But he admitted that on November 15, 1998, at around
7:20 in the evening, he and Baloes were on board one
and the same jeepney bound for Zapote; that while the
jeep was near Uniwide Metro Mall, there was an untoward
incident that took place inside the jeep; that in that
incident, a certain Domingo Boji was stabbed to death. He
did not know that Virginia Boji was also stabbed and
wounded. He would not know how many the passengers
were in that jeepney as he failed to count, but there were
many passengers. Both seats at the back were occupied
by passengers, but he did not notice if the seat in front of
the jeepney was also occupied. There was a commotion
when Domingo was stabbed. He immediately alighted the
vehicle because he was afraid and waited for another
jeepney to transfer to another bound to Zapote.
He admitted that among the passengers, only he and
Baloes were arrested by the police officers because he
was pointed to by the witness as the assailant of Domingo
Boji. Until the time of hearing, no one among the jeepney
passengers were arrested for the death of Domingo and
injury inflicted to Virginia Boji. His co-accused, in this
case, Marvin Baloes is already dead. He has no other co-
accused except Baloes. He came to know her before she
took the witness stand and positively identified him as the
assailant. When he was arrested by the police officers, he
shouted why they arrested him and the police said that he
had to go with them and just explain at the police precinct.
He did not resist when the police officers arrested him. He
was forced to go with them because they handcuffed him.
He was waiting for a ride as he would transfer to another
jeepney in going home. It was PO Ramirez who arrested
him. He did not file a case against Ramirez for arresting
him without a valid reason because he was at the
detention cell nor seek for help in filing a case against
Ramirez because he did not know how as that was the
first time he had a case. He had plan to file the case
against Ramirez who brought him at the UI before PO1
Dalawangbayan. They were not investigated nor
interrogated. He stayed at the UI for one week, then he
was transferred at the Las Pias City jail. He told the
police investigator, PO1 Dalawangbayan, that it was
Baloes who stabbed and killed Domingo Boji but that was
not included in the incident. PO1 Dalawangbayan did not
do anything when he told him that he was not included in
the stabbing incident because the one who was talking
only was Virginia Boji. He did not ask PO1
Dalawangbayan to enter his statement in the blotter.
Before he was transferred to the city jail of Las Pias City,
he was brought to the City Prosecutor's Office for inquest
(TSN, 22 September 2004).32
RTC and CA Dispositions
On November 22, 2004, the RTC handed down a judgment of
conviction, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding accused Conrado M.
Glino GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and Attempted
Murder and hereby sentenced as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 98-1310, to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and its accessory penalty and
indemnify the heirs of Domingo Boji y Daza the sum
of P50,000.00;
2. Criminal Case No. 98-1311, to suffer an indeterminate
prison term of 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional medium as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of
prision mayor medium as maximum and to suffer the
accessory penalty provided for by law and pay Virginia
Boji y Revillas the sum of P101,549.00 actual damages
and the sum of P100,000.00 moral damages;
3. And to pay the costs in both cases.
SO ORDERED.33
Accused-appellant elevated his conviction to the CA by way of an
intermediate review, conformably with the ruling in People v.
Mateo.34 On May 26, 2006, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment in full.
The fallo of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed
decision dated November 22, 2004 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 275, Las Pias City in Criminal Cases Nos.
98-1310 and 98-1311 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.35
Issues
Undaunted, accused-appellant interposed the present recourse.
On September 13, 2006, We resolved to require the parties to submit
their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within thirty
(30) days from notice.
In a Manifestation dated November 13, 2006, the Office of the Solicitor
General, for plaintiff-appellee, opted to dispense with the filing of a
supplemental brief. Accused-appellant, through the Public Attorney's
Office, hoists the same lone error he raised before the appellate
court, viz.:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING
A VERDICT OF CONVICTION DESPITE THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT'S ADMISSION THAT THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DID NOT STAB HER HUSBAND AND
THAT SHE DID NOT SEE THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
STABBED HER.36
In his supplemental brief, accused-appellant contends that the identity
of the assailant was not firmly established. The evidence, he argues,
points to Baloes, who died even before the trial began, as the
perpetrator of Domingo's killing and Virginia's stabbing. In the
alternative, accused-appellant submits that he is guilty of homicide
and attempted homicide only, not murder and attempted murder, due
to the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.37
Our Ruling
We first tackle the conviction for murder.
Positive Identification
Accused-appellant makes capital of Virginia's identification of Baloes
as the person who stabbed her husband, Domingo. According to him,
the trial court gravely erred in rejecting his defense that he was an
innocent bystander. He insists he was not acquainted with Baloes.
They met each other only when they were both tagged by the police
as the persons responsible for the melee.
We are unconvinced. The witnesses for the People were consistent in
the identification of accused-appellant as one of two assailants who
mortally stabbed Domingo. Villaruel, a key eyewitness for the
prosecution, testified thus:
Q: Mr. Witness, at about seven-twenty in the evening of
November 15, 1998, do you remember where you were
then?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Where were you at that time?
A: I was at the corner of Angela Village in Alabang,
Zapote Road waiting for a ride.
Q: While you are waiting there, waiting for a ride at the
said place, do you remember what happened next, if any?
A: So when I was able to take a ride a jeepney in the road
going to Baclaran, that is the time that I witness the
incident.
Q: And then, by the way, where were you going at that
time, Mr. Witness?
A: I was on my way going on at Anabu I, Cavite.
Q: Mr. Witness, after you took a ride in a passenger
jeepney going to on your way home, do you remember
what happened next, if any?
A: When I boarded the jeepney, the jeepney has no
vacancy, so I just hang-on at the back of the jeepney.
Q: And then, what else happened after that, if you
remember?
A: When we are already traveled a short distance, one of
the passenger alighted, sitted (sic) on the left side.
Q: And, what happened next, after you are able to take a
sit inside the passenger jeepney. After one of the
passenger alighted?
A: After a while, another passenger alighted on the right
seat of the jeepney.
Q: What else happened after another passenger alighted
from the said jeepney?
A: And then, that is the time that I noticed that the two
male persons moved closely to the woman, who is sitted
in front of me.
Q: And then, what happened next, after you noticed two
men moved closely to a woman, in front of yours?
A: One of the male passengers, who moved closely to the
woman, little bit lay down his head on the shoulder of the
woman.
Q: And, what the woman do after this male passenger lay
down his head on the shoulder of the woman?
A: I saw that the woman is avoiding the male passenger,
and one of my seatmates on my right side spoke and
asked the male passenger to sit properly.
Q: And what did this male passenger do after the man
sitted before you told him to sit properly?
A: He answered and said "ANONG PAKIALAM MO!"
Q: And what was the reaction of the man sitted beside
you, when the male passenger said "ANONG PAKIALAM
MO!"?
A: And that, and he answered that because that woman
were you lying is my wife.
Q: And what did the male passenger do after the said
man introduced himself as the husband of the female
passenger?
A: "NAGMURA PO."
Q: What else happened after the male passenger coursed
him?
A: And then the other male passenger who moved closely
to the woman told that "KASI, LALASING-LASING KA
HINDI MO NAMAN KAYA."
Q: And what else happened after that?
A: The man sitted beside me thought that it was already
okay, but it is not, because the two male persons, who
moved closely to the woman, were companions, were
together and one of them asked to alight from the vehicle.
Q: And what happened next after one of the two male
persons, who moved closely to the woman, told to alight?
A: Now, we thought that they are going to alight from the
vehicle but when they stood up, they talked to one
another and suddenly stabbed the male passenger, sitted
beside me.
 Q: Who among these two male passengers stabbed the
man sitted beside you?
A: The one who stabbed is the one who pacified the
incident that happened before and the second stabbed
was made by the other male passenger.
Q: How many times did these two male passengers
stabbed the man, who was sitted beside you?
A: I cannot count but I know it is many times.38
Villaruel's account of the incident dovetails significantly with that of
Virginia:
Q: Madam Witness, at about seven-twenty in the evening
of November 15, 1998, do you remember where you were
then?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Where were you at that time?
A: We were at Moonwalk.
Q: You said we, who are your companions at that time?
A: My husband, Sir.
Q: Who is your husband?
A: Domingo Boji, Sir.
Q: Why were you there at the said place during that
particular date and time with your husband?
A: We bought fish.
Q: And, after you bought fish, do you remember what
happened next, if any?
A: And then after that my husband stopped a jeepney
bound to Alabang Zapote.
Q: What happened next, after your husband stopped a
passenger jeepney bound for Zapote?
A: Then we boarded a jeepney, with one vacant seat on
the right and one on the left.
Q: And where did you seat when you boarded a
passenger jeepney?
A: On the left side, Sir.
Q: And how about your husband, where did he seat?
A: On the right side, Sir.
Q: And then, while you were then on board of the said
passenger jeepney, at that time, do you remember what
happened next, if any?
A: While we are on board of the jeepney and the jeepney
is on motion, seated on my right side is a lady.
Q: And how about on your left side, do you know who was
sitting?
A: A lady also, Sir.
Q: And what else happened after that?
A: And then, after a while, the lady on my right side
alighted.
Q: And then, what happened next, after the lady sitting on
your right side alighted from the jeepney?
A: Suddenly, who is drunk get near to me.
Q: And how did you come to know that this man, who
went near beside you, was drunk?
A: Because he smells liquor.
Q: And then what happened next after this man, you
claimed drunk, seated beside you?
A: And then he leaned on my shoulder.
Q: And what did you do after this man on your shoulder?
A: I asked him to move away, considering that there is still
a space.
Q: And what was the reaction of this man?
A: He got mad at me and he said "OH, KUNG AYAW
MONG MAY KATABI, BUMABA KA, AT MAG-TAXI KA."
Q: And what did you do after this man got mad at you and
ordered you to alight from the said jeepney?
A: So I turned my back to him.
Q: And what happened next after you turned your back to
him?
A: And again he leaned on my shoulder.
Q: What happened next after this man leaned again on
your shoulder?
A: And he was accosted by my husband.
Q: How did your husband accosted this man?
A: My husband asked him to sit properly, and he said that
I am his wife.
Q: And what was the reaction of this man?
A: His companion got mad.
Q: Where was the companion of the drunk man seated,
who got angry?
A: Beside the man, who is drunk.
Q: And then what else happened?
Court:
This man, who was leaning on your shoulder,
and the man, who got mad, was seated side
by side?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: What did this companion of the man, seated beside
you, tell you, if any?
A: He answered my husband and asked "what do you
want."
Q: And what was the reply of your husband?
A: My husband answered "I did not say anything wrong."
Q: What was the reply of this companion of the man
seated beside you?
A: None, Sir.
Q: What else happened, while you were there on board of
the said passenger jeepney?
A: While we are still on board on the jeepney approaching
the place of Casimiro Village, and the jeepney moves
slowly, the companion of this drunk man asked the driver
to stop because they will alight.
Q: And then what happened after that, after the
companion of this drunk man ordered the driver to stop?
A: When this man asked his companion, the drunk man,
to alight from the vehicle, and I am seated, while I am
looking down and I noticed, I looked to them they are
going to alight the vehicle I noticed that they suddenly
stabbed my husband. And the two persons announced
"HOLDAP ITO." And when I look to them, I saw that they
stabbed my husband.
Court Interpreter:
As the witness demonstrating while it seems
that she was stabbed on the downward thrust
and the husband was stabbed on the chest.
Q: Who are these man, you are referring to, who stabbed
your husband?
A: The one who died already, Marvin.
Q: Who was this Marvin, the one seated beside you or the
companion of the drunk man?
A: The other man, Sir.
Q: Did you notice how many times Marvin stabbed your
husband?
A: When I look again, I noticed that only once because
the knife is still on the chest of my husband.
Court:
Where was your husband seated in relation
to your seat?
A: In front of me, Your Honor, on the other side.
Q: And what did you do when you saw Marvin stabbed
your husband?
A: None, Sir, I am just looking to nothing.
Q: And after Marvin stabbed your husband, do you
remember what happened next, if any?
A: Because Conrado is blocking me, he is in front of me, it
seems that they are gambling to a knife to one another.
Q: And then, what else happened after that?
A: And then, when I looked at them again, I saw that my
husband seems to fall from where he was seated, so I
embraced, then another stab came in hit my hands.39
As this Court has reiterated often enough, the matter of assigning
values to the testimonies of witnesses is best left to the discretion of
the trial judge.40 In People v. Quijada,41 the Court aptly held:
Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court,
especially on the credibility of witnesses, are accorded
great weight and respect. For, the trial court has the
advantage of observing the witnesses through the
different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as
the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden
pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a
reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply; or
the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the
hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the
heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack
of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an
oath, the carriage and mien.
The doctrine was reiterated with greater firmness in the ponencia of
now Chief Justice Reynato Puno in People v. Ave:42
x x x It is an established rule that when it comes to
credibility of witnesses, appellate courts generally do not
overturn the findings of trial courts. The latter are in a best
position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and
spontaneity of witnesses through their actual observation
of the witnesses' manner of testifying, demeanor, and
behavior in court. x x x
Verily, compared to appellate magistrates who merely deal and
contend with the cold and inanimate pages of the transcript of
stenographic notes and the original records brought before them, the
trial judge confronts the victim or his heirs, the accused and their
respective witnesses. He personally observes their conduct,
demeanor and deportment while responding to the questions
propounded by both the prosecutor and defense counsel. Moreover, it
is also the trial judge who has the opportunity to pose clarificatory
questions to the parties. Elsewise stated, when a trial judge makes his
findings as to the issue of credibility, such findings, especially if
affirmed by the CA, bear great weight, at times even finality, on the
Court.43 We see no cogent reason to depart from these settled
doctrines.
Conspiracy
Even assuming, for the nonce, that it was Marvin Baloes who inflicted
the fatal stab, accused-appellant cannot escape culpability. Their
obvious conspiracy is borne by the records. There is conspiracy when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of the
agreement need not rest on direct evidence. It may be inferred from
the conduct of accused indicating a common understanding among
them with respect to the commission of the offense.44
It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and
entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful
scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out.
Proof that accused acted in concert, each of them doing his part to
fulfill the common design to kill the victim will suffice to support a
conviction.45 In conspiracy, it matters not who among the accused
actually killed the victim. The act of one is the act of all; hence, it is not
necessary that all the participants deliver the fatal blow. Tersely put,
each of the accused will be deemed equally guilty of the crime
committed.46
The acts of accused-appellant Glino and Baloes before, during and
after the killing of Domingo are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted
action and concurrence of sentiment. In her testimony before the trial
court, Virginia categorically narrated that while Baloes was stabbing
Domingo, accused-appellant Glino was blocking her path, effectively
preventing her from rendering aid to her husband.47 Accused-appellant
later joined Baloes in stabbing Domingo with a Batangas knife.48
Lame Denial
Too, we sustain the RTC and the CA's rejection of accused-appellant's
defense founded on denial. Time and again, this Court has ruled that
denial is the weakest of all defenses. It easily crumbles in the face of
positive identification by accused as the perpetrator of the
crime.49 Here, no less than two eyewitnesses in Villaruel and victim
Virginia positively and categorically named Glino as one of the Boji
couple's assailants. Their identification of accused-appellant was
unwavering, made in a simple and straightforward manner. Corollarily,
they had no ill motive to testify falsely against Glino.50 Upon the other
hand, other than his bare denial, no corroborating evidence was put
forth to substantiate accused-appellant's disparate account of the
incident.
Treachery
Accused-appellant next argues that he should be made liable for
homicide only. He claims treachery did not attend the killing of
Domingo.
That treachery or alevosia was present is incontrovertible. The
essence of this qualifying circumstance is the sudden and unexpected
attack by the assailant on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter
of any real chance to defend himself.51 It is employed to ensure the
commission of the crime without the concomitant risk to the aggressor.
The rule is well-settled in this jurisdiction that treachery may still be
appreciated even though the victim was forewarned of danger to his
person.52 What is decisive is that the attack was executed in a manner
that the victim was rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate.53
Concededly, victim Domingo was caught unaware that an attack was
forthcoming. Although he had a verbal exchange with accused-
appellant and Baloes, the assault was sudden, swift and unexpected.
All of the passengers inside the jeepney, including Domingo, thought
all along that the tension had ceased and that Glino and Baloes were
about to alight. Domingo was overpowered by accused-appellant
Glino and Baloes, who took turns in stabbing the hapless victim. By all
indications, Domingo was without opportunity to evade the knife
thrusts, defend himself, or retaliate. In sum, the finding of treachery
stands on solid legal footing.
No Attempted Murder But
Less Serious Physical Injuries
We now proceed to calibrate accused-appellant's liability for the
incised wounds sustained by Virginia. Both the trial court and the
appellate court found Glino liable for attempted murder. The RTC and
the CA are in agreement that there was intent to kill Virginia as well.
An essential element of murder and homicide, whether in their
consummated, frustrated or attempted stage, is intent of the offenders
to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction
of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent which the prosecution must
prove by direct or circumstantial evidence, while general criminal
intent is presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo.54
In People v. Delim,55 the Court had occasion to explain the rudiments
of proving intent to kill in crimes against persons. It may consist in: (1)
the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location and
number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the
malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of the
victim; (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed;
and (5) the motives of accused. If the victim dies as a result of a
deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is presumed.56
In the case under review, intent to kill Virginia is betrayed by the
conduct of accused-appellant and his co-assailant Baloes before, at
the time of, and immediately after the commission of the crime. In her
testimony before the trial court, Virginia disclosed that she was
shocked and was initially unable to come to Domingo's succor as the
first blow was struck; that as Domingo was about to fall down from
where he was seated, she embraced him; that she tried to shield him
from further attacks; that when the assault ceased, her finger was
gushing with blood.57
If the assailants also intended to kill her, they could have easily
stabbed her in any vital part of her body. They did not. The nature and
location of her wound militates against the finding of their intent to kill.
According to the physician who examined her immediately after the
incident, Virginia suffered from an incised wound measuring 2.5
centimeters by 0.2 centimeter in her fifth digit, right hand.58
Gleaned from the foregoing, it is crystal-clear that the wound on
Virginia was inflicted during her attempt to shield Domingo from
accused-appellant's and Baloes' knife thrusts. It bears stressing that
Virginia embraced Domingo while the assault upon him was at its
peak. Evidently, the wound was inflicted while she was in that position.
The wound required medical attendance, and rendered Virginia
incapable of labor, for a period of ten (10) to thirty (30) days.59 Clearly,
accused-appellant Glino should be held liable for less serious physical
injuries only, and not attempted murder.
Although the indictment was for attempted murder, a finding of guilt for
the lesser offense of less serious physical injuries is tenable,
considering that the latter offense is necessarily included in the
former.60
The essential ingredients of physical injuries constitute and form part
of those constituting the felony of murder.61Simply put, an accused
may be convicted of slight, less serious or serious physical injuries in a
prosecution for homicide or murder, inasmuch as the infliction of The heirs of the victim Domingo Boji are likewise entitled to an
physical injuries could lead to any of the latter offenses when carried additional award of P25,000.00 by way of exemplary damages since
out to its utmost degree despite the fact that an essential requisite of the People clearly established treachery in the prosecution for
the crime of homicide or murder intent to kill is not required in a murder.70 Exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000.00 should
prosecution for physical injuries.62 also be awarded to Virginia Boji in the separate conviction for less
Penalties serious physical injuries.71 When a crime is committed with an
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, penalizes aggravating circumstance, either qualifying or generic, an award of
murder in this wise: exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil
Article 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within Code.72
the provision of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is MODIFIED in that, in
guilty of Murder and shall be punished by reclusion Criminal Case No. 98-1310, accused-appellant Conrado Glino is
perpetua to death if committed with any of the following found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder for the killing of
attendant circumstances: Domingo Boji and is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua with its
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, accessory penalties. He is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim
with the aid of armed men, or employing means to in the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P101,549.00 as
weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as
afford impunity; exemplary damages.
There being no averment of mitigating nor aggravating In Criminal Case No. 98-1311, accused-appellant is likewise
circumstance63 that attended the killing of Domingo, the proper found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Less Serious Physical
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63(2) of Injuries for wounding Virginia Boji and he is sentenced to suffer
the RPC. the straight penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, and to pay the
On the other hand, Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code defines and victim the sums of P10,000.00 as moral
penalizes less serious physical injuries in the following manner: damages and another P10,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.
Article 265. Less serious physical injuries. Any person SO ORDERED.
who shall inflict upon another physical injuries not
described in the preceding articles but which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten days or
more, or shall require medical attendance for the same
period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.
Again, absent any appreciable mitigating or aggravating circumstance,
the penalty of arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months) should
be imposed in its medium period (between 2 months and 1 day to 4
months).64
The Indeterminate Sentence Law finds no application in both cases.
The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that the law is not
applicable when the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment. Likewise, the law does not apply to those whose
maximum term of imprisonment is less than one year.65
Damages
We have arrived at the award of damages. When death results due to
a crime, the heirs of the victim are entitled to the following damages:
(1) civil indemnity; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral
damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.66
Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the murder
victim without need of further proof.67 Under current jurisprudence, the
award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto is in order.
We sustain the award of actual damages in the amount
of P101,549.00. The heirs of the victim Domingo were able to prove
during the trial, with proper receipts, that they incurred the said
expense.
The trial court and the CA, however, blundered a bit in
awarding P100,000.00 as moral damages. Prevailing jurisprudence
dictates that in murder, an award of moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.00 is sufficient. 68 For the less serious physical injuries
inflicted on Virginia Boji, moral damages in the sum of P10,000.00 is
warranted.69
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 129433 March 30, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,
vs.
PRIMO CAMPUHAN Y BELLO accused.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 3 April 1990 this Court in People v. Orita 1 finally did away with
frustrated rape 2 and allowed only attempted rape and consummated
rape to remain in our statute books. The instant case lurks at the
threshold of another emasculation of the stages of execution of rape
by considering almost every attempt at sexual violation of a woman as
consummated rape, that is, if the contrary view were to be adopted.
The danger there is that that concept may send the wrong signal to
every roaming lothario, whenever the opportunity bares itself, to better
intrude with climactic gusto, sans any restraint, since after all any
attempted fornication would be considered consummated rape and
punished as such. A mere strafing of the citadel of passion would then
be considered a deadly fait accompli, which is absurd.
In Orita we held that rape was consummated from the moment the
offender had carnal knowledge of the victim since by it he attained his
objective. All the elements of the offense were already present and
nothing more was left for the offender to do, having performed all the
acts necessary to produce the crime and accomplish it. We ruled then
that perfect penetration was not essential; any penetration of the
female organ by the male organ, however slight, was sufficient. The
Court further held that entry of the labia or lips of the female organ,
even without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, was
sufficient to warrant conviction for consummated rape. We
distinguished consummated rape from attempted rape where there
was no penetration of the female organ because not all acts of
execution were performed as the offender merely commenced the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts. 3The inference that may
be derived therefrom is that complete or full penetration of the vagina
is not required for rape to be consummated. Any penetration, in
whatever degree, is enough to raise the crime to its consummated
stage.
But the Court in Orita clarified the concept of penetration in rape by
requiring entry into the labia or lips of the female organ, even if there
be no rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, to warrant a
conviction for consummated rape. While the entry of the penis into the
lips of the female organ was considered synonymous with mere
touching of the external genitalia, e.g., labia majora, labia minora,
etc.,4 the crucial doctrinal bottom line is that touching must be
inextricably viewed in light of, in relation to, or as an essential part of,
the process of penile penetration, and not just mere touching in the
ordinary sense. In other words, the touching must be tacked to the
penetration itself. The importance of the requirement of penetration,
however slight, cannot be gainsaid because where entry into the labia
or the lips of the female genitalia has not been established, the crime
committed amounts merely to attempted rape.
Verily, this should be the indicium of the Court in determining whether
rape has been committed either in its attempted or in its consummated
stage; otherwise, no substantial distinction would exist between the
two, despite the fact that penalty-wise, this distinction, threadbare as it
may seem, irrevocably spells the difference between life and death for
the accused a reclusive life that is not even perpetua but
only temporal on one hand, and the ultimate extermination of life on
the other. And, arguing on another level, if the case at bar cannot be
deemed attempted but consummated rape, what then would constitute
attempted rape? Must our field of choice be thus limited only to
consummated rape and acts of lasciviousness since attempted rape
would no longer be possible in light of the view of those who disagree
with this ponencia?
On 27 May 1997 Primo Campuhan y Bello was found guilty of
statutory rape and sentenced by the court a quo to the extreme
penalty of death, 5 hence this case before us on automatic review
under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659. 6
As may be culled from the evidence on record, on 25 April 1996, at
around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother
of four (4)-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went down from the second
floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her two (2)
children. At the ground floor she met Primo Campuhan who was then
busy filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in the
freezer located at the second floor. Primo was a helper of Conrado
Plata Jr., brother of Corazon. As Corazon was busy preparing the
drinks, she heard one of her daughters cry, "Ayo'ko,
ayo'ko!" 7 prompting Corazon to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw
Primo Campuhan inside her children's room kneeling before Crysthel
whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed,
while his short pants were down to his knees.
According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthel's
vagina. Horrified, she cursed the accused, "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko
iyan!" and boxed him several times. He evaded her blows and pulled
up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside when she tried to block his
path. Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus prompting her
brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within their compound,
to chase the accused. 8 Seconds later, Primo was apprehended by
those who answered Corazon's call for help. They held the accused at
the back of their compound until they were advised by their neighbors
to call the barangay officials instead of detaining him for his misdeed.
Physical examination of the victim yielded negative results. No evident
sign of extra-genital physical injury was noted by the medico-legal
officer on Crysthel's body as her hymen was intact and its orifice was
only 0.5 cm. in diameter.
Primo Campuhan had only himself for a witness in his defense. He
maintained his innocence and assailed the charge as a mere scheme
of Crysthel's mother who allegedly harbored ill will against him for his
refusal to run an errand for her. 9 He asserted that in truth Crysthel
was in a playing mood and wanted to ride on his back when she
suddenly pulled him down causing both of them to fall down on the
floor. It was in this fallen position that Corazon chanced upon them
and became hysterical. Corazon slapped him and accused him of
raping her child. He got mad but restrained himself from hitting back
when he realized she was a woman. Corazon called for help from her
brothers to stop him as he ran down from the second floor.
Vicente, Corazon's brother, timely responded to her call for help and
accosted Primo. Vicente punched him and threatened to kill him. Upon
hearing the threat, Primo immediately ran towards the house of
Conrado Plata but Vicente followed him there. Primo pleaded for a
chance to explain as he reasoned out that the accusation was not
true. But Vicente kicked him instead. When Primo saw Vicente holding
a piece of lead pipe, Primo raised his hands and turned his back to
avoid the blow. At this moment, the relatives and neighbors of Vicente
prevailed upon him to take Primo to the barangay hall instead, and not
to maul or possibly kill him.
Although Primo Campuhan insisted on his innocence, the trial court on
27 May 1997 found him guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him to the
extreme penalty of death, and ordered him to pay his victim
P50,000.00 for moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages,
and the costs.
The accused Primo Campuhan seriously assails the credibility of Ma.
Corazon Pamintuan. He argues that her narration should not be given
any weight or credence since it was punctured with implausible
statements and improbabilities so inconsistent with human nature and
experience. He claims that it was truly inconceivable for him to commit
the rape considering that Crysthel's younger sister was also in the
room playing while Corazon was just downstairs preparing Milo drinks
for her daughters. Their presence alone as possible eyewitnesses and
the fact that the episode happened within the family compound where
a call for assistance could easily be heard and responded to, would
have been enough to deter him from committing the crime. Besides,
the door of the room was wide open for anybody to see what could be
taking place inside. Primo insists that it was almost inconceivable that
Corazon could give such a vivid description of the alleged sexual
contact when from where she stood she could not have possibly seen
the alleged touching of the sexual organs of the accused and his
victim. He asserts that the absence of any external signs of physical
injuries or of penetration of Crysthel's private parts more than bolsters
his innocence.
In convicting the accused, the trial court relied quite heavily on the
testimony of Corazon that she saw Primo with his short pants down to
his knees kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas and panty were
supposedly "already removed" and that Primo was "forcing his penis
into Crysthel's vagina." The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape
is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12), as provided in Art.
335, par. (3), of the Revised Penal Code. Crysthel was only four (4)
years old when sexually molested, thus raising the penalty,
from reclusion perpetuato death, to the single indivisible penalty of
death under RA 7659, Sec. 11, the offended party being below seven
(7) years old. We have said often enough that in concluding that
carnal knowledge took place, full penetration of the vaginal orifice is
not an essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen necessary;
the mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of
consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal
knowledge. 10 But the act of touching should be understood here as
inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labias of the female
organ and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or
the pudendum.
In People v. De la Pea 11 we clarified that the decisions finding a case
for rape even if the attacker's penis merely touched the external
portions of the female genitalia were made in the context of the
presence or existence of an erect penis capable of full penetration.
Where the accused failed to achieve an erection, had a limp or flaccid
penis, or an oversized penis which could not fit into the victim's vagina,
the Court nonetheless held that rape was consummated on the basis
of the victim's testimony that the accused repeatedly tried, but in vain,
to insert his penis into her vagina and in all likelihood reached the
labia of her pudendum as the victim felt his organ on the lips of her
vulva, 12 or that the penis of the accused touched the middle part of
her vagina. 13 Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not
simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a
slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the
victim's vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be
sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the
labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the
external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of
consummated rape. 14 As the labias, which are required to
be "touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs or
location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch them
with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the
surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the
labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital
organs that are visible in the perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia
majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc.
The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after
puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the
labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ composed of the
outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the outer
convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while
the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has
many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora is the labia
minora. 15 Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be
entered for rape to be consummated, 16 and not merely for the penis to
stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface
of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is
not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of
the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either
labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated
rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of
lasciviousness.
Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been confined to the
oft-quoted "touching of the female organ," 17but has also progressed
into being described as "the introduction of the male organ into the
labia of the pudendum," 18 or "the bombardment of the
drawbridge." 19 But, to our mild, the case at bar merely constitutes a
"shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency," or as earlier stated, a
"strafing of the citadel of passion.
A review of the records clearly discloses that the prosecution utterly
failed to discharge its onus of proving that Primo's penis was able to
penetrate Crysthel's vagina however slight. Even if we
grant arguendo that Corazon witnessed Primo in the act of sexually
molesting her daughter, we seriously doubt the veracity of her claim
that she saw the inter-genital contact between Primo and Crysthel.
When asked what she saw upon entering her children's room Corazon
plunged into saying that she saw Primo poking his penis on the vagina
of Crysthel without explaining her relative position to them as to
enable her to see clearly and sufficiently, in automotive lingo, the
contact point. It should be recalled that when Corazon chanced upon
Primo and Crysthel, the former was allegedly in a kneeling position,
which Corazon described thus:
Q: How was Primo holding your daughter?
A: (The witness is demonstrating in such a way that the
chest of the accused is pinning down the victim, while his
right hand is holding his penis and his left hand is
spreading the legs of the victim).
It can reasonably be drawn from the foregoing narration that Primo's
kneeling position rendered an unbridled observation impossible. Not
even a vantage point from the side of the accused and the victim
would have provided Corazon an unobstructed view of Primo's penis
supposedly reaching Crysthel's external genitalia, i.e., labia majora,
labia minora, hymen, clitoris, etc., since the legs and arms of Primo
would have hidden his movements from Corazon's sight, not to
discount the fact that Primo's right hand was allegedly holding his
penis thereby blocking it from Corazon's view. It is the burden of the
prosecution to establish how Corazon could have seen the sexual
contact and to shove her account into the permissive sphere of
credibility. It is not enough that she claims that she saw what was
done to her daughter. It is required that her claim be properly
demonstrated to inspire belief. The prosecution failed in this respect,
thus we cannot conclude without any taint of serious doubt that inter-
genital contact was at all achieved. To hold otherwise would be to
resolve the doubt in favor of the prosecution but to run roughshod over
the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent.
Corazon insists that Primo did not restrain himself from pursuing his
wicked intention despite her timely appearance, thus giving her the
opportunity to fully witness his beastly act.
We are not persuaded. It is inconsistent with man's instinct of self-
preservation to remain where he is and persist in satisfying his lust
even when he knows fully well that his dastardly acts have already
been discovered or witnessed by no less than the mother of his victim.
For, the normal behavior or reaction of Primo upon learning of
Corazon's presence would have been to pull his pants up to avoid
being caught literally with his pants down. The interval, although
relatively short, provided more than enough opportunity for Primo not
only to desist from but even to conceal his evil design.
What appears to be the basis of the conviction of the accused was
Crysthel's answer to the question of the court
Q: Did the penis of Primo touch your organ?
A: Yes, sir.
But when asked further whether his penis penetrated her organ, she
readily said, "No." Thus
Q: But did his penis penetrate your organ?
A: No, sir. 20
This testimony alone should dissipate the mist of confusion that
enshrouds the question of whether rape in this case was
consummated. It has foreclosed the possibility of Primo's penis
penetrating her vagina, however slight. Crysthel made a categorical
statement denying penetration, 27 obviously induced by a question
propounded to her who could not have been aware of the finer
distinctions between touching and penetration. Consequently, it is
improper and unfair to attach to this reply of a four (4)-year old child,
whose vocabulary is yet as underdeveloped as her sex and whose
language is bereft of worldly sophistication, an adult interpretation that
because the penis of the accused touched her organ there was sexual
entry. Nor can it be deduced that in trying to penetrate the victim's
organ the penis of the accused touched the middle portion of her
vagina and entered the labia of her pudendum as the prosecution
failed to establish sufficiently that Primo made efforts to penetrate
Crysthel. 22 Corazon did not say, nay, not even hint that Primo's penis
was erect or that he responded with an erection. 23 On the contrary,
Corazon even narrated that Primo had to hold his penis with his right
hand, thus showing that he had yet to attain an erection to be able to
penetrate his victim.
Antithetically, the possibility of Primo's penis having breached
Crysthel's vagina is belied by the child's own assertion that she
resisted Primo's advances by putting her legs close
together; 24 consequently, she did not feel any intense pain but just felt
"not happy" about what Primo did to her. 25 Thus, she only shouted
"Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko, aray ko!" In cases where penetration SO ORDERED. 1wphi 1.nt
was not fully established, the Court had anchored its conclusion that
rape nevertheless was consummated on the victim's testimony that
she felt pain, or the medico-legal finding of discoloration in the inner
lips of the vagina, or the labia minora was already gaping with
redness, or the hymenal tags were no longer visible. 26 None was
shown in this case. Although a child's testimony must be received with
due consideration on account of her tender age, the Court endeavors
at the same time to harness only what in her story appears to be true,
acutely aware of the equally guaranteed rights of the accused. Thus,
we have to conclude that even on the basis of the testimony of
Crysthel alone the accused cannot be held liable for consummated
rape; worse, be sentenced to death.1wphi1
Lastly, it is pertinent to mention the medico legal officer's finding in this
case that there were no external signs of physical injuries on
complaining witness' body to conclude from a medical perspective that
penetration had taken place. As Dr. Aurea P. Villena explained,
although the absence of complete penetration of the hymen does not
negate the possibility of contact, she clarified that there was no
medical basis to hold that there was sexual contact between the
accused and the victim. 27
In cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical
certificate, both should in all respects complement each other;
otherwise, to rely on the testimonial evidence alone, in utter disregard
of the manifest variance in the medical certificate, would be productive
of unwarranted or even mischievous results. It is necessary to
carefully ascertain whether the penis of the accused in reality entered
the labial threshold of the female organ to accurately conclude that
rape was consummated. Failing in this, the thin line that separates
attempted rape from consummated rape will significantly disappear.
Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is
attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. All the elements
of attempted rape and only of attempted rape are present in the
instant case, hence, the accused should be punished only for it.
The penalty for attempted rape is two (2) degrees lower than the
imposable penalty of death for the offense charged, which is statutory
rape of a minor below seven (7) years. Two (2) degrees lower
is reclusion temporal, the range of which is twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, and in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed upon the
accused shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal,
the range of which is fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and (1) day
to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum shall
be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor,
the range of which is from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years, in any of its periods.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused
PRIMO "SONNY" CAMPUHAN Y BELLO guilty of statutory rape and
sentencing him to death and to pay damages is MODIFIED. He is
instead found guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years four (4) months and ten
(10) days of prision mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years
ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium
as maximum. Costs de oficio.
 Republic of the Philippines ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability
SUPREME COURT is totally extinguished:
Manila
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
SECOND DIVISION pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
G.R. No. 179031 February 24, 2014
xxxx
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff Appellee,
vs. In People v. Amistoso,5 this Court encountered a similar situation
BENJAMIN SORIA y GOMEZ, Accused-Appellant. wherein the accused-appellant died before his appeal could be
resolved. The Court explained the implications of the accused-
appellants demise as follows:
RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On November 14, 2012, this Court rendered its Decision1 in this case
finding accused-appellant Benjamin Soria y Gomez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the December 29, 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR. CR-H.C. No. 01442 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Benjamin Soria y Gomez is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape by sexual
assault and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal,
as maximum. He is also ordered to pay "AAA" the amounts of
30,000.00 as civil indemnity, 30,000.00 as moral damages, and
30,000.00 as exemplary damages. "AAA" is entitled to an interest on
all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum :from the date
of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.2
Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as
his civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused,
the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto
is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.
Undeniably, Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 preceded the
promulgation by the Court of its Decision on January 9, 2013. When
Amistoso died, his appeal before the Court was still pending and
unresolved.1wphi1 The Court ruled upon Amistosos appeal only
because it was not immediately informed of his death.
Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 renders the Courts Decision
dated January 9, 2013, even though affirming Amistosos conviction,
irrelevant and ineffectual. Moreover, said Decision has not yet become
final, and the Court still has the jurisdiction to set it aside.
The Court had no course of action but to set aside its Decision and
dismiss the criminal case against Amistoso by reason of his death.

Likewise, the November 14, 2012 Decision of this Court finding

The said Decision supposedly became final and executory on
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
December 20, 2012.3 Subsequently, however, the Court received a
had become irrelevant and ineffectual by reason of his death on
letter from the Bureau of Corrections informing us of the death of
August 16, 2012. Consequently, the same must be set aside and the
accused-appellant on August 16, 2012. In compliance with our
case against accused-appellant must consequently be dismissed.
directive, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections submitted on
November 11, 2013, a certified true copy of the death certificate4 of
accused-appellant. ACCORDINGLY, the November 14, 2012 Decision of this Court is
SET ASIDE and Criminal Case No. Q-01-98692 before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, is DISMISSED on account of
Clearly, accused-appellants demise on August 16, 2012 transpired
accused-appellant's demise.
before the promulgation of this Courts Decision on November 14,
2012 or before its finality on December 20, 2012. Therefore, when
accused-appellant died, his appeal before this Court was still pending SO ORDERED.
resolution.

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code pertinently provides:

