POLIREV
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT CASES
1. DE LEON v. CA
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 127182. December 5, 2001.]
HON. ALMA G. DE LEON, Chairman, HON. THELMA P.
GAMINDE, Commissioner, and HON. RAMON P. ERENETA,
JR., Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, and
SECRETARY RAFAEL M. ALUNAN, III, Department of Interior
and Local Government, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and JACOB F. MONTESA, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Camilo Miguel M. Montesa for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Applying the case of Achacoso v. Macaraig, this Court, in its
decision dated January 22, 2001, ruled that private respondent
Jacob F. Montesa's appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel
CESO IV of the Ministry of Local Government was temporary for
failure to possess the required Career Executive Service (CES)
eligibility for the said position. Hence, he can be transferred or
reassigned without violating his right to security of tenure. Thus,
private respondent filed the instant motion for reconsideration by
invoking res judicata. He contended that his appointment can no
longer be passed upon and controverted in the present case
considering that the said issue had already been settled in the
Minute Resolution of this Court dated March 17, 1992 in Jacob
Montesa v. Santos, et al., when his appointment was first
contested. In that case, the Court ruled that the Achacoso case
was not applicable to him since he was appointed by virtue of
Article III of the Freedom Constitution, and during that period there
was no Career Executive Service Board. The only eligibility
required was that of the first grader, and private respondent was a
first grader. Therefore, having met all the requirements for the
position to which he was appointed, he cannot be removed in
violation of the constitutional guarantee on security of tenure and
due process.
The Court was not precluded from re-examining its own ruling and
rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to res
judicata would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality.
In this case, a reading of the Integrated Reorganization Plan which
was adopted and declared part of the law of the land
by Presidential Decree No. 1 clearly showed that a CES eligibility
is indeed a requirement for a position embraced in the CES. The
foregoing law and circular were never amended nor repealed by
the Freedom Constitution. A CES eligibility is an existing and
operative requirement at the time of private respondent's
appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel CESO IV. In fact, the
Integrated Reorganization Plan allows the appointment of non-
CES eligibles, like private respondent, provided they subsequently
acquire the needed eligibility. Moreover, assuming ex gratia
argumenti that a CES eligibility is not a requirement in the case of
private respondent, the mobility and flexibility concepts in the
assignment of personnel in the CES, which allow transfer or
reassignment of CES personnel to other positions of the same
rank or salary, justify his transfer to other CES position without
violating his right to security of tenure.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; CONCLUSIVENESS
OF JUDGMENT; EXCEPTION. [T]he principle on
conclusiveness of judgment set forth in Rule 39, Section 47,
paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court, would bar a re-litigation of the
nature of private respondent's appointment. Indeed, once an issue
has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent
court, it can no longer be controverted anew and should be finally
laid to rest. Yet, the Court is not precluded from re-examining its
own ruling and rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn
adherence to res judicata would involve the sacrifice of justice to
technicality. It must be stressed that this is not the first time in
Philippine and American jurisprudence that the principle of res
judicata has been set aside in favor of substantial justice, which is
after all the avowed purpose of all law and jurisprudence.
2. POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; CIVIL SERVICE
RULES; INTEGRATED REORGANIZATION PLAN CLEARLY
SHOWS CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE (CES) ELIGIBILITY IS
A REQUIREMENT FOR A POSITION EMBRACED IN THE CES.
A reading . . . of the Integrated Reorganization Plan which was
adopted and declared part of the law of the land by Presidential
Decree No. 1, dated September 24, 1972, clearly shows that a
CES eligibility is indeed a requirement for a position embraced in
the CES.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AMENDED NOR REPEALED BY THE
FREEDOM CONSTITUTION. [I]n March 1974, the CES Board
issued CESB Circular No. 1 which laid down the requirements for
membership in the CES [.] . . . The foregoing law and circular were
never amended nor repealed by the Freedom Constitution. A CES
eligibility was an existing and operative requirement at the time of
private respondent's appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel
CESO IV. Neither were the said law and circular inconsistent with
the Freedom Constitution as to render them modified or
superseded. In fact, the Integrated Reorganization Plan allows the
appointment of non-CES eligibles, like private respondent,
provided they subsequently acquire the needed eligibility.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ACHACOSO v. MACARAIG; APPLICABLE IN
CASE AT BAR. It bears stressing that in Achacoso v. Macaraig,
the questioned appointment was made on October 16, 1987,
before the CES Board was reconstituted in 1988, and before the
first CESO examination was given in 1990, as in the present case.
Nevertheless, the Court, in Achacoso, ruled that a CES eligibility
is required for a CES position, such that an appointment of one
who does not possess such eligibility shall be temporary.
Evidently, a CES eligibility has always been one of the
requirements for a position embraced in the CES. The Court finds
no reason to make an exception in the instant
controversy. IESDCH
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; MOBILITY AND FLEXIBILITY CONCEPTS IN THE
ASSIGNMENT OF PERSONNEL IN THE CES JUSTIFY THE.
TRANSFER TO OTHER CES POSITION WITHOUT VIOLATING
THE RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE. [I]n the recent case
of Secretary of Justice v. Josefina Bacal, we ruled that security of
tenure in the CES is acquired with respect to rank and not to
position. Hence, assuming ex gratia argumenti that a CES
eligibility is not a requirement in the case of private respondent,
the mobility and flexibility concepts in the assignment of personnel
in the CES, which allow transfer or reassignment of CES
personnel to other positions of the same rank or salary, justify his
transfer to other CES position without violating his right to security
of tenure.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
For resolution is private respondent's motion for reconsideration of
the January 22, 2001 Decision of the Court, which reversed and
set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
38664 and reinstated Resolution Nos. 953268 and 955201 of the
Civil Service Commission.
In the Decision sought to be reconsidered, we ruled that private
respondent's appointment on August 28, 1986, as Ministry Legal
Counsel - CESO IV of the Ministry of Local Government, was
temporary. Applying the case of Achacoso v. Macaraig, 1 we held
that since private respondent was not a Career Executive Service
(CES) eligible, his appointment did not attain permanency
because he did not possess the required CES eligibility for the
CES position to which he was appointed. Hence, he can be
transferred or reassigned without violating his right to security of
tenure.
It appears, however, that in Jacob Montesa v. Santos, et al.,
decided on September 26, 1990, 2 where the nature of private
respondent's appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV,
of the Ministry of Local Government, was first contested, this Court
issued a Minute Resolution dated March 17, 1992, holding
that Achacoso v. Macaraig is not applicable to the case of private
respondent. The pertinent portion thereof reads
. . . The holding of this Court in the Achacoso case is not applicable
to petitioner Montesa. Petitioner was appointed on August 28,
1996 by virtue of Article III of the Freedom Constitution. He was
extended a permanent appointment by then Minister Pimentel and
subsequently confirmed as permanent by the Civil Service
Commission. He is a first grade civil service eligible (RA 1080) the
appropriate eligibility for the position at that time and a member of
the Philippine bar.
There was no Career Executive Service Board during the Freedom
Constitution or at the time of appointment of petitioner. The CESO
was only reconstituted by the appointment of its Board of six (6)
members sometime in August 1988. There was no CESO eligibility
examination during petitioner's incumbency in the Department, as
there was no CESO board. The first CESO examination was given
on August 5 and 12, 1990. The CESO eligibility was not a
requirement at the time of the appointment of petitioner. The only
eligibility required is that of a first grader and petitioner is a first
grade eligible. Therefore, having met all the requirements for the
position to which he was appointed, he cannot be removed in
violation of the constitutional guarantee on security of tenure
and due process.
Invoking res judicata, private respondent contends that the nature
of his appointment can no longer be passed upon and
controverted in the present case considering that said issue had
already been settled in the foregoing Minute Resolution of the
Court.
Concededly, if we follow the conventional procedural path, i.e., the
principle on conclusiveness of judgment set forth in Rule 39,
Section 47, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court, 3would bar a re-
litigation of the nature of private respondent's appointment.
Indeed, once an issue has been adjudicated in a valid final
judgment of a competent court, it can no longer be controverted
anew and should be finally laid to rest. 4
Yet, the Court is not precluded from re-examining its own
ruling and rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn
adherence to res judicata would involve the sacrifice of
justice to technicality. It must be stressed that this is not the first
time in Philippine and American jurisprudence that the principle
of res judicata has been set aside in favor of substantial justice,
which is after all the avowed purpose of all law and
jurisprudence. 5
In the March 17, 1992 Minute Resolution, we held that private
respondent who was appointed in 1986 pursuant to the Freedom
Constitution, though not a CES eligible, possessed all the
requirements for the position of Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV,
of the Ministry of Local Government, since a CES eligibility was
not, at that time, a requirement for the same position.
A reading, however, of the Integrated Reorganization Plan which
was adopted and declared part of the law of the land
by Presidential Decree No. 1, dated September 24, 1972, clearly
shows that a CES eligibility is indeed a requirement for a position
embraced in the CES. Thus:
c. Appointment. Appointment to appropriate classes in the Career
Executive Service shall be made by the President from a list of
career executive eligibles recommended by the Board. Such
appointments shall be made on the basis of rank; provided that
appointments to the higher ranks which qualify the incumbents to
assignments as undersecretary and heads of bureaus and offices
and equivalent positions shall be with the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments. The President may, however, in
exceptional cases, appoint any person who is not a Career
Executive Service eligible; provided that such appointee shall
subsequently take the required Career Executive Service
examination and that he shall not be promoted to a higher class
until he qualifies in such examination.
In fact, in March 1974, the CES Board issued CESB Circular No.
1 which laid down the requirements for membership in the CES, to
wit:
a) Successful completion of CESDP shall constitute one of the
requirements for membership in the CES. Except as otherwise
provided by law, no person shall be admitted into the CES without
having satisfactorily completed the program;
b) Admission into CESDP shall be limited to incumbents of
positions falling within the CES duly nominated by their
Department Heads;
c) Upon satisfactory completion of the program, the incumbent-
participant shall be enrolled in the roster of CES eligibles and shall
be qualified for appointment by the President to the appropriate
rank in the CES upon recommendation of the Board. He may then
be assigned to any position in the CES by the President.
The foregoing law and circular were never amended nor repealed
by the Freedom Constitution. A CES eligibility was an existing and
operative requirement at the time of private respondent's
appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV. Neither were
the said law and circular inconsistent with the Freedom
Constitution as to render them modified or superseded. In fact, the
Integrated Reorganization Plan allows the appointment of non-
CES eligibles, like private respondent, provided they subsequently
acquire the needed eligibility.
It bears stressing that in Achacoso v. Macaraig, the questioned
appointment was made on October 16, 1987, before the CES
Board was reconstituted in 1988, and before the first CESO
examination was given in 1990, as in the present case.
Nevertheless, the Court, in Achacoso, ruled that a CES eligibility
is required for a CES position, such that an appointment of one
who does not possess such eligibility shall be temporary.
Evidently, a CES eligibility has always been one of the
requirements for a position embraced in the CES. The Court
finds no reason to make an exception in the instant
controversy.
Moreover, in the recent case of Secretary of Justice v. Josefina
Bacal, 6 we ruled that security of tenure in the CES is acquired
with respect to rank and not to position. Hence, assuming ex gratia
argumenti that a CES eligibility is not a requirement in the case of
private respondent, the mobility and flexibility concepts in the
assignment of personnel in the CES, which allow transfer or
reassignment of CES personnel to other positions of the same
rank or salary, 7 justify his transfer to other CES position without
violating his right to security of tenure.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant motion for
reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
||| (De Leon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127182 (Resolution),
[December 5, 2001], 422 PHIL 755-763)
2. PEOPLE v. GUTIERREZ
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-32282-83. November 26, 1970.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. MARIO J.
GUTIERREZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Sur, CAMILO PILOTIN, FRANCISCO PIANO,DELFIN
PIANO, PEDRO PATAO, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, CAMILO
PIANO, CAMILO PATAO, PEDRING PIANO, ISIDRO
PUGAL, ANTONIO TABULDO, LORENZO
PERALTA,VENANCIO PACLEB, ANTONIO PIANO, FERMIN
PUGAL, CARLITO PUGAL, FLOR PIANO, ERNING ABAO
and EIGHTY-TWO (82) JOHN DOES, respondents.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General
Conrado T . Limcaoco, Solicitor Eduardo C . Abaya and Special
Attorney Juan A. Sison for petitioners.
Adaza, Adaza & Adaza for respondent Erning Abao.
Crisologo Law Office and Pedro Quadro for respondent Camilo
Pilotin.
Juan T . David for respondent Vincent Crisologo.
Augusto Kalaw as private prosecutor.
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J p:
Petition for writs of certiorari and mandamus, with preliminary
injunction, filed by the Solicitor General and State Prosecutors, to
annul and set aside the order of Judge Mario J. Gutierrez of the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (respondent herein), dated 20
July 1970, denying the prosecution's urgent motion to transfer
Criminal Case Nos. 47-V and 48-V of said Court of First Instance,
entitled "People vs. Pilotin, et al.," to the Circuit Criminal Court of
the Second Judicial District; to direct the respondent Judge to
effectuate such transfer; and to restrain the trial of the cases
aforesaid in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, sitting in
Vigan, capital of the province.
FACTS:
In the morning of 22 May 1970, a group of armed persons
descended on barrio Ora Centro, municipality of Bantay, Province
of Ilocos Sur, and set fire to various inhabited houses therein. On
the afternoon of the same day, in barrio Ora Este of the same
municipality and province, several residential houses were
likewise burned by the group, resulting in the destruction of various
houses and in the death of an old woman named Vicenta Balboa.
After investigation by the authorities, the provincial fiscal, with
several state prosecutors assigned by the Department of Justice
to collaborate with him, on 10 June 1970 filed in the Court of First
Instance of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, two informations (Criminal Cases
47-V for arson with homicide and 48-V for arson) charging that the
seventeen private respondents herein, together with 82 other
unidentified persons, "confederating, conspiring, confabulating
and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously burn or cause to be burned several residential houses,
knowing the said houses to be occupied" and belonging to certain
persons named in the filed informations in barrios Ora Este and
Ora Centro, Bantay, Ilocos Sur (Petition, Annexes B and B-1).
Accused Camilo Pilotin and Vincent Crisologo furnished bail, and
on 15 June 1970 voluntarily appeared before respondent Judge
Gutierrez, were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial was then
set for 27, 28 and 29 July 1970.
