EN BANC
I
A.C. No. 7353, November 16, 2015
NELSON P. VALDEZ, Petitioner, v. ATTY.
ANTOLIN ALLYSON DABON, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment
filed by Nelson P. Valdez (Nelson) against Atty.
Antolin Allyson M. Dabon, Jr. (Atty. Dabon)
anchored on the ground of grossly immoral and
indecent conduct which transgressed the high
moral standards required for membership in the
Bar.
The Position of the Complainant
Complainant Nelson charged respondent Atty.
Dabon, a Division Clerk of Court of the Court of
Appeals (CA), with gross immorality for allegedly
carrying on an adulterous relationship with his
wife, Sonia Romero Valdez (Sonia), which was
made possible by sexual assaults and maintained
through threat and intimidation.
In his Affidavit-Complaint,1 dated September 13,
2006, Nelson averred, among others, that he
married Sonia on January 28, 1998 in Paniqui,
Tarlac; that Sonia was employed as Court
Stenographer of the CA from 1992 until her
resignation on May 15, 2006;2 that Sonia admitted
to have had an adulterous and immoral
relationship with Atty. Dabon, from 2000 to 2006,
a span of more than five years; that he came to
know of the relationship only on April 18, 2006
after receiving an anonymous text message
hinting/stating about the existence of an illicit
affair between the two; and that initially, Sonia
denied the affair but eventually broke down and
admitted her sexual liaison with Atty. Dabon when
confronted with a text message he received from
Atty. Jocelyn Dabon (Atty. Joy), the wife of the
respondent, on May 4, 2006 at about 9:47 o'clock
in the morning, which stated:
Nelson, Jun and I were separating I will file an
annulment anytime soon, although I'm in great
pain, I ask for your apology and forgiveness for
everything he is leaving for US and I hope he
evolves into a strong and mature person there. D
cya masamang tao, just emotional and easily
manipulated. Sana don't blame him entirely bee.
he is d type that never initiate things. He is passive
and tame. He was honest with me and I hope
Sonia would find d courage to tell d truth to you.
just pray for peace and fresh start for all of us. I
just want to go on with my life and use above all
these for my son's sake. I love jun and I appeal to
you n asana wala ka maisip sa atin lahat. Just as I
have accepted everything. Salamat sa panahon at
pangunawa. God bless.3cralawlawlibrary
Nelson also asserted that Sonia confessed her
infidelity and described her extramarital affair with
Atty. Dabon to have been attended by sexual
assaults and maintained through intimidation and
threats of exposure, humiliation and
embarrassment.
In her own Affidavit,4 dated September 13, 2006
and attached to the complaint, Sonia narrated that
her illicit relationship with Atty. Dabon started
sometime in November 2000 and ended in March
2006 when she, bothered by her conscience,
decided to break it off; that Atty. Dabon
relentlessly pursued her for years and even
admitted that he fell in love with her the first time
he laid eyes on her; that on November 13, 2000,
Atty. Dabon lured her to what appeared to be a
mere friendly lunch date, managed to put sleep-
inducing drug into her food or drink causing her to
feel drowsy and weak and, thereafter, brought her
to Victoria Court Motel where he sexually molested
her while she was asleep; that she opted to keep
silent about the incident for fear of its adverse
repercussions of shame and embarrassment to her
and her family; that she pleaded with Atty. Dabon
to leave her and forget what had happened, but
the respondent instead taunted her by laughing at
her misery; that since then, Atty. Dabon
succeeded in having repeated carnal knowledge of
her once or twice a week through intimidation and
threats; that Atty. Dabon threatened her that he
would tell everyone that she had been playing
around with him, if she would not yield to his
lascivious cravings; and that she suffered in
silence for years and submitted herself to the
bestial desires of Atty. Dabon, until she even
thought that she was in love with him.
Sonia further claimed that after years of living in
deception and infidelity, she decided to call it quits
with Atty. Dabon sometime in March 2006 but he
could not let go of their relationship; that Atty.
Dabon started pestering and threatening her
through phone calls and handwritten messages in
vile attempts to persuade her to continue their
illicit affair; that despite their break-up, Atty.
Dabon still pursued his lustful quest by bringing
her to Anito Motel, along Quirino Avenue on March
10, 2006, but she foiled his plan when she went
ballistic prompting the respondent to drive her
back to the CA; that on March 13, 2006, Atty.
Dabon forcibly boarded her car and pleaded for
forgiveness and reconciliation but she remained
firm in her resolve to end the affair; that she had
to seek the assistance of her officemates, Atty.
Heiddi Venecia Barrozo (Atty. Barrozo) and Atty.
Aileen T. Ligot (Atty. Ligot), just to convince Atty.
Dabon to alight from her car as the said incident
had already drawn the attention of several
employees within the vicinity of the CA parking lot;
that Atty. Dabon used the members of his staff to
relay his messages and deliver his handwritten
letters to her; that Atty. Dabon, angered by her
repeated rejection, went berserk and sent her a
letter which stated, among others, that he could
no longer stand her constant avoidance of him and
that he would divulge their illicit relationship to her
husband; that it numbed her with fright, so she
called Atty. Joy, without disclosing her identity,
and told her that Atty. Dabon was harassing an
employee at the CA; that Atty. Dabon sent a text
message to Nelson telling him of the extramarital
affair; that Atty. Joy called up Nelson and informed
him that her husband, Atty. Dabon, had confessed
to her the illicit relationship; and that when she
was asked by Nelson, she initially denied the affair
for fear of reprisal but, afterwards, admitted the
truth and explained to him that she was merely a
victim of Atty. Dabon's threat and intimidation
which led to their illicit relationship.
Nelson further stated that Atty. Dabon's willful,
flagrant and shameless conduct was in gross
defiance of the customs, values and sense of
morality of the community. He prayed for the
disbarment of Atty. Dabon whose immoral acts
showed his lack of moral character, honesty,
probity, and good demeanor and, hence, unworthy
to continue as an officer of the court. Nelson
alleged that he had previously filed an
administrative complaint for "Gross Immorality"
against Atty. Dabon before the CA.
Together with Sonia's Affidavit, Nelson also
attached to his Affidavit-Complaint for disbarment,
the Joint Affidavit5 executed by Atty. Barrozo and
Atty. Ligot on May 19, 2006; the Affidavit6 of
Virginia D. Ramos (Ramos), dated May 19, 2006;
and the Affidavit7 of Marie Iris Magdalene Minerva
(Minerva), dated May 22, 2006, wherein the said
affiants corroborated the declaration of Sonia in
her affidavit.
The Position of Atty. Dabon
Respondent Atty. Dabon strongly refuted the
accusation against him claiming that the same was
baseless and unfounded and that the complaint for
disbarment was merely calculated to harass,
annoy and besmirch his reputation.
In his Comment,8 Atty. Dabon denied the charges
of grossly immoral and unlawful acts through
sexual assaults, abuses, threats and intimidation.
He posited that the allegations of spouses Nelson
and Sonia in their respective affidavits were
nothing but pure fabrication solely intended to
malign his name and honor. In support of his
prayer for the dismissal of the present disbarment
case, Atty. Dabon proffered the following
arguments:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
First, complainant Nelson had no personal
knowledge of the alleged illicit relationship
between him and Sonia. He relied heavily on the
sworn statement of Sonia which was replete with
inconsistencies and incredible and preposterous
claims which defied logic and common sense, thus,
revealing the fallacy of the subject complaint. He
contended that it was highly improbable for him, a
married lawyer at that, to suddenly turn crazy and
abandon all cares just to satisfy his purported
lustful hungerness by sexually assaulting Sonia,
"an ordinary plain-looking 43-year old woman with
two (2) teen aged children."
Second, nowhere in the administrative complaint
of Nelson previously filed before the CA was there
any mention of any sexual assault he allegedly
committed against Sonia or of an adulterous
relationship that was maintained through threats
and intimidation. Surprisingly, such allegations
were included in the present complaint for
disbarment. He also pointed out that Nelson did
not attach to his administrative complaint before
the CA the September 13, 2006 Affidavit of Sonia
containing grave imputations against him. Such
omissions were indicative that the serious charges
against him were mere concoctions and
afterthoughts designed to attain Nelson's desire to
come up with a graver accusation against him. The
filing of the complaint for disbarment was
motivated by vengeance against him as Nelson
was consummed by his suspicion that he had
seduced Sonia which led to the deterioration of
their marriage. He was a victim caught in the
crossfire between the troubled couple, Nelson and
Sonia.
Third, there was no truth to Sonia's allegation that
he was attracted to her from the first time he saw
her much less pursued her relentlessly. He and
Sonia were just close friends. He was Sonia's
confidante. She would usually confide in him her
personal woes and problems especially those
concerning her husband, Nelson. It was Sonia who
aggressively sought his companionship and
frequented his office, bringing food, fruits and
other goodies. The said visits were attested to by
Mary Jane Tulalian and Imelda Adan in their
respective affidavits,10 both dated April 30, 2008.
His friendship with Sonia turned sour when she
learned of his plan to settle for good in the Unites
States with his family. Sonia began to avoid him.
He exerted efforts to make her understand his
decision, but to no avail.
Fourth, the cards expressing Sonia's affection
towards him as well as the expensive gifts she
gave him belied her claim that she was sexually
assaulted and that she resisted his alleged sexual
advances.
Fifth, it was unlikely that Sonia would not tell
anyone the grave injustice and abuses that she
allegedly suffered in his hands or report the matter
to the police considering her length of service in
the Judiciary and her familiarity on how the
criminal justice system worked.
Sixth, he denied Nelson's allegation that he
confessed to his wife, Atty. Joy, his illicit
relationship with Sonia. He also denied that the
alleged text messages, quoted by Nelson and
Sonia in their respective affidavits, were sent by
him or his wife. All were part of an elaborate
scheme to force him to immediately resign as
Division Clerk of Court from the CA.
Lastly, it was not true that he harassed Sonia
through text messages and phone calls. It was he
who was the victim of harassment from Nelson,
who orchestrated a series of events that compelled
him to leave the country earlier than scheduled for
fear that an untoward incident might happen to
him.
On August 15, 2007, the Court referred the case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.11
After the parties had submitted their respective
verified position papers, Investigating
Commissioner Manuel T. Chan (Investigating
Commissioner Chan) of the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) rendered his Report and
Recommendation,12 dated October 2, 2008,
finding that the charge against respondent Atty.
Dabon had been sufficiently proven. The
recommendatory portion of the report reads:
WHEREFORE, this Commissioner, after a thorough
and exhaustive review of the facts and applicable
legal provisions, recommends that respondent be
found guilty of gross immoral conduct and,
accordingly, be disbarred and dropped from the
Roll of Attorneys.
On December 11, 2008, the Board of Governors of
the IBP adopted and approved the
recommendation and issued Resolution No. XVIII-
2008-653, the pertinent portion of which reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and finding Respondent guilty of gross
immoral conduct, Atty. Antolin Allyson M. Dabon,
Jr. is hereby DISBARRED and his name be stricken
off from the Roll of Attorneys.
Atty. Dabon filed a motion for reconsideration of
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-653, but it was denied
by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No.
XX-2012-550,15 dated December 14, 2012.
After due consideration, the Court resolves to
adopt the findings and recommendation of the
IBP-CBD.
Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded by the
Court that possession of good moral character is
both a condition precedent and a continuing
requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and
to retain membership in the legal profession.This
proceeds from the lawyer's bounden duty to
observe the highest degree of morality in order to
safeguard the Bar's integrity,16 and the legal
profession exacts from its members nothing less.
Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity
of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts
constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions
as officers of the court demand no less than the
highest degree of morality.17
The Court explained in Arnobit v. Atty.
Arnobit18 that "as officers of the court, lawyers
must not only in fact be of good moral character
but must also be seen to be of good moral
character and leading lives in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community. A
member of the bar and an officer of the court is
not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships or keeping a mistress but must also
so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the
public by creating the impression that he is
flouting those moral standards." Consequently,
any errant behavior of the lawyer, be it in his
public or private activities, which tends to show
deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or
good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant
suspension or disbarment.19
In the case at bench, the Court subscribes to the
IBP's opinion that there was substantial evidence
showing that Atty. Dabon did have an illicit
relationship with Nelson's legal wife.
To begin with, the Court notes from the
respondent's Comment that he appeared to be
perplexed as to whether or not he would admit his
extramarital liaisons with Sonia. As Investigating
Commissioner Chan stated in his report, Atty.
Dabon interposed a blanket denial of the romantic
involvement but at the same time, he seemed to
have tacitly admitted the illicit affair only that it
was not attended by sexual assaults, threats and
intimidations. The Court also observed that he
devoted considerable effort to demonstrate that
the affair did not amount to gross immoral conduct
and that no sexual abuse, threat or intimidation
was exerted upon the person of Sonia, but not
once did he squarely deny the affair itself.
In other words, the respondent's denial is a
negative pregnant, a denial coupled with the
admission of substantial facts in the pleading
responded to which are not squarely denied.
Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of
negative expression which carries with it an
affirmation or at least an implication of some kind
favorable to the adverse party. Where a fact is
alleged with qualifying or modifying language and
the words of the allegation as so qualified or
modified are literally denied, it has been held that
the qualifying circumstance alone is denied while
the fact itself is admitted.20 It is clear from Atty.
Dabon's Comment that his denial only pertained
as to the existence of a forced illicit relationship.
Without a categorical denial thereof, he is deemed
to have admitted his consensual affair with Sonia.
More telling of the existence of a romantic
relationship are the notes and cards21 that Sonia
sent to Atty. Dabon containing personal and
intimate messages in her own handwriting. The
messages conveyed Sonia's affection towards him
as she even referred to him as "hon" or "honey."
There were also gifts she gave him on special
occasions such as signature shoes, watch and
shirts. It also appeared that Sonia frequently
visited him in his office either to bring him food,
fruits and other goodies or to invite him to lunch
which apparently displayed her emotional
attachment to him. Curiously, the foregoing was
never refuted by Sonia. Such "ego-boosting
admissions"22 of Atty. Dabon indeed proved that a
consensual relationship between him and Sonia
existed.
It has not escaped the Court's attention either that
Atty. Dabon really tried hard to win back Sonia
because he could not let go of their relationship,
even to the point of pestering her with his
persistent pleas for reconciliation. In one instance,
Atty. Dabon boarded Sonia's car and refused to
alight unless she would talk to him. Sonia had to
seek the assistance of her officemates, Atty.
Barrazo and Atty. Ligot, who pleaded with him to
alight from the vehicle. Moreover, Atty. Dabon
made several attempts to communicate with Sonia
in the hope of rekindling their relationship through
letters and phone calls but she remained firm in
her stand to avoid him. Such incident was
recounted by Ramos and Minerva in their
respective affidavits.
Incidentally, vis-a-vis Nelson's overwhelming
evidence of said harassments, he offered only
denials which was self-serving and weak under the
law on evidence. Other than his general claim that
Atty. Barrazo, Atty. Ligot, Ramos, and Minerva
were biased witnessess because they were former
officemates of Sonia, the respondent did not even
bother to proffer his own version of the supposed
harassment incidents.
In light of the above disquisition, the Court finds
Sonia's allegation that the illicit relationship was
made possible by sexual assaults and maintained
through threat and intimidations, to be untrue.
Certainly, a sexually abused woman could not be
expected to lavish her oppressor with expensive
gifts or pay him affectionate compliments or words
of endearment. The natural reaction of a victim of
a sexual molestation would be to avoid her
ravisher. In this case, however, it appeared that
Sonia continually remained in the company of
Atty. Dabon for more than five years, even inviting
him for lunch-outs and frequenting his office to
bring food whenever the latter was preoccupied
with his workload and could not go out with her to
eat. Verily, Sonia's actuations towards Atty. Dabon
are in stark contrast to the expected demeanor of
one who had been repeatedly sexually abused.
Further, the Court cannot fathom why Sonia never
reported the alleged sexual abuse to the police, if
such was the truth. She could have placed the
respondent behind bars and put an end to her
claimed misery. Also, the Court cannot lend
credence to Sonia's claim that she merely
succumbed to the respondent's sexual advances
because of his continuous threats of public
exposure and humiliation. It must be stressed that
Atty. Dabon would be in a much more precarious
situation if he would carry out such threats, as this
would exposed himself to countless criminal and
administrative charges. The Court believes that
Nelson's allegation of sexual assaults and secret, but were only discovered by
continuing threat and intimidation was not complainant through other
established by clear preponderant evidence. The channels.23
Court is left with the most logical conclusion that
Sonia freely and wittingly entered into an illicit and
immoral relationship with Atty. Dabon sans any For what ethical breaches then may Atty. Dabon
threat and intimidation. be held liable?