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 207949 July 23, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ARMANDO DIONALDO y EBRON, RENATO DIONALDO y EBRON,
MARIANO GARIGUEZ, JR. y RAMOS, and RODOLFO LARIDO y
EBRON, Accused-Appellants.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision1 dated February
15, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02888
finding accused-appellants Armando Dionaldo y Ebron (Armando),
Renato Dionaldo y Ebron (Renato), Mariano Gariguez, Jr. y Ramos
(Mariano), and Rodolfo Larido y Ebron (Rodolfo) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention.
The Facts
At around 8 o'clock in the morning of May 16, 2003, Roderick Navarro
(Roderick) dropped his brother Edwin Navarro (Edwin) off at the
Health Is Wealth Gym in Caloocan City. Thirty minutes later, he
received a text message from another brother who told him that Edwin
had been kidnapped.2 Records show that three (3) men, later
identified as Armando, Renato, and Mariano, forcibly dragged a
bloodied Edwin down the stairway of the gym and pushed him inside a
dark green Toyota car with plate number UKF 194.3 Upon receiving
the message, Roderick immediately reported the incident to the police.
At around 10 oclock in the morning of the same day, he received a
phone call from Edwins kidnappers who threatened to kill Edwin if he
should report the matter to the police.4
The following day, Roderick received another call from the kidnappers,
who demanded the payment of ransom money in the amount of
15,000,000.00. Roderick told them he had no such money, as he
only had 50,000.00. On May 19, 2003, after negotiations over the
telephone, the kidnappers agreed to release Edwin in exchange for
the amount of 110,000.00. Roderick was then instructed to bring the
money to Batangas and wait for their next call.5
At around 7:30 in the evening of the same day, as Roderick was on
his way to Batangas to deliver the ransom money, the kidnappers
called and instructed him to open all the windows of the car he was
driving and to turn on the hazard light when he reaches the designated
place. After a while, Roderick received another call directing him to
exit in Bicutan instead and proceed to C-5 until he arrives at the
Centennial Village. He was told to park beside the Libingan ng mga
Bayani. After several hours, an orange Mitsubishi car with plate
number DEH 498 pulled up in front of his vehicle where four (4) men
alighted. Roderick saw one of the men take a mobile phone and upon
uttering the word "alat," the men returned to their car and drove away.6
Meanwhile, a team had been organized to investigate the kidnapping
of Edwin, headed by SPO3 Romeo Caballero (SPO3 Caballero) and
PO3 Nestor Acebuche (PO3 Acebuche) of the Camp Crame Police
Anti-Crime Emergency Response (PACER). During the course of the
investigation, Rodolfo, an employee at the Health Is Wealth Gym,
confessed to PO3 Acebuche that he was part of the plan to kidnap
Edwin, as in fact he was the one who tipped off Mariano, Renato,
Armando and a certain Virgilio7 Varona8 (Virgilio) on the condition that
he will be given a share in the ransom money. Rodolfo gave
information on the whereabouts of his cohorts, leading to their arrest
on June 12, 2003. In the early morning of the following day or on June
13, 2003, the PACER team found the dead body of Edwin at Sitio
Pugpugan Laurel, Batangas, which Roderick identified.9
Thus, accused-appellants as well as Virgilio were charged in an
Information10 which reads:
That on or about the 16th day of May, 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one
another, being then private persons, did then and there by force and
intimidation willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with the use of motor
vehicle and superior strength take, carry and deprive EDWIN
NAVARRO Y ONA, of his liberty against his will, for the purpose of
extorting ransom as in fact a demand of 15,000,000.00 was made as
a condition of the victims release and on the occasion thereof, the
death of the victim resulted.
Contrary to law.
During arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty11 and
interposed the defenses of denial and alibi. Except for Rodolfo, they
individually claimed that on said date and time, they were in their
respective houses when they were taken by men in police uniforms,
then subsequently brought to Camp Crame, and there allegedly
tortured and detained. On the other hand, Rodolfo, for himself, averred
that at around 8 oclock in the evening of June 12, 2003, while walking
on his way home, he noticed that a van had been following him.
Suddenly, four (4) persons alighted from the vehicle, boarded him
inside, blindfolded him, and eventually tortured him. He likewise
claimed that he was made to sign an extrajudicial confession,
purporting too that while a certain Atty. Nepomuceno had been
summoned to assist him, the latter failed to do so.12
During trial, the death of the victim, Edwin, was established through a
Certificate of Death13 with Registry No. 2003-050 (subject certificate of
death) showing that he died on May 19, 2003 from a gunshot wound
on the head.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision14 dated June 13, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, Branch 129 (RTC), in Crim. Case No. C-68329,
convicted accused-appellants of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention, sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
It gave credence to the positive and straightforward testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses which clearly established that it was the
accusedappellants who forcibly dragged a bloodied Edwin into a car
and, consequently, deprived him of his liberty.15 In light thereof, it
rejected accused-appellants respective alibis and claims of torture,
which were not substantiated. It also held that the crime of Kidnapping
had been committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, which is
punishable by death. However, in view of the suspended imposition of
the death penalty pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 9346,16 only the
penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed.17 Further, the RTC found
that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, as the accused-
appellants individual participation was geared toward a joint purpose
and criminal design.18
Notably, while the RTC found that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses prove that the victim Edwin was abducted, deprived of
liberty, and eventually killed,19 a fact which is supported by the subject
certificate of death, it did not consider said death in its judgment. The
CA Ruling
In a Decision20 dated February 15, 2013, the CA affirmed in toto the
RTCs conviction of accused-appellants, finding that the prosecution
was able to clearly establish all the elements of the crime of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, namely: (a) the offender is a
private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner
deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping
must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense, any of the
following circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or detention
lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed simulating public
authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (4) the
person kidnapped or detained is a minor, except when the accused is
any of the parents, female or a public officer.21 It likewise sustained the
finding that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting
ransom, as sufficiently proven by the testimony of the brother of the
victim.22 Moreover, the CA affirmed that conspiracy attended the
commission of the crime, as the acts of accused-appellants emanated
from the same purpose or common design, and they were united in its
execution.23
Separately, the CA found that accused-appellants claims of torture
were never supported, and that Rodolfo voluntarily signed the
extrajudicial confession and was afforded competent and independent
counsel in its execution.24
Aggrieved by their conviction, accused-appellants filed the instant
appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not
accusedappellants are guilty of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is devoid of merit.
Well-settled is the rule that the question of credibility of witnesses is
primarily for the trial court to determine. Its assessment of the
credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, and it is conclusive
and binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless,
through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and influence
has not been considered. Absent any showing that the trial judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, or
that the judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment of the credibility of
witnesses deserves high respect by the appellate court.25
In this case, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, gave weight and
credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, which they
found to be straightforward and consistent. Through these testimonies,
it was clearly established that accused-appellants, who were all
private individuals, took the victim Edwin and deprived him of his
liberty, which acts were illegal, and for the purpose of extorting
ransom.26 Thus, seeing no semblance of arbitrariness or
misapprehension on the part of the court a quo, the Court finds no
compelling reason to disturb its factual findings on this score.1wphi1
Anent the finding that conspiracy attended the commission of the
crime, the Court likewise finds the conclusion of the RTC in this
regard, as affirmed by the CA, to be well-taken. Conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it, and when conspiracy
is established, the responsibility of the conspirators is collective, not
individual, rendering all of them equally liable regardless of the extent
of their respective participations.27 In this relation, direct proof is not
essential to establish conspiracy, as it can be presumed from and
proven by the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, design,
concerted action, and community of interests.28 Hence, as the factual
circumstances in this case clearly show that accused-appellants acted
in concert at the time of the commission of the crime and that their
acts emanated from the same purpose or common design, showing
unity in its execution,29 the CA, affirming the trial court, correctly ruled
that there was conspiracy among them.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court is, however, constrained to
modify the ruling of the RTC and the CA, as the crime the
accusedappellants have committed does not, as the records obviously
bear, merely constitute Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, but
that of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with
Homicide. This is in view of the victims (i.e., Edwins) death, which
was (a) specifically charged in the Information,30and (b) clearly
established during the trial of this case. Notably, while this matter was
not among the issues raised before the Court, the same should
nonetheless be considered in accordance with the settled rule that in a
criminal case, an appeal, as in this case, throws open the entire case
wide open for review, and the appellate court can correct errors,
though unassigned, that may be found in the appealed judgment.31
After the amendment of the Revised Penal Code on December 31,
1993 by RA 7659, Article 267 of the same Code now provides:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private
individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner
deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more
than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public
authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted
upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill
him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor,
except when the accused is any of the parents, female or
a public officer;
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any
other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned
were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or
is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed. (Emphases supplied)
The Court further elucidated in People v. Mercado:32
In People v. Ramos, the accused was found guilty of two separate
heinous crimes of kidnapping for ransom and murder committed on
July 13, 1994 and sentenced to death. On appeal, this Court modified
the ruling and found the accused guilty of the "special complex crime"
of kidnapping for ransom with murder under the last paragraph of
Article 267, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This Court said:
x x x This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept
of special complex crime of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It
effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts between
those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely
sought by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was
not deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought. eligibility for parole, and to pay, jointly and severally, the family of the
Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in kidnap victim Edwin Navarro the following amounts: (1) 100,000.00
the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was as civil indemnity; (2) 100,000.00 as moral damages; and (3)
purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and 100,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with interest at the rate of six
murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully
treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special paid.
complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by SO ORDERED.
RA No. 7659.33 (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)
Thus, further taking into account the fact that the kidnapping was
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, accused-appellants
conviction must be modified from Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention to the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with
Homicide, which carries the penalty of death. As earlier intimated, the
enactment of RA 9346 had suspended the imposition of the death
penalty. This means that the accused-appellants could, as the CA and
trial court properly ruled, only be sentenced to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. To this, the Court adds that the accused-appellants are not
eligible for parole.34
On a final note, the Court observes that the RTC and the CA failed to
award civil indemnity as well as damages to the family of the kidnap
victim. In People v. Quiachon,35 the Court explained that even if the
death penalty was not to be imposed on accused-appellants in view of
the prohibition in RA 9346, the award of civil indemnity was
nonetheless proper, not being dependent on the actual imposition of
the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances
warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the
commission of the crime.36 In the present case, considering that both
the qualifying circumstances of ransom and the death of the victim
during captivity were duly alleged in the information and proven during
trial, civil indemnity in the amount of 100,000.00 must therefore be
awarded to the family of the victim, to conform with prevailing
jurisprudence.37
Similarly, the Court finds that the award of moral damages is
warranted in this case. Under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, moral
damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock and similar injury, while Article
2219 of the same Code provides that moral damages may be
recovered in cases of illegal detention. It cannot be denied, in this
case, that the kidnap victims family suffered mental anguish, fright,
and serious anxiety over the detention and eventually, the death of
Edwin. As such, and in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence,38 moral damages in the amount of 100,000.00 must
perforce be awarded to the family of the victim.
Finally, exemplary damages must be awarded in this case, in view of
the confluence of the aforesaid qualifying circumstances and in order
to deter others from committing the same atrocious acts. In
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,39 therefore, the Court
awards exemplary damages in the amount of 100,000.00 to the
family of the kidnap victim.
In addition, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be
imposed on all damages awarded from the date of finality of judgment
until fully paid, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.40
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated
February 15, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
02888 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that all the
accusedappellants herein are equally found GUILTY of the special
complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, and are
sentenced to each suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 201443 April 10, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BETTY SALVADOR y TABIOS, MONICO SALVADOR, MARCELO
LLANORA, JR. y BAYLON, ROBERT GONZALES y MANZANO,
RICKY PEA y BORRES @ RICK, ROGER PESADO y PESADO @
GER, JOSE ADELANTAR y CAURTE, LOWHEN ALMONTE y
PACETE, JUBERT BANATAO y AGGULIN @ KOBET, and MOREY
DADAAN, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is an appeal1 from the Decision2 rendered by the Court of
Appeals (CA) on February 25, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03279
affirming, albeit with modifications, the conviction by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 219 of Betty Salvador y Tabios
(Betty), Monico Salvador (Monico), Marcelo Llanora, Jr. y Baylon
(Marcelo), Robert Gonzales y Manzano (Robert), Ricky Pea y Borres
@ Rick (Ricky), Roger Pesado y Pesado @ Ger (Roger), Jose
Adelantar y Caurte (Jose), Lowhen Almonte y Pacete (Lowhen),
Jubert Banatao y Aggulin @ Kobet (Jubert), and Morey Dadaan
(Morey) (herein accused-appellants) for having conspired in
kidnapping Albert Yam y Lee (Albert) for the purpose of extorting
ransom. The RTC sentenced the accused-appellants to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered them to solidarily pay Albert
the amount of PhP 100,000.00 as moral damages.3The CA Decision
dated February 25, 2011 concurred with the RTCs factual findings but
expressly stated in its dispositive portion the accused-appellants non-
eligibility for parole. The CA further ordered the accused-appellants to
solidarily pay Albert PhP 50,000.00 as civil indemnity and PhP
100,000.00 as exemplary damages. The RTC and the CA, however,
acquitted accused-appellants of kidnapping a certain Pinky Gonzales
(Pinky), who, from the account of some of the prosecution witnesses,
was likewise taken with Albert during the same abduction incident.
The charges against the accused-appellants stemmed from the
following Informations dated April 15, 2002:
(a) In Criminal Case No. Q-02-108834 against Betty, Monico, Marcelo,
Robert, Ricky, Roger and nine other John Does for the kidnapping and
serious illegal detention of Pinky allegedly lasting for six days, the
Information, in part, reads:
That on or about April 7, 2002 at around 7:30 in the evening, in the
vicinity of the Cainta Cockpit Arena, Cainta, Rizal, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
with the use of firearms, threats and intimidation did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and take away PINKY
GONZALES y TABORA against her will; That in the process, she was
forced to board a Toyota Hi-Ace van which transported her, until finally
she was brought to an undisclosed location in Caloocan City where
she was kept for six (6) days; That she was finally rescued on April 12,
2002 by police operatives from the Philippine National Police.4
(b) In Criminal Case No. Q-02-108835 against Jose, Lowhen, Betty,
Monico, Morey, Jubert, Marcelo, Robert, Ricky, Roger and nine other
John Does for the kidnapping of and demanding from Albert USD
1,000,000.00 as ransom money, the Information states:
That on or about April 7, 2002 at around 7:30 in the evening, in the
vicinity of the Cainta Cockpit Arena, Cainta, Rizal, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
with the use of firearms, threats and intimidation did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and take away ALBERT
YAM y LEE; That in the process, he was forced to board a Toyota Hi-
Ace van which transported him, passing through the areas of U.P.
Balara and Fairview in Quezon City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, until finally he was brought to an undisclosed
location in Caloocan City where he was kept for six (6) days; That
ransom in the amount of $1,000,000.00 was demanded in exchange
for his safe release until he was finally rescued on April 12, 2002 by
police operatives from the Philippine National Police.5
During arraignment, the accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the
charges.
On June 14, 2002, pre-trial was terminated without the parties having
entered into stipulations.
The Case for the Prosecution
During the trial, the prosecution witnesses, with their corresponding
testimonies, were:
(a) Albert, married to Evangeline Lim-Yam (Evangeline), holds a
Marketing degree from De La Salle University. He also took some
units under the Ateneo de Manila Universitys Masters in Business
Administration program. He is engaged in printing and financing
business. He is also a breeder of fighting cocks and race horses. On
February 2002, he took over, with a partner, the operations of the New
Cainta Coliseum (Coliseum), a cockpit arena.
Albert testified6 that the lens grade of his eye glasses is 275. With eye
glasses on, his vision is normal. Without the glasses, he can clearly
see objects one to two meters away from him, but beyond that, his
vision becomes blurry.7
On April 7, 2002, at around 7:30 p.m., Albert rode his Toyota Prado
(Prado) with Plate No. UTJ-112 and drove out of the Coliseums
parking lot. Ahead was a white Honda Civic car (Civic), while behind
was a Toyota Hi-Ace van (Hi-Ace). Upon reaching Imelda Avenue, the
Hi-Ace overtook the Civic. Albert was about to follow suit, but the Hi-
Ace suddenly stopped and blocked the Civic. Six men with long
firearms alighted from the Hi-Ace. Jubert and Morey approached the
Civic, which was just about two to two and a half meters away from
Albert,8 pointed their guns at the driver, who turned out to be
Pinky,9 and motioned for her to step out of the car and ride the Hi-Ace.
Two men ran after the "watch-your-car" boy in a nearby parking lot,
but Albert no longer noticed if the two still returned to the Hi-
Ace.10 Roger and Robert came near the Prado and gestured for Albert
to likewise alight from the vehicle and ride the Hi-Ace.
When Albert rode the Hi-Ace, he saw Marcelo in the drivers seat and
beside him was Ricky. Morey was behind the driver. So too were
Jubert. Roger and Robert rode the Hi-Ace after Albert did.
Albert and Pinky were handcuffed together and made to wear dark
sunglasses. The men took Alberts wallet containing PhP 9,000.00, his
drivers license and other documents. They also took his Patek
Philippe watch which costs PhP 400,000.00.
While inside the Hi-Ace, Albert and Pinky were ordered to duck their
heads. Notwithstanding the position, Albert saw the lights emanating
from the blue eagle figure at the Ateneo gym. He also heard one of the
men telling the driver to pass by Balara. After around 20 minutes,
Albert also noticed having passed by the vicinity of SM Fairview. They
arrived in their destination 10 to 15 minutes after and were handcuffed
separately. Albert and Pinky stayed in the house and were fed food
mostly bought from Jollibee until they were rescued on April 12, 2002.
Albert described the house as "half constructed".11 They were made to
stay in the basement around three and a half by four meters in size,
with a stairway, small sofa, bed, table and four chairs. Behind the table
was a sink and a comfort room. There was a large window about three
by five feet in size, but it was covered with a blanket and a plastic
sack. Albert identified Monico as the person who was beside him,
pulling him up when he fell while descending the basement
stairs.12 Albert claimed that he was still handcuffed then and was
made to wear dark eye glasses. The kidnappers allowed him to
remove the dark eye glasses when he laid down in bed on the first
night of their detention.13 On April 8, 2002, his own eye glasses were
returned to him upon his request.14
Albert told the men that he was the only person they should talk to if
they wanted ransom money. The men inquired how much he can give.
Albert replied that he can shell out PhP 500,000.00. The men asked
for Alberts phone and pin number to be able to call the latters wife.
He was ordered to write a letter to his wife informing her that he was
abducted and indicating therein the names of persons from whom she
could borrow money to be paid to the accused-appellants as ransom.
Albert also claimed that he got to talk, through the telephone, to the
person, whom the accused-appellants seemed to consider as their
boss. The boss demanded USD 1,000,000.00 for Alberts release.
One of the persons posted as guards in the safehouse threatened
Albert that the latter would be killed unless ransom money be paid by
Friday, April 12, 2002.15
Albert had seen Jose a few times in the Coliseum. Albert also recalled
that immediately prior to his abduction, Jose accompanied him to his
Prado and had asked for "balato".16 Albert identified Jose as the
"tipster" who acted as a look-out during the abduction incident.17 Albert
likewise stated that he had seen Ricky in the Coliseum on April 7,
2002 and on several other instances as the latter worked as a "kristo"
or bet taker.18 Albert recognized Marcelo as a bettor.
Albert identified Betty as the person who brought them food and who,
in one occasion, had inquired from the guard how Albert and Pinky
were faring in the basement.19
On April 11, 2002, at around 6:00 a.m.,20 seven persons came down to
the basement to threaten Albert and Pinky.21 Albert later identified
them as Jubert and Morey,22 Marcelo, Ricky, Lowhen and Jose,23 and
Nelson Ocampo y Ruiz @ Joselito Estigoy24 (Nelson). Thereafter, the
men left behind Nelson and Lowhen to remain as guards, who took
their posts in the stairway.25 At around lunch time, Betty gave food to
one of the guards, who in turn handed the same to Albert and Pinky.
Albert was then sitting in the sofa, which was just a little over a meter
away from the stairway.26
Albert remembered having stayed in the basement until the early
hours of April 12, 2002. On that day, he heard the ferocious barking of
a dog, footsteps in the second floor, and then a gun shot. Albert and
Pinky stayed inside the comfort room until a uniformed man brought
them out. One person, who acted as among those guarding Albert and
Pinky while they were detained, was killed in the rescue operations.
He was subsequently identified as Nelson. Another guard left in the
evening of April 10, 2002 and he never went back.27 Albert did not see
Betty and Monico in the premises of the safehouse on the day the
rescue operations were conducted by the police. He only saw the
couple in Camp Crame around 5:00 p.m. while the former was making
a statement.28
Albert and Pinky were brought to Camp Crame between 8:00 a.m. and
9:00 a.m. of April 12, 2002. Some time after lunch, a police line-up
with about 15 men was presented.29 Albert identified seven persons, to
wit, Marcelo, Ricky, Jubert, Morey, Jose, Robert and Roger, as among
his abductors. At that time, he was not yet able to pinpoint the rest of
the accused-appellants because they were not presented to him in the
police line-up.30
(b) Senior Inspector Arnold Palomo (S/Insp. Palomo), who is assigned
at the Anti-Organized Crime for Businessmens Concern Division of
the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG), Camp Crame,
testified that on April 12, 2002, at around 6:30 a.m., he was in the
vicinity of No. 3, Lumbang Street, Amparo Subdivision, Caloocan City,
where they had just rescued Pinky, a victim of kidnapping. Around an
hour later, Betty arrived and introduced herself as the owner of the
house. She inquired why the police officers were shooting at her
house. She was invited by the police to Camp Crame to answer
queries anent why a crime was committed in her house. While in
Camp Crame, Albert and Pinky identified her as the person who
brought them food while they were detained in the safehouse. Betty
was thus arrested.31
(c) Police Inspector Marites Bugnay (P/Insp. Bugnay), Assistant Chief
of the Firearms Identification Division of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory, testified that at around 9:30 a.m. of April 12,
2002, she and her team, with six members, went to Amparo
Subdivision where a rescue operation had just taken place. They
recovered a 5.56 mm Elisco rifle without serial number, a 9 mm
Chinese made pistol, two long and three short magazines for a caliber
5.56 mm rifle, 188 live ammunitions, 24 pieces of cartridges fired from
four different caliber 5.56 mm rifles, two lifted latent prints, among
others. She made a Spot Report of the physical evidence recovered
by her team. P/Insp. Bugnay, however, stated that some of the police
officers, who participated in the rescue operations, also carried caliber
5.56 mm firearms.32
(d) Evangeline, Alberts wife, testified33 having received seven phone
calls34 between April 7, 2002 and April 11, 2002 from the kidnappers
informing her that they took Albert and demanding USD 1,000,000.00
as ransom money.35 On April 11, 2002, she was instructed by the
kidnappers to go to Jollibee along EDSA Guadalupe. The kidnappers
were supposed to hand to her a letter from her husband. A police
operative acted as her driver. She and the police operative got to the
place between 11:30 and 11:45 in the morning.36 The kidnappers
called her and ordered her driver to go to the restrooms to retrieve a
letter taped in one of the toilet bowls. Evangeline went back to her car.
While she was inside, three men tried to forcibly open her car. She
panicked, bowed down and screamed. She was, however, only able to
see the suspects from theirs chests down.37 Thereafter, P/Insp.
Ferdinand Vero (Major Vero) approached the car and informed her
that they were able to apprehend three suspects. She went home. The
next morning, she received a call, got to talk to Albert, and thereafter
proceeded to Camp Crame.
(e) PO1 Paul Pacris (PO1 Pacris) stated that he and four other police
officers from the CIDG were the ones who assisted Evangeline when
she met with Alberts kidnappers in Jollibee along EDSA Guadalupe.
They arrived in the area at around 11:00 a.m. and after about two
hours, they arrested Ricky, Jose and Marcelo who tried to forcibly
open Evangelines car. They recovered from Jose a .38 caliber
Armscor with six live ammunitions. The policemen frisked the three
without opposition from the latter.38
(f) PO3 Manuel Cube (PO3 Cube) corroborated39 PO1 Pacris
testimony relative to the arrest of Ricky, Jose and Marcelo. PO3 Cube
further stated that while it was not his team which arrested the
suspects, after Jose and Ricky were turned over to them, they brought
the two to Camp Crame.40 While in the investigation room, he heard
Jose and Ricky admit knowledge of Alberts abduction.41 Jose and
Ricky were then not assisted by counsel.42 Chief Police
Superintendent Zolio M. Lachica (Col. Lachica) briefed PO3 Cube and
the other policemen that the arrested suspects divulged an information
that the Hi-Ace with Plate No. WNW-180 used in
Alberts abduction was going to pass by Road C-5, Commonwealth
Avenue on April 12, 2002.43 PO3 Cube, Major Vero and other police
officers riding four to five vehicles went to the place. At around 5:45
a.m., they spotted the Hi-Ace, chased it and blocked it with a police
car.44 Robert and Roger were inside the Hi-Ace, and the former had a
shotgun. After the policemen drew their guns, the suspects
surrendered.
(g) PO2 Arvin Garces (PO2 Garces), a field operative and an in-house
bomb technician assigned at the CIDGs Anti-Organized Crime and
Businessmens Concern Division, testified45 that on April 12, 2002,
between 8:00 a.m. and 8:30 a.m., he and 20 policemen went to Sitio
GSIS, Barangay San Martin de Porres, Paraaque to arrest Lowhen,
Jubert and Morey. Their team leader knocked on the door of the target
house, which was partially open. Lowhen came out. Jubert and Morey
were in the adjacent room, which was about five meters away from
where Lowhen was.46 PO2 Garces was uncertain though if the said
adjacent room was part of the same house where Lowhen was
found.47 The three suspects were informed that they were being
implicated for Alberts kidnapping and would thus be taken for
investigation.
Following were among the object evidence likewise offered by the
prosecution: (a) sketches prepared by Albert depicting the (1) exact
location where the kidnapping took place,48 (2) positions of Albert and
Pinky relative to the kidnappers while inside the Hi-Ace,49 and (3)
interior of the basement room where Albert and Pinky were
detained;50 (b) dark glasses wrapped with black tape and handcuffs
worn by Albert and Pinky while they were detained;51 (c) Alberts
handwritten note dated April 10, 2002 addressed to "Vangie" and
signed by "Boogs";52 and (d) Sinumpaang Salaysay53 and
Supplemental Affidavit54 executed by Albert on April 13, 2002 and April
15, 2002, respectively.
The Case for the Defense
The defense witnesses with their testimonies were:
(a) Marcelo, resident of Sta. Ana Compound, Manila East Road,
Taytay, Rizal, testified that he owns a beer house and a billiard hall.
He also renders mechanical services. He claimed that from 12:00
noon until 9:00 p.m. of April 7, 2002, he was repairing a motor bike at
home. Marcelo was with a certain Bogs, the owner of the motor bike,
and Jober, the formers helper.55
From April 8 to 9, 2002, Marcelo just stayed home with his daughter.56
On April 10, 2002, at around 7:00 a.m., Marcelo was in his bedroom
making an accounting of the earnings of his beer house. He heard
knocks at the door of his billiard hall. Thereafter, around six
unidentified men entered, punched, tied him up, and threw him at the
back of a white Revo without a plate. Even when Rosario, Marcelos
daughter, was slapped and kicked by the unidentified men after she
inquired about their identities, she insisted that she be taken with her
father. Marcelo and Rosario were brought to Camp Crame. They were
made to sit down in a room with a hazy glass window. Rosario was
thereafter ordered to leave the room and when she refused, she was
dragged out. The men started showing Marcelo photographs and
asking him questions. When he denied knowing any of the persons in
the photographs, he was blindfolded with a packing tape and got
kicked every time he refused to answer the mens queries. A plastic
bag was likewise placed over his head making it difficult for him to
breathe. His ordeal lasted for an hour, after which somebody told him
that if he had PhP 100,000.00, he would be released.57
At around 5:00 p.m. or 6:00 p.m., Marcelo asked Rosario to go home
and look for a lawyer. At around 10:00 a.m. of the following day, April
11, 2002, Rosario came back with a certain Atty. Platon. Marcelo
narrated to Atty. Platon the circumstances surrounding his
arrest.58 Atty. Platon informed Marcelo that the latter was being
charged of kidnapping.59 Not long after, at around 10:30 a.m. to 11:00
a.m., a certain Dr. Arnold de Vera (Dr. de Vera) arrived and conducted
an examination of Marcelos injuries and bruises.60 Marcelo asked
Atty. Platon if he can file a complaint against the men who mauled
him. Atty. Platon replied in the affirmative, but as of even date, no
complaint had been filed yet as Marcelo had to attend to other
pressing matters relative to the kidnapping case.61 Atty. Platon and Dr.
de Vera left while Marcelo and Rosario stayed in Camp Crame for two
nights.62
On April 12, 2002, at around 3:00 p.m. or 4:00 p.m., Marcelo was
brought to a building in Camp Crame and was made to stand up
alongside nine people with whom he was not acquainted. There were
cameras around and a Chinese man and a woman started pointing at
them.63
Marcelo denied personal acquaintance with Albert,64 PO1
Pacris,65 Jubert, Monico and Betty.66 He admitted having been to the
Coliseum as he was into cock fighting. The Coliseum, located in
Cainta, is only about two kilometers away from Taytay.67
Marcelo offered the testimony of Dr. de Vera,68 a plastic surgeon from
St. Lukes Medical Center, Quezon City, to prove that in the morning
of April 11, 2002, the former was already under the CIDGs custody.
The foregoing is contrary to the prosecutions claim that between
11:30 a.m. and 12:00 noon of the said date, Marcelo was arrested in
Jollibee along EDSA Guadalupe while trying to forcibly open
Evangelines car. Dr. de Vera stated that in the afternoon of April 10,
2002, Marcelos daughter called asking for his help as her father was
allegedly being manhandled. Dr. de Vera went to the CIDG office in
the morning of April 11, 2002. He made a visual examination of
Marcelos body and saw hematoma in the sternum and fresh
abrasions in both hands of the latter, but he did not reduce his
observations into writing.69 To stop Marcelos manhandling, Dr. de
Vera sought audience with the PNP Chief, but the latter was not
around.70
During cross-examination, Dr. de Vera stated that once in a while, he
sings and drinks in Marcelos beer house in Taytay.71
SPO2 Eduardo Peales testimony was dispensed with since the
parties stipulated that he was the officer who, on April 10, 2002, at
around 8:35 a.m., received and recorded in the logbook of the Taytay
Police Station a report from a certain Jover Porras y Perla that
Marcelo was abducted by unidentified men earlier at 7:20 a.m.72
(b) Ricky is a "kristo" or bet taker in Araneta Coliseum and U-Cap
Cockpit in Mandaluyong, and "mananari" or gaffer residing in San Luis
Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.73 He was still asleep in bed with his
wife on April 10, 2002, at around 9:45 a.m.74 when he heard
somebody knocking on the door. When he opened it, a man pointed a
gun at him and told him not to ask any questions but just to go with
them. There were two men and they brought him to a white Revo
where he saw three other people. The owner of the house saw Ricky
being taken.75
Ricky was brought to Camp Crame, was asked if he knew certain
persons from the photographs shown to him, and was mauled when
he replied in the negative.76
In the morning of April 12, 2002 while still detained in Camp Crame,
one of the men, who forcibly took Ricky from his rented room on April
10, 2002, informed the latter that if he had PhP 20,000.00, he would
be released. In the afternoon of April 12, 2002, Ricky was handcuffed
and placed in a police line-up without being informed of the reason for
his inclusion therein.77
Ricky denied being among those who abducted Albert on April 7, 2002
and being present in the safehouse in Amparo Subdivision, Caloocan
at 6:00 a.m. of April 11, 2002.78 He did not know Albert personally and
had not seen him before. However, Ricky admitted having been to the
Coliseum and knowing that Albert was renting the same.79Ricky was
unaware of any grudge Albert, PO1 Pacris or PO3 Cube may have
against him.80 Ricky did not have any document to prove that he was
detained in Camp Crame on April 10, 2002 and his Booking and Arrest
Sheet were both dated April 12, 2002.81
Rickys wife, May, testified82 that after the former was taken by the
unidentified men, she went to Valenzuela Police Station and an officer
opined that her husband may be in Camp Crame.83 She went as
suggested and found her husband, who assured her that he would be
released.84 She went home but got back to Camp Crame at 12:00
noon of April 11, 2002, during which time she was not anymore
allowed to talk to Ricky.85 She stayed in Camp Crame until past 10:00
p.m. and saw from TV Patrol that Ricky was involved in a kidnapping
incident. She got to talk to her husband only on April 13, 2002.86
During cross-examination, May stated that Ricky was with her at
around 7:00 p.m. of April 7, 2002.87
Ritchelda Tugbo (Tugbo), a 63-year old widow and Rickys landlady,
testified88 that at around 9:30 a.m. of April 10, 2002, while she was
eating breakfast, three unidentified men entered her house and took
Ricky from his rented room.89
Sabina Poliquit (Poliquit), an unemployed 50-year old widow, and
Rodolfo Buado (Buado), a 60-year old retired employee, who were
both Rickys neighbors, corroborated Tugbos statements.90
(c) Jose is a trainer gaffer, breeder of fighting cocks, part-time private
martial during derbies, and a resident of San Isidro, Fairview, Quezon
City. During the trial, he stated91 that in the evening of April 9, 2002, he
went to U-Cap Cockpit in Mandaluyong, where a derby sponsored by
a certain Pol Estrellado was being held, to find prospective buyers of
fighting cocks and to place bets.92 He left the place at around 1:00
a.m. of April 10, 2002. While waiting for a cab, a white Revo stopped
in front of him, and three gun-toting men alighted therefrom.93 He was
shoved in the front seat in between the driver and another man. While
inside the Revo, Joses eyes were covered with packing tape. His
wallet, money, watch, necklace and ring were taken, and the men
stepped on his head to keep him down. A plastic bag was placed over
his head making it difficult for him to breathe, and he was repeatedly
punched when he denied involvement in Alberts kidnapping.94
When Jose regained consciousness, he did not know where he was
but there was a boy of around 16 years of age removing the packing
tape from his eyes. Adelantar only learned that he was in Camp
Crame when he was brought to a room with a police line-up at around
6:00 p.m. of April 12, 2002.95 He insisted that from April 10, 2002
onwards, he was held by the police in Camp Crame, hence, he could
not have been present at 6:00 a.m. of April 11, 2002 in the safehouse
where Albert was detained, and at 11:00 a.m. of the same day in
Jollibee along EDSA Guadalupe.96The boy who removed the packing
tape from his eyes could attest to the foregoing, but Jose did not know
his name and had not seen him anymore.97 Further, Jose had never
been to the Coliseum and had not personally met Albert and
Pinky.98 Jose alleged that he and the rest of the accused-appellants
were mere fall guys.99 Jose claimed that he only met Marcelo after
they were both placed in the police line-up and in the same detention
cell.100 Jose admitted that he was acquainted with Ricky, whom he had
recommended to be a
"kristo" in Araneta Cockpit.101 Out of fear, Jose had neither informed
his lawyer that he was mauled by the policemen nor filed any action
against them.102
(d) Betty and her husband Monico have been residing for about 33
years in 224 Malanting Street, Amparo Subdivision, Caloocan City.
Betty, an elementary school graduate, is a housewife tending a sari-
sari store and a piggery. Monico is a drilling contractor and plumber.
Betty and Monico own the house in Lumbang Street, Amparo
Subdivision, Caloocan City, where Albert and Pinky were detained
from April 7 to 12, 2002.
Betty testified103 that due to her busy schedule, she had not visited
their house in Lumbang Street during the alleged period of Albert and
Pinkys detention. Betty and Monico had rented out for PhP 3,000.00
per month the said house to Roger since the late afternoon of April 7,
2002.
Roger was recommended to the spouses by a certain Pidok Igat
(Igat), their acquaintance. Betty saw Roger once but the latter was
wearing sunglasses.104
Betty stated that from April 7 to 12, 2002, Monico was contracted to
build a deep well in Narra Street, Amparo Subdivision, Caloocan City.
In the morning of April 12, 2002, Igat told her that the house in
Lumbang Street was being fired at by the policemen. She first
instructed Monico to report the incident to the police, then, she ran
towards the said house. She was still at a certain distance from the
house when the policemen held her by the arms after finding out that
she owned it. She denied knowledge of the kidnapping incident, but
she was still invited by the police officers to go with them to Camp
Crame.105
Betty was not allowed to go home but was detained by the police in
Camp Crame. At around 6:00 p.m. of April 12, 2002, after Albert and
Pinky arrived, Betty, Roger, Jose, Marcelo, Ricky and other suspects
were placed in a police line-up composed of ten people. Monico,
Jubert and Morey were not among those in the line-up yet. Albert and
Pinky did not pinpoint Betty from the line-up, but a police officer
insisted that she be included because she owned the safehouse. Betty
identified the officer as SPO1 Polero, but she was uncertain of the
name, albeit describing the latter as the one who took Albert and
Pinkys statements.106 Betty did not see Albert and Pinky being
brought out of the house during the rescue operations on April 7,
2002. Betty did not personally know Albert, but first saw him in Camp
Crame in the evening of April 12, 2002.107
During cross-examination, Betty stated that Monico and Jubert were
included in the police line-up.108
(e) Monico stated109 that he received PhP 3,000.00 from Roger and
handed it to Betty as rental for their house in Lumbang Street, Amparo
Subdivision, Caloocan City. The said house is about four streets away
from Bettys sari-sari store and piggery in Malanting Street. The
amount was a mere deposit and he was promised that before the end
of the month, PhP 6,000.00 would be paid as rental.110 Monico did not
visit the house from April 7 to 11, 2002, hence, he did not know if
Roger actually occupied it. Within the same period, Monico was not
able to talk to Igat, who was the person who referred Roger to him and
Betty.111
Monico testified that he was in Bettys store in the night of April 7,
2002 and denied having assisted Albert in descending to the
basement of the safehouse.112
When their house in Lumbang Street was fired at by the police in the
early morning of April 11, 2002, he was instructed by Betty to report
the matter to the authorities. He went to the Novaliches Police, but
was informed that Amparo Subdivision is not within the said stations
jurisdiction. Monico got to Bagong Silang Police Station at around 9:00
a.m., and an officer took notes while talking to him, but the former was
not sure if it was a blotter. Monico was instructed to wait. At around
3:00 p.m., a superior officer arrived, asked Monico questions and
informed the latter that he knew about the shooting incident. He
stayed in the police station until 6:00 p.m. The officer told Monico that
the latter would be brought to Camp Crame to be interviewed and will
be allowed to go home after.113 In Camp Crame, Monico was informed
that he was being implicated in Albert and Pinkys kidnapping.
Although he and Betty denied any involvement in the charges against
them, to date, for lack of opportunity on their part as they are both
detained, no complaints had been filed against the officers who
implicated them.114
(f) Jubert, a carpenter and a college undergraduate from Asibanglan,
Pinukpok, Kalinga Province, testified115 that he came to Manila to look
for a job on January 2002.116 For two months, from February to March
2002, he was among those who worked in constructing the Globe
Telecommunications tower in Sucat. He resided in the house of his
uncle, Daniel Balanay (Balanay), in Bicutan, Taguig.117
Jubert met Lowhen, a resident of Paraaque, while applying for a job
to make cabinets for Perma Wood Industries on March 27, 2002.118
At around 4:00 p.m. of April 11, 2002, Jubert went to Lowhens house
to inquire about the requirements in applying as a security guard, but
the latter was not home yet. Lowhen arrived at around 5:00 p.m.
Morey, whom Jubert met for the first time, was also there. Lowhen
bought drinks for the three of them and Jubert stayed overnight in the
house of Morey, which was just about 50 meters away. While they
were sleeping, men barged in, ordered them to lay face down, and
handcuffed them. Jubert and Morey were taken out of the house
where they saw Lowhen, who was likewise boarded into a car. Out of
fear of the men who seemed angry, Lowhen, Jubert and Morey were
no longer able to ask why they were being taken. They were brought
to Camp Crame. Jubert denied being among those who abducted
Albert and Pinky on April 7, 2002, and guarding the latter two who
were detained in the basement of Betty and Monicos house in
Amparo Subdivision, Caloocan City.119 Jubert insisted that on April 7,
2002, he was fixing the house of his uncle, Balanay, in Bicutan,
Taguig, and with him were the latters brother and two
ladies.120 However, none of the mentioned persons executed affidavits
to corroborate Juberts claim as to his whereabouts on April 7,
2002.121 Jubert vehemently denied having seen Albert prior to April 12,
2002, the day the former was arrested.122
(g) Robert, a farmer from Isabela, a driver since 1986, and resident of
Western Bicutan, Taguig since 1990, alleged123 that on April 7, 2002,
he was in Bontoc, Mountain Province.124 From March 4 to April 8,
2002, he was driving for Engineer Raymundo Vargas, Sr. (Engr.
Vargas), a contractor engineer.125 Robert offered as evidence a
certification, dated November 6, 2003, issued by the Pines Community
Developers and General Services Corporation, signed by Engr.
Vargas, stating that he was employed from February 10, 1987 to April
8, 2002, and five cash vouchers showing that he was paid for his
services.126 The cash voucher for the payment of PhP 2,500.00, dated
April 8, 2002, which was allegedly received by Robert
himself,127 contained erasures. Engr. Vargas justified the erasures by
stating that the typewriter, which was initially used, did not yield very
clear impressions on paper.128Copies of the cash vouchers were,
however, secured by his wife only much later upon his lawyers
instructions.129
On April 11, 2002, Robert was arrested in his house in Bicutan by
CIDG officers contrary to the prosecutions claim that he was riding the
Hi-Ace with Roger and carrying a shotgun when seized by the police
in Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City on April 12, 2002.130 Robert is
not engaged in cockfighting.
Angelita Alto (Alto), a member of the Barangay Auxiliary Force of
Western Bicutan, Taguig, testified131 that at around 7:45 a.m. of April
11, 2002, a van parked in the corner of Sunflower and Calantas
Streets, Western Bicutan, Taguig, and persons clad in dark suits
alighted therefrom.132 They proceeded to Roberts house where Altos
cousin stays as a boarder. The men kicked and broke the door,
handcuffed, blindfolded and took Robert to the van. Alto was about
three meters away from where the events transpired. When the van
left, Alto took two pictures of the broken door, called up Roberts wife
and recorded the events in page 1056 of the barangays logbook.133
Engr. Vargas from Baguio City corroborated134 Roberts claim that they
were together in Bontoc, Mountain Province from February 10 to April
8, 2002. It takes 12 to 14 hours to reach Manila from Bontoc.135 Robert
was with Engr. Vargas on April 7, 2002, but the former went to Baguio
at 10:00 a.m. of the following day supposedly to collect rentals. Robert
said he would be back in two days, but no longer showed up after.
Engr. Vargas only found out in October 2003 that Robert was being
implicated in a kidnapping incident after being informed by the latters
wife.136
(h) Roger, a businessman residing in Signal Village, Bicutan, Taguig,
claimed137 that on April 11, 2002, at around 6:00 a.m., he was walking
along Bravo Street in Signal Village.138 He was on his way to his
brothers wake when he was taken by four armed men wearing civilian
clothes, whom he later found out were police officers from the
CIDG.139 He only met his co-accused-appellants in Camp Crame on
April 11, 2002.140 He saw Albert for the first time on April 12, 2002
when the police line-up was presented to the latter.141
(i) Morey, a warehouse care taker from Barangay Sinakbat, Bacong,
Benguet, stated142 that he was in Burnham, Baguio City tending
coconuts on April 7, 2002. The warehouse closed at 6:00 p.m., after
which he went to his uncles house in Trinidad, Benguet.143
At 1:00 p.m. of April 8, 2002, Morey and a certain Harris Batawang
(Batawang) left Baguio for Manila. Morey was contracted to watch
over a house bought by Batawang in GSIS Village, Paraaque. They
got to Manila at around 9:00 p.m., spent the night in Paraaque, and
the following morning, Batawang called Lowhen and introduced him to
Morey.144
On April 10, 2002, Morey and Batawang bought materials for the
repair of the latters house. At 2:00 p.m. of the following day,
Batawang returned to Baguio to recruit workers to help Morey in
repairing the formers house.145
In the evening of April 11, 2002, Lowhen called Morey and informed
him that the latter has a province mate who was staying in the formers
house. Lowhen was referring to Jubert. Morey went to Lowhens
house. The three drunk the gin bought by Lowhen. Lowhen slept at
11:00 p.m., leaving Morey and Jubert behind. Morey and Jubert slept
in Batawangs house. The following day, men barged into Batawangs
house and handcuffed Morey and Jubert. The men asked if the two
knew a certain Lito, ordered them to surrender their guns, and
ransacked Batawangs house. Lowhen, Morey and Batawang were
boarded into a Revo and brought to Camp Crame.146
Morey denied being acquainted with the other accused-appellants
apart from Lowhen and Morey. Morey initially saw Albert during the
first day of hearing of the kidnapping case.147
(j) Lowhen, a resident of Paraaque City, stated148 that he had been
employed by Regioner Security and Investigation Agency (Regioner)
as a guard since 1993. He was posted in Perma Wood Industries
Corporation in Marian Road 2, Paraaque from March 4 to April 11,
2002. He worked on a 24-hour shift, usually starting at 7:00 a.m.149
On April 10, 2002, Lowhen reported for work in Perma Wood
Industries at 7:30 a.m.150 He offered an uncertified photocopy of his
daily time record (DTR) from March 16 to 31, 2002 with his signature
on it.151 Anent the DTR from April 1 to 15, 2002, it was unsigned by
Lowhen because at that time, he was already arrested by CIDG
officers.152Logbook entries signed by Lowhen and a certain "S/G
Pacete RA," the outgoing guard, indicating that the former assumed
his posts at 7:00 a.m. of April 4, 6, 8 and 10, 2002 were likewise
presented.153 Lowhen got off from work at 7:45 a.m. of April 11,
2002,154 but was no longer able to assume duties the next day
because he was already taken by the CIDG officers.155 He just walked
and got home at 8:00 a.m., ate breakfast and went to visit a certain
Roger Batersal (Batersal) in Malugay Street, Paraaque to have a
picture frame repaired. Batersal, Lowhens brother-in-law, was then
having coffee, so Lowhen went inside the house, laid down in the sofa,
turned on the television and slept till 4:00 p.m. The picture frame was
already assembled and Lowhen went home where he saw Jubert
waiting for him.156 Jubert asked Lowhen about the requirements in
applying for a security guard position. Lowhen bought gin and while
the two were drinking, he found out that Jubert speaks Kalinga and
Ilocano. Lowhen called Morey, who hailed from Baguio and who was
then a boarder in the house of the formers brother. Morey joined the
drinking session but Lowhen left at around 11:00 p.m. as the latter
was already dizzy and still had to assume his post at 7:00 a.m. of the
following day.157
At 6:30 a.m. of April 12, 2002, Lowhens wife woke him up, but he
went back to sleep. Thereafter, Lowhen heard noises from the gate of
the house, then somebody shouted ordering for men to get out. When
Lowhen opened his eyes, a man wearing black was pointing a long
firearm at him. Lowhen went out of the house and was directed to
place his hands behind his head and lie face down on the floor. The
men searched Lowhens house. Lowhen, Morey and Jubert were
taken to the nearby United Paraaque Subdivision and after about 15
to 20 minutes, they were boarded into a green Revo without a plate.
Lowhens wife wanted to tag along but she was informed that she
could no longer be accommodated in the Revo, but she could just
proceed on her own to Camp Crame.158
When they reached Camp Crame, Lowhen, Jubert and Morey were
separated from each other.159 Lowhen was brought into a room and a
police officer asked him if he knew a certain Lito. Lowhen replied in
the negative, then he was questioned if he knew that a man and a
woman had been kidnapped. The officer stepped out of the room, but
he came back later with a bald Chinese man.160 The Chinese man
stood near the door, looked at the officer, shook his head, then left.
The officer tapped Lowhens shoulder and asked the latter to
cooperate with the police by being a star witness, for which he would
be paid PhP 10,000.00 a month, or be hanged. The officer typed an
affidavit, but Lowhen refused to receive it. Lowhen told the officer that
he could not do what was demanded of him, then the latter left.
Lowhen remained in the room until 6:30 p.m. of April 12, 2002 when
he was put alongside more than 10 other persons in a police line-
up.161 Albert did not point at Lowhen in the line-up.162 Prior to April 11,
2002, Lowhen did not personally know Albert.163
During cross-examination, Lowhen stated that he was on duty in the
early morning of April 11, 2002, hence, he could not have been in the
basement of the safehouse where Albert was detained at around the
same time.164
Redentor Pacete (Pacete), a construction worker who used to work as
a reliever guard at Regioner, testified165 that he met Lowhen when
they were both assigned in Perma Wood Industries.166 Pacetes
signatures were affixed in Regioners logbook indicating the times he
assumed his posts before or after Lowhen.
Domingo De Guzman (De Guzman), Lowhens supervisor in Regioner,
was called by the defense to the witness stand to point out to the court
that he was the one who photocopied the logbook entries and the DTR
referred to by Lowhen and Pacete in their testimonies.167 However, the
originals cannot anymore be presented to the court because Regioner
had ceased its operations in 2004 and the records were no longer
available.168 De Guzman brought two index cards, prepared by
Regioners secretary, indicating Lowhens assignments from April 27,
1993 to April 11, 2002,169 and 27 payroll sheets likewise including
Lowhens name covering the period from February 1, 2000 to April 15,
2002.170
The testimony171 of Elsie Batersal (Elsie), Lowhens sister, to the effect
that her brother went to her house at around 8:30 a.m. of April 11,
2002 and slept there until 4:00 p.m., was dispensed with after the
prosecution agreed to stipulate and admit the same.
The Ruling of the RTC
The RTC rendered a Decision172 on September 27, 2007. In Criminal
Case No. Q-02-108834, the accused-appellants were acquitted from
the charges of kidnapping and serious illegal detention of Pinky. The
accused-appellants were, however, convicted of conspiring the
kidnapping of, and demanding of ransom from Albert in Criminal Case
No. Q-02-108835. The RTC imposed upon the accused-appellants the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and a solidary obligation to pay Albert
the amount of PhP 100,000.00 as moral damages. The RTC
ratiocinated that:
Very critical in this case is the testimony of Albert Yam. He testified
about how the kidnapping was perpetrated; he testified that a Toyota
Hi-Ace van with eight (8) occupants blocked the path of the Honda
Civic car colored white driven by Pinky Gonzales; he (Albert Yam) was
driving a Toyota Prado vehicle that was behind the Honda Civic car of
Pinky Gonzales; Albert Yam identified and named before this court
four (4) of those who alighted from the van; he testified that accused
Morey Dadaan and accused Jubert Banatao after going down from
their van, approached the Honda Civic car of Pinky Gonzales; he also
identified and named Roger Pesado accompanied by Robert
Gonzales who went down from their van and approached his car; he
testified that it was Roger Pesado who told him (Albert Yam) to come
out of his vehicle; he further testified about he and Pinky Gonzales
being boarded in the Toyota Hi-Ace van and identified accused
Marcelo Llanora as the driver of the van, Ricky Pea who is seated
beside the driver x x x. Albert Yam also testified that after their
kidnapping ordeal, he learned that accused Jose Adelantar acted as
look out when they were being kidnapped along the road coming from
the Cainta cockpit; x x x he also testified that when the ransom was
being demanded, seven (7) of their kidnappers went down to talk to
him and in court gave the name[s] of six (6) of the accused, namely:
Jubert Banatao, Morey Dadaan, Marcelo Llanora, Ricky Pea, Jose
Adelantar and Lowhen Almonte; Albert also testified that at the
instance when he fell down the steps of the stairs, it was the accused
Monico Salvador who was escorting him and held him; in his
testimony, he stated that accused Betty Salvador brought the food that
they ate and on one occasion, saw her asking another accused about
their condition; x x x Albert Yam testified that the ransom demanded
by the accused is in the amount of One Million Dollars and there were
possibly fifteen (15) people who were involved in the kidnapping; he
further testified about the rescue operation and was able to identify
seven (7) of the accused in the police line-up but mentioned in his
testimony the names of eight (8) accused as among those whom he
identified in the police line-up; x x x Albert Yam explained in his
testimony that he also identified the accused Lowhen Almonte after
the police line-up because said accused was not among those
included during the police line-up and this is in accordance with a
Supplemental Affidavit which Albert Yam identified in court. x x x The
Court was able to deduce from the testimony of Albert Yam that
Monico Salvador and Betty Salvador who are admittedly the owners of
the place where Albert Yam and Pinky Gonzales were kept during the
kidnapping ordeal, were not present at the precise time that the rescue
was conducted by the police.
xxxx
Where there is no evidence, as in this case, to indicate that the
prosecution witness was actuated by improper motive, the
presumption is that he is not so actuated and that his testimony is
entitled to full faith and credit. Also jurisprudence holds that if an
accused had really nothing to do with a crime, it would be against the
natural order of events and human nature and against the
presumption of good faith that a prosecution witness would falsely
testify against him. x x x
xxxx
Direct Proof of previous agreement to commit an offense is not
necessary to prove conspiracy. It may be deduced from the mode,
method and manner in which the offense is perpetrated, or inferred
from the acts of the accused when such acts point to a joint purpose
and design, concerted action and community of interest. x x x
xxxx
Here, we find a closeness of personal association and a concurrence
towards a common unlawful purpose. x x x
x x x There were very minor loose ends in the chain of events and the
testimony of these other witnesses besides Albert Yam completed the
narration of facts for the prosecution. These other witnesses, most of
whom are police officers, provided the proofs for the prosecution as to
how the kidnapping case was solved and why the accused were
apprehended.
xxxx
Denial is a self-serving negative defense that cannot be given greater
weight than the declaration of a credible witness who testifies on
affirmative matters. x x x
Settled is the rule that the defense of alibi is inherently weak and
crumbles in the light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses who
testified on affirmative matters. x x x
xxxx
Among the documentary evidence presented which gives credence to
the testimony of Albert Yam are the three (3) sketches which he
prepared x x x for the prosecution. x x x Two (2) pieces of dark
glasses wrapped with black tape x x x, the two sets of handcuffs x x x,
and the handwritten note of Albert Yam addressed to his wife x x x.
Elisco 5.56 mm rifle, 9mm pistol, Armscor cal. 38 revolver, a shotgun,
magazines for the firearms, live cartridges/ammunition and spent
shells x x x.
x x x It must be emphasized that Pinky Gonzales never testified in
court so how could the prosecution establish that she is indeed a
kidnap victim. x x x173 (Citations omitted and underscoring ours)
The Appeals Filed Against the RTC Decision and the Office of the
Solicitor Generals (OSG) Opposition Thereto
The accused-appellants interposed separate appeals174 essentially
reiterating their respective factual claims, which were in turn
refuted175 by the OSG.
The OSG argued that the supposed eye defect ascribed to Albert was
not severe as to hinder his ability to identify his kidnappers. The dark
eye glasses, which the kidnappers had ordered Albert to put on, were
loose and even slipped as he descended the basement stairs, giving
him the chance to see Monico. Besides, Alberts eye glasses were
returned to him on April 8, 2002. Further, it is settled that when thrust
into exceptional circumstances, victims of crimes strive to remember
the important details and to see the faces of their assailants. Anent
Betty and Monicos claim that it was unnatural for a person involved in
the commission of an offense to proceed to the scene and report the
matter to the police, the OSG interpreted the foregoing as defensive
acts intended to mislead the authorities in the conduct of the
investigation.
Jubert offered no corroborative testimonies regarding his whereabouts
from April 7 to 11, 2002.
Roberts alibi that he was in Bontoc, Mountain Province driving for
Engr. Vargas should be supported by clear and convincing evidence.
The said alibi weighs weaker vis--vis Alberts positive testimony
relative to Roberts participation in the abduction. Engr. Vargas only
testified on Roberts employment. Alto merely witnessed the
circumstances of Roberts arrest on April 11, 2002.
Lowhens post in Perma Wood Industries was not that far from the
locations where the acts of kidnapping were committed, hence, no
physical impossibility to get from one place to the other. The logbook,
index cards and payroll sheets offered by Lowhen had no evidentiary
value for being mere photocopies. Lowhen claimed that Albert did not
identify him from the police line-up. However, Albert testified that he
did not see Lowhen from the line-up. Besides, even if Lowhen was
indeed included in the line-up, Albert, at that time, had just been
rescued, thus, stressed and confused. Albert had modified his initial
lapse by categorically stating in his amended affidavit that Lowhen
was among those who went to the basement in the early morning of
April 11, 2002.
The OSG emphasized that Albert remained unfazed and unwavering
in his testimony and so were the rest of the prosecution witnesses.
The OSG likewise stressed that the RTCs evaluation of the credibility
of the witnesses is entitled to the highest respect and should be
upheld in the absence of proof that the said court had overlooked facts
which if duly regarded, may alter the result of the case.
The Ruling of the CA
On February 25, 2011, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision
denying the appeal of the accused-appellants. However, the CA
modified the RTC ruling by expressly stating the accused-appellants
non-eligibility for parole. Further, the accused-appellants were ordered
to solidarily pay Albert PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity and PhP
100,000.00 as exemplary damages. The CA declared that:
The crucial issue in this case involves the assessment of credibility of
witnesses. Could the version succinctly narrated by the victim, his wife
and the police officers who participated in the operation for the rescue
of the kidnap victims possibly be concocted as so alleged by the
appellants?
x x x Unless otherwise specifically required, the testimony of a single
eyewitness if credible and trustworthy is sufficient to support a finding
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. And since the determination of
credibility is within the province of the trial court which has the
opportunity to examine and observe the demeanor of witnesses,
appellate courts will not generally interfere in this jurisdiction. x x x
xxxx
The most crucial evidence submitted in this case was the positive
testimony of kidnap victim Albert Yam recognizing appellants as his
abductors. Common experience tells us that when extraordinary
circumstances take place, it is natural for persons to remember many
of the important details. x x x The most natural reaction of victims of
criminal violence is to strive to see the features and faces of their
assailants and observe the manner in which the crime is committed.
Yam positively identified appellants as his captors. x x x
xxxx
The evidence also shows that the accused-appellants acted in concert
in perpetrating the kidnapping. x x x
xxxx
x x x The fact that accused Betty Salvadors role was limited to giving
victims their food is immaterial whether she acted as a principal or as
an accomplice because the conspiracy and her participation therein
have been established. In fact, she was the owner of the safehouse
where the victims were kept. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of
all and the conspirators shall be held equally liable for the crime.
xxxx
x x x Police officers are presumed to have acted regularly in the
performance of their official functions in the absence of clear and
convincing proof to the contrary or proof that they were moved by ill
will. x x x.176 Citations omitted and underscoring ours)
Incidents after the Rendition of the CA Decision
The records of this case were elevated to us pursuant to the
Resolution177 issued by the CA on February 9, 2012 giving due course
to the notices of appeal filed by the accused-appellants, except Betty
and Monico.
In compliance with our Resolution178 dated July 2, 2012, a
Supplemental Brief179 was filed by the Public Attorneys Office (PAO)
in behalf of the accused-appellants, except Betty and Monico. In lieu
of a supplemental brief, the OSG filed a Manifestation180 stating that it
is adopting the arguments it had previously raised in the Consolidated
Brief181filed with the CA.
The Issue
Whether or not the CA gravely erred in finding the accused-appellants
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom
despite the prosecutions failure to overthrow the constitutional
presumption of innocence in their favor.182
The Supplemental Brief filed by the PAO once again presented the
accused-appellants factual claims in the proceedings below relative to
the alleged mauling, irregular arrests and extortion attempts
committed by CIDG officers against Marcelo and Ricky. The PAO
stressed anew the alibis that on April 7, 2002, Morey was in his
uncles warehouse in Baguio, Robert was in Bontoc, Mountain
Province driving for Engr. Vargas, while Lowhen assumed his security
guard duties in Perma Wood Industries in Paraaque. The PAO also
maintained that Roger was arrested at 6:00 a.m. of April 11, 2002 in
Bicutan, and not on April 12, 2002 in Commonwealth Avenue.
Our Ruling
The instant appeal lacks merit.
The CA correctly found that the
essential elements comprising the
crime of kidnapping for ransom
were present and that the accused-
appellants conspired in its commission.
People v. Uyboco,183 enumerated the elements of the crime of
kidnapping for ransom, viz:
In order for the accused to be convicted of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the
prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of the crime, namely: (1) the offender is a private individual;
(2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter
of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and
(4) in the commission of the offense any of the following
circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for
more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public
authority; (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the
person kidnapped and kept in detained is a minor, the duration of his
detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and
illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of
his detention is immaterial.184
In the case at bar, the accused-appellants, who were indicted for
forcibly abducting Albert, are all private individuals. Albert was taken
on April 7, 2002 and his detention lasted for six days, during which
period, threats to kill him and demand for ransom were made.
In affirming the conviction of the accused-appellants, we are guided by
four-settled doctrines enunciated in People v. Martinez,185 viz:186
(a) The trial court[]s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses must be
accorded great respect owing to its opportunity to observe and
examine the witnesses conduct and demeanor on the witness stand;
(b) When there is no evidence to show that the prosecution witness is
actuated by an improper motive, identification of the accused-
appellants as the offenders should be given full faith and credit;187
(c) Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof of prior
agreement by the parties to commit a crime but that it may be inferred
from the acts of the accused-appellants before, during and after the
commission of the crime which indubitably point to a joint purpose,
concerted action and community of interest; and
(d) The respective alibis proffered by the accused-appellants cannot
prevail over the unequivocal testimony of the victim categorically and
positively pointing to them as his abductors, and for the defense of
alibis, to be given full credit, they must be clearly established and must
not leave room for doubt.188
The accused-appellants all denied being personally acquainted with
Albert or having knowledge of any grudge which the latter may
harbour against them. The RTC and the CA found Alberts testimony
on the participation of the accused-appellants as conspirators in the
kidnapping incident, and the manner by which he had subsequently
identified them, as clear and categorical.
Albert testified:
PROS. FADULLON:
Q: Mr. Witness, will you please tell this Honorable Court where you
were on April 7, 2002 between the hours of 7:00 and 7:30 in the
evening?
A: I was at the New Cainta Coliseum.
xxxx
Q: Will you please tell us, Sir, if you recall if there was anything
unusual that happened that evening as you were leaving the New
Cainta Coliseum on your way home?
A: I was kidnapped that evening.
xxxx
Q: Now, Sir, will you please tell this Honorable Court what happened
when you notice that the Toyota Hi-Ace van stopped abruptly the path
of the Honda Civic car?
A: I saw six (6) men coming down from the Hi-Ace with long firearms.
xxxx
Q: Now tell us, Sir, what happened when six (6) men armed with long
firearms alighted from the vehicle, Toyota Hi-Ace van?
A: I saw two (2) of those people went to the white car and motioned
the driver with a gun pointed motioning the driver of the white vehicle
to go down.
Q: You mentioned earlier that there were six (6) armed men who
alighted. You accounted for, two (2) went to the driver side of the white
Honda Civic car, what about the others, do you know what happened?
A: They were there and two (2) of them I think ran after the watch-
your-car boy and two of them went to my car, Sir.189
When asked to identify the two men who approached the Civic, Albert
pointed to Jubert and Morey. Albert named those who approached his
Prado as Roger and Robert. Roger and Robert gestured for him to
alight from the Prado and brought him to the Hi-Ace, where he saw
Marcelo in the drivers seat and Ricky in the front passengers seat.190
At around 6:00 a.m. of April 11, 2002, seven men went to the
basement of the safehouse where Albert and Pinky were detained.
They threatened Albert with bodily harm should he not accede to their
demand for ransom. Albert identified them as Jubert, Morey, Marcelo,
Ricky, Lowhen, Jose and Nelson. Five of the men left but Nelson and
Lowhen were left behind to guard Albert and Pinky.191
The overt acts of the accused-appellants Jubert, Morey, Marcelo,
Ricky, Robert, Roger, Lowhen and Jose were undoubtedly geared
towards unlawfully depriving Albert of his liberty and extorting ransom
in exchange for his release.
Albert was able to identify Marcelo, Ricky, Jubert, Morey, Jose,
Lowhen, Robert and Roger from a police line-up of around 15 persons
presented to him in Camp Crame on April 12, 2002.192 During cross-
examination, Albert clarified that Lowhen was not among the seven
persons he had identified as among his captors from the initial police
line-up of 15 persons presented to him. Albert justified the omission by
stating that he saw Lowhen only after the line-up was presented and
after he had already executed his April 12, 2002 affidavit.193
In their defense, Marcelo, Ricky, Jubert, Robert, Morey, Lowhen, Jose
and Roger offered their respective alibis, which fail to persuade.
Marcelo claimed that from 12:00 noon to 9:00 p.m. of April 7, 2002, he
was at home repairing a motor bike. On his part, Jubert insisted that
he was fixing his uncles house in Bicutan, Taguig on the same day.
Morey averred that he was in a coconut warehouse in Burnham,
Baguio City, and he left the place at around 6:00 p.m. to go to his
uncles house in Trinidad, Benguet. Noticeably, Marcelo, Jubert and
Morey offered no corroborative evidence to support their bare
allegations.
Ricky and his wife, May, alleged that they were likewise at home on
April 7, 2002. However, Mays testimony does not carry much weight
in view of her relation to Ricky.
Robert posited that he was in Bontoc, Mountain Province driving for
Engr. Vargas from February 10, 2002 to April 8, 2002. Robert left at
10:00 a.m. of April 8, 2002 on the pretext that he would just collect
rentals in Baguio. He informed Engr. Vargas that he would be back in
two days. Robert testified and Alto corroborated his statement that the
former was arrested by CIDG officers in Bicutan, Taguig on April 11,
2002.
The test to determine the value of the testimony of a witness is
whether such is in conformity with knowledge and consistent with the
experience of mankind; whatever is repugnant to these standards
becomes incredible and lies outside of judicial cognizance.194 It defies
logic to figure out why Engr. Vargas was informed that Robert was
implicated in Alberts kidnapping only on October 2003, or around one
and a half years after the latters indictment. If Roberts alibi were true,
it would have been more in accord with human experience if he
promptly told Engr. Vargas about his predicament for the latter was
then in the best position to corroborate the formers allegations. It is
likewise perplexing why Robert, who had been driving for Engr.
Vargas for five years, was in Taguig on April 11, 2002 and so lightly
regarded his commitment to the latter that he would be back in two
days. No explanations were offered to justify Roberts unreasonable
omissions.
Lowhen insisted that he assumed his 24-hour duty in Perma Wood
Industries in Paraaque from 7:00 a.m. of April 10, 2002 to 7:45 a.m.
of April 11, 2002. He got home at 8:00 a.m., ate breakfast, and
thereafter proceeded to his sister Elsies house where he slept in the
sofa until 4:00 p.m. The testimonies of Pacete, De Guzman and Elsie
were offered to support Lowhens claims. However, we find more
credence in the positive and categorical statements of Albert, against
whom no ill motive was ascribed by the defense, on one hand, than in
the testimonies of persons, who are in one way or another are related
to Lowhen. Further, there is no proof of absolute physical impossibility
for Lowhen to be in Amparo Subdivision in the morning of April 11,
2002, considering that Paraaque is not very far off. In Alberts
testimony, he merely made an estimate of the time in the morning of
April 11, 2002, when Lowhen, along with six other men, went to the
basement. Although Albert testified that it was around 6:00 a.m., he
could have miscalculated the time considering that he no longer had a
watch and they were in a basement. Besides, Lowhen was the link
between Jubert and Morey, whose participations in the kidnapping
incident on April 7, 2002 were clearly established. This renders
dubious Lowhens claim of having introduced Jubert and Morey to
each other only on April 11, 2002, or four days after the latter two had
taken part in the abduction of Pinky and Albert near the Coliseum.
Jose and Roger proffered nary an explanation anent where they were
on April 7, 2002. Jose anchored his defense upon his presence at U-
Cap Cockpit in Mandaluyong from the night of April 9, 2002 until 1:00
a.m. of April 10, 2002. While waiting for a cab going home, Jose
claimed that CIDG officers arrested him and brought him to Camp
Crame where he remained under the polices custody. He thus
claimed that contrary to Alberts claim, he could not have been in the
basement of the safehouse at 6:00 a.m. of April 11, 2002. On the
other hand, Roger alleged that at around 6:00 a.m. of April 11, 2002,
while he was walking along Bravo Street, Signal Village,Bicutan,
Taguig on his way to his brothers wake, he was arrested by CIDG
officers. However, like in the cases of Marcelo, Jubert and Robert,
Jose and Rogers averments were bare and unsupported by any
corroborative evidence.
All told, we find that the RTC and the CA did not overlook essential
facts or circumstances which may otherwise justify the acquittal of
Marcelo, Ricky, Jubert, Robert, Morey, Lowhen, Jose and Roger for
having conspired in kidnapping Albert for the purpose of extorting
ransom. That no ransom was actually paid does not negate the fact of
the commission of the crime, it being sufficient that a demand for it
was made.195
We note Marcelo, Ricky, Jose and Lowhens claims of having been
subjected to mauling, illegal arrest, intimidation and extortion attempts
committed by the police authorities.
It is settled that irregularities attending the arrest of the accused-
appellants should have been timely raised in their respective motions
to quash the Informations at any time before their arraignment, failing
at which they are deemed to have waived their rights to assail the
same.196 No such motions were filed by the accused-appellants.
Further, without meaning to downplay or take the allegations of the
accused-appellants lightly, we, however, note that these were
unsubstantiated as to the identities of the offenders and
uncorroborated by other pieces of evidence. To date, no complaints
against the supposed abusive police officers had yet been filed by the
accused-appellants. If the abuses were indeed committed, we exhort
the accused-appellants to initiate the proper administrative and
criminal proceedings to make the erring police officers liable. We
stress that while the criminal justice system is devised to punish the
offenders, it is no less the States duty to ensure that those who
administer it do so with clean hands.
Betty and Monico are to be held as
co-conspirators because they
knowingly provided the venue for
Alberts detention.
In implicating Monico, Albert testified:
PROS. FADULLON:
Q: And you said you were first handcuffed according to you, you were
handcuffed with Miss Gonzales and removed it and a new set of
handcuffs were placed on you. Will you please tell us what happened
after that?
A: So with my both hands handcuffed, this time I was asked to get out
of the vehicle and I was led to a sort of like underground house
something like that, I had to go down a couple of steps.
Q: What happened, Sir, as you were going down, as you were led
inside, what you claimed to be an underground house and as you
were going down several steps?
A: Because I was handcuffed and I didnt know where to go to pass at
that time, I fell and a person held on my arm.
Q: What happened to your glasses as you claimed you fell as you
were going downstairs?
A: My glasses went down also, Sir.
Q: And you said that there was a person who held on to you, how
close or how far that person from you, Sir?
A: He was just beside me, Sir.
Q: And this person can you give us his description?
A: About 50s, about 59" and has a [sic] very coarse hands, Sir.
Q: This person whom according to you held on to you as you slipped
you were being led downstairs, if you will see him again, will you be
able to recognize him, Sir?
xxxx
Witness pointed to Monico in the courtroom.
xxxx
Q: What happened, Sir, when you slipped and this person now
identified as accused Monico Salvador held on to you, what happened
after that?
A: He held me up and led me to the stairway proceeding down to the
house, Sir.197 (Underscoring ours)
When asked during cross examination about what transpired while he
was descending the basement stairs, Albert stated:
ATTY. MALLABO:
Q: Now, immediately after you catch [sic] the glasses, what exactly did
you do?
A: I told him, "Pare, alalayan mo naman ako ng maayos pababa pala
tayo nun."
Q: You told him that you should be carefully assisted. You told him
that because you were not in a position to see where you were
walking?
A: Yes, Sir.
xxxx
Q: Now, did you try to get hold of the hands of Monico Salvador after
the incident?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you found out that the hands were "magaspang"?
A; Yes, Sir.
Q: And that would make you very sure that he was the one who
assisted you?
A: Even more sure because I saw him also.
Q: Now, after you get [sic] hold of that [sic] glasses you said to him,
"Alalayan mo naman ako."?
A: Because I fell already. So, I said, "Pare alalayan mo naman ako ng
maayos." That was when he was here beside me.
Q: Besides [sic] you?
A: Yes.
Q: I thought that he was at your back holding your armpit?
A: He was here beside me. How do you carry somebody?
Q: If he was beside you, you were only able to recognize the left
portion of his face?
A: I was able to see his face, Sir.
Q: The whole face?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: I thought that he was beside you?
A: He was beside me.
Q: Did you go in front of him and tried to look at the features of his
face?
xxxx
A: I can see him even on my side.
Q: My question is, did you go in front of the person who assisted you?
A: No, I did not face him.198 (Underscoring ours)
When asked who handed him the food that he ate while in detention,
Albert answered:
PROS. FADULLON:
Q: Now Mr. Witness, on that day, April 11, 2002, right after in the early
morning, do you remember if there was any other incident that
happened in that place where you and Miss Gonzales were being
kept?
A: At lunch time, I saw a woman who brought down some foods,
Sir.
Q: Lunch time of what date?
A: April 11, 2002, Sir.
Q: April 11 at around lunch time a woman brought down your food?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Where were you at that time, Mr. Witness, when this woman
according to you came down and brought down your food?
A: At the sofa, Sir.
Q: Tell us, Mr. Witness, what happened when this woman brought
down your food?
A: She gave the food to the guard and the guard gave the food to us,
Sir.
Q: How far away from this woman Sir when you saw her handing the
foods to one of the guards?
A: The stairway was just beside the sofa so you can see her, Sir.
Q: That would be again approximately 2 meters or little over a meter?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Can you give us the description of this woman Sir who according to
you came down and brought down handed over your food in [sic] one
of the guards?
A: She was in her 50s, Sir.
xxxx
[Yam pointed to Betty in the courtroom.]
PROS. CHUA CHENG:
Q: Do you know, Mr. Witness, what kind of food that this accused you
identified as Betty Salvador served that lunch time?
A: Jollibee, Sir.
Q: Tell us, Sir when for the first time you see accused Betty Salvador?
A: The night before, Sir.
Q: The night before referring to what date, Sir?
A: April 10, Sir.
Q: Could you tell us under what circumstances did you see the
accused Betty Salvador?
A; I was having a conversation with the guard who was at the stairway
at that time when I heard a woman asking questions to the guard, Sir.
Q: What question did she ask to the guard if you remember, Sir?
A: "Kumusta sila?".
Q: After that, what happened?
A: She gave the food to the guard, Sir.
Q: What food was this given to you that evening?
A: That was the only time Jollibbe was not served, it was corned beef,
Sir.
PROS. FADULLON:
Q: That would be dinner time of April 10, 2002?
A: Yes, Sir.199 (Underscoring ours)
During cross examination, Albert testified having seen Betty, thus:
ATTY. MALLABO:
Q: Now, how did you see her at the time that she uttered the words,
"Kumusta na sila?"
A: She was in front of me.
Q: Right in front of you?
A: I mean, she was going up the stairway. I can see her.
Q: So you want to tell us that she went down?
A: I did not say she went down. She was up there in the stairway
coming down and she was about to talk to the guard who was
guarding us. So, when she saw the guard and said, "Kumusta sila?", I
was right there at the edge of the, at the foot of the stairway. So, I saw
her.
Q: So you saw her?
A: Yes, sir.200
Albert categorically stated that on the night of April 7, 2002, Monico
assisted him in descending the stairs leading to the basement of the
safehouse. Albert likewise named Betty as the woman who brought
him and Pinky corned beef for dinner on April 10, 2002, and food
items from Jollibee for lunch on April 11, 2002.
This Court has held that the most natural reaction of victims of criminal
violence is to strive to see the features and faces of their assailants
and observe the manner in which the crime is committed.201 It is also
settled that the victims in-court identification is more than sufficient to
establish the identities of accused-appellants as among the
malefactors,202 and previously executed affidavits are generally
considered inferior to statements that the victim gives in open
court.203 Hence, we hold that notwithstanding Alberts failure to identify
Betty and Monico from the police line-up presented on April 12, 2002,
in which the spouses were allegedly included,
no reasonable doubt is cast upon the complicity of the latter two in the
kidnapping. Further, Betty and Monicos postulation that if they were
indeed involved, they should not have proceeded to the scene of the
rescue operations and to the police station, likewise deserves scant
consideration. There is no established doctrine to the effect that, in
every instance, non-flight is an indication of innocence.204 It is possible
for the culprits to pursue unfamiliar schemes or strategies to confuse
the police authorities.205
We stress though that conspiracy transcends companionship.206 Mere
presence at the locus criminis cannot by itself be a valid basis for
conviction, and mere knowledge, acquiescence to or agreement to
cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy,
absent any active participation in the commission of the crime.207
In the case at bar, Monicos assistance extended to Albert when the
latter descended the basement stairs and Bettys visit to the
safehouse to bring food could not automatically be interpreted as the
acts of principals and conspirators in the crime of kidnapping for
ransom.
People of the Philippines v. Garcia208 is instructive anent the
distinctions between a conspirator and an accomplice, viz:
In People v. De Vera, we distinguished a conspirator from an
accomplice in this manner
Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know
and agree with the criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the
criminal intention because they themselves have decided upon such
course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the
principals have reached the decision, and only then do they agree to
cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be
committed; accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not
decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to
the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the
authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who
perform acts not essential to the perpetration of the offense.
xxxx
x x x As we have held in Garcia v. CA, "in some exceptional situations,
having community of design with the principal does not prevent a
malefactor from being regarded as an accomplice if his role in the
perpetration of the homicide or murder was, relatively speaking, of a
minor character." x x x.209 (Citations omitted)
Monicos assistance to Albert when the latter descended the
basement stairs and Bettys visit to the safehouse to bring Jollibee
food items were not indispensable acts in the commission of the crime
of kidnapping for ransom. If to be solely considered, these acts, being
of minor importance, pertain to those committed by mere accomplices.
Betty and Monico were not among those persons who forcibly
abducted Albert while the latter was in the vicinity of the Coliseum.
Neither did the spouses perform positive acts to actively detain Albert.
What spells the difference on why we still find the Betty and Monico as
principals and co-conspirators in the kidnapping is the circumstance
that their acts coincide with their ownership of the safehouse.
Absent his knowledge, consent or concurrence in the criminal design,
the owner of a place, which was used to detain kidnapped victims,
cannot necessarily be considered as either a conspirator or an
accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom. However, in the
case of Betty and Monico, their claim of ignorance relative to Alberts
detention in the basement of the safehouse is belied by their presence
therein. Albert positively and repeatedly testified on the matter.
In a conspiracy to commit the crime of kidnapping for ransom, the
place where the victim is to be detained is logically a primary
consideration. In the case of Betty and Monico, their house in
Lumbang Street, Amparo Subdivision has a basement. It can be
reasonably inferred that the house fitted the purpose of the
kidnappers. Albert's detention was accomplished not solely by reason
of the restraint exerted upon him by the presence of guards in the
safehouse, but by the circumstance of being put in a place where
escape became highly improbable. In other words, Betty and Monico
were indispensable in the kidnapping of Albert because they
knowingly and purposely provided the venue to detain Albert. The
spouses' ownership of the safehouse, Monico's presence therein
during Albert's arrival on the evening of April 7, 2002 and Betty's visits
to bring food reasonably indicate that they were among those who at
the outset planned, and thereafter concurred with and participated in
the execution of the criminal design.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant appeal is
DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated February 25, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03279 is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION insofar as the amount of civil indemnity awarded
to Albert Yam y Lee, to be solidarily paid by the accused-appellants, is
increased from PhP 50,000.00 to PhP 75,000.00 in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence210
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 128106-07. January 24, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GONZALO
BALDOGO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an automatic review of the Joint Judgment,[i] dated
October 18, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Puerto
Princesa City, finding accused-appellant Gonzalo Baldogo
alias Baguio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder in
Criminal Case No. 12900 and Kidnapping in Criminal Case No.
12903. The trial court imposed on accused-appellant the supreme
penalty of death in Criminal Case No. 12900 and reclusion perpetua in
Criminal Case No. 12903.
I. The Indictments
Two Informations were filed against accused-appellant and
Edgar Bermas alias Bunso which read:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1996 in the evening at the
residence of Mr. Julio Camacho of Iwahig Prison and Penal Farm,
Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused who were both convicted by final
judgment of the offense of Homicide and while already serving
sentence, committed the above name offense by conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to
kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and while armed with a
bolo, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault,
attack and hack one JORGE CAMACHO, hitting him and inflicting
upon him mortal wounds at the different parts of his body, which was
the direct and immediate cause of his death shortly thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstances of
treachery, evident[,] premeditation and recidivism. Puerto Princesa
City, Philippines, March 5, 1996.[1]
xxx
That on Thursday, February 22, 1996 at more or less 8:15 in the
evening at the Victims residence, Iwahig Prison and Penal Farm,
Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused while serving sentence at the
Central Sub-Colony both for the offense of Homicide, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, commits
(sic) another offense, kidnapping one JULIE E. CAMACHO, a girl 12
years of age, and brought her to the mountains, where said Julie E.
Camacho was detained and deprived of her liberty fro [sic] more than
five days.
CONTRARY TO LAW and attended by the aggravating circumstance
of recidivism.[2]
Accused-appellant was arraigned on June 28, 1996 and entered
a plea of not guilty to both charges.[3] Edgardo Bermas died before he
could be arraigned.[4] The two cases were ordered consolidated and a
joint trial thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely, Julie
Camacho, Dr. Edilberto Joaquin, Esteban Mamites and Julio Camacho,
Sr., and offered documentary and object evidence on its evidence-in-
chief.
II. The Antecedent Facts
Julio Camacho, Sr. and his wife, Heather Esteban, had four
children, namely: Julio, Jr., a student of the Palawan State University in
Puerto Princesa City and who stayed in Guaygo, Puerto Princesa City;
Jorge, who was fourteen years old;[5] Julie, who was 12 years old and a
grade six elementary pupil at the Iwahig Elementary School and Jasper,
who was eight years old. Julio Sr. was employed as a security guard in
the Iwahig Prison and Penal Colony. He and his family lived in a
compound inside the sub-colony. Edgardo Bermas alias Bunso, an
inmate of the penal colony, was assigned as a domestic helper of the
Camacho spouses. Accused-appellant alias Baguio, also an inmate of
the colony, was assigned in January 1996 as a domestic helper of the
