Introduction:

For law to be just, it must be fair. It must, at the very least, punish the guilty but not
the innocent. The presumption of innocence (after known POI) enshrined in the
constitutions of countries as diverse as France and Argentina. It is also an enduring principle
which is the cornerstone of a lively scholarly debate in England during the 18th century.1 In
practice, POI stays with the accused unless and until the evidence convinces the jury that
the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The right for those criminal accused to be
presumed as innocent is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights2, the ECHR
and also enacted domestically in the U.K by the HRA3.

Criminal cases:

There was a time that POI, the bulwark of criminal law, was at the forefront of
jurists lexicon. In the landmark case Woolmington v DPP4, have formulated with great
rhetorical power a key principle concerning the burden of proof in criminal trials. Trial judge
directed the jury that once the prosecution prove the accused had shot the deceased, the
burden of disproving malice aforethought was then fall on the accused.5 Defendant
appealed to the House of Lords (HL), Viscount Sankey LC said that the direction is improper
and made his famous golden threat speech. 6

It was this decision in 1935 that the first clearly established the so-called golden
thread of UK criminal law. This principle said, it is for the prosecution to bear the legal
burden to prove the accuseds guilt and the accused is consider as innocent until he or she is

1
1 F. Quintard-Morenas, The Presumption of Innocence in the French and Anglo-American Legal Traditions
(2010) 58(1) The American Journal of Comparative Law 107
2
2 Article 11(1) states: [e]veryone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his
defence.
3
Human Rights Act 1998
4
Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 The accused was charged with murder of his wife, and he had gave
evidence that he had shot her accidentally.
5
Adrian Keane, The Modern Law Of Evidence (10th edn, Oxford University Press 2014).87
6
Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one golden thread is always to be seen that it is the duty of
the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt subject to... the defence of insanity and subject also to any
statutory exception. If, at the end of and on the whole of the case, there is a reasonable doubt, created by the
evidence given by either the prosecution or the prisoner... the prosecution has not made out the case and the
prisoner is entitled to an acquittal. No matter what the charge or where the trial, the principle that the
prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner is part of the common law of England and no attempt to
whittle it down can be entertained. Viscount Sankey.

Page | 1
proven guilty, subjected to insanity and statutory exceptions.7 This is to protect the
innocence from being convicted, even at the expense of guilty offenders will attempt to
escape conviction for their crimes. When Viscount Sankey said that no matter what the
charge or where the trialno attempt to whittle it down will be entertained he could hardly
have imagined the proliferation and breadth of statute law doing just that. 8

Exceptions to POI:

As stated above, golden thread have provide some exceptions for the legal burden to
be reversed to the accused. In other words, the legal burden will be on the accused to prove
insanity if he was to raise the defence or if the parliament laid down in the statutes that the
accused to bear the legal burden. Insanity is the only common law exception to the POI. If
the accused raised insanity defence then he will bears legal burden to prove that he was
insane. 9

On the other hand, there are two types of statutory exceptions:

1. express statutory exceptions

2. implied statutory exceptions

There are number of statutes which expressly imposed the legal burden of proving specified
issues on the accused. The legal burden in relations to all issues other than those which
specified remains on the prosecution. For example, s2(2) of Homicide Act 195710 imposed
the legal burden of establishing the statutory defence of diminished responsibility on a
charge of murder on the accused.11

Sometimes, the statutes may be construed as impliedly imposing a legal burden on

the accused. Virtually, implied statutory exceptions will exist where a statute prohibits

7
R. J. C Munday, Evidence (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2013).
8
'Reverse Burden' (2015) <http://www.23es.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/Reverse-Burden-Article-
3.pdf> accessed 11 November 2015.
9
Mohamed Ramjohn and Jay Landa, Unlocking Evidence (Hodder Education 2009).35
10
Homicide Act 1957, s2(2)
11
S2(2) not only dictates which party shoulders the burden of proof once the issue is raised, but also leaves it
to the defense to decide whether the issue should be raised at all. If, therefore, the defense does not raise the
issue but there is evidence of diminished responsibility, the trial judge is not bound to direct the jury to
consider the matter but, at most, should in the absence of the jury draw the matter to the attention of the
defense so that they may decide whether they wish the issue to be considered by the jury. (per Lord Lane in R
v Campbell (1986) 84 Cr App R 255)

