CSC vs. ANDAL, G.R. No.
185749, December 16, 2009 of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte
FACTS:
Herminigildo L. Andal, respondent, holds the position of Security Guard II in the
Sandiganbayan. He filed an application to take the Career Service Professional
Examination-Computer Assisted Test (CSPE-CAT), was admitted to take the
examination, and the result showed that he passed with the rate of 81.03%.
However, when Arlene S. Vito who claimed to have been authorized by respondent
to secure the results of the examination went to do so, verification and comparison
of the pictures attached to the Picture Seat Plan and the identification card of Andal
brought by Vito showed dissimilarity in the facial features. Civil Service Commission
National Capital Region (CSC-NCR) rendered judgment finding the respondent guilty
of dishonesty and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service.
Aggrieved, the respondent appealed, however, it was denied. He then elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals (CA), in which the CA ruled in favor of the respondent.
The CSC filed a motion for reconsideration in the CA but was denied. Hence, the
present petition for reversal of the decision of the CA.
ISSUE: Does the CSCs disciplinary jurisdiction extend to court personnel?
RULING:
The instant petition is DENIED. The Supreme Court ruled that Section 6, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over
all courts and the personnel thereof, thus:
Sec. 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and
the personnel thereof.
By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges
and court personnels administrative compliance with all laws, rules and
regulations. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without
running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Supreme Court also emphasized that in case of violation of the Civil Service Law
by a court personnel, the standard procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint
against a judicial employee before the Office of the Court Administrator of the
Supreme Court, for the filing of the appropriate administrative case against him.
Maceda v. Vasquez
G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993.
Nocon, J.
Facts:
Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the
Regional Trial Court of Antique, seeks the review of the following orders of the Office
motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated
November 22, 1951 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration and directing
petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences.
In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorneys Office alleged
that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by
certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or
determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or
before January 31, 1998, when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision
had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been
submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly
falsified his certificates of service for the months of February, April, May, June, July
and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning January up to September 1990, or
for a total of seventeen (17) months.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by the
Supreme Court an extension of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases.
Issue: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint
for the alleged falsification of a judges certification submitted to the Supreme Court,
and assuming that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme
Court
Held: In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Supreme
Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by
the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of administrative supervision
over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the
Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from
the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court
clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the
judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other
branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioners
certificates of service to the Supreme Court for determination of whether said
certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Supreme Court
has the necessary records to make such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot
compel the Supreme Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit
its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public
respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint.
In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee
arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said
complaint and refer the same to the Supreme Court for determination whether said
Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013 FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL,
NATURE:
The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the JBC in a prior decision rendered
July 17, 2012 that JBCs action of allowing more than one member of the congress
to represent the JBC to be unconstitutional
FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to
the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from
the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half
(1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001,
decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in
this petition. it should mean one representative each from both Houses which
comprise the entire Congress. Respondent contends that the phrase a
representative of congress refers that both houses of congress should have one
representative each, and that these two houses are permanent and mandatory
components of congress as part of the bicameral system of legislature. Both
houses have their respective powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of
the constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7 members only with
only one representative from congress.
ISSUE:
Whether the JBCs practice of having members from the Senate and the House of
Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members to be unconstitutional as
provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution.
HELD: Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase a
representative of congress should be construed as to having only one
representative that would come from either house, not both. That the framers of
the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the
legislative.
It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its
primary function in government to legislate. In the passage of laws, the
Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process.
The same holds true in Congress non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the
two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid
dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in
the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in
the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to mean the
entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed
of seven (7) members only.
FALLO: The motion was denied.
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council
Facts: In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to
the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the
House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2)
of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided
to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one
full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas,
Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It
is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued
that the crux of the controversy is the phrase a representative of Congress. It is
their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are
permanent and mandatory components of Congress, such that the absence of
either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the
Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that
both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated
duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution
speaks of a representative from Congress, it should mean one representative each
from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.
Issue:
1. Are the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial
review have been met in this case?