Camacho family. Both helpers resided in a hut located about ten meters
away from the house of the Camacho family.
In the evening of February 22, 1996, accused-appellant and
Bermas served dinner to Julio Sr., Jorge and Julie in the house of the
Camachos. At about 7:30 p.m., Julio Sr. left the house to attend a bible
study at the dormitory in the Agronomy Section of the Penal
Farm.Heather and her son, Jasper, were in Aborlan town. Only Jorge
and his sister Julie were left in the house.
After Julio Sr. had left the house, Julie went to the sala to study
her assignment. Momentarily, Bermas called Julie from the kitchen
saying: Jul, tawag ka ng kuya mo. Julie ignored him. After five minutes,
Bermas called her again but Julie again ignored him. Julie was
perturbed when she heard a loud sound, akin to a yell, Aahh! Ahh!
coming from the kitchen located ten meters from the house. This
prompted Julie to stand up and run to the kitchen. She was appalled to
see Jorge sprawled on the ground near the kitchen, face down and
bloodied. The vicinity was lighted by a fluorescent lamp. Standing over
Jorge were accused-appellant and Bermas, each armed with a
bolo.[6] The shirt of Bermas was bloodied.[7] Julie was horrified and so
petrified that although she wanted to shout, she could not. She ran back
to the sala with accused-appellant and Bermas in pursuit. Accused-
appellant overtook Julie, tied her hands at her back with a torn t-shirt
and placed a piece of cloth in her mouth to prevent her from shouting
for help from their neighbors. Bermas went to the room of Julies
brothers.Accused-appellant dragged Julie outside the house and
towards the mountain. Bermas tarried in the house.
With the aid of a flashlight, accused-appellant, with Julie in tow,
walked for hours towards the direction of the mountain. About a
kilometer away from the house of the Camachos, accused-appellant
and Julie stopped under a big tamarind tree at the foot of the
mountain.After about thirty minutes, Bermas arrived with a kettle and
raw rice. Accused-appellant and Bermas retrieved a bag containing
their clothing and belongings from the trunk of the tamarind tree. They
untied Julie and removed the gag from her mouth. The three then
proceeded to climb the mountain and after walking for six hours or so,
stopped under a big tree where they spent the night. When the three
woke up in the morning of the following day, February 23, 1996, they
continued their ascent of the mountain. Seven hours thereafter, they
started to follow a descending route. Accused-appellant and Bermas
told Julie that they would later release her. At about 3:00 p.m., Bermas
left accused-appellant and Julie. However, accused-appellant did not
let go of Julie. The two survived on sugar and rice cooked by accused-
appellant. Once, they saw uniformed men looking for Julie. However,
accused-appellant hid Julie behind the tree. She wanted to shout but he
covered her mouth.
In the early morning of February 28, 1996, accused-appellant
told Julie that he was leaving her as he was going to Puerto Princesa
City.He told her to fend for herself and return to the lowland the next
day. After their breakfast, accused-appellant left Julie alone to fend for
herself. A few hours after accused-appellant had left, Julie decided to
return to the lowlands. She found a river and followed its course toward
Balsaham until she saw a hut. She called upon its occupant who
introduced himself as Nicodemus. Julie sought help from him.When
asked by Nicodemus if she was the girl whom the police authorities
were looking for, she replied in the affirmative. Nicodemus brought Julie
to Balsaham where they met some personnel of the penal colony and
police officers, and Nicodemus turned Julie over for custody to them.
Meanwhile, Julio, Sr. arrived home after his bible study at about
9:00 p.m. on February 22, 1996. He noticed that the television set was
switched on but no one was watching it. He looked for his children but
they were nowhere to be found. He then proceeded to the hut occupied
by accused-appellant and Bermas but he also failed to find them. Julio
Sr. then rushed to the house of his older brother, Augusto Camacho, to
look for his children, but Augusto told him that Jorge and Julie were not
there. Julio Sr. then sought the help of Romualdo Esparagoza, a trustee
of the penal farm. The two rushed back to the Camacho residence and
proceeded to the kitchen where they noticed blood on the floor. The two
proceeded to the dirty kitchen and saw the bloodied body of Jorge
dumped about three meters away from the dirty kitchen. Julio Sr. and
Esparagoza then brought Jorge to the Iwahig Hospital where he was
pronounced dead on arrival at 12:40 a.m. of February 23, 1996. Dr.
Edilberto Joaquin examined the cadaver and found that the victim was
stabbed on the breast once and at the back seven times. He sustained
a lacerated wound on the neck. The layers of the neck, trachea and
esophagus of Jorge had been cut. Jorge did not sustain any defensive
wound. Dr. Joaquin performed an autopsy of the cadaver and signed a
medical certificate with his findings, thus:
MEDICAL CERTIFICATE
GENERAL DATA:
JORGE CAMACHO y ESTEBAN, 14 years old, student, resident of
Iwahig Prison and Penal Farm, approximately 53 inches in-height, was
brought to the hospital, (DOA) dead on arrival at 12:40 AM, 23
February 1996, approximate time of death 8:00 P.M. February 22,
1996.
FINDINGS
1. Stab wound, deep, penetrating, approximately 1 inch
in length, at the level of the xyphoid process,
anteriorly.
2. Stab wound, chest, back, approximately 1 inch length,
right midclavicular line, level of the 3rd rib.
3. Stab wound, back, right midclavicular line, level of the
5th rib.
4. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch length level
of the 5th rib, left midclavicular line.
5. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch length, right
midclavicular line, 6th rib.
6. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch length, right
midclavicular line, level of the 4th lumbar region.
7. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch in length,
right third lumbar region, deep, penetrating
involving the liver.
8. Stab wound, back, approximately 3/4 inch, at the level
of the 2nd lumbar region.
9. Lacerated wound, neck, anteriorly, deep, penetrating,
cutting the layers of the neck and the trachea and
esophagus.
CAUSE OF DEATH
Hypovolemia due to severe hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab
wounds and laceration of the neck.[8]
Wounds numbers 7 and 9 were fatal. It was possible that two
sharp-edged and sharp pointed weapons were used in stabbing Jorge
and that two assailants stabbed the victim.[9]
On February 29, 1996, Julie gave her sworn statement and a
supplemental sworn statement to the police investigators.[10] Julio Sr.
suffered mental anguish and sleepless nights because of the death of
Jorge.
The prosecution adduced in evidence excerpts of the personal
file of accused-appellant kept in the penal colony showing that he had
been convicted of homicide by the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City
and that he commenced serving sentence on November 19, 1992 and
that the minimum term of his penalty was to expire on August 16,
1997.[11]
III. The Defenses and Evidence of Accused-Appellant
Accused-appellant denied killing Jorge and kidnapping
Julie. Accused-appellant asserted that Julie implicated him because
she was coached and rehearsed. He testified that he was assigned as
a helper in the house of Augusto Camacho, the Chief of the Industrial
Section of the colony and the older brother of Julio Sr. Augusto told
accused-appellant that his brother, Julio Sr., wanted to have accused-
appellant transferred as his domestic helper. However, accused-
appellant balked because he had heard from Edgardo Bermas, the
helper of Julio Sr., that the latter was cruel and had been maltreating
Bermas. Nonetheless, in December 1995, accused-appellant was
transferred as a domestic helper of Julio Sr. Accused-appellant
confirmed that indeed Julio Sr. was cruel because whenever the latter
was angry, he maltreated accused-appellant by spanking and boxing
him. These would occur about two times a week.
On February 22, 1996, at about 6:30 p.m., accused-appellant
took his dinner in the kitchen. At about 7:00 p.m., while he was already
in his quarters and preparing to sleep, Bermas arrived, armed with a
bloodied bolo measuring about 1 feet long and told accused-appellant
that he (Bermas) had just killed Jorge to avenge the maltreatment he
received from Julio Sr. Bermas warned accused-appellant not to shout,
otherwise he will also kill him. Petrified, accused-appellant kept
silent. Bermas then brought accused-appellant to the kitchen in the
house of the Camachos where accused-appellant saw the bloodied
body of Jorge sprawled near the kitchen. Bermas called Julie three
times, telling her that her brother was calling for her but Julie at first
ignored Bermas. Julie later relented and went to the kitchen where
Bermas grabbed her and threatened to kill her if she shouted. Bermas
tied the hands of Julie with a piece of cloth and placed a piece of cloth
around her face to prevent her from shouting.
Bermas, still armed with his bolo tucked on his waist and a knife
on his hand, brought accused-appellant and Julie outside the
house.The three then trekked towards the mountain. On the way,
Bermas picked a bag containing food provisions and his and accused-
appellants clothings. Accused-appellant thought of escaping but could
not because Bermas was watching him. With the help of a flashlight
brought by Bermas, the three walked towards the mountain, with Julie
walking ahead of accused-appellant and Bermas. After walking for
hours, they stopped by a tree to which Bermas tied Julie. At one time,
while Bermas and accused-appellant were scouring for water, Bermas
kicked accused-appellant and pushed him into a ten feet deep
ravine. The right hand and foot of accused-appellant sustained
bruises. He likewise sustained a sprain on his foot. Bermas left
accused-appellant and Julie after 1 days.
 In the meantime, accused-appellant managed to climb out of the
ravine and heard Julie calling his name. Julie later told accused-
appellant that before Bermas left, the latter told her that he was going
to kill accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant and Julie remained in the mountain after
Bermas had left. At one time, accused-appellant and Julie saw soldiers
who were looking for her. Accused-appellant did not reveal his and
Julies location to the soldiers because he was afraid that he might be
killed.On February 25, 1996, accused-appellant untied Julie. He told her
that he will set her free as soon as his foot shall have healed.
On February 27, 1996, accused-appellant told Julie that she can
go home already. He ordered her to go down the mountain and proceed
to Balsaham on her way back home. Although his foot was still aching,
accused-appellant went down from the mountain ahead of Julie and
proceeded to Balsaham. He then walked to Irawan where he took a
tricycle to the public market in the poblacion in Puerto Princesa City. He
then took a passenger jeepney and alighted at Brookes Point where he
was arrested after one week for the killing of Jorge and the kidnapping
of Julie.
Accused-appellant maintained that he did not intend to hurt Julie
or deprive her of her liberty. He averred that during the entire period that
he and Julie were in the mountain before Bermas left him, he tried to
protect her from Bermas. Accused-appellant asserted that he wanted to
bring Julie back to her parents after Bermas had left them and to
surrender but accused-appellant was afraid that Julio Sr. might kill him.
IV. The Verdict of the Trial Court
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered its decision, the
decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, a Joint Judgment is
hereby rendered in:
A. CRIMINAL CASE NO. 12900 finding the accused Gonzalo
Baldogo, alias Baguio, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of
the crime of murder as defined and penalized in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No.
7659, and appreciating against him the specific aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage and use of superior strength,
without any mitigating circumstance to offset the same, and pursuant
to the provisions of the second paragraph, No. 1, of Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to death in the manner
prescribed by law; to pay the heirs of the deceased Jorge Camacho;
1. Actual and compensatory damages:
For expenses incurred for funeral and
other expenses incident to his death ---P45,000.00
2. Moral damages ----------------------------- 100,000.00
3. Civil indemnity for the death of the
victim, Jorge Camacho ------------------- 50,000.00
or the aggregate amount of ------------- 195,000.00
B. CRIMINAL CASE NO. 12903 finding the accused GONZALO
BALDOGO, alias, Baguio, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal
of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined and
penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659, and there being no modifying
circumstance appreciated and pursuant to the provisions of the
second paragraph, No. 2, of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, and
not being entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
he is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction for life, and of perpetual absolute
disqualification; to pay the offended party, Julie Camacho for physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety and moral shock, distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed in
moral damages of P100,000; and to pay the costs. anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned
The case as against co-accused Edgar Bermas is ordered dismissed innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all these and on the
by reason of extinction of criminal liability occasioned by his death basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned
pending conclusion of the proceedings as against him. verdict.[14]
SO ORDERED.[12] In contrast, the trial court has the unique advantage of
V. Assignment of Error monitoring and observing at close range the attitude, conduct and
In his appeal brief, accused-appellant avers that: deportment of witnesses as they narrate their respective testimonies
I before said court. Echoing a foreign courts observation, this Court
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE declared:
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND Truth does not always stalk boldly forth naked, but modest withal, in a
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER printed abstract in a court of last resort. She oft hides in nooks and
AND KIDNAPPING. crannies visible only to the minds eye of the judge who tries the
II case. To him appears the furtive glance, the blush of conscious
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF DENIAL. heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the
III scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE mien. The brazen face of the liar, the glibness of the schooled witness
QUALIFYING AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF in reciting a lesson, or the itching overeagerness of the swift witness,
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION AND GENERIC as well as the honest face of the truthful one, are alone seen by
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TAKING him.[15]
ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH DESPITE The rule, however, is not iron clad. This Court has enumerated
THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE exceptions thereto, namely: (a) when patent inconsistencies in the
THE SAME. statements of witnesses are ignored by the trial court; (b) when the
IV conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by the evidence; (c)
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE when the trial court ignored, misunderstood, misinterpreted and/or
DEATH PENALTY UPON THE ACCUSED- misconstrued facts and circumstances of substance which, if
APPELLANT IN THE (SIC) CRIMINAL CASE #12900.[13] considered, will alter the outcome of the case.[16] In this case, the trial
VI. Resolution of this Court court found the youthful Julie credible and her testimony entitled to full
The first two assignments of errors being interrelated, the Court probative weight. Accused-appellant has not sufficiently demonstrated
will delve into and resolve the same simultaneously. to this Court the application of any of the aforestated exceptions.
Accused-appellant avers that he had nothing to do with, and The Court agrees with accused-appellant that the prosecution
hence should not be claimed for, the death of Jorge and the kidnapping was burdened to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the felonies
and detention of Julie. Accused-appellant claims that he was acting for which he is charged. This Court has held that accusation is not
under duress because he was threatened by Bermas with death unless synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove
he did what Bermas ordered him to do. Accused-appellant was even the corpus delicti, more specifically, that the crimes charged had been
protective of Julie. He insists that the latter was not a credible witness committed and that accused-appellant precisely committed the
and her testimony is not entitled to probative weight because she was same.The prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and
merely coached into implicating him for the death of Jorge and her not on the weakness of the evidence of the accused.[17] The reasonable
kidnapping and detention by Bermas. standard rule which was adopted by the United States way back in 1978
We find the contention of accused-appellant farcical. At the is a requirement and a safeguard, in the words of Mr. Justice Felix
heart of the submission of accused-appellant is the credibility of Julie, Frankfurter of the United States Supreme Court, of due process of law
the 12-year old principal witness of the prosecution and the probative in the historic, procedural content of due process. The United States
weight of her testimony. Supreme Court emphasized in Re: Winship[18] that in a criminal
This Court has held in a catena of cases that the findings of facts prosecution, the accused has at stake interests of immense importance,
of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonial evidence of the parties, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty or even his
its assessment of the probative weight of the collective evidence of the life upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be
parties and its conclusions anchored on its findings are accorded by the stigmatized by the conviction.
appellate court great respect, if not conclusive effect. The raison In the cases at bar, the prosecution failed to adduce direct
detre of this principle is that this Court has to contend itself with the mute evidence to prove that accused-appellant killed Jorge. However, the
pages of the original records in resolving the issues posed by the prosecution adduced indubitable proof that accused-appellant
parties: conspired with Bermas not only in killing Jorge but also in kidnapping
x x x The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the and detaining Julie.
truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is
assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous conspiracy if two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide
mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply. The to commit it. Conspiracy may be proved by direct evidence or
record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of
in confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to the accused, before, during and after the commission of a felony
pointing to a joint purpose and design and community of intent.[19] It is
not required that there be an agreement for an appreciable period prior
to the commission of a felony; rather, it is sufficient that at the time of
the commission of the offense, all the conspira`tors had the same
purpose and were united in its execution.[20] In a conspiracy, the act of
one is the act of all.[21] All the accused are criminally liable as co-
principals regardless of the degree of their participation.[22] For a
conspirator to be criminally liable of murder or homicide, it is not
necessary that he actually attacks or kills the victim. As long as all the
conspirators performed specific acts with such closeness and
coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose or design
in bringing about the death of the victim, all the conspirators are
criminally liable for the death of said victim.[23]
In these cases, the prosecution adduced conclusive proof that
accused-appellant indeed conspired with Bermas to kill Jorge and
kidnap Julie as shown by the following cogent facts and circumstances:
1. When Julie responded to the repeated calls of Bermas for her
to go to the kitchen on his pretext that Jorge wanted to talk to her, Julie
saw accused-appellant and Bermas, each armed with a bolo, about half
a meter from Jorge who was sprawled on the ground, bloodied all
over.[24]
2. Even as Julie fled from the kitchen for dear life to the sala of
their house, accused-appellant and Bermas ran after her. Accused-
appellant tied the hands of Julie with a piece of cloth and inserted a
piece of cloth into her mouth to prevent her from shouting for help from
their neighbors.[25]
3. With a flashlight on hand, accused-appellant then exited from
the house, dragged Julie towards the direction of the mountain while
Bermas remained in the house to rummage through the things in the
bedroom of her brothers. Accused-appellant stopped for a while for
Bermas to join him.[26]
4. Before the killing of Jorge, accused-appellant and Bermas
placed their clothing and personal belongings in a bag and buried the
bag under a tree, and when accused-appellant and Bermas were on
their way to the mountain after killing Jorge, they excavated and
retrieved the bag from under the tree.[27]
5. Accused-appellant and Bermas brought with them to the
mountain a kettle filled with raw rice which they cooked in the forest.[28]
6. When Julie saw uniformed men who were looking for her and
wanted to shout for help, accused-appellant covered her mouth to
prevent her from shouting for help.[29]
7. Even after Bermas had left accused-appellant and Julie in the
forest in the afternoon of February 23, 1991, accused-appellant
continued detaining Julie in the forest until February 27, 1996, when he
abandoned Julie in the forest to fend for herself.
The evidence of the prosecution was even buttressed by the
judicial admissions of accused-appellant, thus:
1. After releasing Julie on February 27, 1996, accused-appellant
proceeded to Puerto Princesa City and on to Brookes Point where he
was arrested a week after said date.[30]
2. Both accused-appellant and Bermas had a motive to kill Jorge
and kidnap Julie, that is, to avenge the repeated maltreatment and
physical abuse on them by Julio Sr., the father of Jorge and Julie.[31]
The flight of both accused-appellant and Bermas from the house
of Julio Sr. to the mountain where they found refuge after killing Jorge,
and their motive to kill Jorge Jr. and kidnap and detain Julie
in conjunto constitute potent evidence of their confabulation and of their
guilt for the death of Jorge and kidnapping and detention of Julie.[32]
 The bare denial by accused-appellant of criminal liability for the
crimes charged is inherently weak. Accused-appellants claims that he
even protected Julie from harm and that he was forced by Bermas to
kidnap Julie are of the same genre.[33] The bare denial by accused-
appellant of the crimes charged constitutes self-serving negative
evidence which cannot prevail over the categorical and positive
testimony of Julie and her unequivocal identification of accused-
appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crimes charged.[34]
Accused-appellants insistence that he was forced by Bermas,
under pain of death, to cooperate with him in killing Jorge and
kidnapping and detaining Julie is merely an afterthought. For duress to
exempt accused-appellant of the crimes charged, the fear must be well-
founded, and immediate and actual damages of death or great bodily
harm must be present and the compulsion must be of such a character
as to leave no opportunity to accused for escape or interpose self-
defense in equal combat.[35] Accused-appellant is burdened to prove by
clear and convincing evidence his defense of duress. He should not be
shielded from prosecution for crime by merely setting up a fear from, or
because of, a threat of a third person.[36] As Lord Dennan declared
in Reg. Vs. Tyler,[37] No man from fear of circumstances to himself has
the right to make himself a party to committing mischief on mankind. In
these cases, in light of the testimony of Julie and the inculpatory acts of
accused-appellant no less, there is no doubt that the latter acted in
concert with Bermas and is himself a principal by direct
participation.That accused-appellant abandoned Julie after six days of
captivity does not lessen his criminal culpability much less exempt him
from criminal liability for the killing of Jorge and the kidnapping and
detention of Julie.
Accused-appellant failed to prove his claim that Julie was
coached on how and what to testify on. Indeed, when asked to identify
the person or persons who coached Julie, accused-appellant failed to
mention any person:
Q You heard the testimony of Julie Camacho that she is
pointing to you to have kidnapped her and
participated in the killing of her brother Jorge,
what can you say to that?
A That is not true.
Q You donot (sic) know the reason why? In fact you
treated her well, why she pointed you as one of
the authors of the crime?
A Maybe somebody coached her.
Q Who do you think coached her?
A I cannot mention the name but I am sure that
somebody coached her.[38]
It bears stressing that when she testified, Julie was merely 12
years old. The Court has repeatedly held that the testimony of a minor
of tender age and of sound mind is likewise to be more correct and
truthful than that of an older person so that once it is established that
they have fully understood the character and nature of an oath, their
testimony should be given full credence and probative weight.[39] Julie
had no ill motive to tergiversate the truth and falsely testify against
accused-appellant. Hence, her testimony must be accorded full
probative weight.[40]
VII. Crimes Committed by Accused-Appellant
The Court shall now delve into and resolve the issue of what
crime or crimes accused-appellant is guilty of. The trial court convicted
accused-appellant of two separate crimes and not the special complex
crime of kidnapping with murder or homicide under the last paragraph
of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act
7659.[41] The trial court is correct. There is no evidence that Jorge was
kidnapped or detained first by accused-appellant and Bermas before he
was killed. The last paragraph of Article 267 of the Code is applicable
only if kidnapping or serious illegal detention is committed and the victim
is killed or dies as a consequence of the kidnapping or serious illegal
detention.
Re: Criminal Case No. 12900
(For Murder)
The trial court convicted accused-appellant of murder with the
qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, based on
the following findings and ratiocination:
The slaying of Jorge Camacho took place about 8:30 oclock in the
evening of February 22, 1996. It was carried out after the accused
have been through tidying-up the kitchen, the dining room and the
kitchen wares the family of the Camachos used in their early dinner
before 7:00 oclock that evening. But even before dinner, the accused
have already made preparations for their flight, shown by the fact that
they already had their clothes, other personal belongings and food
provisions stacked in their respective travelling bags then placed in a
spot where they can just pick them up as they take to flight.[42]
The trial court also appreciated against accused-appellant the
qualifying aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength with
the following disquisition:
The victim, Jorge Camacho, is a lad only 14 years of age and
unarmed when brutally slain. On the contrary, both accused are of age
and confirmed convicted felons. Any one of them would already be
superior in strength and disposition to their hapless and innocent
victim. How much more with the combined strength and force of the
two of them.
Their choice of the object of their brutality is indicative of their
unmistakable intent of taking advantage of their superior strength. The
likely object of their resentment, for purported cruelty to them, is
Prison Guard Julio Camacho, father of the victim. They could have
directed their criminal intent on Julio Camacho himself. But Julio
Camacho could be a match in strength and agility to any of them or
even to the combined force of both of them. So, to insure execution of
their criminal intent without risk to them for the defense which the
offended party might put up, they directed their criminal acts against
the deceased who is very much inferior in physical combat even only
to any one of them.[43]
While the Court agrees that accused-appellant is guilty of
murder, it does not agree with the rulings of the trial court that the crime
was qualified by evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength. To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution
must establish the confluence of the following requisites:
x x x (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the
crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his
determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the
determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect
upon the consequences of his act. x x x[44]
The qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation, like any other qualifying circumstance, must be proved
with certainty as the crime itself. A finding of evident premeditation
cannot be based solely on mere lapse of time from the time the
malefactor has decided to commit a felony up to the time that he actually
commits it.[45] The prosecution must adduce clear and convincing
evidence as to when and how the felony was planned and prepared
before it was effected.[46] The prosecution is burdened to prove overt
acts that after deciding to commit the felony, the felon clung to his
determination to commit the crime. The law does not prescribe a time
frame that must elapse from the time the felon has decided to commit a
felony up to the time that he commits it. Each case must be resolved on
the basis of the extant factual milieu.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove evident
premeditation. The barefaced fact that accused-appellant and Bermas
hid the bag containing their clothing under a tree located about a
kilometer or so from the house of Julio Sr. does not constitute clear
evidence that they decided to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie. It is possible
that they hid their clothing therein preparatory to escaping from the
colony. There is no evidence establishing when accused-appellant and
Bermas hid the bag under the tree. The prosecution even failed to
adduce any evidence of overt acts on the part of accused-appellant, nor
did it present evidence as to when and how he and Bermas planned
and prepared to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie and to prove that the two
felons since then clung to their determination to commit the said
crimes. Although accused-appellant and Bermas were armed with
bolos, there is no evidence that they took advantage of their numerical
superiority and weapons to kill Jorge. Hence, abuse of superior strength
cannot be deemed to have attended the killing of Jorge.[47] Nighttime
cannot likewise be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance
because there is no evidence that accused-appellant and Bermas
purposely sought nighttime to facilitate the killing or to insure its
execution or accomplishment or to evade their arrest.[48] Neither is
dwelling aggravating because there is no evidence that Jorge was killed
in their house or taken from their house and killed outside the said
house.
In light of the evidence on record, it is clear that the killing of
Jorge was qualified by treachery. When Jorge was killed by accused-
appellant and Bermas, he was barely 14 years old. The Court has
previously held that the killing of minor children who by reason of their
tender years could not be expected to put up a defense is attended by
treachery.[49] Since treachery attended the killing, abuse of superior
strength is absorbed by said circumstance.[50]
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended by Republic Act 7659 is reclusion perpetua to death.
There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances in the
commission of the crime, accused-appellant should be meted the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.[51] Conformably with current
jurisprudence, accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay to the heirs
of the victim civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and the amount
of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages. Although Julio Sr. testified
that he spent P45,000.00 during the wake and burial of the victim, the
prosecution failed to adduce any receipts to prove the same. Hence, the
award of P45,000.00 by way of actual damages has no factual basis
and should thus be deleted.
Re: Criminal Case No. 12903
(For Kidnapping)
The trial court convicted accused-appellant of kidnapping under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court is correct.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code was taken from Article
267 of the Spanish Penal Code, which reads:
Art. 267Detencin ilegal grave.Ser castigado con la pena de reclusin
temporal el particular que secuestrare o encerrare a otro o en
cualquier forma le privare de libertad.
Secuestrare means sequestration.[52] To sequester is to
separate for a special purpose, remove or set apart, withdraw from
circulation.[53] It also means to lock-up or imprison. Encerrare is a
broader concept than secuestrare.[54] Encerrare includes not only the
imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in
whatever form and for whatever length of time. As explained by
Groizard, encerrar es meter una persona cosa en parte de donde no
pueda salir; detener o arrestar, poner en prisin, privar de la libertad
alguno. He continued that la detencin, la prisin, la privacin de la libertad
de una persona, en cualquier forma y por cualquier medio por cualquier
tiempo en virtud de la cual resulte interrumpido el libre ejercicio de su
actividad.[55] On his commentary on the Spanish Penal Code, Cuello
Calon says that the law preve dos modalidades de privacion de libertad,
el encierro y la detencion. Encerrar significa recluir a una persona en
un lugar de donde no puede salir, detener a una persona equivale a
impedirle o restringirle la libertad de movimiento. Para que el sujeto
pasivo no quiera permanecer en el sitio donde esta recluido, pues no
es posible llamar encierro ni detencion a la estancia de un a persona
en lugar del que no quiere salir.[56]
In this case, Julie, a minor, was not locked up. However, she
was seized and taken from her house through force and dragged to the
mountain. Since then, she was restrained of her liberty by and kept
under the control of accused-appellant and Bermas. She was prevented
from going back home for a period of about six days. Patently then,
accused-appellant is guilty of kidnapping and illegally detaining
Julie.The crime was aggravated by dwelling because Julie was taken
from their house by accused-appellant and Bermas. However, dwelling
was not alleged in the Information as an aggravating circumstance as
required by Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure which reads:
SEC. 9. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall
state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts
or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense,
reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute
punishing it.[57]
Even if dwelling is proven but is not alleged in the Information
as an aggravating circumstance, the same will not serve to aggravate
the penalty.[58]
Quasi-recidivism as defined in Article 160 of the Revised Penal
Code[59] is alleged in both Informations. Accused-appellant is alleged to
have committed murder and kidnapping while serving sentence in the
penal colony by final judgment for the crime of homicide. Quasi-
recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance.[60] The prosecution is
burdened to prove the said circumstance by the same quantum of
evidence as the crime itself. In the present case, to prove quasi-
recidivism, the prosecution was burdened to adduce in evidence a
certified copy of the judgment convicting accused-appellant of homicide
and to prove that the said judgment had become final and
executory.[61] The raison detre is that:
x x x Since the accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty to such
information, there was a joinder of issues not only as to his guilt or
innocence, but also as to the presence or absence of the modifying
circumstances so alleged. The prosecution was thus burdened to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and the
existence of the modifying circumstances. It was then grave error for
the trial court to appreciate against the accused-appellant the
aggravating circumstance of recidivism simply because of his failure to
object to the prosecutions omission as mentioned earlier.[62]
In this case, the prosecution adduced in evidence merely the
excerpt of the prison record of accused-appellant showing that he was
convicted of homicide in Criminal Case No. 10357-R by the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio (Branch 6) with a penalty of from six years and
one day as minimum to fourteen years, eight months and one day as
maximum and that the sentence of accused-appellant commenced on
November 19, 1992 and that the minimum term of the penalty was to
expire on August 16, 1997.[63] The excerpt of the prison record of
accused-appellant is not the best evidence under Section 3, Rule 130
of the Revised Rules of Court[64] to prove the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City and to prove that said judgment had become
final and executory. Said excerpt is merely secondary or substitutionary
evidence which is inadmissible absent proof that the original of the
judgment had been lost or destroyed or that the same cannot be
produced without the fault of the prosecution. The barefaced fact that
accused-appellant was detained in the penal colony does prove the fact
that final judgment for homicide has been rendered against
him.[65] There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of
the crime, accused-appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion
perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the Revised penal Code.[66]
VIII. Civil Liability of Accused-Appellant for Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention
The trial court awarded the amount of P100,000.00 to Julie by
way of moral damages for the felony of kidnapping with serious illegal
detention, predicated on her having suffered serious anxiety and fright
when she was kidnapped and dragged to the mountain where she was
detained for several days. The trial court is correct. Julie is entitled to
moral damages.[67] In light of the factual milieu in this case, the amount
is reasonable. Julie is also entitled to exemplary damages in the amount
of P25,000.00.[68]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION:
1. In Criminal Case No. 12900, accused-appellant is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder defined in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended and is hereby meted the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, there being no modifying circumstances
attendant to the commission of the felony. Accused-appellant is hereby
ordered to pay to the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity and the amount of P50,000.00 as of moral damages. The
award of P45,000.00 as of actual damages is deleted.
2. In Criminal Case No. 12903, accused-appellant is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping with serious illegal detention
defined in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act 7659, and there being no modifying circumstances
attendant to the commission of the felony is hereby meted the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay
moral damages to the victim, Julie Camacho, in the amount
of P100,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 138033 February 22, 2006
RENATO BALEROS, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr.
assails and seeks the reversal of the January 13, 1999 decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 17271 as reiterated in its
March 31, 1999 resolution2 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The assailed decision affirmed an earlier decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 91-101642
finding petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr. y David (CHITO) guilty of
attempted rape.3
The accusatory portion of the information4 dated December 17, 1991
charging petitioner with attempted rape reads as follow:
That about 1:50 in the morning or sometime thereafter of 13
December 1991 in Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, by forcefully covering the face of
Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical
with dizzying effects, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commenced the commission of rape by lying on top of her
with the intention to have carnal knowledge with her but was unable to
perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance, said acts being
committed against her will and consent to her damage and prejudice.
Upon arraignment on February 5, 1992, petitioner, assisted by
counsel, pleaded "Not Guilty."5 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
To prove its case, the prosecution presented thirteen (13) witnesses.
Among them were private complainant Martina Lourdes Albano
(Malou), and her classmates, Joseph Bernard Africa, Rommel Montes,
Renato Alagadan and Christian Alcala. Their testimonies, as narrated
in some detail in the decision of the CA, established the following
facts:
Like most of the tenants of the Celestial Marie Building (hereafter
"Building", ) along A.H. Lacson Street, Sampaloc, Manila, MALOU,
occupying Room 307 with her maid, Marvilou Bebania (Marvilou), was
a medical student of the University of Sto. Tomas [UST] in 1991.
In the evening of December 12, inside Unit 307, MALOU retired at
around 10:30. Outside, right in front of her bedroom door, her maid,
Marvilou, slept on a folding bed.
Early morning of the following day, MALOU was awakened by the
smell of chemical on a piece of cloth pressed on her face. She
struggled but could not move. Somebody was pinning her down on the
bed, holding her tightly. She wanted to scream for help but the hands
covering her mouth with cloth wet with chemicals were very tight
(TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 33). Still, MALOU continued fighting off her
attacker by kicking him until at last her right hand got free. With this
the opportunity presented itself when she was able to grab hold of
his sex organ which she then squeezed.
The man let her go and MALOU went straight to the bedroom door
and roused Marvilou. xxx. Over the intercom, MALOU told S/G Ferolin
that: "may pumasok sa kuarto ko pinagtangkaan ako" (Ibid., p. 8).
Who it was she did not, however, know. The only thing she had made
out during their struggle was the feel of her attackers clothes and
weight. His upper garment was of cotton material while that at the
lower portion felt smooth and satin-like (Ibid, p. 17). He was
wearing a t-shirt and shorts Original Records, p. 355).
To Room 310 of the Building where her classmates Christian Alcala,
Bernard Baptista, Lutgardo Acosta and Rommel Montes were staying,
MALOU then proceeded to seek help. xxx.
It was then when MALOU saw her bed topsy-turvy. Her nightdress
was stained with blue (TSN, July 5, 1993, pp. 13-14). Aside from
the window with grills which she had originally left opened, another
window inside her bedroom was now open. Her attacker had fled from
her room going through the left bedroom window (Ibid, Answers to
Question number 5; Id), the one without iron grills which leads to
Room 306 of the Building (TSN, July 5, 1993, p.6).
xxx xxx xxx
Further, MALOU testified that her relation with CHITO, who was her
classmate , was friendly until a week prior to the attack. CHITO
confided his feelings for her, telling her: "Gusto kita, mahal kita" (TSN,
July 5, 1993, p. 22) and she rejected him. . (TSN, July 5, 1993, p.
22).
Meanwhile, according to S/G Ferolin, while he was on duty, CHITO
arrived at the Building at 1:30 in the early morning of December 13,
1991, wearing a white t-shirt with a marking on the front of the T-
shirt T M and a Greek letter (sic) and below the quoted letters the
word 1946 UST Medicine and Surgery (TSN, October 9, 1992, p. 9) In their presence, the CIS opened the bag and pulled out its contents,
and black shorts with the brand name Adidas (TSN, October 16,
1992, p.7) and requested permission to go up to Room 306. This Unit
was being leased by Ansbert Co and at that time when CHITO was
asking permission to enter, only Joseph Bernard Africa was in the
room.
He asked CHITO to produce the required written authorization and
when CHITO could not, S/G Ferolin initially refused [but later, relented]
. S/G Ferolin made the following entry in the security guards
logbook :
"0130H Baleros Renato Jr. is a visitor of Ansbert Co who has not have
(sic) a Request letter from our tenant of Unit #-306 Ansbert, but still I
let him inter (sic) for the reason that he will be our tenant this coming
summer break as he said so I let him sign it here
(Sgd.) Baleros Renato Jr."
(Exhibit "A-2")
That CHITO arrived at Room 306 at 1:30 A.M. of December 13, 1991
was corroborated by Joseph Bernard Africa (Joseph), .
xxx xxx xxx
Joseph was already inside Room 306 at 9 oclock in the evening of
December 12, 1991. xxx by the time CHITOs knocking on the door
woke him up, . He was able to fix the time of CHITOs arrival at 1:30
A.M. because he glanced at the alarm clock beside the bed when he
was awakened by the knock at the door .
Joseph noticed that CHITO was wearing dark-colored shorts and
white T-shirt (Ibid., p. 23) when he let the latter in. . It was at around
3 oclock in the morning of December 13, 1991 when he woke up
again later to the sound of knocking at the door, this time, by Bernard
Baptista (Bernard), .
xxx. With Bernard, Joseph then went to MALOUs room and thereat
was shown by Bernard the open window through which the intruder
supposedly passed.
xxx xxx xxx
Later, at about 6 to 6:30 in the morning of December 13, 1991, Joseph
was finally able to talk to CHITO . He mentioned to the latter that
something had happened and that they were not being allowed to get
out of the building. Joseph also told CHITO to follow him to Room 310.
CHITO did just that. He followed after Joseph to Unit 310, carrying his
gray bag. xxx. None was in Room 310 so Joseph went to their yet
another classmate, Renato Alagadan at Room 401 to see if the others
were there. xxx.
People from the CIS came by before 8 oclock that same morning .
They likewise invited CHITO and Joseph to go with them to Camp
Crame where the two (2) were questioned .
An occupant of Room 310 Christian Alcala (Christian) recalled in
Court that in the afternoon of December 13, 1991, after their 3:30
class, he and his roommates, Bernard Baptista and Lutgardo Acosta
(Gary) were called to the Building and were asked by the CIS people
to look for anything not belonging to them in their Unit. While they
were outside Room 310 talking with the authorities, Rommel Montes
(Loyloy), another roommate of his, went inside to search the Unit.
Loyloy found (TSN, January 12, 1993, p. 6) a gray "Khumbella" bag
cloth type (Ibid, pp. 44-45) from inside their unit which they did not
know was there and surrender the same to the investigators. When he
saw the gray bag, Christian knew right away that it belonged to CHITO
(Ibid, p. 55) as he had seen the latter usually bringing it to school
inside the classroom (Ibid, p. 45).
Tau Sigma Phi Fraternity . MALOU, , was known to him being
among others, a white t-shirt with a Taunu (sic) Sigma Phi sign (Ibid,
p. 7), a Black Adidas short pants, a handkerchief , three (3) white T-
shirts, an underwear, and socks (Ibid).
Christian recognized the t-shirt (Exhibit "D-4"), the Adidas short pants
(Exhibit "D-5"), and the handkerchief (Exhibit "D-3) to be CHITOs
because CHITO had lent the very same one to him . The t-shirt with
CHITOs fraternity symbol, CHITO used to wear on weekends, and the
handkerchief he saw CHITO used at least once in December.
That CHITO left his bag inside Room 310 in the morning of December
13, 1991, was what consisted mainly of Renato R. Alagadans
testimony.
xxx xxx xxx.
The colored gray bag had a handle and a strap, was elongated to
about 11/4 feet and appeared to be full but was closed with a zipper
when Renato saw it then (Ibid, pp. 19-20). At that time Christian, Gary,
Bernard, and Renato went back to Room 310 at around 3 to 4 oclock
that afternoon along with some CIS agents, they saw the bag at the
same place inside the bedroom where Renato had seen CHITO leave
it. Not until later that night at past 9 oclock in Camp Crame, however,
did Renato know what the contents of the bag were.
xxx xxx xxx.
The forensic Chemist, Leslie Chambers, of the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, having acted in response to
the written request of PNP Superintendent Lucas M. Managuelod
dated December 13, 1991, (Exhibit "C"; Original Records, p. 109.)
conducted laboratory examination on the specimen collated and
submitted. Her Chemistry Report No. C-487-91 (Exhibit "E"; Ibid., p.
112) reads in part, thus:
"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
xxx xxx xxx:
1) One (1) small white plastic bag marked UNIMART with the
following:
xxx xxx xxx
Exh C One (1) night dress colored salmon pink. open the door until Rommel Montes, approached him and even
2) One (1) small white pl astic bag marked JONAS with the following:
Exh. D One (1) printed handkerchief.
Exh. E One (1) white T-shirt marked TMZI.
Exh. F One (1) black short (sic) marked ADIDAS.
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of volatime (sic), non-volatile and/or
metallic poison on the above stated specimens.
FINDINGS:
Toxicological examination conducted on the above stated specimens
gave the following results:
Exhs. C and D POSITIVE to the test for chloroform, a volatile
poison.
Exhs. A, B, E and F are insufficient for further analysis.
CONCLUSION:
Exhs. C and D contain chloroform, a volatile poison."6 (Words in
bracket added)
For its part, the defense presented, as its main witness, the petitioner
himself. He denied committing the crime imputed to him or making at
any time amorous advances on Malou. Unfolding a different version of
the incident, the defense sought to establish the following, as culled
from the same decision of the appellate court:
In December of 1991, CHITO was a medical student of (UST). With
Robert Chan and Alberto Leonardo, he was likewise a member of the
also a medical student at the UST at the time.
From Room 306 of the Celestial Marie Building , CHITO, wearing
the prescribed barong tagalog over dark pants and leather shoes,
arrived at their Fraternity house located at Dos Castillas, Sampaloc,
Manila at about 7 oclock in the evening of December 12, 1991. He
was included in the entourage of some fifty (50) fraternity members
scheduled for a Christmas gathering at the house of their senior
fraternity brother, Dr. Jose Duran, at No. 3 John Street, North
Greenhills, San Juan. xxx.
The party was conducted at the garden beside [the] swimming pool .
Soon after, the four (4) presidential nominees of the Fraternity,
CHITO included, were being dunked one by one into the pool. xxx.
xxx CHITO had anticipated his turn and was thus wearing his t-shirt
and long pants when he was dunked. Perla Duran, , offered each
dry clothes to change into and CHITO put on the white t-shirt with the
Fraternitys symbol and a pair of black shorts with stripes. xxx .
Again riding on Albertos car and wearing "barong tagalog over a white
t-shirt with the symbol TAU Sigma Phi, black short pants with stripe,
socks and shoes" (TSN, April 25, 1994, p. 15), CHITO left the party
with Robert Chan and Alberto at more or less past 1 A.M. of
December 13, 1991 and proceeded to the Building which they reached
at about 1:30 A.M. (Ibid., p. 19). He had left his gray traveling bag
containing "white t-shirt, sando, underwear, socks, and toothbrush
(Ibid., pp. 17-18) at room 306 in the afternoon of the previous day .
At the gate of the Building, CHITO knocked and , S/G Ferolin,
looking at his watch, approached. Because of this, CHITO also looked
at his own watch and saw that the time was 1:30 (Ibid., p. 26). S/G
Ferolin initially refused CHITO entry . xxx.
S/G Ferolin called Unit 306 . xxx. When S/G Ferolin finally let him in,
already about ten (10) minutes had lapsed since CHITO first arrived
(Ibid., p. 25).
CHITO went up the floor, found the key left for him by Joseph behind
the opened jalousie window and for five (5) minutes vainly tried to
commented: "Okey ang suot mo ha, di mo mabuksan ang pinto (Ibid.,
pp. 26-29). Rommel tried to open the door of Unit 306 but was
likewise unsuccessful. CHITO then decided to just call out to Joseph
while knocking at the door.
It took another (5) minutes of calling out and knocking before Joseph,
, at last answered the door. Telling him, "Ikaw na ang bahala diyan"
Joseph immediately turned his back on CHITO and went inside the
bedroom. CHITO , changed to a thinner shirt and went to bed. He
still had on the same short pants given by Perla Duran from the
fraternity party (TSN, June 16, 1994, p. 20).
At 6 oclock in the morning of December 13, 1991, CHITO woke up .
He was already in his school uniform when, around 6:30 A.M, Joseph
came to the room not yet dressed up. He asked the latter why this was
so and, without elaborating on it, Joseph told him that something had
happened and to just go to Room 310 which CHITO did.
At Room 310, CHITO was told by Rommel Montes that somebody,
whom MALOU was not able to identify, went to the room of MALOU
and tried to rape her (TSN, April 25, 1994, p. 36). xxx.
Joseph told him that the security guard was not letting anybody out of
the Building . When two (2) CIS men came to the unit asking for
Renato Baleros, CHITO presented himself. Congressman Rodolfo B.
Albano, father of MALOU, then asked him for the key to Room 306.
xxx xxx xxx
The CIS men looked inside the bedroom and on the windows. Joseph
was told to dress up and the two (2) of them, CHITO and Joseph,
were brought to Camp Crame.
When they arrived at Camp Crame , Col. Managuelod asked
Joseph inside his room and talked to him for 30 minutes. xxx. No one
interviewed CHITO to ask his side.
xxx xxx xxx
Both CHITO and Joseph were taken to Prosecutor Abesamis who
later instructed them to undergo physical examination at the Camp
Crame Hospital .. At the hospital, CHITO and Joseph were
physically examined by a certain Dr. de Guzman who told them to strip
. insolvency, and to pay the costs.
xxx xxx xxx
CHITO had left his gray bag containing, among others, the black
striped short pants lent to him by Perla Duran (Exhibit "8-A", Original
Records, p. 345), inside Room 310 at more/less 6:30 to 7 oclock in
the morning of December 13, 1991. The next time that he saw it was
between 8 to 9 P.M. when he and Joseph were brought before Fiscal
Abesamis for inquest. One of the CIS agents had taken it there and it
was not opened up in his presence but the contents of the bag were
already laid out on the table of Fiscal Abesamis who, however, made
no effort to ask CHITO if the items thereat were his.
The black Adidas short pants purportedly found in the bag, CHITO
denied putting in his gray bag which he had left at Room 306 in the
early evening of December 12, 1991 before going to the fraternity
house. He likewise disavowed placing said black Adidas short pants in
his gray bag when he returned to the apartment at past 1:00 oclock in
the early morning of December 13, 1991 (TSN, June 16, 1994, p. 24),
nor when he dressed up at about 6 oclock in the morning to go to
school and brought his gray bag to Room 310 (Ibid. 25). In fact, at any
time on December 13, 1991, he was not aware that his gray bag ever
contained any black short Adidas pants (Ibid). He only found out for
the first time that the black Adidas short pants was alluded to be
among the items inside his gray bag late in the afternoon, when he
was in Camp Crame.
Also taking the witness stand for the defense were petitioners 4. In not finding that proof of motive is miserably wanting
fraternity brothers, Alberto Leonardo and Robert Chan, who both in his case.
testified being with CHITO in the December 12, 1991 party held in Dr. 5. In awarding damages in favor of the complainant
Durans place at Greenhills, riding on the same car going to and despite the fact that the award was improper and
coming from the party and dropping the petitioner off the Celestial unjustified absent any evidence to prove the same.
Marie building after the party. Both were one in saying that CHITO 6. In failing to appreciate in his favor the constitutional
was wearing a barong tagalog, with t-shirt inside, with short pants and presumption of innocence and that moral certainty has not
leather shoes at the time they parted after the party.7 Rommel Montes, been met, hence, he should be acquitted on the ground
a tenant of Room 310 of the said building, also testified seeing CHITO that the offense charged against him has not been proved
between the hours of 1:30 and 2:00 A.M. of December 13, 1991 trying beyond reasonable doubt.
to open the door of Room 306 while clad in dark short pants and white Otherwise stated, the basic issue in this case turns on the question on
barong tagalog. whether or not the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the RTC finding
On the other hand, Perla Duran confirmed lending the petitioner the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted
pair of short pants with stripes after the dunking party held in her rape.
fathers house.8 Presented as defense expert witness was Carmelita After a careful review of the facts and evidence on record in the light of
Vargas, a forensic chemistry instructor whose actual demonstration in applicable jurisprudence, the Court is disposed to rule for petitioners
open court showed that chloroform, being volatile, evaporates in thirty acquittal, but not necessarily because there is no direct evidence
(30) seconds without tearing nor staining the cloth on which it is pointing to him as the intruder holding a chemical-soaked cloth who
applied.9 pinned Malou down on the bed in the early morning of December 13,
On December 14, 1994, the trial court rendered its 1991.
decision10 convicting petitioner of attempted rape and accordingly Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not
sentencing him, thus: per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of
WHEREFORE, under cool reflection and prescinding from the the crime. There are two types of positive identification. A witness may
foregoing, the Court finds the accused Renato D. Baleros, Jr., alias identify a suspect or accused as the offender as an eyewitness to the
"Chito", guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted rape very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct
as principal and as charged in the information and hereby sentences evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a
him to suffer an imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO witness may not have actually witnessed the very act of commission of
(2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correctional, as Minimum a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused
to TEN (10) YEARS of Prision Mayor as Maximum, with all the as the perpetrator of a crime as when, for instance, the latter is the
accessory penalties provided by law, and for the accused to pay the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately
offended party Martina Lourdes T. Albano, the sum of P50,000.00 by before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second
way of Moral and exemplary damages, plus reasonable Attorneys type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial
fees of P30,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of evidence.13 In the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may
resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden.
SO ORDERED. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under condition where
Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA whereat his appellate recourse concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted under all
was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 17271. circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who committed
As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its assailed Decision heinous crimes in secret or secluded places will be hard, if not well-
dated January 13, 1999, affirmed the trial courts judgment of nigh impossible, to prove.14
conviction, to wit: Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the conditions
WHEREFORE, finding no basis in fact and in law to deviate from the when circumstantial evidence may be sufficient for conviction. The
findings of the court a quo, the decision appealed from is hereby provision reads:
AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against appellant. Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient Circumstantial
SO ORDERED.11 evidence is sufficient for conviction if
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the a) There is more than one circumstance;
CA in its equally assailed resolution of March 31, 1999.12 b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
Petitioner is now with this Court, on the contention that the CA erred - proven; and
1. In not finding that it is improbable for petitioner to have c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
committed the attempted rape imputed to him, absent produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
sufficient, competent and convincing evidence to prove In the present case, the positive identification of the petitioner forms
the offense charged. part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with the
2. In convicting petitioner of attempted rape on the basis other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only
merely of circumstantial evidence since the prosecution fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that petitioner was the
failed to satisfy all the requisites for conviction based intruder in question.
thereon. We quote with approval the CAs finding of the circumstantial evidence
3. In not finding that the circumstances it relied on to that led to the identity of the petitioner as such intruder:
convict the petitioner are unreliable, inconclusive and Chito was in the Building when the attack on MALOU took place. He
contradictory. had access to the room of MALOU as Room 307 where he slept the
night over had a window which allowed ingress and egress to Room
306 where MALOU stayed. Not only the Building security guard, S/G
Ferolin, but Joseph Bernard Africa as well confirmed that CHITO was
wearing a black "Adidas" shorts and fraternity T-shirt when he arrived
at the Building/Unit 307 at 1:30 in the morning of December 13, 1991.
Though it was dark during their struggle, MALOU had made out the
feel of her intruders apparel to be something made of cotton material
on top and shorts that felt satin-smooth on the bottom.
From CHITOs bag which was found inside Room 310 at the very spot
where witness Renato Alagadan saw CHITO leave it, were discovered
the most incriminating evidence: the handkerchief stained with blue
and wet with some kind of chemicals; a black "Adidas" satin short
pants; and a white fraternity T-shirt, also stained with blue. A different
witness, this time, Christian Alcala, identified these garments as
belonging to CHITO. As it turned out, laboratory examination on these
items and on the beddings and clothes worn by MALOU during the
incident revealed that the handkerchief and MALOUs night dress both
contained chloroform, a volatile poison which causes first degree burn
exactly like what MALOU sustained on that part of her face where the
chemical-soaked cloth had been pressed.
This brings the Court to the issue on whether the evidence adduced
by the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt
of the petitioner for the crime of attempted rape.
The Solicitor General maintained that petitioner, by pressing on
Malous face the piece of cloth soaked in chemical while holding her
body tightly under the weight of his own, had commenced the
performance of an act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape the
victim. It is argued that petitioners actuation thus described is an overt
act contemplated under the law, for there can not be any other logical
conclusion other than that the petitioner intended to ravish Malou after
he attempted to put her to an induced sleep. The Solicitor General,
echoing what the CA said, adds that if petitioners intention was
otherwise, he would not have lain on top of the victim.15
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a
man who has carnal knowledge or intercourse with a woman under
any of the following circumstances: (1) By using force or intimidation;
(2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
and (3) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
Under Article 6, in relation to the aforementioned article of the same
code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the
commission of rape directly by overt acts and does not perform all the
acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.16
Expounding on the nature of an attempted felony, the Court, speaking
thru Justice Claro M. Recto in People vs. Lamahang,17 stated that "the
attempt which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical
connection to a particular, concrete offense; that which is the
beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the
perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation."
Absent the unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation
of the cause and its effect, as where the purpose of the offender in
performing an act is not certain, meaning the nature of the act in
relation to its objective is ambiguous, then what obtains is an attempt
to commit an indeterminate offense, which is not a juridical fact from
the standpoint of the Penal Code.18
There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual
intercourse or carnal knowledge in the present case. The next
question that thus comes to the fore is whether or not the act of the
petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of
Malou, constitutes an overt act of rape.1avvphil.net
Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or
deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a
mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete
termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by
external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator,
will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.19
Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this case, it would be
too strained to construe petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked
cloth in the mouth of Malou which would induce her to sleep as an
overt act that will logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As it were,
petitioner did not commence at all the performance of any act
indicative of an intent or attempt to rape Malou. It cannot be
overemphasized that petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no
attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch her private part.
For what reason petitioner wanted the complainant unconscious, if
that was really his immediate intention, is anybodys guess. The CA
maintained that if the petitioner had no intention to rape, he would not
have lain on top of the complainant. Plodding on, the appellate court
even anticipated the next step that the petitioner would have taken if
the victim had been rendered unconscious. Wrote the CA:
The shedding of the clothes, both of the attacker and his victim, will
have to come later. His sexual organ is not yet exposed because his
intended victim is still struggling. Where the intended victim is an
educated woman already mature in age, it is very unlikely that a rapist
would be in his naked glory before even starting his attack on her. He
has to make her lose her guard first, or as in this case, her
unconsciousness.20
At bottom then, the appellate court indulges in plain speculation, a
practice disfavored under the rule on evidence in criminal cases. For,
mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof
required to establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable
doubt.21
In Perez vs. Court of Appeals,22 the Court acquitted therein petitioner
of the crime of attempted rape, pointing out that:
xxx. In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to
produce the felony. Thus, for there to be an attempted rape, the
accused must have commenced the act of penetrating his sexual
organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however,
slight, is not completed.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners act of lying on top of the complainant, embracing and
kissing her, mashing her breasts, inserting his hand inside her panty
and touching her sexual organ, while admittedly obscene and
detestable acts, do not constitute attempted rape absent any showing
that petitioner actually commenced to force his penis into the
complainants sexual organ. xxx.
Likewise in People vs. Pancho,23 the Court held:
xxx, appellant was merely holding complainants feet when his Tito
Onio arrived at the alleged locus criminis. Thus, it would be stretching
to the extreme our credulity if we were to conclude that mere holding
of the feet is attempted rape.
Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not saying that petitioner is
innocent, under the premises, of any wrongdoing whatsoever. The
information filed against petitioner contained an allegation that he
forcefully covered the face of Malou with a piece of cloth soaked in
chemical. And during the trial, Malou testified about the pressing
against her face of the chemical-soaked cloth and having struggled
after petitioner held her tightly and pinned her down. Verily, while the
series of acts committed by the petitioner do not determine attempted
rape, as earlier discussed, they constitute unjust vexation punishable
as light coercion under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the
Revised Penal Code. In the context of the constitutional provision
assuring an accused of a crime the right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation,24 it cannot be said that petitioner was
kept in the dark of the inculpatory acts for which he was proceeded
against. To be sure, the information against petitioner contains
sufficient details to enable him to make his defense. As aptly observed
by then Justice Ramon C. Aquino, there is no need to allege malice,
restraint or compulsion in an information for unjust vexation. As it
were, unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint or
compulsion for the reason that this term is broad enough to include
any human conduct which, although not productive of some physical
or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent
person.25 The paramount question is whether the offenders act
causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to the
mind of the person to whom it is directed.26 That Malou, after the
incident in question, cried while relating to her classmates what she
perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case for
attempted rape proved beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if not
distressed by the acts of petitioner.
The penalty for coercion falling under the second paragraph of Article
287 of the Revised Penal Code is arresto menor or a fine ranging from
5.00 to 200.00 or both.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming
that of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and a new one entered ACQUITTING petitioner Renato
D. Baleros, Jr. of the charge for attempted rape. Petitioner, however,
is adjudged GUILTY of light coercion and is accordingly sentenced to
30 days of arresto menor and to pay a fine of 200.00, with the
accessory penalties thereof and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 110097 December 22, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ARNULFO ASTORGA, accused-appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Actual detention or "locking up" is the primary element of kidnapping.
If the evidence does not adequately prove this element, the accused
cannot be held liable for kidnapping. In the present case, the
prosecution merely proved that appellant forcibly dragged the victim
toward a place only he knew. There being no actual detention or
confinement, the appellant may be convicted only of grave coercion.
The Case
The foregoing principle is used by this Court in resolving the appeal of
Arnulfo Astorga challenging the March 31, 1993 Decision1 of the
Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao convicting him of kidnapping.
In an Information2 dated March 24, 1992 and docketed as Criminal
Case No. 8243, Appellant Arnulfo Astorga was charged with violation
of Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about December 29, 1991 in the Municipality of Tagum,
Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent
and by means of force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap Yvonne Traya, a minor, 8 years of age, thereby
depriving her of her liberty against her will, to the damage and
prejudice of said offended party.
Arraigned on February 24, 1993, Appellant Astorga, duly assisted by
his counsel,3 pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits
ensued. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision4 reads as
follows:5
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the guilt of accused ARNULFO
ASTORGA having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, pursuant to
Article 267 paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, [he] is hereby
sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua to be served at the National
Penitentiary, [Muntinlupa].
This appeal was filed directly with this Court in view of the penalty
imposed.6
The Facts
Evidence for the Prosecution
The evidence for the prosecution was narrated in the Decision of the
trial court, as follows:7
Prosecution witnesses extant from their testimonies categorically
assert that around 6:30 P.M. children of neighbors were near the store
of the grandparents of Yvonne Traya.
Incidentally, there was a brown out that evening hence candle was
used. The daughter and nephew of her aunt Bebeth were quarelling
[sic] about the possession of a flashlight until the glass got lost.
Accused or "Boy" Astorga, went near and asked her daughter Jane
what happened. Glenda or Bebeth grabbed her baby and went home.
Accused told Yvonne to go with him to buy candy. She did not answer
and accused immediately grabbed and hold [sic] her hand. Accused
placed his hand on her shoulder and covered his [sic] mouth.
Yvonne was only eight (8) years old on 29 December 1991 when she
was brought by the accused allegedly to buy candy. Some stores were
closed; others were opened. Accused never went inside the store to
buy candy. Instead she [sic] held and dragged Yvonne until they went
inside the compound of Maco Elementary School. They were walking
inside the perimeter fence, [while the accused was] holding closely the
child. Later, there being no person around the gate, accused brought
her out to the highway and walked towards the direction of Tagum.
Yvonne stays with her grandparents and so with her parents at Sitio
Binuangan, Maco. She asked him where they were going and accused
answered that they were going home. She told him that they were
already on the opposite direction because her grandparent's house is
at Binuangan, while their route was going towards Tagum. Indeed, it
was an opposite direction. Notwithstanding the assertion of Yvonne
that they were on the wrong direction, accused placed his hands on
her shoulder and dragged her. She cried and protested that she must
go home. Accused did not heed her plea and while she was forced to
walk she continued crying.
While accused and Yvonne were walking in the situation as described,
somewhere near the Luponlupon bridge they met some group of men.
Having met on their opposite direction, the two, were noticed by the
group of youngsters. The group were bound to Maco Catholic Church
to see a drama. Having met the two and as noticed by the group
accused keep [sic] on looking back at them. The group were
suspicious about the man who was bringing a child. The group
decided to follow them. Accused hurriedly walked fast with Yvonne,
and to prevent from being overtaken, he carried the victim and ran.
They were chased. After a distance of half a kilometer they were
overtaken.
Edwin Fabila declared that Jonathan, one of his companions with
others in chasing, asked the accused where they were bound. He
answered towards Binuangan. The group noticed something
suspicious because their destination was already towards Tagum
which is an opposite direction to Binuangan.
When asked who is the child, accused answered Traya. Jonathan one
of those who chased knew the family. He got from the accused
Yvonne who showed some resistance. Nevertheless, the group
brought her home at Binuangan. Likewise, accused was also brought
by them to Yvonne's home. The house of accused and Yvonne were
five (5) meters away. Accused wanted to talk to the parents of the
victim, but he was driven by her aunt and adviced [sic] to leave
otherwise he will be stabbed by Yvonne's father. He left and never
talked with the family.
Evidence for the Defense
The facts as viewed by the defense are presented in the Appellant's
Brief,8 dated December 10, 1993:
The defense consisted of the testimonies of Arbeth Nalcot and the
accused-appellant himself.
Arbeth Nalcot, a resident of Tagum, Davao, testified tht [sic] in the
afternoon of December 29, 1991, she was at the Municipal Hall of
Maco, Davao. She saw Astorga with two (2) companions. They were
drinking Red Horse and were already drunk. When they finished
drinking, she went with Astorga to the latter's house. (TSN, pp. 7-8
and 18, March 23, 1993). The house of Astorga is about 5 meters
away from the house of the complainant[.] Yvonne came and asked
money from the accused to buy candy. The two went together and she
was left behind. She told them to hurry up. When they failed to return,
she looked for them, but because it was already dark. She did not find
them. She went back to the house of the accused. (Ibid., pp. 10-11).
Arnulfo Astorga, a resident of Maco, Davao and a gold panner testified
that "at around 1:00 P.M. of December 29, 1991, he arrived at Maco
from Tagum. Upon arrival his two friends, Vicvic and Anding were
already at his home. They decided to drink, hence they proceeded to
Adecor Cottage and drank two gallons of Tuba. At around 2:00 P.M.,
they were at the market place and drink beer grande. At 5:00 P.M. on
the same day, the three proceeded near the municipal hall and with
some persons, they again continued their drinking spree taking up
Red Horse wine". (Decision, p. 3).
At about 6:00 P.M., he was already drunk and he went home. Yvonne
approached him and asked him money to buy candy. He told her that
they will buy. They were not able to buy because the two stores where
they went were already closed. (TSN, pp. 12 and 13, March 24, 1993).
He took her for a stroll for his drunkeness [sic] to subside. They
walked inside the school premises which was about 20 meters away
from the second store. They went out of the school compound going
towards Lupon-lupon because due to his drunkneness [sic], he
thought it was the way towards their house. (Ibid, pp. 14-15) They
reached Lupon-lupon bridge, crossed it twice thinking that it was the
bridge near the municipal hall. After reaching Purok, they met several
persons, he was asked were (sic) they were heading, and he
answered to Tagumpay, but he was told that they [sic] way was
already going to Tagum. He requested those persons to guide them to
Tagumpay. They asked him who was the child he was carrying. He
answered that it was Traya's child, (Ibid, pp. 16-17). He was carrying
the child because he was already crying she already wanted to go
home. The group of persons, men and women, guided them. Yvonne
was being held by the women. They arrived at Yvonne's house. He
talked to the auntie of the child and told her that he would converse
with her but he was advised to go away because the father of Yvonne
might hack him. So he went home. (Ibid, pp. 18-19)
The Trial Court's Ruling
The trial court justified its finding of guilt with the following discussion:9
Accused insisted [that] he was already drunk hence when he took
Yvonne to buy candy, he strolled with her so that his drunkenness be
subsided.
All these defense version was rebutted by Yvonne when she
categorically declared that she did not smell liquor on the accused.
His defense of intoxication has no leg to stand [on].
Consider these facts.
Never did he present Vicvic and Anding to corroborate that he was
intoxicated that afternoon and at dusk because of their drinking spree
from 1:00 P.M. until 5:00 P.M.
He did not rebut the testimonies of Fabila that when they noticed his
actions suspicious bringing with him a child, he walked fast dragging
Yvonne. When he noticed that the group of youngsters were chasing
him, he carried Yvonne and ran until they covered a distance of half a
kilometer in chasing them, until they had overtaken him.
If he was that intoxicated, being under stupor and weakened by liquor,
he could not ran that fast carrying Yvonne for half a kilometer.
Moreover, Yvonne categorically in straight forward testimony asserted
that she did not smell liquor on the accused.
Accused, naivety [sic], that because of his intoxication, he got lost and
was not able to proceed with Yvonne to Binuangan was a shallow
afterthought.
It must be recalled that Yvonne told him they were already going at
opposite direction from home. Instead they were heeding towards
Tagum. Accused did not change course.
xxx xxx xxx
Again, not only force was employed in having Yvonne as captive by
dragging, slapping her mouth and was holding her tight, but accused
also used psychological means of scaring her about a red eyed ghost.
Through this means and efforts, Yvonne was deprived of her liberty
and was by force prevented to go home to her parents.
On rebuttal, Yvonne denied that she asked money from accused to
buy candy. She also denied as testified by defense witness Arbeth
Nalcot that she went to the house of the accused on 29 December
1991 or on any other dates to ask money from Astorga for candy.
Defense evidence are [sic] punctured with unbelievability in his off
tangent and incredible theory of drunkardness. His alleged being lost
in the direction of Binuangan in spite of Yvonne's insistence and that
of the person they met that he was on the wrong way considering that
there are no criss crossing roads except the highway is preposterous.
The Issues
Appellant imputes the following errors to the trial court:10
I detail.
The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution's witnesses which were replete with inconsistencies and
contradictions.
II
The trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the fact that
Yvonne Traya was not detained, locked-up or deprived of her liberty.
III
The trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the fact that
appellant had no motive to kidnap Yvonne Traya.
In the main, appellant challenges the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses and the legal characterization of the acts imputed to him.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant should be convicted only of
grave coercion, not kidnapping.
First Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses
Appellant contends that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
are not worthy of credence because they were inconsistent and
improbable. He cites the following:
Glenda Chavez testified that she was present when the accused told
Yvonne that they will buy candy. She sensed that the accused was
drunk. (TSN, pp. 10-11, March 10, 1993). These testimonies were
contradicted by Yvonne Traya when she declared that Glenda Chavez
had already went [sic] inside their house when [the] accused told her
that they will buy candy (TSN, pp. 10, March 16, 1993). She testified
that she did not smell liquor on the accused. (Decision, pp. 3-4)
Edwin Fabila testified that their group was able to overtake the
accused at a distance of 2 fathoms and they [sic] him about 15 to 20
meters (TSN, p. 35, March 10, 1993) Arnel Fabila, on the other hand,
testified that they overtook the accused after chasing him at a distance
of half kilometer (TSN, p. 10, March 11, 1993).
Yvonne Traya testified that the accused could not ran fast carrying her
because she was heavy. (TSN, p. 19, March 16, 1993). However,
Arnel Fabila declared that they were able to overtake the accused only
after chasing him at a distance of half kilometer (TSN, p. 10, March
11, 1993) meaning accused was running fast.11
We hold, however, that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses
concerning minor details and collateral matters, like the examples
cited by appellant, do not affect the substance, veracity or weight of
their declarations. These inconsistencies reinforce, rather than
weaken, their credibility, for different witnesses of startling events
usually perceive things differently.12 Indeed, the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses cannot be expected to be uniform to the last
The testimony of Glenda Chavez that the accused was drunk at that
time allegedly contradicted Yvonne's statement that the accused did
not smell of liquor. This does not detract from the credibility of either
witness. Yvonne, then an eight-year-old child,13 and her Aunt Glenda,
then twenty-seven years old,14 do not have the same experiences or
level of maturity; hence, their perceptions of events differ. More
important, whether the accused was drunk or not is an insignificant
detail that does not substantially affect the testimonies of these
witnesses.
Further, the discrepancy in the witnesses' estimate of the distance
covered by the men who chased appellant does not render their
testimonies incredible.15 Quite the contrary, such discrepancy shows
their candor and sincerity, demonstrating that their testimonies were
unrehearsed.16 Yvonne testified that when appellant noticed the
group of men following them, he carried her and ran. Yvonne's
testimony is in accord with that of Arnel Fabila a member of the
group who chased appellant that they were able to overtake
appellant after chasing him half a kilometer.17
Appellant's challenge to the credibility of the prosecution account is
also premised on the alleged failure of the trial court to consider the
following
points:18
a) that the alleged victim admitted that she and the accused
casually moved around the school premises, as if they were strolling;
That when they were already in the highway, they were also walking
openly and casually until they were met by a group of youngster[s].
Edwin Fabila, one of the prosecution's witnesses, corroborated the
fact that the two were walking casually along the highway when he
first saw them;
b) That it is highly incredible that accused and the alleged
victim will not be seen or noticed by the people travelling or those
persons residing along the highway if it was true that the accused was
dragging her and she was continuously crying from her residence up
to a distance of more than one kilometer;
c) That the accused and the alleged victim were travelling at
a very slow pace; a distance of barely a kilometer for a period of more
than two hours;
d) That the accused was very drunk, having been drinking
different kinds of intoxicating liquors from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.,
causing him to be confused on which way they should take in going
home.
e) That the accused was not hurt by the group of youngsters
who allegedly rescued the child, nor was immediately brought to the
municipal hall which was just near the house of the victim for the filing
of the necessary charge; this [sic] actuations only confirm the fact that
the accused merely sought their help in guiding them home, and
f) That it took more than one week for the complainant and
her parents to file the case at the Fiscal's Office.
We cannot sustain these contentions. The charge is not belied by the
one-week delay in the filing of the complaint. It has been held that
delay or vacillation in making a criminal accusation does not
necessarily weaken the credibility of a witness where such delay is
satisfactorily explained.19 In the present case, one week was
reasonable, considering that the victim was a resident of Binuangan
and that the case was filed in Tagum, Davao.
Furthermore, the group whom appellant met did not hurt or bring him
to the municipal hall, because they deemed it more urgent at the time
to rescue Yvonne and to bring her home, which they actually did.20
There is no settled rule on how a group of young men should react
upon seeing a young girl snatched by an older man. Verily, violence is
not the only normal reaction of young men who see a girl being
forcibly taken.
Appellant's claim that he and Yvonne were merely strolling and
walking casually does not negate the fact that Yvonne was deprived of
her will. As noted by the trial court, appellant used physical force and
psychological means in restraining her.21 Despite her young age,
Yvonne was able to clearly recount the events that transpired on that
fateful night.
Moreover, there is no merit in the argument that the people travelling
or living along the highway should have noticed appellant and Yvonne.
The fact is that a group of men actually noticed and ultimately chased
them.
All in all, appellant utterly fails to justify a departure from the long
settled rule that the trial court's assessment of the credibility of
witnesses should be accorded great respect on appeal.22
Second Issue: No Motive to "Kidnap"
Petitioner contends that "[t]here was no evidence presented to prove
why the accused should kidnap Yvonne Traya." He submits that "the
prosecution had failed to prove [any] motive to support the alleged
kidnapping incident, thus, making the theory of the defense more
credible and believable."23
The contention is insignificant. Motive is not an element of the crime.
Furthermore, motive becomes material only when the evidence is
circumstantial or inconclusive, and there is some doubt on whether a
crime has been committed or whether the accused has committed it.
Indeed, motive is totally irrelevant when ample direct evidence
sustains the culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.24 In
this case, the identity of appellant is not in question. He himself
admitted having taken Yvonne to Maco Central Elementary School.
Third Issue: Kidnapping or Coercion?
Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove one essential
element of kidnapping the fact of detention or the deprivation of
liberty. The solicitor general counters that deprivation of liberty is not
limited to imprisoning or placing the victim in an enclosure. Citing
People vs. Crisostomo, 25 he argues:
(T)he act proven in the record constitutes (kidnapping). It is no
argument against this conclusion that the accused deprived the
offended party of her liberty without placing her in an inclosure;
because illegal detention, as defined and punished in our Code, may
consist not only in imprisoning a person but also in detaining her or
depriving her in any manner of her liberty.26
We agree with appellant's contention this time.
Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,27 the elements of
kidnapping are as follows:
1. That the offender is a private individual.
2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other
manner deprives the latter of his liberty.
3. That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal.
4. That in the commission of the offense, any of the following
circumstances is present:
5. That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than five
(5) days; or
6. That it committed simulating public authority; or
7. That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or
8. That the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female,
or a public officer.
The Spanish version of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code uses
the terms "lockup" (encerrar) rather than "kidnap" (secuestrar or
raptar). Lockup is included in the broader term of "detention," which
refers not only to the placing of a person in an enclosure which he
cannot leave, but also to any other deprivation of liberty which does
not necessarily involve locking up.28 Likewise, the Revised Penal
Code was originally approved and enacted in Spanish. Consequently,
the Spanish text is controlling in cases of conflict with the English
version, as provided in Section 15 of the Revised Administrative
Code.29
A review of the events as narrated by the prosecution witnesses
ineluctably shows the absence of "locking up." Victim Yvonne Traya
testified:30
 A We were going around and when he saw that there is no Q And so, what did you do?
Q And after that what happened next? person in the gate we passed at that gate. A He said that we will go home but I know [sic] that place
A I continued crying, sir. we are [sic] heading to is [sic] not a way to our home but it is [sic] the
A When Auntie Bebeth went inside her house she was Q And where did he go after passing that gate? opposite.
already bringing her child and bringing with her candle. And Arnulfo Q And after that, what happened?
Astorga told me that we will buy candy, sir. A Towards Lupon-lupon, sir. Q So, what happened next?
A We continued walking and we met a person and he asked
Q And after that? xxx xxx xxx Boy Astorga where we are going, sir. A He continued dragging me and after that we met plenty of
persons and I shouted for help and at that instance, he slapped my
A And while I was not answering the question he Q What about you, did you talk to him? Q What did that man ask Boy Astorga? mouth and after a few steps he already carried me.
immediately grabbed me.
A I asked him where we were going and he told me that we A The man asked Boy Astorga where are you going, and xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx are going home and I told him that this is not the way to our house, Boy Astorga answered, to Binuangan, but the man continued to say
and we did not pass this way. (Witness gesturing a certain direction). that this way is going to Tagum and not to Binuangan any more. A He continued walking and I also continued crying and I
Q And after that, after he held your hand, what did he do told him that I want to go home and he told me that we are heading
next? Q And so when you said that that is not the way, when you Q What else did the man ask, if any? towards home, but I told him that the way we are going to is not the
said that is not the way because our house is towards Binuangan. . . way to our house.
A He placed his hands on my shoulder and also covering A I further said that we will already leave, and we will be the
[sic] my mouth. By the way, you said you were going to Lupon-lupon, do you know to ones to go to Binuangan, and after that, Boy Astorga put me down Q By the way, when you shouted [for] help, was it loud?
what direction is going to Lupon-lupon, to what place is Lupon-lupon because he urinated. So, at that instance, I ran, but, after he urinated,
xxx xxx xxx going to? he already took hold of me not to run any more because there is a A Yes, sir.
ghost.
Q And after that what did he do next? A Yes, sir. Q So, what happened next?
Q When you said you ran away after Boy Astorga left you
A He brought me to the school. Q Where? when he urinated, where did you run? A He continued running and he stopped several vehicles but
they did not stop, so, we just continued walking.
Q What school did Boy Astorga bring you? What is the A Going to my place. A Towards Binuangan, sir.
name of the school? Q After that, what happened next?
Q Do you know the place where it was going? What is that Q Towards the direction of your house?
A Maco Central Elementary School. place? A He moved closer to the banana plants. He looked back
A Yes, sir. and he saw that persons were already chasing him and after that he
Q How far is Maco Central Elementary School from your A On the road going to Tagum. carried me and ran.
house? Q And you were overtaken again by Boy Astorga?
Q Now, what, about your house, where is it going? From the foregoing, it is clear that the appellant and the victim were
A A little bit near. A Yes, sir. constantly on the move. They went to Maco Elementary School and
A To Binuangan. strolled on the school grounds. When nobody was at the Luponlupon
Q When Boy Astorga brought you to school, was it dark? Q What did he do to you when you were overtaken by Boy bridge, appellant took the victim to the highway leading to Tagum,
Q And so when you . . . what did he do next when you said Astorga? Davao. At that time, Yvonne pleaded with appellant that she really
A Yes, sir. that is not the place going to your house? wanted to go home to Binuangan, but appellant ignored her pleas and
A He took hold of me again and he told me, he threatened continued walking her toward the wrong direction. Later on, the group
Q Exactly where in Maco Elementary School did Boy A We continued walking and he also placed his hands on me that there is [sic] a red eyes but I answered him that is [sic] not a of Witness Arnel Fabila spotted them. Appellant Astorga carried the
Astorga bring you? my shoulder and dragged me, sir. red eyes of the ghost but that is a light coming from the vehicle. victim and ran, but Fabila's group chased and caught up with them.