Consequently, the Court quotes with approval the The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
following observations of Investigating
Commissioner Chan on this score, Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Sorting out the maze of technicalities, denials and Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
evasions of the respondent as well as the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
oftentimes exaggerated language of complainant support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
or his wife, Sonia, and the self-exculpatory
declarations of Sonia, this Commissioner considers Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
the following facts as established: that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private
1. Respondent and Sonia are both life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
married, not to each other, but to discredit of the legal profession.cralawlawlibrary
other persons, and each is aware of
this fact, or should have known such
Morality in our liberal society today is probably a
fact at the start of their illicit far cry from what it used to be. Notwithstanding
relationship because they were
this permissiveness, lawyers, as keepers of public
officemates at that time;
faith, are burdened with a high degree of social
responsibility and, hence, must handle their
2. Respondent and Sonia engaged in
personal affairs with greater caution.24 Indeed,
an intimate and sexual relationship,
those who have taken the oath to assist in the
intermittent perhaps, for a period of
dispensation of justice should be more possessed
about six years starting 2000 up to
of the consciousness and the will to overcome the
2006;
weakness of the flesh.
3. Respondent and Sonia, despite
It has been repeatedly held that to justify
protestations of Sonia that
suspension or disbarment, the act complained of
respondent assaulted her using
must not only be immoral,
drugs and employing threats and
but grossly immoral.25 A grossly immoral act is
blackmail to maintain the
one that is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal
relationship, appeared to have
act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
entered into such illicit relationship
high degree or committed under such scandalous
voluntarily and also appeared to
or revolting circumstances as to shock the
have been fueled by their deep
common sense of decency. It is willful, flagrant, or
emotional needs, if not mutual lust,
shameless as to show indifference to the opinion
as shown by the fact that the illicit
of good and respectable members of the
relationship lasted for six long
community.26
years;
In the case at bench, Atty. Dabon's intimate
4. Respondent and Sonia, despite the
relationship with a woman other than his wife
protestation of Sonia to the
showed his moral indifference to the opinion of the
contrary, were not really ready to
good and respectable members of the community.
give up the illicit relationship even if
It manifested his disrespect for the laws on the
they were fully aware of its
sanctity of marriage and for his own marital vow
immorality or its devastating effect
of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral depravity
on their respective marriages and
and low regard for the fundamental ethics of his
careers as shown by the fact that
profession. Indeed, he has fallen below the moral
both respondent and Sonia did not
bar. Such detestable behavior warrants a
voluntarily confess to their
disciplinary sanction. Even if not all forms of
respective spouses their dark
extramarital relations are punishable under penal
law, sexual relations outside of marriage are
considered disgraceful and immoral as they
manifest deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws. 27
In Advincula v. Macabata,28 the Court elucidated
as to what disciplinary sanction should be imposed
against a lawyer found guilty of misconduct. Thus:
Xxx. "When deciding upon the appropriate
sanction, the Court must consider that the primary
purposes of disciplinary proceedings are to protect
the public; to foster public confidence in the Bar;
to preserve the integrity of the profession; and to
deter other lawyers from similar misconduct.
Disciplinary proceedings are means of protecting
the administration of justice by requiring those
who carry out this important function to be
competent, honorable and reliable men in whom
courts and clients may repose confidence. While it
is discretionary upon the Court to impose a
particular sanction that it may deem proper
against an erring lawyer, it should neither be
arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal
animosity or prejudice, but should ever be
controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously
guard the purity and independence of the bar and
to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his
duties to the court, to his client, to his brethren in
the profession and to the public.
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to
be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle, with great caution and only for
the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases
of misconduct which seriously affect the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and member of the Bar. Only those acts
which cause loss of moral character should merit
disbarment or suspension, while those acts which
neither affect nor erode the moral character of the
lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless
they are of such nature and to such extent as to
clearly show the lawyer's unfitness to continue in
the practice of law. The dubious character of the
act charged as well as the motivation which
induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly
demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is
meted out. The mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that attended the commission of
the offense should also be considered.
The penalty for maintaining an illicit relationship
may either be suspension or disbarment,
depending on the circumstances of the case.29 In
case of suspension, the period would range from
one year30 to indefinite suspension, as in the case
of Cordova v. Cordova,31 where the lawyer was
found to have maintained an adulterous
relationship for two years and refused to support
his family. On the other hand, there is a string of
cases where the Court meted out the extreme
penalty of disbarment, to wit:
In Toledo v. Toledo,32 a lawyer was disbarred from
the practice of law, when he abandoned his lawful
wife and cohabited with another woman who had
borne him a child.
In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,33 a lawyer was
disbarred after the complainant proved that he
had abandoned her and maintained an adulterous
relationship with a married woman. The Court
declared that the respondent failed to maintain the
highest degree of morality expected and required
of a member of the Bar.
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,34 the respondent
lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his
lawful wife and three children, lured an innocent
woman into marrying him and misrepresented
himself as a "bachelor" so he could contract
marriage in a foreign land.
In Dantes v. Dantes,35 disbarment was imposed as
a penalty on the respondent lawyer who
maintained illicit relationships with two different
women during the subsistence of his marriage to
the complainant. The Complainant's testimony,
taken in conjunction with the documentary
evidence, sufficiently established that the
respondent breached the high and exacting moral
standards set for members of the law profession.
In Villatuya v. Tabalingcos,36 the respondent
lawyer was disbarred because he was found to
have entered into marriage twice while his first
marriage was still subsisting. The Court declared
that he exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree
of morality required of him as a member of the
Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity.
In the case at bench, Atty. Dabon's misconduct
and unrepentant demeanor clearly showed a
serious flaw in his character, his moral indifference
to the sanctity of marriage and marital vows, and
his outright defiance of established norms. All
these could not but put the legal profession in
disrepute and place the integrity of the
administration of justice in peril. Accordingly, the
Court finds the need for the imposition of the
extreme administrative penalty of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, finding the respondent Atty.
Antolin Allyson M. Dabon, Jr. GUILTY of Gross
Immorality, the Court hereby DISBARS him from
the practice of law.
Let respondent's name be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys immediately. Furnish the Bar Confidant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all court
throughout the country with copies of this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sereno, CJ., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De
Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-
Bernabe, Leonen, and Jardeleza, JJ., cocnur.
CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
This court resolves an administrative Complaint for
disbarment filed by complainant Nelson P. Valdez
(Nelson) against respondent Atty. Antolin Allyson
M. Dabon, Jr., (Atty. Dabon) for gross immoral and
indecent conduct unbecoming of a member of the
Bar.1
Nelson claims that he and his wife, Sonia Romero
Valdez (Sonia), were married on January 28, 1998
in Paniqui, Tarlac.2 Sonia was a Court
Stenographer at the Court of Appeals from 1992
to 2006.3 She admitted that she had an adulterous
and immoral relationship with Atty. Dabon, a
Division Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals,
from 2000 to 2006.4According to Nelson, Sonia
told him that the illicit affair was carried out
through Atty. Dabon's sexual assaults,
intimidation, and threats on Sonia.5
Sonia's affidavit was attached to Nelson's
Complaint. In her affidavit, Sonia claims that her
sexual relationship with Atty. Dabon started when
they had a friendly lunch date on November 13,
2000.6 Unknown to her, Atty. Dabon put a sleep-
inducing substance in either her food or drink,
which caused her to feel drowsy and weak. 7 Atty.
Dabon then brought her to a motel and took
advantage of her.8 He sexually assaulted her while
she was unconscious.
Sonia felt ashamed of what had happened; thus,
she kept the incident to herself.10 She also feared
the ramifications of the incident on her and her
family.11 Sonia asked Atty. Dabon to forget about
the incident and leave her alone. However, Atty.
Dabon threatened her that he would tell everyone
they knew about it.12 From then on, Atty. Dabon
was successful in having carnal knowledge with
her once to twice a week.13 This went on for
several years.14
In March 2006, Sonia ended her affair with Atty.
Dabon.15 This resulted in a series of unpleasant
occasions where Sonia and Atty. Dabon publicly
clashed in a motel and inside the Court of Appeals
and involved other employees of the judiciary as
well as their spouses.16
For his part, Atty. Dabon denies the allegations in
the Complaint. He denies the acts constituting
gross immoral conduct imputed by Nelson and
Sonia. He also denies being attracted to Sonia and
drugging and sexually assaulting her.17 At most,
they were just good friends.18 Atty. Dabon also
points to the alleged inconsistencies in the claims
of Sonia and her husband.19 Sonia's true feelings
for him are evident in the cards she signed and
sent to him, together with the expensive gifts such
as signature shoes, watches, and shirts she gave
him.20 Sonia even spent time in the United States
with him and his sons.21
Atty. Dabon further alleges that Sonia had become
emotionally dependent on him since he was always
there to listen to her problems.22 According to
Atty. Dabon, Sonia started to act strangely when
she learned of his plans to settle in the United
States for good.23
Atty. Dabon also claims that Nelson and Sonia are
good friends with the Court of Appeals Presiding
Justice Ruben Reyes as Sonia had worked as Court
Stenographer for him for three (3) years. 24 The
Presiding Justice had allegedly asked Atty. Dabon
to resign, else cases would be filed against
him.25cralawred
Moreover, contrary to Nelson and Sonia's claims,
it was actually Atty. Dabon who was harassed
through text messages and phone calls, which
prompted him to leave the country earlier than
scheduled.26
On August 15, 2007, this court referred the
Complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for investigation, report, and recommendation.27
In his October 2, 2008 Report and
Recommendation, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Investigating Commissioner Manuel T.
Chan found Atty. Dabon guilty of gross immoral
conduct.28 The Commissioner recommended that
Atty. Dabon be disbarred and dropped from the
Roll of Attorneys.29
On December 11, 2008, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors issued Resolution
No. XVIII-2008-653, which adopted and approved
the recommendations of the Investigating
Commissioner:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and finding Respondent guilty of gross
immoral conduct, Atty. Antolin Allyson M. Dabon,
Jr. is hereby DISBARRED and his name be stricken
off from the Roll of Attorneys.30cralawlawlibrary
Atty. Dabon filed his motion for reconsideration of
the Resolution.31 However, this was denied by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors in Resolution No. XX-2012-550 dated
December 4, 2012:
RESOLVED to unanimously DENY Respondent's
Motion for Reconsideration there being no cogent
reason to reverse the findings of the Commission
and it being a mere reiteration of the matters
which had already been threshed out and taken
into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XVIII-
2008-653 dated December 11, 2008 is hereby
AFFIRMED.32cralawlawlibrary
I concur with this court's finding that Atty. Dabon
is guilty of gross immoral conduct.33
The ponencia declares that Atty. Dabon's illicit
relationship with Nelson's wife amounts to gross
immoral conduct that transgresses the Code of
Professional
Responsibility,34thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In the case at bench, Atty. Dabon's intimate
relationship with a woman other than his wife
showed his moral indifference to the opinion of the
good and respectable members of the community.
It manifested his disrespect for the laws on the
sanctity of marriage and for his own marital vow
of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral depravity
and low regard for the fundamental ethics of his
profession. Indeed, he has fallen below the moral
bar. Such detestable behavior warrants a
disciplinary sanction. Even if not all forms of
extramarital relations are punishable under penal
law, sexual relations outside of marriage are
considered disgraceful and immoral as they
manifest deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our
laws.35cralawlawlibrary
However, the ponencia also declared that Sonia's
claims of sexual assaults, threats, and intimidation
are false:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In light of the above disquisition, the Court finds
Sonia's allegation that the illicit relationship was
made possible by sexual assaults and maintained
through threat and intimidations, to be untrue.
Certainly, a sexually abused woman could not be
expected to lavish her oppressor with expensive
gifts or pay him affectionate compliments or words
of endearment. The natural reaction of a victim of
a sexual molestation would be to avoid her
ravisher. In this case, however, it appeared that
Sonia continually remained in the company of
Atty. Dabon for more than five years, even inviting
him for lunch-outs and frequenting his office to
bring whenever the latter was preoccupied with his
workload and could not go out with her to eat.
Verily, Sonia's actuations towards Atty. Dabon are
in stark contrast to the expected demeanor of one
who had been repeatedly sexually abused.
Further, the Court cannot fathom why Sonia never
reported the alleged sexual abuse to the police, if
such was the truth. She could have placed the
respondent behind bars and put an end to her
claimed misery. Also, the Court cannot lend
credence to Sonia's claim that she merely
succumbed to the respondent's sexual advances
because of his continuous threats of public
exposure and humiliation. It must be stressed that
Atty. Dabon would be in a much more precarious
situation if he would carry out such threats, as this
would exposed [sic] himself to countless criminal
and administrative charges. The Court believes
that Nelson's allegation of sexual assaults and
continuing threat and intimidation was not
established by clear and preponderant
evidence. The Court is left with the most logical
conclusion that Sonia freely and wittingly entered
into an illicit and immoral relationship with Atty.
Dabon sans any threat and
intimidation. (Emphasis supplied)
The relationship between Atty. Dabon and Sonia
was consensual. Relationships between men and
women traditionally involve power exerted by one
against the other. In Garcia v. Drilon,37 this court
recognized the unequal power relationship
between a man and a woman, justifying the valid
classification provided under Republic Act No.
9262:38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
The unequal power relationship between women
and men; the fact that women are more likely than
men to be victims of violence; and the widespread
gender bias and prejudice against women all make
for real differences justifying the classification
under the law. As Justice Mclntyre succinctly
states, "the accommodation of differences . . . is
the essence of true equality."
A. Unequal power relationship between men
and women
According to the Philippine Commission on Women
(the National Machinery for Gender Equality and
Women's Empowerment), violence against women
(VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with
the unequal power relationship between
women and men otherwise known as "gender-
based violence". Societal norms and traditions
dictate people to think men are the leaders,
pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in
society while women are nurturers, men's
companions and supporters, and take on
subordinate roles in society. This perception leads
to men gaining more power over women. With
power comes the need to control to retain that
power. And VAW is a form of men's expression of
controlling women to retain power.
The United Nations, which has long recognized
VAW as a human rights issue, passed its
Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on
Elimination of Violence Against Women on
December 20, 1993 stating that "violence against
women is a manifestation of historically unequal
power relations between men and women,
which have led to domination over and
discrimination against women by men and to the
prevention of the full advancement of women, and
that violence against women is one of the crucial
social mechanisms by which women are forced
into subordinate positions, compared with
men."39(Emphasis in the original, citations
omitted)
"Sexual harassment in the workplace is not about
a man taking advantage of a woman by reason of
sexual desire - it is about power being exercised
by a superior officer over his women
subordinates."40 The superior can cause the
removal of the subordinate from the workplace if
the latter refuses his or, in certain cases, her
amorous advances.41 These acts, which
necessarily result in an intimidating, hostile, and
offensive working environment for subordinates,
constitute sexual harassment.42
Under A.M. No. 03-03-13-SC (Re: Rule on
Administrative Procedure in Sexual Harassment
Cases and Guidelines on Proper Work Decorum in
the Judiciary), work-related sexual harassment is
defined as an act of:
an official or employee in the Judiciary who, having
authority, influence or moral ascendancy over
another in a work environment, demands,
requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor
from the other, regardless of whether the demand,
request or requirement for submission is accepted
by the latter.
It is committed when:
(a) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the
hiring or in the employment, re-employment or
continued employment of said individual, or in
granting said individual favorable compensation,
terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or
the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in
limiting, segregating or classifying the employee
which in any way would discriminate, deprive or
diminish employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect said employee. It shall include,
but shall not be limited to, the following modes:
1. Physical, such as malicious touching, overt
sexual advances, and gestures with lewd
insinuation.
2. Verbal, such as requests or demands for sexual
favors, and lurid remarks.
3. Use of objects, pictures or graphics, letters or
written notes with sexual underpinnings.
4. Other acts analogous to the foregoing.
(b) The above acts would impair the employee's
rights or privileges under existing laws; or
(c) The above acts would result in an intimidating,
hostile or offensive environment for the employee.
While Sonia was technically not a subordinate of
Atty. Dabon, his actions nevertheless resulted in
an intimidating, hostile, and offensive working
environment for Sonia, especially towards the end
of their illicit relationship. The gravity of Atty.
Dabon's actions should be considered in
determining the proper penalty to be imposed in
this disbarment case for gross immoral conduct.
As the Integrated Bar of the Philippines found,
Atty. Dabon refused to accept that his relationship
with Sonia had already ended, to the point of
harassing Sonia publicly several times:
It has not escaped the Court's attention either that
Atty. Dabon really tried hard to win back Sonia
because he could not let go of their relationship,
even to the point of pestering her with his
persistent pleas of reconciliation. In one instance,
Atty. Dabon boarded Sonia's car and refused to
alight unless she would talk to him. Sonia had to
seek the assistance of her officemates, Atty.
Barrazo and Atty. Ligot, who pleaded with him to
alight from the vehicle. Moreover, Atty. Dabon
made several attempts to communicate with Sonia
in the hope of rekindling their relationship through
letters and phone calls but she remained firm in
her stand to avoid him. Such incident was
recounted by Ramos and Minerva in their
respective affidavits. Incidentally, vis-a-vis
Nelson's overwhelming evidence of said
harassments, he offered only denials which was
[sic] self-serving and weak under the law on
evidence. Other than his general claim that Atty.
Barrazo, Atty. Ligot, Ramos, and Minerva were
biased witnesses because they were former
officemates of Sonia, the respondent did not even
bother to proffer his own version of the supposed
harassment incidents.
Conduct is immoral when it is "so willful, flagrant,
or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion
of good and respectable members of the
community."46
Further:
[The] conduct [to warrant disciplinary action]
must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. .
. . [I]t must be so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree or committed under
such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the common sense of decency."
Good moral character is a continuing requirement
to maintain one's good standing in the legal
profession.48 "It is the bounden duty of law
practitioners to observe the highest degree of
morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the
Bar."49
There is no fixed standard of what constitutes
gross immoral conduct, or "moral delinquency and
obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar."50 Hence,
"what appears to be unconventional behavior to
the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct
that warrants disbarment."51
Disbarment is clearly warranted for gross immoral
conduct that entails abuse of power of whatever
kind or nature.
In Barrientos v. Daarol,52 the respondent was held
guilty of gross immoral conduct and was disbarred
for inducing a female half his age to have sexual
relations with him after promising marriage,
despite him being married already, and later on
abandoning the woman and his child.
In Tucay v. Tucay,53 this court held that having an
illicit affair with a married woman, regardless of
whether a bigamous marriage was contracted,
constitutes gross immoral conduct that merits the
extreme penalty of disbarment.
In Arnobit v. Arnobit,54 this court disbarred the
respondent for abandoning his wife and 12
children to cohabit with another woman.
In Garrido v. Garrido,55 two lawyers who
engaged in an extra-marital affair were disbarred
since their actions established a "pattern of grave
and immoral misconduct that demonstrates their
lack of mental and emotional fitness and moral
character to qualify them for the responsibilities
and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals
and as officers of the court."56
In his Comment, Atty. Dabon averred that there
could not have been an illicit affair between him
and Sonia since Sonia was merely "an ordinary
plain-looking middle aged woman with two (2)
teen aged children."57 He alleged that:
It is an outrage for herein respondent for the
complainant and Ms. Valdez to accuse him of
sexually assaulting the latter. There is absolutely
no iota of truth to this incredible claim of the
Valdezes. Why would a man like the respondent, a
married lawyer at that with no prior encounter with
the law, would suddenly turn crazed with lust
despite the aloofness and coldness of Ms. Valdez
towards him as alleged in her affidavit, drugging
her then dragging her to his car and sexually
assaulting her in a motel? Is Ms. Valdez that
irresistibly attractive and compelling that
would turn the respondent into an unthinking
sex pervert and criminal, risking everything
just to get her to satisfy his alleged lust for
her?58(Emphasis in the original)
This statement is nothing but an attempt to
obviate the consequence of his actions by
degrading the appearance of another human
being. This strongly reveals Atty. Dabon's
character and the extent to which he is willing to
go to gain impunity for his infractions.

Atty. Dabon carried out illicit relations with Sonia,

a married woman and his co-worker in the
judiciary, for at least five (5) years. Atty. Dabon's
blase attitude towards the affair and its aftermath
not only made a mockery of the position he holds
as member of the bar and an employee of the
judiciary, but also showed his utter disregard for
laws protecting and respecting the dignity of
women. He failed to meet the high standard of
morality required of his profession. He is unfit to
be a member of the bar.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote that respondent Atty.

Antolin Allyson Dabon, Jr. be DISBARREDand his
name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
EN BANC
The Department of Agrarian Reform granted the
A.C. No. 7348, September 27, 2016 request and furnished Rouel with all documents
related to the Notice of Coverage. 17 Among these
ROUEL YAP PARAS, Complainant, v. ATTY. documents were: (1) Atty. Paras' October 20,
JUSTO P. PARAS, Respondent. 2004 letter18 to Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
Stephen M. Leonidas; (2) an authorization
letter19 by Atty. Paras for Edna R. Mijares; and (3)
RESOLUTION
an October 9, 2006 Certification20 by Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer Grace B.
PER CURIAM: Fua.21chanrobleslaw