It appears that on the same day, 15 June, the Secretary of Justice
issued Administrative Order No. 221, authorizing Judge Lino
Aover, of the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial
District, with official station at San Fernando, La Union, to hold a
special term in Ilocos Sur, from and after 1 July 1970. Three days
thereafter, on 18 June 1970, the Secretary further issued
Administrative Order No. 226, authorizing Judge Mario Gutierrez
to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit
Criminal Court, "in the interest of justice and pursuant to Republic
Act No. 5179, as implemented by Administrative Order Nos. 258
and 274" of the Department of Justice.
On 22 June 1970, the prosecution moved the respondent judge for
a transfer of cases 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court,
invoking the Administrative Orders just mentioned and calling
attention to the circumstance that they were issued at the instance
of the witnesses seeking transfer of the hearing from Vigan to
either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City, for reasons of
security and personal safety, as shown in their affidavits. The
accused vigorously opposed such transfer, and on 20 July 1970,
the respondent judge declined the transfer sought, on the ground
that Administrative Order No. 258 only provided for transfer of
cases to the Circuit Criminal Court where the interest of justice
required it for the more expeditious disposal of the cases, and in
the cases involved the accused had already pleaded; that if the
objective of the proposed transfer was to subsequently obtain a
change of venue from the Supreme Court under Section 4
of Republic Act No. 5179 the same should have been done right
at the very inception of these cases.
In view of the lower court's denial of the motion to transfer the
cases to the Circuit Criminal Court, the prosecution resorted to Us
for writs of certiorari and mandamus, charging abuse of discretion
and praying this Court to set aside the order of denial of the
transfer and to compel the respondent Court of First Instance to
remand the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second
Judicial District, as well as to authorize the latter to try the cases
(47-V and 48-V) at either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City.
Respondents in their answer denied any abuse of discretion in
view of the fact that the Administrative Order No. 226 merely
authorized the court below, but did not require or command it, to
transfer the cases in question to the Circuit Criminal Court, and
likewise denied that the circumstances justified any such transfer.
At petitioners' request this Court enjoined the respondent Judge
Gutierrez from proceeding with the trial of the cases until further
orders.
HELD:
We agree with respondents that the present laws do not confer
upon the Secretary of Justice power to determine what court
should hear specific cases. Any such power, even in the guise of
administrative regulation of executive affairs, trenches upon the
time-honored separation of the Executive and the Judiciary; and
while not directly depriving the courts of their independence, it
would endanger the rights and immunities of the accused or civil
party. It could be much too easily transformed into a means of pre-
determining the outcome of individual cases, so as to produce a
result in harmony with the Administration's preferences. The
creation by Republic Act No. 5179 of the Circuit Criminal Courts
for the purpose of alleviating the burden of the regular Courts of
First Instance, and to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases
pending or to be filed therein, nowhere indicates an intent to permit
the transfer of preselected individual cases to the circuit courts.
Neither do Administrative Orders Nos. 258 and 274 evidence any
such intention; particularly since Administrative Order No. 258,
Series of 1968, in Section 2 of its Part V, as confirmed by
Administrative Order No. 274 of the same year, in Section 3 of Part
III thereof, provides that the transfer to Circuit Criminal Courts of
cases pending in the regular Courts of First Instance should be
effected by raffle, chance here operating to nullify any executive
arbitration of what particular cases should be apportioned to either
tribunal. The very terms of Administrative Order No. 226, issued
on 18 June 1970 by Secretary of Justice Makasiar, relied upon by
the petitioners, in merely authorizing, and not directing, Judges
Arciaga and Gutierrez of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur
to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 44-V and 47-V (People vs. Pilotin,
et al.) to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District,
reveals that the Secretary himself was aware of the impropriety of
imperatively directing transfer of specified cases. Respondent
Judge Gutierrez, therefore in construing Administrative Order
No. 226 as permissive and not mandatory, acted within the
limits of his discretion and violated neither the law nor the
Executive Orders heretofore mentioned.
It is unfortunate, however, that in refusing to consider Department
Administrative Order No. 226 of the Secretary of Justice as
mandatory respondent Judge Gutierrez failed to act upon the
contention of the prosecuting officers that the cases against
private respondents herein should be transferred to the Circuit
Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District because a
miscarriage of justice was impending, in view of the refusal of
the prosecution witnesses to testify in the court sitting in Vigan,
Ilocos Sur, where they felt their lives would be endangered. This
claim was buttressed by the affidavits of the injured parties and
prosecution witnesses, reaffirming their fear to appear in Vigan to
testify in cases 47-V and 48-V and expressing their willingness to
testify if the cases are heard outside of Ilocos Sur, where they can
be free from tension and terrorism (Petition, Annex J). The fear
thus expressed cannot be considered fanciful and unfounded
when account is taken of the circumstances that the informations
filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur show that of the
one hundred armed participants in the burning of the houses at
barrios Ora Este and Ora Centro, Municipality of Bantay, some
eighty-two (82) are still unidentified and at large; that one of the
accused, private respondent Vincent Crisologo, belongs to an
influential family in the province, being concededly the son of the
Congressman for the first district of Ilocos Sur and of the lady
Governor that the reluctant witnesses are themselves the
complainants in the criminal cases, and, therefore, have reasons
to fear that attempts will be made to silence them; that it is not
shown that the Executive branch is able or willing to give these
witnesses full security during the trial and for a reasonable time
thereafter, that even if armed security escorts were to be provided,
the same would be no guarantee against the possibility of
murderous assault against the affiant witnesses, as recent events
have proved; that Constabulary reports (Annex H) show that
between 1 January and 31 May 1970 no less than 78 murders
have been reported committed in said province, of which number
only 21 were solved; and, finally, that the promotion and
confirmation of respondent Judge Mario Gutierrez from Clerk of
Court to Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Second Judicial
District, Branch III, was actively supported by Congressman and
Governor Crisologo, parents of accused Vincent Crisologo
(Annexes H, H-1, and K to N-2 to petitioner's supplemental
memorandum).
This just refusal to testify in Ilocos Sur manifested by the
complaining witnesses, who had on a previous occasion
freely given evidence before the investigators in Manila,
renders manifest the imperious necessity of transferring the
place of trial to a site outside of Ilocos Sur, if the cases are to
be judicially inquired into conformably to the interest of truth
and justice and the State is to be given a fair chance to
present its side of the case.
The respondents vigorously contend that a transfer of the trial site
cannot be made, because it is a long standing rule of criminal
procedure in these Islands that one who commits a crime is
amenable therefor only in the jurisdiction where the crime is
committed, for the reason pointed out in U.S. vs. Cunanan, 26 Phil.
376, and People vs. Mercado, 65 Phil. 665, that the jurisdiction of
a Court of First Instance in the Philippines is limited to certain well-
defined territory and they cannot take jurisdiction of persons
charged with one offense committed outside of that limited
territory, and they invoke Rule 110, Section 14 (a), of the Revised
Rules of Court providing that "in all criminal prosecutions the action
shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or
province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the
essential ingredient thereof took place."
It is well to note that this Court has explained in Beltran vs. Ramos,
96 Phil. 149, 150, that the purpose of the rule invoked by accused
respondents herein was "not to compel the defendant to move to
and appear in a different court from that of the province where the
crime was committed, as it would cause him great inconvenience
in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place."
Where the convenience of the accused is opposed by that of
the prosecution, as in the case at bar, it is but logical that the
court should have power to decide where the balance of
convenience or inconvenience lies, and to determine the
most suitable place of the trial according to the exigencies of
truth and impartial justice.
In the particular case before Us, to compel the prosecution to
proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty
to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial
process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts have
been established. Since the rigorous application of the general
principle of Rule 110, Section 14 (a), would result here in
preventing a fair and impartial inquiry into the actual facts of the
case, it must be admitted that the exigencies of justice demand
that the general rule relied upon by accused respondents should
yield to occasional exceptions wherever there are weighty reasons
therefor. Otherwise, the rigor of the law would become the highest
injustice "summun jus, summa in juria."
The respondents accused can not complain that to transfer the trial
to a site where the prosecution's witnesses can feel free to reveal
what they know would be equivalent to railroading them into a
conviction. Because regardless of the place where its evidence is
to be heard, the prosecution will be always obligated to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The scales of
justice clearly lean in favor of the prosecution being given full
opportunity to lay its case before a proper arbiter: for a dismissal
of the charges for lack of evidence is a verdict that the prosecution
can neither challenge nor appeal.
We must thus reject the idea that our courts, faced by an impasse
of the kind now before Us, are to confess themselves impotent to
further the cause of justice. The Constitution has vested the
Judicial Power in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as
may be established by law (Article VIII, Section 13), and such
judicial power connotes certain incidental and inherent attributes
reasonably necessary for an effective administration of justice.
The courts "can by appropriate means do all things necessary to
preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary
an effective institution of government" (Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41
Phil. 322).
One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of
transferring the trial of cases from one court to another of equal
rank in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of securing a
fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so
demands. This authority was early recognized in England as
inhering in the courts of justice even prior to the eighteenth
century. The opinion in Crocker vs. Justices of the Superior Court,
208 Mass. 162, 21 Ann. Cases 1067, has shown how the eminent
Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, in Rex vs. Cowle (Eng.) 2 Burr 834,
decided in 1759, said that, in this respect, "the law is clear and
uniform as far back as it can be traced."
And in Reg. vs. Conway, 7 Jr. C. J. 507, the question was fully
discussed, and all the judges appear to have agreed as to the
power of the court, Cramption, Jr., saying at page 525:
"There is another common-law right, equally open to defendants
and prosecutors, . . . that where it appears that either party cannot
obtain a fair and impartial trial in the prope county, then this court
. . . has jurisdiction to take the case out of the proper county, as it
is called, and to bring it into an indifferent county . . . This
jurisdiction to change the venue . . . has been exercised by this
court from a very early period. We have reported cases, where the
doctrine is laid down in emphatic language; we have the practice
of the Court of Queen's Bench in England independently of any
practice of our own court . . . The general jurisdiction of the court,
in a proper case, to change the venue from one county to any
other, cannot be the subject of doubt."
This power to transfer trial of criminal cases in furtherance of
justice, exercised through writs of certiorari, has, according to the
weight of authority, passed to the State Supreme Courts of the
American Union. 1 In Cochecho R. Co. vs. Farrington, 26 N.H.
428, at page 436, it was held that the power to transfer the place
of holding trials
"became thoroughly engrafted upon the common law, long before
the independence of this country; and from that time forth, not only
has the practice prevailed in the courts of England, but the power
is now exercised by the Courts of very many if not all of our states,
either by force of express statute or the adoption of the common
law in the jurisprudence of the same."
That such inherent powers are likewise possessed by the
Philippine courts admits of no doubt, because they were organized
on the American pattern with the enactment of the first judicial
organic law, Act 136, on 11 June 1901, by the Philippine
Commission, then composed by a majority of able American
lawyers, fully familiar with the institutions and traditions of the
common law.
In Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21 Phil. 300, 333, this Court
stated:
"And it is safe to say that in every volume of the Philippine Reports,
numbers of cases might be cited wherein recourse has been had
to the rules, principles and doctrines of the common law in
ascertaining the true meaning and scope of the legislation enacted
in and for the Philippine Islands since they passed under American
sovereignty."
"Among the earliest measures of the Philippine Commission, after
the establishment of Civil Government under American
sovereignty, was the enactment on June 11, 1901, of Act No. 136,
'An Act providing for the organization of courts in the Philippine
Islands.' This Act in express terms abolished the then
existing Audiencia or Supreme Court and Courts of First Instance,
and substituted in their place the courts provided therein. It sets
out in general terms the jurisdiction, duties, privileges, and powers
of the new courts and their judges. The majority of the members
of the body which enacted it were able American lawyers. The
spirit with which it is informed, and indeed its very language and
terminology would be unintelligible without some knowledge of the
judicial systems of England and the United States. Its manifest
purpose and object was to replace the old judicial system, with its
incidents and traditions drawn from Spanish sources, with a new
system modeled in all its essential characteristics upon the judicial
systems of the United States. It cannot be doubted, therefore, that
any incident of the former system which conflicts with the essential
principles and settled doctrines on which the new system rests,
must be held to be abrogated by the law organizing the new
system."
While not expressly conferred by Act 136, We find it difficult to
believe that the framers' intent was to deny, by silence, to the
Philippine Courts, and particularly upon this Supreme Court, the
inherent jurisdiction possessed by the English and American
courts under their common law heritage to transfer the place of
trial of cases in order to secure and promote the ends of justice,
by providing fair and impartial inquiry and adjudication.
Like the exemption of judges of courts of superior or general
authority from liability in a civil action for acts done by them in the
exercise of their judicial functions, upheld in the Alzua case as
essentially inherent in the courts established by Act 136, even if
not expressly provided for, the power to transfer the place of trials
when so demanded by the interest of justice is equally essential
and possesses no inferior rank. To it apply, mutatis mutandis, the
words of this Court in the Alzua case just cited:
"The grounds of public policy and the reasoning upon which the
doctrine is based are not less forceful and imperative in these
Islands than in the countries from which the new judicial system
was borrowed; and an examination of the reasons assigned . . .
leaves no room for doubt that a failure to recognize it as an incident
to the new judicial system would materially impair its usefulness
and tend very strongly to defeat the ends for which it was
established." (21 Phil. 333-334)
Not only has there been since then no proof of any specific
pronouncement, by Constitution or Congress, against the exercise
by our Courts of the power discussed heretofore: on the contrary,
the law establishing the Circuit Criminal Courts, Republic Act No.
5179, in its Section 4, provides express legislative recognition of
its existence:
"SECTION 4. The Circuit Criminal Courts may hold sessions
anywhere within their respective districts: Provided, however, that
cases shall be heard within the province where the crime subject
of the offense was committed. And provided further, that when the
interest of justice so demands, with prior approval of the Supreme
Court, cases may be heard in a neighboring province within the
district . . ." (Emphasis supplied)
Since the requirements for proper jurisdiction have been satisfied
by the filing of the criminal case in question with the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur, in which province the offenses charged
were committed, according to the informations; since the holding
of the trial in a particular place is more a matter of venue, rather
than jurisdiction; since the interests of truth and justice can not be
subserved by compelling the prosecution to proceed to trial in the
respondent court in Ilocos Sur, because its witnesses, for just and
weighty reasons, are unwilling to testify therein, and the
respondent court, ignoring their safety, has abusively denied the
motion to have the case transferred to another court, this Supreme
Court, in the exercise of judicial power possessed by it under the
Constitution and the statutes, should decree that the trial of cases
47-V and 48-V should be heard and decided by the Circuit Criminal
Court of the Second Judicial District, either in San Fernando, La
Union, or in Baguio City, at the earlier available date. This
arrangement would have the advantage that the same trial judge
could later be authorized to hear the defense witnesses in Vigan,
if circumstances so demanded. Furthermore, the adjudication of
the case by a judge other than respondent Gutierrez, if resulting in
acquittal, would remove any doubt or suspicion that the same was
in any way influenced by the trial Judge's being beholden to the
Crisologo family.