Page | 2
particular type of conduct but permits it in specified circumstances, or by a particular class
of person with specified qualifications, by a person with permission by a specified body but
in determining whether a statute place a legal burden of proof on the accused by
implication the court must construe the provision to identify the intention of Parliament,
should not be too ready to construe a statute as having this effect and factor like the
difficulty of defence in proving or prosecution in disproving the issue may be relevant. For
example, in Gatland v MPC12 which is under s140 (1) of Highways Act 195913, have imposed
the legal burden of proof on the accused to established the legal authority of excuse of
deposited a thing on a highway in consequence one of the user of the highway had been
endangered.

Impact of HRA 1998:

Before 1998, legal burden of proof will automatically be imposed on the accused if
there is express statutory reversal. However, this is open to challenge on the basis of its
compatibility with Art 6(2) of ECHR after HRA came into force in October 200014. Obviously,
a reverse onus will not give rise to a finding of incompatibility, as ECHR did not actually
outlaw the presumption of facts or law yet requires that they are kept within the reasonable
limits and should not be arbitrary. Hence, if it unjustifiably goes against Article 6(2), then
further issue will arise as to whether it should be read down in accordance with s 3 of the
1998 Act15 to impose an evidential burden on the accused. Once raised, legal burden will
revert to the prosecution to disprove the defence to the normal criminal standard. 16There

12
Gatland v MPC [1986] 2 QB 279,
13
Highways Act 1959, s140(1),
14
Article 6(2) states: [e]veryone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved
guilty according to law.
15
Human Rights Act 1998, s3:
(1)So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect
in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights.
(2)This section
(a)applies to primary legislation and subordinate legislation whenever enacted;
(b)does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of any incompatible primary legislation;
and
(c)does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of any incompatible subordinate
legislation if (disregarding any possibility of revocation) primary legislation prevents removal of the
incompatibility.
16
<http://www.23es.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/Reverse-Burden-Article-3.pdf> accessed 17
November 2015.

Page | 3
is probably no area of evidence law which has been more affected by the implementation of
the HRA than that of the allocation of the burden of proof in criminal cases.

POI in both domestic law and convention is that, it is opposite to the notions of
fairness for the prosecutor to accuse the accused for a crime, and for the accused then to be
required to disprove the accusation in order to avoid punishment and conviction. Under the
domestic law, Parliament does not view presumption as an absolute right. The same, Article
6(2) right is not absolute. To reach the question of incompatibility, the test is whether the
limitation of Article 6(2) right is lawful or satisfies the principle of proportionality. (There
should be a balance between the interests of the community and the protection of the
individual rights).

The first case indicated the effect of the HRA is R v Lambert17, where appelant avail
himself of s28 of Misuse of Drugs Act197118 which was a defence for accused to prove that
he neither knew nor suspected nor had reason to suspect that the bag contained a drug. He
appealed against the conviction on the basis that provision of s28 conflicted with the POI
guaranteed by article 6(2) of ECHR.19 HL held, by majority, that in general, HRA cannot apply
retrospectively. Therefore, his appeal was dismissed. Yet, HL was of the view (Lord Hutton
dissenting) that the reverse legal burden of proof provision of s28 was incompatible with Art
6(2) and under s3 of HRA, may be read as imposing no more than an evidential burden on
the accused.20 Lord Steyn then approached the question of compatibility by applying what is
known as three-stage test:

1. Whether there has been a legislative interference with the presumption

2. If so, whether there is an objective justification for such interference; and
3. If so, whether the interference is proportionate, ie no greater than is necessary

Regarding to the first stage, it was held that under s28 an accused will be denied
moral blameworthiness and the maximum penalty for this offence is life imprisonment,