A Inside the gate, sir. Q What about you, what did you do when he was dragging Q Now, what happened next? This narration does not adequately establish actual confinement or
you? restraint of the victim, which is the primary element of kidnapping.31
Q And once inside the gate what did he do to you? A He placed a necklace on me, sir. Appellant's apparent intention was to take Yvonne against her will
A I was crying, sir. towards the direction of Tagum. Appellant's plan did not materialize,
A We were going around the school? xxx xxx xxx however, because Fabila's group chanced upon them. The evidence
Q Did you say any word to him when you were crying? does not show that appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much less,
xxx xxx xxx A He was dragging me and I was crying when he was that he actually detained her. Appellant's forcible dragging of Yvonne
A Yes, I told him that we are going home. dragging me. to a place only he knew cannot be said to be an actual confinement or
Q Do you know why you were going around the school? restriction on the person of Yvonne. There was no "lockup."
Q And what did Boy Astorga say? Q While you were being dragged did you make any plea to Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping under Article
A Yes, sir. him? 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
A He told me that we will be going home, and told me not to
Q Why, what did he do? make any noise because if I will make any noise we will be lost on our A Yes, I told him that I will go home. Rather, the felony committed in this case is grave coercion under
way. Article 286 of the same code. Grave coercion or coaccion grave has
Q And what did he say? three elements: (a) that any person is prevented by another from
doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something
against his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or
compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such a
display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control
over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who
restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so or, in other
words, that the restraint is not made under authority of a law or in the
exercise of any lawful right.32 When appellant forcibly dragged and
slapped Yvonne, he took away her right to go home to Binuangan.
Appellant presented no justification for preventing Yvonne from going
home, and we cannot find any.
The present case should be distinguished from People vs. Rosemarie
de la Cruz. 33 Here, Appellant Astorga tricked Yvonne to go with him
by telling her that they were going to buy candy. When Yvonne
recognized the deception, she demanded that she be brought home,
but appellant refused and instead dragged her toward the opposite
direction against her will. While it is unclear whether Appellant Astorga
intended to detain or "lock up" Yvonne, there is no question that he
forced her to go with him against her will. In Rosemarie de la Cruz,
Victim Whiazel voluntarily went with accused. Furthermore, the
accused in that case failed to consummate the crime of kidnapping
because of the timely intervention of the victim's neighbor. Thus, the
Court held in that case: 34
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and
proof When there is variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information, and that proved or established by the
evidence, and the offenses as charged is included in or necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense
charged included in that which is proved.
At the time the felony was committed on December 29, 1991, the
penalty imposed by law for grave coercion was arresto mayor and a
fine not exceeding five hundred pesos. 35 The Indeterminate
Sentence Law does not apply here because the maximum penalty
does not exceed one year. 36 However, appellant has been
imprisoned for more than six (6) months. He has more than served the
penalty imposable for such an offense. 37
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Appellant is CONVICTED only of grave coercion and is sentenced to
six (6) months of arresto mayor. Unless he is being detained for any
other valid cause, his IMMEDIATE RELEASE is herewith ordered,
considering that he has more than served the maximum penalty
imposable upon him. That director of prisons is DIRECTED to inform
this Court, within five days from receipt of this Decision, of the actual
date the appellant is released. No costs.