The solution thus adopted is in harmony with the ideals set by this
Court in Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523,
where We said:
". . . The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that which
gives opportunity for the most complete and perfect exercise of the
powers of the court within the limitations set by natural justice. It is
that one which, in other words, gives the most perfect opportunity
for the powers of the court to transmute themselves into concrete
acts of justice between the parties before it. The purpose of such
a procedure is not to restrict the jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter but to give it effective facility in righteous action.
It may be said in passing that the most salient objection which can
be urged against procedure to-day is that it so restricts the
exercise of the court's power by technicalities that part of its
authority effective for justice between the parties is many times in
inconsiderable portion of the whole. The purpose of procedure is
not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of
justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not
to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration
of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are
always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means
best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to
an end. It is the means by which the powers of the court are made
effectivity in just judgments. When it loses the character of the one
and takes on that of the other the administration of justice
becomes incomplete and unsatisfactorily and lays itself open to
grave criticism. (Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General, 20 Phil.
523, 529 [1911]. Emphasis and paragraphing supplied.)
In resume, this Court hold, and so rules:
(1) That Republic Act No. 5179 creating the Circuit Criminal
Courts did not, and does not, authorize the Secretary of Justice to
transfer thereto specified and individual cases;
(2) That this Supreme Court, in the exercise of the Judicial Power
vested by the Constitution upon it and other statutory Courts,
possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the trial
and disposition of a case pending in a Court of First Instance be
transferred to another Court of First Instance within the same
district whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and
there are serious weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court
that originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a
fair and impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice.
(3) That in the present case there are sufficient and adequate
reasons for the transfer of the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 47-
V and 48-V of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur to the Circuit
Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, in the interest of truth
and justice.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the writs of certiorari and
mandamus prayed for are granted; the order of the respondent
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, dated 20 July 1970, is
sustained in so far as it holds that the Administrative Order No.
221 of the Department of Justice is not mandatory, but only
directory; nevertheless, said order is declared in grave abuse of
discretion and set aside in so far as it declines to transfer the trial
of its cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to another court within the district;
and said respondent Court is accordingly directed and ordered to
remand the two criminal cases aforesaid to the Circuit Criminal
Court of the Second Judicial District for hearing of the evidence for
the prosecution either in Baguio or San Fernando, La Union, at the
earliest available date, and such other proceedings as the Circuit
Criminal Court may determine in the interest of justice.
The accused are required to file bail bonds to answer for their
appearance at the trial and sentence by the Circuit Criminal Court
for the Second Judicial District, in the same amount, and under the
same terms and conditions as their present bail bonds, which will
be replaced by those herein ordered, all within fifteen (15) days
from finality of this decision.
No special pronouncement as to costs.
||| (People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. L-32282-83, [November 26,
1970], 146 PHIL 761-786)
3. IN RE: ATTY. MARCIAL EDILLON
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 1928. August 3, 1978.]
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of
Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLON (IBP Administrative Case No.
MDD - 1).
SYNOPSIS
For respondent's stubborn refusal to pay his memebership dues
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since the
latter's constitution, notwithstanding due notice, the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines unanimously
adopted and submitted to the Supreme Court a resolution
recommending the removal of respondent's name from its Roll of
Attorneys, pursuant to Par. 2, Sec. 24, Art. III of the By-Laws of
the IBP.
Respondent, although conceding the propriety and necessity of
the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, questions the all-
encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership therein and the
obligation to pay membership dues arguing that the provisions
therein (Section 1 and 9 of the Court Rule 139-A) constitute an
invasion of his constitutional right in the sense that he is being
compelled, as a precondition to maintaining his status as a lawyer
in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty
and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Respondent
likewise questions the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike
his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that this matter is
not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is of an
administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body.
The Supreme Court unanimously held that all legislation directing
the integration of the Bar are valid exercise of the police power
over an important profession; that to compel a lawyer to be a
member of the IBP is not violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate; that the requirement to pay membership fees is
imposed as a regulatory measure designed to raise funds for
carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration; that the
penalty provisions for non-payment are not void as unreasonable
or arbitrary; that the Supreme Court's jurisdiction and power to
strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys is expressly
provided by Art.X, Section 5(5) of the Constitution and held as an
inherent judicial function by a host of decided cases; and that the
provisions of Rules of Court 139-A ordaining the integration of the
Bar of the Philippines and the IBP By-Laws complained of are
neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
Respondent disbarred and his name ordered stricken from the Roll
of Attorneys.
SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEYS; BAR INTEGRATION; NATURE AND
PURPOSE. An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to
which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
associations organized by individual lawyers themselves,
membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is
essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded
an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the
Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities.
Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar
is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be
members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed
for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of
the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional
ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes
sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper
cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment
of the offending member.
2. ID.; ID.; INTEGRATION OF THE BAR, A VALID EXERCISE OF
POLICE POWER; PRACTICE OF LAW NOT A VESTED RIGHT
BUT A PRIVILEGE. All legislation directing the integration of
the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid
exercise of the police power over an important profession. The
practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege
moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes
substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in
the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in
one of the most important functions of the State the
administration of justice as an officer of the Court. The practice
of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege
must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the
extent of the interest he has created. The expression "affected with
a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the
police power"
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGISLATION TO EFFECT THE INTEGRATION
OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR. The Congress in enacting Republic
Act No. 6397, approved on September 17, 1971, authorizing the
Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of
the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did
so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The
Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively," the Supreme
Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution
promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the
Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body
corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4,
1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public
welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of
pressing public necessity.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; IMPOSITION OF RESTRAINTS JUSTIFIED.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere
with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations.
Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens
in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State
(U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes,
"Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme
law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of
individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which
life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over
authority because then society will fall into anarchy (Calalang vs.
Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to
restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from
some freedom.
5. ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTION VESTS SUPREME COURT WITH
PLENARY POWER IN ALL CASES REGARDING ADMISSION
TO AND SUPERVISION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW. Even
without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking
solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting
the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission
to the practice of law, "(Sec. 5[5], Art. X, 1973 Costitution) it at
once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests
the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the
admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
6. ID.; ID.; COMPULSORY MEMBERSHIP THEREIN NOT
VIOLATIVE OF A LAWYER'S CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM TO
ASSOCIATE. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any
group of which he is not already a member. He becomes a
member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that
integration actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive
group of which every lawyer is already a member. Bar integration
does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or
vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual
dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may
require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program
the lawyers.
7. ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF MEMBERSHIP FEE; A REGULATORY
MEASURE NOT PROHIBITED BY LAW. There is nothing in the
Constitution that prohibits the Supreme Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the
Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) from
requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to
pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation
of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the
fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise
funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; PENALTY PROVISIONS, NOT VOID. If the
power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize,
then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may
be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or
arbitrary. The practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power
of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer s public
responsibilities.
9. ID.; POWER TO PASS UPON FITNESS TO REMAIN A
MEMBER OF THE BAR VESTED IN THE SUPREME COURT.
The matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have
been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions
and responsibilities. The power of the Supreme Court to regulate
the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon
constitutional or statutory grounds. It has limitations no less real
because they are inherent. The very burden of the duty is itself a
guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted.
10. ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. The provisions of Rule 139-A of the
Rules of Court ordaining the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines and the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines is neither unconstitutional nor illegal, and a lawyer's
stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, notwithstanding due notice, in violation of said
Rule and By-Laws, is a ground for disbarment and striking out of
his name from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, C.J p:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing
attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP
for short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted
Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the
Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A.
Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of
the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to
pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the
latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano
B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration
and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the
By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:
". . . . Should the delinquency further continue until the following
June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes
of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall
deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme
Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the
Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by
registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter
concerned."
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to
comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above; he
submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his
refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the
IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on March
24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the
hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in
amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth
submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's
pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded.
The respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of
Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 in
accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated
and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III of the IBP
By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the
Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from
the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article III of the
IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue
the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which
reads:
"SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the
provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of
annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for
one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the
IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule: LLphil
"SECTION 1. Organization. There is hereby organized an
official national body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the
Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear
or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court."
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following
words of the Court Rule:
"SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated
Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall
determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. . . . ."
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above
provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the
sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining
his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP
and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of
this compelled financial support of the said organization to which
he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of
the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by
the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above
provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and
of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to
strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said
matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but
is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an
administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court
relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably
come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate
the practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or
revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised
in a previous case before the Court, entitled "Administrative
Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of
the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The
Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its
Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the
unanimous pronouncement that it was.
". . . . fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of
all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the
authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in
the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that
the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and
legally unobjectionable' . . ."
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every
lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations
organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which
is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which
every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share
in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear
his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the
direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body
of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are,
therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of
the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable
annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar,
and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional
responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a
recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending
member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by
overriding considerations of public interest and public welfare to
such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies
the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal
interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation
directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and
universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over
an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right
but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest
because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but
also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the
nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the
State the administration of justice as an officer of the
Court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the
holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the
common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the
U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the
expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of
"subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York,
291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No.
6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to
effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions
as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police
power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of
the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and
enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectivity." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court
in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution
promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the
Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body
corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4,
1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public
welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of
pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere
with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations.
Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens
in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State
(U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes,
"Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme
law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of
individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which
life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over
authority because then society will fall into anarchy (Calalang vs.
Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to
restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from
some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality
and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit
unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by
Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the
Philippines, which reads:
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
"(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law
and the integration of the Bar . . .",
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
"SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the
Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration
of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in
order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively."
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the
enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the
language of the provision of the Constitutiongranting the Supreme
Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law, " it at once becomes indubitable that this
constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary
power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of
the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal
profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said
profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject
to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such
regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for
the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of
his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable
interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public
with an interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now
concisely deal with them seriatim. prLL
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is
without power to compel him to become a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court
Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of
freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To
compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not
violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of
which he is not already a member. He became a member of the
Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration
actually does is to provide an official national organization for the
well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every
lawyer is already a member. 8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as
he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further
the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving
the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. 9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a
lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is
justified as an exercise of the police power of the state. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision
of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void.
We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under
its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning
the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the
Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution)
which power the respondent acknowledges from requiring
members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a
reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the
profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is
indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds
for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the
penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of property
without due process and hence infringes on one of his
constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right,
in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to
practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length,
as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the
necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence,
the respondent's right to practice law before the courts of this
country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry.
And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which
penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as
unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a
property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow to
the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance
with the lawyer s public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of
Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their
regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably
recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and
the authorities holding such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the
report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment
proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court,
sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: The power to
regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not
depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power
which is inherent in this court as a court appropriate, indeed
necessary, to the proper administration of justice . . . the argument
that this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself
or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature
of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they are
inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother
member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are
disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a
determination to uphold the ideals and traditions of an honorable
profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud.
The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will
not be misused or prostituted. . ."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973
Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to
"promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice . . . and the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar . . ."
(Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the
respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed
undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court
139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal. cdll
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of
the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he
is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
||| (In re: Edillon, A.C. No. 1928 (Resolution), [August 3, 1978], 174
PHIL 55-68)
4. DIZON v. JUDGE LOPEZ
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1338 September 5, 1997
[Formerly OCA IPI-95-21-RTJ]
ENGINEER FERNANDO S. DIZON, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE LILIA C. LOPEZ, Regional Trial Court, Branch 109,
Pasay City, respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint charging Judge Lilia C. Lopez of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City, with violation of the
Constitution, serious misconduct, inefficiency, and falsification in
connection with her decision in Criminal Case No. 91-0716 entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Engineer Fernando S. Dizon."
It appears that on April 22, 1993, judgment was rendered,
convicting complainant of falsification of private document. The
promulgation of the judgment consisted of reading the dispositive
portion of the decision sentencing him to imprisonment, without
serving a copy of the decision on him. The accused and his
counsel were told to return in a few days for their copy of the
decision, but although petitioner and his father by turns went to the
court to obtain a copy of the decision they were not able to do so.
To protect his right, complainant filed a partial motion for
reconsideration on May 5, 1993, expressly reserving his light to
submit a more elaborate one upon receipt of the decision. The
hearing of the motion for reconsideration was scheduled on May
12, 1993, but the case was not called as complainant's counsel
was told that the decision had not yet been finished. On November
29, 1994, complainant filed an "Omnibus Motion to Annul
Promulgation of Sentence and to Dismiss" the case. On December
16, 1994, the date set for hearing the motion, complainant was
served a copy of the decision, dated April 22, 1993, the dispositive
portion of which states:
In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Fernando
Dizon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification
of Private Document as defined and penalized under Art. 172, par.
2 in relation to Art. 171 par. 2 and 4 thereof and hereby sentences
him to imprisonment of two (2) Years, Four (4) Months and One
(1) Day to Six (6) Years and a fine of P5,000.00.
Complainant alleges that the failure of respondent judge to
furnish him a copy of the decision until almost one year and
eight months after the promulgation of its dispositive portion
on April 22, 1993 constitutes a violation of Art. VIII, 14 of the
Constitution which prohibits courts from rendering decisions
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and
law on which they are based and 15 of the same Art. VIII,
which provides that in all cases lower courts must render
their decisions within three months from the date of their
submission. He alleges further that he was denied the right to a
speedy trial in violation of Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution and
that Judge Lopez falsified her decision by antedating it and
including therein, as additional penalty, a fine of P5,000.00.
On December 26, 1994, complainant filed another motion for
reconsideration after receiving a copy of the full decision of the
court. On January 3, 1995, he moved to disqualify respondent from
hearing the motions for reconsideration which he had filed.
Respondent judge responded by voluntarily inhibiting herself from
further consideration of the case and ordered it forwarded to the
Office of the Clerk of Court for re-raffle. The case was eventually
assigned to Judge Manuel F. Dumatol of Branch 113 of the Pasay
City RTC.