17
R v Lambert [2001] UKHL 37; [2002] 2 A.C; [2001] 2 Cr. App. In this case, the appellant was convicted of
possession of a class A drug with intent to supply which contrary to s5(3) of Misuse of Drugs Act 1971..
18
Misuse of drugs Act 1971, section28. Section 28 purpose to impose the legal burden on the accused to prove
his defence, on a balance of probabilities.
19
Peter Murphy, Murphy On Evidence (13th edn, Oxford University Press 2013).90
20
The word prove as used in s28 must be construed to mean give sufficient evidence

Page | 4
knowledge of the existence and control of the contents inside the container is the gravamen
of the offence, thus, s28 derogated from POI.

While in second stage, Lord Steyn was satisfied that there is an objective justification
for the legislative interfere with the POI, namely that sophisticated drug smugglers, dealers
and couriers typically secrete drugs in some container thereby enabling the person in
possession of the container to say that he was unaware the contents. Such a defence is
commonplace and poses real difficulties for the police and prosecuting authorities. In the
third stage, the principle of proportionality required the House to consider whether there
was an imperative necessity to place the legal burden instead of evidential burden. The
obligation to show that only a reverse legal burden can solve the difficulties of prosecution
in the drug cases is strong.21

While in L v DPP22, an accused may evade liability for having a lock-knife in a public
place contrary to s139 of Criminal Justice Act 198823 if he able to prove that he had a good
reason or lawful authority24 Distinguish Lambert, the court held that, striking a fair balance,
s139(4) does not conflict with art 6 of ECHR, as there was a strong public interest in the
restriction of knives in public places and it was not offensive to the rights of an individual to
require the carrier to show that he had good reason for doing so. Besides, the reason would
be something within the knowledge of the accused. 25

In R v DPP, Ex parte Kebeline26 HL decided that HRA did not give rise to a legitimate
expectation that the DPP would exercise his discretion not to consent and that the decision
of the DPP was not amenable to judicial review. As a result, the questions as to the reverse
burden and its compatibility with Article 6(2) need not to be answered. In assessing where
the balance lies, Lord Hope explained the test of proportionality in 3 prompt test, what does

21
Adrian Keane, The Modern Law Of Evidence (10th edn, Oxford University Press 2014). 94
22
L v DPP [2003] QB 137, DC
23
Criminal Justice Act 1988, s139
24
S 139(4) of Criminal Justice Act
25
<http://www.23es.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/Reverse-Burden-Article-3.pdf> accessed 19
November 2015.
26
R v DPP, Ex parte Kebeline [2000] 1 Cr App R 275, pp 321-33. Which concerned an allegations that the
defendants were involved with terrorism in Algeria. The defendants challenged the DPPs decision to consent
to the institution of criminal proceedings against the respondents on the basis that s.16A of the Prevention of
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 198926 reversed the legal burden of proof and therefore was in breach
of Article 6(2) ECHR.

Page | 5
the prosecution have to prove in order to transfer the onus to the defence? What is the
burden on the accused (does it relate to something which is likely to be difficult for him to
prove)? What is the nature of the trape faced by society which the provision is designed to
combat? Firstly, prosecutor have to prove actus reus and mens rea and in order for the
burden to shift to the accused, that burden must be something within the accused personal
knowledge. Third, is it justifiable to shift the legal burden to the accused? If it satisfied those
answer and it is justifiable to impose legal burden on the accused, then the reversal will
success. 27

27
<http://www.hendersonchambers.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/pdf/reverse-burden-of-proof-developments-
in-the-law.pdf> accessed 18 November 2015.

Page | 6
Ian Dennis 6 Cardinal Principle:

Ian Dennis identified in his article 6(2) factors which have emerged from cases
discussing the point on presumption of innocence that would determine if a reverse burden
is proportionate. According to him there are 6 factors to be considered, which is judicial
deference, classification of offences, construction of criminal liability; element of offences
and defences, significance of maximum penalties, ease of proof and peculiar knowledge,
and POI.