2. Is the JBCs practice of having members from the Senate and the House of
Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members unconstitutional?
3. What is the effect of the Court's finding that the current composition of the
JBC is unconstitutional?
Held:

1. Yes. The Courts power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely:
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (b) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue
of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be
allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are present, especially
when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in
issue.
The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner lost his
standing to sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice.
While it is true that a personal stake on the case is imperative to have locus standi,
this is not to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to
the Court and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC
likewise screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily
publicized in this regard, the JBCs duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the
highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over
the country may be affected by the Courts ruling. More importantly, the legality of
the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the
controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional
is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens
who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
2. Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of
the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that
the provision is clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of
a JBC and places the same under the supervision of the Court. Then it goes to its
composition where the regular members are enumerated: a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the Court and a
representative from the private sector. On the second part lies the crux of the present
controversy. It enumerates the ex officio or special members of the JBC composed of
the Chief Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and a
representative of Congress.
The use of the singular letter a preceding representative of Congress is
unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what
the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may
designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more
than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers
could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words
of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle
of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must
be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As
much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense
they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based
on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis
non est recedendum from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word
Congress used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic
sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House
of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.
It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical
purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This
underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided
into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting
members of the JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause
disorder and eventually muddle the JBCs voting process, especially in the event a tie
is reached. The aforesaid purpose would then be rendered illusory, defeating the
precise mechanism which the Constitution itself createdWhile it would be
unreasonable to expect that the Framers provide for every possible scenario, it is
sensible to presume that they knew that an odd composition is the best means to
break a voting deadlock.
The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word
Congress in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including
both the Senate and the House of Representatives. They theorize that it was so
worded because at the time the said provision was being drafted, the Framers initially
intended a unicameral form of Congress. Then, when the Constitutional Commission
eventually adopted a bicameral form of Congress, the Framers, through oversight,
failed to amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.
It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its primary
function in government to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is
explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds
true in Congress non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is
necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court
cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC
representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of
the JBC. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative
department.
3. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if
it has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine
of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are
legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair play.
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a
matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by
recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an
undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a
criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in
double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance
upon a law creating it.3
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and
holds that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current
composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. (Chavez vs.
Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012)
Jardeleza vs Sereno
GR 213181 August 19, 2014
Facts: Following Justice Abads compulsory retirement, the JBC announced the
application or recommendations for the position left by the Associate
Justice. Jardeleza, the incumbent Sol-Gen at the time, was included in the list of
candidates. However, he was informed through telephone call from some Justices
that the Chief Justice herself CJ Sereno, will be invoking Sec 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 or
the so-called unanimity rule against him. Generally, the rule is that an applicant is
included in the shortlist when s/he obtains affirmative vote of at least a majority of
all the members of the JBC. When Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, however, is invoked
because an applicants integrity is challenged, a unanimous vote is
required. Jardeleza was then directed to make himself available on June 30, 2014
before the JBC during which he would be informed of the objections to his integrity.
Jardeleza wrote a letter-petition asking the SC to exercise its supervisory power and
direct the JBC to, among others, give Jardeleza a written notice and sworn written
statements of his oppositors or any documents in the JBC hearings, and to disallow
CJ Sereno from participating in the voting process for nominees on June 30, 2014.
During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, Justice Carpio appeared and disclosed
a confidential information which, to CJ Sereno, characterized Jardelezas integrity as
dubious. Jardeleza demanded that CJ Sereno execute a sworn statement specifying
her objections and that he be afforded the right to cross-examine her in a public
hearing. He also requested deferment of the JBC proceedings, as the SC en banc has
yet to decide in his letter-petition.
However, the JBC continued its deliberations and proceeded to vote for the
nominees to be included in the shortlist. Thereafter, the JBC released the shortlist
of 4 nominees. It was revealed later that there were actually 5 nominees who
made it to the JBC shortlist, but 1 nominee could not be included because of the
invocation of the unanimity rule..
Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus via Rule 65 with prayer for TRO to
compel the JBC to include him in the list of nominees on the grounds that the JBC
and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite having
garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.