Through this administrative Complaint1 directly On October 25, 2006, Rouel Yap Paras filed this
filed before this Court, Rouel Yap Paras (Rouel) Complaint before this Court and alleged:
charges his father Atty. Justo J. Paras (Atty. Paras)
with violation of his lawyer's oath and the Code of chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Professional Responsibility.2 Atty. Paras allegedly 1. That respondent, ATTY. JUSTO J. PARAS,.
voluntarily offered properties he did not own nor had violated the LAWYER'S OATH and the
possess to the Department of Agrarian Reform for Code of Professional Responsibility,
coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Reform Program.3 Atty. Paras has been previously a) Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
disciplined twice upon complaint of his thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
wife.4chanrobleslaw 1. Deceit
2. Violation of Oath of Office
In September 2006, Rouel found out that a listing 3. Willful disobedience of any lawful order of
of possible beneficiaries for the Department of a superior court;
Agrarian Reform's Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program was being made by a certain b) The Code of Professional Responsibility in
Edna Mijares and Tomas Visitacion.5 On the same Canon 1, "A lawyer shall uphold the
month, he received at their residence in Negros Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and
Oriental6 a copy of a Notice of Coverage7 dated promote respect for law and legal
September 8, 2006 from the Department of Land processes"; Canon 3, "a lawyer in making
Reform. The Notice of Coverage was addressed to known his legal services shall use only trne,
Atty. Paras and was signed by Provincial Agrarian honest, fair, dignified and objective
Reform Officer Grace B. Fua. Five (5) of the six (6) information or statement of facts; Canon 7,
properties listed in the Notice of Coverage were "a lawyer shall at all times up hold [sic] the
those subject of Civil Case No. 02-028-BY pending integrity and dignity of the legal
before Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of Bais profession[,]"; Canon 10 that "a lawyer owes
City, Negros Oriental.8 Civil Case No. 02-028-BY is candor, fairness and good faith to the court";
based on a Complaint9 filed by Rouel against Atty. Canon 8, "a lawyer shall conduct himself with
Paras for annulment of Original Certificates of Title courtesy, fairness and candor towards his
of the properties. professional colleagues...";
2. That the respondent engaged in an
Rouel referred the matter to his counsel, who unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct
wrote Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer Grace B. when he deliberate[ly] represented himself
Fua.10 In the letter dated October 9, 2006, his as "LANDOWNER", and voluntarily offered
counsel requested a copy of all documents real properties to the DAR for CARP coverage,
pertaining to the September 8, 2006 Notice of when he knew fully well that he is NOT THE
Coverage addressed to Atty. Paras.11 Rouel's OWNER OF THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTIES;
counsel also informed the Department of Agrarian .....
Reform that: (1) the real properties were subject
of a pending case;12 (2) Atty. Paras was 3. That RESPONDENT, ATTY. JUSTO J. PARAS, ...
suspended by this Court for unlawfully "having the with manifest bad faith and inexcusable
said properties titled in his name[;]"13 (3) the negligence, proceeded to present himself to the
properties were titled in the name of Atty. Paras DAR, and offered the subject properties, even with
only for free patent title coverage;14 (4) Atty. his full knowledge of the pending litigations
Paras did not possess the properties;15 and (5) involving the said properties;
Rouel was the real owner and in possession of the
properties.16chanrobleslaw 4. That in spite of the pendency of the "PETITION
FOR annulment of OCT NOS. 32360, 32361,
32362, and 33476 and DAMAGES" proceedings,
which is pending before the Regional Trial Court
Branch 45, Bais City, respondent, ATTY. JUSTO J.
PARAS, had instigated the VOLUNTARY OFFER OF
COVERAGE TO THE DAR, to dispossess the
complainant, his mother, and the members of the
YAP family of their property rights, as it is very
clear that ATTY. JUSTO J. PARAS was fully aware
that the subject real properties WERE NOT OWNED
BY HIM, and he DID NOT HAVE ANY ACTUAL
PHYSICAL POSSESSION of the subject real
properties;
5. That the AUTHORIZATION issued to EDNA
MIJARES by respondent, is a GROSS
MISREPRESENTATION, and this had caused
innocent barrio folks of Barangay Matobato,
Bindoy, Negros Oriental to pay P500.00 to
Edna Mijares, in view of the false promise
that they will be included as DAR
beneficiaries, even if they were not tenants
or residing in the subject property;
....
7. THAT RESPONDENT HAD THE SOLE INTENT
OF DISPOSSESSING THE UNDERSIGNED, HIS
LEGITIMATE SON, OF HIS PROPERTY
RIGHTS, USING HIS LEGAL PROFESSION, AS
HIS WEAPON OF VENGEANCE, TO
UNDERMINE THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
OF THE UNDERSIGNED, HIS MOTHER, ROSA
YAP PARAS, AND MEMBERS OF THE YAP
FAMILY OF BINDOY, NEGROS
ORIENTAL[.]22(Emphasis and underscoring in the
original)
Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred
as respondent had already been suspended by this
Court in two (2) previous administrative
cases.23chanrobleslaw
On February 22, 2007, respondent filed his
Comment.24 He alleged that the present Complaint
is "identical in subject-matter, principal parties
involved, issues and persecutory
intent"25cralawred with A.C. No. 734926 filed
against him by Rosa Yap-Paras, complainant's
mother.27 However, respondent admitted that:
the properties subject-matter of the instant
[administrative] complaint ... [are] subject of a
pending trial court proceedings [sic] before RTC,
Branch 45, Bais City: Civil Case No. 02-028-BY,
entitled: ROUEL YAP PARAS vs. JUSTO J. PARAS
and Register of Deeds of Negros Oriental, for
"Annulment of OCT Nos. 32360, 32350, 32361,
32362 and 33476 and damages.["]28
On the allegation of voluntary offer of properties,
respondent claimed:
4. That under ... [the] Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law . . . the implementation of the law
under C[omprehensive] A[graria]n R[eform]
P[rogram] on private properties is under two (2)
modes, namely:
1) Compulsory Acquisition by DAR (Sec. 16,
CARL), or 2) Voluntary Offer of Sale (VOS, under
Sees. 19 & 20, RA 6657). Under Mode 1, DAR on
its own initiative listing and documentation
compulsorily covers usually big real properties
owned by a single landowner in a given community
thru service of its "NOTICE OF COVERAGE". The
other Mode 2 covers properties offered for sale
under VOS by landowner. The pursuit of whichever
mode of acquisition is left to the discretion of DAR
unless offer is made.
Respondent's CARP coverage is thru the
COMPULSORY MODE. This is evidenced by ... a
"NOTICE OF COVERAGE" of DAR- sent by DAR to
Respondent informing him of the extent of
coverage of compulsory acquisition by DAR with
listing (initial) of his real properties covered. In
fact Respondent had been informed that following
or subsequent "NOTICE OF COVERAGE" shall
include or involve properties not covered by titles
or under tax declarations only, real properties
which respondent owned in Bindoy as well as in
the neighboring municipalities of Ayungon and
Mabinay, all in the province of Negros Oriental.
It being a compulsory coverage process initiated,
pursued and documented primarily by DAR, the
listing of all real properties titled, covered only by
tax declarations or possessed by Respondent are
all the workings of DAR. Respondent never
submitted to DAR a listing of his properties.
Respondent prayed for the dismissal of this case.
On April 11, 2007, this Court referred the case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
On August 22, 2007, a mandatory conference was
set for October 26, 2007 at 2:00 p.m.32 Counsel of
complainant appeared for complainant, while
respondent appeared for himself.33 The
conference ended with both parties submitting
their issues to Investigating Commissioner
Salvador B. Hababag (Commissioner Hababag) of
the Commission on Bar Discipline.34chanrobleslaw
Complainant's counsel submitted the following
issues for resolution:
1. Whether or not the respondent should be liable
for misrepresenting himself as owner of the
subject real properties when in truth an[d] in fact.
he is not;
2. Whether or not the respondent violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility which requires
a lawyer to observe honesty, candor, integrity and
in the pleadings filed therein;
3. Whether or not the respondent is bound by the
findings of the Supreme Court in Administrative
Case No. 4947 the fact that respondent committed
deceit and falsehood in having applied for pre-
patent [sic] of the lands owned by another over
which he had no actual physical possession being
aware of the fact that the same was previously
transferred in the name of Aurora Yap and which
act reflected his fitness to practice law in violation
of Rule 7.03[,] Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.35
Respondent, on the other hand, submitted the
following Issues for resolution:
1. Whether or not the previously filed and pending
Civil Case No.
02-028-BY filed by the complainant and seeking
annulment of free-patent titles is a prejudicial
question to this case;
2. Whether or not complainant has successfully
identified his quitclaimed acquired properties as to
be related to the three (3) free patented titles of
the respondent.36
Both parties were ordered to submit position
papers.
On November 23, 2007, complainant filed his
Position Paper.38 He reiterated the circumstances
and grounds for respondent's disbarment and
emphasized respondent's October 20, 2004 letter
to Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer Stephen M.
Leonidas, stating:
[C]ontrary to the misrepresentations of the
respondent, he offered the subject real properties
for VOLUNTARY ACQUISITION with the DAR as
shown in his letter....
. . . .
IT IS VERY CLEAR THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD
THE DELIBERATE AND MALICIOUS INTENT TO
DEPRIVE THE COMPLAINANT OF OWNERSHIP
RIGHTS TO THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTIES,
USING HIS LEGAL KNOWLEDGE TO CIRCUMVENT
THE JUDICIAL PROCESSES BY USING THE DAR,
INSPITE OF THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME
COURT SUSPENDING HIM FOR ONE YEAR FOR
"HIS DECEIT AND FALSEHOOD IN THE
APPLICATION FOR A FREE PATENT OVER SAID
PROPERTIES.["] NOW HE HAS DEFIED AGAIN THE
SUPREME COURT BY VOLUNTARILY OFFERING
THIS LAND FOR COMPENSATION BY DAR BY
FALSELY CLAIMING AS THE OWNER OF SAID
PROPERTIES[;]
THAT IT WAS ONLY IN 2006, THAT THE DAR GAVE
NOTICE OF THE COMPULSORY ACQUISITION, AND
INSPITE OF THE POSSESSION OF COMPLAINANT,
THE RESPONDENT HAD CONTINUED TO PURSUE
THE DAR ACQUISITION, BY CONDUCTING
MEETINGS WITH HIS ["]DAR BENEFICIARIES", AS
PROOF OF HIS .BENEVOLENCE, SINCE HE IS
GIVING AWAY ALL THE TITLED PROPERTIES, IN
HIS NAME, KNOWING THAT HE IS NOT THE TRUE
OWNER/POSSESSOR THEREOF;
THAT RESPONDENT WAS FOLLOWING UP THE
RELEASE OF THE CHECKS REPRESENTING THE
DAR PAYMENT FOR THE SUBJECT REAL
PROPERTIES, TO BE IN HIS NAME, THUS, THE
INTENT TO "CASH IN", IS SO GROSS AND
UNJUST, AND SHOWS THAT RESPONDENT DOES
NOT DESERVE TO BE AN OFFICER OF THE COURT
AND A MEMBER OF THE BAR[.]39(Emphasis in the
original)
On December 18, 2007, respondent filed his
Position Paper.40 He claimed that (1) the pendency
of Civil Case No. 02-028-BY is a prejudicial
question to the present case;41 and that (2)
complainant "failed to identify [the] four (4)
quitclaim-acquired properties as the same as
those gratuitously given by Government to
Respondent by way of free patent titles."42 To
prove his second claim, respondent compared the
size of properties in the quitclaim to complainant
as against the size of free patent titled properties
he acquired.
On January 14, 2008, complainant filed his
Reply.44 He restated his claims and added that
"while respondent claims ownership over real
properties located in Bindoy, Negros [O]riental, he
has not paid any of REAL TAXES over the subject
real properties[.]"
In his Report and Recommendation46 dated
January 5, 2008, Commissioner Hababag found
respondent guilty of violating his lawyer's oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:
Respondent has been deplorably lacking in the
candor required of him as member of the bar in his
acts of applying for the issuance of a free patent
over the properties in issue despite knowledge
that the same had already been sold by his
mother to complainant's aunt. This fact,
respondent even admitted in the comment, he
committed deceit and falsehood in his application
for free patent over the said properties when he
manifested under oath that he had been in the
actual possession and occupation of the said lands
despite the fact these were continuously in the
possession and occupation of complainant's
family, as evidenced no less by respondent's own
statements in the pleadings filed before the IBP in
Adm. Case No. 4947.
The practice of law is not a right but merely a
privilege bestowed by the State upon those who
show that they possess, and continue to possess,
the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege. . . . One of those
requirements is the observance of honesty and
candor.
The facts and evidence obtaining in the instant
case indubitably reveal respondent's failure to live
up to his duties as lawyer in consonance with the
strictures of the lawyer's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, he has shown no
remorse nor reformation thereby occasioning
sanction for his stubbornness.
The penalty of a one (1)-year suspension from the
practice of law was recommended.49chanrobleslaw
In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-42 dated January
50
17, 2008, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Board of Governors adopted and approved
Commissioner Hababag's Report and
Recommendation. However, the Board of
Governors modified the penalty and reduced
respondent's suspension from one (1) year to six
(6) months.
On April 25, 2008, complainant moved for
reconsideration52 of the January 17, 2008
Resolution, praying that the penalty of suspension
be reconsidered and a penalty of disbarment be
imposed instead. On January 3, 2013, the Motion
for Reconsideration was denied in the Board of
Governors' Resolution No. XX-2013-07.
The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether
respondent violated his lawyer's oath and the Code
of Professional Responsibility when he voluntarily
offered property that he neither owned nor
possessed for coverage under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program.
We confirm the guilt of respondent. However, we
modify the penalty imposed.
In deciding this case, this Court takes judicial
notice of two (2) administrative cases filed by Rosa
Yap Panis against respondent.
In Paras v. Atty. Paras,54 respondent was found
guilty of falsifying Rosa Yap-Paras' signature in
bank loan documents and other related
instruments; and of immorality, concubinage, and
abandonment of his own family.55 Respondent was
meted the penalty of a six (6)-month suspension
from the practice of law for the first offense, and a
one (1)-year suspension for the second offense.
In Yap-Paras v. Atty. Paras,57 respondent was
found guilty of violating his lawyer's oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility when he
"[applied] for the issuance of a free patent over
the properties in issue despite his knowledge that
the same had already been sold by his mother to
complainant's sister."58 This Court also found that:
[He] committed deceit and falsehood in his
application for free patent over the said properties
when he manifested under oath that he had been
in the actual possession and occupation of the said
lands despite the fact that these were continuously
in the possession and occupation of complainant's
family, as evidenced no less by respondents own
statements in the pleadings filed before the IBP. 59
Respondent was suspended from the practice of
law for one (1) year.60chanrobleslaw
Both Yap-Paras and this case involve the same real
properties. Both likewise refer to respondent's
deceit and misrepresentation as basis for his
administrative sanction.
In this case, one of the complainant's claims was
that:
[R]espondent engaged in an unlawful, dishonest
and deceitful conduct when he deliberate[ly]
represented himself as "LANDOWNER," and
voluntarily offered real properties to the DAR for
CARP coverage, when he knew fully well that he is
NOT THE OWNER OF THE SUBJECT REAL
PROPERTIES[.]61 (Emphasis in the original)
Respondent's violation of his lawyer's oath and of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, by
misrepresenting himself as the owner of the
properties, has already been decided in Yap-
Paras:
In the instant case, it is clear to the Court that
respondent violated his lawyer's oath as well as
the Code of Professional Responsibility which
mandates upon each lawyer, as his duty to society
and to the courts, the obligation to obey the laws
of the land and to do no falsehood nor consent to
the doing of any in court. Respondent has been
deplorably lacking in the candor required of him as
a member of the Bar and an officer of the court in
his acts of applying for the issuance of a free
patent over the properties in issue despite his
knowledge that the same had already been sold by
his mother to complainant's sister. This fact,
respondent even admitted in the comment that he
filed before this Court when he alleged that the
said properties were public land under the Forestal
Zone "when the mother of the respondent ceded
to Aurora Yap some portions of entire occupancy
of the Parases." Moreover, respondent committed
deceit and falsehood in his application for free
patent over the said properties when he
manifested under oath that he had been in the
actual possession and occupation of the said lands
despite the fact that these were continuously in
the possession and occupation of complainants
family, as evidenced no less by respondent's own
statements in the pleadings filed before the
IBP.62 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Commissioner Hababag likewise found respondent
guilty of the same offense in this case:
Respondent has been deplorably lacking in the
candor required of him as member of the bar in his
acts of applying for the issuance of a free patent
over the properties in issue despite knowledge
that the same had already been sold by his mother
to complainant's aunt. This fact, respondent even
admitted in the comment, he committed deceit
and falsehood in his application for free patent
over the said properties when he manifested under
oath that he had been in the actual possession and
occupation of the said lands despite the fact these
were continuously in the possession and
occupation of complainant's family, as evidenced
no less by respondent's own statements in the
pleadings filed before the IBP in Adm. Case No.
4947.63 (Emphasis supplied)
Although respondent's violation in this case was
not squarely addressed by Commissioner
Hababag's Report and Recommendation, the
records of the case reveal that respondent's
voluntary offer of properties was motivated by ill
will, for which he should be sanctioned.
Prior to respondent's voluntary offer of properties,
he was sanctioned by the Board of Governors in
Resolution No. XVI-2004-120 dated February 27,
2004.64 The Board of Governors adopted the
recommendation of Investigating Commissioner
Lydia A. Navarro, thus:
[R]espondent committed deceit and falsehood in
having applied for free patent over lands owned by
another over which he had no actual physical
possession being aware of the fact that the same
was previously transferred in the name of Aurora
Yap[.]65
Despite the issuance of the Resolution and the full
knowledge that the properties were subject of a
pending civil case,66 respondent submitted in
August 2004 to the Department of Agrarian
Reform of Bantayan, Dumaguete City a list of
landholdings he allegedly owned for voluntary
offer under Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program coverage.67 He even wrote a letter dated
October 20, 2004 addressed to Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer Stephen M. Leonidas requesting
that the list of properties he submitted be covered
under the Compulsory Acquisition Scheme
instead, as he could not get his spouse's
conformity for voluntary offer.68chanrobleslaw
The existence of the letter was contrary to his
claim in his Comment that he had no hand in the
Compulsory Acquisition scheme:
It being a compulsory coverage process initiated,
pursued and documented primarily by DAR, the
listing of all real properties titled, covered only by
tax declarations or possessed by Respondent are
all the workings of DAR. Respondent never
submitted to DAR a listing of his
properties.69 (Emphasis supplied)
He further contradicted himself when he admitted
the October 20, 2004 letter during the mandatory
conference:
ATTY. YAP:
The existence of the Letter of the Respondent,
Atty. Justo J. Paras dated October 20, 2004 to
Stephen M. Leonidas, Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer of the Department of Agrarian Reform,
Bantayan, Dumaguete City which is in [sic] filed
with the Department of Agrarian Reform, Negros
Oriental?
COMM. HABABAG:
Any comment?
ATTY. PARAS:
We admit that.70
Eight (8) months after this Court promulgated its
Resolution in Yap Paras,71 which confirmed the
Board of Governors' Resolution No. XVI-2004-120,
respondent authorized Edna R. Mijares, Chair of
the Domolog Tagaytay Multi-Purpose Cooperative,
to come up with a list of beneficiaries for the
properties he requested to be covered under the
Compulsory Acquisition Scheme of the
Department of Agrarian Reform.72chanrobleslaw
By authorizing Edna R. Mijares, respondent
pushed for the inclusion of his alleged properties
for Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
coverage. He did this notwithstanding the
Resolution finding him guilty of "commit[ing]
deceit and falsehood in his application for free
patent over the said properties when he
manifested under oath that he had been in the
actual possession and occupation of the said lands
despite the fact that these were continuously in
the possession and occupation of complainants
family[.]"73chanrobleslaw
Respondent's acts constitute a violation of his
lawyer's oath, which states:
I,__________________, do solemnly swear that I
will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey
the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or
sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give
aid nor consent to the same. I will delay no man
for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself
this voluntary obligation without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me
God. (Emphasis supplied)
His deliberate act of disregarding this Court's
ruling is conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and
degrades the legal profession. He is likewise guilty
of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 10, Rule
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01. -A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
....
CANON 10- A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS
AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01. - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall
he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
In offering to government property that he knew
he neither owned nor possessed, respondent
committed dishonesty, misrepresentation, and
deceit. Although deceit and misrepresentation are
present in both Yap-Paras and in this case, the
surrounding circumstances are different. In Yap-
Paras, deceit and misrepresentation were used to
apply for the issuance of a free patent. On the
other hand, in this case, they were used for a
voluntary offer of land for Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program coverage. The application for the
issuance of a free patent and the voluntary offer
of property for Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program coverage are distinct from one another
and are not prerequisites of each other. His
offense in the previous case is separate and
distinct from this case, for which he is sanctioned
anew.
Respondent has already been sanctioned three (3)
times. The dispositive portion of Paras, which was
dated October 17, 2000, reads:
In the light of the foregoing, respondent is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6)
MONTHS on the charge of falsifying his wife's
signature in bank documents and other related
loan instruments; and for ONE (1) YEAR from the
practice of law on the charges of immorality and
abandonment of his own family, the penalties to
be served simultaneously. Let notice of this
decision be spread in respondent's record as an
attorney, and notice of the same served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office
of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the
courts concerned.
SO ORDERED.74 (Emphasis supplied)
In Yap-Paras, respondent was suspended and
warned by this Court:

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Justo J.

Paras guilty of committing a falsehood in
violation of It's lawyer's oath and of the Code
of Professional Responsibility,the Court
Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year, with a
WARNING that commission of the same or similar
offense in the future will result in the imposition of
a more severe penalty.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the IBP,

as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all
courts for their information and guidance and
likewise be entered in the record of respondent as
attorney.

SO ORDERED.75 (Emphasis supplied)

This is respondent's fourth case involving the same

properties and his second infraction of an offense
of the same nature. The six (6)-month suspension
imposed by the Commission on Bar Discipline is
too light a penalty. Respondent deserves a graver
penalty for his acts of dishonesty,
misrepresentation, and deceit.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Atty.

Justo J. Paras

GUILTY of violating the lawyer's oath and Canon

1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and
his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the

Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent's personal record as attorney, to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to the Office
of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all
courts throughout the country for their information
and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, Del

Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen,
Jardeleza, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Carpio and Leonardo-De Castro, JJ., on official
leave.
Brion and Reyes, JJ., on leave.
EN BANC
Complainant further alleges that on March 24,
A.C. No. 5951, July 12, 2016 2002, respondent filed before this Court a
Complaint for "Writ of Preliminary Prohibitive and
JUTTA KRURSEL, Complainant, v. ATTY. Mandatory Injunction with Damages[.]"13 For such
LORENZA A. ABION, Respondent. services, respondent demanded and received the
following amounts on May 7,
2002:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
RESOLUTION
Php - For filing fee to the Supreme
PER CURIAM: 225,000.00 Court