Judicial deference, which consider how much deference should the courts show to
the Parliament. In other words, is the literal rule absolute? In Kebilene28 Lord Hope referring
to his succinctly termed "discretionary area of judgement"29 which require the court to
make a distinction between legitimate aim and proportionality. In identifying a legitimate
aim requires the courts to consider the policy goals of criminalisation being pursued by
relevant provision. It can be decided by identifying the social or economic objectives to be
attained by penal provisions they have examined in the context of reverse onuses and
regarding them as legitimate. Later, the court should ask itself whether the imposition of
the reverse burden of proof is proportionate to achieve the policy goal of the offence.30

Similar protectionist stands were taken by Lord Nicholls in Johnstone31, and Lord
Woolf in Attorney-Generals Reference (No1 of2004)32. However, in Sheldrake v DPP33 Lord
Bingham cast doubt on Lord Woolfs proposition, argued that the approach taken by the
courts to defer the issue may lead the court to give too much weight to the enactment

28
R v Director of Public Prosecutions, Ex Parte Kebeline and Others [1999] UKHL 43
29
" ...In some circumstances it will be appropriate for the courts to recognise that there is an area of judgment
within which the judiciary will defer, on democratic grounds, to the considered opinion of the elected body or
person whose act or decision is said to be incompatible with the Convention...It will be easier for such an area
of judgment to be recognised where the Convention itself requires a balance to be struck, much less so where
the right is stated in terms which are unqualified. It will be easier for it to be recognised where the issues
involve questions of social or economic policy, much less so where the rights are of high constitutional
importance or are of a kind where the courts are especially well placed to assess the need for protection..."
Lord Hope
30
<http://www.uniassignment.com/essay-samples/law/the-term-burden-of-proof-law-general-essay.php>
accessed 19 November 2015.
31
Johnstone [2003] UKHL 28.
32
Attorney-Generals Reference (No.1 of 2004) [2004] EWCA Crim 1025
33
Sheldrake v DPP [2005] 1 AC 264

Page | 7
under review and too little to the POI and the obligation imposed on the court by s3 of the
HRA 1998.34

Ian Dennis attempted to distinguish between legitimate aims and proportionality

whereby a legitimate aim is the task on Parliament to make clear when making an
enactment. Proportionality should be looked at as a procedural rather than a substantive
issue as Dennis puts forwards that courts are guardians of principles of procedural justice
and upholders of the rule of law. By tweaking the perspectives of the courts Dennis suggests
that it must remember that the importance of Art 6(2) of the ECHR should always prevail
the principle of deference.35

Next, classification of offences, there are mala in se (acts that are truly criminal) and
mala prohibita (acts that are merely regulatory). This was extracted from Lord Clydes
judgement in Lambert whereby he agree that imposed of legal burden on the accused may
be compatible with Article 6(2) if the statutory offence concerns regulation of conduct. The
rationale is such cases are considered trivial and mainly involve monetary penalties and
carries no real social disgrace or infamy. In Davies v Health and Safety Executive36, courts
held that s.40 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 197437 was only regulatory as it carries
no risk of imprisonment and merely concerns the health, safety and welfare of the
employees. CA also held that the reversal of legal burden on the employer was justified,
proportionate and accordingly compatible with ECHR.38 However, Dennis pointed out that it
may not be justifiable to base the reversal on classification because it does not consider
about the moral quality of the act. The significance between a regulatory and a truly
criminal may intertwine that for example a regulatory offence that leads towards
widespread pollution of the environment. Hence, courts should change to see offences not

34
Both Lambert and Johnstone are recent decision of the House, binding all lower courts for what they
decide. Nothing said in Johnstone suggest an intention to depart from or modify the earlier decision, which
should not be treated as superseded or implicitly overruled. Differences of emphasis (and Lord Steyn was not a
lone voice in Lambert) are explicable by the difference in the subject matter of the two cases.
(Sheldrake v DPP [2005] 1 AC 264,[30])
35
<http://www.uniassignment.com/essay-samples/law/the-term-burden-of-proof-law-general-essay.php>
accessed 19 November 2015.
36
Davies v Health and Safety Executive [2002] EWCA Crim 2949; an employer was charged under health and
safety legislation with failure to ensure that his employees were not to exposed to health and safety risks. The
relevant employee had died.
37
Health and Safe at Work Act 1974 1974, s40
38
<http://www.23es.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/Reverse-Burden-Article-3.pdf> accessed 19 November
2015.