Issue: W/N the right to due process is demandable as a matter of right in JBC
proceedings
Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not mean that
an applicants access to the rights afforded under the due process clause is
discretionary on the part of JBC.
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC
proceedings. Notwithstanding being a class of its own, the right to be heard and
to explain ones self is availing. In cases where an objection to an applicants
qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither contradicts the
fulfillment of the JBCs duty to recommend. This holding is not an encroachment on
its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of
due process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant,
who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to
protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces,
thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and capricious assessment of
information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the rules of
evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the same, to
hear the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness
because the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of
soundness.
But may the salaries of the members of the judiciary be increased?
Yes. The Congress may pass a law increasing the salary of the members of the
judiciary and such increase will immediately take effect thus the incumbent
members of the judiciary (at the time of the passing of the law increasing their
salary) shall benefit immediately.

Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been
included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of
Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose not from the unconstitutionality of
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 per se, but from the violation by the JBC of its own
rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process. By no means does the Court
intend to strike down the unanimity rule as it reflects the JBCs policy and,
therefore, wisdom in its selection of nominees. Even so, the Court refuses to turn a
blind eye on the palpable defects in its implementation and the ensuing treatment
that Jardeleza received before the Council. True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a
nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to observe
the minimum requirements of due process.
Judge David Nitafan vs Commissioner of Internal Revenue
152 SCRA 284 Political Law Constitutional Law The Judicial Department
Judicial Autonomy Income Tax Payment By The Judiciary
Judge David Nitafan and several other judges of the Manila Regional Trial Court
seek to prohibit the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) from making any
deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries or compensation for such would
tantamount to a diminution of their salary, which is unconstitutional. Earlier
however, or on June 7, 1987, the Court en banc had already reaffirmed the directive
of the Chief Justice which directs the continued withholding of taxes of the justices
and the judges of the judiciary but the SC decided to rule on this case nonetheless
to settle the issue once and for all.
ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the judiciary are exempt from the payment
of income tax.
HELD: No. The clear intent of the framers of the Constitution, based on their
deliberations, was NOT to exempt justices and judges from general taxation.
Members of the judiciary, just like members of the other branches of the
government, are subject to income taxation. What is provided for by the
constitution is that salaries of judges may not be decreased during their
continuance in office. They have a fix salary which may not be subject to the whims
and caprices of congress. But the salaries of the judges shall be subject to the
general income tax as well as other members of the judiciary.
Congress can also pass a law decreasing the salary of the members of the judiciary
but such will only be applicable to members of the judiciary which were appointed
AFTER the effectivity of such law.
Note: This case abandoned the ruling in Perfecto vs Meer and in Endencia vs David.
Perfecto v Meer 85 Phil 552
GREGORIO PERFECTO vs. BIBIANO L. MEER
[G.R. No. L-2348. February 27, 1950.]
Facts:
In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio
Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary as member of this Court during the year
1946. After paying the amount (P802), he instituted this action in the Manila Court
of First Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being
taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation
of the Constitution.
Issue:
Does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary amount to a diminution
thereof?
Held:
Yes. As in the United States during the second period, we must hold that salaries of
judges are not included in the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two
paramount circumstances may additionally be indicated, to wit: First, when the
Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable "income" did not
include salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from diminution. That
was the prevailing official belief in the United States, which must be deemed to
have been transplanted here ; and second, when the Philippine Constitutional
Convention approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution of the judges'
compensation, the Federal principle was known that income tax on judicial salaries
really impairs them.
This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. These pay
taxes. Upon buying gasoline, or cars or other commodities, they pay the
corresponding duties. Owning real property, they pay taxes thereon. And on
incomes other than their judicial salary, assessments are levied. It is only when the
tax is charged directly on their salary and the effect of the tax is to diminish their
official stipend that the taxation must be resisted as an infringement of the
fundamental charter.
Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not
perceive and block encroachments upon their prerogatives in whatever form. The
undiminishable character of judicial salaries is not a mere privilege of judges
personal and therefore waivable but a basic limitation upon legislative or
executive action imposed in the public interest (Evans vs. Gore).
Pastor Endencia vs Saturnino David
93 Phil. 699 Political Law The Judiciary Te Legislature Separation of Powers
Statutory Construction Who May Interpret Laws
Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of
Justice Pastor Endencias and Justice Fernando Jugos (and other judges) salary
pursuant to Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 590 which provides that
No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines
shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby
declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by
law.
The judges however argued that under the case of Perfecto vs Meer, judges are
exempt from taxation this is also in observance of the doctrine of separation of
powers, i.e., the executive, to which the Internal Revenue reports, is separate from
the judiciary; that under the Constitution, the judiciary is independent and the
salaries of judges may not be diminished by the other branches of government; that
taxing their salaries is already a diminution of their benefits/salaries (see Section 9,
Art. VIII, Constitution).
The Solicitor General, arguing in behalf of the CIR, states that the decision in
Perfecto vs Meer was rendered ineffective when Congress enacted Republic Act No.
590.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.
HELD: No. The said provision is a violation of the separation of powers. Only courts
have the power to interpret laws. Congress makes laws but courts interpret them.
In Sec. 13, R.A. 590, Congress is already encroaching upon the functions of the
courts when it inserted the phrase: payment of which [tax] is hereby declared not
to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.
Here, Congress is already saying that imposing taxes upon judges is not a
diminution of their salary. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment
of the meaning of the phrase which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office, found in Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring
to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any
part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established
province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory
act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any
binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute
is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would
be usurping a judicial function in defining a term.
The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the
exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a
law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a
way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of
the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the
interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous
interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land.
Gualberto De La Llana vs Manuel Alba
112 SCRA 294 Political law Constitutional Law Political Question if there is
no question of law involved BP 129
In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed. Gualberto De la
Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be
one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and
second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which
provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts. He averred that only the
Supreme Court can remove judges NOT the Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the
legislature by such statute (BP 129).
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is empowered to
discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order
their dismissal. Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the
Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of maximum ten months allowed by the law). The Secretary of Justice, however,
course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the convinced Macaraig to forego his leave and instead to assist the Secretary, without
office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is being extended a formal detail, whenever he was not busy attending to the needs
in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who of his court.
would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of
strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Paz Garcia on the other hand filed a complaint alleging that Macaraig is
Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of incompetent, dishonest and has acted in violation of his oath as a judge. Garcia
separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition said that Macaraig has not submitted the progress of his Courts as required by
of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of law. And that Macaraig has received salaries as a judge while he is fully aware that
the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would he has not been performing the duties of a judge. Also questioned was the fact that
be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far a member of the judiciary is helping the the DOJ, a department of the executive oi
as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its charge of prosecution of cases.
view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is
a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render ISSUE: Whether or not Macaraig has acted with incompetence and dishonesty as
advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly Judge.
this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two
departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the
HELD: No. Macaraigs inability to perform his judicial duties under the
matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be
circumstances mentioned above does not constitute incompetence. Macaraig was,
appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the
like every lawyer who gets his first appointment to the bench, eager to assume his
hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore
judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of being a judge without a sala, but
from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be
forces and circumstances beyond his control prevented him from discharging his
achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge
judicial duties.
that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the
power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or
On the other hand, none of these is to be taken as meaning that the Court looks
disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint,
with favor at the practice of long standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed in
even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust.
the DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of
Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that
exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge
in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which
may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or
would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.
officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept
clear and jealously observed, lest the principle of separation of powers on which
Paz Garcia vs Catalino Macaraig, Jr.
our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually
39 SCRA 106 Political Law Separation of Powers
eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the
public service.