In a prosecution for kidnapping, the intent of the accused to deprive SO ORDERED.

the victim of the latter's liberty, in any manner, needs to be established
by indubitable proof (People vs. Puno, 219 SCRA 85 [1993]). The acts
held by the trial court, and maintained by the People, as
consummating the crime of kidnapping in this case are those when
accused-appellant held the victim's hand and refused to let go when
the victim asked to go over to her neighbor, who by then already saw
what was happening. This happened for only a very brief span of time
and the evidentiary record shows that there were a good number of
people present at that time, that a guard was stationed at the gate,
and that there was at least a teacher nearby. The child could have just
as easily shouted for help. While it does not take much to scare the
wits out of a small child like Whiazel, under the attendant
circumstances, we cannot say with certainty that she was indeed
deprived of her liberty. It must further be noted that up to that brief
moment when Cecilia saw them, and the child asked to be let go, the
victim had gone with accused-appellant voluntarily. Without any further
act reinforcing the inference that the victim may have been denied her
liberty, even taking cognizance of her minority, the Court hesitates to
find that kidnapping in the case at bar was consummated. While it is a
well-entrenched rule that factual findings of trial courts, especially
when they concern the appreciation of testimony of witnesses, are
accorded great respect, by exception, when the judgment is based on
a misapprehension of facts, as we perceive in the case at bar, the
Court may choose to substitute its own findings (People vs. Padua,
215 SCRA 266 [1992]).