Page | 8
only in terms of seriousness of the offence but also its implications and moral inequity to
decide on a reversal. 39

As to the distinction between the offences and defences, Lord Hope in Lambert
established that, if an offence is clearly separated from the defence, it would be much more
easier to justify the reversal of legal burden onto the accused. However, Lord Steyn who was
the presiding in Lambert suggested that difference between offence and defence is
essentially that of a drafting technique. So, the burden of proving them should be reverted
to the prosecution but not the accused. This followed by the CA in of AGs Reference (No.4
of 2002)40, such difference of views goes to suggests that this factor may not be effective in
facilitating judges in determining whether a reversal of legal burden onto the accused is
compatible with Article 6(2) of the ECHR. However, what seems to be certain is to identify
Parliaments intention and rationale behind the offence. Hence this may be better
guidelines to be followed by judges in such situations.

Moving on, the significance of maximum penalties is to avoid the unfair effect if an
innocence received harsh penalties simply because he was unable to prove his innocence. It
was held that the higher the maximum penalty, the more reluctant the courts will reverse
the legal burden to the defendant. Lord Steyn made it clear in Lambert that life
imprisonment is a harsh penalty and the legal burden should be read down. However, R v
Johnstone went further when the reversal of legal burden was upheld where the maximum
penalty was 10 years imprisonment. This was later contrasted in the case of AGs Reference
(No.4 of 2002) where the courts decided that 10 years maximum penalty was too harsh and
refused to shift the burden onto the accused. Thus, it again reminded that maximum
penalties although clear-cut; do not provide clear guidelines for the reversal of legal
burdens.

Furthermore, ease of proof and peculiar knowledge compare the ease to prove the
legal burden between the accused and prosecution. If the accused had the required
knowledge to prove the legal burden in a way which is easier than the prosecution, it will be
proportionate to revert the burden to him. However, as per Clarke LJ in Sheldrake, the

39
<https://www.academia.edu/3665839/Reversal_of_the_Legal_Burden_in_Criminal_Cases_in_the_UK>
accessed 19 November 2015.
40
AGs Reference (No.4 of 2002) [2003] 3 WLR 1153, HL

Page | 9
peculiar knowledge can be easily blurred with the state of mind.41 Hence, some judges
prefer to apply both elements of this factor separately. This can be illustrated in Kebeline
whereby Lord Hope stated that it is important when it comes to the question of
proportionality to distinguish between easy access and knowledge. However, there are still
some cases which will point both elements in the same direction. In DPP v Barker42,
concerned s37(3) of the Road Traffic Act 198843. It was held that, as being the holder of a
provisional licence, the burden could be easily discharged by producing the licence and, as
to the conditions of the licence, in some cases, in the absence of any information from the
accused as to the identity of a passenger, it would be impossible for the prosecution to
establish his identity and that he was the holder of licence and hence qualified to be
supervising the accused.44

The last factor of identified by Dennis is POI. In fact, Dennis quoted Roberts and
Zuckermans description of the presumption being a standard which helps to prevent
wrongful convictions. Despite the principle in Woolmington by Lord Sankey, the courts in
Strasbourg take this notion seriously as many would say that it is the founding right to a fair
trial under Art 6. The ECHR emphasize in Salabiaku v France45 that under art 6 was an
enshrined fundamental principle of the rule of law and would with exceptions prevent the
courts from depriving the POI from an accused. Lord Bingham advocates for this in respect
to the Convention in Sheldrake in his own terms.46 Lord Bingham in AGs Reference (No. 4
of 2002) warned the risk and the effect of unfair conviction and stressed that it might be too
impossible for the accused to prove that he had not taken part in the illegal activities as