In a verified Complaint,1 filed on January 23, Php

- For Sheriff's Service Fee
2003, complainant Jutta Krursel, a German 55,000.00
national, charges respondent Atty. Lorenza A.
Abion with forgery, swindling, and falsification of a Php - For Atty. Soriano, Clerk of
public document. She asks that respondent be 50.000.00 Court, to expedite matters
disbarred.
Php - Total14 (Emphasis in the
Complainant alleges that she engaged the services 330,000.00 original)
of respondent to assist her in filing a case against Respondent failed to account for these amounts
Robinsons Savings Bank - Ermita Branch land its despite complainant's demands for a
officers, in relation to the bank's illegal receipt.15Complainant's demand letter16 dated
withholding/blocking of her account. June 24, 2002 for accounting and receipts was
attached to the Complaint as Annex E.
In March 2002, respondent filed, on complainant's
behalf, a complaint against Robinsons Savings Instead of providing a receipt for the amounts
Bank and its officers before the Monetary Board I received, respondent allegedly presented
of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas for "Conducting complainant a document purporting to be an
Business in an Unsafe and Unsound Manner in Order17 dated May 10, 2002 from this Court's First
violation of Republic Act No. 8791[.]" Division, resolving the case' in complainant's
favor. The Order was purportedly signed by Atty.
Without complainant's knowledge, respondent Virginia; R. Soriano, "Division Clerk of the First
withdrew the complaint with prejudice through a Division of the Supreme Court."18 Complainant
letter5dated April 15, 2002 addressed to I the sought the advice of Atty. Abelardo L. Aportadera,
Monetary Board. Complainant claims that Jr., who, in turn, wrote to Atty. Virginia Ancheta-
respondent forged her signature and that of a Soriano (Atty. Soriano) on July 30, 200219inquiring
certain William Randeli Coleman (Coleman) in the about the supposed Order.20 Atty. Soriano
letter.6 She adds that she never authorized nor replied21 denying the signature as hers. She stated
acceded to respondent's withdrawal of the that the Order did not even follow this Court's
complaint. format, and that, on the contrary, the case had
been dismissed
Complainant was further surprised to discover two
(2) Special Powers of Attorney dated March 7, Finally, complainant alleges that in April 2002,
20028and March 24, 2002,9 which appear to have while she was sick and in the hospital, respondent
her and Coleman's signature as principals. The asked for complainant's German passportj to
documents constituted respondent as their secure its renewal from the German
attorney-in-fact to represent, to receive, sign in Embassy.23 For this service, respondent asked for
their behalf, all papers, checks, accounts the total amount of P440,000.00 to cover the
receivables, wired remittances, hi their legal and following expenses:
extra legal efforts to retrieve and unblock the peso
and dollar savings accounts opened up with the May 20, 2002 - Php 40,000.00 - For Processing of
Robinsons Savings Bank at its branch office at Travel Papers
Ermita, Manila, in order for her to withdraw and to
encash all their accounts, receivables, checks,
savings, remittances. May 27, 2002 - Php 50,000.00 - For Additional Fee
Again, complainant claims that the signatures for the Travel Papers
were forged.11 She denies ever having executed a
special power of attorney for respondent. June 3, 2002 - Php 350.000,00 - For the release
of Travel Paper as required by Atty. O. Dizon, BID
Php 450,000.00 [sic]24 (Emphasis in the
original)
These sums were allegedly not properly accounted
for despite complainant's demand.
Respondent eventually presented a purportedly
renewed German passport, which complainant
rejected because it was obviously fake.
Complainant later found out that her original
German passport was in the possession of
Robinsons Savings Bank.
Complainant avers that respondent's malicious
acts warrant her removal from the roster of
lawyers.28She adds that she and Coleman filed
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City a criminal Complaint29 against respondent for
the unlawful acts committed against them.
In the Resolution31 dated February 24, 2003, this
Court required respondent to file her comment.
Copies of the February 24, 2003 Resolution were
subsequently served on respondent's various
addresses. However, these were returned
unserved with the notations "Unclaimed," "Party
Moved Out," "Moved Out," and "Party in
Manila."32 This Court requested the assistance of
the National Bureau of Investigation, but
respondent could still not be found.
In the Resolution34 dated October 10, 2011, this
Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
On March 14, 2012, the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
directed both parties to appear for mandatory
conference.35 However, copies of the Notice of
Mandatory Conference were returned unserved as
both parties were stated to have "moved out."
Hence, in the Order37 dated April 24, 2012, the
Commission on Bar Discipline deemed the case
submitted for resolution on the basis of the
Complaint (with attachments) filed before this
Court.
In his Report and Recommendation38 dated July 6,
2013, Investigating Commissioner Peter Irving C.
Corvera recommended that respondent be
disbarred for fabricating and forging Special
Powers of Attorney and an order from this Court,
coupled with her exaction of money from
complainant without receipt or accounting despite
demands.39 These acts are in culpable violation of
Canon 1; Rule 1.01; Canon 16, Rule 16.01; and
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.40chanrobleslaw
In the Resolution41 dated October 10, 2014, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors adopted and approved the findings and
recommendations of the Investigating
Commissioner. Respondent did not file a motion
for reconsideration or any other subsequent
pleading.
On October 13, 2015, the Board of Governors
transmitted its Resolution to this Court for final
action under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
The issue for resolution is whether respondent
should be disbarred for committing forgery,
falsification, and swindling.
I
At the outset, we cannot ignore this Court's
several attempts to serve a copy of the February
24, 2003 Resolution (requiring respondent to file
a comment on the Complaint for disbarment) on
respondent at her address ion record and at the
different addresses provided by complainant and
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, only to be
returned unserved. On June 1, 2011, this Court
requested the assistance of the National Bureau of
Investigation to locate respondent, but to no
avail.43 All these circumstances reveal that either
respondent was disinterested in contesting the
charges against her or she was deliberately
eluding the service of this Court's Resolutions to
evade the consequences of her actions.
Respondent's willful behavior has effectively
hindered this Court's process service and unduly
prolonged this case. This evasive attitude is
unbecoming of a lawyer, an officer of the court
who swore to "obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities."
In Stemmerick v. Mas, this Court held that proper
notice of the disbarment proceedings was given to
the respondent lawyer who abandoned his law
office after committing the embezzlement against
his client. Thus:
Respondent should not be allowed to benefit from
his disappearing act. He can neither defeat this
Court's jurisdiction over him as a member of the
bar nor evade administrative liability by the mere
ruse of concealing his whereabouts. Thus, service
of the complaint and other orders and processes
on respondent's office was sufficient notice to him.
Indeed, since he himself rendered the service of
notice on him impossible, the notice requirement
cannot apply to him and he is thus considered to
have waived it. The law does not require that the
impossible be done. Nemo tenetur ad impossibile.
The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility.
Laws and rules must be interpreted in a way that
they are in accordance with logic, common sense,
reason and practicality.
In this connection, lawyers must update their
records with the IBP by informing the IBP National
Office or their respective chapters of any change
in office or residential address and other contact
details. In case such change is not duly updated,
service of notice on the office or residential
address appearing in the records of the IBP
National Office shall constitute sufficient notice to
a lawyer for purposes of administrative
proceedings against him.46 (Citations omitted)
Here, respondent's apparent disregard of the
judicial process cannot be tolerated. Under the
circumstances, respondent is deemed to have
waived her right to present her evidence for she
cannot use her disappearance as a shield against
any liability she may have incurred.
Respondent's evasive attitude is tantamount to "a
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court,"47 which alone is a ground for
disbarment or suspension.
We proceed to address the charges raised in the
Complaint.
II
Complainant claims that respondent forged her
and Coleman's signatures in two (2)
documents: first, in the Special Powers of Attorney
dated March 7, 200248 and March 24,
2002; and second, in respondents April 15, 2002
49
letter50 withdrawing her complaint against
Robinsons Savings Bank before the Monetary
Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
A comparison of the signature of complainant Jutta
Krursel in her Complaint and Verification and
Certification, on one hand, and her contested
signature in the Special Power of Attorney dated
March 7, 2002, on the other, visibly shows
significant differences in the stroke, form, and
general appearance of the two (2) signatures. The
inevitable conclusion is that the two (2) signatures
were not penned by one person. Similarly,
complainant's contested signature under the
Conforme portion in the April 15, 2002 letter of
respondent clearly appears to have been forged.
Nonetheless, with respect to complainant's forged
signature in Special Power of Attorney, we find no
other evidence pointing to respondent as the
author of the forgery. Jurisprudence51 creates a
presumption that a person who was in possession
of, or made use of, or benefitted from the forged
or falsified documents is the forger. However, in
this case, the facts are insufficient for us to
presume that respondent forged complainant's
signature.
Although the Special Power of Attorney may have
been executed in respondent's favoras it
authorized her to represent, receive, and sign
papers, checks, remittances, accounts, and
receivables on behalf! of complainanther
appointment as attorney-in-fact was only in
relation to complainant's "legal and extra[-]legal
efforts to retrieve and unblock [complainant's]
peso and dollar savings accounts with Robinsons
Savings Bank, Ermita."52chanrobleslaw
The authority given was only in furtherance of
complainant's employment of respondent's legal
services. There was no allegation or proof that
respondent benefitted from or used the falsified
document.53Moreover, complainant had
possession of the Special Power of Attorney, a
icopy of which was attached to her Complaint. In
all likelihood, the Special Power of Attorney may
not only have been known to complainant; she
may have conformed to its preparation all along.
However, the same conclusion cannot be made
with regard to compiainant's forged signature in
the April 15, 2002 letter. In the
Verification attached to the letter, respondent
54
declared under oath that she jcaused the
preparation of the letter of withdrawal of the
complaint with prejudice. She declared under oath
that she also caused the conforme of her clients
after informing them of the facts, both as counsel
and attorney-in-fact.
Thus, respondent committed serious acts of deceit
in: (1) withdrawing the complaint with prejudice,
without the knowledge and consent of
complainant; and (2) forging complainant's
signature or causing her signature to be forged in
the April 15, 2002 letter, thus making it appear
that complainant conformed to the withdrawal of
the complaint.
In Sebastian v. Calis:55
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer
are disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal
moral flaws in a lawyer. They are unacceptable
practices. A lawyer's relationship with others Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
should be characterized by the highest degree of dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
good faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence
of the lawyer's oath. The lawyer's oath is not mere . . . .
facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust
that must be upheld and keep inviolable. The CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES
nature of the office of an attorney requires that he UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
should be a person of good moral character. This LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
requisite is not only a condition precedent to ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
admission to the practice of law, its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the . . . .
practice of law. We have sternly warned that any
gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
professional or private capacity, puts his moral that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, law, nor should he, whether in public or private
and renders him unfit to continue in the practice life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
of law.56 (Citations omitted) discredit of the legal profession.
Respondent's deception constitutes a gross
. . . .
violation of professional ethics and a breach of her
fiduciary duty to her client, subjecting her to
disciplinary action.57chanrobleslaw CANON 15. A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR,
FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS
III AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.

Furthermore, we agree with the Committee on Bar . . . .

Discipline's fmding that complainant has
sufficiently proven her allegations regarding the
falsified order.
The appearance of the purported May 10, 2002
Order58 in G.R. No. 152946 is markedly different
from the orders and resolutions of this Court.
Indeed, it was later confirmed through the
letter59 issued by Atty. Soriano, Clerk of Court of
the First Division, that there was no such order
issued, that the signature there was not hers, and
that the format did not follow this Court's format.
Complainant avers that she paid substantial
amounts of money to respondent in relation to the
filing of the complaint for injunction in G.R. No.
152946, though respondent did not issue any
receipt or accounting despite her demands.
Instead, respondent allegedly furnished
complainant with the fabricated May 10, 2002
Order purportedly ruling in her favor. Complainant
later found out that no such order existed. The
case was already dismissed.
Respondent's acts amount to deceit, malpractice,
or gross misconduct in office as an attorney.60 She
violated her oath to "do no falsehood"61 and to
"conduct [her] self as a lawyer . . . with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to; [her]
clients."62 She also violated the following
provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
CANON 17. A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE
CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL
OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN
HIM.
CANON 18. A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT
WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
. . . .
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep his elient
informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client's
request for information.
Respondent's transgressions are grave and
serious. She abused her legal knowledge and
training. She took undue advantage of the trust
reposed on her by her client. Her misconduct
exhibits a brazen disregard of her duties as a
lawyer. The advocate for justice became the
perpetrator of injustice.
Aside from defrauding her client, respondent
recklessly put Arty. Soriano's career in jeopardy by
fabricating an order, thus making a mockery of the
judicial system. That a lawyer is not merely a
professional but also an officer of the court cannot
be overemphasized. She owes the courts of justice
and its judicial officers utmost respect.63 Her
conduct degrades the administration of justice and
weakens the people faith in the judicial system.
She inexorably besmirched the entire legal
profession. or contemplated proceedings to be initiated
against respondent.
In Embido v. Pe, Jr.,64 Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Salvador Pe, Jr. was found guilty of The Legal Office of the Office of the Court
violating Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and was meted the Administrator is DIRECTED to file the appropriate
penalty of disbarment for falsifying a court criminal charges against respondent! for falsifying
decision "in a non-existent court an order of this Court.
proceeding."65 Thus:
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the
moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
justify a lawyer's disbarment or suspension from Philippines, and the Office of the Court
the practice of law. Specifically, the deliberate Administrator for dissemination to all courts in the
falsification of the court decision by the respondent country.
was an act that reflected a high degree of moral
turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a This Resolution takes effect immediately.
mockery of the administration of justice in this
country, given the purpose of the falsification, SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the
personal status of a person. He thereby became Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De
unworthy of continuing as a member of the Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Bar.66 (Citations omitted) Perez, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza,
Respondent's unethical and unscrupulous conduct and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Mendoza, and Reyes, JJ., on official leave.
proves her unworthy of the public's trust and
confidence. She shamelessly transgressed all the
things she swore to uphold, which makes her unfit
to continue as a member of the bar. Hence, we
find no hesitation in removing respondent from the
Roll of Attorneys.

However, we find a dearth of evidence to support

complainant's claim as to the amounts demanded
and received by respondent, that is: (1) a total of
P330,000.00 in relation to G.R. No. 152946; and
(2) a total of P440,000.00 for the renewal of
complainant's passport. The demand letter dated
June 24, 2002, attached to the Complaint as
Annex E, is not competent proof of the actual
amounts paid to and received by respondent. The
demand letter does not contain the date when the
addressee received the letter; this produces doubt
as to whether the demand letter was actually
sent/delivered to respondent.

In administrative cases, it is the complainant who

has the burden to prove, by substantial
evidence,67the allegations in the
complaint.68chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Arty.

Lorenza A. Abion GUILTY of gross misconduct in
violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility. She is
hereby DISBARREDfrom the practice of law. The
Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to
remove the name of Lorenza A. Abion from the Roll
of Attorneys.

This Resolution is without prejudice to any pending


SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 8920 : September 28, 2011]
JUDGE RENE B. BACULI, COMPLAINANT, VS.
ATTY. MELCHOR A. BATTUNG, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the resolution[1] of the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) finding Atty. Melchor Battung liable for
violating Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommending
that he be reprimanded. The complainant is Judge
Rene B. Baculi, Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Tuguegarao City.
The respondent, Atty. Battung, is a member of the
Bar with postal address on Aguinaldo St.,
Tuguegarao City.
Background
Judge Baculi filed a complaint for
disbarment[2] with the Commission on Discipline of
the IBP against the respondent, alleging that the
latter violated Canons 11[3] and 12[4] of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
Judge Baculi claimed that on July 24, 2008, during
the hearing on the motion for reconsideration of
Civil Case No. 2502, the respondent was shouting
while arguing his motion. Judge Baculi advised him
to tone down his voice but instead, the respondent
shouted at the top of his voice. When warned that
he would be cited for direct contempt, the
respondent shouted, "Then cite me!"[5] Judge
Baculi cited him for direct contempt and imposed
a fine of P100.00. The respondent then left.
While other cases were being heard, the
respondent re-entered the courtroom and
shouted, "Judge, I will file gross ignorance against
you! I am not afraid of you!"[6] Judge Baculi
ordered the sheriff to escort the respondent out of
the courtroom and cited him for direct contempt of
court for the second time.
After his hearings, Judge Baculi went out and saw
the respondent at the hall of the courthouse,
apparently waiting for him. The respondent again
shouted in a threatening tone, "Judge, I will file
gross ignorance against you! I am not afraid of
you!" He kept on shouting, "I am not afraid of
you!" and challenged the judge to a fight. Staff
and lawyers escorted him out of the building.[7]
Judge Baculi also learned that after the respondent
left the courtroom, he continued shouting and
punched a table at the Office of the Clerk of
Court.[8]
Violation of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
According to Judge Baculi, the respondent filed
dilatory pleadings in Civil Case No. 2640, an
ejectment case.
Judge Baculi rendered on October 4, 2007 a
decision in Civil Case No. 2640, which he modified
on December 14, 2007. After the modified decision
became final and executory, the branch clerk of
court issued a certificate of finality. The
respondent filed a motion to quash the previously
issued writ of execution, raising as a ground the
motion to dismiss filed by the defendant for lack of
jurisdiction. Judge Baculi asserted that the
respondent knew as a lawyer that ejectment cases
are within the jurisdiction of First Level Courts and
the latter was merely delaying the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.
The respondent filed his Answer,[9] essentially
saying that it was Judge Baculi who disrespected
him.[10] We quote from his Answer:
23.I only told Judge Rene Baculi I will file Gross
ignorance of the Law against him once inside
the court room when he was lambasting me[.]
24.It was JUDGE BACULI WHO DISRESPECTED
ME. He did not like that I just submit the Motion
for Reconsideration without oral argument
because he wanted to have an occasion to just
HUMILIATE ME and to make appear to the
public that I am A NEGLIGENT LAWYER, when
he said "YOU JUSTIFY YOUR NEGLIGENCE
BEFORE THIS COURT" making it an impression
to the litigants and the public that as if I am a
NEGLIGENT, INCOMPETENT, MUMBLING, and
IRRESPONSIBLE LAWYER.
25.These words of Judge Rene Baculi made me
react[.]
xxxx
28.Since I manifested that I was not going to
orally argue the Motion, Judge Rene Baculi
could have just made an order that the Motion
for Reconsideration is submitted for resolution,
but what he did was that he forced me to argue
so that he will have the room to humiliate me
 as he used to do not only to me but almost of
the lawyers here (sic).
Atty. Battung asked that the case against him be
dismissed.
The IBP conducted its investigation of the matter
through Commissioner Jose de la Rama, Jr. In his
Commissioner's Report,[11] Commissioner De la
Rama stated that during the mandatory
conference on January 16, 2009, both parties
merely reiterated what they alleged in their
submitted pleadings. Both parties agreed that the
original copy of the July 24, 2008 tape of the
incident at the courtroom would be submitted for
the Commissioner's review. Judge Baculi
submitted the tape and the transcript of
stenographic notes on January 23, 2009.
Commissioner De la Rama narrated his findings,
as follows:[12]
At the first part of the hearing as reflected in the
TSN, it was observed that the respondent was
calm. He politely argued his case but the voice of
the complainant appears to be in high
pitch. During the mandatory conference, it was
also observed that indeed, the complainant
maintains a high pitch whenever he speaks. In
fact, in the TSN, where there was already an
argument, the complainant stated the following:
Court: Do not shout.
Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting.
Court: This court has been constantly under this
kind of voice Atty. Battung, we are very sorry if
you do not want to appear before my court, then
you better attend to your cases and do not appear
before my court if you do not want to be corrected!
(TSN, July 24, 2008, page 3)
(NOTE: The underlined words - "we are very sorry"
[- were] actually uttered by Atty. Battung while
the judge was saying the quoted portion of the
TSN)
That it was during the time when the complainant
asked the following questions when the
undersigned noticed that Atty. Battung shouted at
the presiding judge.
Court: Did you proceed under the Revised Rules
on Summary Procedure?
* finished)
Atty. Battung: It is not our fault Your Honor to
proceed because we were asked to present our
evidence ex parte. Your Honor, so, if should we
were ordered (sic) by the court to follow the rules
on summary procedure. (TSN page 3, July 24,
2008)
It was observed that the judge uttered the
following:
Court: Do not shout.
Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting.
(Page 3, TSN July 24, 2008)
Note: * it was at this point when the respondent
shouted at the complainant.
Thereafter, it was observed that both were already
shouting at each other.
Respondent claims that he was provoked by the
presiding judge that is why he shouted back at
him. But after hearing the tape, the undersigned
in convinced that it was Atty. Battung who
shouted first at the complainant.
Presumably, there were other lawyers and litigants
present waiting for their cases to be called. They
must have observed the incident. In fact, in the
joint-affidavit submitted by Elenita Pacquing et al.,
they stood as one in saying that it was really Atty.
Battung who shouted at the judge that is why the
latter cautioned him "not to shout."
The last part of the incident as contained in page
4 of the TSN reads as follows:
Court: You are now ordered to pay a fine of
P100.00.
Atty. Battung: We will file the necessary action
against this court for gross ignorance of the law.
Court: Yes, proceed.
(NOTE: Atty. Battung went out the courtroom)
Court: Next case.
Interpreter: Civil Case No. 2746.
(Note: Atty. Battung entered again the courtroom)
Atty. Battung: But what we do not like ... (not
Court: The next time...
Atty. Battung: We would like to clear ...
Court: Sheriff, throw out the counsel, put that
everything in record. If you want to see me, see
me after the court.
Next case.
Civil Case No. 2746 for Partition and Damages,
Roberto Cabalza vs. Teresita Narag, et al.
(nothing follows)
Commissioner De la Rama found that the
respondent failed to observe Canon 11 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility that requires a
lawyer to observe and maintain respect due the
courts and judicial officers. The respondent also
violated Rule 11.03 of Canon 11 that provides
that a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous,
offensive or menacing language or behavior before
the courts. The respondent's argument that Judge
Baculi provoked him to shout should not be given
due consideration since the respondent should not
have shouted at the presiding judge; by doing so,
he created the impression that disrespect of a
judge could be tolerated. What the respondent
should have done was to file an action before the
Office of the Court Administrator if he believed that
Judge Baculi did not act according to the norms of
judicial conduct.
With respect to the charge of violation of Canon 12
of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
Commissioner De la Rama found that the evidence
submitted is insufficient to support a ruling that
the respondent had misused the judicial processes
to frustrate the ends of justice.
Commissioner De la Rama recommended that the
respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for six (6) months.
On October 9, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors
passed a Resolution adopting and approving the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, with the modification that the
respondent be reprimanded.
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the IBP's finding that the
respondent violated Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Battung
disrespected Judge Baculi by shouting at him
inside the courtroom during court proceedings in
the presence of litigants and their counsels, and
court personnel. The respondent even came back
to harass Judge Baculi. This behavior, in front of
many witnesses, cannot be allowed. We note that
the respondent continued to threaten Judge Baculi
and acted in a manner that clearly showed
disrespect for his position even after the latter had
cited him for contempt. In fact, after initially
leaving the court, the respondent returned to the
courtroom and disrupted the ongoing proceedings.
These actions were not only against the person,
the position and the stature of Judge Baculi, but
against the court as well whose proceedings were
openly and flagrantly disrupted, and brought to
disrepute by the respondent.
Litigants and counsels, particularly the latter
because of their position and avowed duty to the
courts, cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule,
demean and disrespect a judge, and the court that
he represents. The Code of Professional
Responsibility provides:
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain
the respect due the courts and to judicial officers
and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.
We ruled in Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr.[13] that it
is the duty of a lawyer, as an officer of the court,
to uphold the dignity and authority of the
courts. Respect for the courts guarantees the
stability of the judicial institution; without this
guarantee, the institution would be resting on very
shaky foundations.
A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom
completely disregards the latter's role, stature and
position in our justice system. When the
respondent publicly berated and brazenly
threatened Judge Baculi that he would file a case
for gross ignorance of the law against the latter,
the respondent effectively acted in a manner
tending to erode the public confidence in Judge
Baculi's competence and in his ability to decide
cases. Incompetence is a matter that, even if true,
must be handled with sensitivity in the manner
provided under the Rules of Court; an objecting or
complaining lawyer cannot act in a manner that
puts the courts in a bad light and bring the justice
system into disrepute.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended that
Atty. Battung be reprimanded, while the
Investigating Commissioner recommended a
penalty of six (6) months suspension.

We believe that these recommended penalties are

too light for the offense.

In Re: Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo,

Former Senior State Prosecutor,[14] we suspended
Atty. Bagabuyo for one year for violating Rule
11.05, Canon 11, and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and for
violating the Lawyer's Oath for airing his
grievances against a judge in newspapers and
radio programs. In this case, Atty. Battung's
violations are no less serious as they were
committed in the courtroom in the course of
judicial proceedings where the respondent was
acting as an officer of the court, and before the
litigating public. His actions were plainly
disrespectful to Judge Baculi and to the court, to
the point of being scandalous and offensive to the
integrity of the judicial system itself.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty.