Judge Lopez claims that on April 22, 1993, when the judgment was
promulgated with the reading of the dispositive portion, her
decision was already prepared, although to prevent leakage in the
process of preparing it, she withheld its dispositive portion until the
day of its promulgation. Respondent judge states that after the
dispositive portion had been read to complainant, respondent gave
it to Ma. Cleotilde Paulo (Social Worker II, presently OIC of Branch
109) for typing and incorporation into the text of the decision. The
court found complainant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
falsification of private document under Art. 172, par. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code. Respondent states that the delay in
furnishing complainant with a copy of the decision was
unintentional.
Respondent judge referred to difficulties she had in preparing
her decision and to a series of personal problems which
contributed to this delay in the release of her decision, to wit:
she has only two (2) stenographers to attend to daily trials in her
court, making it necessary for her to make use of the Social Worker
assigned to her to type her decisions. During the period January
to December 1993 she had to dispose of 285 cases, apart from
the fact that there was an unusually big number of criminal, civil,
and land registration cases as well as special proceedings filed in
her court which required the holding of hearings in the mornings
and in the afternoons. During the same period, she went through
some personal tragedies. She lost her niece, Gloria Lopez Roque,
whom she had raised from childhood, due to a hospital accident.
This was followed by the death on March 1, 1992 of her mother,
Margarita Lopez, who had been under respondent's care for the
past eight years after suffering a stroke. On September 17, 1993,
respondent's father died of diabetes, renal failure, pneumonia, and
cardiac arrest. Respondent was the one who single-handedly
brought them in and out of the hospital because all her able-bodied
relatives are abroad. Respondent herself was found to be suffering
from diabetes and hypertension, necessitating her treatment and
leave of absence from September 27, 1994 to December 12, 1994,
in addition to her other leaves of absence. Aside from these,
respondent's family suffered financial reverses because of estafa
committed against them.
On February 19, 1996, Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P.
Abesamis submitted a memorandum, finding the charge of
violation of the Constitution to be without merit. He called attention
to the written decision of respondent judge, which, albeit delivered
to complainant late, nonetheless states the facts and law on which
it is based. He likewise finds the charge of serious misconduct and
falsification to be without basis in view of the absence of malice.
However, he finds the charge of inefficiency to be well founded on
the basis of respondent's failure to furnish complainant or his
counsel a copy of the decision within a reasonable time after its
promulgation. Hence, the Deputy Court Administration believes
that Judge Lopez should be given admonition for her negligence,
but recommends that the other charges against her for violation of
the Constitution, serious misconduct, and falsification be
dismissed for lack of merit.
HELD:
The Court finds that respondent violated Art. VIII, 15(1) of the
Constitution which provides:
All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution
must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date
of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the
Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts and
three months for all other lower courts.
Although respondent judge promulgated her decision within three
months of the submission of the case for decision, the fact is that
only the dispositive portion was read at such promulgation.
She claims that on April 22, 1993 the text of her decision,
containing her findings and discussion of complainant's liability,
had already been prepared although it had to be put in final form
by incorporating the dispositive portion. However, the fact is that
it took a year and eight months more before this was done
and a copy of the complete decision furnished the
complainant on December 16, 1994. Rule 120 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides:
1. Judgment defined. The term judgment as used in this Rule
means the adjudication by the court that the accused is guilty or is
not guilty of the offense charged, and the imposition of the proper
penalty and civil liability provided for by law on the accused.
2. Form and contents of judgment. The judgment must be
written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by
the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly
a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and
the law upon which the judgment is based.
. Promulgation of judgment. The judgment is promulgated by
reading the same in the presence of the accused and any judge of
the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for
a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence
of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or
outside of the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated
by the clerk of court.
It is clear that merely reading the dispositive portion of the decision
to the accused is not sufficient. It is the judgment that must be read
to him, stating the facts and the law on which such judgment is
based. Since this was done only on December 16, 1994 when
a copy of the complete decision was served on complainant,
it is obvious that the respondent failed to render her decision
within three months as required by Art. VIII, 15 of the
Constitution.
If indeed all that had to be done after the dispositive portion had
been read in open court on April 22, 1993 was to incorporate it in
the text of the decision allegedly then already prepared, it is
difficult to see why it took respondent judge one year and eight
more months before she was able to do so. Respondent claims
that she was prevented from putting out her decision by a series
of personal and other problems which leads the Court to believe
that when she promulgated her sentence she had not finished the
preparation of the entire decision. At all events, she could have
applied for extension of time to decide the case and put off the
promulgation of judgment until she had finished it.
What respondent did in this case was to render what is known as
a "sin perjuicio" judgment, which is a judgment without a
statement of the facts in support of its conclusion to be later
supplemented by the final judgment.1 That is why, in answer to
complainant's charge that the dispositive portion of the judgment
read to him did not impose a fine, respondent contends that the
addition of the fine of P5,000.00 was within her power to do even
if no such fine had been included in the oral sentence given on
April 22, 1993. As respondent judge states, because the decision
was not complete it could be modified and cites in support of her
contention the case of Abay, Sr. v. Garcia.2Respondent only
succeeds in showing that the judgment promulgated on April 22,
1993 was a "sin perjuicio" judgment which was incomplete and
needed a statement of the facts and law upon which the judgment
was based. As early as 1923, this Court already expressed its
disapproval of the practice of rendering "sin perjuicio" judgments,
what with all the uncertainties entailed because of the implied
reservation that it is subject to modification when the decision is
finally rendered.3 This Court has expressed approval of the
practice of some judges of withholding the dispositive portion from
their opinions until the very last moment of promulgation of their
judgment in order to prevent leakage,4 but that refers to
the preparation of their decision, not its promulgation. What must
be promulgated must be the complete decision. There would be
no more reason to keep the dispositive portion a secret at the
stage of promulgation of judgment.
However, the Court finds the other charges against respondent to
be without merit.
First, the claim that complainant was deprived of his right to a
speedy trial by reason of respondent's failure to furnish him with a
copy of the decision until after one year and eight months is without
basis. It appears that despite the destruction of records by fire in
the Pasay City Hall on January 18, 1992 the parties were required
to submit simultaneously their memoranda on August 18, 1992.
The delay, if any, was not such "vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delay"5 as to justify finding a denial of the right to a
speedy trial. The fact is that the reading of the sentence on April
22, 1993, albeit not in compliance with the requirement for
promulgation of judgments, nonetheless put an end to trial.
Second, the delay in furnishing complainant a copy of the
complete decision did not prejudice his right to appeal or file a
motion for reconsideration. It is true that an accused must be given
a copy of the decision in order to apprise him of the basis of such
decision so that he can intelligently prepare his appeal or motion
for reconsideration. However, in accordance with the ruling
in Director of Lands v. Sanz,6 complainant's period to appeal or file
a motion for reconsideration did not begin to run until after he
actually received a copy of the judgment on December 16, 1994.
He therefore suffered no prejudice. If at all, complainant suffered
from the anxiety to refute a conviction which he could not do for
lack of a statement of the basis of the conviction.
Nonetheless, certain factors mitigate respondent judge's
culpability. Except for this incident, respondent's record of public
service as legal officer and agent of the National Bureau of
Investigation, as State Prosecutor, and later Senior State
Prosecutor, of the Department of Justice for 17 years and as
Regional Trial Judge for more than 13 years now is unmarred by
malfeasance, misfeasance or wrongdoing. This is the first time she
is required to answer an administrative complaint against her. Her
failure to decide the case of complainant was brought about by
factors not within her control, to wit, lack of stenographers and
unusually big number of cases; and her personal loss as a result
of the death of her niece and both her parents, financial reverses
of the family, and poor health as a result of diabetes and
hypertension.
In Mangulabnan v. Tecson,7 a joint decision in two criminal cases
was rendered by respondent judge on February 24, 1978, six
months and eight days from submission of the case, and a copy
was delivered to complainant on September 28, 1979, over 19
months after rendition of the decision. Two complaints were filed
for violation of the constitutional provision requiring submitted
cases to be decided by lower courts within three months and for
violation of complainant's right to a speedy trial. Respondent judge
blamed the delay in deciding the cases on the fact that his clerks
had misfiled the records. As to the delay in furnishing complainant
with a copy of the decision, the judge attributed this to the mistake
of his clerk who did not think complainant was entitled to receive
the same. The judge was reprimanded. The reason for the delay
in that case was even less excusable than the difficulties
experienced by respondent Judge Lopez, i.e., deaths in
respondent's family, her own poor state of health, financial
reverses suffered by her family, and the volume of work done
within the period in question, which somewhat mitigate her liability.
The Court believes that a similar penalty would be appropriate.
In view of the foregoing, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED
with WARNING that repetition of the same acts complained of will
be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
5. JUDGE CAOIBES v. OMBUDSMAN
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132177. July 19, 2001.]
JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR., petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN and JUDGE FLORENTINO M.
ALUMBRES, respondents.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
On May 20, 1997, petitioner Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr. and
respondent Judge Florentino M. Alumbres were involved in a fight
within the court premises over a piece of furniture. Thereafter, the
respondent judge lodged before the Office of the Ombudsman, a
criminal complaint for physical injuries, malicious mischief for the
destruction of complainant's eyeglasses, and assault upon a
person in authority. He prayed that criminal charges be filed before
the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner judge. The respondent
judge also filed an administrative complaint with the Supreme
Court, praying for the dismissal of petitioner judge from the
judiciary on the ground of grave misconduct or conduct
unbecoming a judicial officer. Instead of filing a counter-affidavit,
petitioner judge filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Referral to the
Honorable Supreme Court," praying that the Office of the
Ombudsman hold its investigation of the case in abeyance, and
refer the same to the Supreme Court. The motion for referral was,
however, denied by the Office of the Ombudsman. Invoking
Section 15 of R.A. 6770, the Office of the Ombudsman refused to
refrain from taking cognizance of the cases in favor of the
Supreme Court on the ground that, allegedly, the accusations
therein against petitioner judge constitute simple criminal charges
falling within the parameters of its constitutional power and duty to
investigate and prosecute any act or omission of any public officer
or employee which appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. The Office of the Ombudsman denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration and directed petitioner judge to submit
a counter-affidavit. Petitioner sought recourse before the Supreme
Court through a petition for certiorari.
Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme
Court, which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision
over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this premise,
the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether
a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves
an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have
all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it,
referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether an
administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should hold true
regardless of whether an administrative case based on the act
subject of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already
pending with the Court. For, aside from the fact that the
Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless he is informed
of it, he should give due respect for and recognition of the
administrative authority of the Court, because in determining
whether an administrative matter is involved, the Court passes
upon not only administrative liabilities but also other administrative
concerns. Accordingly, the Court directed the Ombudsman to
dismiss the complaint filed by the respondent Judge and to refer
the same to the Court for appropriate action. THcEaS
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT;
SUPREME COURT; HAS EXCLUSIVE ADMINISTRATIVE
SUPERVISION OVER ALL COURTS AND ITS PERSONNEL;
ALL CASES AGAINST A JUDGE OR COURT PERSONNEL
MUST BE REFERRED TO THE SUPREME COURT;
OMBUDSMAN HAS NO AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE
WHETHER A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT AGAINST A JUDGE OR
COURT EMPLOYEE INVOLVES AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MATTER. Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is
the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this
premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself
whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee,
involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound
to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before
it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether
an administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should hold
true regardless of whether an administrative case based on the act
subject of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already
pending with the Court. For, aside from the fact that the
Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless he is informed
of it, he should give due respect for and recognition of the
administrative authority of the Court, because in determining
whether an administrative matter is involved, the Court passes
upon not only administrative liabilities but also other administrative
concerns, as is clearly conveyed in the case of Maceda vs.
Vasquez.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION
OVER ALL COURTS AND COURT PERSONNEL CANNOT BE
INTRUDED BY OTHER BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT.
In Maceda vs. Vasquez, this Court resolved in the affirmative the
issue of whether or not the Ombudsman must defer action on a
criminal complaint against a judge, or a court employee where the
same arises from their administrative duties, and refer the same to
this Court for determination whether said judge or court employee
had acted within the scope of their administrative
duties. Maceda is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional
power of administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down
to the lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is only the Supreme Court
that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance
with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against
them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of
the doctrine of separation of powers. AEHCDa
3. ID.; OMBUDSMAN; FINDINGS THEREOF THAT A CASE
DOES OR DOES NOT HAVE ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLICATIONS
ARE NOT BINDING ON THE SUPREME COURT; REASON.
The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its
findings that a case before it does or does not have administrative
implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of the exercise of its
administrative prerogatives and to arrogate unto itself a power not
constitutionally sanctioned. This is a dangerous policy which
impinges, as it does, on judicial independence.
DECISION
BUENA, J p:
Petitioner Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., Presiding Judge of Branch 253 of
the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, seeks the review of the
following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order
dated August 22, 1997 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the
Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated
December 22, 1997 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit
and other controverting evidences. HASDcC
On May 23, 1997, respondent Florentino M. Alumbres, Presiding
Judge of Branch 255 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City,
filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, a Criminal
Complaint 1 for physical injuries, malicious mischief for the
destruction of complainant's eyeglasses, and assault upon a
person in authority. Respondent alleged therein that on May 20,
1997, at the hallway on the third floor of the Hall of Justice, Las
Pias City, he requested petitioner to return the executive table he
borrowed from respondent; that petitioner did not answer so
respondent reiterated his request but before he could finish talking,
petitioner blurted "Tarantado ito ah," and boxed him at his right
eyebrow and left lower jaw so that the right lens of his eyeglasses
was thrown away, rendering his eyeglasses unserviceable; and
that respondent had the incident blottered with the Las Pias
Police Station. He prayed that criminal charges be filed before the
Sandiganbayan against the petitioner.
On June 13, 1997, respondent Judge lodged another
Complaint 2 against petitioner, this time an administrative case
with the Supreme Court, docketed as Adm. Case No. 97-387-RTJ,
praying for the dismissal of petitioner from the judiciary on the
ground of grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming a judicial
officer. Said complaint is based on the same facts as those in the
complaint filed earlier with the Office of the Ombudsman.
In the Order 3 dated June 25, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman
required petitioner to file a counter-affidavit within ten (10) days
from receipt thereof. Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, petitioner
filed on July 7, 1997 an "Ex-Parte Motion for Referral to the
Honorable Supreme Court," 4 praying that the Office of the
Ombudsman hold its investigation of Case No. OMB-0-97-0903 in
abeyance, and refer the same to the Supreme Court which,
through the Office of the Court Administrator, is already
investigating what transpired on May 20, 1997. Petitioner
contended that the Supreme Court, not the Office of the
Ombudsman, has the authority to make a preliminary
determination of the respective culpability of petitioner and
respondent Judge who, both being members of the bench, are
under its exclusive supervision and control.