41
There are very many aspects of the criminal law in which the state of mind of the accused is of crucial
importance but where the burden of proving it is on the prosecution.[[2003] EWHC 237, at para 61]
42
DPP v Barker [2004] 168 JP 617, DC; [2006] Crim LR 140, DC
43
Road Traffic Act 1988, s37(3), whereby a disqualified driver may hold a provisional licence and drive in
accordance with its conditions.
44
Adrian Keane, The Modern Law Of Evidence (10th edn, Oxford University Press 2014).97
45
Salabiaku v France , [1988] 12 EHRR 379
46
" ...The overriding concern is that a trial should be fair, and the presumption of innocence is a fundamental
right directed to that end. The Convention does not outlaw presumptions of fact or law but requires that these
should be kept within reasonable limits and should not be arbitrary... The justifiability of any infringement of
the presumption of innocence cannot be resolved by any rule of thumb, but on examination of all the facts and
circumstances of the particular provision as applied in the particular case... Lord Bingham

Page | 10
provided in S. 11(2) of the Terrorism Act 200047. The courts are hence urged to uphold the
presumption of innocence.48

47
Terrorism Act 2000, s11(2)
48
<https://www.academia.edu/3665839/Reversal_of_the_Legal_Burden_in_Criminal_Cases_in_the_UK>
accessed 19 November 2015.

Page | 11
 POI in other countries

In many countries POI comes with the corollary that the accused must have the right
to remain silent and there must be no need for him to participate in any way to the
acquisition of evidence. However, while this happens in some countries such as the United
States, the presumption of innocence does not necessarily imply the right to remain silent.
For instance, in France the right to remain silent is granted only during the judicial
investigation, while during the investigatory detention (garde vue) conducted by the
Police such right is not envisioned. 49

In Australia, Australian Constitution does not expressly protect POI, academic and
juridical discussion has suggested that the presumption may be considered part of the
broader concept of a fair trial entrenched in common law. For example, in separate
judgments in Dietrich v The Queen50, Deane and Gaudron JJ relied on Chapter III of the
Australian Constitution, which establishes the judicial branch of government, as authority
for the protection of a fair trial.51

However, principle of legality provides some protection for the principle that the
prosecution should bear the burden of proof in criminal proceedings. When interpreting a
statute, courts will presume that Parliament did not intend to revert the BOP, unless this
intention was made unambiguously clear. This is illustrated in Momcilovic v The Queen52,
when French CJ called POI an important incident of the liberty of the subject53

49
<http://defensewiki.ibj.org/index.php/Presumption_of_Innocence> accessed 3 January 2016.
50
Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 326 (Deane J) and 362 (Guadron J)
51
<https://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/ip46_ch_9._burden_of_proof.pdf> accessed
3 January 2016.
52
Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1.
53
French CJ held that: The common law presumption of innocence in criminal proceedings is an important
incident of the liberty of the subject. The principle of legality will afford it such protection, in the interpretation
of statutes which may affect it, as the language of the statute will allow. A statute, which on one construction
would encroach upon the presumption of innocence, is to be construed, if an alternative construction be
available, so as to avoid or mitigate that encroachment. On that basis, a statute which could be construed as
imposing either a legal burden or an evidential burden upon an

Page | 12
Conclusion

In a nutshell, there can see that there are many arguments that seems to suggest
that the imposition of legal burden on the accused rather than the prosecution is
unconditional by virtue of art 6(2) of HRA. However, here it is argued that reversing the
burden of proof might be necessary to prevent miscarriages of justice which is contrary to
what is suggested by Jeremy Bentham. In my opinion, sometimes, reversal of legal burden is
indispensable as it will be unreasonable for a prosecution to prove something which is
within the knowledge of the accused. Besides, delay of the court proceeding may be needed
for the prosecution to find more information to prove the guilt of accused. Obviously, this
will cost more in terms of time and money(court fee). In such situation, why not the accused
bear the legal burden of proof rather than the prosecutor so that waste of time and money
can be prevented?