The Information, dated March 24, 1992, filed against Astorga contains
sufficient allegations constituting grave coercion, the elements of
which were sufficiently proved by the prosecution. Hence, a conviction
for said crime is appropriate under Section 4, Rule 120 of the 1988
Rules on Criminal Procedure:
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 152997. November 10, 2004]
SALVADOR MARZALADO,* JR., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision[1] dated
November 9, 2001 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 22645, which
affirmed the Decision[2] dated November 5, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 79, in Criminal Case No. Q-98-74695. The
RTC upheld the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 35,
convicting herein petitioner Salvador Marzalado, Jr., for violation of Article
280[3] of the Revised Penal Code on Qualified Trespass to Dwelling, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of two (2) months and one (1) day
of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of P500 and to pay the costs.[4] This
petition likewise assails the Resolution[5] dated April 23, 2002, of the Court
of Appeals, denying the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Cristina N. Albano was the lessee of a unit in the house owned by
Luz Marzalado, the mother of herein petitioner, Salvador Marzalado, Jr.
Sometime in February 1993, Luz Marzalado filed an ejectment case against
Albano. Judgment was rendered against Albano, who was ordered to vacate
the leased premises and to pay the unpaid rentals. Albano appealed to the
RTC.
In September 1993, during the pendency of the appeal, the
electricity supply of the unit was cut off due to non-payment of bills. As a
result, Albano transferred her children to her fathers house, four houses
away, leaving a maid to sleep in the unit.
Albano claims that on November 2, 1993, at around 1:00 p.m., she
went to her unit. She noticed that the lead pipe she used to hang clothes to
dry was missing. When she returned at about 8:00 a.m. the following day,
November 3, 1993, she discovered the padlock of the main door changed,
preventing her from entering the premises. She went to see petitioner but he
was not around.
On November 4, 1993, Albano again returned to her unit. She
peeked through the window jalousies and saw that the place was already
empty. She immediately reported the matter to the barangay officials, who in
turn, advised her to go to the police. Thereafter, she filed a complaint for
grave coercion, qualified trespass to dwelling and theft against petitioner.
On November 14, 1993, Albano tried to see the accused, but again
failed. This time she noticed that the roofing of her unit had been removed
and the main door locked from the inside. She was informed that on
November 1, 1993, Marzalado, Jr., and his female companion took her lead
pipe and on November 2, 1993, Marzalado, Jr., took her personal belongings
and brought them inside his house.
Accordingly, Albano filed a suit for trespass to dwelling with the
MeTC of Quezon City against Marzalado, Jr., thus:
The undersigned accuses SALVADOR MAR[Z]ALADO, JR., of the crime of
Trespass to Dwelling, committed as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of November, 1993, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused without any justifiable cause, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the dwelling place
of CRISTINA N. ALBANO located at No. 241 Road 1, Pag-Asa, this City,
against the latters will and without her consent or any members of the
household, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Quezon City, Philippines, March 16, 1994.[6]
On May 12, 1994, the accused was arraigned and pleaded not guilty
to the charge. A summary hearing followed, with Albano and her witness,
Narciso Raniedo, testifying for the prosecution.
Raniedo, the owner of the house fronting Albanos unit, testified that
at around 5:00 p.m., on November 1, 1993, he was about to enter his house,
when he glanced at the unit leased by Albano. He saw Marzalado, Jr., take
a lead pipe and hand it to a woman waiting at the terrace of Marzalado, Jr.s
house. Raniedo further said that on November 2, 1993, sometime between
4:30 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. he was relaxing in front of his house, when he heard
noises coming from Albanos apartment. There he saw Marzalado, Jr.,
forcibly open the door of the unit, bring out the belongings of Albano, and
take these to his own house.
For his defense, Marzalado, Jr., testified that after the MeTC ruled
against Albano in the MeTC ejectment case filed by his mother and because
of the disconnection of the electricity, Albano already vacated the leased unit
and moved to her fathers place. According to petitioner, on November 3,
1993, he was on his way home when he saw water in a continuous stream
flowing out of Albanos unit. He then searched for Albano but to no avail. He
reported the matter to the barangay officers and asked for two barangay
tanods to accompany him to the vacated unit. They went inside the unit
where they found an open faucet, with water flooding the floor. He accused
Albano of deliberately leaving the faucet open. He claimed Albano filed the
criminal case of trespass to dwelling to harass him and to retaliate against
him and his family.
On October 28, 1997, the MeTC handed down the following
judgment:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Salvador Mar[z]alado, Jr. GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Trespass To Dwelling under Article
280 of the Revised Penal Code and he is hereby sentenced the penalty of
TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Arresto Mayor and to pay a fine
of P 500.00 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The trial court observed that the defense would have been a good
defense had the alleged entry been made on November 2, 1993, the date
stated in the Information, instead of November 3, 1993, the date the accused
said he entered the premises because Albano deliberately left the faucet
open.
Marzalado, Jr., appealed to the RTC, which ruled the matter in this
wise:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the appealed decision dated
October 28, 1997, the same is hereby affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Undaunted, Marzalado, Jr., elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22645. The Court of Appeals found no error in
the challenged RTC decision and held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the lower courts decision is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto and the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Hence, petitioner comes to this Court assigning as errors of the
court a quo the following:
I been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISIONS OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT AND THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BOTH OF QUEZON CITY BECAUSE THE
INCIDENT HAPPENED ON NOVEMBER 3, 1993, AND NOT NOVEMBER
2, 1993, AND THE PETITIONERS ENTRY IN THE PREMISES IS FULLY
JUSTIFIED BECAUSE HE WAS ASSISTED BY THEIR BARANGAY
SECRETARY AND TWO BARANGAY TANOD[S] AND THE ENTRY IS
FOR A VALID PURPOSE. HENCE, THERE IS NO TRESPASS TO
DWELLING.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE
INFORMATION THAT THE ALLEGED TRESPASS TO DWELLING
HAPPENED ON NOVEMBER 2, 1993. THUS, WITH DUE RESPECT TO
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THERE WAS A
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, AND IT SHOULD NOT HAVE
ADOPTED THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT AND REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.[10]
The foregoing may be reduced to one issue: Did the Court of
Appeals err in sustaining the conviction of Marzalado, Jr., for qualified
trespass to dwelling?
The petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in sustaining the lower court, since in the proceedings below,
there was a grave misapprehension of facts by both the MeTC and RTC in
finding that he committed trespass to dwelling despite the glaring proof that
his entry was justifiable under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal
Code[11] - to prevent an imminent danger to property. He stresses that while
he did enter the unit, he did so with the aid of barangay officers and for the
sole purpose of turning off the faucet that was causing the flooding of the
unit. He adds that the Information filed against him should be considered
fatally defective for having stated that his entry was on November 2, 1993,
when in fact it was on November 3, 1993.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that petitioners
entry cannot be justified since the flooding of the floor was not a danger to
life nor property. Rather, the OSG claims that the flooding of the unit could
have been averted had the petitioner resorted to merely turning off the inlet
valve of the water source. The OSG also stresses petitioners failure to refute
the charge that he entered the complainants unit on November 2, 1993.
Moreover, the OSG asserts that the exact time of the commission of the
crime in the Information need not be so accurate to preclude other dates
near the actual date. It is sufficient that the Information states a time as near
to the actual date, more so, where the time is not an essential element of the
offense, as in this case.
Anent the Information, the contention of petitioner that the
Information is defective is untenable. Admittedly, there is a discrepancy on
the precise date of the alleged trespass - the Information charges petitioner
Marzalado, Jr., with trespass to dwelling allegedly committed on November
2, 1993, while petitioners defense relate to an entry made the following day.
The discrepancy however, does not make the information defective. Facts
and circumstances necessary for inclusion in the information are determined
by reference to the definition and elements of the specific crime.[12] In
trespass to dwelling, the elements are: (1) the offender is a private person;
(2) that he enters the dwelling of another; and (3) such entrance is against
the latters will.
The exact date when the alleged trespass occurred is not an
essential element of the offense of trespass. It is sufficient that the Complaint
or Information states that the crime has been committed at any time as near
as possible to the date of its actual commission.[13]Rule 110, Section 11 of
the Rules of Court provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint
or information the precise time the offense was committed except when time
is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have
was committed as the information or complaint will permit. A variance
between the time set out in the indictment and that established by the
evidence during trial does not constitute an error so serious as to warrant
reversal of a conviction solely on that score.[14] Thus, the error invoked by
the petitioner in the date of the alleged trespass in the Information is of no
grave import, for it is far from being the decisive issue in this case.
However, still incumbent upon the prosecution is to establish the
criminal intent and the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Criminal cases rise and fall on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution
and not the weakness of the evidence of the defense or the lack of it.[15] In
the prosecution for trespass, the material fact or circumstance to be
considered is the occurrence of the trespass. The gravamen of the crime is
violation of possession[16] or the fact of having caused injury to the right of
the possession.[17]
To prove trespass, the prosecution presented as witness Narciso
Raniedo who testified that he saw petitioner enter the unit at around 4:30
p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on November 2 and take out Albanos belongings. No other
eyewitness corroborated Raniedos testimony. However, by her own
account, Albano declared that she discovered the trespass in the evening of
November 3,[18] the same day the barangay certified Marzalado, Jr.s entry.
This obviously does not discount the fact that although the exact date of
entry varied as between petitioner and respondent, they both were referring
to the same entry.
What remains now is the issue of whether the entry of petitioner
Marzalado, Jr., was legally justified. We rule that it is, based on the
circumstances of this case.
As certified by Barangay Lupon Secretary Romulo E. Ragaya, the
unit rented by Albano was forcibly opened by the owner because of the
strong water pressure coming out of the faucet[19] As Albano herself
admitted, she and her children already left the unit when the electricity supply
was cut off in the month of September. Hence, nobody was left to attend to
the unit, except during some nights when Albanos maid slept in the unit.
Clearly, Marzalado, Jr., acted for the justified purpose of avoiding further
flooding and damage to his mothers property caused by the open faucet. No
criminal intent could be clearly imputed to petitioner for the remedial action
he had taken. There was an exigency that had to be addressed to avoid
damage to the leased unit. There is nothing culpable concerning Marzalado,
Jr.s judgment call to enter the unit and turn off the faucet instead of closing
the inlet valve as suggested by the OSG.
Thus, we find the evidence on record insufficient to hold petitioner
guilty of the offense charged. Palpable doubt exists in our mind as to the guilt
of petitioner. In our view, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court and of the Metropolitan Trial Court when it found
petitioner guilty of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling. In a situation of ambiguity,
where the act of the accused permits of two possible signification, one
culpable and another innocent, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of
the accused. The evidence in this case simply fails to convince us of his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
November 9, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22645, and
its Resolution dated April 23, 2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner SALVADOR MARZALADO,
JR., is hereby ACQUITTED of the charge against him for lack of evidence to
sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-21529 March 28, 1969
ROSAURO REYES, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Jose F. Maacop for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor
General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for
respondent.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This case is before us on appeal by certiorari, from the decision of
the Court of Appeals affirming that a the municipal court of Cavite City,
convicting Rosauro Reyes of the crimes of grave threats and grave
oral defamation, and sentencing him, in the first case (Criminal Case
No. 2594), to four (4) months and ten (10) days of arresto mayor and
to pay a fine of P300, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and in the second case (Criminal Case No. 2595), to an
indeterminate penalty of from four (4) months of arresto mayor to one
(1) year and eight (8) months of prison correccional and to pay Agustin
Hallare the sum of P800 as moral damages, with costs in both cases.
The petitioner herein, Rosauro Reyes, was a former civilian
employee of the Navy Exchange, Sangley Point, Cavite City, whose
services were terminated on May 6, 1961. In the afternoon of June 6,
1961, he led a group of about 20 to 30 persons in a demonstration
staged in front of the main gate of the United States Naval Station at
Sangley Point. They carried placards bearing statements such as,
"Agustin, mamatay ka;" "To, alla boss con Nolan;" "Frank do not be a
common funk;" "Agustin, mamamatay ka rin"; "Agustin, Nolan for you;"
"Agustin alla bos con Nolan;" "Agustin, dillega, el dia di quida rin bo
chiquiting;" and others. The base commander, Capt. McAllister, called
up Col. Patricia Monzon, who as Philippine Military Liaison Officer at
Sangley Point was in charge of preserving harmonious relations
between personnel of the naval station and the civilian population of
Cavite City. Capt. McAllister requested Col. Monzon to join him at the
main gate of the base to meet the demonstrators. Col. Monzon went to
the place and talked to Rosauro Reyes and one Luis Buenaventura
upon learning that the demonstration was not directed against the
naval station but against Agustin Hallare and a certain Frank Nolan for
their having allegedly caused the dismissal of Rosauro Reyes from the
Navy Exchange, Col. Monzon suggested to them to demonstrate in
front of Hallare's residence, but they told him that they would like the
people in the station to know how they felt about Hallare and Nolan.
They assured him, however, that they did not intend to use violence,
as "they just wanted to blow off steam."
At that time Agustin Hallare was in his office inside the naval station.
When he learned about the demonstration he became apprehensive
about his safety, so he sought Col. Monzon's protection. The colonel
thereupon escorted Hallare, his brother, and another person in going
out of the station, using his (Monzon's) car for the purpose. Once
outside, Col. Monzon purpose slowed down to accommodate the
request of Reyes. He told Hallare to take a good look at the
demonstrators and at the placards they were carrying. When the
demonstrators saw Hallare they shouted, "Mabuhay si Agustin." Then
they boarded their jeeps and followed the car. One jeep overtook
passed the car while the other to led behind. After Hallare and his
companions had alighted in front of his residence at 967 Burgos St.,
Cavite City, Col. Monzon sped away.
The three jeeps carrying the demonstrators parked in front of
Hallare's residence after having gone by it twice Rosauro Reyes got
off his jeep and posted himself at the gate, and with his right hand
inside his pocket and his left holding the gate-door, he shouted
repeatedly, "Agustin, putang ina mo. Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin
lumabas ka, papatayin kita." Thereafter, he boarded his jeep and the
motorcade left the premises. Meanwhile, Hallare, frightened by the
demeanor of Reyes and the other demonstrators, stayed inside the
house.lwphi1.et
On the basis of the foregoing events Rosauro Reyes was charged on
July 24 and 25, 1961 with grave threats and grave oral defamation,
respectively (Criminal Cases Nos. 2594 and 2595, Municipal Court of
Cavite City), as follows;
The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Cavite
accuses Rosauro Reyes of the crime of Grave Threats, as
defined by Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code and
penalized by paragraph 2 of the same Article, committed
as follows:
That on or about June 6, 1961, in the City of Cavite,
Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above named accused, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, orally
threaten to kill, one Agustin Hallare.
Contrary to law.
Cavite City, July 24, 1961.
DEOGRACIAS S. SOLIS
City Fiscal
BY: (SGD.) BUEN N. GUTIERREZ
Special Counsel
The undersigned complainant, after being duly sworn to
an oath in accordance with law, accuses Rosauro Reyes
of the crime of Grave Oral Defamation, as defined and
penalized by Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code,
committed as follows:
That on or about June 6, 1961, in the City of Cavite,
Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above named accused, without
any justifiable motive but with the intention to cause
dishonor, discredit and contempt to the undersigned
complainant, in the presence of and within hearing of
several persons, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously utter to the undersigned complainant the
following insulting and serious defamatory remarks, to wit:
"AGUSIN, PUTANG INA MO". which if translated into
English are as follows: "Agustin, Your mother is a whore."
Contrary to law.
Cavite City, July 25, 1961.
(SGD.) AGUSTIN HALLARE
Complainant
Subscribed and sworn to before me this. 25th day of
July, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Philippines.
(SGD.) BUEN N. GUTIERREZ
Special Counsel
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to both charges
and the cases were set for joint trial. On the day of the hearing the
prosecution moved to amend the information in Criminal Case No.
2594 for grave threats by deleting therefrom the word "orally". The
defense counsel objected to the motion on the ground that the
accused had already been arraigned on the original information and
that the amendment "would affect materially the interest of the
accused." Nevertheless, the amendment was allowed and the joint
trial proceeded.
From the judgment of conviction the accused appeal to the Court of
Appeals, which returned a verdict of affirmance. A motion for
reconsideration having been denied, the accused brought this appeal
by certiorari.
Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in affirming the
proceedings in the lower court allowing the substantial amendment of
the information for grave threats after petitioner had been arraigned on
the original information; (2) in proceeding with the trial of the case of
grave threats without first requiring petitioner to enter his plea on the
amended information; (3) in convicting petitioner of both offenses
when he could legally be convicted of only one offense, thereby
putting him in jeopardy of being penalized twice for the same offense;
(4) in convicting petitioner of grave threats when the evidence
adduced and considered by the court tend to establish the offense of
light threats only; and (5) in convicting petitioner of grave oral
defamation when the evidence tend to establish that of simple slander
only.
On the first error assigned, the rule is that after the accused has
pleaded the information may be amended as to all matters of form by
leave and at the discretion of the court when the same can be done
without prejudice to the rights of the defendant (Section 13, Rule 110,
New Rules of Court). Amendments that touch upon matters of
substance cannot be permitted after the plea is entered.
After a careful consideration of the original information, we find that
all the elements of the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282
1 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by its paragraph 2 were
alleged therein namely: (1) that the offender threatened another
person with the infliction upon his person of a wrong; (2) that such
wrong amounted to a crime; and (3) that the threat was not subject to
a condition. Hence, petitioner could have been convicted thereunder.
It is to be noted that under the aforementioned provision the particular
manner in which the threat is made not a qualifying ingredient of the
offense, such that the deletion of the word "orally" did not affect the
nature and essence of the crime as charged originally. Neither did it
change the basic theory of the prosecution that the accused
threatened to kill Rosauro Reyes so as to require the petitioner to
undergo any material change or modification in his defense. Contrary
to his claim, made with the concurrence of the Solicitor General,
petitioner was not exposed after the amendment to the danger of
conviction under paragraph 1 of Article 282, which provides for a
different penalty, since there was no allegation in the amended
information that the threat was made subject to a condition. In our
view the deletion of the word "orally" was effected in order to make the
information conformable to the evidence to be presented during the
trial. It was merely a formal amendment which in no way prejudiced
petitioner's rights.
Petitioner next contends that even assuming that the amendment
was properly allowed, the trial court committed a reversible error in
proceeding with the trial on the merits without first requiring him to
enter his plea to the amended information. Considering, however, that
the amendment was not substantial, no second plea was necessary at
all.
The third and fourth issues are related and will be discussed
together. Petitioner avers that the appellate court erred in affirming the
decision of the trial court erred in affirming him of grave threats and of
grave oral defamation when he could legally be convicted of only one
offense, and in convicting him of grave threats at all when the
evidence adduced and considered by the court indicates the
commission of light threats only.
The demonstration led by petitioner Agustin Hallare in front of the
main gate of the naval station; the fact that placards with threatening
statements were carried by the demonstrators; their persistence in
trailing Hallare in a motorcade up to his residence; and the
demonstration conducted in front thereof, culminating in repeated
threats flung by petitioner in a loud voice, give rise to only one
conclusion: that the threats were made "with the deliberate purpose of
creating in the mind of the person threatened the belief that the threat
would be carried into effect." 2Indeed, Hallare became so
apprehensive of his safety that he sought the protection of Col.
Monzon, who had to escort him home, wherein he stayed while the
demonstration was going on. It cannot be denied that the threats were
made deliberately and not merely in a temporary fit of anger,
motivated as they were by the dismissal of petitioner one month
before the incident. We, therefore, hold that the appellate court was
correct in upholding petitioner's conviction for the offense of grave
threats.
The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the
words, "Agustin, putang ina mo". This is a common enough
expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander
but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken
in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of
a mother. In the instant case, it should be viewed as part of the threats
voiced by appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the
same more emphatic. In the case of Yebra, G.R. No. L-14348, Sept.
30, 1960, this Court said:
The letter containing the allegedly libelous remarks is
more threatening than libelous and the intent to threaten
is the principal aim and object to the letter. The libelous
remarks contained in the letter, if so they be considered,
are merely preparatory remarks culminating in the final
threat. In other words, the libelous remarks express the
beat of passion which engulfs the writer of the letter,
which heat of passion in the latter part of the letter
culminates into a threat. This is the more important and
serious offense committed by the accused. Under the
circumstances the Court believes, after the study of the
whole letter, that the offense committed therein is clearly
and principally that of threats and that the statements
therein derogatory to the person named do not constitute
an independent crime of libel, for which the writer maybe
prosecuted separately from the threats and which should
be considered as part of the more important offense of
threats.
The foregoing ruling applies with equal force to the facts of the
present case.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and
petitioner is acquitted, with costs de oficio, insofar as Criminal Case
No. 2595 of the Court a quo (for oral defamation) is concerned; and
affirmed with respect to Criminal Case No. 2594, for grave threats,
with costs against petitioner.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 179187 July 14, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
RENATO TALUSAN y PANGANIBAN, Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By Decision of May 25, 2007, the Court of Appeals1 affirmed the
conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 199 of Las Pias
City of Renato Talusan y Panganiban (appellant) of kidnapping with
rape of AAA,2 a minor of six years.
The Information filed against appellant, together with one "Eljoy
Salonga," reads:
That during the period from January 15, 2004 up to January 23. 2004,
in the City of Las Pinas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together with one ELJOY SALONGA, whose true
identity and present whereabout is still unknown, without legal
authority or justifiable motive, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously kidnap, carry away, detain and deprive AAA, a SIX (6)
year old, minor, of her liberty, against her will and consent, and the
said detention lasted for eight (8) days, and while accused RENATO
TALUSAN y PANGANIBAN @ Nato, @ Roxell B. Verga, Jr., was in
custody of AAA and armed with a gun, by means of force, threat, or
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
inserted his finger into the vagina of AAA for several instances against
her will and consent thereby subjecting her to sexual abuse, which is
prejudicial to her physical and psychological development.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Salongas "true identity and . . . whereabout[s]" were, as stated in the
Information, unknown.
From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is
gathered:
In the early morning of January 14, 2004, as AAA was on her way to
school, appellant, who was sitting by a tree in Las Pias, pulled her
aside and cajoled her into joining him by telling her that they would
go to Jollibee. AAA obliged as she knew appellant to be a fellow
attendee of Sunday Bible classes. Appellant brought AAA, however, to
a house in Imus, Cavite occupied by one El Joy Salonga and two
unidentified individuals to whom he introduced her as his daughter.
AAA was thereafter under appellants control and custody for eight
days during which he abused her by inserting his finger inside her
vagina on a daily basis before breakfast, despite her resistance.
AAA having failed to return home by noon of January 14, 2004, her
stepfather BBB went to her school to inquire. As nobody knew her
whereabouts, BBB decided to report the matter to the Las Pias City
Police Station. A neighbor then informed him that he saw appellant
sitting by a tree at the same time that AAA was on her way to school.
BBB thereupon went around the community to elicit information about
appellant. A former co-worker of appellant gave BBB an address in
Imus, Cavite, prompting BBB to report on January 22, 2004 to the
Imus Police Station the disappearance of AAA.
At dawn of the following day, January 23, 2004, appellant, who was
with AAA, was apprehended.
For inquest purposes, Dr. Pierre Paul Carpio, medico-legal officer of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, conducted an
initial medico-legal examination which revealed the following
Findings:
- Hymen: Deep fresh 3 & 9oclock position so he claims, to judiciously follow the guidelines set forth in People v.
- Vestibule congested
Conclusion:
- Subject compatible with recent loss of virginity
- There are no ext. signs of application of any form of
trauma4 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the filing of the Information for kidnapping with rape.
Upon arraignment, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel de
oficio, entered a plea of guilty. The lower court thereupon conducted a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness of appellants plea, and
despite repeated questions and just as repeated answers showing that
appellant understood his plea and its consequences, the trial court still
ordered the prosecution to, as it did, present evidence.
Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, noting that AAAs "detailed
account of her ordeal is a manifestation of her honesty and
forthrightness,"5 convicted appellant, disposing in its Decision of June
7, 2004 as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing discussions and finding the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt by his voluntary and
spontaneous plea of guilty, while the undersigned Presiding Judge
does not believe in the imposition of death penalty as a form of
punishment, nevertheless, in obedience to the law which is his duty to
uphold, this Court finds the accused, RENATO TALUSAN y
PANGANIBAN, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt for the special
complex crime of KIDNAPPING with RAPE and hereby sentences
him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH.
The Court did not consider the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
plea of guilty because the penalty imposable is single and indivisible
and this is regardless of its presence. x x x
Accused is hereby ordered to pay the victim AAA, the amount of
P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity and an additional amount of
P50,000.00 by way of moral damages which by case law is
automatically awarded to rape victims without need of proof. x x x
SO ORDERED.6 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
The case was forwarded to this Court on automatic review due to the
death penalty imposed. Per People v. Mateo,7however, the Court
referred the case to the Court of Appeals by Resolution of November
22, 2005 for intermediate disposition.
By Decision of May 25, 2007, the Court of Appeals, upholding with
modification appellants conviction, disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated 07 June 2004 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 199, Las Pinas City is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Renato Talusan y
Panganiban @ Natol @ Roxell B. Vergara, Jr. is sentenced
to reclusion perpetua, conformably with R.A. No. 9346, without
eligibility for parole and is ordered to indemnify the AAA the following:
(a) 50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and (b) 50,000.00 as moral
damages.
Costs de oficio. (Underscoring supplied)
SO ORDERED.8
By Resolution of December 3, 2007, the Court required the parties to
simultaneously file their respective Supplemental Briefs if they so
desired within thirty (30) days from notice.9 In compliance, the parties
submitted their respective Manifestations that the Appeal Briefs they guilt is sustained. Consider the following transcript of stenographic
had earlier filed would suffice. notes of the proceedings taken during appellants arraignment:
In his lone assignment of error, appellant faults the trial court for ATTY. CABARDO
convicting him on the basis of an improvident plea of guilt as it failed, Accused is ready for arraignment, Your Honor.
COURT
Pastor.10 Arraign the accused in Tagalog.
The appeal is bereft of merit. (Accused is arraigned and he pleads Guilty to the
In Pastor, the Court, holding that "there is no definite and concrete rule Criminal Information)
as to how a trial judge must conduct a searching inquiry," COURT
nevertheless came up with the following guidelines: What is his plea? Hes pleading guilty?
1. Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was COURT INTERPRETER
brought into the custody of the law; (b) whether he had Yes, Your Honor.
the assistance of a competent counsel during the COURT
custodial and preliminary investigations; and (c) under This Court will conduct a searching inquiry into the
what conditions he was detained and interrogated during voluntariness of his plea.
the investigations. This is intended to rule out the Q Mr. Renato Talusan, what is your educational
possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed attainment?
under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical ACCUSED
harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because A I reached 2nd year High School, Your Honor.
of the judge's intimidating robes. Q Do you know how to read and write?
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to A Yes, Your Honor.
whether he had conferred with, and completely explained Q What is your occupation?
to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea A Im a driver, Your Honor.
of guilty. Q When you were arraigned today, you pleaded Guilty as
3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the charged in the Criminal Information. Did you plead Guilty
accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and voluntarily, freely without anyone forcing or intimidating
educational background, which may serve as a you?
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and A Yes, Your Honor.
informed plea of guilty. Q Did Atty. Cabardo, your counsel explained [sic] to you
4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or the effects and consequences if you will plead Guilty to
nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that the Criminal Information as charged?
he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an A Yes, Your Honor.
accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or Q Is it the understanding of the Court that Atty. Cabardo
upon bad advice or because of promises of the authorities explained to you fully your rights under the Constitution
or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or before you plead Guilty to the Criminal Information?
express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that A Yes, Your Honor.
the accused does not labor under these mistaken Q Do you know Mr. Talusan that, if you will plead Guilty to
impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not the Criminal Information, this Court will immediately
only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but sentence you and confine you at the National
also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that Penitentiary?
increase punishment. A Yes, Your Honor.
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is Q Did Atty. Cabardo exert pressure on you or influence
charged and fully explain to him the elements of the crime you so that you will plead Guilty to the Criminal
which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to Information?
do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right A No, Your Honor.
to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation Q Are you saying, Mr. Talusan that you are doing this
against him and a denial of his right to due process. voluntarily, freely and of your own volition?
6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a A Yes, Your Honor.
language known and understood by the latter. Q Did Fiscal assigned in this Court, State Prosecutor
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in Napoleon A. Monsod intimidate you or exert pressure on
pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be you so that you will plead Guilty to the Criminal
required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or Information?
furnish its missing details.11 A No, Your Honor.
There is thus no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a COURT
"searching inquiry." As long as the voluntary intent of the accused and Please speak louder.
his full comprehension of the consequences of his plea are ACCUSED
ascertained, as was done in the present case, the accuseds plea of A No, Your Honor.
COURT
 Q Did anyone outside or inside of this courtroom threaten
you, exert pressure on you so that you will plead Guilty as
charged to the Criminal Information?
A None, Your Honor.
Q So, it is therefore true that on January 15, 2004 up to
January 23, 2004, you kidnapped, detained one AAA, a
six (6) year old minor against her will and consent?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q And that while in your custody, by means of force
intimidation, you inserted your finger inside the vagina of
the said minor for several instances against her will?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q For the last time, Mr. Renato Talusan, despite the
admonition given to you by this Court, do you still insist
and reiterate your pleading Guilty to the Criminal
Information as charged for Kidnapping with Multiple
Rape?
A Yes, Your Honor.
COURT
The Court is convinced. I admire you Mr. Talusan for
taking the responsibilities and I hope that you will be
completely reformed.
ACCUSED
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT
Fiscal, inspite of [sic] the fact that the accused has
pleaded Guilty as charged in the Criminal Information, I
am directing the Prosecution to present evidence to
determine the culpability of the accused.12 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
But even assuming arguendo that appellant entered an improvident
plea of guilt when arraigned, there is no compulsion to remand the
case to the trial court for further reception of evidence. While the Court
has set aside convictions based on improvident pleas of guilt in capital
offenses, which pleas had been the sole basis of the judgment, where
the trial court receives evidence to determine precisely whether the
accused erred in admitting his guilt, the manner in which the plea is
made loses legal significance for the simple reason that the conviction
is, independently of the plea, based on evidence proving the
commission by the accused of the offense charged.
In the present case, even without the plea of guilt of appellant, the
evidence presented by the prosecution supports his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt13 of the special complex crime of kidnapping with
rape under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659.14 Thus in People v. Larraaga15 the Court
held:
Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more component
offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Some
of the special complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code are (1)
robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping with
serious physical injuries, (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide, and
(5) rape with homicide. In a special complex crime, the prosecution
must necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same
precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of
separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this
provision: "When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts,
the maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives A word on the award of civil indemnity and moral damages. In
rise to a special complex crime. (Italics in the original; underscoring accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, the award of civil indemnity,
supplied)1avvphi1 which is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape, and the award of
A review of the evidence for the prosecution shows that the actual moral damages even without need of proof as it is presumed that the
confinement, restraint and rape of AAA were proven. victim suffered moral injuries,19 are both increased from 50,000 to
Thus, AAA, a minor whose testimony is given full faith and credit, 75,000.
youth and immaturity being generally badges of truth and WHEREFORE, the Decision of May 25, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
sincerity,16 declared: is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the separate awards of civil
Q: Did you go voluntarily with the accused? indemnity and moral damages are increased from 50,000 to
A: He forced me, Your Honor. 75,000. In all other respects, the Decision is AFFIRMED.
Q: Why did you say that the accused forced you to go SO ORDERED.
with him, what did the accused do to you?
A: He told me that we are going to Jollibee but it turned
out that it was not true.
Q: When you went with the accused and boarded a
tricycle, you really wanted to go to Jollibee, is that the
understanding of the Court?
A: I did not want to, Your Honor.
Q: What did you do when you say that you do not want to
go with the accused?
A: Nothing, Your Honor.
Q: Did you cry?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: How did you cry?
A: I was just crying, Your Honor.17
xxxx
Q: Can you remember how many nights and days you
have not seen your mother and father?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How many nights?
A: Eight (8) nights, sir.
Q: After you were brought to the wake, where there is a
dead person and at the club, where else were you taken
by Kuya Renato?
A: At coastal mall, sir.
Q: A while ago, AAA, you said that kuya Renato abused
you and Kuya Renato inserted his penis in your vagina,
do you recall that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Which was inserted, his penis or his finger?
A: His finger, sir.
xxxx
Q: When it was inserted inside, did you cry?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you say to Kuya Renato?
A: I told him that it was painful. 18
AAAs stepfather BBB testified on her disappearance for eight days
and the measures he took in order to recover her. And the initial
medico-legal report conducted for inquest purposes shows that AAA
suffered deep fresh lacerations in her hymen which are "compatible
with recent loss of virginity."
The qualifying circumstance of minority was alleged and established
with the presentation of AAAs certificate of live birth, hence, the death
penalty imposed by the trial court is in order. In view, however, of the
enactment in the interim of Republic Act 9346, "An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," the appellate court
correctly modified the sentence to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility
for parole.
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 198012, April 22, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANGEL
MATEO Y JACINTO AND VICENTA LAPIZ Y MEDINA, Accused-
Appellants.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is an appeal from the February 17, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02366, which denied the appeal
brought therewith and affirmed the May 31, 2006 Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 40 in Criminal Cases
Nos. 99-176598 and 99-176599 to 603. The RTC convicted Angel
Mateo y Jacinto (Mateo) and Vicenta Lapiz y Medina (Lapiz) a.k.a.
"Vicky Mateo" (appellants) of the crime of illegal recruitment in large
scale under Republic Act No. 8042 (RA 8042), otherwise known as the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, and of five
counts of estafa.
Factual Antecedents
Sometime during the period from January to March 1998, the five
private complainants, namely, Abe] E. Balane (Abel), Emilio A.
Cariaga (Emilio), Victorio D. Flordeliza (Victorio), Manuel Oledan
(Manuel) and Virgiiio N. Concepcion (Virgiiio), met appellants on
separate occasions at Plaza Ferguzon, Malate, Manila to apply for
overseas employment. Appellant Mateo, representing himself to have
a tie-up with some Japanese firms, promised them employment in
Japan as conversion mechanics, welders, or fitters for a fee.
Appellants also promised that they could facilitate private
complainants' employment as direct hires and assured their departure
within three weeks. However, after the private complainants paid the
required fees ranging from P18,555.00 to P25,000.00, appellants
failed to secure any overseas employment for them. Appellants
likewise failed to return private complainants' money. This prompted
Manuel to go to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) where he was issued a Certification3 stating that appellants
are not licensed to recruit applicants for overseas employment.
Thereupon, the private complainants filed their Complaint and
executed their respective affidavits with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). The NBI referred the charges to the Department of
Justice which subsequently found probable cause against appellants
for large scale illegal recruitment and estafa4 and accordingly filed the
corresponding Informations5 for the same before the RTC of Manila.
For their defense, appellants proffered denials. Mateo claimed that he
is a legitimate car importer and not a recruiter. Lapiz, on the other
hand, denied knowing any of the private complainants whom she
claimed to have met for the first time at the Prosecutor's Office.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC disposed of the cases in its Decision6 rendered on May 31,
2006 as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 99-176598 for Illegal
Recruitment, this Court finds both accused ANGEL MATEO y
JACINTO and VICENTA LAPIZ y MADINA a.k.a. "VICKY MATEO"
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale
and hereby sentences each of them to life imprisonment and to pay
P500,000.00 fine each as well as to indemnify private complainants
(1) Manuel Oledan the sum of P25,000.00, and (2) Emilio A. Cariaga,
(3) Abel E. Balane, (4) Virgilio N. Concepcion and (5) Victorio D.
Flordelizathe sum of PI 8,555.00 each.
This Court finds both accused also GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
in Criminal Cases Nos. 99-176599, 99-176600, 99-176601, 99-176602
and 99-176603 for five (5) counts of Estafa and each accused is
hereby sentenced in each case to an indeterminate penalty of from
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum,
to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty one (21) days of prision
mayor, as maximum.
The [Philippine] Overseas and Employment Administration (POEA)
shall be furnished with certified copy of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.7
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In their appeal before the CA, appellants essentially claimed that the
prosecution failed to prove the elements of the crimes for which they
were charged. They contended that Abel has not shown any receipt to
prove that they received money from him; that there is likewise no
proof that Virgilio borrowed money from a friend of his aunt which
money he, in turn, gave to them; that the testimony of Emilio that
appellants were holding office inside the van of Abel cannot be easily
accepted; and that their transactions with Manuel and Victorio were
limited to the processing of their travel documents.
The CA, however, denied appellants' appeal in its Decision8 dated
February 17, 2011, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 40, dated May 31, 2006 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, the present appeal.
Per Resolution10 dated September 19, 2011, the Court required both
parties to file their respective supplemental briefs. Appellants filed their
Supplemental Brief,11 while appellee People of the Philippines, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, opted not to file any and just
adopted the appellee's brief it filed before the CA.12
The Court's Ruling and was even the one keeping the money entrusted by the private
complainants to appellants. She would also often pacify the private
The appeal utterly lacks merit. complainants' uneasiness about the absence of receipts for each of
the amounts given and repeatedly assure them they would be
The offense of illegal recruitment in large scale has the following deployed to Japan. In short, she was an indispensable participant and
elements: (1) the person charged undertook any recruitment activity effective collaborator of Mateo in the illegal recruitment of the private
as defined under Section 6 of RA 8042; (2) accused did not have the complaintants.
license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment of
workers; and, (3) accused committed the same against three or more In view of the foregoing, the Court sustains the lower courts' conviction
persons individually or as a group.13 These elements are obtaining in of appellants for the crimes charged.
this case. First, the RTC found appellants to have undertaken a
recruitment activity when they promised private complainants It must be noted, however, that both the RTC and the CA failed to
employment in Japan for a fee. This factual finding was affirmed by award interest on the money judgment in Criminal Case No. 99-
the CA. "The time-tested doctrine is that the matter of assigning values 176598 for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale. Following prevailing
to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently jurisprudence, the Court, therefore, imposes interest at the rate of
performed by the trial judge."14 And when his findings have been 6% per annum on each of the amounts awarded from the date of
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and finality of this Decision until fully paid.
conclusive upon the Supreme Court.15 Second, the Certification issued
by the POEA unmistakably reveals that appellants neither have a WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated
license nor authority to recruit workers for overseas employment. February 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
Notably, appellants never assailed this Certification. Third, it was 02366 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amounts
established that there were five complainants. Clearly, the existence of ordered restituted in Criminal Case No. 99-176598 shall each earn an
the offense of illegal recruitment in large scale was duly proved by the interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully
prosecution. paid.
Appellants' argument that there was no proof that they received SO ORDERED.
money from the private complainants deserves no credence. Suffice it
to say that money is not material to a prosecution for illegal
recruitment considering that the definition of "illegal recruitment" under
the law includes the phrase "whether for profit or not." Besides, even if
there is no receipt for the money given by the private complainants to
appellants, the former's respective testimonies and affidavits clearly
narrate the latter's involvement in the prohibited recruitment.16
Anent the charge for estafa, "[w]ell-settled is the rule that a person
convicted for illegal recruitment under the [law] may, for the same
acts, be separately convicted for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of
the [Revised Penal Code]. The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused
defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and
(2) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice
capable of pecuniary estimation."17 All these elements are likewise
present in this case. As aptly held by the CA:
Here, the appellants Mateo and Lapiz committed deceit against the
private complainants by making it appear as though they had the
authority and resources to send them to Japan for employment; that
there were available jobs for them in Japan for which they would be
hired although, in truth, there were none; and, that by reason or on the
strength of such assurance, the private complainants parted with their
money in payment of the placement fee, documentation and hotel
accommodations. All these representations were actually false and
fraudulent and thus, the appellants must be made liable under par
2(a), Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code.18
With this ratiocination, Lapiz's defense of not knowing any of the
complainants must necessarily fail. As noted by the RTC and the CA,
she was present in all of the transactions, serving as runner of Mateo
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 199208 July 30, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
TRINIDAD A. CAHILIG, Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is an appeal by Trinidad A. Cahilig (Cahilig) from the
Decision qf the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01381
affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 137,
Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 03-2178 to 2207 finding her guilty of
thirty (30) counts of Qualified Theft.
The Facts
Cahilig worked as cashier at Wyeth Philippines Employees Savings
and Loan Association, Inc. (WPESLAI) from December 1992 until 7
November 2001. She was tasked with handling, managing, receiving,
and disbursing the funds of the WPESLAI.1
It was discovered that from 31 May 2000 to 31 July 2001, Cahilig
made withdrawals from the funds ofWPESLAI and appropriated the
same for her personal benefit.2 Cahilig would prepare disbursement
vouchers, to be approved by the WPESLAI president and Board of
Directors, in order to withdraw funds from one of WPESLAIs bank
accounts then transfer these funds to its other bank account. The
withdrawal was done by means of a check payable to Cahilig, in her
capacity as WPESLAI cashier. This procedure for transferringfunds
from one bank account to another was said to be standard practice at
WPESLAI. However, Cahilig did not actually transfer the funds.
Instead, she made it appear in her personal WPESLAI ledger that a
deposit was made into her account and then she would fill out a
withdrawal slip to simulate a withdrawal of said amount from her
capital contribution.3
The trial court found that Cahilig employed the same scheme in each
of the 30 cases of qualified theft filed against her, allowing her to pilfer
from WPESLAIS funds a total of 6,268,300.00, brokendown into the
following amounts:
All 30 cases were consolidated and jointly heard. Upon agreement of
the parties, only three of the 30 cases went thru trial. The remaining
27 cases were the subject of a written stipulation of facts, on the basis
of which these were submitted for resolution. The stipulation stated,
among others: That for purposes of efficient and speedy
administration of these cases, the parties herein agreed, during the
pre-trial conference and approved by the Honorable Court, that the
actualtrial and presentation of evidence will be done only on the first
three (3) counts of the cases, i.e., on Cases Numbers 03-2178 to 03-
2180, with the understanding and agreement that after the termination
of the hearing onsaid three (3) cases, the parties shall adopt the
results thereof in the remaining twenty-seven (27) counts, considering
that all the cases arose from similar transactions with the same
methods or modus operandi used in committing the crime charged,
and involving the same accused and the same offended party[.]4
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC found Cahilig guilty of the crimes charged, in a Decision
dated 16 June 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court hereby finds
Trinidad Cahlig guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified theft in each of the informations, and sentences her to suffer
the penalty of:
1. In Criminal Case No. 03-2178, reclusion perpetuaand
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
200,000.00;
2. In Criminal Case No. 03-2179, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
250,000.00;
3. In Criminal Case No. 03-2180, reclusion perpetuaand
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
200,000.00;
4. In Criminal Case No. 03-2181, reclusion perpetuaand
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
55,000.00;
5. In Criminal Case No. 03-2182, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
55,000.00;
6. In Criminal Case No. 03-2183, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
85,000.00;
7. In Criminal Case No. 03-2184, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
350,000.00;
8. In Criminal Case No. 03-2185, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
250,000.00;
9. In Criminal Case No. 03-2186, ten (10) years and one
(1) days (sic) as minimum to twenty (20) years as
maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the
amount of 20,000.00;
10. In Criminal Case No. 03-2187, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
250,000.00;
11. In Criminal Case No. 03-2188, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
60,000.00;
12. In Criminal Case No. 03-2189, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
150,000.00;
13. In Criminal Case No. 03-2190, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
50,000.00;
14. In Criminal Case No. 03-2191, ten (10) years and one
(1) day as minimum to twenty (20) years as maximum and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
4[6],300.00;
15. In Criminal Case No. 03-2192, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
205,000.00;
16. In Criminal Case No. 03-2193, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
200,000.00;
17. In Criminal Case No. 03-2194, ten (10) years and one
(1) day as minimum to twenty (20) years as maximum and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
25,000.00;
18. In Criminal Case No. 03-2195, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
500,000.00;
19. In Criminal Case No. 03-2196, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
500,000.00;
20. In Criminal Case No. 03-2197, ten (10) years and one
(1) day as minimum to twenty (20) years as maximum and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
30,000.00;
21. In Criminal Case No. 03-2198, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
400,000.00;
22. In Criminal Case No. 03-2199, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
300,000.00;
23. In Criminal Case No. 03-2200, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
500,000.00;
24. In Criminal Case No. 03-2201, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
65,000.00;
25. In Criminal Case No. 03-2202, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
47,000.00;
26. In Criminal Case No. 03-2203, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
500,000.00;
27. In Criminal Case No. 03-2204, ten (10) years and one
(1) day as minimum to twenty (20) years as maximum and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
40,000.00;
28. In Criminal Case No. 03-2205, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
400,000.00;
29. In Criminal Case No. 03-2206, ten (10) years and one
(1) day as minimum to twenty (20) years as maximum and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of Theft is likewise committed by:
35,000.00;
30. In Criminal Case No. 03-2207, reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
500,000.00.
Costs against accused in eachof the above numbered cases.
SO ORDERED.5
The RTC held that Cahilig, as cashier of WPESLAI, was granted trust
and confidence by the key officers ofthe association. The RTC noted
that Cahilig "enjoyed access to the funds and financial records of the
association, a circumstance that understandably facilitated her easy
withdrawal of funds which she converted to her personal use in the
manner heretofore described. Undoubtedly, she betrayed the trust and
confidence reposed upon her by her employer."6
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Cahilig appealed her conviction to the CA. In a Decision dated 18
February 2011, the CA denied her appeal and affirmed the RTCs
Decision.
The CA held that all the elements of Qualified Theft were present in
every charge:
x x x First, there was taking ofpersonal property, when
accusedappellant took the proceeds of the WPESLAI checks issued in
her name as cashier of the association which are supposed to be
redeposited to another account of WPESLAI. Second, the property
belongs to another, since the funds undisputably belong to WPESLAI.
Third, the taking was done without the consent of the owner, which is
obvious because accusedappellant created a ruse showing that the
funds were credited to another account but were actually withdrawn
from her own personal account. Fourth, the taking was done with
intentto gain, as accused-appellant, for her personal benefit, took the
fundsby means of a modus operandi that made it appear through the
entries inthe ledgers that all withdrawals and deposits were made in
the normal course of business and with the approval of WPESLAI.
Fifth, the taking was accomplished without violence or intimidation
against the person [or] force upon things. And finally, the acts were
committed with grave abuse of confidence considering that her
position as cashier permeates trust and confidence.7
The Courts Ruling
The Court denies the petition. However, the penalties imposed by the
trial court in six of the 30 cases are incorrect and, therefore, must be
modified.
Qualified Theft
Article 310, in relation to Article 308, of the Revised Penal Code
defines the crime of Qualified Theft:
Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified
in the next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic servant, or
with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor
vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from
the premises of a plantation, fish taken froma fishpond or fishery, orif
property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon,
volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil
disturbance.
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. - Theft is committed by any person
who, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of
persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another
without the latters consent.
1. Any person who, having found lostproperty, shall fail to
deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the
property of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits
or objects of the damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a
field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to
another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or
fish upon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or other
forest or farm products.
Thus, the elements of Qualified Theft, committed with grave abuse of
confidence, are as follows:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owners consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things;
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.8
It is clear that all the elements ofQualified Theft are present in these SO ORDERED.
cases.
Cahilig took money from WPESLAI and its depositors by taking
advantage of her position. Her intent to gain is clear in the use of a
carefully planned and deliberately executed scheme to commit the
theft.
Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of Qualified Theft, "must be
the result of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or
vigilance, between the appellant and the offended party that might
create a high degree of confidence betweenthem which the appellant
abused."9
Cahiligs position was one reposed with trust and confidence,
considering that it involves "handling, managing, receiving, and
disbursing" money from WPESLAIs depositors and other funds of the
association.1wphi1 Cahiligs responsibilities as WPESLAI cashier
required prudence and vigilance over the money entrusted into her
care.
However, instead of executing her duties, she deliberately misled the
board of directors into authorizing disbursements for money that
eventually ended up in her personal account, a fact that Cahilig did not
deny.
Proper Penalty
The trial court, however, erred inthe penalty imposed in Criminal Case
Nos. 03-2186, 03-2191, 03-2194, 03-2197, 03-2204, and 03-2206.
To recall, the amounts involved in the aforesaid cases are
20,000.00, 46,300.00, 25,000.00, 30,000.00, 40,000.00, and
35,000.00, respectively.
Article 310 provides that Qualified Theft "shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified
in the next preceding article." Article 309, in turn, states:
Art. 309. Penalties. -Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if
the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not
exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the
latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one
prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten
thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with
the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of
the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed pr is ion
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
xxxx
In the aforementioned six cases, none of the amounts are below
12,000.00. Hence, if the crime charged had been simple theft, the
penalty in any of these six cases would have been, at least, prision
mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since it was established
that the crime was qualified by grave abuse of confidence, Article 310
provides that the penalty to be imposed shall be the one "next higher
by two degrees," which in this case is reclusion perpetua. Accordingly,
the penalty in these six cases should be reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 01381 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In lieu of the
penalties meted out by the trial court in Criminal Case Nos. 03-2186,
03-2191, 03-2194, 03-2197, 03-2204, and 03-2206, appellant Trinidad
A. Cahilig is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count of qualified theft in the aforesaid cases. The
judgment to indemnify the amounts in each of the corresponding
charges stands.
 Pedro Arguelles (Brgy. Captain Arguelles)and accused Inanoria, to In its assailed Decision, dated December 14, 2012, the CA sustained substance that would have cast doubt on the guilt of the
substantiate its claim of innocence for all the accused. the findings of facts and conclusions of law by the RTC and upheld the accused.9 The said exception apparently exists in the case at bench.
Atanacio testified that he authorized his brothers-in-law, Magsino and judgment of conviction rendered against the accused. The CA was of It is the statutory definition that generally furnishes the elements of
Republic of the Philippines
Magsumbol, to cut down the coconut trees within the boundary of his the view, however, that the crime committed in this case would not fall each crime under the RPC, while the elements in turn unravel the
SUPREME COURT
property, which was adjacent to the land co-owned by Menandro. under the general definition of theft under Article 308 of the Revised particular requisite acts of execution and accompanying criminal
Manila
Atanacio admitted that he had never set foot on his property for about Penal Code (RPC), but rather under paragraph (2) of the same intent. In the case at bench, petitioner Magsumbol and his co-accused
SECOND DIVISION
20 years already and that he was not present whenthe cutting incident provision which penalizes theft of damaged property. The CA ruled were convicted by the CA of the crime of theft of damaged property
G.R. No. 207175 November 26, 2014
happened. that the RTC was correct in giving full faith and credence to the under paragraph (2) of Article 308 of the RPC which provides:
EDUARDO MAGSUMBOL, Petitioner,
Defense witness Brgy. Captain Arguelles testified that on January 28, testimony of Caringal who was not shown to have been motivated by Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.: xxxx
vs.
2002, Magsumbol, Magsino, Ramirez, and Inanoria came to his office any ill will to testify falsely against the accused. It agreed with the RTC Theft is likewise committed by:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
seeking permission to cut down the coconut trees planted on the land that Atanacios testimony should not be given any evidentiary weight 1. xxxxx;
DECISION
of Atanacio. in view of his relationship with Magsino and Magsumbol, which 2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the
MENDOZA, J.:
All the accused vehemently denied the charges against them. Ramirez provided sufficient reason for him to suppress or pervert the truth. property of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set
and Magsumbol claimed that only the coconut trees which stood within Anent the element of intent to gain, the CA stated that the mere fact or object of the damage caused by him; and xxx.
aside the December 14, 2012 Decision1 and the May 6, 2013
the land owned by Atanacio, a relative of the private complainant, that the accused cut the coconut trees on Menandros land and made [Emphasis Supplied]
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 34431
were cut down on that morning of February 1, 2002. Ramirez added them into coco lumber, gave rise to the presumption that it was done To warrant a conviction under the aforecited provision for theft of
filed by Eduardo Magsumbol (Magsumbol), questioning his conviction
that he was a coco lumber trader and that Atanacio offered to sell the with intent to gain. The falloreads: damaged property, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable
for Theft.
coconut trees planted on his lot. Magsumbol claimed that he took no WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. that the accused maliciously damaged the property belonging to
The Facts
part in the felling of the coconut trees but merely supervised the same. The Decision dated March 15, 2011, of the Regional Trial Court, another and, thereafter, removed or used the fruits or object thereof,
Petitioner Magsumbol, together with Erasmo Magsino (Mogsino).
He claimed that he did not receive any remuneration for the service he Branch 55, Lucena City is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the with intent to gain. Evidently, theft of damaged property is an
Apolonio Inanoria (Jnanoria), and Bonifacio Ramirez (Ramirez). vvas
rendered or a share from the proceeds of the coco lumbers sale. accused-appellants Erasmo Magsino, Apolonio Inanoria, Eduardo intentional felony for which criminal liability attaches only when it is
charged with the crime of Theft in the Information, dated August 30,
Inanoria likewise denied participation in the cutting down of the Magsumbol and Bonifacio Ramirez are sentenced to suffer shown that the malefactor acted with criminal intent or malice. Criminal
2002, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 55
coconut treesbut confirmed the presence of Magsumbol and Magsino imprisonment of tw0 (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day as intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime;
(RTC) and docketed as Criminal Case No. 2002-1017. The
at the site to supervise the accomplishment of the work being done minimum, to seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, as otherwise, no crime is committed.10 Was criminal intent substantiated
Information indicting Magsumbol and his co-accused reads:
thereat. Inanoria corroborated the narration of Magsumbol and maximum; and to pay jointly and severally private complainant tojustify the conviction of Magsumbol and his co-accused?
That on or about the 1st day of February 2002, at Barangay Kinatihan
Ramirez that all the felled trees were planted inside the lot owned by Menandro Avanzado the amount of Thirteen Thousand Two Hundred It does not so appear in this case.
I, in the Munipality of Candelaria, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and
Atanacio. Inanoria intimated that Menandro included him in the Pesos (13,200.00). There is no dispute that the land co-owned by Menandro is adjacent to
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
complaint for theft due to his refusal to accede to latters request for SO ORDERED.7 the land owned by Atanacio. The prosecution claimed that the thirty
accused, conspiring and confederating together with seven (7) John
him to testify against his co-accused in relation to the present criminal The accused moved for reconsideration of the December 14, 2012 three (33) cut coconut trees were planted within the land co-owned by
Does whose true names and real identities are still unknown and
charge.4 Decision but their motion was denied by the CA on May 6, 2013. Menandro. The defense, on the other hand, averred that only the
whose physical descriptions were not made known by available
Ruling of the RTC Issues: coconut trees found within the land of Atanacio were felled by
witnesses, and who are all still at large, and mutually helping one
On March 15, 2011, the RTC rendered its decision5 stating that the Bewailing his conviction, Magsumbolfiled the present petition before Magsumbol and his co-accused. Menandro testified that there were
another, with intent togain and without the consent of the owner,
prosecution was able to establish with certitude the guilt of all the this Court and imputes to the CA the following muniments that delimit the boundaries between the adjacent
Menandro Avanzado, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
accused for the crime of simple theft. The RTC rejected the defense of ERRORS: lots11 while Atanacio claimed that there were none and that "x" marks
feloniously cut, take, steal and carry away with them thirty three (33)
denial invoked by the accused in the face of positive identification by THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS were just etched on the trunk of the trees to delineate the boundary of
coconut trees from the coconut plantation of the said owner, valued at
Caringal pointing to them as the perpetrators of the crime. It did not ERRORS OF LAW WHEN IT FOUND THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF his land.12 Apart from the bare allegations of these witnesses, no
FORTY FOUR THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (44,400.00),
believe the testimony of Atanacio and even branded him as biased THE CRIME OF THEFT UNDER ARTICLE 308 OF THE REVISED concrete and competent evidence was adduced to substantiate their
Philippine currency, belonging to said Menandro Avanzado, to his
witness on account of his relationship with accused Magsino and PENAL CODE, IN THAT: respective submissions. In view of such conflicting claims and
damage and prejudice in the aforesaid amount.3
Magsumbol. The trial court adjudged: I considering the meager evidence on hand, the Court cannot
Culled from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Ernesto Caringal
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding all the accused NO COMPETENT EVIDENCEWAS ADDUCED BY THE determine with certainty the owner of the 33 felled coconut trees. The
(Caringal), private complainant Engr. Menandro Avanzado
Erasmo Magsino, Apolonio Inanoria, Eduardo Magsumbol and PROSECUTION TO PROVE THAT THE COCONUT TREES THAT uncertainty of the exact location of the coconut trees negates the
(Menandro), and SPO1 Florentino Manalo (SPO1 Manalo), it appears
Bonifacio Ramirez guilty as charged and applying the Indeterminate WERE CUT WERE BEYOND THE PROPERTY OWNED BY presenceof the criminal intent to gain.
that at around 11:00 oclock in the morning of February 1, 2002,
sentence law, the court hereby sentences them to suffer an ATANACIO AVANZADO; and At any rate, granting arguendo that the said coconut trees were within
Caringal, the overseer of a one-hectare unregistered parcel of land
imprisonment of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of Prision Correccional II Menandros land, no malice or criminal intent could be rightfully
located in Candelaria, Quezon, and co-owned by Menandro, saw the
as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as maximum. MALICE AND INTENT TO GAIN, AS ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF attributed to Magsumbol and his co-accused. The RTC and the CA
four accused, along with seven others, cutting down the coconut trees
The accused are likewise directed to pay jointly and severally Engr. THEFT, ARE NOT PRESENT IN THE CASE AT HAND.8 overlooked one important point in the present case, to wit: Magsumbol
on the said property. Later, the men turned the felled trees into coco
Menandro Avanzado and the other heirs of Norberto Avanzado the The Courts Ruling and his co-accused went to Barangay KinatihanI, Candelaria, Quezon,
lumber. Caringal did not attempt to stop the men from cutting down the
sum of 13,200.00 representing the value of the 33 coconut trees The petition is impressed with merit. to cut down the coconut trees belonging to Atanacio upon the latters
coconut trees because he was outnumbered. Instead, Caringal left the
they have cut and sold to accused Ramirez. It is a time-honored rule that the assessment of the trial court with instruction.
site and proceeded toSan Pablo City to inform Menandro about the
SO ORDERED. regard to the credibility of witnesses deserves the utmost respect, if Such fact was confirmed by Atanacio who narrated that due to
incident.
Aggrieved, the accused appealed from the March 15, 2011 judgment not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the prerogative, financial reversals, he sold all the coconut trees in his land to Ramirez,
On February 3, 2002, Menandro and Caringal reported the incident to
of the RTC before the CA insisting that the prosecution evidence did denied to appellate judges, of observing the demeanor of the a coco lumber trader; that since he could not go to the site due to
the police. Thereafter, the two, accompanied by SPO1 Manalo, went
not meet the quantum of proof necessary towarrant their conviction of declarants in the course of their testimonies. Though it is true that the health reasons, he authorized Magsumbol and Magsino to cut down
to the coconut plantation only to discover that about thirty three (33)
the crime charged. They posited that the RTC erred in failing to trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their his trees and to oversee the gathering of the felled trees; that he
coconut trees (subject trees) had been cut down. The coco lumber
appreciate the lack of criminal intent on their part to commit the crime testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on informed Menandro about this and even offered to pay for the
were no longer in the area. They took photographs of the stumps left
of simple theft. They claimed that not a scintilla of evidence was appeal, this rule, however, is not a hard and fast one. The exception is damages that he might have sustained as some of his (Menandros)
by the men.
presented to prove the element of intent to gain.6 observed if there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked, trees could have been mistakenly cut down in the process; that
The defense, on the other hand, presented Atanacio Avanzado
Ruling of the CA misunderstood, or misapplied some factor circumstance of weight and Menandro refused his offer of compensation and replied that a case
(Atanacio),accused Ramirez, petitioner Magsumbol, Barangay Captain
had already been filed against the four accused; and that he tried to from moral certainty that guilt has been established by proof beyond
seek an audience again from Menandro, but the latter refused to talk reasonable doubt.
to him anymore.13 Here, that quantum of proof has not been satisfied.1wphi1 The
Both the RTC and the CA chose to brush aside the foregoing prosecution miserably failed to establish proof beyond reasonable
unrebutted testimony of Atanacio for being unreliable and considered doubt that Magsumbol, together with his co-accused, damaged the
him a biased witness simply because he is related by affinity to property or Menandro with malice and deliberate intent and then
Magsumbol and Magsino. Family relationship, however, does not by removed the felled coconut trees from the premises.
itself render a witness testimony inadmissible or devoid of evidentiary Hence, we must reckon with a dictum of the law, in dubilis reus est
weight.14To warrant rejection of the testimony of a relative or friend, it absolvendus. All doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused.
must be clearly shown that, independently of the relationship, the WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed December 14,
testimony was inherently improbable or defective, or that improper or 2012 Decision and the May 6, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
evil motives had moved the witness to incriminate the accused in CA-G.R. CR No. 34431 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
falsely.15 Eduardo Magsumbol is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
The relationship of Atanacio to the accused, per se, does not impair SO ORDERED.
his credibilty.1wphi1 It bears stressing that while Magsumbol and
Magsino are Atanacios brothers-in-law, Menandro ishis cousin.
Considering that both the accused and the accuser are Atanacios
relatives, and purportedly both have bearing with regard to his
decision, why would then Atanacio support one over the other? The
logical explanation could only be that Atanacio had indeed ordered
Magsumbol and Magsino to cut the trees on his land. The Court is
convinced that Atanacio was telling the truth.
If, indeed, in the course of executing Atanacios instructions,
Magsumbol and his co-accused encroached on the land co-owned by
Menandro, because they missed the undetectable boundary between
the two lots, and cut down some of Menandros trees, such act merely
constituted mistake or judgmental error. The following pronouncement
in the case of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan16 may serve as a guidepost,
to wit:
If what is proven is mere judgmental error on the part of the person
committing the act, no malice or criminal intent can be rightfully
imputed to him. x x x. Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful
act for a crime to exist. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There
can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. As a general rule,
ignorance or mistake as to particular facts, honest and real, will
exempt the doer from felonious responsibility. The exception of course
is neglect in the discharge of duty or indifference to consequences,
which is equivalent to criminal intent, for in this instance, the element
of malicious intent is supplied by the element ofnegligence and
imprudence.17
[Emphasis supplied]
The criminal mind is indeed wanting in the situation where Magsumbol
and his co-accused even sought prior permission from Brgy. Captain
Arguelles to cut down the coconut trees which was done openly and
during broad daylight effectively negated malice and criminal intent on
their part. It defies reason that the accused would still approach the
barangay captain if their real intention was tosteal the coconut trees of
Menandro. Besides, criminals would usually execute their criminal
activities clandestinely or through stealth or strategy to avoid detection
of the commission of a crime or a wrongdoing.
The findings of this Court in this case should not create the mistaken
impression that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses should
always be looked at with askance. The point is that courts should
carefully scrutinize the prosecution evidence to make sure that no
innocent person is condemned. An allegation, or even a testimony,
that an act was done should never be hastily accepted as proof that it
was really done. Evidence adduced must be closely examined under
the lens of a judicial microscope to ensure that conviction only flows
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 191015 August 6, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE C. GO, AIDA C. DELA ROSA, and FELECITAS D.
NECOMEDES,** Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The power of courts to grant demurrer in criminal cases should be
exercised with great caution, because not only the rights of the
accused - but those of the offended party and the public interest as
well - are involved. Once granted, the accused is acquitted and the
offended party may be left with no recourse. Thus, in the resolution of
demurrers, judges must act with utmost circumspection and must
engage in intelligent deliberation and reflection, drawing on their
experience, the law and jurisprudence, and delicately evaluating the
evidence on hand.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the
September 30, 2009 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 101823, entitled "People of the Philippines, Petitioner,
versus Hon. Concepcion Alarcon-Vergara et al., Respondents," as
well as its January 22, 2010 Resolution3 denying reconsideration of
the assailed judgment.
Factual Antecedents
The following facts appear from the account of the CA:
On October 14, 1998, the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP) issued Resolution No. 1427 ordering the closure of the
Orient Commercial Banking Corporation (OCBC) and placing such
bank under the receivership of the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation (PDIC). PDIC, as the statutory receiver of OCBC,
effectively took charge of OCBCs assets and liabilities in accordance
withits mandate under Section 30 of Republic Act 7653.
xxxx
While all the aforementioned events were transpiring, PDIC began
collecting on OCBCs past due loans receivable by sending demand
letters to its borrowers for the immediate settlement oftheir outstanding
loans. Allegedly among these borrowers of OCBC are Timmys, Inc.
and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. which appeared to have obtained a loanof
[P]10 Million each. A representative of Timmys, Inc. denied being
granted any loan by OCBC and insisted that the signatures on the
loan documents were falsified. A representative of Asia Textile Mills,
Inc. denied having applied, much less being granted, a loan by OCBC.
The PDIC conducted an investigation and allegedly came out with a
finding that the loans purportedly in the names of Timmys, Inc. and
Asia Textile Mills, Inc. were released in the form of managerschecks
in the name of Philippine Recyclers and Zeta International, Inc. These
managers checks were then allegedly deposited to the savings
account of the private respondent Jose C. Go with OCBC and,
thereafter, were automatically transferred to his current account in
order to fund personal checks issued by him earlier.
On September 24, 1999, PDIC filed a complaint4 for two (2) counts of
Estafa thru Falsification of CommercialDocuments in the Office of the
City Prosecutor of the City of Manila against the private respondents in
relation to the purported loans of Timmys, Inc.and Asia Textile Mills,
Inc. On November 22, 2000, after finding probable cause, the Office of
the City Prosecutor of the City of Manila filed Informations5 against the
private respondents which were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 00-
187318 and 00-187319 in the RTC in Manila.
Upon being subjected to arraignment by the RTC in Manila, the private
respondents pleaded not guilty to the criminal cases filed against
them. A pretrial was conducted. Thereafter, trial of the cases ensued
and the prosecution presented its evidence. After the presentation of
all of the prosecutions evidence, the private respondents filed a
Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence and a Motion for
Voluntary Inhibition. The presiding judge granted the private
respondents Motion for Voluntary Inhibition and ordered the case to
be re-raffled to another branch. The case was subsequently re-raffled
to the branch of the respondent RTC judge.6
In an Order dated December 19, 2006, the respondent RTC judge
granted the private respondents Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to
Evidence. On January 17, 2007, the private respondents filed their
Demurrer to Evidence7praying for the dismissal of the criminal cases
instituted against them due to the failure of the prosecution to
establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On July 2, 2007, an Order8 was promulgated by the respondent RTC
judge finding the private respondents Demurrer to Evidence to be
meritorious, dismissing the Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-
187319 and acquitting all of the accused in these cases. On July20,
2007, the private prosecutor in Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-
187319 moved for a reconsideration of the July 2, 2007 Order but the
same was denied by the respondent RTC judge in an Order9 dated
October 19, 2007.10
Surprisingly, and considering thathundreds of millions of Orient
Commercial Banking Corporation (OCBC) depositors money appear
to have been lost which must have contributed to the banks being
placed under receivership, no motion for reconsideration of the July 2,
2007 Order granting respondents demurrer to evidence was filed by
the handling public prosecutor, Manila Prosecutor Marlo B. Campanilla
(Campanilla). Only complainant Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation (PDIC) filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and the same
lacked Campanillas approval and/or conform; the copy of the Motion
for Reconsideration filed with the RTC11 does not bear Campanillas
approval/conform; instead,it indicates thathe was merely furnished
with a copy of the motion by registered mail.12 Thus, while the
prosecutions copy of PDICsMotion for Reconsideration13 bore
Campanillas subsequent approval and conformity, that which was
actually filed by PDIC with the RTC on July 30, 2007 did not contain
the public prosecutors written approval and/or conformity.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On January 4, 2008, the prosecution, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed anoriginal Petition for Certiorari14 with
the CA assailing the July 2, 2007 Order of the trial court. Itclaimed that
the Order was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lackor excess of jurisdiction; that it was issued with partiality; that the
prosecution was deprived of its day in court; and that the trial court
disregarded the evidence presented, which undoubtedly showed that
respondents committed the crime of estafa through falsification
ofcommercial documents.
On September 30, 2009, the CA issued the assailed Decision with the
following decretal portion: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
premises, the petition filed in this case is hereby DENIED and the
assailed Orders of the respondent RTC judge are AFFIRMED and
deemed final and executory.
SO ORDERED.15
Notably, in dismissing the Petition, the appellate court held that the
assailed July 2, 2007 Order of the trial court became final since the
prosecution failed to move for the reconsideration thereof, and thus
double jeopardy attached. The CA declared thus
More important than the fact that double jeopardy already attaches is
the fact that the July 2, 2007 Order of the trial court has already
attained finality. This Order was received by the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila on July 3, 2007 and by the Private Prosecutor on
July 5, 2007. While the Private Prosecutor filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the said Order, the Public Prosecutor did not seek
for the reconsideration thereof. It is the Public Prosecutor who has the
authority to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the said order and the
Solicitor General who can file a petition for certiorari with respect to
the criminal aspect of the cases. The failure of the Public Prosecutor
to file a Motion for Reconsideration on or before July 18, 2007 and the
failure of the Solicitor General to file a Petition for Certiorarion or
before September 1, 2007 made the order of the trial court final.
As pointed out by the respondents, the Supreme Court ruled
categorically on this matter in the case of Mobilia Products, Inc. vs.
Umezawa (452 SCRA 736), as follows:
"In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest
of the private complainant or the offended party is limited to the civil
liabilityarising therefrom. Hence, if a criminal case is dismissed by the
trial court or if there is an acquittal, a reconsideration of the order of
dismissal or acquittal may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible,
insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is concerned and may be made
only by the public prosecutor; or in the case of an appeal, by the State
only, through the OSG. The private complainant or offended party may
not undertake such motion for reconsideration or appeal on the
criminal aspect ofthe case. However, the offended party or private
complainant may file a motion for reconsideration of such dismissal or
acquittal or appeal therefrom but only insofar as the civil aspect
thereof is concerned. In so doing, the private complainant or offended
party need not secure the conformity of the public prosecutor. If the
court denies his motion for reconsideration, the private complainant or
offended party may appeal or file a petition for certiorarior mandamus,
if grave abuse amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown and
the aggrieved party has no right of appeal or given an adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law."16 granting respondents demurrer that is, by "joining"the private
In addition, the CA ruled that the prosecution failed to demonstrate
that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the
demurrer, or that it was denied its day in court; that on the contrary,
the prosecution was afforded every opportunity to present its
evidence, yet it failed to prove that respondents committed the crime
charged.
The CA further held that the prosecution failed to present a witness
who could testify, based on personal knowledge, that the loan
documents were falsified by the respondents; that the prosecution
should not have relied on "letters and unverified ledgers," and it
"should have trailed the money from the beginning to the end;"17 that
while the documentary evidenceshowed that the signatures in the loan
documents were falsified, it has not been shown who falsified them. It
added that since only two of the alleged 13 managers checks were
being questioned, there arose reasonable doubt as to whether estafa
was committed, as to these two checks; instead, there is an
"inescapable possibility that an honest mistake was made in the
preparation of the two questioned managers checks since these
checks were made out to the names of different payees and not in the
names of the alleged applicants of the loans."18 The appellate court
added
x x x Finally, the petitioner failed to present evidence on where the
money went after they were deposited to the checking account of the
private respondent Jose C. Go. There is only a vague reference that
the money was used to fund the personal checks earlier issued by x x
x Go. The petitioner should have gone further and identified who were
the recipients of these personal checks and if these personal checks
were negotiated and honored. With all the resources of the public
prosecutors office, the petitioner should have done a better job of
prosecuting the cases filed against the private respondents. It isa
shame that all the efforts of the government will go for naught due to
the negligence of the public prosecutors in tying up the chain of
evidence in a criminal case.19
As a final point, the CA held that if errors were made inthe
appreciation of evidence, these are mere errors of judgment and not
errors of jurisdiction which may no longer be reviewed lest
respondents be placed in double jeopardy.
The OSG moved for reconsideration, but in the assailed January 22,
2010 Resolution, the CA stood its ground. Hence, the instant Petition
was instituted.
Issues
In the Petition, it is alleged that
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT RULED THAT
(a) NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS
COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT RTC JUDGE IN
GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE;
(b) THE ORDER OF ACQUITTAL HAS ALREADY
ATTAINED FINALITY WHEN IT WAS NOT
CHALLENGED IN A TIMELY AND APPROPRIATE
MANNER; AND
(c) THE LOWER COURT MERELY COMMITTED
ERRORS OF JUDGMENT AND NOT OF
JURISDICTION.20
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioner argues that the public prosecutor actually filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the assailed July 2,2007 Order of the trial court
prosecutor PDIC in the latters July 20, 2007 Motion for
Reconsideration. Nonetheless,it admitted that while it joined PDIC in
the latters July 20, 2007 Motion for Reconsideration, it had only until
July 18, 2007 within which to seek reconsideration since it received
the order on July 3, 2007, while the private prosecutor received a copy
of the Order only on July 5, 2007; it pleads thatthe two-day delay in
filing the motion should not prejudice the interests of the State and the
People.
Petitioner assumes further that, since it was belated in its filing of the
required Motion for Reconsideration, it may have been tardy as well in
the filing of the Petition for Certiorariwith the CA, or CA-G.R. SP No.
101823. Still, it begs the Court to excuse its mistake in the nameof
public interest and substantial justice, and in order to maintain stability
in the banking industry given that the case involved embezzlement of
large sums ofdepositors money in OCBC.
Petitioner goes on to argue that the CAerred in affirming the trial
courts finding that demurrer was proper. It claims that it was able to
prove the offense charged, and it has shown that respondents were
responsible therefor.
In its Reply,21 petitioner claims thatthe July 2, 2007 Order of the trial
court granting respondents demurrer was null and void to begin with,
and thus it could not have attained finality. It adds thatcontrary to
respondents submission, the private prosecutors Motion for
Reconsideration contained the public prosecutors written conformity,
and that while it may be saidthat the public prosecutors motion was
two days late, still the trial court took cognizance thereof and passed
upon its merits; by so doing, the trial court thus validatedthe public
prosecutors action of adopting the private prosecutorsMotion for
Reconsideration as his own. This being the case, it should therefore
besaid that the prosecutions resultant Petition for Certiorariwith the
CA on January 4, 2008 was timely filed within the required 60-day
period, counted from November 5, 2007,or the date the public
prosecutor received the trial courts October 19, 2007 Order denying
the Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner submits further that a Petition for Certiorariwas the only
available remedy against the assailed Orders of the trial court, since
the granting of a demurrer in criminal cases is tantamount to an
acquittal and is thus immediately final and executory. It adds that the
denial of its right to due process is apparent since the trial courts
grant of respondents demurrer was purely capricious and done with
evident partiality, despite the prosecution having adduced proof
beyond reasonable doubt that they committed estafa through
falsification of commercial documents. Petitioner thus prays that the
assailed CA dispositions be reversed and that Criminal Case Nos. 00-
187318 and 00-187319 be reinstated for further proceedings.
Respondents Arguments
Praying that the Petition be denied, respondents Jose C. Go (Go),
Aida C. Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa), and Felecitas D. Necomedes
(Nicomedes) the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-
187319 argue in their Comment22 that the trial courts grant of their
demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal; any subsequent
prosecution for the same offense would thus violate their constitutional
right against double jeopardy. They add thatsince the public
prosecutor failed to timely move for the reconsideration of the trial
courts July 2, 2007 Order, it could not have validly filed an original
Petition for Certiorariwith the CA. Nor can it be said that the
prosecution and the private prosecutor jointly filed the latters July 20,
2007 Motion for Reconsideration with the trial court because the public
prosecutors copy of PDICsmotion was merely sent through registered
mail. Therefore if it were true that the public prosecutor gave his
approval or conformity to the motion, he did so only afterreceiving his
copy of the motion through the mail, and not at the time the private
prosecutor actually filed its Motion for Reconsideration with the trial
court.
Next, respondents submit that petitioner was not deprived of its day in
court; the grant of their demurrer to evidence is based on a fair and
judicious determination of the facts and evidence bythe trial court,
leading it to conclude that the prosecution failed to meet the quantum
of proof required to sustain a finding of guilt on the part of
respondents. They argue thatthere is no evidence to show that OCBC
released loan proceeds to the alleged borrowers, Timmys, Inc. and
Asia Textile Mills, Inc., and that these loan proceeds were then
deposited in the account of respondent Go. Since no loans were
granted to the two borrowers, then there is nothing for Go to
misappropriate. With respect to the two managers checks issued to
Philippine Recyclers Inc. and Zeta International, respondents contend
that these may not beconsidered to be the loan proceeds pertaining to
Timmys, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc.s loan application because
these checks were not in the name of the alleged borrowers Timmys,
Inc.and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. as payees. Besides, these two checks
were never negotiated with OCBC, either for encashmentor deposit,
since they did not bear the respective indorsements or signatures and
account numbers of the payees; thus, they could not be considered to
havebeen negotiated nor deposited with Gos account with OCBC.
Next, respondents argue that the cash deposit slip used to deposit the
alleged loan proceeds in Gos OCBC account is questionable, since
under banking procedure, a cash deposit slip may not be used to
deposit checks. Moreover, it has not been shown who prepared the
said cash deposit slip. Respondents further question the validity and
authenticity of the other documentary evidence presented, such as the
Subsidiary Ledger, Cash Proof,23 Schedule of Returned Checks and
Other Cash Items (RTCOCI), etc.
Finally, respondents claim that not all the elementsof the crime of
estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code have
been established; specifically, it has not been shown that Goreceived
the alleged loan proceeds, and that a demand was made upon him for
the return thereof.
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.
Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 for estafa through
falsification of commercial documents against the respondents are
based on the theory that in 1997, fictitious loans in favor of two entities
Timmys, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. were approved, after
which two managers checks representing the supposed proceeds of
these fictitious loans were issued but made payable to two different
entities Philippine RecyclersInc. and ZetaInternational without any
documents issued by the supposed borrowers Timmys, Inc. and Asia
Textile Mills, Inc. assigning the supposedloan proceeds tothe two
payees. Thereafter, these two managers checks together with
several others totaling 120,819,475.0024 were encashed, and then
deposited in the OCBC Savings Account No. 00810-00108-0 of Go.
Then, several automatic transfer deposits were made from Gos
savings account to his OCBC Current Account No. 008-00-000015-0
which were then used to fund Gos previously dishonored personal
checks.
The testimonial and documentary evidenceof the prosecution indicate
that OCBC, a commercial bank, was ordered closed by the BSP
sometime in October 1998. PDIC was designated as OCBC receiver,
and it took over the banks affairs, assets and liabilities, records, and
collected the banks receivables.
During efforts to collect OCBCs pastdue loan receivables, PDIC as
receiver sent demand letters to the banks debtor-borrowers on record,
including Timmys, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. which appeared to
have obtained unsecured loans of 10 million each, and which
apparently remained unpaid. In response to the demand letters,
Timmys, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. denied having obtained loans
from OCBC. Timmys, Inc., through its designated representative,
claimed that while it is true that it applied for an OCBC loan, it no
longer pursued the application after it was granted a loan by another
bank. When the OCBC loan documents were presented to Timmys,
Inc.s officers, it was discovered that the signatures therein of the
corporate officers were forgeries. In their defense and to clarify
matters, Timmys, Inc.s corporate officers executed affidavits and
furnished official documents such as their passports and the
corporations Articles of Incorporation containing their
respectivesignatures to show PDIC that their purported signatures in
the OCBC loan documents were forgeries. After its investigation into
the matter, PDIC came to the conclusion that the signatures on the
Timmys, Inc. loan documents were indeed falsified.25
On the other hand, in a written reply26 to PDICs demand letter, Asia
Textile Mills, Inc. vehemently denied thatit applied for a loan with
OCBC. On this basis, PDIC concluded that the AsiaTextile Mills,
Inc.loan was likewise bogus. Moreover, PDIC discovered other bogus
loans in OCBC.
Through the falsified loan documents, the OCBC Loan Committee
composed of Go, who was likewise OCBCPresident, respondent Dela
Rosa (OCBC Senior Vice President, or SVP, and Chief Operating
Officer, or COO), Arnulfo Aurellano and Richard Hsu approved a
10 million unsecured loan purportedly in favor of Timmys, Inc. After
deducting finance charges, advance interest and taxes, DelaRosa
certified a net loan proceeds amounting to 9,985,075.00 covered by
Managers Check No. 000000334727 dated February 5, 1997.28 The
face of the check bears the notation "Loan proceeds of CL-484," the
alpha numeric code ("CL-484")of which refers to the purported loan of
Timmys, Inc.29 However, the payee thereof was not the purported
borrower, Timmys, Inc., but a certain "Zeta International". Likewise,
on even date, Managers Check No. 000000334030 for 9,985,075.00
was issued, and on its face is indicated "Loan proceeds of CL-477",
which alpha numeric code ("CL-477") refers to the purported loan of
AsiaTextile Mills, Inc.31 Managers Check No. 0000003340 was made
payable not to Asia Textile Mills, Inc., but to "Phil. Recyclers Inc."
On the same day that the subject managers checks were issued, or
on February 5, 1997, it appears that the two checks together with
other managers checks totaling 120,819,475.00 were encashed; discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be
on the face ofthe checks, the word "PAID" was stamped, and at the
dorsal portion thereof there were machine validations showing
thatManagers Check No. 0000003347 was presented at 6:16 p.m.,
while Managers Check No. 0000003340 was presented at 6:18 p.m.32
After presentment and encashment, the amount of 120,819,475.00
which among others included the 9,985,075.00 proceeds of the
purported Timmys, Inc. loan and the 9,985,075.00 proceeds of the
supposed Asia Textile Mills, Inc. loan was deposited in Gos OCBC
Savings Account No. 00810-00108-0 at OCBC Recto Branch,
apparently on instructions of respondent Dela Rosa.33 The deposit is
covered by OCBC Cash Deposit Slip34 dated February 5, 1997, with
the corresponding machine validation thereon indicating that the
deposit was made at 6:19 p.m.35 The funds were credited to Gos
savings account.36
It appears that previously, or on February 4, 1997, seven OCBC
checks issued by Go from his personal OCBC Current Account No.
008-00-000015-0 totaling 145,488,274.48 were dishonored for
insufficiency of funds.37 After Managers Check Nos. 0000003340 and
0000003347, along with several other managers checks, were
encashed and the proceeds thereof deposited in Gos OCBC Savings
Account No. 00810-00108-0 withautomatic transferfeature to his
OCBC Current Account No. 008-00-000015-0, funds were
automatically transferred from the said savings account to the current
account, which atthe time contained only a total amountof
26,332,303.69. GosOCBC Current Account No. 008-00-000015-0
was credited with 120,819,475.00, and thereafter the account
registered a balance of 147,151,778.69. The seven previously
dishonored personal checks were thenpresented for clearing, and
were subsequently cleared that sameday, or on February 5,
1997.38 Apparently, they were partly funded by the
120,819,475.00managers check deposits which include
Managers Check Nos. 0000003340 and 0000003347.
During the examination and inquiry into OCBCs operations, oron
January 28, 1998, Go issued and sent a letter39 to the BSP, through
Maria Dolores Yuviengco, Director of the Departmentof Commercial
Banks, specifically requesting that the BSP refrain from sending any
communication to Timmys, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc., among
others. He manifested that he was "willing to assume the viability and
full payment"of the accounts under investigation and examination,
including the Timmys, Inc. and AsiaTextile Mills, Inc. accounts.
Demurrer to the evidence40 is "an objection by one of the parties in an
action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is
insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or
sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiencyof the
whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the
sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to
ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain
the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. x x x Sufficient evidence
for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in
character, weight or amount as will legally justify the judicial or official
action demanded according to the circumstances. To be considered
sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the commission of
the crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation therein by the
accused."41 Thus, when the accused files a demurrer, the court must
evaluate whether the prosecution evidence is sufficient enough to
warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.42
"The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound
disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion."43 As to
effect, "the grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal
and cannot be appealed because it would place the accused in double
jeopardy. The order is reviewable only by certiorariif it was issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack or excess of
jurisdiction."44 When grave abuse of discretion is present, an order
granting a demurrer becomes null and void.
As a general rule, an order granting the accuseds demurrer to
evidence amounts to an acquittal. There are certain exceptions,
however, as when the grant thereof would not violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy. For instance, this Court ruled that
when there is a finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court in dismissing a criminal case by granting the
accuseds demurrer to evidence,its judgment is considered void, as
this Court ruled in People v. Laguio, Jr.:
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal
orders of trial courts granting an accuseds demurrer to evidence. This
may be done via the special civil action of certiorariunder Rule 65
based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void
judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of
dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original
special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against
double jeopardy is not violated.
In the instant case, having affirmed the CA finding grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court when it granted the accuseds
demurrer to evidence, we deem its consequent order of acquittal
void.45
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as "that capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility. The party questioning the acquittal of an
accused should be able toclearly establish that the trial court blatantly
abused its discretion such that it was deprived of its authority to
dispense justice."46
In the exercise of the Courts "superintending control over inferior
courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular
case as the ends of justice may require. So it is that the writ will be
granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do
substantial justice."47
Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, the Court declaresthat the
CA grossly erred in affirming the trial courts July 2, 2007 Order
granting the respondents demurrer, which Order was patently null and
void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion and
manifest irregularity, thus causing substantial injury to the banking
industry and public interest.1avvphi1 The Court finds that the
prosecution has presented competent evidence to sustain the
indictment for the crime of estafa through falsification of commercial
documents, and that respondents appear to be the perpetrators
thereof. In evaluating the evidence, the trial court effectively failed
and/or refused to weigh the prosecutions evidence against the
respondents, which it was duty-bound to do as a trier of facts;
considering that the case involved hundreds of millions of pesos of
OCBC depositors money not to mention that the banking industry is
impressed with public interest, the trial court should have conducted
itself with circumspection and engaged in intelligent reflection in
resolving the issues.
The elements of estafa through abuse ofconfidence under Article 315,
par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code48 are: "(a) that money,goods or
other personal property is received by the offender in trust oron
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (b) that
there be misappropriation orconversion of such money or property by
the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;
and (d) there is demand by the offended party to the offender."49
Obviously, a bank takes its depositors money as a loan, under an
obligation to return the same; thus, the term "demand deposit."
The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the
provisions of the Civil Code on simpleloan. Article 1980 of the Civil
Code expressly provides that "x x x savingsx x x deposits of money in
banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions
concerning simple loan." There is a debtor-creditor relationship
between the bank and its depositor. The bank is the debtor and the
depositor is the creditor. The depositor lends the bank money and the
bank agrees to pay the depositor on demand. x x x50
Moreover, the banking laws impose high standards on banks in view
of the fiduciary nature of banking."This fiduciary relationship means
that the banks obligation to observe high standards ofintegrity and
performance is deemed written into every deposit agreement between
a bank and its depositor. The fiduciary nature of banking requires
banks to assume a degree of diligence higher than that of a good
father of a family."51
In Soriano v. People,52 it was held that the President of a bank is a
fiduciary with respect to the banks funds, and he holds the same in
trust or for administration for the banks benefit. From this, it may
beinferred that when such bank president makes it appear through
falsification that an individual or entity applied for a loan when in fact
such individual or entity did not, and the bank president obtains the
loan proceeds and converts the same, estafa is committed.
Next, regarding misappropriation, the evidence tends to extablish that
Managers Check Nos.0000003340 and 0000003347 were encashed,
using the banks funds which clearly belonged to OCBCs depositors,
and then deposited in Gos OCBC Savings Account No. 00810-00108-
0 at OCBC Recto Branch although he was not the named payee
therein. Next, the money was automatically transferred to Gos OCBC
Current Account No. 008-00-000015-0 and used to fund his seven
previously-issued personal checks totaling 145,488,274.48, which
checks were dishonored the day before. Simply put, the evidence
strongly indicates that Go converted OCBC funds to his own personal
use and benefit. "The words convert and misappropriate connote an
act of using or disposing of anothers property as if it were ones own,
or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon.
To misappropriate for ones own use includes not only conversion to
ones personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the
property of another without right. x x x In proving the element of
conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption of
misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds
of the sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to give an account
of their whereabouts.Thus, the merepresumption of misappropriation
or conversion is enough to conclude thata probable cause exists for
the indictment x x x."53
As to the third element of estafa, there is no question that as a
consequence of the misappropriation of OCBCs funds, the bank and
its depositors have been prejudiced; the bank has been placed under
receivership, and the depositors money is no longer under their
unimpeded disposal.
Finally, on the matter of demand, while it has not been shown that the
bank demanded the return of the funds, it has nevertheless been held
that "[d]emand is not an element of the felony or a condition precedent
tothe filing of a criminal complaint for estafa. Indeed, the accusedmay
be convicted ofthe felony under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code if the prosecution proved misappropriation or
conversion by the accused of the money or property subject of the
Information. In a prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary
where there is evidence of misappropriation or conversion."54 Thus,
strictly speaking, demand is not an element of the offense of estafa
through abuse of confidence; even a verbal query satisfies the
requirement.55 Indeed, in several past rulings of the Court, demand
was not even included as anelement of the crime of estafa through
abuse of confidence, orunder paragraph 1(b).56
On the other hand, the elements of the crime of falsification of
commercial document under Art. 17257 are: "(1) that the offender is a
private individual; (2) that the offender committed any of the acts of
falsification; and (3) that the act of falsification is committed ina
commercial document."58 As to estafa through falsification of public,
official or commercial documents, it has been held that
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a
means of committing Estafa, because before the falsified document is
actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of Falsification has
already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not
being an element of the crime of falsification of public, official or
commercial document. In other words, the crime of falsification has
already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official or
commercial document todefraud another is estafa. But the damage is
caused by the commission of Estafa, not by the falsification of the
document. Therefore, the falsification of the public, official or
commercial document is only a necessary means to commit the
estafa.59
Simulating OCBC loan documents such as loan applications, credit
approval memorandums, and the resultant promissory notes and other
credit documents by causing it to appear that persons have
participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so
participate, and by counterfeiting or imitating their handwriting or
signatures constitute falsification of commercial and public documents.
As to the respondents respective participation in the commission of
the crime, suffice it to state that as the beneficiary of the proceeds, Go
is presumed to be the author of the falsification. The fact that
previously, his personal checks totaling 145,488,274.48 were gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal
dishonored, and the day after, the amount of 120,819,475.00 was
immediately credited to his account, which included funds from the
encashment of Managers Check Nos. 0000003340 and 0000003347
or the loan proceeds of the supposed Timmys, Inc. and Asia Textile
Mills, Inc. accounts, bolsters this view. "[W]henever someone has in
his possession falsified documents [which he used to] his advantage
and benefit, the presumption that he authored it arises."60
x x x This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged
documents was so closely connected in time with the forgery that the
user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing
the forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers, and
therefore, had complicity in the forgery.
In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in
possession of a forged document and who used or uttered it is
presumed to be the forger.
Certainly, the channeling of the subjectpayments via false remittances
to his savings account, his subsequent withdrawals of said amount as
well as his unexplained flight at the height of the banks inquiry into the
matter more than sufficiently establish x x x involvement in the
falsification.61
Likewise, Dela Rosas involvement inthe scheme has been
satisfactorily shown. As OCBC SVP and COO and member of the
OCBC Loan Committee, she approved the purported Timmys,
Inc.loan, and she certified and signed the February 2, 1997 OCBC
Disclosure Statement and other documents.62 She likewise gave
specific instructions to deposit the proceeds of Managers Check Nos.
0000003340 and 0000003347, among others, in Gos OCBC Savings
Account No. 00810-00108-0 at OCBC Recto Branch.63 Finally, she
was a signatory to the two checks.64
On the other hand, respondent Nicomedes as OCBC Senior Manager
for Corporate Accounts Account Management Group, among others
prepared the Credit Approval Memorandum and recommended the
approval of the loans.65
In granting the demurrer, the trial court in its assailed July 2, 2007
Order concluded that based on the evidence adduced, the
respondents could not have falsified the loan documents pertaining
toTimmys, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. since the individuals who
assert that their handwriting and signatures were forged were not
presented incourt to testify on such claim; that the prosecution
witnesses Honorio E. Franco, Jr. (Franco) of PDIC, the designated
Assisting Deputy Liquidator of OCBC, and Virginia Rowella Famirin
(Famirin), Cashier of OCBC Recto Branch were not present when
the loan documents were executed and signed, and thus have no
personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the alleged
falsification; and as high-ranking officers of OCBC, respondents could
not be expected to have prepared the saiddocuments. The evidence,
however, suggests otherwise; it shows that respondents had a direct
hand in the falsification and creation of fictitious loans. The loan
documents were even signed by them. By disregarding what is evident
in the record, the trial court committed substantial wrong that frustrates
the ends of justice and adversely affects the public interest. The trial
courts act was so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in
grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and personal hostility. x x x66
On the charge of estafa, the trial court declared that since the payees
of Managers Check Nos. 0000003340 and 0000003347 were not Asia
Textile Mills, Inc. and Timmys, Inc., respectively, but other entities
Phil. Recyclers Inc. and Zeta International, and there are no
documents drawn by the borrowers assigning the loan proceeds to
these two entities, then it cannot besaid that there were loan proceeds
released to these borrowers. The trial court added that it is doubtful
that the two managers checks were presented and negotiated for
deposit in Gos savings account, since theydo not contain the required
indorsements of the borrowers, the signatures of the tellers and
individuals/payees who received the checks and the proceeds thereof,
and the respective account numbers of the respondents; and the
checks were presented beyond banking hours. The trial court likewise
held that the fact that a cash deposit slip and not a check deposit
slip was used to allegedly deposit the checks raised doubts as to the
truth of the allegation that the managers checks were deposited and
credited to Gos savings account.
The CA echoed the trial courts observations, adding that the evidence
consisted of mere "letters and unverifiedledgers" which were thus
insufficient; that there was an "inescapable possibility that an honest
mistake was made" in the preparation and issuance of Managers
CheckNos. 0000003340 and 0000003347, since these two checks are
claimed to be just a few of several checks numbering thirteen in all
the rest of which werenever questioned by the receiver PDIC. The
appellate court added that the prosecution should have presented
further evidence as to where the money went after being deposited
inGos savings and current accounts, identifying thus the recipients of
Gospersonal checks.
What the trial and appellate courts disregarded, however, is that the
OCBC funds ended up in the personal bank accountsof respondent
Go, and were used to fund his personal checks, even as he was not
entitled thereto. These, if not rebutted, are indicative ofestafa, as may
be seen from the afore-cited Sorianocase.
The bank money (amounting to 8million) which came to the
possession of petitioner was money held in trust or administration by
him for the bank, in his fiduciary capacity as the President of said
bank. It is not accurate to say that petitioner became the owner of the
8 million because it was the proceeds of a loan. That would have
been correct if the bank knowingly extended the loan to petitioner
himself. But that is not the case here. According to the information for
estafa, the loan was supposed to be for another person, a certain
"Enrico Carlos"; petitioner, through falsification, made it appear that
said "Enrico Carlos" applied for the loan when infact he ("Enrico
Carlos") did not. Through such fraudulent device, petitioner obtained
the loan proceeds and converted the same. Under these
circumstances, it cannot be said that petitioner became the legal
owner of the 8 million. Thus, petitioner remained the banks fiduciary
with respect to that money, which makes it capable of
misappropriation or conversion in his hands.67
Thus, it is irrelevant that the proceeds of the supposed loans were
made payable to entities other than the alleged
borrowers.1wphi1 Besides, the managers checks themselves
indicate that they were the proceeds of the purported Timmys, Inc.s
and Asia Textile Mills, Inc.s loans, through the alpha numeric codes
specifically assigned to them that are printed on the face of the
checks; the connection between the checks and the purported loans is
thus established. In the same vein, the CAs supposition that there is
an "inescapable possibility that an honest mistake was made inthe
preparation of the two questioned managers checks" is absurd; even
so, the bottom line is that they were encashed using bank funds, and
the proceeds thereof were deposited in Gos bank savings and current
accounts and used to fund his personal checks.
Furthermore, as correctly pointed outby petitioner, it issuperfluous to
require that the recipients of Gos personal checks be identified. For
purposes of proving the crime, it has been shown that Goconverted
bank funds to his own personal use when they were deposited in his
accounts and his personal checks were cleared and the funds were
debited from his account.1wphi1 This suffices. Likewise, the Court
agrees that the prosecutions reliance on the supposed loan
documents, subsidiary ledgers, deposit slip, cash proof, RTCOCI and
other documents was proper. They are both public and private
documents which may be received in evidence; notably, petitioners
documentary evidence was admitted in full by the trial court.68 With
respect to evidence consisting of private documents, the presumption
remains that "therecording of private transactions has been fair and
regular, and that the ordinary course of business has been followed."69
Gos January 28, 1998 letter to the BSP stating that he was "willing to
assume the viabilityand full payment" of the accounts under
examination which included the Timmys, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills,
Inc. accounts, among others is an offer of compromise, and thus an
implied admission of guilt under Rule 130, Section 27 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence.70
In addition, appellants act of pleading for his sister-in-laws
forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to
compromise, which in turn can be received as an implied admission
ofguilt under Section 27, Rule 130 x x x.71
As a result of the Courts declaration of nullity of the assailed Orders of
the trial court, any dissection of the truly questionable actions of
Prosecutor Campanilla which should merit appropriate disciplinary
action for they reveal a patent ignorance of procedure, if not indolence
or a deliberate intention to bungle his own case becomes
unnecessary. It is conceded that the lack of Campanillas approval
and/or conformto PDICs Motion for Reconsideration should have
rendered the trial courts assailed Ordersfinal and executory were it
not for the fact that they were inherently null and void; Campanillas
irresponsible actions almost cost the People its day in court and their
right to exact justice and retribution, not to mention that they could
have caused immeasurable damage to the banking industry. Just the
same, "[a] void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect,
force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-
existent. Such judgment or order may be resisted in any action or
proceeding whenever it is involved. It is not even necessary to take
any steps to vacate or avoid a void judgment or final order; it may
simply be ignored."72 More appropriately, the following must be cited:
x x x Clearly, the assailed Order of Judge Santiago was issued in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. A void
order is no order at all. It cannot confer any right or be the source of
any relief. This Court is not merely a court of law; it is likewise a court
of justice.
To rule otherwise would leave the private respondent without any
recourse to rectify the public injustice brought about by the trial court's
Order, leaving her with only the standing to file administrative charges
for ignorance of the law against the judge and the prosecutor. A party
cannot be left without recourse to address a substantive issue in law.73
Finally, it must be borne in mind that "[t]he granting of a demurrer to
evidence should x x x be exercised with caution, taking into
consideration not only the rights of the accused, but also the right of
the private offended party to be vindicated of the wrongdoing done
against him, for if it is granted, the accused is acquitted and the private
complainant is generally left with no more remedy. In such instances,
although the decision of the court may be wrong, the accused can
invoke his right against double jeopardy. Thus, judges are reminded to
be more diligent and circumspect in the performance of their duties as
members of the Bench xx x."74
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The September 30, 2009
Decision and January 22, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The July 2, 2007 and October 19, 2007
Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49 in Criminal
Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 are declared null and void, and
the said cases are ordered REINSTATED for the continuation of
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 188708, July 31, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. ALAMADA
MACABANDO, Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This is an appeal filed by appellant Alamada Macabando assailing the
February 24, 2009 decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR HC No. 00208-MIN. The CA decision affirmed in toto the August
26, 2002 judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25,
Cagayan de Oro City, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of destructive arson, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
THE CASE
The prosecutions evidence showed that at around 4:00 p.m. on
December 21, 2001, the appellant broke bottles on the road while
holding a G.I. pipe, and shouted that he wanted to get even (manabla
ko).3 Afterwards, he uttered that he would burn his house.4cralaw
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At 6:35 p.m. of the same day, Cornelio Feliciano heard his neighbors
shout that there was a fire. When Cornelio went out of his house to
verify, he saw smoke coming from the appellants house. He got a pail
of water, and poured its contents into the fire.5 Eric Quilantang, a
neighbor whose house was just 10 meters from that of the appellant,
ran to the barangay headquarters to get a fire extinguisher. When Eric
approached the burning house, the appellant, who was carrying a
traveling bag and a gun, told him not to interfere; the appellant then
fired three (3) shots in the air.6 The appellant also told the people
around that whoever would put out the fire would be killed.7cralaw
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Upon hearing the gunshots, Cornelio hurriedly went home to save his
nephews and nieces.8 Eric also returned to his house to save his
belongings.9cralaw virtualaw library
Fire Officer (FO) II Victor Naive and FOI Reynaldo Maliao conducted a
spot investigation of the incident, and concluded, among others, that
the fire started in the appellants house; and that it had been
intentional.10 Barangay Chairman Modesto Ligtas stated that the fire
gutted many houses in his barangay, and that he assisted the City
Social Welfare and Development Department personnel in assessing
the damage.11cralaw virtualaw library
The defense, on the other hand, presented a different version of the
events.
The appellant declared on the witness stand that he lived in the two-
storey house in Barangay 35, Limketkai Drive, which was owned by
his sister, Madji Muslima Edemal.12 He admitted that he felt angry at
around 2:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001 because one of his radio
cassettes for sale had been stolen.13 The appellant claimed that he
went to sleep after looking for his missing radio cassette, and that the
fire had already started when he woke up. He denied making a threat
to burn his house, and maintained that he did not own a gun. He
added that the gunshots heard by his neighbors came from the
explosion of firecrackers that he intended to use during the New Year
celebration.14cralaw virtualaw library
Lomantong Panandigan, the appellants cousin, stated, among others,
that he did not see the appellant carry a revolver or fire a shot on
December 21, 2001.15 Dimas Kasubidan, the appellants brother-in-
law, stated that he and the appellant lived in the same house, and that
the latter was asleep in his room at the ground floor before the fire
broke out.16cralaw virtualaw library
The prosecution charged the appellant with the crime of destructive
arson under Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended, before the RTC.17 The appellant pleaded not guilty to the
charge on arraignment.18 In its judgment dated August 26, 2002, the
RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment in toto. It gave weight
to the RTCs factual findings since these findings were based on
unrebutted testimonial and documentary evidence. The CA held that
the totality of the presented circumstantial evidence led to the
conclusion that the appellant was guilty of the crime charged.
THE COURTS RULING
We deny the appeal, but modify the crime committed by the appellant
and the penalty imposed on him.
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
We point out at the outset that no one saw the appellant set fire to his
house in Barangay 35, Limketkai Drive, Cagayan de Oro City. The trial
and appellate courts thus resorted to circumstantial evidence since
there was no direct evidence to prove the appellants culpability to the
crime charged.
It is settled that in the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial
evidence may be sufficient to sustain a conviction provided that: (a)
there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of
all the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to
the exclusion of all others, is the one who has committed the crime.
Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the
combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to
leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.19cralaw
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In the present case, the following circumstances constitute an
unbroken chain that leads to an unavoidable conclusion that the
appellant, to the exclusion of others, set fire to his house: first, the
appellant, while holding an iron lead pipe, acted violently and broke
bottles near his house at around 4:00 p.m. of December 21, 2001;
second, while he was still in a fit of rage, the appellant stated that he
would get even, and then threatened to burn his own house; third,
Judith Quilantang saw a fire in the appellants room approximately two
hours after the appellant returned to his house; fourth, the appellant
prevented Cornelio, Eric, and several other people from putting out the
fire in his house; fifth, the appellant fired shots in the air, and then
threatened to kill anyone who would try to put out the fire in his house;
sixth, the appellant carried a traveling bag during the fire; and finally,
the investigation conducted by the fire marshals of the Bureau of Fire
Protection revealed that the fire started in the appellants house, and
that it had been intentional.
The combination of these circumstances, indeed, leads to no other
conclusion than that the appellant set fire to his house. We find it
unnatural and highly unusual for the appellant to prevent his neighbors
from putting out the fire in his house, and threaten to kill them if they
did, if he had nothing to do with the crime. The first impulse of an
individual whose house is on fire is to save his loved ones and/or
belongings; it is contrary to human nature, reason and natural order of
things for a person to thwart and prevent any effort to put out the fire in
his burning property. By carrying (and firing) a gun during the fire, the
appellant showed his determination to repel any efforts to quell the
fire. Important to note, too, is the fact that the appellant carried a
traveling bag during the fire which, to our mind, showed deliberate
planning and preparedness on his part to flee the raging fire; it
likewise contradicted his statement that he was asleep inside his
house when the fire broke out, and that the fire was already big when
he woke up. Clearly, the appellants indifferent attitude to his burning
house and his hostility towards the people who tried to put out the fire,
coupled with his preparedness to flee his burning house, belied his
claim of innocence. Notably, the appellant failed to impute any
improper motive against the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify
against him; in fact, he admitted that he had no misunderstanding with
them prior to the incident.
The Crime Committed
The CA convicted the appellant of destructive arson under Article 320
of the RPC, as amended, which reads:cralawlibrary
Article 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death shall be imposed upon any person who shall burn:
One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of
burning, or as a result of simultaneous burnings, committed on several
or different occasions.
Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in
general or where people usually gather or congregate for a definite
purpose such as, but not limited to, official governmental function or
business, private transaction, commerce, trade, workshop, meetings
and conferences, or merely incidental to a definite purpose such as
but not limited to hotels, motels, transient dwellings, public
conveyances or stops or terminals, regardless of whether the offender
had knowledge that there are persons in said building or edifice at the
time it is set on fire and regardless also of whether the building is
actually inhabited or not.
Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to
transportation or conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or
leisure.
Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances
thereto, which are devoted to the service of public utilities.
Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or
destroying evidence of another violation of law, or for the purpose of
concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or to collect from
insurance.
xxxx
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon
any person who shall burn:cralawlibrary
Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks
factory, ordinance, storehouse, archives or general museum of the
Government.
In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or
explosive materials.
In sum, Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures,
both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels,
aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial
establishments by any person or group of persons.20cralaw virtualaw
library
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613,21 on the other hand, currently
governs simple arson. Section 3 of this law provides:cralawlibrary
Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal
to Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any
of the following:
Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;
Any inhabited house or dwelling;
Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform
or tunnel;
Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard,
bamboo grove or forest;
Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and
Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse. [italics and
emphasis ours]
P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and
private structures, regardless of size, not included in Article 320 of the
RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.22 This law punishes
simple arson with a lesser penalty because the acts that constitute it
have a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness. Simple arson
contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political,
and national security implications than destructive arson.23cralaw
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The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613
are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally
burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Both these elements have
been proven in the present case. The Information alleged that the
appellant set fire to his own house, and that the fire spread to other
inhabited houses. These allegations were established during trial
through the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which the trial
and appellate courts found credible and convincing, and through the
report of the Bureau of Fire Protection which stated that damaged
houses were residential, and that the fire had been intentional.
Moreover, the certification from the City Social Welfare and
Development Department likewise indicated that the burned houses
were used as dwellings. The appellant likewise testified that his burnt
two-story house was used as a residence. That the appellants act
affected many families will not convert the crime to destructive arson,
since the appellants act does not appear to be heinous or represents
a greater degree of perversity and viciousness when compared to
those acts punished under Article 320 of the RPC. The established
evidence only showed that the appellant intended to burn his own
house, but the conflagration spread to the neighboring houses.
WHEREFORE, the assailed February 24, 2009 decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00208-MIN is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:cralawlibrary
(1)
appellant Alamada Macabando is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of simple arson under Section 3(2) of Presidential Decree No.
1613; and
(2)
he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