On August 22, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman issued an
Order 5 denying the motion for referral to the Supreme Court.
Invoking Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No. 6770, the Office of the
Ombudsman held that it is within its jurisdiction to investigate the
criminal charges of respondent Judge against petitioner.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration 6 of the foregoing order,
maintaining that the Office of the Ombudsman should either refer
Case No. OMB-0-97-0903 to the Supreme Court for preliminary
evaluation, or await the latter's resolution of Adm. Case No. 97-
387-RTJ which involves the same parties and subject matter.
Otherwise, petitioner argues, the absurd situation may result
wherein the Office of the Ombudsman files criminal charges
against petitioner who, on the other hand, is declared without fault
by the Supreme Court.
In the Order 7 dated December 22, 1997, the Office of the
Ombudsman denied the motion for reconsideration and required
petitioner to submit a counter-affidavit within an inextendible
period of five (5) days from receipt thereof.
Hence, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari, asking for the
reversal of the assailed Orders dated August 22, 1997 and
December 22, 1997 of the Office of the Ombudsman and the
issuance of a writ of injunction or temporary restraining order,
directing the Office of the Ombudsman to refrain from taking
further action in the implementation of the challenged orders.
The issue in this case is whether or not the Office of the
Ombudsman should defer action on Case No. OMB-0-97-0903
pending resolution of Adm. Case No. 97-387-RTJ.
The issue is not novel. In Maceda vs. Vasquez, 8 this Court
resolved in the affirmative the issue of whether or not the
Ombudsman must defer action on a criminal complaint against a
judge, or a court employee where the same arises from their
administrative duties, and refer the same to this Court for
determination whether said judge or court employee had acted
within the scope of their administrative duties.
Invoking Section 15 of R.A. 6770, the Office of the Ombudsman
refuses to refrain from taking cognizance of Case No. MB-0-97-
0903 in favor of this Court on the ground that, allegedly, the
accusations therein against petitioner constitute simple criminal
charges falling within the parameters of its constitutional power
and duty to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of any
public officer or employee which appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient.
Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 grants, among others, the following
powers and duties to the Office of the Ombudsman:
"(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own, or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee,
office or agency when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
this primary jurisdiction, it may takeover, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such
cases;
"(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer or
employee of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charter, to perform and
expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent and
correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties;
"(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against
a public officer or employee at fault or who neglects to perform an
act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and
ensure compliance therewith, or enforce its disciplinary authority
as provided in Section 21 of this Act . . ."
The foregoing provisions supply the legal basis for the
Ombudsman in maintaining its jurisdiction over the charges of
physical injuries, malicious mischief and assault upon a person in
authority filed by respondent Judge against petitioner. This
conclusion seems to be reinforced by Section 16 of R.A.
6770 which states that the powers of the Office of the Ombudsman
apply to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance
committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of
office.
The Office of the Solicitor General in its Manifestation, in Lieu of
Comment, correctly opined and we quote:
". . . the grant of the aforequoted powers to the Office of the
Ombudsman is not tantamount to giving it exclusive authority
thereon. In fact, Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770, which is relied upon
by the Office of the Ombudsman in its assailed order, provides that
it has primary, not exclusive, jurisdiction over graft and corruption
cases and felonies committed by public officers in relation to their
office. Moreover, it was held in Sanchez vs. Demetriou, 227 SCRA
627 [1993], that the Ombudsman's power under Section 15 (1)
of R.A. 6770is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or
concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged." 9
It appears that the present case involves two members of the
judiciary who were entangled in a fight within court premises over
a piece of office furniture. Under Section 6, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel.
Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine
for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge,
or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The
Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and
court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for
determination as to whether an administrative aspect is involved
therein. This rule should hold true regardless of whether an
administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint
before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For,
aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this
matter unless he is informed of it, he should give due respect for
and recognition of the administrative authority of the Court,
because in determining whether an administrative matter is
involved, the Court passes upon not only administrative liabilities
but also other administrative concerns, as is clearly conveyed in
the case of Maceda vs. Vasquez. 10
The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its
findings that a case before it does or does not have administrative
implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of the exercise of its
administrative prerogatives and to arrogate unto itself a power not
constitutionally sanctioned. This is a dangerous policy which
impinges, as it does, on judicial independence.
Maceda is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power of
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel,
from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the
lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is only the Supreme Court that
can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all
laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they
commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may
intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED, the
Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the complaint filed by
respondent Judge Florentino M. Alumbres and to refer the same
of this Court for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Caoibes, Jr. v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 132177, [July 19, 2001],
413 PHIL 717-725)
6. RE: DEROGATORY NEWS ITEM CHARGING COURT OF
APPEALS JUSTICE DEMETRIO DEMETRIA WITH
INTERFERENCE ON BEHALF OF A SUSPECTED DRUG
QUEEN
EN BANC
[A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA. March 27, 2001.]
IN RE: DEROGATORY NEWS ITEMS CHARGING COURT OF
APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DEMETRIO DEMETRIA WITH
INTERFERENCE ON BEHALF OF A SUSPECTED DRUG
QUEEN:
COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DEMETRIO G.
DEMETRIA, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
Men and women of the courts must conduct themselves with
honor, probity, fairness, prudence and discretion. Magistrates of
justice must always be fair and impartial. They should avoid not
only acts of impropriety, but all appearances of impropriety. Their
influence in society must be consciously and conscientiously
exercised with utmost prudence and discretion. For, theirs is the
assigned role of preserving the independence, impartiality and
integrity of the Judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates a judge to "refrain from
influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute
pending before another court or administrative agency." 1 The
slightest form of interference cannot be countenanced. Once a
judge uses his influence to derail or interfere in the regular course
of a legal or judicial proceeding for the benefit of one or any of the
parties therein, public confidence in the judicial system is
diminished, if not totally eroded.
Such is this administrative charge triggered by newspaper
accounts which appeared on the 21 July 2000 issues of The
Manila Standard, The Manila Times, Malaya, The Philippine Daily
Inquirer and Today. The national dailies collectively reported that
Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria tried to
intercede on behalf of suspected Chinese drug queen Yu Yuk Lai,
alias Sze Yuk Lai, who went in and out of prison to play in a Manila
casino. 2
That same day, 21 July 2000, Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
issued a Memorandum to Justice Demetria directing him to
comment on the derogatory allegations in the news items. 3 On 24
July 2000, Justice Demetria submitted his Compliance.
Subsequently, Chief State Prosecutor (CSP) Jovencito R. Zuo,
who disclosed to the media the name of Justice Demetria, and
State Prosecutor (SP) Pablo C. Formaran III, a member of the
Task Force on Anti-Narcotics Cases of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) prosecuting the case of the suspected Chinese drug queen,
filed their respective Comments on the Compliance of Justice
Demetria. 4
On 8 August 2000, the Court En Banc ordered an investigation
and designated Mme. Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino as
Investigator and Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo as
Prosecutor. An investigation then commenced on 22 August 2000
and continued until 16 November 2000.
The Prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely, CSP Zuo,
SP Formaran III, Agnes P. Tuason, secretary of SP Formaran III,
and Jose H. Afalla, an employee from the Office of Asst. CSP
(ACSP) Leonardo Guiyab, Jr. The defense on the other hand
presented ten (10) witnesses: respondent Justice Demetria, Asst.
Chief State Prosecutor (ACSP) Severino Gaa, Jr., Senior State
Prosecutor (SSP) Romeo Daosos, Go Teng Kok, Yu Yuk Lai,
MTC Judge Orlando Siapno, Peter Young, Atty. Reinerio Paas,
lawyer of Go Teng Kok, Danilo J. Mijares, bodyguard of Go Teng
Kok, and Luisito Artiaga, official of the Philippine Amateur Track
and Field Association (PATAFA).
The facts as borne out by the evidence presented by the
prosecution are quite clear. In an Information dated 9 December
1998, SP Formaran III charged Yu Yuk Lai, together with her
supposed nephew, a certain Kenneth Monceda y Sy alias William
Sy, before the RTC of Manila, Br. 18, 5 with violation of Sec. 15,
Art. III, RA 6425, as amended, for "conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent and without
authority of law . . . (to) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and
deliver to a poseur-buyer three (3) kilograms, more or less, of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), which is a regulated
drug." 6 Accused of non-bailable offense, both Yu Yuk Lai and
Kenneth Monceda were held at the detention cell of the PNP
Narcotics Group in Camp Crame, Quezon City. On 25 June 1999,
accused Yu Yuk Lai filed a Petition for Bail on the ground that the
evidence of her guilt was not strong.
On 10 November 1999, upon receiving information that the
accused, especially Yu Yuk Lai, had been seen regularly playing
in the casinos of Heritage Hotel and the Holiday Inn Pavilion, SP
Formaran III filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Transfer the
Detention of the Accused to the City Jail. 7 On the same day,
Judge Perfecto A. S. Laguio, Jr., granted the motion and
ordered the immediate transfer of the two (2) accused to the
Manila City Jail. 8
On 18 January 2000, Judge Laguio, Jr., concluded that "the
evidence standing alone and unrebutted, is strong and sufficient
to warrant conviction of the two accused for the crime charged"
and denied the petition for bail of accused Yu Yuk Lai for lack of
merit. 9 Consequently, both accused filed a Joint Motion for
Inhibition arguing that the trial court's actuations "do not inspire the
belief that its decision would be just and impartial." 10 On 28
January 2000, Judge Laguio, Jr., believing that the joint motion
was utterly without merit but considering the gravity of the offense
and for the peace of mind of the accused, inhibited himself. 11
The case was re-raffled to Branch 53, presided by Judge Angel V.
Colet. Accused Yu Yuk Lai then filed a Motion to Order the
Confinement of the Accused in a Hospital. Before Judge Colet
could resolve the motion, the case was handled by the Branch's
Pairing Judge Manuel T. Muro. SEHaDI
On 15 May 2000 Judge Muro granted accused Yu Yuk Lai's motion
and allowed her to be confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital for
a period not exceeding seven (7) days, 12contrary to the
recommendation of Dr. Jose Estrada Rosal, Chief of the Health
Services of the Manila City Jail, that Yu Yuk Lai be confined at the
Philippine General Hospital. 13
On 5 June 2000 Judge Muro granted Yu Yuk Lai's Urgent Motion
for Extension of Medical Confinement "for a period of one (1)
month, or until such time that she is fit to be discharged from the
said hospital." 14 On 7 July 2000 Judge Muro also granted Yu Yuk
Lai's Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence with
Motion to Admit Demurrer to Evidence. 15 Soon, rumors circulated
in the Manila City Hall that Judge Muro was partial towards
accused Yu Yuk Lai.
The rumors did not end there. On 6 July 2000 unidentified
employees of the RTC Manila calling themselves "CONCERNED
COURT EMPLOYEES" wrote the Secretary of Justice, copy
furnished the Chief State Prosecutor, the Ombudsman, and Judge
Muro. The letter alleged that Judge Muro ordered the
hospitalization of Yu Yuk Lai "even if she (was) not sick and there
(was) already a rumor circulating around the City Hall, that the
notorious Judge had given the go signal to the counsel of the
accused to file the Motion to Quash, which (would) be granted for
a consideration of millions of pesos and the contact person (was)
allegedly the daughter of the Judge, who is an employee in the
said branch." 16
Accordingly on 14 July 2000, SP Formaran III filed a Motion for
Inhibition praying that Judge Muro inhibit himself "from further
handling this case and/or from resolving the demurrer to evidence
filed by the accused Yu Yuk Lai as well as any other pending
incidents therein." 17
On 16 July 2000, at around 7:30 o'clock in the morning, while she
was supposed to be confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital,
accused Yu Yuk Lai was arrested inside the VIP room of the
Casino Filipino at the Holiday Inn Pavilion, Manila, while playing
baccarat. She was unescorted at the time of her arrest.
On 18 July 2000, at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, the Motion for
Inhibition of Judge Muro was heard and submitted for resolution.
Later, at around 11:30 o'clock, when SP Formaran III arrived in his
office from the hearing, he was informed by his secretary, Agnes
Tuason, that the staff of Court of Appeals Justice Demetrio
Demetria had called earlier and said that the Justice wanted to
speak with him. The caller requested for a return call. As
requested, SP Formaran III immediately returned the call of
Justice Demetria but the Justice had already gone out for lunch.
Later in the afternoon, between 1:30 and 2:00 o'clock, Justice
Demetria, PATAFA President Go Teng Kok and Atty. Reinerio
Paas, lawyer of Go Teng Kok and a close friend of Justice
Demetria, went to the office of SP Formaran III in the DOJ which
SP Formaran III shares with SP Albert Fonacier. Apparently,
Justice Demetria was not familiar with SP Formaran III as he
greeted SP Fonacier "Kamusta ka, Prosecutor Formaran?" 18
Soon the visitors were seated. Go Teng Kok immediately pleaded
with SP Formaran III to withdraw his motion to inhibit Judge Muro
as this would purportedly delay the resolution of the case. Go Teng
Kok also expressed his apprehension that if Judge Muro would
inhibit, a new judge might convict his friend, accused Yu Yuk Lai,
who was then already receiving bad publicity.