Melchor A. Battung is found GUILTY of violating
Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, for which he is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for one (1) year effective upon
the finality of this Decision. He is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of a similar offense
shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office

of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the
respondent's personal record as an attorney; the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; the Department
of Justice; and all courts in the country, for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Del Castillo,** Perez,

Mendoza, ***
and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Brion,* (Acting Chairperson)

EN BANC
A.C. No. 11095 [Formerly CBD Case No. 11-
3140], September 20, 2016
EUFEMIA A. CAMINO, Complainant, v. ATTY.
RYAN REY L. PASAGUI, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Disbarment Complaint1 dated July
13, 2011 filed by Eufemia A. Camino against
respondent Atty. Ryan Rey L. Pasagui before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBD Case
No. 11-3140, now A.C. No. 11095.
The facts are as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryComplainant Eufemia
A. Camino (Camino) is the vendor of a lot covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
70247,2 still registered under the name of the
Heirs of Camino's father. Respondent Atty. Ryan
Rey L. Pasagui (Atty. Pasagui) was allegedly the
lawyer of Congresswoman Mila Tan (Tan) who was
in charge of handling the payments for the
property which Camino sold to Tan in 2010.
Camino narrated that sometime after the election,
Atty. Pasagui offered her Tan's payment in the
amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
However, Camino refused to accept the same as
she wanted to have the payment in full and added
that she also returned to Atty. Pasagui the
postdated check amounting to Two Million Pesos
(P2,000,000.00) which Tan previously issued.
Atty. Pasagui then advised her to this effect,
"maupay ngani na war ay mo karawta, kay
magrerecall man ngani diri ka na mababaydan kay
war ay na hi Congresswoman Mila Tan kwarta.
Pamiling nala hin iba na buyer ibabalik nato it
kwarta ha iya ngan maghihimo nala ako hin
demand letter na kinahanglan na maimpasan kay
kun diri makahatag, ibabalik nala an iya nahatag"
(Good that you did not accept it because there will
be a recall and Congresswoman Mila would not
have enough money to pay you. Look for another
buyer and we'll return her money. I will prepare a
demand letter that she must pay you or else you
will just pay her back the amount she has paid).
Camino further alleged that Atty. Pasagui assured
her that he will take care of everything and
encouraged her to look for another buyer and
advised her to set its price at Seven Million Pesos
(Php7,000,000.00).
Few weeks after, Camino informed Atty. Pasagui
that she has a buyer but the latter wanted to have
a clean title of the property since said property is
still under the names of all the heirs of her father.
Atty. Pasagui then asked for the title to make the
verifications and facilitate the transferring of the
title under her name considering that she has paid
her siblings with their respective shares. Atty.
Pasagui then told her that the transfer of the title
in her name will cost about Seven Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P700,000.00) or more and that
the said amount would be enough because he can
ask for discounts from his friend at the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR).
Sometime in January 2011, Atty. Pasagui told
Camino that they will proceed with the sale to
another buyer since Tan did not give any payment
yet even after sending her the demand letter. Atty.
Pasagui, however, failed to show Camino the said
demand letter.
Convinced by Atty. Pasagui's assurance that she
could still sell the property to another buyer, she
consented to his proposition and told him that she
will look for a sufficient amount of money
necessary for the processing of the transfer of the
title.
In the evening of February 3, 2011, Camino
informed Atty. Pasagui that she already has the
amount of P120,000.00 to start the processing of
the transfer of title in her name. However, on the
day they were supposed to meet, Atty. Pasagui
failed to meet her and instead sent his mother,
Susie Pasagui, to receive the P120,000.00.
Thereafter, Atty. Pasagui advised Camino to apply
for a loan at Perpetual Help Credit Cooperative,
Inc. (PHCCI), Alang-alang, Leyte, using her
residential house and lot at V & G as collateral. The
proceeds thereof will then be used for the
necessary expenses in transferring the title in
Camino's name. He claimed that the loan can be
released in one (1) week.
Thus, Camino and her husband, Perpetuo P.
Camino, executed a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA)4 in favor of respondent Atty. Pasagui,
authorizing the latter to obtain a loan in their
behalf with PHCCI to be secured by their own
property covered by TCT No. T-35197.
A month after, Camino went to Atty. Pasagui's
house to inquire about the status of the loan
application. She was then told that the application
was still in process and the maximum loanable
amount was only Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P700,000.00) and that the release will be on a
staggered basis.
Doubtful, Camino personally went to PHCCI and
asked for the copy of his loan application. Upon
securing a copy of the application, Camino
discovered that the loan was already approved and
that the proceeds thereof amounting to One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was released on February
15, 2011.
Sometime in April 2011, Atty. Pasagui, together
with his parents invited complainant and her son,
Francis Peter Camino, to the pension house where
Tan was staying. At that time, Camino have yet to
confront Atty. Pasagui about her discovery that he
already collected the loan proceeds from PHCCI as
she was hoping that he would be the one to tell
her himself.
On the way to the pension house, Camino recalled
that Atty. Pasagui advised her to refuse payment
from Tan should she attempt to hand over an
amount less than Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00). Camino then wondered why Tan
would still offer her payment of P200,000.00 when
she thought that Atty. Pasagui already told her
that the sale of the property will no longer push
through.
When they reached the pension house, Atty.
Pasagui went directly to the room of Tan and spent
almost thirty minutes inside. When they got out of
the room, Tan handed to her an envelope
containing the amount of P150,000.00. Atty.
Pasagui then gave her a signal to accept the said
amount. She accepted the money from Tan who
also promised her the full payment on April 28,
2011.
On April 28, 2011, Camino tried to call Atty.
Pasagui to follow up on Tan's payment but he did
not answer her call. Neither did Atty. Pasagui get
in touch with her after their meeting.
Camino then decided to check the status of the
title of the property at the Register of Deeds. She
found out that Atty. Pasagui neither processed the
transfer of the title in her name nor paid the
necessary fees for its transfer. Camino also went
to Atty. Pasagui's house to inquire about Tan's
promise of payment but he was not around.
Confused, on June 6, 2011, with the assistance of
a lawyer, Camino wrote Atty. Pasagui and
reminded him of their agreement that he will be
the one to facilitate and secure a loan with PHCCI
in order to finance the payment of the necessary
expenses for the transfer of the title in her
name.6 Camino mentioned that she was able to
secure a printout of the loan interest worksheet
and that it was reflected therein that Atty. Pasagui
already received the proceeds of the loan. Camino
alleged that sufficient time have elapsed already,
yet, even after several inquiries and verification
from the Register of Deeds and other government
agencies concerned, there had been no
transaction filed in connection with the transfer of
the ownership of the property. Camino added that
she tried to get in touch with Atty. Pasagui but the
same was futile, thus, she demanded from him to
account and turn-over the proceeds of the real
estate loan from the PHCCI and to return back to
her all pertinent documents and papers which
were entrusted to him.7chanrobleslaw
In his Answer8 dated June 16, 2011, Atty. Pasagui
explained, to wit
As of the moment, however, the undersigned is
already facilitating for the release of your
documents from Perpetual Help Credit
Cooperative, Inc., Alang-alang Branch, Alang-
alang, Leyte. As to your pertinent documents
relative to Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
70247, the same is not within my possession as
those documents are in the possession of the
person who bought the same real properly way
back in the year 2009.
On August 12, 2011, the IBP-CBD ordered Atty.
Pasagui to submit his Answer to the
complaint.9chanrobleslaw
Atty. Pasagui, in his Answer10 dated September
21, 2011, admitted that he had indeed applied for
a loan with PHCCI but insisted that the same was
personal to him, thus, he will also be the one to
personally pay for it. He further alleged that he is
not under any obligation to report or account to
Camino where the proceeds of the loan went
because it is he, himself, Who will pay it anyway.
On October 12, 2011, the IBP-CBD notified the
parties to appear before the Commission for the
mandatory conference.
In its Report and Recommendation12 dated July
10, 2014, the IBP-CBD found Atty. Pasagui guilty
of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for Lawyers which is a mandate for
lawyers to desist from "dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." It recommended that Atty.
Pasagui be reprimanded with a warning that a
repetition of the same infraction will result in the
imposition of a more severe penalty.
In Resolution No. XXI-2014-93813 dated
December 14, 2014, the IBP-Board of Governors
resolved to adopt and approve with modification
as to the penalty the Report and Recommendation
of the IBP-CBD. Instead, it recommended that
Atty. Pasagui be suspended from the practice of
law for one (1) year for violation of Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, without
prejudice to the filing by the complainant of an
appropriate action in court.
We sustain the findings of the IBP-CBD except as
to the penalty.
A lawyer is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness
and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with
his clients. The profession, therefore, demands of
an attorney an absolute abdication of every
personal advantage conflicting in any way, directly
or indirectly, with the interest of his client. In this
case, Atty. Pasagui failed to measure up to the
exacting standard expected of him.
Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, provides that "[a] lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." It is well established that a
lawyer's conduct is "not confined to the
performance of his professional duties. A lawyer
may be disciplined for misconduct committed
either in his professional or private capacity. The
test is whether his conduct shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and
good demeanor, or whether it renders him
unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court."15chanrobleslaw
Any act or omission that is contrary to, or
prohibited or unauthorized by, or in defiance of,
disobedient to, or disregards the law is "unlawful."
"Unlawful" conduct does not necessarily imply the
element of criminality although the concept is
broad enough to include such element. To be
"dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, defraud or betray; be unworthy; lacking
in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle,
fairness and straight-forwardness, while conduct
that is "deceitful" means the proclivity for
fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation,
artifice or device that is used upon another who is
ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and
damage of the party imposed upon.
In the instant case, Atty. Pasagui's guilt is
undisputed. Atty. Pasagui's defense that the loan
was personal to him fails to convince. A perusal of
the Special Power of Attorney issued by Camino
and her husband to Atty. Pasagui clearly shows
that the application of the loan with PHCCI was in
behalf of the Caminos and that the property
mortgaged was likewise the property of the latter.
If it were true that it was a personal loan to him,
Atty. Pasagui failed to provide an explanation as
to why he used Camino's property as collateral.
There was likewise no explanation as to why the
Caminos would allow such set up of applying a loan
for the personal benefit of Atty. Pasagui using their
own property as collateral. In the absence of any
agreement between the parties, as in this case, it
does not make sense that the Caminos would allow
their own residential property to be mortgaged in
order to finance something that will not be of
benefit to them. It is then plausible that the true
intention of the Caminos in designating Atty.
Pasagui as attorney-in-fact was for the purpose of
obtaining a loan with the PHCCI to finance the
expenses of the transfer of title in Camino's name.
Thus, by his failure to make good of their
agreement to use the proceeds of the loan for the
transfer of the title in Camino's name, Atty.
Pasagui not only betrayed the trust and confidence
reposed upon him but he is also guilty of engaging
in dishonest and deceitful conduct. The failure of
Atty. Pasagui to inform Camino of the status of the
transfer of title despite the release of the loan to
finance the transfer of the title, is a clear indicium
that he converted the money for his own use and
constituted a gross violation of professional ethics
and betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession.17 He violated Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which states that "[a]
lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties
of his client that may come into his possession."
Furthermore:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money
or property collected or received for or from the
client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each
client separate and apart from his own and those
of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and
property of his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and
may apply so much thereof as may be necessary
to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving
notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall
also have a lien to the same extent on all
judgments and executions he has secured for his
client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to
delay any man for money or malice and is bound
to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his
clients. He is obligated to report promptly the
money of his client that has come into his
possession. He should not commingle it with his
private property or use it for his personal purposes
without his client's consent. When a lawyer
collects or receives money from his client for a
particular purpose (such as for filing fees,
registration fees, transportation and office
expenses), he should promptly account to the
client how the money was spent. If he does not
use the money for its intended purpose, he must
immediately return it to the client.18 Respondent,
by converting the money of his client to his own
personal use without her consent, was guilty of
deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct. Not only
did he degrade himself but as an unfaithful lawyer
he besmirched the fair name of an honorable
profession.
Furthermore, Atty. Pasagui's act of propositioning
himself as a lawyer of Tan and Camino who have
opposing interests as one being the seller and the
other one, the buyer, is deplorable. As lawyer of
the buyer, Tan, he facilitated the buyer's
payments to Camino, but at the same time when
it seemed that he could get a higher price from
another buyer, he encouraged Camino to cancel
the sale in favor of Tan. Clearly, such actuations
of Atty. Pasagui are tantamount to double-dealing
and conflict of interest, and manifests unethical
practice of law. Attorneys, like Caesar's wife, must
not only keep inviolate their client's confidence,
but must also avoid the appearance of treachery
and double-dealing, for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
attorneys which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice.19chanrobleslaw
PENALTY
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even
disbarred or suspended from his office as an
attorney, for violation of the lawyer's oath and/or
for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. For the practice of law is "a
profession, a form of public trust, the performance
of which is entrusted to those who are qualified
and who possess good moral character." The
appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends
on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based
on the surrounding facts.20chanrobleslaw
Here, Atty. Pasagui demonstrated not just a
negligent disregard of his duties as a lawyer but a
wanton betrayal of the trust of his client and, in
general, the public. Accordingly, the Court finds
that the suspension for one (1) year recommended
by the IBP-Board of Governors is not sufficient
punishment for Atty. Pasagui's unacceptable acts
and omissions. The acts of the respondent
constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his
office as attorney. His incompetence and appalling
indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and
society render him unfit to continue discharging
the trust reposed on him.
The Court also deems it appropriate to order the
return of the moneys which respondent received
as attorney-in-fact, for the purpose of facilitating
the transfer of the title in the name of the
complainant with the corresponding payment of
legal interest as pronounced in the case of Nacar
v. Gallery Frames.21True, in disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is
whether the officer of the court is still fit to be
allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. In
such cases, the Court's only concern is the
determination of respondent's administrative
liability; it should not involve his civil liability for
moneys received from his client in a transaction
separate, distinct, and not intrinsically linked to his
professional engagement. However, in this case, it
appeared that the Caminos entrusted the task of
facilitating the transfer of the title by virtue of
respondent's legal expertise. The receipt of the
moneys was not by virtue of a personal transaction
between the complainant and respondent. After
all, if a person, in respect to business affairs or
troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view
to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and
the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with
the consultation, as in this case, then the
professional employment is established.22 Once
lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they
owe fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
them.23chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XXI-2014-938
dated December 14, 2014 of the IBP-Board of
Governors which found respondent Atty. Ryan Rey
L. Pasagui GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION as to the penalty.
Respondent Atty. Ryan Rey L. Pasagui is instead
meted the penalty of DISBARMENT. Respondent
is further ORDERED to immediately RETURN the
loan proceeds amounting to P1,000,000.00 and to
pay legal interest at the rate of twelve percent
(12%) per annum computed from the release of
the loan on February 15, 2011 up to June 30,
2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July
1, 2013 until fully paid, as well as, the
P120,000.00 received for the purpose of
transferring the title in the name of the
complainant and to pay legal interest at the rate
of twelve percent (12%) per annum computed
from receipt of the amount on February 3, 2011
up to June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per
annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid. He is
likewise ORDERED to RETURN all other
documents pertinent to the loan obtained from
PHCCI and those received from complainant.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the

Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the
personal record of respondent; the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.

This Decision shall be immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
EN BANC
Sereno, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro,
Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez, A.C. No. 8494, October 05, 2016
Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen,
Jardeleza, and Caguioa, JJ., concur. SPOUSES EMILIO AND ALICIA
Carpio, J., on official leave. JACINTO, Complainants, v. ATTY. EMELIE P.
BANGOT, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A lawyer shall observe candor, honesty and

fairness in dealing with his clients, and shall only
charge fair and reasonable fees for his legal
services. He should not excessively estimate the
value of his professional services. In drawing up
the terms of his professional engagement, he
should not practice deceit. The clients are entitled
to rescind the written agreement on his
professional fees if the terms thereof contravened
the true agreement of the parties.

Antecedents

This administrative case stems from the complaint

brought on December 8, 2009 by the Spouses
Emilio and Alicia Jacinto, then 81 and 76 years of
age, respectively, against Atty. Emelie P. Bangot,
Jr. for the latter's unjust and dishonest treatment
of them as his clients. They hereby seek that he
be sanctioned for his actuations.1chanrobleslaw