In this regard, our ruling in Buebos v. People24 is particularly

instructive, thus:cralawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by
the degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The
acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code constituting
Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes "for being
grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity
are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of
decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the
other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson
are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the
law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson
contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political
and national security implications than Destructive Arson.

The Proper Penalty

Under Section 3, paragraph 2, of P.D. No. 1613, the imposable

penalty for simple arson is reclusion temporal, which has a range of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day, to reclusion perpetua. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable should be an
indeterminate penalty whose minimum term should be within the
range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, or
six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, and whose
maximum should be the medium period of reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua, or sixteen (16) years and one (1) day to twenty
(20) years, taking into account the absence of any aggravating or
mitigating circumstances that attended the commission of the crime.
Taking these rules into account, we therefore impose on the appellant
the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.

As regards the award of damages, we sustain the lower courts

findings that the records do not adequately reflect any concrete basis
for the award of actual damages to the offended parties. To seek
recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual
amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable.25cralaw
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 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 163437 February 13, 2008
ERNESTO PIDELI, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
ON appeal via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming that2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Baguio City, convicting petitioner Ernesto Pideli of
theft in the amount of P49,500.00 belonging to his brothers business
partner. The appeal zeroes in on the questions of ownership, unlawful
taking and intent to gain. In short, is it estafa or theft?
The Facts
Sometime in March 1997, Placido Cancio (Placido) and Wilson Pideli
(Wilson) entered into a verbal partnership agreement to subcontract a
rip-rapping and spillway project at Tongcalong, Tinongdan Dalupirip
Road, Itogon, Benguet. Placido and Wilson agreed to undertake the
project in favor of ACL Construction (ACL), the contractor awarded the
development project by the Department of Public Works and
Highways.3
Petitioner Ernesto Pideli (petitioner), brother to Wilson and neighbor
and friend to Placido, offered the duo the use of his credit line with the
Mt. Trail Farm Supply and Hardware (MTFSH) in La Trinidad,
Benguet. Petitioner was an employee of the Provincial Planning and
Development Office of Benguet, likewise based in La Trinidad. With
the said arrangement, Wilson and Placido, with the assistance of
petitioner, were able to secure an assortment of construction materials
for the rip-rap and spillway contract.4
On November 17, 1997, after the completion of the project, ACL
summoned all its subcontractors to a meeting. Placido, Wilson and
petitioner were in attendance. At the meeting, ACL management
informed Placido and Wilson that the final payment for the work that
they have done would be withheld. It was learned that they failed to
settle their accountabilities with the MTFSH.5
Placido, Wilson and petitioner made representations with the
accountable ACL personnel, a certain Boy Candido, to facilitate the
release of their payment. They assured Boy that the matter of the
unpaid obligations to MTFSH has been resolved. Boy acceded to the
request and proceeded to release the final payment due to Placido
and Wilson, amounting to P222,732.00.6
Consequently, Placido, Wilson and petitioner computed their
expenses and arrived at a net income of P130,000.00. Placido, as
partner, claimed one-half (1/2) or P65,000.00 of the net amount as his
share in the project. Petitioner, however, advised the two to first settle
their accountabilities for the construction materials taken from the
hardware store. Placido and Wilson did as told and entrusted the full
amount to petitioner, with express instructions to pay MTFSH and
deliver the remaining balance to them.7
The following day, or on November 18, 1997, Placido attempted but
failed to contact petitioner. He had hoped to obtain his share of the
partnership income. Placido got hold of petitioner the next morning.
Unexpectedly, petitioner informed Placido that nothing was left of the
proceeds after paying off the supplier.8 Despite repeated demands,
petitioner refused to give Placido his share in the net income of the
contract.9
Alarmed over the sudden turn of events, Placido lodged a complaint
for theft against petitioner Ernesto Pideli. Eventually, an Information
bearing the following allegations was instituted against petitioner:
The undersigned accuses ERNESTO PIDELE (sic) of the
crime of THEFT, committed as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of November, 1977, in the
City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent of gain (sic) and without the knowledge and consent
of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away,
cash money in the amount of P65,000.00, belonging to
PLACIDO CANSIO (sic) y TALUKTOK, to the damage
and prejudice of the owner thereof in the aforementioned
amount of SIXTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P65,000.00), Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. Then,
trial on the merits ensued.
The evidence for the People portraying the foregoing facts was
supplied by private complainant Placido, the lone prosecution witness.
Petitioners defense founded on denial is summarized by the trial court
as follows:
Ernesto Pideli, 43 years old, married, government
employee and a resident of Km. 4, La Trinidad, Benguet.
He is a government employee at the Provincial Planning
and Development Office, Capitol, La Trinidad, Benguet.
He was first employed at the Provincial Engineers Office
on April 11, 1978. Sometime in 1980, he was appointed
as Project Development Officer of the Provincial Planning
and Development Office and continuously up to the
present.
Wilson Pideli is his brother. In 1997, his brother Wilson
had a construction project along Tinongdan, Itogon,
Benguet. His brother asked him if he knows of a hardware
which can extend him credit for construction materials. He
approached the manager of Mt. Trail Farm Supply and
Hardware, Mrs. Editha Paayas, who then said that they
could extend credit to his brother. As of 1997, his brother
owed the hardware the amount of P279,000.00 for the
construction materials supplied by the hardware, namely:
reinforcement bars, cement, tire wires and other
construction materials. This amount was paid to the
hardware by installment. The first installment was paid in
June 1997 when the main contractor paid his brother. His
brother gave him P179,000.00 at his residence and he
was the one who paid the hardware which issued him a
receipt (Exhibit 1-C). After the project was completed, his
brother gave him P100,000.00 on November 18, 1997
while he, his brother and Placido Cancio were at the Rose
Bowl Restaurant. He went to the hardware but the
manager was not there. One of the staff then informed
him that the manager will still have to compute the interest
of their loan credit and so he deposited P75,000.00 which
was covered by a receipt (Exhibit 1-B). Their account was
finally computed in December 1997 and so he paid their
balance of P25,000.00. All in all, he paid the hardware the
amount of P279,000.00.
When his brother tendered to him the P100,000.00 at the
Rose Bowl Restaurant, Placido Cancio was also there
discussing the expenses. The money which his brother
got from the main contractor, Boy Cupido, the partner of
the late Engineer Lestino, was being held by his brother
and not Placido Cancio.
The total cost of the materials taken by his brother from
the Mt. Trail Farm Supply is P279,000.00. On June 10,
1997, he paid the initial payment of P179,000.00 covered
by Exhibit 1-C issued by the sales boy Cris. The second
partial payment was made on November 18, 1997 in the
amount of P75,000.00 covered by Exhibit 1-B issued by
Mrs. Editha Paayas. The last time that he paid was on
December 18, 1997 in the amount of P25,000.00. This
was not yet the full payment because according to Mrs.
Paayas she still has to compute for the interest. (TSN,
May 2, 2000, pp. 19-20). Aside from the amount
of P279,000.00 representing the materials taken by his
brother, he still has an outstanding account with Mt. Trail
Farm Supply charged in his name. This is the reason why
in the receipt it was noted as part payment (TSN, May 2,
2000, p. 21).
On cross-examination, Ernesto Pideli said that he was
never a partner of his brother. It was only in 1997 that his
brother sought his assistance to look for a hardware
where he can buy construction materials on credit. All
materials ordered by Wilson for the project were placed in
his account because it was easier for the hardware to
contact him at their office which is nearer. After the project
in Itogon, Wilson stopped his construction project. He
denies having taken the P65,000.00. He does not also
know where the amount went (TSN, May 2, 2000, p. 18).
On redirect, he said that when he tendered the first
payment of P179,000.00, a statement of account was
prepared by the salesboy of Mt. Trail Farm Supply and
Hardware (Exhibit 1-D). He was furnished a copy of the
statement of account. After the first and second payment,
other materials were obtained by his brother, this is the
reason why they still have a balance of P20,000.00 to be
settled within the hardware.11(Underscoring supplied)
RTC and CA Dispositions
On March 13, 2001, the RTC handed down a judgment of conviction,
disposing in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused having been
proven beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby
rendered CONVICTING the accused of the crime of theft
and hereby sentences him after applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, to suffer imprisonment from
4 years of prision correccional medium as minimum, to 12
years of prision mayor maximum as maximum (applying
Art. 309(1) of the Revised Penal Code) and to reimburse
the private complainant the amount of P49,500.00 plus
interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from date of
filing of the complaint up to the time it is actually paid.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.12
In convicting petitioner of theft, the trial court ratiocinated:
x x x Upon evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses,
the court finds the lone testimony of the private
complainant more credible than the testimony of the
defense witnesses. The testimony of the private
complainant is positive and credible, sufficient to sustain a
conviction even in the absence of corroboration. The
testimony of defense witness Wilson Pideli was glaringly
inconsistent and contradictory on material points. At the
initial stages of his (Wilson Pideli) testimony on direct
examination, he categorically stated that it was he and his
laborers who implemented the project (rip rap project
along Dalupirip Road, Itogon, Benguet) awarded to him by
ACL Construction. The private complainant had no
participation in the project (TSN, October 18, 1999, pp. 9-
10). Later, in his narration of what actually transpired
between him, his brother Ernesto Pideli and private
complainant at the Rose Bowl Restaurant on November
17, 1997, he said that after computing their expenses, he
entrusted to the private complainant the following
amounts: 1. P15,000.00 to be given by the private
complainant to the laborers who excavated for the project;
2. P500.00 to be given by the private complainant to Mr.
Apse as payment for the cement test; 3. P10,500.00
because he (private complainant) was pestering him
(TSN, October 18, 1999, pp. 14-16). The question is, if
the private complainant had no real participation in the
project subject of this case, why would Wilson Pideli be
entrusting such amounts to the former. If really private
complainant has no involvement whatsoever in the
project, why was he present at the: 1. Mido Restaurant
where Josephine Bentres was disbursing final payments
to the subcontractors of the project, and 2. At the Rose
Bowl Restaurant when the Pideli brothers were computing
the expenses incurred in the project and also presenting
his list of expenses (Exhibit B, Exhibit 2). Later, in his
testimony on direct, Wilson Pideli said that when he
started the project, private complainant asked him to join
him and he (Wilson Pideli) agreed provided the private
complainant share in the expenses. Private complainant
did not, however, share in the expenses nor did he
provide any equipment (TSN, October 18, 1999; p. 13) yet
he entrusted the aforementioned amounts to Cancio. On
cross-examination, Wilson Pideli admitted that he gave
private complainant P10,500.00 despite the fact that he
did not share in the expenses for the implementation of
the project (TSN, November 22, 1999, pp. 5-6). Such act
is abnormal and contrary to human behavior and
experience. The only plausible and logical conclusion is,
private complainant and Wilson Pideli were partners in a
joint venture. Just as private complainant did, in fact,
stated, he was the one who provided the laborers and
some equipments used in the project. Thus, it is only
logical that the money for the payment of the wages and
the cement test were entrusted to him because it was his
responsibility/obligation to pay them and not because they
were his neighbors as the defense would like this court to
believe. The reason propounded by Wilson Pideli to
explain his actuations is too flimsy for this court to believe.
Furthermore, Wilson Pideli admitted on cross that while
the case was filed by private complainant against his
brother Ernesto Pideli, he submitted an affidavit with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City. In Paragraph
1 of the said affidavit which was read into the records of
the case, he (Wilson Pideli) alleged that "Placido Cancio
was his companion in the project at Dalupirip Road,
Itogon, Benguet which he subcontracted for ACL
Construction." When asked by the Public Prosecutor what
he meant by his statement, Wilson Pideli categorically
admitted that Placido Cancio (the private complainant) is
his partner in the endeavor along Dalupirip Road, Itogon,
Benguet (TSN, November 22, 1999, p. 8). The testimony
of Wilson Pideli, instead of being corroborative, in effect,
weakened the cause of the defense. The rule is that
witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered. It has not
been uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the
basis of the testimony of a single witness (People v.
Gondora, 265 SCRA 408). Truth is established not by the
number of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies
(People v. Ferrer, 255 SCRA 190).
It is unfortunate that the evidence on record does not
disclose the agreement between the private complainant
and Wilson Pideli with regards to the sharing of the capital
(expenses) and profits on the project. Article 1790 of the
Civil Code, however, provides: "Unless there is stipulation
to the contrary, the partners shall contribute equal shares
to the capital of the partnership." Paragraph 1 of Article
1797 of the same code further provides: "The losses and
profits shall be distributed in conformity with the
agreement. If only the share of each partner in the profits
has been agreed upon, the share of each in the losses
shall be in the same proportion." Thus, it is safe for the
court to conclude that as a partner in the joint venture,
Placido Cancio is entitled to 1/2 share in the net
proceeds, i.e. P130,000.00 + 2 = P65,000.00.
The accused insists that private complainant and his
brother were not partners in the subcontract project.
According to him, he merely acted as guarantor of his
brother so the latter can withdraw construction materials
on credit from the Mt. Trail Farm Supply and Hardware.
As the guarantor, he was also the one who paid his
brothers credit when his brother was able to collect
payment. Thus, denying the charges filed against him.
Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence which
deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater
evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses
who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Paragua, 257
SCRA 118). Affirmative testimony is stronger than a
negative one. As between positive and categorical
testimony which has a ring of truth, on one hand, and a
bare denial, on the other hand, the former is generally
held to prevail (People v. Tuvilla, 259 SCRA).
Finding the testimony of the private complainant to be
more credible than that of the accused and his witnesses,
the court rules that the presumption of innocence
guaranteed by law in favor of the accused has been
overturned and must be convicted of the crime charged.
Article 309(1) of the Revised Penal Code
provides: Any person guilty of theft shall be
punished by:
"The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
and medium periods, if the value of the thing
stolen is more than P12,000.00, but does not
exceed P22,000.00; but if the value of the
thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the
penalty shall be the maximum period of the
one prescribed in this paragraph, and one
year for each additional ten thousand pesos,
but the total of the penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed
and for the purpose of the other provisions of
the code the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may
be." x x x
The penalty imposed upon those guilty of theft depends
on the amount stolen. Accused carted away P65,000.00
representing private complainants share in the next
proceeds of the project. Accuseds brother, Wilson Pideli,
however, gave the private complainant and this was
admitted by the latter the amount of P10,500.00 when the
latter kept on pestering him at the Rose Bowl Restaurant
and P5,000.00 at the initial (first) payment. Thus, the
amount of P10,500.00 and P5,000.00 should be deducted
from his net share of P65,000.00 leaving a balance
of P49,500.00 which is now the basis for the construction
of the penalty.13(Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner appealed to the CA. In a decision promulgated on April 30,
2003, the CA affirmed14 the trial court disposition.
Petitioner moved to reconsider the adverse judgment. The motion
was, however, denied with finality through a Resolution dated March
9, 2004.15
Issues
In this petition, petitioner imputes to the CA triple errors,
viz.:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING
THAT THE PROPERTY ALLEGEDLY STOLEN WAS
OWNED BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT THERE WAS
AN UNLAWFUL TAKING OF PERSONAL PROPERTY;
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT THE
ALLEGED TAKING BY THE PETITIONER WAS
ATTENDED WITH INTENT TO GAIN.16 (Underscoring
supplied)
Our Ruling
Prefatorily, the thrust of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 is the resolution only of questions of law.17Any peripheral factual
question addressed to this Court is beyond the ambit of this mode of
review.18 Indeed, well-entrenched is the general rule that the
jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the CA is
limited to reviewing or revising errors of law.19
The petition at bench raises not only questions of law but also of facts.
We are asked to recalibrate the evidence adduced by the parties and
to reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. On this ground alone, the
petition is dismissible.
We, however, deem it proper to delve into the merits of the present
petition considering that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole
case wide open for review.20
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the concept of the
crime of theft, viz.:
ART. 308. Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed by
any person who, with intent to gain but without violence
against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things,
shall take personal property of another without the latters
consent. x x x
Accordingly, the elements of theft are as follows:
1. That there be taking of personal property;
2. That said property belongs to another;
3. That the taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That the taking be done without the consent of the
owner; and
5. That the taking be accomplished without the use of
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things.21
There is, here, a confluence of the elements of theft. Petitioner
received the final payment due the partners Placido and Wilson under
the pretext of paying off their obligation with the MTFSH. Under the
terms of their agreement, petitioner was to account for the remaining
balance of the said funds and give each of the partners their
respective shares. He, however, failed to give private complainant
Placido what was due him under the construction contract.
In an effort to exculpate himself, petitioner posits that he cannot be
held liable for theft of the unaccounted funds. The monies subject
matter of the complaint pertain to the partnership. As an agent of
partner Wilson, intent to gain cannot be imputed against petitioner.
The CA correctly debunked petitioners postulation in the following
tenor:
We likewise find no merit in appellants contention that the
money did not belong to the private complainant as the
latter was only claiming for his share of P65,000.00; that it
was owned by the partnership and was for payment of
materials obtained from the supplier. Complainants share
in the amount of P65,000.00 manifestly belonged to and
was owned by the private complainant.
Appellants argument that since the money belonged to
the partnership, hence, cannot be the object of the crime
of theft as between the partners, and that appellant as
their agent acted in good faith and without intent to gain,
holds no water. Parenthetically, this argument is
inconsistent with the assertion of the defense witnesses
that complainant had no participation at all in the project,
and, hence, had no right to a share in its payment. In any
case, appellant was not complainants partner but his
brother. As for his alleged acting in good faith and without
intent of gain, it is jurisprudentially settled that intent is a
mental state, the existence of which is made manifest by
overt acts of the person. The intent to gain is presumed
from the taking of property appertaining to another.
Appellant presented a receipt dated November 18, 1997
allegedly evidencing his payment of P75,000.000 to Mt.
Trail Farm Supply and Hardware store. Granting
arguendo that appellant paid P75,000.00 to the Mt. Trail
Farm Supply and Hardware (which the trial court did not
grant credence), the same still does not exculpate him
from liability. The net income earned and disbursed to the
partnership of private complainant and Wilson Pideli
was P130,000.00 and a balance of P55,000.00 still
remained despite the alleged payment, which should be
divided into two (2) or P27,000.00 for each of them.
However, not a single centavo of this amount was
received by private complainant.
When appellant received the disbursement, he had only
physical custody of private complainants money, which
was supposed to be applied to a particular purpose, i.e.
settle the account with the supplier. Appellants failure to
do so or to return the money to the private complainant
renders him guilty of the crime of theft. This is in line with
the rulings of the Supreme Court in the case of United
States vs. De Vera, 43 Phil. 1000 (1929) that the delivery
of money to another for a particular purpose is a parting
with its physical custody only, and the failure of the
accused to apply the money to its specific purpose and
converting it to his own use gives rise to the crime of theft.
The basic principles enunciated in the De Vera case was
reiterated in the recent case of People vs. Tan, 323 SCRA
30, an Anti-Carnapping case, where the High Court ruled
that the unlawful taking or deprivation may occur after the
transfer of physical possession and, in such a case, "the
article (is considered as being) taken away, not received,
although at the beginning the article was, in fact, given
and received." We agree with the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) that appellant had but the
material/physical or de facto possession of the money and
his act of depriving private complainant not only of the
possession but also the dominion (apoderamiento) of his
share of the money such that he (the appellant) could
dispose of the money at will constitutes the element of
"taking" in the crime of theft.22 (Underscoring supplied)
Although there is misappropriation of funds here, petitioner was
correctly found guilty of theft. As early as U.S. v. De Vera,23 the Court
has consistently ruled that not all misappropriation is estafa. Chief
Justice Ramon C. Aquino, in his commentary on the Revised Penal
Code, succinctly opined:
The principal distinction between the two crimes is that in
theft the thing is taken while in estafa the accused
receives the property and converts it to his own use or
benefit. However, there may be theft even if the accused
has possession of the property. If he was entrusted only
with the material or physical (natural) or de
facto possession of the thing, his misappropriation of the
same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical
 possession of the thing, his conversion of the same occasions, from Wilson Pideli. Verily, only P49,500.00 is due private
constitutes embezzlement or estafa.24 complainant.
In De Vera, the accused, Nieves de Vera, received from Pepe, an Hence, the imposable penalty is the maximum period of prision
Igorot, a bar of gold weighing 559.7 grams for the purpose of having a mayor minimum and medium prescribed in the abovequoted first
silversmith examine the same, and bank notes amounting to P200.00 paragraph of Article 309. That period ranges from six (6) years and
to have them exchanged for silver coins. Accused appropriated the one (1) day to ten (10) years, plus one (1) year for every additional ten
bar of gold and bank notes. The Court ruled that the crime committed thousand pesos in excess of P22,000.00, which in this case is two (2)
was theft and not estafa since the delivery of the personal property did years for the excess amount of P27,500.00.
not have the effect of transferring the juridical possession, thus such Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term could
possession remained in the owner; and the act of disposal with gainful be twelve (12) years while the minimum term would fall under the next
intent and lack of owners consent constituted the crime of theft. lower penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
In People v. Trinidad,25 defendant received a finger ring from the periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years), to be imposed in
offended party for the purpose of pledging it as security for a loan any of its periods.
of P5.00 for the benefit of said offended party. Instead of pledging the Both the trial court and the CA sentenced petitioner to an
ring, the defendant immediately carried it to one of her neighbors to indeterminate penalty of four (4) years of prision correccional medium,
whom she sold it for P30.00 and appropriated the money to her own as minimum term, to twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as
use. The Court, citing De Vera, similarly convicted defendant of theft. maximum term. We sustain it. Petitioners civil liability is likewise
In People v. Locson,26 this Court considered deposits received by a maintained.
teller in behalf of a bank as being only in the material possession of WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED in full.
the teller. This interpretation applies with equal force to money SO ORDERED.
received by a bank teller at the beginning of a business day for the
purpose of servicing withdrawals. Such is only material possession.
Juridical possession remains with the bank. In line with the reasoning
of the Court in the above-cited cases, beginning with People v. De
Vera, if the teller appropriates the money for personal gain then the
felony committed is theft and not estafa. Further, since the teller
occupies a position of confidence, and the bank places money in the
tellers possession due to the confidence reposed on the teller, the
felony of qualified theft would be committed.
In People v. Isaac,27 this Court convicted a jeepney driver of theft and
not estafa when he did not return the jeepney to its owner since the
motor vehicle was in the juridical possession of its owner, although
physically held by the driver. The Court reasoned that the accused
was not a lessee or hirer of the jeepney because the Public Service
Law and its regulations prohibit a motor vehicle operator from entering
into any kind of contract with any person if by the terms thereof it
allows the use and operation of all or any of his equipment under a
fixed rental basis. The contract with the accused being under the
"boundary system," legally, the accused was not a lessee but only an
employee of the owner. Thus, the accuseds possession of the vehicle
was only an extension of the owners.
The doctrine was reiterated in the recent case of Roque v. People.28
Now, on the penalty. Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes
theft in the following tenor:
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be
punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more
than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos;
but if the value of the thing stolen exceed the latter
amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the
one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each
additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years.29 (Underscoring supplied)
The record bears out that private complainant originally
claimed P65,000.00 as his share in the partnership. However, he
admitted receiving the total amount of P15,500.00, on two separate
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 163705 July 30, 2007
NOMER OCAMPO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
On 22 May 1996, petitioner Nomer Ocampo, Elmer Miranda, and
Danilo Cruz were charged with the crime of robbery with physical
injuries. The Information reads:
That on or about the 14th day of November 1995, at around 8:15
oclock in the evening, in Barangay San Nicolas I, Municipality of
Magalang, Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent of gain and by means of force and intimidation
grab one Rommel Q. Misayah by the neck and armed with a bladed
weapon attack the latter, inflicting upon him physical injuries which
required and did require medical attendance, and on the occasion
thereof, accused in furtherance of their intent to gain did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away
with them the following, to wit:
a) One (1) Icom radio . . . 4,500.00
b) Two (2) T-shirts . . . 350.00
c) A pair of maong pants . . . 345.00
d) A clutch bag . . . 150.00
e) Cash . . . 29,000.00
with a total value of THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND THREE
HUNDRED FORTY FIVE (34,345.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, belonging to and owned by the said
Rommel Q. Misayah, to the damage and prejudice of the
owner, in the afore-said [sic] amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Records show that there was an Amended Information2 dated 17 July
1996 changing the crime charged to Robbery with Violence and
Intimidation against all of the accusedOcampo, Cruz and Miranda.
Arraignment ensued on 19 July 19963 where all of the accused
pleaded not guilty. Accused Cruz jumped bail during the pendency of
the trial and was tried in absentia.4
The prosecution presented and offered the testimony of Rommel Q.
Misayah and several documentary evidence.
Misayah testified that on 14 November 1995, at around 8:10 p.m., he
was walking along San Nicolas Street on his way home when three
male individuals approached him.5 As the place was sufficiently lighted
by a nearby post, he was able to identify the trio as accused Cruz,
Ocampo and Miranda. When the three accused were already near
him, Cruz grabbed Misayahs neck and choked him while Miranda
held his shoulder and got his shoulder bag.6Ocampo meanwhile was
in the middle, holding a knife, warning him not to fight back. Sensing
that he would be harmed anyway, Misayah fought back by pushing the
hands of the accused and trying to parry their blows. He and Cruz
then fell on the ground with Cruz on top of him. When the handle of his
shoulder bag snapped, all of the accused ran away with the shoulder
bag.7
By reason of the incident, Misayah sustained wounds in his hands
caused by the bladed weapon held by Ocampo when he attempted to
evade Ocampos blows.8 The shoulder bag taken from Misayah
contained the items enumerated in the aforequoted Information.
At the nearby Municipal Hall, Misayah reported the incident to Police
Officers de Leon, Mon Mendoza, and Catalino Mutuc.9 Misayah was
brought to Balitucan Emergency Hospital for treatment and thereafter
proceeded to the precinct. After further investigation, he then executed
a statement before Sr/Insp. Catalino Mutuc and SPO4 de Leon.10
In their defense, accused Ocampo, Miranda, and another witness,
Oliver Santos, gave their version of what happened that night.
Miranda testified that he was with Ocampo in the afternoon of 14
November 1995 to accompany the latter to borrow a wheelbarrow
from a certain Lut Ocampo.11 Miranda and Ocampo played chess until
6:00 in the evening at Lut Ocampos place while waiting for him to
arrive. As they were leaving that place, they met Cruz. Instead of
proceeding home, Ocampo invited Miranda for a drink at an
establishment identified as "Irmas" and Cruz went along with them.
That was already about 7:30 in the evening. While on their way to
Irmas, Cruz and Misayah "bumped each other and had an
altercation."12 Then Miranda informed his companions that he would
go ahead. Miranda was about one yard away from Cruz and Misayah
when he saw Cruz strangle Misayah. Claiming that he did not want to
get into trouble, he did not pacify Cruz and Misayah. He hurriedly left
and proceeded to Sally Felicianos house and stayed there until 11:00
in the evening. As he was in a hurry to leave the incident where the
altercation happened, he did not notice what happened to Ocampo.13
Ocampo, on his behalf, testified that he knew Misayah who has a drug
store in Magalang, Pampanga. At about 8:00 p.m. of 14 November
1995, he was walking with Miranda and Cruz on their way to Vannies
Restaurant when Cruz crossed the street and approached
Misayah.14 Ocampo and Miranda continued walking when Ocampo
saw Cruz choke Misayah and then have an exchange of fist blows.
Ocampo and Miranda did not assist Cruz as it was only a brief fist
fight. Ocampo saw Cruz run away while he and Miranda were left
behind. Ocampo and Miranda saw Misayah run towards the Municipal
Hall and the two proceeded to their respective homes.15
Defense witness Oliver Santos who knew the three accused testified
that on the evening of 14 November 1995, he was at Vannies videoke
having a drinking spree with his friends. At 9:00 p.m., he asked leave
from his friends to go ahead. While waiting for a motorcycle ride
outside of Vannies videoke, he saw Cruz and Misayah, whom he
knew as the owner of a drug store, acting as if they were strangling
each other. The fight took about a minute. He did not bother to do
anything because he was afraid and also because fighting was a
common incident in that area.16Santos was somewhat inebriated when
he witnessed the incident as he had consumed one (1) pitcher of draft
beer. However, he still recognized the faces of Misayah and Cruz. On
that occasion, he also saw Ocampo and Miranda walking towards the
town proper.17
All three accused were convicted by the trial court in a
decision18 dated 31 May 2000, which held:
WHEREFORE, finding the three (3) accused, Danilo Cruz, Nomer
Ocampo and Elmer Miranda @ Mitoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Robbery with Physical Injuries defined and penalized
under Article 294 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, with the presence of
an aggravating circumstance of conspiracy, they are hereby
sentenced to suffer each an imprisonment in an indeterminate penalty
of from [sic] eight (8) years to twenty one (21) days of prision mayor,
as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and to
indemnify the complainant Rommel Q. Misayah the amount of
34,345.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.
Ocampo and Miranda appealed their conviction to the Court of
Appeals. However, in its decision19 dated 10 February 2004, the Court
of Appeals affirmed with modification the trial courts decision, stating
thus:
As to the penalty, the crime of robbery with violence against persons is
penalized under par. 5, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code by
prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium. Considering
the attendant aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength
(not conspiracy as ruled by the trial court), which is not offset by any
mitigating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its
maximum period, which is prision mayor medium or from eight (8)
years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum of the imposable penalty shall be the
penalty next lower in degree which is arresto mayor maximum
to prision correccional medium, in any of its periods, or from four (4)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Thus,
appellants should have been meted the indeterminate penalty of from
[sic] 4 years and two months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years of prision mayor medium, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellants are hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from [sic] four (4)
years and two months of prision correccional, as minimum to eight (8)
years of prision mayor, as maximum. Costs against appellants,
SO ORDERED.20
Miranda did not challenge the affirmance of his conviction by the Court
of Appeals. On the other hand, Ocampo filed a Motion for
Reconsideration21 which was denied through a Resolution dated 20
May 2004.22 Ocampo alone then filed the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari.23
Ocampo argues that the appellate court erred in finding him criminally
liable because: (i) Misayahs testimony was uncorroborated; (ii) it was
unbelievable that Misayah would just walk on a slightly lighted street
when he is carrying a considerable amount of cash and other items;
(iii) there was no clear record that the prosecution presented any of
the police officers who apprehended and investigated petitioner; (iv)
the court failed to give credence to the testimony of Santos simply
because he was tipsy; (v) although Misayah claimed that he had been
grabbed by the neck, his medical certificate does not show any injury
on the neck or on the arm to confirm if he was indeed held by Miranda
on that part of his body; (vi) the examining doctor was not presented to
confirm the authenticity of the issued medical certificate and to be
cross-examined thereon; and (vii) it is very unlikely that Misayahs
shoulder bag could accommodate all the items he claimed to have
been contained therein. In sum, petitioner reiterates that the
prosecution failed to prove that he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime for which he is being charged.
Before proceeding to the merits of this case, certain observations from
the trial and appellate courts decisions have to be clarified.
The initial information filed by the prosecution in this case designated
the offense charged as Robbery with Physical Injuries.24 This was later
amended to Robbery with Violence and Intimidation.25 Yet, the trial
courts decision convicted the accused of Robbery with Physical
Injuries under Article 294 (5) of the Revised Penal Code. The
appellate court, on the other hand, affirmed the conviction under
Article 294 (5) but classified the crime as robbery with violence against
persons.
The variance in the assigned nomenclatures may give rise to the false
impression that robbery with physical injuries under Article 294 (5) of
the Revised Penal Code is distinct from robbery with intimidation as
well as robbery with violence against persons. The title or heading of
Article 294 reads "Robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons." Said heading is clearly the general nomenclature given to all
five (5) types of robbery enumerated
thereunder.26 Paragraphs 2 to 5 cover robbery with physical
injuries.27 Paragraph 5, in particular, defines what is known as simple
robbery. Simple robbery involves only slight or less serious physical
injuries.28 For conviction under this paragraph, the injury inflicted
should not fall within the categories provided for in paragraphs 1 to 4
of Article 294. Thus, over and above the dichotomy of the terms
employed, it is certain and beyond dispute that the three accused
were tried for the crime under Article 294 (5) of the Revised Penal
Code.
Now, to the merits.
The core of Ocampos arguments in this instant petition is that the
findings of the appellate court do not conform to the evidence on
record. It should be emphasized that factual matters cannot be raised
in a petition for review on certiorari before the Court as this Court is
limited to reviewing only questions of law.29 The findings of fact of the
trial court are binding upon this Court when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.30 Exceptions to this rule are when the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings and conclusions of the
trial court, or are not supported by the evidence on record.31 Absent
any ground to apply the exception to this instant case, there is no
reason, therefore, to disturb the findings of the lower courts.
Petitioner claims it was erroneous for the appellate court to give
credence to Misayahs uncorroborated evidence because it failed to
establish where his money and other valuables came from and his
injuries did not conform to the nature of the attack made on him as
well.
Based on the records, we cannot see how and why the questions
raised by petitioner can cast doubt on the credibility of the testimony of
Misayah. As Misayah owns a drug store, it is not unlikely that Misayah
would have 29,000.00 cash in his possession as he returned home
from a days work. With respect to the injuries suffered by Misayah, he
stated in his cross examination that he tried to parry the blows made
by all the accused by the use of his hands.32 Thus, it is believable that
his hands would bear the brunt of the blows. Further, Miranda himself
admitted during his direct examination that he "personally saw" Cruz
strangle Misayah.33
Moreover, we give weight to the trial courts observation that Misayah
testified "in a straightforward manner" and positively identified not only
Cruz as the one who choked him but also the other
two (2) accused.34 The testimony of a sole witness, though
uncorroborated, is sufficient for conviction if it is free from any sign of
impropriety or falsehood.35 The testimony of a lone eyewitness, if
found positive and credible by the trial court, is sufficient to support a
conviction especially when the testimony bears the earmarks of truth
and sincerity and had been delivered spontaneously, naturally and in a
straightforward manner.36 Indeed, the testimony of a single witness is
sufficient and needs no corroboration, save only in offenses where the
law expressly prescribes a minimum number of witnesses.37
On the lower courts disregard of defense witness Santoss testimony,
we have consistently held that where the credibility of witnesses is an
issue, the appellate court will generally not disturb the findings of the
trial court unless some facts and circumstances may have been
overlooked that may otherwise affect the result of the
case.38 The Court accords deference to the trial courts appraisal on a
witnesss credibility, or lack thereof, because of its superior advantage
in observing the conduct and demeanor of the witness while
testifying.39 Given that the observation of the trial court with respect to
Santos is supported by evidence, there is no ground to discredit the
trial and appellate courts assessment of Santoss testimony.
Petitioner likewise alleges that Misayahs testimony was filled with
inconsistencies such as his allegation that he immediately executed
an affidavit after the incident when in fact his affidavit was dated 20
November 1995 or six days after the incident. However, it is not
beyond reason if a victim like Misayah would immediately report the
incident but subsequently make a sworn statement days after the
incident especially when the victim, as did Misayah, suffered injuries
requiring medical attention. Moreover, the RTC records also show that
Misayah executed a separate sworn statement before SPO1
Mutuc, investigator of Magalang Police Station, on 16 November
199540 and the prosecution submitted another affidavit by Misayah
taken before SPO2 Rivera41 in its formal offer of evidence. It is not
unlikely, therefore, that several affidavits were in fact executed by
Misayah in the days immediately following the incident.
Even as petitioner challenges the evidence of the prosecution, he
downplays the inconsistencies of the testimonies of the witnesses for
the defense. Said inconsistencies, particularly on the witnesses
accounts of what proceeded after the incident, are material and have
rendered their testimonies implausible. It is hard to believe that there
was a mere lapse of memory of either Miranda or Ocampo on whether
they were indeed left behind together or whether one of them fled and
the other was left behind even before the departure of
Cruz.42 Certainly, one cannot fail to observe or at least recall later who
was with whom considering the gravity of the incident and the fact that
only three of them were together that evening.
More fundamentally, the defenses version of the incident is contrary
to human experience and behavior. As correctly pointed out by the
trial court:
It is incredible that accused Nomer Ocampo and Elmer Mirand[a] have
not done anything when their companion Danilo Cruz was in a fight
with complainant. The least they could do was to pacify the two
protagonists yet, they did not do this and
they proceeded to go to their respective way home as if nothing has
happened. If indeed the incident happened so fast and that the
accused Danilo Cruz and complainant Rommel Misayah separated
immediately after that "sudden strangling" of each other" [sic], the
least that Ocampo and Miranda could do [sic] was to wait and ask
Cruz what happened. Yet, again, they did not do this. x x x x43
Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness but must be credible in itself, such that the common
experience and observation of mankind can show it as probable under
the circumstances.44And, the best test of the credibility of a testimony
is its compatibility with human knowledge, observation and common
experience of man.45 Whatever is repugnant to these standards
becomes incredible and lies outside of judicial cognizance.46
On the conspiracy aspect, it is worthy of note that while the Court of fight back. While the evidence did not prove the existence of
Appeals in the body of its decision sustained the existence of conspiracy, it indelibly established that the accused took advantage of
conspiracy as held by the lower court47 yet in the penultimate their superior strength.55
paragraph of the decision as well as in the dispositive portion, it ruled Article 294, paragraph (5) of the Revised Penal Code fixes the penalty
out the presence of conspiracy. Thus: for simple robbery at prision correccional in its maximum period
As to the penalty, the crime of robbery with violence against persons is to prision mayor in its medium period, the range of which is from four
penalized under par. 5, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code by (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to ten (10)
prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium. Considering years.56 Considering the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
the attendant aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength superior strength, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum
(not conspiracy as ruled by the trial court),48 which is not offset by any period while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in
mitigating degree, which is arresto mayor maximum to prision
circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period, correccional medium in any of its periods, the range of which is four
which is prision mayor medium or from eight (8) years and one (1) (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.57
day to ten (10) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the We note that the appellate courts decision did not order the accused
minimum of the imposable penalty shall be the penalty next lower in to indemnify Misayah the amount of 34,345.00. The records do not
degree which is arresto mayor maximum to prision show that this amount had already been paid pursuant to the Decision
correctional medium, in any of its periods, or from four (4) months of the trial court dated 31 May 2000. Thus, we modify the appellate
and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Thus, appellant courts decision in this respect.
should have been meted the indeterminate penalty of from 4 years WHEREFORE, the decision dated 10 February 2004 of the Court of
and two months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused Ocampo is
years of prision mayor medium, as maximum. sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is months of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellants mayor as maximum. Petitioner Ocampo together with his other co-
are hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from four accused Miranda and Cruz are ordered to indemnify Rommel Q.
(4) years and two months of prision correccional, as minimum to Misayah the amount of 34,345.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in
eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum. Costs against case of insolvency. Costs against petitioner.
appellants. SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.49
It is a well-settled rule that the dispositive portion of the decision
prevails over the opinion, the former being the final order while the
opinion is an informal expression of the views of the court, thus
forming no part of the judgment.50Following this rule, the appellate
court thus found the presence of abuse of superior strength as an
aggravating circumstance but not conspiracy.
The appellate court is correct in ruling out conspiracy. The existence
of conspiracy cannot be presumed. The elements of conspiracy must
be proven beyond reasonable doubt.51 Conspiracy must be shown to
exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense
itself.52 Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it.53 It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before,
during, and after the commission of the crime. All taken together,
however, the evidence therefor must be reasonably strong enough to
show a community of criminal design.54
In the case at bar, there is no convincing evidence that all of the
accused had resolved to rob Misayah prior to the actual robbery. What
is evident is that the robbery that transpired was a spur of the moment
decision among the three accused. For one, Miranda and Ocampo
were consistent in their statement that they were on their way to have
a drink at the common time of the incident. For another, they saw
Misayah by chance. Still for another, there was no evidence that all of
the accused knew beforehand that Misayah would be passing by the
street where the robbery occurred that fateful evening. Neither was it
shown that the street was part of Misayahs regular route on his way
home.
According to Misayah in his testimony, Cruz grabbed his neck and
choked him while Miranda held his shoulder.1avvphi1Ocampo
meanwhile was in the middle, holding a knife and warning him not to
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 130508. April 5, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO
REGALA y ABRIOL, accused-appellant.
DECISION
GONZAGA_REYES, J.:
Armando Regala appeals from the judgment in Criminal Case No.
7929 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate,
Branch 46, 5th Judicial Region, convicting him of the crime of Robbery
with Rape.
The information against accused-appellant on November 27, 1995,
filed by 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jesus C. Castillo, reads
as follows: Sppedsc
"That on or about September 11, 1995, in the evening thereof, at
Barangay Bangon, Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate,
Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused
confederating together and helping one another, with intent to gain,
violence and intimidation upon persons, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously enter the kitchen of the house of Consuelo
Arevalo and when inside, hogtied said Consuelo Arevalo and
granddaughter Nerissa Regala (sic), take, steal, rob and carry away
cash amount of P3,000.00 and two (2) gold rings worth P6,000.00, to
the damage and prejudice of owner Consuelo Arevalo in the total
amount of P9,000.00, Philippine Currency; and in pursuance of the
commission of the crime of robbery against the will and consent of the
granddaughter Nerissa Regala (sic) wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
accused Armando Regala y Abriol has for two times sexually abused
and/or intercoursed with her, while hogtied on the bed and in the
kitchen.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
Accused-appellant was apprehended by the police four days after the
incident. He was identified at a police line-up by Nerissa and her
grandmother. Calrsc
The prosecution presented three witnesses: Dra. Conchita Ulanday,
Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, who personally examined
the rape victim; Nerissa Tagala, the rape victim, 17 years old, a third
year high school student; and her grandmother, Consuelo Arevalo,
who was her companion when the robbery with rape transpired at
Consuelos house.
The prosecutions version is stated in Appellees Brief as follows: Sccalr
"On September 11, 1995, at about 9:00 oclock in the evening at
Barangay Bangon, Aroroy, Masbate, then 16-year old victim Nerissa
Tagala and her grandmother (Consuelo Arevalo) were sleeping, when
appellant Armando Regala and his two other companions entered the
formers house. (pp. 6-7, TSN, August 26, 1996).
Appellant and his companions entered the house through the kitchen
by removing the pieces of wood under the stove. Appellant went to the
room of Nerissa and her grandmother and poked an 8-inch gun on
them, one after the other. (p. 8, TSN, August 26, 1996)
Nerissa and her grandmother were hogtied by appellant and his
companions. Thereafter, Nerissa was raped by appellant Armando
Regala in bed while her grandmother was on the floor. After the rape,
appellant and his two companions counted the money which they took
from the "aparador." (pp. 9-10, TSN, August 26, 1996)
Appellant and his companions then ran away with P3,000 in cash, 2
pieces of ring valued at P6,000 and two wrist watches worth P5,000.
(pp. 11-13, TSN, August 26, 1996)
The following day, September 12, 1995, Nerissa went to the Rural
Health Clinic of Aroroy, Masbate for medical examination. In the
Medical Report presented by Municipal Health Officer Dr. Conchita S.
Ulanday, it was shown that Nerissa sustained laceration of the hymen
at 4:00 oclock and 7:00 oclock positions (fresh wounds), indicating a
possible sexual assault upon the victim. (p. 16, TSN, August 26,
1996)[2]
The defense presented accused-appellant who testified that on
September 11, 1995, he was staying in the house of Antonio Ramilo at
barangay Syndicate, Aroroy, Masbate. Ramilo was the manager in the
gold panning business where accused-appellant was employed.
Antonio Ramilo testified and corroborated his defense and stated that
accused-appellant was in his house, which is about 5 kilometers away
from Barangay Bangon. Calrspped
The trial court held that the defense of alibi cannot overcome the
positive identification of the accused. The dispositive portion of the
judgment reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused
Armando Regala y Abriol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Robbery with Rape, as penalized under Par. 2 of Art. 294 of the
Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the victim Consuelo
Arevalo the sum of P9,000.00, the cash and value of the looted
articles; to indemnify the victim Nerissa Tagala the sum of P50,000.00
as moral damages, and the further sum of P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages. No subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs."[3]
Armando has appealed to this Court pleading that: Scedp
(1) THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXIST TO ESTABLISH CLEARLY THE
IDENTITY OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS PERPETRATOR OF
THE CRIME CHARGED.
(2) THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED.[4]
which alleged errors were discussed jointly.
In essence, accused-appellant questions the sufficiency of the
prosecutions evidence in identifying him as one of the perpetrators of
the crime charged. He claims that the complaining witness could not
have positively identified him as there was no electricity nor any light
in the place of the incident which took place at 9:00 oclock in the
evening. Consuelo Arevalo was able to identify accused-appellant only
after he was pinpointed by Nerissa, and made contradictory
statements in court when she stated that accused-appellant removed
his mask after she was hogtied, and later stated that accused-
appellant removed his mask before she was hogtied. The medico-
legal officer, Dr. Ulanday, herself testified that the complaining witness
either voluntarily submitted to a sexual act or was forced into one.
Edpsc
The appellee insists that appellants lame defense of alibi cannot stand
against the positive identification made by the victim, and avers that
the victim, a 16 year old barrio lass at the time the rape was
committed, was motivated by a sincere desire to seek and obtain
justice. The Solicitor General also recommends an additional award of
compensatory damages of P50,000.00 in favor of Nerissa Tagala. Edp
We affirm the judgment of conviction.
There was sufficient evidence to establish the identity of accused-
appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Misedp
Nerissa positively recounted the incident on the witness stand. She
was sleeping with her grandmother in the latters house when the
accused-appellant Regala, together with the unidentified companions
entered the house. Regala pointed a gun, about 8 inches long, at her
grandmother, and then at her, and hogtied both of them. Regala took
off her panty and her shorts, and removed his own "porontong" pants,
and made sexual intercourse ("itot") with her while she was hogtied in
bed. Her grandmother was at the floor. She saw the aparador of her
grandmother being opened. She could not shout because the gun was
pointed at her, and she was afraid. Two companions of the accused-
appellant entered the room as she was being raped. Two rings valued
at about P6,000.00 and 2 wrist watches (one "Seiko" and the other
"Citizen") and money was taken by the accused-appellant and his
companions. After raping her in bed, Nerissa saw accused-appellant
counting the money taken from the aparador. Thereafter, she was
brought to the kitchen, still hogtied, and raped again.[5] On cross-
examination, Nerissa stated that although there was no electricity, and
the light in the house was already off, she was able to see the face of
Regala because at the time Regala was counting the money, one of
his companions was holding the flashlight "beamed to the money" and
there was "some reflection" on the face of Regala[6] She remembered
the face of Regala because of an earring on his left ear[7] which he
was wearing when presented at the police line-up.[8]
Consuelo Arevalo testified and corroborated the testimony of her
granddaughter. Armando Regala entered the house with two
companions, hogtied her and Nerissa, and were asking for money.
After having sexual intercourse with Nerissa, Regala took P3,000.00 in
paper bills and coins from her aparador, and got a stainless Seiko
wristwatch and two gold rings valued at P6,000.00. She was able to
recognize Regala because of his earring on his left ear, and because
he was pinpointed by Nerissa at the police station. She was not able
to shout at the time because her mouth was gagged with a piece of
cloth by Regala.[9] On cross-examination, Consuelo Arevalo declared
that she was able to see Regala because he used her flashlight, and
he took off the mask he was wearing; she recognized Regala because
of his earring and his flat top hair cut.[10]
The Court gives its approbation to the finding of the trial court that the
evidence was sufficient to clearly establish the identity of Armando
Regala as the person who, with two companions, committed the crime
of robbery accompanied by rape on the night of September 11, 1995.
Nerissa Tagala positively identified Armando Regala because at the
time he was counting the money on her bed, the other companion of
the accused beamed the flashlight towards the money and there was
a reflection on the face of Regala. Although the three intruders were
wearing masks when they entered the house, they removed their
masks later.[11]
Our cases have held that wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight and
starlight may, in proper situations, be sufficient illumination, making
the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on this ground
unmeritorious.[12]
We are not persuaded by the contention of accused-appellant that the
contradictory replies of Consuelo Arevalo when asked whether Regala
removed his mask "before"[13] or "after"[14] she and Nerissa were
hogtied exposed the fact that she was not able to identify the accused-
appellant. The contradiction referred to a minor detail and cannot
detract from the fact that both Nerissa and Consuelo positively
identified Regala as there was a flashlight used to focus at the money
while it was being counted and there was a reflection on the face of
Regala. Both Nerissa and Consuelo remembered the earring on his
left ear, which he was still wearing at the time of the police line-up
inside the police station. Misoedp
Dr. Conchita Ulandays testimony does not support the contention of
accused-appellant that Nerissa voluntarily submitted to the sexual
advances of Regala. The admission of Dr. Ulanday that her findings
point to the fact that Nerissa "either voluntarily or was forced into
sexual act" does not prove that Nerissa voluntarily submitted to the
sexual act. Dr. Ulanday testified that there was suggested evidence of
penetration as shown by the two lacerations at 4 oclock and at 7
oclock which were fresh wounds. That the act was involuntary was
clearly established by the fact that Nerissa was hogtied when she was
sexually attacked. As correctly pointed out by appellee, Nerissa was a
16-year old barrio lass, not exposed to the ways of the world and was
not shown to have any ill-motive to falsely implicate accused-
appellant, who was a stranger. And as repeatedly pronounced by this
Court, it simply would be unnatural for a young and innocent girl to
concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private
parts and thereafter subject herself to a public trial or ridicule if she
was not, in fact, a victim of rape and deeply motivated by a sincere
desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished.[15]
The crime of robbery with rape was committed in 1995 when RA 7659
was already in force. Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended now provides, under paragraph 1 thereof: Edpmis
"1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when for any reason of results from the ordinary crime of rape to warrant per se an award of
or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been P50,000.00 as moral damages.[25]
committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape
or intentional mutilation or arson." WHEREFORE, the judgment convicting Armando Regala y Abriol
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape, is
The victim in the case at bar was raped twice on the occasion of the hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Nerissa Tagala is
robbery. There are cases[16] holding that the additional rapes entitled to an additional award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. Court
committed on the same occasion of robbery will not increase the
penalty. In People vs. Martinez,[17] accused Martinez and two (2) SO ORDERED.
other unidentified persons, who remained at large, were charged with
the special complex crime of robbery with rape where all three raped
the victim. The Court imposed the penalty of death after considering
two (2) aggravating circumstances, namely, nocturnidad and use of a
deadly weapon. However, the Court did not consider the two (2) other
rapes as aggravating holding that "(T)he special complex crime of
robbery with rape has, therefore, been committed by the felonious acts
of appellant and his cohorts, with all acts or rape on that occasion
being integrated in one composite crime." Jjsc