Justice Demetria then asked about the status of the case. SP
Formaran III informed the Justice that a motion for inhibition has
been submitted for resolution, one basis of which was the
unsigned letter of the concerned court employees. Justice
Demetria opined that it was a bit dangerous to anchor the inhibition
of a judge on an unsigned, anonymous letter. The Justice then
advised Go Teng Kok who was becoming persistent to "keep his
cool" and asked SP Formaran III if he could do something to help
Go Teng Kok. Apparently, prior to 18 July 2000, Go Teng Kok had
already been asking SP Formaran III to go slow in prosecuting
accused Yu Yuk Lai. 19 SP Formaran III at first politely declined
the request. But later, "just to put an end to (the)
conversation," 20 he told them that he would bring the matter to
CSP Zuo. "Iyon pala," Justice Demetria replied. The Justice then
stood up, bade good bye and left. Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok
followed closely behind. 21
Thereafter, SP Formaran III went to see CSP Zuo and informed
the latter of what had transpired. CSP Zuo replied, "No way!" SP
Formaran III also told ACSP Guiyab, Jr., who gave the same
reply. 22
At around 3:00 o'clock that same afternoon, CSP Zuo received a
call from Justice Demetria who requested him to instruct SP
Formaran III to withdraw the motion for inhibition of Judge Muro so
that the Judge could already issue an order. "Pakisabi mo nga kay
State Prosecutor Formaran na i-withdraw na iyong kanyang
Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa na ng Order si Judge
Muro," Justice Demetria was quoted as saying. 23 Politely, CSP
Zuo said that he would see what he could do. "Tingnan ko po
kung ano ang magagawa ko." 24
On 20 July 2000, The Philippine Daily Inquirer reported that a
"Supreme Court Justice . . . and an outspoken sports person and
leader" 25 had been exerting "undue pressure" on the DOJ to go
slow in prosecuting re-arrested drug queen Yu Yuk Lai. That same
afternoon, the names of Justice Demetria and Mr. Go Teng Kok
were disclosed to the media to clear the name of the Supreme
Court justices who might have been affected by the erroneous
news report. The following day, 21 July 2000, several newspapers
named Justice Demetria and Go Teng Kok as "drug lawyers."
Also on 20 July 2000 the DOJ received a copy of an Order dated
19 July 2000 of Judge Muro inhibiting himself from further hearing
the case of Yu Yuk Lai and Kenneth Monceda. 26
Respondent Justice Demetria, for his part, vehemently denied
having interceded for Yu Yuk Lai. While he admitted that he indeed
visited the DOJ on 18 July 2000, he went there to "visit old friends"
and his meeting Go Teng Kok whom he did not know until that time
was purely accidental. Expectedly, Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok
corroborated the claim of respondent Justice.
Justice Demetria explained that he merely requested SP
Formaran III "to do something to help Go Teng Kok about the
case" without ever specifying the kind of "help" that he requested.
He averred that it was purely on the basis of erroneous impression
and conjecture on the part of SP Formaran III that he impliedly
asked him to withdraw the motion "because that is what Mr. Go
Teng Kok was appealing and requesting." 27 Respondent claimed
that the "help" he was requesting could well be "within legal
bounds or line of duty."
Justice Demetria claimed that if ever he said anything else during
the discussion between Go Teng Kok and SP Formaran III, such
was not a form of intervention. He only admonished Go Teng Kok
"to cool it" when the discussion between the prosecutor and Go
Teng Kok became heated. While he asked about the status of the
case this, he said, demonstrated his lack of knowledge about the
case and bolstered his claim that he could not have possibly
interceded for Yu Yuk Lai.
Respondent Justice likewise argued that the bases of his
identification by CSP Zuo as the Justice exerting undue pressure
on the DOJ were all hearsay. Respondent submitted that CSP
Zuo based his identification from a newspaper account, from the
statement of his secretary that it was he (Justice Demetria) who
was on the other end of the telephone and from SP Formaran III
when the latter consulted the Chief State Prosecutor about the visit
of the Justice and Go Teng Kok impliedly asking him to withdraw
the motion.
In defense of respondent Justice, Atty. Paas stated that it was
actually he, not Justice Demetria, who later called up CSP Zuo to
inquire about the latter's decision regarding the withdrawal of the
motion to inhibit since SP Formaran III had earlier told Go Teng
Kok that the matter would be taken up with his superiors.
In fine, respondent Justice Demetria maintains that it is
inconceivable for him to ask SP Formaran III whom he just met for
the first time to do something for Go Teng Kok whom he claims he
just likewise met for the first time. Neither did he know Yu Yuk Lai,
a claim Yu Yuk Lai herself corroborated. It would be unthinkable
for him to intercede in behalf of someone he did not know. Indeed
respondent Justice asserted that his meeting Go Teng Kok on 18
July 2000 at the DOJ was purely coincidence, if not accidental.
So, did respondent Justice Demetria really intercede in behalf of
suspected drug queen Yu Yuk Lai?
Investigating Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino believes so. In her
Report dated 5 January 2001, she found respondent Justice
Demetria "guilty of violating Rule 2.04, Canon 2, Code of Judicial
Conduct" and recommended that "appropriate disciplinary action
be taken against him by this Honorable Court." 28
Only rightly so. The evidence is clear, if not overwhelming, and
damning. Thus, even the Senate Committee on Justice and
Human Rights, after a hearing, found that "there was a conspiracy
to commit the following offenses on the part of CA Associate
Justice Demetrio Demetria and PATAFA President Go Teng Kok
and Miss Yu Yuk Lai: obstruction of justice punishable
under PD No. 1829 and Article 3(a) of RA 3019, or the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act." 29
While Justice Demetria vehemently denied interfering with the
criminal case, his denial cannot stand against the positive
assertions of CSP Zuo and SP Formaran III, 30 which are
consistent with natural human experience. To accept the
testimony of the defense witnesses that it was Atty. Paas who
telephoned CSP Zuo, and not Justice Demetria, and that the
"help" the respondent Justice was requesting SP Formaran III was
something "within legal bounds or line of duty" other than the
withdrawal of the motion is to strain too far one's imagination.
The testimony of CSP Zuo is plainly unambiguous and
indubitably consistent with the other facts and circumstances
surrounding the case
CSP Zuo:
As far as I could recall Justice Demetria said, "Pakisabi mo nga
kay State Prosecutor Formaran na iwithdraw na iyong kanyang
Motion to Inhibit para naman makagawa ng Order si Judge
Muro." 31
In his discussion with Go Teng Kok and Justice Demetria, SP
Formaran III said that he would consult his superiors regarding the
proposal to withdraw the motion. The timely telephone call to CSP
Zuo was thus a logical follow-up. And no one could have made
the call except respondent Justice since it is not uncommon for
anyone to believe that CSP Zuo would recognize the voice of
respondent Justice who was CSP Zuo's former superior in the
DOJ. Thus, the confident utterance "[p]akisabi mo nga kay State
Prosecutor Formaran na iwithdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to
Inhibit para naman makagawa ng Order si Judge Muro" could not
have come from anyone else but from respondent Justice who had
moral ascendancy over CSP Zuo, he being a Justice of the Court
of Appeals and a former Undersecretary and at one time Acting
Secretary of the DOJ. CSAaDE
Even the requested "help" for Go Teng Kok, whom respondent
Justice claims he did not know and met only that time, could not
have meant any other assistance but the withdrawal of the motion
to inhibit Judge Muro. True, Justice Demetria never categorically
asked SP Formaran III to withdraw his Motion. But when
respondent Justice Demetria asked the state prosecutor at that
particular time "to do something . . . to help Mr. Go Teng Kok," the
latter was pleading for the withdrawal of the motion, and nothing
else. That was the only form of "help" that Go Teng Kok wanted.
The subtle pressure exerted simply pointed to one particular act.
Thus, subsequently respondent Justice called CSP Zuo to ask
for just that the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit Judge Muro.
Justice Demetria also claimed that he, together with Atty. Paas,
went to the DOJ, first, to see Secretary Artemio Tuquero and seek
assistance in the appointment of Atty. Paas to the Court of
Appeals, and second, to "visit old friends," 32 and that the meeting
with Go Teng Kok was purely accidental. But respondent Justice
never mentioned in his earlier Compliance to the Memorandum of
the Chief Justice that his primary purpose in going to the DOJ was
to see Sec. Tuquero, and since Sec. Tuquero was not in, he
instead decided to see some officials/prosecutors whom he had
not visited for a long time.
We find this assertion difficult to accept. For, even his very own
witnesses belied his alibi. ACSP Gaa, Jr. testified and confirmed
that Justice Demetria only said "hi." 33 SSP Daosos, denied
seeing him and claimed that it was only Atty. Paas who peeped
into his room. 34 Suspiciously, it was really in the office of SP
Formaran III, whom respondent Justice Demetria did not know,
where Justice Demetria, Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok decided to
"stay a while." 35
Thus, as found by Mme. Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, the
Investigating Justice, Justice Demetria and company could not
have been there to exchange pleasantries with SPs Formaran III
and Fonacier since they were not acquainted with each other. Prior
to this incident, Justice Demetria did not personally know either SP
Formaran III or SP Fonacier, a fact corroborated by respondent
himself. 36
All of these contradict and belie respondent Justice Demetria's
earlier Compliance to the Memorandum of the Chief Justice that
"[b]ecause Prosecutor Formaran is also a friend, we decided to
drop by his office . . . (and) I stayed a while." 37
As pointed out by the Investigating Justice, respondent Justice
was there "to join forces with Go Teng Kok in arguing for the
withdrawal of Formaran's Motion for Inhibition of Judge Muro,
which was the real purpose of their visit to SP Formaran and to the
DOJ. The uncanny coincidence in the timing of Justice Demetria's
visit to SP Formaran's office, and that of Go Teng Kok, could not
have been 'accidental' but pre-arranged." 38 And, "visiting old
friends" only came as an afterthought. The circumstances simply
show that Justice Demetria and Atty. Paas, together with Go Teng
Kok, did not go to the DOJ to see Sec. Tuquero, but to visit, if not
"pressure," CSP Zuo and SP Formaran III.
Justice Demetria also claimed that it is inconceivable for him to
help Yu Yuk Lai and Go Teng Kok, both of whom he did not
personally know, and more unthinkable that he would be asking
help from SP Formaran III whom he had just met for the first time.
The argument cannot be sustained. It is admitted that respondent
is a very close friend of Atty. Paas, lawyer of Go Teng Kok. And, it
is not necessary that respondent Justice Demetria be acquainted
with Go Teng Kok, Yu Yuk Lai or SP Formaran III for him to
intercede in behalf of the accused. It is enough that he is a close
friend of the lawyer of Go Teng Kok, who has been helping the
accused, and that he wields influence as a former DOJ
Undersecretary and later, Acting Secretary, and now, a Justice of
the Court of Appeals.
In sum, we find the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
convincing and trustworthy, as compared to those of the defense
which do not only defy natural human experience but are also
riddled with major inconsistencies which create well-founded and
overriding doubts.
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office
charged with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed with the
heavy burden of responsibility. His at all times must be
characterized with propriety and must be above suspicion. 39 His
must be free of even a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect
to the performance of his judicial duties, but also his behavior
outside the courtroom and as a private individual.
Unfortunately, respondent Justice Demetrio Demetria failed to live
up to this expectation. Through his indiscretions, Justice Demetria
did not only make a mockery of his high office, but also caused
incalculable damage to the entire Judiciary. The mere mention of
his name in the national newspapers, allegedly lawyering for a
suspected drug queen and interfering with her prosecution,
seriously undermined the integrity of the entire Judiciary.
Although every office in the government service is a public
trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness
and uprightness than a seat in the Judiciary. 40 High ethical
principles and a sense of propriety should be maintained, without
which the faith of the people in the Judiciary so indispensable in
an orderly society cannot be preserved. 41 There is
simply no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet the
exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity. 42
WHEREFORE, we sustain the findings of the Investigating Justice
and hold Justice Demetrio G. Demetria GUILTY of violating Rule
2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is ordered DISMISSED
from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to
his appointment or reappointment to any government office,
agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation or institution.
SO ORDERED.
||| (In re Demetria, A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA, [March 27, 2001], 407
PHIL 671-686)
7. SANTIAGO v. TULFO
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 205039. October 21, 2015.]
SPOUSES ROZELLE RAYMOND MARTIN and CLAUDINE
MARGARET SANTIAGO, petitioners, vs. RAFFY TULFO,
BEN TULFO, and ERWIN TULFO, respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the
Resolutions dated August 6, 2012 2 and January 7, 2013 3 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City 4 (RTC) in SP No. Q-12-
71275, which (a) dismissed the petition for writ of amparo filed by
petitioners-spouses Rozelle Raymond Martin "Raymart"
(Raymart) and Claudine Margaret Santiago (Claudine;
collectively, petitioners) and (b) dissolved the temporary
protection order (TPO) previously issued therein.
FACTS:
At around 11:40 in the morning of May 6, 2012, petitioners arrived
at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Terminal 3 (NAIA 3)
aboard a Cebu Pacific Airline flight from a vacation with their family
and friends. They waited for the arrival of their baggage but were
eventually informed that it was offloaded and transferred to a
different flight. Aggrieved, petitioners lodged a complaint before
the Cebu Pacific complaint desk. As they were complaining, they
noticed a man taking photos of Claudine with his cellular phone.
Raymart approached the man and asked what he was doing.
Suddenly, the man, later identified as Ramon "Mon" Tulfo (Mon),
allegedly punched and kicked Raymart, forcing the latter to fight
back. When Claudine saw the commotion, she approached Mon
and the latter likewise allegedly kicked and pushed her back
against the counter. At that instance, Raymart rushed to defend
his wife, while one Edoardo Benjamin Atilano (Atilano) joined in
the brawl. Immediately thereafter, several airport security
personnel came to stop the altercation and brought them to the
Airport Police Department for investigation. 5
Days after the incident, respondents Raffy, Ben, and
Erwin Tulfo (respondents), brothers of Mon, aired on their TV
program comments and expletives against petitioners, and
threatened that they will retaliate. 6
Terrified by the gravity of the threats hurled, petitioners filed a
petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo against respondents
on May 11, 2012 before the RTC. 7
On May 23, 2012, Erwin Tulfo filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Deny Issuance of Protection Order and/or Dismissal of the
Petition Motu Proprio 8 (May 23, 2012 Motion) which was
opposed by petitioners for being a prohibited pleading. 9
On May 24, 2012, then Presiding Judge Bayani Vargas (Judge
Vargas) issued a Resolution 10 granting a TPO in favor of
petitioners and directed respondents to file their return/answer. 11
In his return/answer, 12 Ben Tulfo claimed that the statements he
uttered did not involve any actual threat and that he merely
expressed his strong sentiments to defend his brother. 13
On June 29, 2012, Judge Vargas submitted the case for resolution
but eventually retired on July 11, 2012. Consequently, Judge
Maria Filomena Singh (Judge Singh) was designated as the Acting
Presiding Judge who assumed office and handled the present
case. 14
RTC:
In a Resolution 15 dated August 6, 2012, the RTC, through Judge
Singh, dismissed the petition and ordered the dissolution of the
TPO. 16 It held that the petition is not a proper subject of a writ
of amparo since the rules were intended to apply solely to cases
of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, noting that the
purpose of the law is to, among others, ascertain the whereabouts
of an aggrieved party, recover evidence related to the death or
disappearance of the person identified in the petition, and
determine the facts surrounding the death or disappearance of a
missing person. Consequently, it held that it did not have the
authority to issue said writ in favor of petitioners. In this relation, it
explained that while it is true that the May 23, 2012 Motion was a
motion to dismiss and as such, a prohibited pleading under the
rules, it still had the discretion to dismiss the case when in its own
determination the case is not covered by the same rule. It
expressed that the prohibition against motions to dismiss was
meant to expedite the proceedings; thus, in line with the same
objective, it has the primary duty to so declare if it cannot grant the
remedy at the outset so as not to waste the time and resources of
the litigants and the courts, both in a moot and academic
exercise. 17
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, 18 which was,
however, denied for lack of merit in a Resolution 19 dated January
7, 2013; hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
The essential issue in this case is whether or not the RTC's
dismissal of petitioners' amparo petition was correct.