The complainants averred that a private survey

team had conducted a survey of Cad. 237 Lot No.
1351 on October 10-11, 2008 pursuant to the
order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, in
Cagayan de Oro City in connection with the
reconstitution of the lost certificate of title of said
lot by the owners; that after conducting the
perimeter survey, the survey team had tried to
enter the premises owned by them but they had
prevented the team from doing so because their
premises had already been segregated by virtue of
the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. P-
3387; that their land covered by OCT No. P-3387
had already been subdivided into nine lots; that
the survey team had then desisted from
proceeding with their survey of their land but had
nonetheless informed them that they would return
another time for the survey; and that this had
forced them to consult a lawyer on the legal
remedies to prevent the intrusion on their
property.2chanrobleslaw
The complainants further averred that they had
then consulted with the respondent, briefing him
on their concern, and delivering to him the
documents pertinent to their land; that after
scrutinizing the documents, he had told them that
he would be initiating a case for certiorari in their
behalf to nullify the order for the reconstitution of
the lost title covering Cad. 237 Lot No. 1351; that
he had then insinuated that one of their lots would
be his attorney's fees; and that they had not
initially agreed to the insinuation because the lots
had already been allocated to each of their seven
children, but they had ultimately consented to
giving him only a portion of Lot No. 37926-H with
an area of 250 square meters n.3chanrobleslaw
It appears that soon after the respondent
unilaterally prepared the document so-
called Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), to wit:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryI, ATTY. EMELIE P.
BANGOT, JR., of legal age, married and a resident
of Lot 13, Block 1, Xavier Heights Subd., Upper
Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City, hereinafter
referred as the FIRST PARTY; and cralawlawlibrary
WE, SPOUSES EMILIO JACINTO AND ALICIA
JACINTO, both legal age, and residents of Cagayan
de Oro City, herein referred as the SECOND
PARTY;
WITNESSETH:
1. That the FIRST PARTY shall be the
counsel/lawyer of the SECOND PARTY, regarding
their parcel of land formerly covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. P-3387 with an area of
4,138 sq. m., located at Kauswagan, Cagayan de
Oro City, presently subdivided into 8 lots with
individual certificate of titles (sic);
2. That the First Party shall get 300 sq. m., from
Lot No. 37925-G covered by TCT No. 121708
3. That this agreement shall take effect
immediately upon the signing of the parties (sic)
cannot be revoked, amended or modified by the
Second Party without the consent of the First
Party.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The complainants recalled that on October 17,
2008 the respondent requested them to proceed
to his law office. What thereafter transpired and
that led to the signing of the MOA were set forth
in their complaint, as follows:
On October 17, 2008, my wife received a phone
call from the office of Atty. Bangot directing us to
go to his office to sign documents they have
prepared. The phone call was relayed to me by my
wife so we immediately proceeded to his office
arriving thereat at exactly 4:00 PM. The daughter
of Atty. Bangot handed to us two sets of
documents for our signatures. Because of full trust
to Atty. Bangot, we did not bother reading the
contents of the documents. Per instruction, we
brought the papers to their friend lawyer for
notarization and after the notarization returned to
the office where we were given our personal file,
without reading every detail of the documents.
Upon arriving at our residence, I read the contents
of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). Said
MOA was not signed by Atty. Bangot and did not
bear the signature of witnesses. I was surprised to
know that the terms of the (MOA) did not reflect
the true intentions being contemplated in our
previous discussions. Contrary to what I have told
him, a different area which is 37925-G under TCT
No. 121708 was written. I already told him that
my other lots including the lot written in the MOA
could no longer be. disposed of because these lots
were already committed to each of my children.
The lot area was also increased from 250 sq. m. to
300 sq. m. Because of this situation, I called my
wife and children and told them about the
problem. My daughter whose share was involved
reacted badly and she was hurt because she will
then be deprived of her place to live in, in the
future. We continued our discussion and we
decided to see Atty. Bangot to have the MOA be
revoked because we felt that we were deceived,
Atty. Bangot took advantage of our old age, thus
breaking the trust and confidence the client[']s
and lawyer should uphold at all times in the
exercise of one's profession.
As a gesture of acknowledging his efforts, we
offered to pay him in cash, fair enough for the
services he had rendered to us. However, he
refused to revoke the MOA because accordingly,
he would consult his wife which finally did not
materialize because his wife was not amenable
which in effect showed that they have vested
interest on the property and they are bent on
taking the property at any cause. He even
challenged us to file an appropriate case in court
against him rather than agree with our pleading
for payment of cash. Likewise, he refused our offer
to pay his services in cash alleging that he already
filed a Manifestation in court and claimed that our
possession would not be disturbed and that he will
be filing a case for Certiorari as promised.
To our surprise though, we came to know that the
Manifestation filed by Atty. Bangot is not a
preparatory pleading for certiorari. No way could it
even stop the intrusion into our property.
Basically, we were deceived by Atty. Bangot into
believing that the Manifestation he filed would stop
any legal disturbance on our property and the
same is preparatory
for certiorari.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Feeling aggrieved, the complainants decided to
bring their complaint against the respondent.
On his part, the respondent denied the allegations
of the complainants. He insisted that the complaint
against him was a harassment tactic designed to
intimidate him from seeking judicial remedies to
settle their dispute on the validity of the
MOA;6 that the MOA was valid; that
the Manifestation for Informationhe had filed in
court prevented the intrusion into the
complainants' land; that the administrative
complaint was designed to insure the derailment
of his application for a judgeship position, and to
cover up the negligence of the complainants'
counsel as the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2008-302
(for annulment and/or rescission of agreement),
which case was dismissed for failure to comply
with the requirement for the prior barangay
conciliation proceedings; and that they had
voluntarily signed the MOA without intimidation,
fraud or undue influence.7chanrobleslaw
On August 23, 2010, the Court referred the
complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.8chanrobleslaw
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
In due course, IBP Commissioner Oliver A.
Cachapero submitted his Report and
Recommendation9finding the complaint against
the respondent meritorious, and recommending
that the respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one year for his unfair and
injudicious treatment of the complainants as his
clients.
In Resolution No. XX-2013-71,10 the IBP Board of
Governors increased the duration of the
respondent's recommended penalty to suspension
from the practice of law for two years,
viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED AND APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution
as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules and considering that
Respondent breached his duty of candor and
fairness to his client, Atty. Emelie P. Bangot, Jr. is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for two (2) years.
Through its Resolution No. XXI-2014-315,11 the
IBP Board of Governors denied the respondent's
motion for reconsideration.
Issue
Did the respondent violate his ethical duties as a
member of the Bar in his dealings with the
complainants?
Ruling of the Court
We find and hold that the respondent grossly
violated his Lawyer's Oath and his ethical duties as
an attorney because he did not observe candor
and fairness in his dealings with his clients.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Cachapero,
which sufficiently described the violations of the
respondent, provide an irrefutable insight into the
gravity of the violations by the respondent, as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The question to ask is, "Was the MOA fair to the
parties and entered into by them in goodfaith?"
The undersigned resolves in the negative. To begin
with, the conduct of Respondent had evinced an
instinctive interest in the property of
Complainants. He had the MOA executed at the
same time he filed the Manifestation for
Information before the court that was hearing LRC
Case No. 98-010. Not only that, Respondent's
proposal to have a MOA executed between him
and the Complainant was meant to impress that
his supposed attorney's fees would be paid on
contingent basis, however, a perusal of the MOA
indicates that the payment of Respondents' fee by
way of a real property is being made immediately
effective upon execution of the agreement.
As to the agreement of the Complainant and the
Respondent, the undersigned gives full faith to the
allegation of Complainant that the payment of
Respondent's attorney's fees by way of a real
property would come from TCT No. 121709 and
not T-121708. Complainants explained that the
latter lot had already been committed to their
seven (7) children especially because this lot is
situated in a prime location thus they could not
have picked the same over Lot No. 121709. The
Respondent knew straightforwardly that lot
121708 was a better lot yet Respondent gave a
different account of their agreement and took
advantage of the frailty and advance ages (sic) of
his clients.
But, the most shocking of all, is the apparent
inequity or disproportion between the amount of
attorney's fees (measured from the value of the
property taken by Respondent) and the effort or
service already performed or still to be performed
by him. The Complainants were not made parties
to the LRC case or any other case and Respondent
filed a mere two-paged Manifestation for
Information in court which he did almost
effortlessly. It is not clear how the court had
reacted to the manifestation but Respondent did
not follow it up with [any] other action. Despite
the same, Respondent stuck to his tale that the
Complainants had signed [the] MOA and despite
his minimal representation of the Complainants in
court, he held on to his idea that he had taken
from his clients valid title to a million [pesos]
worth of real estate in payment of his fees.
The undersigned does not see fairness and
judiciousness to Respondent's treatment of his
clients, 81 and 76 years old, respectively, and he
need not add to his brief disquisition in this
regard.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We adopt the findings and note the insights thus
expressed.
We must, therefore, highlight the following
reasons why the findings and insights should be
sustained.
To determine the reasonableness of attorney's
fees, the following factors as enumerated in Rule
20.1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility may serve as a guide, to wit: (a) the
time spent and the extent of the services rendered
or required; (b) the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved; (c) the importance of the
subject matter; (d) the skill demanded; (e) the
probability of losing other employment as a result
of acceptance of the proffered case; (f) the
customary charges for similar services and the
schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he
belongs; (g) the amount involved in the
controversy and the benefits resulting to the client
from the service; (h) the contingency or certainty
of compensation; (i) the character of the
employment, whether occasional or established;
and j) the professional standing of the lawyer.
It was not disputed that only the filing of the two-
paged Manifestation for Information constituted
the respondent's rendition of professional services
for the complainants. Although he did claim that
the filing of the Manifestation for Information had
prevented any intrusion on their property, thereby
fulfilling his end of the contract,13 the worth of
such minimal effort was exaggerated and
disproportionate when taken in the context of the
attorney's fees being Lot No. 37925-G with 300
square meters in area. The two-
paged Manifestation for Information was not even
the procedural precursor of the promised petition
for certiorari. Moreover, he did not actually file the
petition for certiorari as he had promised. And,
lastly, he did nothing more after filing
the Manifestation for Information. He certainly
transgressed the Lawyer's Oath by receiving
property of a substantial value from the
complainants after having made them believe that
he could ensure their land from intrusion by third
parties. He took advantage of them who had
reposed their full trust and confidence in his ability
to perform the task by virtue of his being a lawyer.
He was definitely bent on obtaining Lot No. 37925-
G than in protecting the complainants' interest in
their property. He exhibited this zeal by refusing
their offer to give cash for his attorney's fees
instead of the land. We sadly note in this
connection that his changing the property
ostensibly agreed upon with the bigger lot as
payment for his legal services14 reflected his deceit
at the start of the relationship. He maintained the
deceit by ultimately enforcing the MOA against
them through the action for specific performance.
Surely, the totality of the respondent's actuations
inevitably eroded public trust in the Legal
Profession. On the basis of his acts and actuations,
the attorney's fees in the form of the lot he
charged from them were unconscionable and
unreasonable, and should be struck down for
failing to pass muster under the aforestated
guidelines.
The respondent appears to have impressed on the
complainants at the time of their negotiations that
the attorney's fees in the form of the lot would be
delivered to him only on a contingent basis. Again,
he had misrepresented himself to them because
the express terms of the MOA stipulated that "this
agreement shall take effect immediately upon the
signing of the parties [and] cannot be revoked,
amended or modified by the Second Party without
the consent of the First Party."
As worded, the agreement was not a contingent
fee arrangement. Indeed, a contingent fee
arrangement is a contract in writing in which the
fee, usually a fixed percentage of what may be
recovered in the action, is made to depend upon
the success in the effort to enforce or defend a
supposed right.15 The amount of the contingent
fee agreed upon by the parties is subject to the
stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal
services only if the suit or litigation prospers. A
much higher compensation is allowed as
contingent fee in consideration of the risk that the
lawyer may get nothing should the suit fail. Such
arrangement is generally recognized as valid and
binding in this jurisdiction but its terms must be
reasonable.16 Canon 13 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics states that "a contract for a
contingent fee, when sanctioned by law, should be
reasonable under all the circumstances of the case
including the risk and uncertainty of the
compensation, but should always be subject to the
supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness." A
contract of this nature is permitted because it
redounds to the benefit of the poor client and the
lawyer especially in cases where the client has a
meritorious cause of action but has no means with
which to pay for the legal services unless he can,
with the sanction of law, make a contract for a
contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of
the litigation. Oftentimes, such arrangement is the
only means by which the poor and helpless can
seek redress for injuries sustained and have their
rights vindicated.
Considering that a contingent fee arrangement is
susceptible to abuse, the courts should closely
scrutinize it to protect the client from unjust
charges. The court looks in large measure at the
reasonableness of the stipulated fee under the
circumstances of each case.18 Section 24, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides:
Section 24. Compensation of attorneys;
agreement as to fees. -- An attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client no
more than a reasonable compensation for his
services, with a view to the importance of the
subject matter of the controversy, the extent of
the services rendered, and the professional
standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound
by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as
to the proper compensation, but may disregard
such testimony and base its conclusion on its own
professional knowledge. A written contract for
services shall control the amount to be paid
therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable. (Emphasis ours)
All the foregoing circumstances established that
the respondent was deceitful, dishonest and
unreasonable in his dealings with the complainants
as his clients. He thus violated his Lawyer's Oath,
whereby he vowed, among others, to do no
falsehood, and not to consent to the doing of any
falsehood, as well as not to delay any man's cause
for money or malice but to conduct himself as a
lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion "with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to [his] clients. He also breached the
following canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 15 A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness
and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with
his clients.
Canon 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
Canon 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Canon 20- A lawyer shall charge only fair and
reasonable fees. Rule 20.4 A lawyer shall avoid
controversies with clients concerning his
compensation and shall resort to judicial action
only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
We have said time and again, and this we cannot
overemphasize, that the Law is neither a trade nor
a craft but a profession whose basic ideal is to
render public service and to secure justice for
those who seek its aid. If the Law has to remain
an honorable profession and has to attain its basic
ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not only
master its tenets and principles but should also, by
their lives, accord continuing fidelity to such tenets
and principles.19 The respondent's behavior and
deceit demonstrated a preference for self-gain
that transgressed his sworn duty of fidelity, loyalty
and devotion to his clients' cause. His betrayal of
his clients' trust besmirched the honorable name
of the Law Profession. These considerations justify
suspending him from the practice of law.
Moreover, the respondent made the following
allegations in his motion for reconsideration filed
with the IBP Board of Governors, to wit:
9. It is quite disturbing that to cover up Atty.
Palasan's negligence and reckless filing of
Annulment and/or Rescission of Agreement titled
Spouses Emilio Jacinto and Alicia Jacinto vs. Atty.
Emelie P. Bangot docketed as Civil Case No. 2008-
302 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41,
Cagayan de Oro City where the subject matter was
the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between
the complainant and respondent, said counsel
resorted to another forum by filing this
administrative case where his chance of
oppressing and harassing respondent is far greater
because when he filed said administrative case
Atty. Roan Libarios then one of the Officers of the
IBP National Chapter and member of the Board of
Governors, representing Eastern Mindanao, was
holding office at IBP, Ortigas Center, Pasig City as
such, his officemate or law partner at Butuan City
(sic). Unfortunately, for respondent, Atty. Libarios
eventually became the IBP National President;
x x x x
18. The statement by Commissioner Cachapero in
his Report and Recommendation, 1stsentence,
2nd par., thereof that: "On October 10 & 11, 2008,
a survey was conducted on Cadastral Lot No. 1351
situated at Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City in
connection with the reconstitution of the lost title
of the lot which was then pending before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, R-10, Cagayan de
Oro City." is quite confusing and designed to put
down respondent probably at any cost and
probably by an "unseen but influential
hands(sic)";20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The aforequoted allegations indicated that the
respondent had readily attributed the filing of the
administrative charge to the lawyer representing
the complainants in the suit against him to annul
or rescind the MOA, as well as to "unseen but
influential hands" in the hierarchy of the IBP. The
attribution was bereft of factual and legal
justifications, however, because he did not even
attempt to establish it with satisfactory proof. We
cannot but dismiss the attribution as malicious and
unfounded in view of the record establishing his
serious ethical violations. He displayed an
unmitigated lack of professionalism by casting
aspersions against his peers, and exhibited a
dangerous propensity to disparage others, which
should move us to consider his violations as
aggravated.
To be now considered, therefore, is the condign
penalty of the respondent. A review of precedents
shows that the penalty of suspension, or even
disbarment, has been meted on similar violations
and transgressions. In Santeco v. Avance,21 the
respondent attorney was suspended for five years
for abandoning the cause of her client without
notice despite her having collected her legal fees.
She also failed to account for the money of the
client and constantly refused to submit herself to
the proceedings of the IBP. In Lemoine v. Balon,
Jr.,22 this Court disbarred the respondent attorney
who did not promptly account for the funds he had
received for the benefit of his client, and for his
deceit in dealings with his client. In Overgaard v.
Valdez,23 the respondent attorney was disbarred
for assuring the complainant that his property
involved in a civil case would be safeguarded, and
then collecting the full amount of legal fees
amounting to P900,000.00, only to desert the
complainant after receiving the fees. The
respondent attorney had further failed to submit
an answer as well as to attend the proceedings
before the IBP.
Although the complainants appeared to have
initially bound themselves to give a part of their
land as the respondent's professional fees, they
did so apparently because he had misrepresented
to them the gravity and extent of their legal
matter. His misrepresentation was undeniably
calculated to make them part with their valuable
asset in lieu of cash. He did not thereafter render
any worthy professional legal service in their
favor. Verily, as the cliche goes, they did not get
their money's worth from him. Even if this charge
was his first infraction, the grossness of his
violations of the Lawyer's Oath and the various
relevant canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility quoted earlier absolutely warranted
his suspension from the practice of law for five
years effective upon his receipt of this decision,
with warning of sterner sanctions should he
hereafter commit a similar offense. This duration
of suspension was the penalty we prescribed in the
recent case of Mercullo v. Ramon 24 where the
respondent lawyer had deceived the complainants
into parting with the substantial sum of
P350,000.00 as her attorney's fees but did not
subsequently perform her professional
undertaking.
In addition, the respondent should not be entitled
to receive any attorney's fees in view of the
worthlessness of the professional services he
supposedly rendered. There is no question, as
ruled in Sanchez v. Aguilos,25cralawred that every
attorney is entitled to have and receive a just and
reasonable compensation for services performed
at the special instance and request of his client;
and that for as long as the attorney is in good faith
and honestly trying to represent and serve the
interests of the client, he should have a reasonable
compensation for such services. Yet, equally
without question is that the attorney should not
accept the engagement that is way above his
ability and competence to handle, for there will
then be no basis for him to accept any amount as
attorney's fees; or that he should at least begin to
perform the contemplated task undertaken for the
client to entitle him to be compensated on the
basis of quantum meruit.26chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, this
Court FINDS and HOLDS respondent ATTY.
EMELIE P. BANGOT, JR. guilty of violation of the
Lawyer's Oath and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; SUSPENDS him from the practice
of law for five (5) years effective upon notice of
this decision, with warning that sterner sanctions
will be meted on him for a similar offense;
and DECLARES that he is not entitled to recover
any attorney's fees from the complainants.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the

Office of the Bar Confidant; the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines; and to the Office of the Court
Administrator.

The Office of the Court Administrator shall

disseminate this decision to all courts of the
Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., on official business.

Carpio, (Acting Chief Justice), Velasco, Jr.,
Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Del Castillo, Perez,
Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen,
Jardeleza, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., on leave.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7178, August 23, 2016
VICENTE M. GIMENA, Complainant, v. ATTY.
SALVADOR T. SABIO, Respondent.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
Before us is a Complaint for Disbarment1 filed by
Vicente M. Gimena (complainant) against Atty.
Salvador T. Sabio (respondent) for gross
negligence in handling RAB Case No. 06-11-
10970-99 (case). Complainant laments that his
company, Simon Peter Equipment and
Construction Systems, Inc. (company) lost in the
case because respondent filed an unsigned
position paper and ignored the order of the labor
arbiter directing him to sign the pleading. Aware
of the unfavorable decision, respondent did not
even bother to inform complainant of the same.
The adverse decision became fmal and executory,
robbing complainant of a chance to file a timely
appeal.
Facts
Complainant is the president and general manager
of the company.2 In his Complaint3 dated March 7,
2006, he narrated that he engaged the legal
services of respondent in relation to a case for
illegal dismissal4 filed against him and the
company. All the pleadings and orders were
directed to respondent because the company no
longer had active presence in Bacolod, save for the
stockpile of construction equipment found in
Barangay Mansilingan.5 Sometime in February
2000, complainant signed the verification page of
the position paper for the case and sent it to
respondent for his signature. However,
respondent filed the position paper without signing
it.6 The labor arbiter noticed the unsigned pleading
and directed respondent to sign it within 10 days
from notice.7 Respondent did not comply with the
directive.
In a Decision8 dated October 21, 2004, the labor
arbiter ruled against the company and noted that:
"[the company] filed an unsigned position paper
which cannot be considered as such. Despite the
order to Atty. Salvador Sabia to sign said position
paper, the order was deemed to have been taken
for granted."9Respondent received a copy of the
Decision on January 13, 2005 but he did not notify
complainant about it.10 Complainant only learned
of the Decision after a writ of execution was served
on the company on June 2005 and by that time, it
was already too late to file an
appeal.11chanrobleslaw
Complainant stressed that respondent was
previously suspended from the practice of law on
two (2) occasions: first was in the case of Cordova
v. Labayen,12 where respondent was suspended
for six (6) months, and the second was in the case
of Credito v. Sabio,13 where he was suspended for
one (1) year. The latter case involved facts
analogous to the present Complaint.
In his Comment,14 respondent countered that
complainant engaged his services in 2000.
Complainant, however, did not pay the expenses
and attorney's fees for the preparation and filing
of the position paper in the amount of
P20,000.00.15 The lack of payment contributed to
respondent's oversight in the filing of the unsigned
position paper.16 Respondent also insisted that the
unfavorable Decision of the labor arbiter is based
on the merits and not due to default.17 Respondent
further explained that he was not able to inform
complainant of the outcome of the case because
he does not know the address of the company
after it allegedly abandoned its place of business
in Barangay Mansilingan, without leaving any
forwarding address.18 Respondent claimed that
complainant only communicated to him when the
writ of execution was issued on July 27, 2005. 19 He
faulted complainant and the company for being
remiss in their legal obligation to be in constant
communication with him as to the status of the
case.20chanrobleslaw
Moreover, respondent averred that the filing of the
administrative case against him is tainted with ill
will to compensate for complainant's failure to post
a bond to stay the writ of execution and the sale
of the construction equipment levied
upon.21 Respondent submitted that if it were true
that he was negligent in the handling of the case,
then why did complainant, the company and the
third party claimants still avail of his services as
attorney-in-fact in the auction
sale?22chanrobleslaw
In his Reply,23 complainant insisted that the
acceptance fee of respondent was P50,000.00.
Complainant paid respondent P20,000.00 as
advance payment, but which was without a receipt
because complainant trusted him.24 The remaining
P30,000.00 was also paid to respondent, as
evidenced by photocopies of deposit slips to his
Banco De Oro account.25cralawredchanrobleslaw
We referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for report and recommendation.
During the mandatory conference before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (the Commission),
complainant and respondent were asked to discuss
their complaint and defense, respectively. For the
first time, respondent raised the issue of lack of
attorney-client relationship. He pointed out that he
and complainant had never met each other and
that there was no formal engagement of his
services.26 The parties did not enter into
stipulation of facts and limited the issues to the
following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a) Whether or not there was attorney-client
relationship between respondent and the
company in RAB Case No. 06-11-10970-
99;
b) If in the affirmative, whether or not
respondent was negligent in handling RAB
Case No. 06-11-10970-99 and whether
such negligence renders him liable under
the Code of Professional Responsibility.27
The Commission ordered the parties to file their
verified position papers. Respondent, in his
Position Paper,28 reiterated that he cannot be
expected to render legal services to the company
and the complainant because no formal contract
for legal retainer services was executed.
On December 2, 2008, the Commission issued its
Report and Recommendation30 finding respondent
guilty of gross negligence.
IBP Recommendation
As regards the first issue, the Investigating
Commissioner Atty. Randall C. Tabayoyong (the
Investigating Commissioner) ruled that there is
indeed an attorney-client relationship between
complainant and respondent. Respondent's
assertion that he was not a counsel of record in
the case is belied by his own admission in the
Comment he filed before the Commission.31 In
paragraph 1 of his Comment, respondent stated
that he was "engaged by complainant in 2000
regarding the labor case of the
[company]."32 Then, in paragraph 2, he averred
that he was not paid for legal expenses and legal
charges for the filing of the position paper.33 More,
the Order and Decision of the labor arbiter referred
to respondent as the counsel of the
company.34chanrobleslaw
With respect to the second issue, the Investigating
Commissioner declared that the evidence on
record sufficiently supports the charges of
negligence against respondent.35 Again, it was
respondent's own admissions that put the final nail
on his coffin. Respondent neither denied that he
filed an unsigned pleading nor refuted the claim
that he did not inform complainant of the outcome
of the case and the due date of the appeal before
the National Labor Relations Commission. He only
offered excuses, which the Investigating
Commissioner found as "reprehensible" and
"downright misleading."36chanrobleslaw
The Investigating Commissioner noted that
respondent violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for the negligence that
he committed in handling the case referred to
him.37 Weight was also given to the fact that
respondent was previously suspended for the
same offense in Credito.38Hence, it was
recommended that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of two (2) years
with a warning that a similar violation in the future
will merit a heavier penalty.39chanrobleslaw
The recommendation was adopted and approved
by the IBP Board of Governors in its
Resolution40 dated April 16, 2010. Respondent
filed a Motion for Reconsideration41 but the same
was denied.
Issue
Whether respondent should be held
administratively liable for the acts complained of.
Ruling
We concur with the findings of the IBP, with the
addition that respondent also violated Rule 18.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We also
find that a longer period of suspension is
warranted in view of the number of times that
respondent had been disciplined administratively.
There is attorney-client relationship between
respondent and complainant
The contention of respondent that there was no
attorney-client relationship between him and the
company is, at best, flimsy. It is improper for him
to capitalize on the fact that no formal contract for
legal retainer was signed by the parties, for
formality is not an essential element in the
employment of an attorney.43 The contract may be
express or implied and it is sufficient that the
advice and assistance of the attorney is sought
and received, in matters pertinent to his
profession. An attorney impliedly accepts the
relation when he acts on behalf of his client in
pursuance of the request made by the
latter.44chanrobleslaw
Respondent acted on behalf of the company and
the complainant in relation to the case. Albeit
unsigned, he allowed his name to appear as
"counsel for respondent"45 in the position paper
that he filed before the labor arbiter. He never
called the attention of the labor court that he was
not the counsel of the company. More importantly,
he admitted in his Comment that the complainant
engaged his legal services. Respondent cannot
plead the same before us then later on deny it
before the IBP to save him from his omissions.
Estoppel works against him. Basic is the rule that
an admission made in the pleading cannot be
controverted by the party making it for such is
conclusive as to him, and all proofs to the contrary
shall be ignored, whether objection is interposed
by the said party or not.46chanrobleslaw
Respondent is grossly negligent in handling
RAB Case No. 06-11-10970-99
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (the "Code") mandates that a
lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence. Corollarily, Rule 18.03 directs that a
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him.47 He must exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family with respect to the case that he
is handling. This is true whether he accepted the
case for free or in consideration of a fee.
A lawyer is presumed to be prompt and diligent in
the performance of his obligations and in the
protection of his client's interest and in the
discharge of his duties as an officer of the
court.48 Here, however, this presumption is
overturned by clear and convincing evidence that
respondent was grossly negligent as counsel of the
company and complainant in the case.
Every law student is taught that an unsigned
pleading creates no legal effect, such that the
party may be deemed not to have filed a pleading
at all. Yet, respondent, a long standing legal
practitioner, did not sign a position paper that he
filed in a labor suit allegedly due to oversight.
What more, he claimed that his client's failure to
pay legal expenses and attorney's fees contributed
to such oversight. These actuations of respondent
demean the legal profession. Lawyering is not
primarily concerned with money-making; rather,
public service and administration of justice are the
tenets of the profession.49 Due to respondent's
negligence, the labor arbiter did not consider the
position paper of the company and the
complainant. This circumstance deprived the
company of the chance to explain its side of the
controversy - an unfortunate incident brought
about by its own counsel.
Respondent's inattention is further highlighted by
his disobedience to the labor arbiter's directive
that he sign the position paper. His conduct
evinces a willful disregard to his duty as officer of
the court. This alone warrants the imposition of
administrative liability.
Respondent's irresponsibility went beyond the
unsigned pleading and refusal to obey court
orders; he also admittedly failed to apprise the
company and the complainant of the adverse
decision against them. He even had the audacity
to place the blame on his client for not
communicating to him as regards the status of the
case. He furthermore justified his omission by
saying that he was not aware of the address of the
company.
The foregoing excuses should be rejected. As the
IBP correctly observed, respondent overlooked the
attached affidavit of the complainant in the
unsigned position paper, which clearly indicates
that the principal office address of the company is
at Quirino Highway, Sacred Heart Village IV,
Novaliches, Caloocan City.50 Respondent himself
had notarized the affidavit.51 Thus, contrary to his
contention, it appears from the records that he
was fully aware of the address of the company.
There was no justifiable reason for him not to
notify complainant and the company of the
adverse decision against them.
Respondent's conduct is inconsistent with Rule
18.04 of the Code, which requires that "[a] lawyer
shall keep the client informed of the status ofhis
case and shall respond within a reasonable time to
the client's request for information."
In Alcala v. De Vera,52 we ruled that the failure of
a lawyer to notify his client of a decision against
him manifests a total lack of dedication or devotion
to his client's interest expected under the lawyer's
oath and the then Canons of Professional
Ethics.53chanrobleslaw
Then in Garcia v. Manuel,54 we decreed that the
failure of a lawyer to inform his client of the status
of the case signifies bad faith, for the relationship
between an attorney and his client is highly
fiduciary; thus, the ever present need to inform
clients of the developments of the case.55 It is only
in this manner that the trust and faith of the client
in his counsel will remain
unimpaired.56chanrobleslaw
Respondent is a repeat offender
This is not the first time that respondent was
subjected to disciplinary proceedings.
In Credito,57 the then members of the Third
Division found respondent guilty of violating
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Similar to the present case,
respondent's legal services were engaged in
connection with a labor suit. The labor case went
up to us only to be dismissed due to respondent's
failure to attach the required certification on non-
forum shopping and to pay the total revised docket
and other legal fees. Respondent also kept his
clients in the dark as to the fact that their petition
was dismissed.
Prior to Credito, respondent was also held
administratively liable in Cordova58 for instigating
his clients to file a complaint against a judge to
frustrate the enforcement of lawful court orders.
All told, respondent seems unfazed by the
sanctions we have so far imposed upon him. He
did not learn from his previous suspensions and
continued with his negligent ways. In Tejano v.
Baterina,59 we imposed a longer period of
suspension on account of the lawyer's previous
suspension for negligence in handling a case. We
found the lawyer's pattern of neglecting his duty
to his clients and his propensity to disrespect the
authority of the courts
unacceptable.60chanrobleslaw
For this reason, we impose upon the respondent
the penalty of suspension from the practice oflaw
for three (3) years.
WHEREFORE, for violating Rules 18.03 and 18.04
of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, respondent Atty. Salvador T. Sabio
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for THREE (3) YEARS. He is likewise STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts
and the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is
instructed to include a copy in respondent's
personal file.
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De
Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez,
Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen,
and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., on leave.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6387 [Formerly CBD Case No. 11-
3001], July 19, 2016
GABINO V. TOLENTINO AND FLORDELIZA C.
TOLENTINO, Complainants, v. ATTY. HENRY B.
SO AND ATTY. FERDINAND L.
ANCHETA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This resolves a disbarment case against
respondent Atty. Henry B. So for neglect in
handling a case, and respondent Atty. Ferdinand
L. Ancheta for extorting P200,000.00 from a client.
Complainant Flordeliza C. Tolentino was the
defendant in Civil Case No. SC-2267 entitled
"Benjamin Caballes v. Flordeliza Caballes" a case
involving recovery of possession of a parcel of
land.1 On June 24, 1991, Branch 26 of the
Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
rendered the Decision2 against complainant
Flordeliza ordering her to vacate the land.
The case was appealed3 to the Court of Appeals
through complainant Flordeliza's counsel, Atty.
Edilberto U. Coronado (Atty. Coronado). While the
appeal was pending, Atty. Coronado was replaced
by Atty. Henry B. So (Atty. So), a lawyer of the
Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance of the
Department of Agrarian Reform.4chanrobleslaw
Complainants Flordeliza and Gabino V. Tolentino,
her husband, afterwards learned that the Court of
Appeals affirmed5 the Regional Trial Court
Decision against complainant Flordeliza.
Complainants contend that Atty. So did not inform
them nor take the necessary action to elevate the
case to this Court.6 Thus, they were compelled to
secure the legal services of Atty. Ferdinand L.
Ancheta (Atty. Ancheta), whom they paid
P30,000.00 as acceptance fee.7chanrobleslaw
Atty. Ancheta allegedly promised them that there
was still a remedy against the adverse Court of
Appeals Decision, and that he would file a "motion
to reopen appeal case."8 Atty. Ancheta also
inveigled them to part with the amount of
P200,000.00 purportedly to be used for making
arrangements with the Justices of the Court of
Appeals before whom their case was
pending.9chanrobleslaw
Initially, complainants did not agree to Atty.
Ancheta's proposal because they did not have the
money and it was against the law.10 However, they
eventually acceded when Atty. Ancheta told them
that it was the only recourse they had to obtain a
favorable judgment.11chanrobleslaw
Hence, in January 2003, they deposited
P200,000.00 to Atty. Ancheta's Bank Account No.
1221275656 with the United Coconut Planters
Bank.12chanrobleslaw
Complainants were surprised to learn that no
"motion to reopen case" had been filed,13 and the
Court of Appeals Decision had become final and
executory.14chanrobleslaw
Hence, complainants sought to recover the
amount of P200,000.00 from Atty. Ancheta.
Through a letter dated September 10, 2003 15 by
their new counsel, complainants demanded for the
return of the P200,000.00. However, Atty.
Ancheta did not heed their demand despite receipt
of the letter.
On May 17, 2004, complainants filed
their Sinumpaang Sakdal praying
16
for the
disbarment of Atty. So for neglect in handling
complainant Flordeliza's case, and Atty. Ancheta
for defrauding them of the amount of
P200,000.00.
Atty. So counters that he was no longer connected
with the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance of the
Department of Agrarian Reform when the Court of
Appeals Decision was promulgated on July 16,
2001.17He alleges that he worked at the Bureau
from 1989 to 1997, and that he resigned to
prepare for the elections in his hometown in
Western Samar.18 It was a procedure in the
Bureau that once a handling lawyer resigns or
retires, his or her cases are reassigned to other
lawyers of the Bureau.
Atty. Ancheta did not file a comment despite due
notice. Hence, in this Court's Resolution dated
February 23, 2011,20 he was deemed to have
waived his right to file a comment. This Court
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report, and
recommendation.21chanrobleslaw
On June 8, 2011, the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines directed
the parties to appear for mandatory conference at
10:00 a.m. on July 6, 2011.22 However, on July 6,
2011, only Atty. So appeared.23 Since there was
no showing on record that complainants and Atty.
Ancheta were notified, the mandatory conference
was reset to August 10, 2011 at 10:00
a.m.24chanrobleslaw
In the August 10, 2011 mandatory conference,
complainant Flordeliza was represented by her
daughter, Arlyn Tolentino, together with counsel,
Atty. Restituto Mendoza.25cralawred Arlyn
Tolentino informed the Commission that
complainant Gabino V. Tolentino had already
died.26 Respondents did not appear despite due
notice.27chanrobleslaw
Hence, the mandatory conference was terminated,
and the parties were directed to submit their
respective verified position papers within a non-
extendible period of 10 days from notice. After, the
case would be submitted for report and
recommendation.28chanrobleslaw
On September 19, 2011, complainant Flordeliza
filed as her position paper, a Motion for Adoption
of the Pleadings and their Annexes in this
Case,29 including the relevant documents30 in
Criminal Case No. SC-1191 (for estafa) against
Atty. Ancheta, which she filed.
Atty. So filed his Position Paper31 on September
15, 2011. Atty. Ancheta did not file any position
paper.
The Commission on Bar Discipline
recommended33 that Atty. So be absolved of the
charge against him for insufficiency of
evidence.34 As to Atty. Ancheta, the Commission
found him guilty of serious misconduct and deceit
and recommended his disbarment.35chanrobleslaw
In the Resolution36 dated December 14, 2014, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors adopted and approved the findings and
recommendations of the Investigating
Commissioner.
On January 11, 2016, the Board of Governors
transmitted its Resolution to this Court for final
action, pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court.