Judge Catalino Macaraig, Jr. took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and San
Pablo City on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 newly created CFI
The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three
branches, had to be organized from scratch. From July 1, 1970 to February 28, 1971,
departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts
Macaraig was not able to assume the duties and functions of a judge due to the fact
on check and balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as
that his Court Room can not be properly established due to problems as to location
more paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental
and as to appropriations to make his Court up and running. When Macaraig
conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under our
realized that it would be some time before he could actually preside over his court,
present constitutional scheme of government that no judge of even the lowest
he applied for an extended leave (during the 16 years he had worked in the
court in this Republic should place himself in a position where his actuations on
Department of Justice, he had, due to pressure of duties, never gone on extended
matters submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to review and
leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave benefits he had earned beyond the
prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any
authority other than the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may
be. Needless to say, the Court feels very strongly that it is best that this practice is
discontinued.
Meralco vs. Pasay Transportation Company Case Digest
The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall
not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions. (Sec. 12, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)
Facts:
Act No. 1446 was passed. Section 11 of the Act provides: "Whenever any franchise
or right of way is granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in
existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on
which said other person or corporation shall use such right of way, and the
compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other person or corporation
for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board
of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final."
Pursuant to said Act, Meralco filed a petition requesting the members of the Supreme
Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain
transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Manila
Electric Company and the compensation to be paid to the Manila Electric Company
by such transportation companies.
Copies of the petition were directed to be sent to transportation companies affected
by the petition. Opposition was entered to the petition by a number of public utility
operators.
Issue: Can the members of the Supreme Court sit as arbitrators and fix the terms and
compensation as is asked of them in this case?
Held: The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three
divisions of power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only
which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian
of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of
the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the
powers expressly or by implication conferred on it. The Supreme Court and its
members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform
any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the
administering of judicial functions.
Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a
democratic government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper
and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators,
the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila
Electric Company. (Meralco vs. Pasay Transportation Company, G.R. No. L-37878,
November 25, 1932)
Fernando Lopez vs Gerardo Roxas
17 SCRA 756 Political Law Constitutional Law Judicial Power Defined
Fernando Lopez and Gerardo Roxas were the candidates for Vice President in the
1965 elections. Lopez won the election. Roxas appealed his loss before the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). The PET was created by RA 1793. It is provided
in the law that:
There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal . . . which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
president-elect and the Vice-president elect of the Philippines.
In effect, a losing candidate would have the right to appeal his loss. Lopez assailed
the law and he sought to enjoin Roxas and the PET from proceeding with the case.
Lopez averred that the PET is unconstitutional for it was not provided for in the
constitution. Also, since the PET is composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten
members of the SC any decision of the PET cannot be validly appealed before the SC
or that there may be conflict that may arise once a PET decision is appealed before
the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PET is a valid body.
HELD: Yes. In coming up with the PET, the Congress merely conferred a new
function to the Supreme Court. Such is within its power, the Constitution allowed
Congress to determine which body should decide controversies relating to the
election of the President or the Vice President. RA 1793 did not create another
court within the SC for pursuant to the Constitution, the Judicial power shall be
vested in one SC and in such inferior courts as may be established by law
The Supreme Court went on to emphasize that the fundamental law vests in the
judicial branch of the government, not merely some specified or limited judicial
power, but the judicial power under our political system, and, accordingly, the
entirety or all of said power, except, only, so much as the Constitution confers
upon some other agency, such as the power to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the Senate and those of the
House of Representatives, which is vested by the fundamental law solely in the
Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal, respectively.
Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes
involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or
the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. The proper exercise of said
authority requires legislative action: (1) defining such enforceable and demandable
rights and/or prescribing remedies for violations thereof; and (2) determining the
court with jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies or disputes, in the first
instance and/or on appeal. For this reason, the Constitution ordains that Congress
shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts, subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental law.
The SC ruled that the PET is not in conflict with the constitution. RA 1793 merely
added the courts jurisdiction and such can be validly legislated by Congress. It
merely conferred upon the SC additional functions i.e., the functions of the PET.
This is valid because the determining of election contests is essentially judicial.
IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE
ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.