Page | 13
Bibliography

Website:

1. 'Burden Of Proof Vs. Burden Of Evidence' (2015) <http://www.abogadomo.com/law-

professor/law-professor-archives/burden-of-proof-vs-burden-of-evidence> accessed 10
November 2015

2. Swarb.co.uk, 'Nagy -V- Weston; QBD 1965 | Swarb.Co.Uk' (2015)

<http://swarb.co.uk/nagy-v-weston-qbd-1965/> accessed 14 November 2015

3. Swarb.co.uk, 'Environment Agency -V- M E Foley Contractors Ltd And Another; QBD 18
Jan 2002 | Swarb.Co.Uk' (2015) <http://swarb.co.uk/environment-agency-v-m-e-foley-
contractors-ltd-and-another-qbd-18-jan-2002/> accessed 15 November 2015

4. 'The Reverse Burden Of Proof - How Frayed Is The Golden Thread?' (2015)
<http://www.23es.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/Reverse-Burden-Article-3.pdf>
accessed 17 November 2015

5. Prashant Popat, 'REVERSE BURDEN OF PROOF: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW' (2015)

<http://www.hendersonchambers.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/pdf/reverse-burden-of-
proof-developments-in-the-law.pdf> accessed 18 November 2015.

6. Uniassignment.com, 'The Term Burden Of Proof Law General Essay' (2015)

<http://www.uniassignment.com/essay-samples/law/the-term-burden-of-proof-law-
general-essay.php> accessed 19 November 2015

7. Academia.edu, 'Reversal Of The Legal Burden In Criminal Cases In The UK' (2015)
<https://www.academia.edu/3665839/Reversal_of_the_Legal_Burden_in_Criminal_Cas
es_in_the_UK> accessed 19 November 2015

8. Defensewiki.ibj.org, "Presumption Of Innocence - Criminal Defense Wiki" (2016)

<http://defensewiki.ibj.org/index.php/Presumption_of_Innocence> accessed 3 January
2016

Page | 14
Journal Article:

1. "Burden Of Proof" [2014] Australian Constitution

<https://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/ip46_ch_9._burden_of_
proof.pdf> accessed 11 November 2015

2. "The Reverse Burden Of Proof - How Frayed Is The Golden Thread?"

<http://ttp://www.23es.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/Reverse-Burden-Article-
3.pdf> accessed 11 November 2015.

Books:

1. Keane A, The Modern Law Of Evidence (10th edn, Oxford University Press 2014)

2. Ramjohn M and Landa J, Unlocking Evidence (Hodder Education 2009)

3. Murphy P, Murphy On Evidence (13th edn, Oxford University Press 2013)

4. Munday R, Evidence (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2013)

Statutes:

1. Human Rights Act 1998

2. Homicide Act 1957

3. Misuse of Drugs Act 1971

4. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989

5. Criminal Justice Act 1988

6. Terrorism Act 2000

Cases:

1. Woolmington v. DPP [1935] AC 462

2. Gatland v MPC [1986] 2 QB 279

3. R v Lambert [2001] UKHL 37; [2002] 2 A.C; [2001] 2 Cr. App

4. R v White [1988] 51 DLR 481

Page | 15
5. R v DPP, Ex parte Kebeline [2000] 1 Cr App R 275, pp 321-33.

6. Johnstone [2003] UKHL 28

7. Sheldrake v DPP [2005] 1 AC 264

8. L v DPP [2003] QB 137, DC

9. Attorney-Generals Reference (No.1 of 2004) [2004] EWCA Crim 1025

10. Davies v Health and Safety Executive [2002] EWCA Crim 2949

11. Attorney-Generals Reference (No.4 of 2002) [2003] 3 WLR 1153, HL

12. DPP v Barker [2004] 168 JP 617, DC; [2006] Crim LR 140, DC

13. Salabiaku v France, [1988] 12 EHRR 379

Page | 16