There are likewise cases[18] which held that the multiplicity of rapes
committed could be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. In
People vs. Candelario[19] where three (3) of the four (4) armed men
who robbed the victim "alternately raped her twice for each of them",
this Court, citing People vs. Obtinalia,[20] ruled that "(T)he
characterization of the offense as robbery with rape, however, is not
changed simply because there were several rapes committed. The
multiplicity of rapes should instead be taken into account in raising the
penalty to death." Scjj

It should be noted that there is no law providing that the additional

rape/s or homicide/s should be considered as aggravating
circumstance. The enumeration of aggravating circumstances under
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive as opposed to the
enumeration in Article 13 of the same code regarding mitigating
circumstances where there is a specific paragraph (paragraph 10)
providing for analogous circumstances. Sjcj

It is true that the additional rapes (or killings in the case of multiple
homicide on the occasion of the robbery) would result in an
"anomalous situation" where from the standpoint of the gravity of the
offense, robbery with one rape would be on the same level as robbery
with multiple rapes.[21] However, the remedy lies with the legislature.
A penal law is liberally construed in favor of the offender[22] and no
person should be brought within its terms if he is not clearly made so
by the statute.[23]

In view of the foregoing, the additional rape committed by herein

accused-appellant should not be considered as aggravating. The
penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court is proper.
Supreme

As regards the civil indemnity, we find well-taken the recommendation

of the Solicitor General that compensatory damages should be
awarded in the amount of P50,000.00. Nerissa Tagala is entitled to an
award of civil indemnity ex delicto of P50,000.00, which is given in
favor of the offended party in rape.[24] Also a conviction for rape
carries with it the award of moral damages to the victim since it is
recognized that the victims injury is concomitant with and necessarily
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 77368 October 5, 1993
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE C. DE GUZMAN, PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 93, AND SPOUSES
DANILO A. ALCANTARA AND ISABELITA ESGUERRA-
ALCANTARA, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
VITUG, J.:
Is the crime of "fencing" a continuing offense that could allow the filing
of an information therefor in the place where the robbery or theft is
committed and not necessarily where the property, unlawfully taken is
found to have later been acquired?
The above query is the sole issue in this Petition for certiorari and
mandamus filed by the People of the Philippines, praying for the
reversal, annulment and setting aside of the Order of 28 February
19861 of the respondent Judge, who has ruled in the negative, as well
as his Order, dated 21 March 1986,2 denying the motion for
reconsideration. The petitioner prays that the respondent Judge be
directed to assume jurisdiction over, and to proceed with the trial of,
the criminal case.
On 09 September 1985, robbery was committed in Quezon City in the
house of Jose L. Obillos, Sr., where various pieces of precious jewelry
alleged to be worth millions of pesos were taken. An information,
dated 30 September 1985, was instituted against the perpetrators in
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, docketed thereat
asCriminal Case No. G.R. No. 42078.3
Subsequently, an information, dated 22 October 1985, for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the "Anti-Fencing
Law," was also filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 93, docketed as Criminal Case No. 42433, against herein
respondent spouses Danilo A. Alcantara and Isabelita Esguerra-
Alcantara, from whose possession the jewelries stolen were recovered
in Antipolo, Rizal.4
The trial court, acting on the motion to quash filed by the accused
[now private respondents], issued the now questioned order of 28
February 1986, viz:
Before the Court is a Motion to Quash, filed by the accused thru
counsel, praying that the information filed against both accused be
quashed, on the ground that the Court has no jurisdiction to try the
offense charged. Among others, the motion alleges, that as per police
investigation, the crime took place in Antipolo, Rizal. For this reason,
Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612 is an independent crime,
separate and distinct from that of Robbery. The accused claims,
likewise, that jurisdiction to try the same is with the Court within which
territorial jurisdiction, the alleged fencing took place.
The Prosecution filed an opposition thereto, alleging among others,
that there is nothing in the law which prohibits the filing of a case of
fencing in the court under whose jurisdiction the principal offense of
robbery was committed. The prosecution claims further, that the
consideration in the enactment of PD 1612 was to impose a heavier
penalty on persons who profit by the effects of the crimes robbery or
theft.
On this point, we should not lose sight of the fact that in all criminal
prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
Municipality or Province wherein the offense was committed, or
anyone of the essential ingredients thereof took place.5
Since the alleged act of fencing took place in Antipolo, Rizal, outside
the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, and considering that all criminal
prosecutions must be instituted and tried in the Municipality or
Province where the offense took place, this Court, necessarily, does
not have jurisdiction over the instant case.
Wherefore, the above-entitled case is hereby QUASHED, without
prejudice to the filing of the corresponding action against the accused
in the Court having proper jurisdiction.
The private prosecutor's motion for reconsideration was denied in the
court's order of 21 March 1986.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Solicitor General argues that since an essential element of the
crime of fencing is the commission of robbery, in this case committed
in Quezon City, the information therefor filed in said City accords with
the provisions of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
and the refusal of the Court a quo to assume and exercise jurisdiction
thereover constitutes a serious error of law and a grave abuse of
discretion. He theorizes that fencing is a "continuing offense." He
explains that the Anti-Fencing Law has been enacted for the purpose
of imposing a heavier penalty on persons who profit from the effects of
the crime of robbery or theft, no longer merely as accessories under
Article 19, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, but as equally
guilty with the perpetrators of the robbery or theft itself.
In People vs. Ledesma,6 we said:
. . . A "continuous crime" is a single crime consisting of a series ofacts
arising from a single criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of
division. According to Cuello Calon, when the actor, there being unity
of purpose and of right violated, commits diverse acts each of which,
although of a delictual character merely constitutes a partial execution
of a single particular delict, such concurrence of delictual acts is called
a "delito continuado." For it to exist there should be plurality of acts
performed separately during a period of time; unity of penal provision
infringed upon or violated; unity of criminal intent or purpose, which
means that two or more violations of the same penal provision are
united in one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the
same criminal purpose or aim.
Robbery is the taking of personal property belonging to another, with
intent to gain, by means of violence against or intimidation of any
person, or using force upon anything.7 "Fencing", upon the other
hand, is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for
another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or
dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any
article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be
known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft.8
The crimes of robbery and fencing are clearly then two distinct
offenses. The law on fencing does not require the accused to have
participated in the criminal design to commit, or to have been in any
wise involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery or theft.
Neither is the crime of robbery or theft made to depend on an act of
fencing in order that it can be consummated. True, the object property
in fencing must have been previously taken by means of either
robbery or theft but the place where the robbery or theft occurs is
inconsequential. It may not be suggested, for instance, that, in the
crime of bigamy which presupposes a prior subsisting marriage of an
accused, the case should thereby be triable likewise at the place
where the prior marriage has been contracted.9
We are not unaware of a number of instances 10 when the Court
would allow a change of venue in criminal cases "whenever the
interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious and
weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally had
jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial
and lead to a miscarriage of justice." 11 Here, however, we do not see
the attendance of such compelling circumstances, nor are we
prepared to state that the lower court gravely abused its discretion in
its questioned orders.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is
DISMISSED, and the orders appealed from are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias "Beloy," and ENRIQUE
AMURAO y PUNO, alias "Enry," accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Edward C. Castaeda for accused-appellants.
REGALADO, J.:
The primal issue for resolution in this case is whether accused-
appellants committed the felony of kidnapping for ransom under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information; or a
violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974), as contended by the Solicitor General and
found by the trial court; or the offense of simple robbery punished by
Paragraph 5, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as claimed by
the defense.
In an information dated and filed on May 31, 1989 in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 103, as Criminal Case No. Q-57404
thereof, appellants were charged with kidnapping for ransom allegedly
committed in the following manner:
That on or about the 13th day of January, 1988 in Quezon City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, being then private individuals, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping each other, did, then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and carry away one
MARIA DEL SOCORRO SARMIENTO y MUTUC * for the purpose of
extorting ransom, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended
party in such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions
of the Civil Code.1
On a plea of not guilty when arraigned,2 appellants went to trial which
ultimately resulted in a judgment promulgated on September 26, 1990
finding them guilty of robbery with extortion committed on a highway,
punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532, with this disposition in
the fallo thereof:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
ISABELO PUNO and ENRIQUE AMURAO GUILTY as principals of
robbery with extortion committed on a highway and, in accordance
with P.D. 532, they are both sentenced to a jail term of reclusion
perpetua.
The two accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally the
offended private victim Ma. Socorro M. Sarmiento the sum of
P7,000.00 as actual damages and P3,000.00 as temperate
damages.3
Before us now in this appeal, appellants contend that the court a quo
erred (1) in convicting them under Presidential Decree No. 532 since
they were not expressly charged with a crime therein; (2) in applying
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court since the charge
under said presidential decree is not the offense proved and cannot
rightly be used as the offense proved which is necessarily included in
the offense charged.4
For the material antecedents of this case, we quote with approval the
following counter-statement of facts in the People's brief5 which
adopted the established findings of the court a quo, documenting the
same with page references to the transcripts of the proceedings, and
which we note are without any substantial divergence in the version
proffered by the defense.
This is a prosecution for kidnapping for ransom allegedly done on
January 13, 1988 by the two accused (tsn, Jan. 8, 1990, p. 7).
Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta
Avenue, Quezon City called Nika Cakes and Pastries. She has a
driver of her own just as her husband does (Ibid., pp. 4-6).
At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused
Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband
(who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of local election
there) arrived at the bakeshop. He told Mrs. Socorro that her own
driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency (something bad
befell a child), so Isabelo will temporary (sic) take his place (Id., pp. 8-
9).
Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so
she got into the Mercedes Benz of her husband with Isabelo on (sic)
the wheel. After the car turned right in (sic) a corner of Araneta
Avenue, it stopped. A young man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded
the car beside the driver (Id., pp. 9-10).
Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front
seat and went onto where Ma. Socorro was seated at the rear. He
poke (sic) a gun at her (Id., p. 10).
Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew announced,
"ma'm, you know, I want to get money from you." She said she has
money inside her bag and they may get it just so they will let her go.
The bag contained P7,000.00 and was taken (Id., pp. 11-14).
Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00 more. Ma.
Socorro agreed to give them that but would they drop her at her gas
station in Kamagong St., Makati where the money is? The car went
about the Sta. Mesa area. Meanwhile, Ma. Socorro clutched her
Rosary and prayed. Enrique's gun was menacingly storing (sic) at her
soft bread (sic) brown, perfumed neck. He said he is an NPA and
threatened her (Id., p.15).
The car sped off north towards the North superhighway. There
Isabelo, Beloy as he is called, asked Ma. Socorro to issue a check for
P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro complied. She drafted 3 checks in
denominations of two for P30 thousand and one for P40 thousand.
Enrique ordered her to swallow a pill but she refused (Id., pp. 17-23).
Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later, he changed
his mind and turned the car again towards Pampanga. Ma. Socorro,
according to her, jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side
of the superhighway and, after some vehicles ignored her, she was
finally able to flag down a fish vendors van. Her dress had blood
because, according to Ma. Socorro, she fell down on the ground and
was injured when she jumped out of the car. Her dress was torn too
(Id., pp. 23-26).
On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the matter to CAPCOM
(Id., p. 27).
(sic), because I need money and I had an ulcer and that I have been
Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was arrested trying to
encash Ma. Socorro's P40,000.00 check at PCI Bank, Makati. (tsn,
Oct. 18, 1989, pp. 10-13)6
As observed by the court below, the defense does not dispute said
narrative of complainant, except that, according to appellant Puno, he
stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed complainant to
step out of the car. He even slowed the car down as he drove away,
until he saw that his employer had gotten a ride, and he claimed that
she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the
highway.7
Appellants further testified that they brought the Mercedez Benz car to
Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga and parked it near a barangay or
police outpost. They thereafter ate at a restaurant and divided their
loot.8 Much later, when he took the stand at the trial of this case,
appellant Puno tried to mitigate his liability by explaining that he was in
dire need of money for the medication of his ulcers.9
On these relatively simple facts, and as noted at the start of this
opinion, three theories have been advanced as to what crime was
committed by appellants. The trial court cohered with the submission
of the defense that the crime could not be kidnapping for ransom as
charged in the information. We likewise agree.
Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in
the determination of the crime for which the accused should be held
liable in those instances where his acts partake of the nature of variant
offenses, and the same holds true with regard to the modifying or
qualifying circumstances thereof, his motive and specific intent in
perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable aids in arriving at a
correct appreciation and accurate conclusion thereon.
Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been held to be
relevant or essential to determine the specific nature of the crime as,
for instance, whether a murder was committed in the furtherance of
rebellion in which case the latter absorbs the former, or whether the
accused had his own personal motives for committing the murder
independent of his membership in the rebellious movement in which
case rebellion and murder would constitute separate offenses. 10
Also, where injuries were inflicted on a person in authority who was
not then in the actual performance of his official duties, the motive of
the offender assumes importance because if the attack was by reason
of the previous performance of official duties by the person in
authority, the crime would be direct assault; otherwise, it would only be
physical injuries. 11
In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had
any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they committed the
wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of money
from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation. This much is
admitted by both appellants, without any other esoteric qualification or
dubious justification. Appellant Puno, as already stated, candidly laid
the blame for his predicament on his need for funds for, in his own
testimony, "(w)hile we were along the way Mam (sic) Corina was
telling me "Beloy, I know your family very well and I know that your
(sic) not (a) bad person, why are you doing this?" I told her "Mam,
getting an (sic) advances from our office but they refused to give me
any bale (sic). . . ." 12
With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge
that they had kidnapped the victim, we can rely on the proverbial rule
of ancient respectability that for this crime to exist, there must be
indubitable proof that
the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party
of her liberty, 13 and not where such restraint of her freedom of action
was merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily
intended by the offenders. Hence, as early as United States vs.
Ancheta, 14 and consistently reiterated thereafter, 15 it has been held
that the detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims by the
accused, even for an appreciable period of time but for the primary
and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds the offenders liable for
taking their lives or such other offenses they committed in relation
thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims' liberty does not
constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention.
That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap or
deprive the complainant of her personal liberty is clearly demonstrated
in the veritably confessional testimony of appellant Puno:
Q At what point did Mrs. Sarmiento handed (sic) the bag
containing the P7,000.00 to your nephew?
A Santo Domingo Exit.
Q And how about the checks, where were you already when
the checks was (sic) being handed to you?
A Also at the Sto. Domingo exit when she signed the
checks.
Q If your intention was just to robbed (sic) her, why is it that
you still did not allow her to stay at Sto. Domingo, after all you already
received the money and the checks?
A Because we had an agreement with her that when she
signed the checks we will take her to her house at Villa (sic) Verde.

Q And why did you not bring her back to her house at Valle
Verde when she is (sic) already given you the checks?
A Because while we were on the way back I (sic) came to
my mind that if we reach Balintawak or some other place along the
way we might be apprehended by the police. So when we reached
Santa Rita exit I told her "Mam (sic) we will already stop and allow you
to get out of the car." 16
Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as
equivalent to or in the nature of ransom, considering the immediacy of
their obtention thereof from the complainant personally. Ransom, in
municipal criminal law, is the money, price or consideration paid or
demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment
that releases from captivity. 17 It can hardly be assumed that when
complainant readily gave the cash and checks demanded from her at
gun point, what she gave under the circumstances of this case can be
equated with or was in the concept of ransom in the law of kidnapping.
These were merely amounts involuntarily surrendered by the victim
upon the occasion of a robbery or of which she was summarily
divested by appellants. Accordingly, while we hold that the crime
committed is robbery as defined in Article 293 of the Code, we,
however, reject the theory of the trial court that the same constitutes
the highway robbery contemplated in and punished by Presidential
Decree No. 532.
The lower court, in support of its theory, offers this ratiocination:
The court agrees that the crime is robbery. But it is also clear from the
allegation in the information that the victim was carried away and
extorted for more money. The accused admitted that the robbery was
carried on from Araneta Avenue up to the North Superhighway. They
likewise admitted that along the way they intimidated Ma. Socorro to
produce more money that she had with her at the time for which
reason Ma. Socorro, not having more cash, drew out three checks. . . .
In view of the foregoing the court is of the opinion that the crimes
committed is that punishable under P.D. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law of 1974) under which where robbery on the
highway is accompanied by extortion the penalty is reclusion
perpetua.18
The Solicitor General concurs, with the observation that pursuant to
the repealing clause in Section 5 of said decree, "P.D. No- 532 is a
modification of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly
Article 267 which
are inconsistent with it." 19 Such opinion and complementary
submission consequently necessitate an evaluation of the correct
interplay between and the legal effects of Presidential Decree No. 532
on the pertinent Provisions of the Revised Penal Code, on which
matter we are not aware that any definitive pronouncement has as yet
been made.
Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General, Presidential
Decree No. 532 is not a modification of Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code on kidnapping and serious illegal detention, but of Articles
306 and 307 on brigandage. This is evident from the fact that the
relevant portion thereof which treats of "highway robbery" invariably
uses this term in the alternative and synonymously with brigandage,
that is, as "highway robbery/brigandage." This is but in line with our
previous ruling, and which still holds sway in criminal law, that highway
robbers (ladrones) and brigands are synonymous. 20
Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage (bandolerismo) in
order to put our discussion thereon in the proper context and
perspective, we find that a band of brigands, also known as
highwaymen or freebooters, is more than a gang of ordinary robbers.
Jurisprudence on the matter reveals that during the early part of the
American occupation of our country, roving bands were organized for
robbery and pillage and since the then existing law against robbery
was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the
Brigandage Law was passed. 21
The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are
succinctly explained in a treatise on the subject and are of continuing
validity:
The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of
bands of robbers. The heart of the offense consists in the formation of
a band by more than three armed persons for the purpose indicated in
art. 306. Such formation is sufficient to constitute a violation of art.
306. It would not be necessary to show, in a prosecution under it, that
a member or members of the band actually committed robbery or
kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent means. The
crime is proven when the organization and purpose of the band are
shown to be such as are contemplated by art 306. On the other hand,
if robbery is committed by a band, whose members were not primarily
organized for the purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping, etc.,
the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because
robbery was committed by a band of more than three armed persons,
it would not follow that it was committed by a band of brigands. In the
Spanish text of art. 306, it is required that the band "sala a los campos
para dedicarse a robar." 22 (Emphasis supplied).
In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway
robbery. If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only
robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed
participants. 23 The martial law legislator, in creating and
promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the objectives
announced therein, could not have been unaware of that distinction
and is presumed to have adopted the same, there being no indication
to the contrary. This conclusion is buttressed by the rule on
contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from the time
when and the circumstances under which the decree to be construed
originated. Contemporaneous exposition or construction is the best
and strongest in the law. 24
Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway
robbery or brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws
indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways
as defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed against only a
predetermined or particular victim, is evident from the preambular
clauses thereof, to wit:
WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that
lawless elements are still committing acts of depredation upon the
persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who
travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing the peace, order
and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social
progress of the people:
WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute . . . highway
robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of
lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged
from perpetrating such acts of depredaions by imposing heavy penalty
on the offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all obstacles to the
economic, social, educational and community progress of the people.
(Emphasis supplied).
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a
particular person chosen by the accused as their specific victim could
be considered as committed on the "innocent and defenseless
inhabitants who travel from one place to another," and which single act
of depredation would be capable of "stunting the economic and social
progress of the people" as to be considered "among the highest forms
of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries," and
would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the economic, social,
educational and community progress of the people, " such that said
isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or brigandage
contemplated and punished in said decree. This would be an
exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.
True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to
Articles 306 and 307 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the
penalties, albeit limiting its applicability to the offenses stated therein
when committed on the highways and without prejudice to the liability
for such acts if committed. Furthermore, the decree does not require
that there be at least four armed persons forming a band of robbers;
and the presumption in the Code that said accused are brigands if
they use unlicensed firearms no longer obtains under the decree. But,
and this we broadly underline, the essence of brigandage under the
Code as a crime of depredation wherein the unlawful acts are directed
not only against specific, intended or preconceived victims, but against
any and all prospective victims anywhere on the highway and
whosoever they may potentially be, is the same as the concept of
brigandage which is maintained in Presidential Decree No. 532, in the
same manner as it was under its aforementioned precursor in the
Code and, for that matter, under the old Brigandage Law. 25
Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to the
fact that the crime of robbery committed by appellants should be
covered by the said amendatory decree just because it was committed
on a highway. Aside from what has already been stressed regarding
the absence of the requisite elements which thereby necessarily puts
the offense charged outside the purview and intendment of that
presidential issuance, it would be absurd to adopt a literal
interpretation that any unlawful taking of property committed on our
highways would be covered thereby. It is an elementary rule of
statutory construction that the spirit or intent of the law should not be
subordinated to the letter thereof. Trite as it may appear, we have
perforce to stress the elementary caveat that he who considers merely
the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its meaning, 26 and
the fundamental rule that criminal justice inclines in favor of the milder
form of liability in case of doubt.
If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway
would be the determinant for the application of Presidential Decree
No. 532, it would not be farfetched to expect mischievous, if not
absurd, effects on the corpus of our substantive criminal law. While we
eschew resort to a reductio ad absurdum line of reasoning, we
apprehend that the aforestated theory adopted by the trial court falls
far short of the desideratum in the interpretation of laws, that is, to
avoid absurdities and conflicts. For, if a motor vehicle, either stationary
or moving on a highway, is forcibly taken at gun point by the accused
who happened to take a fancy thereto, would the location of the
vehicle at the time of the unlawful taking necessarily put the offense
within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 532, thus rendering
nugatory the categorical provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of
1972? 27 And, if the scenario is one where the subject matter of the
unlawful asportation is large cattle which are incidentally being herded
along and traversing the same highway and are impulsively set upon
by the accused, should we apply Presidential Decree No. 532 and
completely disregard the explicit prescriptions in the Anti-Cattle
Rustling Law of 1974? 28
We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact that
the robbery in the present case was committed inside a car which, in
the natural course of things, was casually operating on a highway, is
not within the situation envisaged by Section 2(e) of the decree in its
definition of terms. Besides, that particular provision precisely defines
"highway robbery/brigandage" and, as we have amply demonstrated,
the single act of robbery conceived and committed by appellants in
this case does not constitute highway robbery or brigandage.
Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is
simple robbery defined in Article 293 and punished under Paragraph 5
of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in
its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. Appellants
have indisputably acted in conspiracy as shown by their concerted
acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of purpose. In the
determination of their respective liabilities, the aggravating
circumstances of craft 29 shall be appreciated against both appellants
and that of abuse of confidence shall be further applied against
appellant Puno, with no mitigating circumstance in favor of either of
them. At any rate, the intimidation having been made with the use of a
firearm, the penalty shall be imposed in the maximum period as
decreed by Article 295 of the Code.
We further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the conviction
of appellants of the crime of simple robbery upon an information
charging them with kidnapping for ransom, since the former offense
which has been proved is necessarily included in the latter offense
with which they are charged. 30 For the former offense, it is sufficient
that the elements of unlawful taking, with intent to gain, of personal
property through intimidation of the owner or possessor thereof shall
be, as it has been, proved in the case at bar. Intent to gain (animus
lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an information where it is
charged that there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and
appropriation by the offender of the things subject of the robbery. 31

These foregoing elements are necessarily included in the information

filed against appellants which, as formulated, allege that they wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnapped and extorted ransom from the
complainant. Such allegations, if not expressly but at the very least by
necessary implication, clearly convey that the taking of complainant's
money and checks (inaccurately termed as ransom) was unlawful,
with intent to gain, and through intimidation. It cannot be logically
argued that such a charge of kidnapping for ransom does not include
but could negate the presence of any of the elements of robbery
through intimidation of persons. 32

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET

ASIDE and another one is rendered CONVICTING accused-
appellants Isabelo Puno y Guevarra and Enrique Amurao y Puno of
robbery as Punished in Paragraph 5 of Article 294, in relation to Article
295, of the Revised Penal Code and IMPOSING on each of them an
indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
maximum, and jointly and severally pay the offended party, Maria del
Socorro M. Sarmiento, the amounts of P7,000.00 as actual damages
and P20,000.00 as moral damages, with costs.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138470. April 1, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ARTEMIO
GARCIA y CRUZ, JR. and REGALADO
BERNABE yORBE, accused.
REGALADO BERNABE y ORBE, appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision[1] dated March 10, 1999 of
the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 21, in Criminal
Case No. 830-M-98, finding Artemio Garcia y Cruz, Jr. and Regalado
Bernabe y Orbe guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Carnapping with Homicide and sentencing them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
On June 3, 1998, Artemio Garcia, Jr. and Regalado Bernabe
were charged with the crime of Carnapping with Homicide as defined in
Republic Act No. 6539. The Information against them reads:
That on or about the 21st day of December, 1996, in the municipality of
San Rafael, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating together and helping with each other, with
intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
and by means of violence and intimidation, forcibly take from the driver
Wilfredo Elis a brand new Toyota Tamaraw FX with Plate No. UJL-761
owned by Fernando Ignacio;
That during the commission of the offense, or by reason thereof, the
said accused, armed with bladed weapons, conspiring, confederating
and helping each other, did then and there, with intent to kill, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab Wilfredo Elis in
different parts of his body causing mortal wounds which directly
resulted in his death.
Contrary to law.[2]
Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Thereafter, the case was tried on the merits.
It appears from the record that on December 17, 1996, Joselito
Cortez, a taxicab operator based in Marilao, Bulacan, was approached
by Garcia and Bernabe because they wanted to borrow his brand new
Mitsubishi L300 van for their trip to the Bicol region. Cortez refused,
saying that the van was unavailable.
Instead, he got in touch with Ferdinand Ignacio, who had just
purchased a brand new Toyota Tamaraw FX for P475,500.00.[3] Ignacio
agreed to lease his vehicle to Cortez for two days at the daily rate of
P2,000.00. Bernabe and Garcia, on the other hand, rented the vehicle
from Cortez for P4,000.00 a day inclusive of the P500.00 drivers fee.
They agreed to pay the rental fee upon their return from Bicol.[4]
In the early morning of December 18, 1996, Cortez and his
driver, Wilfredo Elis, picked up Ignacios Tamaraw FX at his residence
in Meycauayan, Bulacan. Elis drove the same back to Marilao, Bulacan
and, at 8:00 a.m., he and the two accused left for Bicol.[5]
Four days passed without a word from Garcia and Bernabe.
Cortez began to worry about the vehicle he had borrowed from
Ferdinand Ignacio so he informed the Barangay Captain of Saog,
Marilao, Bulacan. Meanwhile, Elis wife, Nancy, approached Cortez and
asked where her husband was.[6]
In the afternoon of December 23, 1996, SPO2 Emmanuel
Lapurga of the Moncada, Tarlac Police notified the Chief of Police that
two suspicious looking persons were seen selling a vehicle in Anao,
Tarlac at the grossly inadequate price of P50,000.00. The Chief of
Police immediately formed a team,[7] but when they reached Anao,
Tarlac, they found out that the two accused had already left for
Nampicuan, Nueva Ecija. The team thereafter coordinated with the
Nueva Ecija Police. The two accused were seen in front of a store in
Brgy. Pangayan, Nampicuan, Nueva Ecija. When they failed to produce
documents of ownership over the Tamaraw FX, they were brought to
the Moncada Police Station for investigation.[8]
Garcia and Bernabe admitted to the Moncada Police that they
attempted to sell the Tamaraw FX belonging to Ferdinand Ignacio. In
the early morning of December 24, 1996, a joint team of police officers
composed of members of the Moncada and Marilao Police, together
with the Barangay Captain of Saog, Marilao, Bulacan, were
accompanied by Cortez to Moncada, Tarlac, where the latter positively
identified Ignacios Tamaraw FX.
Cortez went to visit Garcia and Bernabe in detention. They
admitted to him that they stabbed Elis and dumped him along the
highway near the sabana in San Rafael, Bulacan. They claimed that
they were compelled to eliminate Elis when he refused to join their plan
to sell the Tamaraw FX. Garcia brought the policemen, together with
Cortez and the Barangay Captain, to San Rafael, Bulacan where he
pointed to the place where they killed Elis. However, the police were
unable to find Elis body. After returning to Moncada, Cortez immediately
inspected the interior of the vehicle and found bloodstains on the side
and back of the drivers seat. He also found several personal items
belonging to Elis, such as his clothes and drivers license,[9] as well as
Garcias bag which contained bonnets, tear gas, the warranty card and
the car registration papers.[10]
On December 29, 1996, the Moncada police received
information that a male cadaver was found in San Rafael, Bulacan,
submerged in mud ten meters away from where they searched
earlier. The cadaver was identified as that of Wilfredo Elis by his wife,
Nancy.[11]
Dr. Benito Caballero, Municipal Health Officer and Medico-Legal
Officer of the province of Bulacan, who performed the autopsy, found
four stab wounds in the posterior, one stab wound in the lateral and one
on the left side of the thorax. He opined that the wounds which
penetrated the abdomen and lungs were fatal.[12]
In their defense, Garcia and Bernabe alleged that they agreed
to rent the subject vehicle for a period of five days from December 18,
1996; that Garcia and Elis had a fight because the latter allegedly did
not want to go with them to Nueva Ecija; that Elis, while driving the
Tamaraw FX, bumped a passenger jeepney along Baliuag Highway;
that they left Elis along the Baliuag Highway at 3:30 a.m. so he can
inform Cortez that they were already in Bulacan and were en route to
Nueva Ecija to have the dented portion of the vehicle fixed.[13]
After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, this Court finds and so holds
that the prosecution has been able to establish the accuseds criminal
culpability. In view thereof, Artemio Garcia y Cruz, Jr. and Regalado
Bernabe y Orbe are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the special complex crime of Carnapping with Homicide in violation
of Republic Act No. 6539 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
Accordingly, absent any circumstances that will aggravate the
commission thereof, both of them are hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Further, both accused are hereby
ordered jointly and severally to indemnify the heirs of Wilfredo Elis, the
sum of P50,000.00; to pay them the amount of P100,000.00 for moral
damages; P15,290.00 for actual/ compensatory damages; and
P250,000.00 for loss of earnings.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Both accused appealed from the decision of the trial court. On
March 31, 2000, accused Garcia filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw
Appeal,[15] which was granted in a Resolution dated September 27,
2000.
Appellant Bernabe raises the following assignment of errors:
I crimes of unlawful taking of property through intimidation or violence, it
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALL
THE ELEMENTS OF CARNAPPING AS DEFINED IN REPUBLIC
ACT 6539 (ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT) AS AMENDED ARE PRESENT
AND DULY PROVEN.
II
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
ACCUSED-APPELLANT BERNABE WAS PART OF AN ALLEGED
CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT CARNAPPING.
III
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT BERNABE ON THE BASIS OF HIS
ALLEGED ADMISSION OF THE CRIME TO PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS.
Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as An Act Preventing
and Penalizing Carnapping, defines carnapping as the taking, with
intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latters
consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or
by using force upon things.[16] More specifically, the elements of the
crime are as follows:
1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
2. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle;
3. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender
himself;
4. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that
the taking was committed by means of violence against or intimidation
of persons, or by using force upon things.[17]
A careful examination of the evidence presented shows
that all the elements of carnapping were proved in this case.
Unlawful taking is the taking of a vehicle without the consent of
the owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons,
or by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment
the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity
to dispose of the same.[18]
In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that the nature of the
appellants possession of the Tamaraw FX was initially
lawful. Nevertheless, the unlawful killing of the deceased for the
purpose of taking the vehicle radically transformed the character of said
possession into an unlawful one. Cortez categorically stated that during
his first visit to the Moncada Police Station where appellant and his co-
accused were detained, the two separately admitted to him that they
killed the deceased when the latter refused to join their plan to sell the
vehicle. Their confession, having been freely and voluntarily given to
Cortez, a private individual, is admissible against the appellant.[19] Thus,
the duration of the lease of the Tamaraw FX, whether for an indefinite
period as contended by the defense, or only for 4 days, as claimed by
the prosecution, has no bearing on the culpability of the appellant. It
does not matter whether the unlawful taking occurred within the period
of the lease. What is decisive here is the purpose of appellant and his
co-accused in killing the victim. Such is the vital point on which the crime
and the nature thereof is to be determined. To reiterate, the prosecution
was able to establish that appellant and his co-accused stabbed the
victim to death because he refused to join them in their plan to
appropriate the vehicle. This undoubtedly satisfied the element of
unlawful taking through violence, rendering appellant liable for the crime
charged.
Moreover, it must be stressed that the acts committed by
appellant constituted the crime of carnapping even if the deceased was
the driver of the vehicle and not the owner. The settled rule is that, in
is not necessary that the person unlawfully divested of the personal
property be the owner thereof. What is simply required is that the
property taken does not belong to the offender. Actual possession of
the property by the person dispossessed suffices. So long as there
is apoderamiento of personal property from another against the latter's
will through violence or intimidation, with animo de lucro, unlawful taking
of a property belonging to another is imputable to the offender. [20]
Furthermore, at the time of their apprehension, appellant
Bernabe and Garcia were unable to give a plausible explanation why
they still had the Tamaraw FX in their possession. Appellant Bernabe
claims that he and his co-accused went to Nampicuan, Nueva Ecija to
have the dent on the vehicle repaired. Garcia, on the other hand,
testified that there was no such damage. A person in possession of a
stolen article is presumed guilty of having illegally and unlawfully taken
the same unless he can satisfactorily explain his possession of the
thing.[21]
Appellant contends that he did not conspire with his co-accused
to commit the crime of carnapping.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it. Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence and may be
inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime,[22] which are indicative of a joint purpose,
concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.[23] In conspiracy, the
act of one is the act of all. Conspiracy is present when one concurs with
the criminal design of another, indicated by the performance of an overt
act leading to the crime committed. It may be deduced from the mode
and manner in which the offense was perpetrated.[24]
In the case at bar, it was sufficiently proved that Garcia and
Bernabe, through Joselito Cortez, hired the brand new Toyota Tamaraw
FX belonging to Ferdinand Ignacio for their trip to Bicol; that at 8:00 a.m.
of December 18, 1996, they left for Bicol on board the Tamaraw FX
driven by Elis; that on December 23, 1996, SPO2 Emmanuel Lapurga
of Moncada, Tarlac reported to the Chief of Police that two suspiciously
looking persons, who turned out to be Garcia and Bernabe were offering
to sell a brand new Toyota Tamaraw FX for a mere P50,000.00 in Anao,
Tarlac; and that the two were finally apprehended with the subject
vehicle at Nampicuan, Nueva Ecija by elements of the Tarlac and
Nueva Ecija Police.
While there may be no direct evidence of the commission of the
crime, the foregoing constitute circumstantial evidence sufficient to
warrant Garcias and Bernabes conviction. The following requisites for
circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction were met, to wit: (1)
there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.[25] The circumstances indeed form an unbroken chain which
leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that Bernabe and Garcia were
the perpetrators of the crime. It has been held that facts and
circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence
constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may surpass
even direct evidence in its effect upon the court.[26]
The records show that Garcia and Bernabe admitted to Cortez
and Ignacio that they were responsible for taking the vehicle and killing
the victim, Elis. On December 24, 1996, Cortez went to the Moncada
Municipal Jail and talked to them while they were detained. Both
admitted to him that they forcibly took the said vehicle from Elis, stabbed
him and thereafter dumped him at San Rafael,
Bulacan.[27]Subsequently, on December 26, 1996, Cortez and Ignacio
went to Moncada and confronted the two in their cells. Garcia admitted
to Cortez and Ignacio that they stole the vehicle because they were in
dire need of money, while Bernabe kept quiet.[28]
Appellant Bernabe maintains that the trial court erred in
admitting in evidence his admission to Cortez and Ignacio on the
grounds that (a) he did not make such admission; (b) the admission
made by Garcia should not prejudice him; and (c) assuming he made
such admission, it should be excluded for having been made under
duress and intimidation.[29]
In People v. Andan,[30] it was held that the constitutional
procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given
in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having
committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory
disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Article
III, Section 12 of the Constitution are guaranteed to preclude the
slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit
something false, and not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily
telling the truth. Hence, appellants voluntary admission to Cortez that
he and his co-accused conspired in killing the deceased when the latter
opposed their plan to sell the vehicle is admissible as evidence against
him.
Anent Garcias extrajudicial confession implicating appellant in
the commission of the offense, it appears that the latter did not oppose
or affirm Garcias statement. Neither did he make an attempt to refute
the same insofar as his participation in the commission of the crime was
concerned. As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General,
he cannot invoke his silence during this crucial moment as his right.He
ought to speak and failing to do so, his silence weighs heavily on
him. Thus, it was not accused-appellants Garcias admission that
prejudiced accused-appellant Bernabe, but his own silence when it was
such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true.[31]
Rule 130, Section 32 of the Rules of Court provides that an act
or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing or
observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or
declaration is such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true,
and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in
evidence against him.
We likewise find no merit in the allegation that duress was
employed on appellant. Suffice it to state that such bare allegation of
force and duress is not enough to prove that he was indeed tortured to
admit complicity in the offense charged.
The penalty for carnapping is provided in Section 14 of RA 6539,
as amended by Section 20 of RA 7659, to wit:
Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping.- Any person who is found guilty of
carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall,
irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by
imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and
not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping
is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon
things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and
four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person,
or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof.[32] (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua on appellant Bernabe and his co-accused, Garcia.
The award by the trial court of P50,000.00 in favor of the heirs
of the victim should be affirmed. When death occurs as a result of a
crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to such amount as
indemnity for the death, without need of any evidence of proof of
damages.[33] This is in addition to the actual damages of P15,290.50
which was duly substantiated by proof.[34] We, however, reduce the
award of moral damages to P50,000.00, in line with current
jurisprudence.[35]
Lastly, we find the court a quos award of P250,000.00 for loss
of earning capacity to be without basis. Nancy testified that her husband
Wilfredo was earning P600.00 a day prior to his death,[36] however, she
failed to produce evidence to substantiate her claim. As held in the case
of People v. Panabang,[37] a self-serving statement is not enough; the
indemnification for loss of earning capacity must be duly proven.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated March 10, 1999, of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 21, finding appellant
Regaldo Bernabe y Orbe guilty of Carnapping with Homicide,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering
him to pay the heirs of the victim, Wilfredo Elis, the sums of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity and P15,290.00 as actual damages, is AFFIRMED
with the following MODIFICATIONS: Appellant is further ordered to pay
the heirs of the victim, Wilfredo Elis, moral damages in the reduced
amount of P50,000.00. The award of P250,000.00 for loss of earnings
is DELETED for lack of factual basis.
Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.