FACTS: Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, an Executive Judge in RTC in Bangui, Ilocos
Norte was appointed as a member of Provincial Committee on Justice created
pursuant to Presidential EO 856. Petitioner requested the Court to allow him to
accept the appointment and to consider his membership in the committee as
neither violative to his judicial function. He also added that his membership in the
said Committee is still part of the primary functions of an Executive Judge.
Upon examination of EO 856 reveals that Provincial/City Committees on Justice are
created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those
involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving
local jail conditions. Among the functions of the Committee are
3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, final or judge
who may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and
refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action;
3.5 Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to
the proper administration of criminal justice.
ISSUE: Whether the membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial
Committee discharges as administrative functions and will be in violation of the
Constitution.
HELD: Yes. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and
control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the
legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic
law of its existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc., vs.
Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Blacks Law Dictionary).
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial
or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution). Petition denied.
Air France vs Rafael Carrascoso
Civil Law Torts and Damages Negligence Malfeasance Quasi-Delict
Remedial Law Evidence Hearsay Rule Res Gestae Startling Event
In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were tourists en route
to Rome from Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first class round trip ticket by Air
France. But during a stop-over in Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager of
Air France to vacate his seat because a white man allegedly has a better right
than him. Carrascoso protested but when things got heated and upon advise of
other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat and was transferred to the
planes tourist class.
After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air
France for damages for the embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court,
Carrascoso testified, among others, that he when he was forced to take the tourist
class, he went to the planes pantry where he was approached by a plane purser
who told him that he noted in the planes journal the following:
First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that
the captain refused to intervene
The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court eventually
awarded damages in favor of Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that the
issuance of a first class ticket to Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be
seated in first class because allegedly in truth and in fact, that was not the true
intent between the parties.
Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascosos testimony regarding the
note made by the purser because the said note was never presented in court.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on what basis.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not the testimony of Carrasoso regarding the note which was
not presented in court is admissible in evidence.
HELD 1: Yes. It appears that Air Frances liability is based on culpa-contractual and
on culpa aquiliana.
Culpa Contractual
There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was a
contract to furnish Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said contract was
breached when Air France failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok;
and Third, that there was bad faith when Air Frances employee compelled
Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth after he was already,
seated and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered
inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral
damages.
The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air Frances claim that the issuance of
a first class ticket to a passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a first class
seat. Such claim is simply incredible.
Culpa Aquiliana
Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France
and Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do
not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the
carriers employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They
are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for
damages against the carrier. Air Frances contract with Carrascoso is one attended
with public duty. The stress of Carrascosos action is placed upon his wrongful
expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the Air France a case of quasi-
delict. Damages are proper.
HELD: 2: Yes. The testimony of Carrascoso must be admitted based on res gestae.
The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the
entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such
testimony is admissible. Besides, when the dialogue between Carrascoso and the
purser happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and
continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in
this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. The utterance of the
purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the
circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It
thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
Valladolid v Inciong; G.R. Nos. L-52364 & L-53349; 25 Mar 1983; 121 SCRA 205
FACTS:
Petitioner Ricardo Valladolid was refused admittance by JRM when he reported for
work on February 16, 1979 from a cumulative 50-day leave. [He requested a five-
day vacation leave on December 30, 1978, a fifteen-day sick leave on January 8,
1979 and a thirty-day sick leave on January 23, 1979. Only the first two leaves were
granted.]
On February 22, 1979, he filed for illegal dismissal with vacation and sick leave pay.
On February 28, 1979, JRM filed an application for clearance with the Ministry of
Labor for willful breach of trust and gross neglect of duty.
On May 2, 1979, the Regional Director issued the order denying the application for
clearance with preventive suspension and directing JRM to reinstate Valladolid to
his former position without backwages and without loss of seniority rights.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not JRM was deprived of due process by the Regional Director
of the Ministry of Labor.
RULING: NO. JRM cannot claim that it was deprived of due process considering that
applications for clearance have to be summarily investigated and a decision
required to be rendered within ten (10) days from the filing of the opposition. There
is no violation of due process where the Regional Director merely required the
submission of position papers and resolved the case summarily thereafter. Petitions
are DENIED.
NUAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 94005
April 6, 1993
FACTS:
Sometime in December 1974, after trial and hearing, the then Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial court) rendered its judgment in favor of private respondents and
ordered the partition of the property of the late Frank C. Lyon and Mary Ekstrom
Lyon. The order of partition was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in July 1982
then remanded to the lower court and two years later, a writ of execution was issued
by the latter.

On July 17, 1984, Mary Lyon Martin, daughter of the late Frank C. Lyon and Mary
Ekstrom Lyon, assisted by her counsel filed a motion to quash the order of execution
with preliminary injunction. In her motion, she contends that not being a party to the
above-entitled case her rights, interests, ownership and participation over the land
should not be affected by a judgment in the said case; that the order of execution is
unenforceable insofar as her share, right, ownership and participation is concerned,
said share not having been brought within the Jurisdiction of the court a quo. She
further invokes Section 12, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
On January 1987, the lower court issued the assailed order directing the inclusion of
Mary Lyon Martin as co-owner with a share in the partition of the property
The petitioner filed an appeal before the CA assailing the decision of the lower court
whether or not the trial court may order the inclusion of Mary L. Martin as co-heir
entitled to participate in the partition of the property considering that she was
neither a party plaintiff nor a party defendant in Civil Case No. 872 for partition and
accounting of the aforesaid property and that the decision rendered in said case has
long become final and executory.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proper remedy to enforce a right of an excluded heir to a final
and executory judgment of partition is a motion to quash said judgment?
HELD:
The Court held in the negative. The Court said that when a final judgment becomes
executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what
is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether
the modification is attempted to be made by the Court rendering it or by the highest
Court of land. The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or
the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party,
and, of course, where the judgment is void."
Furthermore, "any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and
executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire
proceedings held for that purpose."
In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 872 has become final
and executory. Thus, upon its finality, the trial judge lost his jurisdiction over the case.
Consequently, any modification that he would make, as in this case, the inclusion of
Mary Lyon Martin would be in excess of his authority.
The remedy of Mary Lyon Martin is to file an independent suit against the parties in
Civil Case No. 872 and all other heirs for her share in the subject property, in order
that all the parties in interest can prove their respective claims.
Mangelen vs. Court of Appeals Case Digest
There is a difference between a judgment against a defendant based on evidence
presented ex-parte pursuant to a default order and one based on evidence
presented ex-parte and against a defendant who had filed an answer but who failed
to appear at the hearing. In the former, section 5 of Rule 18 provides that the
judgment against the defendant should not exceed the amount or to be different
in kind from that prayed for. In the latter, however, the award may exceed the
amount or be different in kind from the prayed for.
Facts:
Mangelen filed a case for breach of contract against Habaluyas Enterprises,
Inc. and Pedro Habaluyas. The Defendants were declared in default for their failure
to file an answer within the reglementary period. The trial court rendered a Decision
in favor of plaintiff awarding him exemplary damages which was not included in his
prayer.
Issue: Was the award of exemplary damages proper?
Held: No. Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides that judgment entered
against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from
that prayed for. Consequently, an award of exemplary damages should not have been
made since it was not even prayed for. Besides, the complaint is for beach of contract.
Exemplary damages may only be awarded therein if private respondents acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. There is no finding
whatsoever on the matter.
There is a difference between a judgment against a defendant based on evidence
presented ex-parte pursuant to a default order and one based on evidence presented
ex-parte and against a defendant who had filed an answer but who failed to appear
at the hearing. In the former, section 5 of Rule 18 provides that the judgment against
the defendant should not exceed the amount or to be different in kind from that
prayed for. In the latter, however, the award may exceed the amount or be different
in kind from the prayed for. (Mangelen vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88954, October
29, 1992)
SAMSON B. BEDRUZ and EMMA C. LUNA v . OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
YOLANDA P. LIONGSON 484 SCRA 452 (2006)
The omission of the trial court to state the factual and legal bases of its decision is
not violative of the constitutional requirement if the same can be inferred from the
discussion of the decision. Petitioners Tagaytay City Engineer Samson B. Bedruz and
City Administrator Emma C. Luna were held administratively liable for violation of the
Constitution, the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials, and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in
manifesting arrogance, bias, abuse and crystal personal interest in connection with
the issuance of a permit to fence a lot. Resolving in the affirmative, the Deputy
Ombudsman fined them in an amount equivalent to One (1) Month Salary. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Ombudsman. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Court of Appeals committed grave error and mistake in
denying the petition for certiorari.