This Court accepts and adopts the findings of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors.
I promulgated.44 Thus, complainants had ample
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines correctly
absolved Atty. So of the charge of negligence in
the performance of his duties as counsel of
complainant Flordeliza.
Complainants fault Atty. So for failing to inform
them about the Court of Appeals Decision and for
not taking the necessary steps to elevate their
case to this Court.38 However, it is undisputed that
Atty. So was no longer employed at the Bureau of
Agrarian Legal Assistance when the Court of
Appeals Decision was rendered on July 16, 2001.
Atty. So had resigned in 1997, four (4) years
before the Decision was
promulgated.39chanrobleslaw
Atty. So handled the appeal of complainant
Flordeliza in his capacity as a government-
employed legal officer of the Bureau of Agrarian
Legal Assistance of the Department of Agrarian
Reform. In his Notice of Appearance40 dated
August 11, 1993 and Motion to Admit Additional
Evidence41 dated November 22, 1993 filed before
the Court of Appeals, Atty. So affixed his signature
under the representation of the Bureau of Agrarian
Legal Assistance.
Atty. So's appearance for complainant Flordeliza
may be likened to that of a lawyer assigned to
handle a case for a private law firm's client. If the
counsel resigns, the firm is simply bound to
provide a replacement.42 Similarly, upon Atty. So's
resignation, the Director of the Bureau merely
reassigned his case assignment to other lawyers
in the Bureau even without complainants' consent.
It would have been prudent for Atty. So to have
informed complainants about his resignation and
the eventual reassignment of their case to another
lawyer, although this was not required. Still, Atty.
So's omission is not of such gravity that would
warrant his disbarment or suspension. The serious
consequences of disbarment or suspension should
follow only where there is a clear preponderance
of evidence of the respondent's misconduct
affecting his standing and moral character as an
officer of the court and member of the
bar.43chanrobleslaw
On the other hand, complainants were not entirely
blameless. Had complainants been indeed vigilant
in protecting their rights, they should have
followed up on the status of their appeal; thus,
they would have been informed of Atty. So's
resignation. Atty. So resigned four (4) years
before the Court of Appeals Decision was
time to engage the services of a new lawyer to
safeguard their interests if they chose to do so. A
party cannot blame his or her counsel for
negligence when he or she is guilty of neglect.
II
The same conclusion cannot be made with regards
Atty. Ancheta. We agree with the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines' recommendation that he should
be disbarred.
Atty. Ancheta's repeated failure to comply with
several of this Court's Resolutions requiring him to
comment on the complaint lends credence to
complainants' allegations. It manifests his tacit
admission. Hence, we resolve this case on the
basis of complainants' Sinumpaang Sakdal and its
Annexes.
It was established by the evidence on record that
(1) Atty. Ancheta received the acceptance fee of
P30,000.00 on December 9, 2002;46 and (2)
complainants deposited on January 17, 200347 the
amount of P200,000.00 to Atty. Ancheta's bank
account. Atty. Ancheta made false promises to
complainants that something could still be done
with complainant Flordeliza's case despite the
Court of Appeals Decision having already attained
finality on September 22, 2001.48 Worse, he
proposed bribing the Justices of the Court of
Appeals in order to solve their legal dilemma.
Atty. Ancheta should have very well known that a
decision that has attained finality is no longer open
for reversal and should be respected.49 A lawyer's
duty to assist in the speedy administration of
justice50demands recognition that at a definite
time, issues must be laid to rest and litigation
ended.51 As such, Ancheta should have advised
complainants to accept the judgment of the Court
of Appeals and accord respect to the just claim of
the opposite party. He should have tempered his
clients' propensity to litigate and save them from
additional expense in pursuing their contemplated
action. Instead, he gave them confident
assurances that the case could still be reopened
and even furnished them a copy of his prepared
"motion to reopen case." Despite his
representation that he would file the motion,
however, he did not do so.52chanrobleslaw
Atty. Ancheta's deceit and evasion of duty is
manifest. He accepted the case though he knew or legislative body.
the futility of an appeal. Despite receipt of the
P30,000.00 acceptance fee, he did not act on his Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client
client's case. Moreover, he prevailed upon compliance with the laws and the principles of
complainants to give him P200,000.00 purportedly fairness.
to be used to bribe the Justices of the Court of
Appeals in order to secure a favorable ruling, . . . .
palpably showing that he himself was unconvinced
of the merits of the case. "A lawyer shall not, for CANON 16 -A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL
any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT
or proceeding or delay any man's cause." 53 Atty. MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Ancheta's misconduct betrays his lack of
appreciation that the practice of law is a Rule 16.01. - A lawyer shall account for all money
profession, not a money-making or property collected or received for or from the
trade.54chanrobleslaw client.

As a servant of the law, Atty. Ancheta's primary . . . .

duty was to obey the laws and promote respect for
the law and legal processes.55 Corollary to this
duty is his obligation to abstain from dishonest or
deceitful conduct,56 as well as from "activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system."57 Atty. Ancheta's
advice involving corruption of judicial officers
tramps the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and the judicial system and adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law.
Rule 16.03. - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and
property of his client when due or upon demand....
. . . .
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE
CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL
OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN
HIM.

Complainants eventually found out about his CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT
duplicity and demanded for the return of their WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
money.58Still, Atty. Ancheta did not return the
P200,000.00 and the P30,000.00 despite his . . . .
failure to render any legal service to his
clients.59chanrobleslaw Rule 18.03. - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
Atty. Ancheta breached the following duties connection therewith shall render him liable.
embodied in the Code of Professional
A lawyer "must at no time be wanting in probity
Responsibility:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
and moral fiber, which are not only conditions
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES precedent to his entrance to the Bar but are
UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE likewise essential demands for his continued
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
membership therein."60Atty. Ancheta's deceit in
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
dealing with his clients constitutes gross
professional misconduct61 and violates his oath,
. . . .
thus justifying his disbarment under Rule 138,
Section 2762 of the Rules of Court.
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR,
FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS Furthermore, his failure to heed the following
AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS
Resolutions of the Court despite notice aggravates
his misconduct:
. . . .
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 15.05. - A lawyer, when advising his client,
shall give a candid and honest opinion on the (1) Resolution63 dated June 21, 2004,
merits and probable results of the client's case, requiring him to comment on the
neither overstating nor understating the prospects complaint;
of the case.

Rule 15.06. - A lawyer shall not state or imply that

he is able to influence any public official, tribunal

(2) Resolution64 dated October 16, 2006,
directing him to show cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or
held in contempt for failure to comply with
the June 21, 2004 Resolution;
(3) Resolution65 dated January 21, 2009,
imposing upon him the penalty of
P1,000.00 for failure to comply with the
June 21, 2004 and October 16, 2006
Resolutions;
(4) Resolution66 dated January 27, 2010,
imposing an additional fine of P2,000.00
or a penalty of imprisonment of 10 days
for failure to comply with the January 21,
2009 Resolution; and
(5) Resolution67 dated January 12, 2011,
ordering his arrest and directing the
National Bureau of Investigation to arrest
and detain him for five (5) days and until
he complied with the previous
Resolutions.
of evidence. On the other hand, this Court finds
respondent Atty. Ferdinand L. Ancheta GUILTY of
gross misconduct in violation of the Lawyer's Oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility and
hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law.
The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to
remove the name of Ferdinand L. Ancheta from the
Roll of Attorneys.
Respondent Ancheta is ORDERED to return to
complainants Gabino V. Tolentino and Flordeliza C.
Tolentino, within 30 days from receipt of this
Resolution, the total amount of P230,000.00, with
legal interest at 12% per annum from the date of
demand on September 10, 2003 to June 30, 2013,
and at 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until full
payment. Respondent Ancheta is
further DIRECTED to submit to this Court proof of
payment of the amount within 10 days from
payment.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the
Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts in the
country.
This Resolution takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De

Atty. Ancheta's cavalier attitude in repeatedly Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez,
ignoring the orders of this Court constitutes utter Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza,
disrespect of the judicial institution. His conduct and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
shows a high degree of irresponsibility and betrays Brion, J., on leave.
a recalcitrant flaw in his character. Indeed, his Mendoza, J., on official leave.
continued indifference to this Court's orders
constitutes willful disobedience of the lawful orders
of this Court, which, under Rule 138, Section
2768 of the Rules of Court, is in itself a sufficient
cause for suspension or disbarment.

The maintenance of a high standard of legal

proficiency, honesty, and fair dealing69 is a
prerequisite to making the bar an effective
instrument in the proper administration of
justice.70 Any member, therefore, who fails to live
up to the exacting standards of integrity and
morality exposes himself or herself to
administrative liability.71chanrobleslaw

Atty. Ancheta's violations show that he is unfit to

discharge the duties of a member of the legal
profession. Hence, he should be
disbarred.72chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent

Atty. Henry B. So is DISMISSED for insufficiency
EN BANC
July 12, 2016
A.C. No. 10541
(Formerly CBD Case No. 11-3046)
AURORA AGUILAR-DYQUIANGCO, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. DIANA LYNN M. ARELLANO, Respondent
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
A lawyer, once he takes up the cause of his client, has the
duty to serve such client with competence, and to attend
to his client's cause with diligence, care and devotion,
whether he accepts the engagement for free or for a
fee.1Moreover, lawyers should refrain from obtaining
loans from their clients, in order to avoid the perils of
abusing the trust and confidence reposed upon him by
such client.2
The facts established in the proceedings before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP"), which we adopt
in tum, are as follows:
Complainant Aurora Aguilar-
Dyquiangco ("Complainant") and Respondent Atty.
Diana Lynn M. Arellano ("Respondent") first met in 2004
at the Don Mariano Marcos Memorial State University,
College of Law when the latter became Complainant's
professor.3
Sometime in 2006, Complainant engaged Respondent's
services for the purpose of filing a case for collection of
sum of money against a certain Delia
Antigua ("Antigua"), advancing l0,000.00 for filing fees
and 2,000.00 as part of the attorney's fees out of the
agreed amount of 20,000.00.4 Three years later,
Complainant, upon inquiry with the Regional Trial
Court ("RTC") of San Fernando, La Union, discovered
that Respondent failed to file her case against
Antigua.5 Consequently, Complainant sent a letter to
Respondent terminating Respondent's services and
demanding the return of the said money and documents
she entrusted to Respondent,6 who, in turn, refused to
return Complainant's documents alleging that she was
enforcing her retainer's lien.7
During the existence of a lawyer-client relationship
between them, Respondent frequently borrowed money
from Complainant and her husband, Antonio
Dyquiangco ("Antonio"),8 for which Respondent issued
postdated checks in July 2008 ("checks issued in July
2008") as security.9 Complainant and Antonio later
stopped lending money to Respondent when they
discovered that she was engaged in "kiting", that is, using
the newer loans to pay off the previous loans she had
obtained.10
These accumulated loans totaled 360,8l8.20 as of
September 2008, covered by ten (10) checks.11 Upon
presentment by Complainant, all of the said checks were
dishonored due to insufficiency of funds and closure of
accounts. Hence, Complainant filed complaints for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 ("BP Blg.
22") against Respondent.12 These cases are currently
pending with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of San F
emando, La Union, Branch 2.13
Sometime in June 2008, in a separate transaction from
the previous loans, Respondent purchased magnetic
bracelets in the amount of 282,110.00 from
Complainant's Good Faith Network Marketing business in
order to resell the same.14 In addition, since
Complainant's business uses "networking" as a marketing
scheme, Respondent also bought an "up-line"15 slot in the
amount of 126,160.00 to maximize her earnings.16
Respondent then borrowed 360,000.00 from
Complainant.17 A part of the loan proceeds were used by
Respondent to pay for the magnetic bracelets by issuing
postdated checks for the purpose. Respondent
purchased seventy five (75) bracelets, which were kept at
Complainant's business center, and withdrawn by
Respondent whenever she had buyers.18 However,
Respondent's total withdrawals exceeded the number of
bracelets actually purchased from
Complainant.19 Moreover, Respondent failed to pay the
price for the magnetic bracelets.20
Respondent similarly acquired from Complainant other
products (i.e., soaps, slimming products, coffee, etc.) for
reselling in the amount of 15,770.00 which Respondent
failed to pay up to this day.21
On June 24, 2008, Complainant and Respondent opened
a joint checking account with East West Bank in
connection with their Good Faith Magnetic Bracelets
business transactions, with an initial balance of
130,000.00.22Respondent issued a check from this joint
account in the amount of 126,160.00 to pay for the "up-
line" slot she purchased from Complainant.23 Subsequent
deposits by Complainant were used by Respondent when
the latter issued checks in the amounts of 136,000.00
and 75,000.00.24
On June 17, 2009, Respondent obtained another loan
from Complainant in the amount of 30,000.00, which the
Respondent used to pay off her obligation to
Complainant's husband.25
Complainant and her husband sent a demand letter dated
August 26, 200926 to Respondent for the payment of the
dishonored checks issued in July 2008. The
Respondent's failure to pay despite demand resulted in
letter exchanges between the parties dated September
28, 200927 and October 7, 2009.28 The October 7, 2009
demand letter by Complainant was also sent to
Respondent's mother, Florescita M. ArellaNo. 29 This
exchange of letters, which the Respondent believed to be
libelous, led to the filing of two (2) complaints for Libel
against Complainant with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Manila and the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of La
Union, both of which were eventually dismissed for lack of
probable cause.30
On May 27, 2011, based on the foregoing transactions
and incidents between the parties, the Complainant filed
against the Respondent the instant administrative case
for suspension and disbarment with the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines ("IBP"),31 listing seven causes of action
based on the Respondent's acts of:
1. Failing to file a collection case on behalf of the
Complainant, for which the Respondent received
10,000.00 for filing fees ("First Cause of
Action");
2. Obtaining several loans from the Complainant,
which remain unpaid ("Second Cause of
Action");
3. Taking out merchandise (i.e. magnetic
bracelets) in excess of what she purchased from
the Complainant ("Third Cause of Action");
4. Acquiring other merchandise from the
Complainant without paying for the
same ("Fourth Cause of Action");
5. Inducing the Complainant to open joint bank
accounts, out of which the Respondent made
several withdrawals ("Fifth Cause of Action");
6. Obtaining a 30,000.00 loan that remains
unpaid ("Sixth Cause of Action");
7. Filing libel cases against the Complainant
based on incidents related the transactions that
gave rise to the second, third, fourth, fifth and
sixth causes of action ("Seventh Cause of
Action").1wphi1
Proceedings with the IBP
The instant case was initially set for mandatory
conference on March 23, 2012,32 but the same was reset
to June 29, 2012 upon motion of Respondent.33 After due
proceedings, the mandatory conference was terminated
and both parties were required by the investigating
commissioner, Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero, to file
their respective position papers.34 Both parties filed their
respective position papers on July 26, 2012 35 and
September 7, 2012.36
The Findings of the IBP
On September 28, 2012, Commissioner Cachapero
rendered a Report and Recommendation37 finding
Respondent guilty of violation of Rules 16.04, 16.02, and
18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility ("CPR''). The dispositive portion reads:
Foregoing premises considered, the undersigned
believes and so hold that the instant complaint is with
merit. Accordingly, he recommends that the Respondent
be meted with the penalty of SUSPENSION for a period
of one (1) year.38
In a Resolution dated March 21, 2013, the IBP Board of
Governors resolved to adopt and approve with
modification the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner dated September 28, 2012
which states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering that Respondent violated Canon 16, Rule
16.02 and Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Diana Lynn M. Arellano
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five
(5) years.39
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated July
16, 2013,40 which was subsequently denied through a
Resolution dated March 21, 2014.41 In view of the penalty
recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, the case
was referred to this Court En Banc.
The Court's Ruling
After a judicious examination of the records and
submission of the parties, we find no cogent reason not to
adopt the factual findings of the Investigating
Commissioner as approved by the IBP Board of
Governors. However, we reduce the penalty for the
reasons to be discussed below.
First Cause of Action
Respondent violated Canon 18 when she failed to file the
collection case in court. In this regard, Canon 18 of the
CPR mandates, thus:
A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence.
Rule 18.03 thereof emphasizes that:
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable.
In Reyes v. Vi tan,42 this Court held that the failure of a
lawyer to file a complaint with the court in behalf of his
client, despite receiving the necessary fees from the
latter, is a violation of the said canon and rule:
The act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal
services in handling complainant's case and
subsequently failing to render such services is a clear
violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall serve his
client with competence and diligence. More specifically,
Rule 18.03 states:
"Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable."
A member of the legal profession owes his client entire
devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights. An attorney is
expected to exert his best efforts and ability to preserve
his client's cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to
his client likewise serves the ends of justice. Verily, the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
corresponding duties, not only to the client, but also to the
court, to the bar and to the public.43
Further, as this Court ruled in Parinas v. Paguinto,44it is of
no moment that there is only partial payment of the
acceptance fee, to wit:
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
("the Code") provides that a lawyer shall account for all
money or property collected for or from the client.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an
attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of
fidelity to the client's cause. Money entrusted to a
lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee,
but not used for failure to file the case must
immediately be returned to the client on
demand. Paguinto returned the money only after Parinas
filed this administrative case for disbarment.45
In the case before us, it is undisputed that after
Complainant paid the filing fees and also part of the
acceptance fees, Respondent did not bother to file any
complaint before the court. Worse, Respondent knew for
a long time that she required additional documents from
Complainant before filing the complaint, yet Respondent
did not appear to exert any effort to contact Complainant
in order to obtain the said documents and finally file the
said case.46 In fact, in the occasions Respondent met with
Complainant in order to obtain a loan or discuss the
magnetic bracelet business, Respondent never brought
up the needed documents for the case to Complainant.
As correctly held by Commissioner Cachapero,
Respondent displayed a lack of zeal in handling the case
of Complainant in neglecting to remind the latter of the
needed documents in order to file the complaint in court.47
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Causes of
Action
Respondent violated Canon 16 when she obtained loans
from a client. Pertinently, Canon 16 of the CPR states:
A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of
his client that may come into his possession.
Moreover, Rule 16.02 provides that:
A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and
apart from his own and those of others kept by him.
Finally, Rule 16.04 thereof commands that:
A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the
client's interests are fully protected by the nature of the
case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice,
he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter
he is handling for the client.
In the instant case, there is no dispute that Respondent
obtained several loans from Complainant beginning in
2008 or two (2) years after they established a lawyer-
client relationship in 2006, and before they terminated the
same in 2009, in violation of Rule 16.04 of the CPR.48
We have previously emphasized that it is unethical for a
lawyer to obtain loans from Complainant during the
existence of a lawyer-client relationship between them as
we held in Paulina T Yu v. Atty. Berlin R. Dela Cruz49:
This act alone shows respondent lawyer's blatant
disregard of Rule 16.04. Complainant's acquiescence to
the "pawning" of her jewelry becomes immaterial
considering that the CPR is clear in that lawyers are
proscribed from borrowing money or property from clients,
unless the latter's interests are fully protected by the
nature of the case or by independent advice. Here,
respondent lawyer's act of borrowing does not constitute
an exception. Respondent lawyer used his client's jewelry
in order to obtain, and then appropriate for himself, the
proceeds from the pledge. In so doing, he had abused the
trust and confidence reposed upon him by his client. That
he might have intended to subsequently pay his client the
value of the jewelry is inconsequential. What deserves
detestation was the very act of his exercising influence
and persuasion over his client in order to gain undue
benefits from the latter's property. The Court has
repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a
lawyer and his client is one imbued with trust and
confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes,
this "trust and confidence" is prone to abuse. The rule
against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his
client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking
advantage of his influence over his client. The rule
presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer's
ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his
obligation. Suffice it to say, the borrowing of money or
property from a client outside the limits laid down in
the CPR is an unethical act that warrants sanction.
xxxx
Given the circumstances, the Court does not harbor any
doubt in favor of respondent lawyer. Obviously, his
unfulfilled promise to facilitate the redemption of the
jewelry and his act of issuing a worthless check constitute
grave violations of the CPR and the lawyer's oath. These
shortcomings on his part have seriously breached the
highly fiduciary relationship between lawyers and clients.
Specifically, his act of issuing worthless checks patently
violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR which requires
that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." This indicates a lawyer's
unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on
him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good
moral character as to render him unworthy of public
confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary
action, and thus seriously and irreparably tarnishes
the image of the profession. Such conduct, while
already off-putting when attributed to an ordinary person,
is much more abhorrent when exhibited by a member of
the Bar. In this case, respondent lawyer turned his back
from the promise that he once made upon admission to
the Bar. As "vanguards of the law and the legal system,
lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially
in their dealings with their clients and the public at large,
with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach."50
Respondent even exacerbated her infractions when she
issued worthless checks to pay for her debts,51 the
existence of which was admitted by Respondent. Both
the Yu case quoted above and the case of Wong v. Moya
II52citing Lao v. Medel53are in point:
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates all members of the Bar to obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law. Rule 1.01 of the Code
specifically provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." In Co
v. Bernardino, [A.C. No. 3919, January 28, 1998, 285
SCRA 102] the Court considered the issuance of
worthless checks as violation of this Rule and an act
constituting gross misconduct.
Moreover, in Cuizon v. Macalino, we also ruled that the
issuance of checks which were later dishonored for
having been drawn against a closed account
indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and
confidence reposed on him, shows such lack of
personal honesty and good moral character as to
render him unworthy of public confidence, and
constitutes a ground for disciplinary
action. Similarly, Sanchez v. Somoso held that
the persistent refusal to settle due obligations despite
demand manifests a lawyer's low regard to his
commitment to the oath he has taken when he joined
his peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the
image of the profession he should, instead, hold in
high esteem. This conduct deserves nothing less than a
severe disciplinary action.
Clearly, therefore, the act of a lawyer in issuing a check
without sufficient funds to cover the same constitutes
such willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to
undermine the public confidence in the legal profession.
He cannot justify his act of issuing worthless checks by
his dire financial condition. Respondent should not have
contracted debts which are beyond his financial capacity
to pay. If he suffered a reversal of fortune, he should have
explained with particularity the circumstances which
caused his failure to meet his obligations. His generalized
and unsubstantiated allegations as to why he reneged in
the payment of his debts promptly despite repeated
demands and sufficient time afforded him cannot
withstand scrutiny.54
Regarding the issue of commingling of funds, the Court
ruled in the case of Velez v. De Vera,55 citing Espiritu v.
Ulep,56that using a client's funds for the lawyer's personal
use and depositing the same in his personal account is
prohibited, to wit:
[A] lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds
or property held by him on behalf of his client gives
rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the
same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in
violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is
a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics; it impairs the public confidence in the
legal profession and deserves punishment.
Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them
are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty
of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.
Those who are guilty of such infraction may be disbarred
or suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.
(Emphases supplied.)
xxxx
In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on
to his client's money without the latter's acquiescence is
conduct indicative of lack of integrity and
propriety.1wphi1 It is clear that Atty. de Vera, by
depositing the check in his own account and using
the same for his own benefit is guilty of deceit,
malpractice, gross misconduct and unethical
behavior. He caused dishonor, not only to himself but to
the noble profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot
be denied that the respect of litigants to the profession is
inexorably diminished whenever a member of the
profession betrays their trust and confidence. Respondent
violated his oath to conduct himself with all good fidelity to
his client.58
Further, in Barcenas v. Alvero,59 the Court held that the
failure of a lawyer to render an account of any money
received from a client and deliver the same to such client
when due or upon demand, is a breach of the said rule;
and, that a lawyer is liable for gross misconduct for his
failure to return or repay money due to another person
upon demand, even in the absence of an attorney-client
relationship between them.
In this case, Respondent admitted that she commingled
her money and those of the Complainant for the bracelet
business by opening an East West Bank joint account for
the said purpose.60 To be sure, Commissioner Cachapero
noted that Respondent has not shown that she had made
any effort to separate her funds from Complainant's
money and properly account for the same, including any
withdrawals Respondent made therefrom.61
Seventh Cause of Action
The Court notes, in addition, that the Investigating
Commissioner failed to consider Respondent's act of filing
two (2) baseless complaints for libel against Complainant
in two (2) different venues (Manila62 and San Fernando
City, La Union63) for the same alleged act. The fact that
the handling prosecutors in both cases are in agreement
that there was nothing in the demand letter subject of the
said cases that could be considered libelous,64 and that
the City Prosecutor of Manila made mention of the
aforementioned criminal complaint filed with, and
previously dismissed by, the Provincial Prosecutor of La
Union,65 make the aforementioned filing of criminal
complaints by Respondent a clear violation of the
Lawyer's Oath - which states that a lawyer shall "not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false
or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the
same."67 This is enunciated by this Court in Vaflor-
Fabroa v. Paguinto:68
When respondent caused the filing of baseless criminal
complaints against complainant, he violated the Lawyer's
Oath that a lawyer shall "not wittingly or willingly promote
or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid
or consent to the same."
The filing of baseless criminal complaints, even merely
threatening to do so, also violates Canon 19 and Rule
19.01 of the CPR, as explained
in Pena v. Aparicio,69 thus:
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
states that "a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal
within the bounds of the law," reminding legal practitioners
that a lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice; to that end, his client's success
is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must
always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. In
particular, Rule 19.01 commands that a "lawyer shall
employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in
presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal
charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding." Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or
threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case
or cases against the adversaries of his client designed to
secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or
withdraw their own cases against the lawyer's client.70
As to the imposable penalty, and after due consideration
of the totality of the circumstances attendant to this case,
the nature of the offenses committed, we find the
recommended penalty of the IBP to be too harsh,
especially in light of the fact that this is Respondent's first
administrative case.71
In Parinas v. Paguinto,72 cited above, this Court
suspended Atty. Paguinto from the practice of law for six
(6) months for failing to file the complaint on behalf of his
client despite having been paid a part of his acceptance
fee.
In Orbe v. Adaza,71this Court suspended Atty. Adaza for
one (1) year for issuing two (2) worthless checks, in spite
of the pendency of the BP Blg. 22 cases filed against him.
In Velez v. De Vera,72 a two (2)-year suspension was
given to Atty. de Vera for using his client's funds for his
personal use and depositing the same in his personal
account.
Finally, in Olivares v. Villalon, Jr.,73the Court would have
imposed a penalty of six (6) months suspension against
the late Atty. Villalon had he not died prior to the resolution
of the said case for violating the rule on forum-shopping
by filing a second complaint for the same cause of action,
despite the finality of the decision in the first case.
In view of the foregoing jurisprudence, and taking into
consideration that this is Respondent's first administrative
case, and that she fully participated in the proceedings
before the IBP, we deem it more appropriate to reduce the
period of suspension from five (5) years, as
recommended, to only three (3) years.
One final note: It also bears mentioning that there is
nothing in the records to show that the l0,000.00 filing
fee advanced by the Complainant has been returned to
her by Respondent after failing to file the said complaint
against Antigua. This Court has, in numerous
administrative cases, ordered lawyers to return any
acceptance, filing, or other legal fees advanced to them
by their clients.74 Hence, the return of the said amount to
Complainant is proper. Furthermore, the 2,000.00
Respondent received as attorney's fees should likewise
be returned.
As we conclude, we remind lawyers that it is not only
important to serve their clients with utmost zeal and
competence. It is also an equally important responsibility
for them to properly separate and account for any money
given to them by their clients, and to resist the temptation
to borrow money from their clients, in order to preserve
the trust and confidence reposed upon lawyers by every
person requiring their legal advice and services. ESTELA M. MARVIC M.V.F.
PERLAS-BERNABE LEONEN
Associate Justice Associate Justice
WHEREFORE, we find Respondent Atty. Diana Lynn M.
Arellano GUILTY of Violation of Rules 16.02, 16.04, and
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Lawyer's Oath. We SUSPEND Respondent from the
Associate Justice
practice of law for a period of THREE (3) YEARS. We
also ORDER Respondent to return to Aurora Aguilar-
Dyquiangco the full amount of TWELVE THOUSAND
PESOS (12,000.00) within 30 days from notice hereof
and DIRECT her to submit to this Court proof of such
payment. We STERNLY WARN Respondent that a
repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.

We also DIRECT Respondent to inform this Court of the

date of her receipt of this Decision to determine the
reckoning point of the effectivity of her suspension.

Let a copy of this Decision be made part of Respondent's

records in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and copies be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts.

SO ORDERED.

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. PRESBITERO J.
CARPIO VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE ARTURO D. BRION
CASTRO Associate Justice
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. LUCAS P.
PERALTA BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL JOSE PORTUGAL

CASTILLO PEREZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Official Leave) (On Official Leave)

JOSE CATRAL BIENVENIDO L.
MENDOZA* REYES*
Associate Justice Associate Justice
EN BANC
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR
AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR
APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101,
charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other
individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with
the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991.
The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction
of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of
"hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation
rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into
plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of
such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of
homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was
accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11
February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused
individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a
period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues
filed an application for probation with the lower court. The
application for probation was granted in an Order dated
18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro
T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2)
years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the
probation officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino
filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar
Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his
criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was
allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this
Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993.1 He
passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however,
allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this
Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of office and
to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge
Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by
virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his
probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months
from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him
probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino
has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his
Petition for Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right to be granted to everyone who
demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited
to citizens of good moral character, with special
educational qualifications, duly ascertained and
certified.2 The essentiality of good moral character in
those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following
excerpts which we quote with approval and which we
regard as having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character" prescribed by the
statute, as a condition precedent to the
applicant's right to receive a license to
practice law in North Carolina, and of
which he must, in addition to other
requisites, satisfy the court, includes all
the elements necessary to make up such
a character. It is something more than an
absence of bad character. It is the good
name which the applicant has acquired,
or should have acquired, through
association with his fellows. It means that
he must have conducted himself as a
man of upright character ordinarily would,
or should, or does. Such character
expresses itself, not in negatives nor in
following the line of least resistance, but
quite often, in the will to do the
unpleasant thing if it is right, and the
resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is
wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this
requirement of the statute is eminently
proper. Consider for a moment the duties
of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor,
and his advice comes home, in its
ultimate effect, to every man's
fireside. Vast interests are committed to
his care; he is the recipient of unbounded
trust and confidence; he deals with is
client's property, reputation, his life, his
all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer
of the Court, whose chief concern, as
such, is to aid the administration of
justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx4
In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8
Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis
359, 210 NW 710: Attorney's are licensed because of their
learning and ability, so that they may not
It can also be truthfully said that there only protect the rights and interests of
exists nowhere greater temptations to their clients, but be able to assist court in
deviate from the straight and narrow path the trial of the cause. Yet what protection
than in the multiplicity of circumstances to clients or assistance to courts could
that arise in the practice of profession. such agents give? They are required to
For these reasons the wisdom of be of good moral character, so that the
requiring an applicant for admission to agents and officers of the court, which
the bar to possess a high moral standard they are, may not bring discredit upon the
therefore becomes clearly apparent, and due administration of the law, and it is of
the board of bar examiners as an arm of the highest possible consequence that
the court, is required to cause a minute both those who have not such
examination to be made of the moral qualifications in the first instance, or who,
standard of each candidate for admission having had them, have fallen
to practice. . . . It needs no further therefrom, shall not be permitted to
argument, therefore, to arrive at the appear in courts to aid in the
conclusion that the highest degree of administration of justice.
scrutiny must be exercised as to the
moral character of a candidate who It has also been stressed that the requirement of good
presents himself for admission to the moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as
bar. The evil must, if possible, be the general public and the proper administration of justice
successfully met at its very source, and are concerned, than the possession of legal learning:
prevented, for, after a lawyer has once
been admitted, and has pursued his
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E.
profession, and has established himself
635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10
therein, a far more difficult situation is
Ann./Cas. 187):
presented to the court when proceedings
are instituted for disbarment and for the
recalling and annulment of his license. The public policy of our
state has always been to
admit no person to the
In Re Keenan:6
practice of the law
unless he covered an
The right to practice law is not one of the upright moral
inherent rights of every citizen, as in the character. The
right to carry on an ordinary trade or possession of this by the
business. It is a peculiar privilege granted attorney is more
and continued only to those who important, if anything, to
demonstrate special fitness in intellectual the public and to the
attainment and in moral character. All proper administration of
may aspire to it on an absolutely equal justice than legal
basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate learning. Legal learning
machinery has been set up to test may be acquired in after
applicants by standards fair to all and to years, but if the
separate the fit from the unfit. Only those applicant passes the
who pass the test are allowed to enter the threshold of the bar with
profession, and only those who maintain a bad moral character
the standards are allowed to remain in it. the chances are that his
character will remain
Re Rouss:7 bad, and that he will
become a disgrace
Membership in the bar is a privilege instead of an ornament
burdened with conditions, and a fair to his great calling a
private and professional character is one curse instead of a
of them; to refuse admission to an benefit to his
unworthy applicant is not to punish him community a Quirk, a
for past offense: an examination into Gammon or a Snap,
character, like the examination into instead of a Davis, a
learning, is merely a test of fitness. Smith or a Ruffin.9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be that the participant was then possessed of good moral
inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the character.
Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be
properly broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings Now that the original period of probation granted by the
for disbarment: trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to
consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C.
Re Stepsay: 10 Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in
moral character referred to above. We stress that good
The inquiry as to the moral character of moral character is a requirement possession of which
an attorney in a proceeding for his must be demonstrated not only at the time of application
admission to practice is broader in for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and
scope than in a disbarment proceeding. more importantly, at the time of application for admission
to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.
Re Wells: 11
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its
examination and consideration, evidence that he may be
. . . that an applicant's contention that
now regarded as complying with the requirement of good
upon application for admission to the
California Bar the court cannot reject him moral character imposed upon those seeking admission
to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn
for want of good moral character unless
certifications from responsible members of the community
it appears that he has been guilty of acts
who have a good reputation for truth and who
which would be cause for his disbarment
have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period
or suspension, could not be
of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was
sustained; that the inquiry is broader in
its scope than that in a disbarment rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court
proceeding, and the court may how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a
receive any evidence which tends to helpless student to the family of the deceased student and
show the applicant's character as to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other
respects honesty, integrity, and general words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a
morality, and may no doubt refuse different person now, that he has become morally fit for
admission upon proofs that might not admission to the ancient and learned profession of the
establish his guilt of any of the acts law.
declared to be causes for disbarment.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names
by those who would seek admission to the bar must of and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof,
brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten
necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct
(10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution
expected from members of the general public. There is a
be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any,
very real need to prevent a general perception that entry
of Raul Camaligan.
into the legal profession is open to individuals with
inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a
perception would signal the progressive destruction of our Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero
people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal and Melo, JJ., concur.
system as we know it.12
Bellosillo, J. is on leave.
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing"
activities certainly fell far short of the required standard of
good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely
accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical
injuries which proximately led to the death of the
unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious
character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such
injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to
discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-
being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to
the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all
of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and
kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus,
participation in the prolonged and mindless physical
beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted
evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally
irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding