Professional Documents
Culture Documents
NLRC
G.R. No. 124382 August 16, 1999
KTA: Relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an
employee is purely secular in nature because it has no relation with the
practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the church, such affairs are governed
by labor laws. The Labor Code applies to all establishments, whether religious
or not.
Facts:
The petitioner answered saying that he should not be made accountable since
it was Pastor Buhat and Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes
and offerings since he was very ill to be able to do the collecting.
Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, and
sued the SDA for reinstatement and backwages plus damages. Decision was
rendered in favor of petitioner.
Issue:
Held/Ratio:
1. No. The matter at hand relates to the church and its religious ministers but
what is involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the
minister as an employee, which is purely secular because it has no
relationship with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines. The grounds
invoked for petitioners dismissal are all based on Art. 282 of Labor Code.
Facts:
Toribio claimed to have laid off workers due to the shortage of leather soles in
the Ang Tibay factory.
The Court of industrial relations forwarded a motion for recon with the
supreme court.
In pursuit of a retrial in the Court of Industrial Relations, the national labor
union, the respondent, averred:
1. The shortage of soles has no factual basis
2. The scheme was to prevent the forfeiture of his bond to cover the breach of
obligation with the Army
3. The letter he sent to the army was part of this scheme
4. The company union was an employer dominated one.
5. laborers rights to CBA is indispensable.
6. Civil code shouldnt be used to interpret a legislation of American industrial
origins.
7. Toribio was guilty of unfair labor practice for favoring his union.
8. Exhibits are inaccessible to respondents.
9. The exhibits can reverse the judgment.
Issue: Is the Court of Industrial Relations the proper venue for the trial?
FACTS:
MHR alleged business losses as the reason for not reinstating the respondents.
On various dates, respondents filed complaints for underpayment of wages,
money claims and illegal dismissal.
ISSUES:
HELD:
Since April 1997 until the time the Labor Arbiter rendered its decision in July
2000, or more than three (3) years after the supposed temporary lay-off,
the employment of all the respondents with petitioner had ceased,
notwithstanding that the new premises had been completed and the same
resumed its operation. This is clearly dismissal or the permanent severance
or complete separation of the worker from the service on the initiative of the
employer regardless of the reasons therefor.
Article 286 of the Labor Code is clear there is termination of employment
when an otherwise bona fide suspension of work exceeds six (6) months. The
cessation of employment for more than six months was patent and the
employer has the burden of proving that the termination was for a just or
authorized cause.
If doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the
employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter the
employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the
dismissal was for a justifiable cause. It is a time-honored rule that in
controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising
from the evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements and writing should
be resolved in the former's favor. The policy is to extend the doctrine to a
greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under the law,
which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum
aid and protection of labor.
2. Money claims
The Supreme Court reinstated the award of monetary claims granted by the
Labor Arbiter.
Extension was denied by the LA Siao and ordered the employer company to
pay the employees.
RULING:
Engineer Estacios appearance before the labor arbiters and his promise to
settle the claims of private respondents is another matter.
The general rule is that only lawyers are allowed to appear before the labor
arbiter and respondent Commission in cases before them. The Labor Code and
the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, nonetheless, lists three (3)
exceptions to the rule, viz:
Sec. 6. Appearances. . . . .
A non-lawyer may appear before the Commission or any Labor Arbiter only
if:
(a) he represents himself as party to the case;
(b) he represents the organization or its members, provided that he shall be
made to present written proof that he is properly authorized; or
(c) he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized by
the Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases
referred thereto by the latter. . . . 10
A non-lawyer may appear before the labor arbiters and the NLRC only if: (a)
he represents himself as a party to the case; (b) he represents an organization
or its members, with written authorization from them: or (c) he is a
duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized by the
Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases referred
to by the latter. 11
Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were not lawyers. Neither were they
duly-accredited members of a legal aid office. Their appearance before the
labor arbiters in their capacity as parties to the cases was authorized under the
first exception to the rule. However, their appearance on behalf of petitioner
required written proof of authorization. It was incumbent upon the arbiters to
ascertain this authority especially since both engineers were named
co-respondents in the cases before the arbiters. Absent this authority,
whatever statements and declarations Engineer Estacio made before the
arbiters could not bind petitioner.
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
Amelita made some changes in the business operation and private respondent
and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the management thereof.
As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had
illegally terminated his employment. The labor arbiter rendered a decision in
favor of petitioner declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed
between the parties and therefore his office had no jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: WON the decision of the NLRC are appealable to the Court of Appeals.
RULING:
The Court is of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC
to the SC were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil
action for certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of
decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word appeal in relation thereto and
in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because
appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of
judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction
between them, however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned
here is that the special civil action for certiorari is within the concurrent
original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals; whereas to indulge
in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the SC are allowed would not
subserve, but would subvert, the intention of the Congress as expressed in the
sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P No. 129 to supposed
appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby
declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule65.
Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court
of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the
appropriate forum for the relief desired.