HELD: A review of the records of the case shows that the following factual findings of
the Ombudsman, upon which its decision of May 8, 1999 was based, and which were
cited by the appellate court in arriving at its assailed decision, are supported by the
evidence on record. Clearly, the appellate court did not err in finding that the
Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion. As for Bedruz and Lunas
complaint that the Ombudsman did not express in a clear manner the law on which
its decision was based, thereby violating Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution which provides that [n]o decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based, the same fails. Political Law A trial courts omission to specify the offense
committed, or the specific provision of law violated, is not in derogation of the
constitutional requirement that every decision must clearly and distinctly state the
factual and legal bases for the conclusions reached by the trial court as long as the
legal basis can be inferred from the discussion in the decision. From the
Ombudsmans decision, it can be gathered that Bedruz and Luna violated Sections 19
of R.A. No. 6770 (THE OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1989) in relation to Section 4,
paragraphs A(b) & (c) of R.A. No. 6713, as amended (THE CODE OF CONDUCT AND
ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES), requiring public
officials and employees to perform and discharge their duties with the highest
degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill, act with justness and
sincerity and not to discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the
underprivileged.
Bernardino Marcelino vs Fernando Cruz, Jr.
121 SCRA 51 Political Law Constitutional Law Period to Resolve a Case from
Date of Submission Promulgation vs Rendition of Judgment
Constitutional Period to Decide not Mandatory
Bernardino Marcelino was charged for the crime of rape. On August 4, 1975, the
prosecution finished presenting evidence against Marcelino and rested its case. On
the same date, the attorneys of both parties in the criminal case moved for time
within which to submit their respective memoranda. The presiding judge, Fernando
Cruz, Jr., gave them 30 days or until September 4, 1975. Only Marcelino submitted
a memoranda.
On November 28, 1975, Judge Cruz filed with the Clerk of Court a copy of his
decision, his decision bears the same date of November 28, 1975. The promulgation
of the decisions was scheduled in January 1976. Marcelino is now contending that
the court can no longer promulgate judgment because by January 1976, the 3-
month period (90 day period) within which lower courts must decide on cases had
already lapsed, thus, the lower court lost its jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Cruz had resolved the case within the allotted period.
HELD: Yes. The case is deemed submitted for decision on September 4, 1975 (date
of last day of filing of the memoranda by the respective parties). From that day, the
3-month period begins to run so Judge Cruz had until December 4, 1975 to rule on
the case. Judge Cruz made a rendition of his decision on November 28, 1975. The
date of rendition is the date of filing of the decision with the clerk of court. Hence,
Judge Cruz was able to rule on the case within the 3-month period because
November 28, 1975 was merely the 85th day from September 4, 1975.
The date of promulgation of a decision, in this case it was set in January 1976, could
not serve as the reckoning date because the same necessarily comes at a later date.
Is the period to decide provided for by the Constitution mandatory?
Section 11 (1), Art 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides that upon the effectivity of
this constitution, the maximum period within which case or matter shall be decided
or resolved from the date of its submission shall be; 18 months for the Supreme
Court, 12 months for the inferior courts and 3 months for lower courts. In practice,
the Supreme Court is liberal when it comes to this provision. The provision is
mandatory, its merely directive. Extensions can be granted in meritorious cases. To
interpret such provision as mandatory will only be detrimental to the justice
system. Nevertheless, the SC warned lower court judges to resolve cases within the
prescribed period and not take this liberal construction as an excuse to dispose of
cases at later periods.