Petitioners argue that the issuance of a writ of amparo is not
limited to cases of extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances,
or threats thereof. 20 They submit that they need not undergo the
human rights abuses such as extrajudicial killings or enforced
disappearances, as is common to landmark decisions on military
and police abuses, before their right to life, liberty, and security
may be protected by a writ of amparo. 21 Further, they insist that
the May 23, 2012 Motion was a prohibited pleading and, hence,
should not have been allowed. 22
HELD:
The petition is bereft of merit.
In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense v.
Manalo 23 (Manalo), the Court has already explained that the writ
of amparo, under its present procedural formulation, namely, A.M.
No. 07-9-12-SC, 24 otherwise known as "The Rule on the Writ
of Amparo," was intended to address and, thus, is presently
confined to cases involving extralegal killings and/or enforced
disappearances, or threats thereof:
As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable
problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced
disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is
confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. . . .
. 25 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Indeed, while amparo (which literally means "protection" in
Spanish) has been regarded as a special remedy provided for the
enforcement of constitutional rights, the parameters of protection
are not the same in every jurisdiction.
In Manalo, the origins of amparo were discussed as follows:
The writ of amparo originated in Mexico. "Amparo" literally
means "protection" in Spanish. In 1837, de Tocqueville's
Democracy in America became available in Mexico and stirred
great interest. Its description of the practice of judicial review in the
U.S. appealed to many Mexican jurists. One of them, Manuel
Crescencio Rejn, drafted a constitutional provision for his native
state, Yucatan, which granted judges the power to protect all
persons in the enjoyment of their constitutional and legal rights.
This idea was incorporated into the national constitution in
1847, viz.:
The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in
the exercise and preservation of those rights granted to him by this
Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant hereto, against attacks
by the Legislative and Executive powers of the federal or state
governments, limiting themselves to granting protection in the
specific case in litigation, making no general declaration
concerning the statute or regulation that motivated the violation.
Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican
constitutionalism. If, after hearing, the judge determines that a
constitutional right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the
official, or the official's superiors, to cease the violation and to take
the necessary measures to restore the petitioner to the full
enjoyment of the right in question. Amparo thus combines the
principles of judicial review derived from the U.S. with the
limitations on judicial power characteristic of the civil law tradition
which prevails in Mexico. It enables courts to enforce the
constitution by protecting individual rights in particular cases, but
prevents them from using this power to make law for the entire
nation.
The writ of amparo then spread throughout the Western
Hemisphere, gradually evolving into various forms, in response to
the particular needs of each country. It became, in the words of a
justice of the Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one piece of
Mexico's self-attributed "task of conveying to the world's legal
heritage that institution which, as a shield of human dignity, her
own painful history conceived." What began as a protection
against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of
constitutional rights later evolved for several purposes: (1) amparo
libertad for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent to
the habeas corpus writ; (2) amparo contra leyes for the judicial
review of the constitutionality of statutes; (3) amparo casacion for
the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a judicial
decision; (4) amparo administrativo for the judicial review of
administrative actions; and (5) amparo agrario for the protection of
peasants' rights derived from the agrarian reform process.
In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of amparo has
been constitutionally adopted to protect against human rights
abuses especially committed in countries under military juntas. In
general, these countries adopted an all-encompassing writ to
protect the whole gamut of constitutional rights, including socio-
economic rights. Other countries like Colombia, Chile, Germany
and Spain, however, have chosen to limit the protection of the writ
of amparo only to some constitutional guarantees or fundamental
rights. 26
In our jurisdiction, the contextual genesis, at least, for the
present Amparo Rule has limited the remedy as a response to
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or threats
thereof. "Extrajudicial killings," according to case law, are
generally characterized as "killings committed without due process
of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings," 27 while "enforced disappearances," according to
Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 9851, 28 otherwise known as the
"Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law,
Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity," "means the
arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political
organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation
of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of
those persons, with the intention of removing from the protection
of the law for a prolonged period of time."
In Navia v. Pardico, 29 the Court held that it must be shown and
proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was
carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence
of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of
removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has
the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable
element of government participation. 30 Notably, the same
requirement of government participation should also apply to
extralegal killings, considering that the writ of amparo was,
according to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, who headed the
Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court that drafted A.M.
No. 07-9-12-SC, intended to "hold public authorities, those who
took their oath to defend the constitution and enforce our laws, to
a high standard of official conduct and hold them accountable to
our people. [In this light] [t]he sovereign Filipino people should be
assured that if their right[s] to life and liberty are threatened or
violated, they will find vindication in our courts of
justice." 31 Stated differently, the writ of amparo is an
extraordinary remedy that is meant to balance out the
government's incredible power in order to curtail human rights
abuses on its end.
Consistent therewith, the delimitation of our current writ
of amparo to extralegal killings and/or enforced disappearances,
or threats thereof, is explicit from Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-
SC, which reads:
Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof.
While the foregoing rule, as per Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-
SC's first paragraph, does state that the writ is a remedy to protect
the right to life, liberty, and security of the person desiring to avail
of it, the same section's second paragraph qualifies that the
protection of such rights specifically pertain to extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances or threats thereof, which are more
concrete cases that involve protection to the rights to life, liberty
and security. The two paragraphs should indeed be read together
in order to construe the meaning of the provision. Clearly
applicable is the statutory construction rule that "clauses and
phrases must not be taken as detached and isolated expressions,
but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing
the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious
whole. Every part of the statute [or, in this case, procedural rule]
must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every
part of the statute must be considered together with other parts of
the statute and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment." 32
In this case, it is undisputed that petitioners' amparo petition
before the RTC does not allege any case of extrajudicial killing
and/or enforced disappearance, or any threats thereof, in the
senses above-described. Their petition is merely anchored on a
broad invocation of respondents' purported violation of their right
to life and security, carried out by private individuals without any
showing of direct or indirect government participation. Thus, it is
apparent that their amparo petition falls outside the purview
of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC and, perforce, must fail. Hence, the RTC,
through Judge Singh, properly exercised its discretion to motu
proprio dismiss the same under this principal determination,
regardless of the filing of the May 23, 2012 Motion. The court,
indeed, has the discretion to determine whether or not it has the
authority to grant the relief in the first place. And when it is already
apparent that the petition falls beyond the purview of the rule, it
has the duty to dismiss the petition so as not to prejudice any of
the parties through prolonged but futile litigation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The petition for writ
of amparo filed by petitioners-spouses Rozelle Raymond Martin
and Claudine Margaret Santiago before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, docketed as SP No. Q-12-71275, is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Spouses Santiago v. Tulfo, G.R. No. 205039, [October 21,
2015])
8. BARROSO v. OMELIO
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 194767. October 14, 2015.]
EDGAR T. BARROSO, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE GEORGE E.
OMELIO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 14,
Davao City and TRAVELLERS INSURANCE & SURETY
CORPORATION, ANTONIO V. BATAO, Regional
Manager, respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J p:
This deals with the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court praying that the Order 1 dated July 29, 2009,
and the Order 2 dated September 15, 2010, both of the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 14 (RTC-Br. 14), be reversed
and set aside.
FACTS:
Sometime in 2007, herein petitioner filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City, Branch 16 (RTC-Br. 16) a Complaint for sum
of money, damages and attorney's fees against Dennis Li. The
complaint included a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
attachment, and after Dennis Li filed his Answer, RTC-Br. 16
granted herein petitioner's application for a Writ of Attachment and
approved the corresponding attachment bond. On the other hand,
Dennis Li filed a counter-attachment bond purportedly issued by
herein respondent Travellers Insurance & Surety
Corporation (Travellers).
On January 7, 2008, petitioner filed a Motion for Approval of
Compromise Agreement. Thereafter, RTC-Br. 16 issued a
Judgment on Compromise Agreement dated January 22, 2008.
However, Dennis Li failed to pay the sums of money as provided
for under said Judgment on Compromise Agreement. Herein
petitioner then filed a Motion for Execution and RTC-Br. 16 issued
a Writ of Execution solely against Dennis Li. When said Writ of
Execution against Dennis Li was returned by the Sheriff
unsatisfied, petitioner then filed a Motion for Execution of
Judgment upon the Counterbond. Acting on said Motion, RTC-Br.
16 issued an Order 3 dated April 2, 2009, pertinent portions of
which read as follows:
Since the Writ was returned "UNSATISFIED", plaintiff filed a
Motion for Execution of Judgment upon the Counter-Bond, a copy
of which was sent to the Head Office of Travellers Insurance
Surety Corporation. In accordance with the Rules, a summary
hearing to determine the liability under the counterbond was set.
Notice of said hearing was likewise sent to the Head Office of the
surety corporation at the address appearing on the face of the
counterbond issued. For reasons unknown, the notice was simply
returned.
The case law cited by movant . . . justifies the issuance of an Alias
Writ of Execution against the Defendant Dennis Li but this time
including the Travellers Insurance Surety Corporation based on its
counterbond. . . . . 4
An Alias Writ of Execution dated April 28, 2009 was then issued
against both Dennis Li and respondent Travellers based on the
counterbond it issued in favor of the former, and pursuant to said
writ, Sheriff Anggot served a Demand Letter on Travellers. In a
letter dated July 1, 2009 addressed to Sheriff Anggot, Travellers
asked for a period of seven (7) days within which to validate the
counterbond and, thereafter, for its representative to discuss the
matter with complainant, herein petitioner.
However, on July 10, 2009, instead of appearing before RTC-Br.
16, Travellers filed a separate case for Declaration of Nullity,
Prohibition, Injunction with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction
& Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), and Damages, which was
raffled to RTC-Br. 14. Said petition prayed for the following reliefs:
(a) the issuance of a TRO enjoining Sheriff Anggot and herein
petitioner from implementing and enforcing the Writ of Execution
dated April 28, 2009, and after hearing, the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction; (b) judgment be rendered declaring the
counterbond and its supporting documents to be null and void;
ordering Sheriff Anggot and herein petitioner to desist from further
implementing the Writ of Execution dated April 28, 2009; and (c)
ordering Sheriff Anggot and herein petitioner to pay Travellers
actual and moral damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.
After hearing on the application for a writ of preliminary injunction,
herein respondent judge issued the assailed Order dated July 29,
2009 directing the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
RTC-Br. 14, in its Order dated July 29, 2009, ratiocinated, thus:
Be it noted that under letter (b) of paragraph six (6) of respondents'
[herein petitioner among them] answer with counterclaim they
alleged that: ". . . The evidence the counter-attachment bond is
fake has yet to be proven by the petitioner [Travellers] in the proper
forum. Till then, said judicial officers enjoy the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their judicial duties . . ."
Precisely, herein petitioner [comes] before this Court, which is the
"proper forum" referred to by the respondents in their answer, to
prove that the counter-attachment bond which herein respondents
are about to implement, is fake. And the only remedy for the
petitioner to hold in abeyance the enforcement of the subject writ
of execution lest the decision of this Court on the merit more so if
favorable to the petitioner will become moot and academic or
phyrric victory, is the writ of preliminary injunction.
Anent the respondents' defense that "this Court has no jurisdiction
to interfere with the judgment of RTC, Branch 16 in Davao City" . .
., suffice it to state that this Court is not interfering with the Order
or judgment of RTC-Br. 16 which is a coordinate Court. On the
contrary[,] this Court is merely exercising its complementary
jurisdiction with that of the jurisdiction of RTC 16 a coordinate
court, the latter to hypothetically state, was hoodwinked into
believing as to the regularity and due production of the subject
counter-attachment bond now subject to be executed and
enforced against herein petitioner. While this Court is aware of
this doctrine of non-interference by a Court against the Order
or judgment of another coordinate court, this doctrine,
however, is not without exception. The maxim is: For every
rule, there is an exception; for in every room, there is always
a door. This case is an exception. . . . 5
On July 30, 2009, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued,
commanding Sheriff Anggot to refrain from implementing the Writ
of Execution dated April 28, 2009. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the afore-quoted Order was denied in the Order
dated September 15, 2010.
Hence, the instant petition was filed with this Court, alleging that
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and gross ignorance of the law
by (1) acting on respondent Travellers' petition despite the lack of
jurisdiction of RTC-Br. 14; (2) issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction without requiring Travellers to put up an injunction bond;
and (3) assuming jurisdiction over the action for prohibition and
injunction against the executive sheriff of a co-equal court.
Herein petitioner, while acknowledging that the Court of
Appeals (CA) had concurrent jurisdiction over this petition,
justified his immediate resort to this Court by pointing out that
respondent judge's conduct shows his gross ignorance of the law,
and any other remedy under the ordinary course of law would not
be speedy and adequate.
Private respondents, on the other hand, counter that its petition
before RTC-Br. 14 involved the issue of the validity of a contract,
hence, the court presided by respondent judge had jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the same. Private respondent then reiterated
its arguments regarding the dubious authenticity and genuineness
of the counterbond purportedly issued by Travellers and filed by
Dennis Li before RTC-Br. 16.
HELD:
It must first be emphasized that trifling with the rule on hierarchy
of courts is looked upon with disfavor by the Court. Said rule is an
important component of the orderly administration of justice and
not imposed merely for whimsical and arbitrary reasons. This
doctrine was exhaustively explained in The Diocese of Bacolod,
represented by the Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra and the
Bishop Himself in His Personal Capacity v. Commission on
Elections and the Election Officer of Bacolod City, Atty. Mavil V.
Majarucon6 in this wise:
. . . we explained the necessity of the application of the hierarchy
of courts:
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the
hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be
ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the
policy is designed to shield the Court from having to deal with
causes that are also well within the competence of the lower
courts, and thus leave time for the Court to deal with the more
fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution
has assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only
when absolutely necessary or when serious and important
reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy.
xxx xxx xxx
The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts
was created by this court to ensure that every level of the
judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and
efficient manner. Trial courts do not only determine the facts from
the evaluation of the evidence presented before them. They are
likewise competent to determine issues of law which may include
the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance
in relation to the Constitution. To effectively perform these
functions, they are territorially organized into regions and then into
branches. Their writs generally reach within those territorial
boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important
task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically
presented before them. In many instances, the facts occur within
their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the "actual case"
that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such
action. The consequences, of course, would be national in scope.
There are, however, some cases where resort to courts at their
level would not be practical considering their decisions could still
be appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of
Appeals.
The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court
that reviews the determination of facts and law made by the trial
courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more
standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial court. But the
Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over most special
civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide
scope. It is competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act
on constitutional issues that may not necessarily be novel unless
there are factual questions to determine.
This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new
ground or further reiterating in the light of new circumstances or
in the light of some confusion of bench or bar existing
precedents. Rather than a court of first instance or as a repetition
of the actions of the Court of Appeals, this court promulgates these
doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that role. 7
However, in the same case, it was acknowledged that for
exceptionally compelling reasons, the Court may exercise its
discretion to act on special civil actions for certiorari filed directly
with it. Examples of cases that present compelling reasons are: (1)
those involving genuine issues of constitutionality that must be
addressed at the most immediate time; (2) those where the issues
are of transcendental importance, and the threat to fundamental
constitutional rights are so great as to outweigh the necessity for
prudence; (3) cases of first impression, where no jurisprudence yet
exists that will guide the lower courts on such issues; (4) where
the constitutional issues raised are better decided after a thorough
deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the
majority of those who participated in its discussion; (5) where time
is of the essence; (6) where the act being questioned was that of
a constitutional body; (7) where there is no other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that could free
petitioner from the injurious effects of respondents' acts in violation
of their constitutional rights; and (8) the issues involve public
welfare, the advancement of public policy, the broader interest of
justice, or where the orders complained of are patent nullities, or
where appeal can be considered as clearly an inappropriate
remedy. 8
Verily, the issues in this case could have been competently
resolved by the CA, thus, the Court was initially inclined to reject
taking cognizance of this case. However, we cannot close our
eyes to the unbecoming conduct exhibited by respondent judge in
obstinately issuing an injunction against the orders of a co-equal
court despite this Court's consistent reiteration of the time-honored
principle that "no court has the power to interfere by injunction with
the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate
jurisdiction. The various trial courts of a province or city,
having the same or equal authority, should not, cannot, and
are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases,
much less with their orders or judgments." 9 The issue raised
in this case, therefore, falls under one of the exceptions to the rule
on hierarchy of courts, i.e., where the order complained of is a
patent nullity.
Atty. Cabili v. Judge Balindong 10 is closely analogous to the
present case. In Cabili, the RTC of Iligan City issued a writ of
execution, but the judgment debtor, instead of complying with said
writ, filed a separate petition for prohibition and mandamus with
application for issuance of temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction with the RTC of Marawi
City. After the hearing, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Marawi
City issued the TRO restraining the sheriff from enforcing the writ
of execution issued by the RTC of Iligan City.
In the aforementioned case, the Court struck down such action of
the RTC of Marawi City, ruling thus:
The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular
orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle
in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction
with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent
jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the
injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of
jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and
renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the
exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and
over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice,
the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with
this judgment.
Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution
order has been issued is considered as still pending, so that all
the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the
suit. A court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent
power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its
ministerial officers and to control its own processes. To hold
otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of the appropriate
forum in the resolution of incidents arising in execution
proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly
administration of justice.
xxx xxx xxx
To be sure, the law and the rules are not unaware that an issuing
court may violate the law in issuing a writ of execution and have
recognized that there should be a remedy against this violation.
The remedy, however, is not the resort to another co-equal body
but to a higher court with authority to nullify the action of the issuing
court. This is precisely the judicial power that the 1987
Constitution, under Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2, speaks of
and which this Court has operationalized through a petition
for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
xxx xxx xxx
It is not a viable legal position to claim that a TRO against a writ of
execution is issued against an erring sheriff, not against the
issuing Judge. A TRO enjoining the enforceability of a writ
addresses the writ itself, not merely the executing sheriff. . . . As
already mentioned above, the appropriate action is to assail the
implementation of the writ before the issuing court in whose behalf
the sheriff acts, and, upon failure, to seek redress through a higher
judicial body. . . . . 11
Applying the foregoing ruling, it is quite clear that, in this case, the
issuance of the subject writ of preliminary injunction was improper
and, thus, correctible by certiorari. Herein respondent judge
does not have jurisdiction to hinder the enforcement of an
order of a co-equal court. He must be aware that said co-equal
court had the exclusive jurisdiction or authority to correct its own
issuances if ever there was, indeed, a mistake. There is no
question, therefore, that subject writ of preliminary injunction is null
and void.
Further, had Judge Omelio not been dismissed from the service in
2013 for gross ignorance of the law and violation of judicial
conduct, he could have been subjected to an investigation again
for gross ignorance due to his unprecedented acts in the case at
bar.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the Orders
dated July 29, 2009 and September 15, 2010, both issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 14, are hereby SET
ASIDE and declared NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Barroso v. Omelio, G.R. No. 194767 , [October 14, 2015])
9. HERNANDEZ v. GELLA
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-13-2356. June 9, 2014.]
[Formerly OCA No. IPI-11-3701-RTJ]
ARGEL D. HERNANDEZ, complainant, vs. JUDGE VICTOR C.
GELLA, PRESIDING JUDGE, CLARINCE B. JINTALAN, LEGAL
RESEARCHER, and ROWENA B. JINTALAN, SHERIFF IV, ALL
FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 52,
SORSOGON CITY, respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J p:
We reiterate that an administrative complaint against a judge is not
a substitute for a proper remedy taken in due course to review and
undo his acts or omissions done in the performance of his judicial
duties and functions. For any litigant to insist otherwise is
censurable because the complaint adversely affects the
administration of justice and harms the reputation of a judicial
officer.
FACTS:
In his verified complaint dated July 8, 2011, 1 complainant Argel
D. Hernandez charged Judge Victor C. Gella, as the Presiding
Judge of Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Sorsogon City
(RTC), with gross ignorance of the law; and Sheriff IV Rowena B.
Jintalan, also of Branch 52, and Legal Researcher Clarince B.
Jintalan with abuse of authority in connection with the
implementation of the writ of execution issued in Case No. 2005-
7473, a proceeding for consolidation of ownership entitled Maria
Purisima Borlasa v. Spouses Jesus Hernandez and Margarita de
Vera.
It appears that the property involved in Case No. 2005-7473 was
sold at a public auction in which Maria Purisima Borlasa was
declared the winning bidder; that a final bill of sale was issued to
Borlasa on May 30, 2007; that in 2009, Borlasa's motion for the
issuance of the writ of execution was granted; that in 2010, Sheriff
Jintalan started implementing the writ but was unsuccessful in
doing so because Hernandez consistently found ways to resist her
implementation, including the filing of a petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals.
Ultimately, on May 31, 2011, Sheriff Jintalan successfully
implemented the writ of execution and entered the house of
Hernandez.
According to Hernandez, the implementation of the writ of
execution was tainted with abuse. He claimed that Sheriff Jintalan
and Legal Researcher Jintalan, together with policemen and
goons carrying bolos and mallets, had arrived at his house; that
she ordered the goons to destroy his house despite being made
aware of the pendency of the petition for certiorari in the CA; that
the goons entered his house, and took his family's belongings and
valuables outside the house and loaded them in a truck; that his
family's belongings and valuables were brought to a warehouse of
Vicente Bonaobra, who was the brother and attorney-in-fact of the
plaintiff; that his children, who witnessed the proceedings, were
traumatized; and that he had a verbal argument with Legal
Researcher Jintalan, who had owed him some money. 2
Hernandez added that such acts of Sheriff Jintalan and Legal
Researcher Jintalan of destroying his house and taking his family's
belongings and valuables were in excess of their authority; and
that such excess of authority would not have happened had Judge
Gella not authorized the execution of the writ of execution
notwithstanding the pendency of the petition for certiorari in the
CA. 3
The respondents denied the charges.
Judge Gella narrated the background of Case No. 2005-7473 and
set forth the events leading to the filing of the petition
for certiorari by Hernandez in the CA and the enforcement of the
writ of execution on May 31, 2011. He insisted that the RTC had
afforded due process to Hernandez; that prior to the
implementation of the writ of execution Sheriff Jintalan had already
accommodated Hernandez by granting him concessions; and that
Hernandez was only a disgruntled litigant who refused to accept
and to bow to the lawful orders and processes of the RTC. 4
Legal Researcher Jintalan explained that he had been tasked to
assist in the implementation of the writ by Sheriff Jintalan, who was
his wife; that police assistance became necessary because
Hernandez and his uncle had been resisting the writ of execution,
which was a lawful court order, by threatening Sheriff Jintalan with
administrative and criminal cases, and even physical harm; that
although admitting having instructed the hired men to destroy the
chain of the fence and the door lock of the main door of
Hernandez's house, he had done so only to gain entry into and to
exit from the property; that Hernandez and the other occupants of
the house had earlier padlocked the gate and parked a ten-
wheeler truck behind the fence to block the entry of the sheriff; that
Hernandez had also used his children as a shield by having them
barricade the door to prevent entry of the sheriff's team; that
Hernandez had taunted the implementing officers into firing at his
children; that no jewelry and money were taken because the
members of the sheriff's team did not go inside Hernandez's
bedroom; and that he did not owe any money to Hernandez. 5
On her part, Sheriff Jintalan asserted that she had only performed
her ministerial duty to implement the writ of execution; that cutting
the chain of the fence and breaking the door knob had been
necessary to gain entry into the house; that her team could pull out
only a few pieces of furniture and several sacks of palay because
Hernandez had used his children to barricade the entrance and
had dared them to shoot at him and the children; that at one point
Hernandez had poked a gun at her; that they had loaded the
inventoried items in the truck owned by Vicente Bonaobra to be
brought to the latter's warehouse only for safekeeping; and that
only the assisting policemen had carried guns during the execution
proceedings. 6
In its Report dated March 28, 2012, 7 the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) recommended that:
1. The administrative complaint against Judge Victor C. Gella,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon City
be DISMISSED for being premature and judicial in nature;
2. The administrative complaint against Rowena B. Jintalan,
Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon City be RE-
DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;
3. Respondent Rowena B. Jintalan be found Guilty of Simple
Neglect of Duty and be SUSPENDED from office for one (1) month
and one (1) day without pay; and
4. The administrative complaint against Clarince B. Jintalan, Legal
Researcher, Regional Trial Court Branch 52, Sorsogon City
be DISMISSED for being unsubstantiated. 8
Ruling
We ACCEPT the findings of the OCA because they were
supported by the records, and, accordingly, ADOPT its
aforequoted recommendations.
Re: Judge Gella
Hernandez's complaint against Judge Gella, being rooted in the
denial of Hernandez's motion for reconsideration (vis--vis the
denial of Hernandez's motion to quash the writ of execution),
unquestionably related to Judge Gella's performance of his judicial
office, and is for that reason outrightly dismissible. We reiterate
that an administrative remedy is neither alternative nor cumulative
to any proper judicial review. A litigant like Hernandez who is
aggrieved by an order or judgment of the judge must pursue his
proper available judicial remedies because only a higher court
exercising appellate authority can review and correct any error of
judgment committed in the discharge of the judicial office. As to an
order or judgment tainted by grave abuse of discretion or a
jurisdictional defect, only a higher court invested with supervisory
authority can revise the order or judgment. It is always worth
stressing that an administrative remedy cannot be a proper means
to undo or rectify the order or judgment.
The filing of administrative complaints or just the threats of the
filing of such complaints do subvert and undermine the
independence of the Judiciary and its Judges. Thus, the Court
does not tolerate unwarranted administrative charges brought
against sitting magistrates in respect of their judicial actions.
Moreover, as the Court pointedly observed in Re: Verified
Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board/CEO
of FH-GYMN Multi-Purpose and Transport Service Cooperative,
against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., Hon. Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and
Hon. Florito S. Macalino, Associate Justices, Court of
Appeals, 9 to wit:
It is evident to us that Ongjoco's objective in filing the
administrative complaint was to take respondent Justices to task
for the regular performance of their sworn duty of upholding the
rule of law. He would thereby lay the groundwork for getting
back at them for not favoring his unworthy cause. Such
actuations cannot be tolerated at all, for even a mere threat of
administrative investigation and prosecution made against a
judge to influence or intimidate him in his regular
performance of the judicial office always subverts and
undermines the independence of the Judiciary.
We seize this occasion, therefore, to stress once again that
disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions brought
against any judge in relation to the performance of his official
functions are neither complementary to nor suppletory of
appropriate judicial remedies, nor a substitute for such
remedies. Any party who may feel aggrieved should resort to
these remedies, and exhaust them, instead of resorting to
disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions. 10 (Bold
emphasis supplied)
The nature of adjudication by a judicial magistrate as a function of
sovereignty invests the magistrate with a great degree of immunity
from administrative and other liabilities. This the Court explained
in Re: Verified Complaint for Disbarment of AMA LAND, INC.
(Represented by Joseph B. Usita) against Court of Appeals
Associate Justices Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, Hon. Sesinando E.
Villon and Hon. Ricardo G. Rosario: 11
Indeed, no judicial officer should have to fear or apprehend being
held to account or to answer for performing his judicial functions
and office because such performance is a matter of public duty
and responsibility. The office and duty to render and administer
justice are function of sovereignty, and should not be simply taken
for granted. As a recognized commentator on public offices and
public officers has written:
It is a general principle, abundantly sustained by authority and
reason, that no civil action can be sustained against a judicial
officer for the recovery of damages by one claiming to have been
injured by the officer's judicial action within his jurisdiction. From
the very nature of the case, the officer is called upon by law
to exercise his judgment in the matter, and the law holds his
duty to the individual to be performed when he has exercised
it, however erroneous or disastrous in its consequences it
may appear either to the party or to others.
A number of reasons, any one of them sufficient, have been
advanced in support of this rule. Thus it is said of the judge:
"His doing justice as between particular individuals, when
they have a controversy before him, is not the end and object
which were in view when his court was created, and he was
selected to preside over or sit in it. Courts are created on
public grounds; they are to do justice as between suitors, to
the end that peace and order may prevail in the political
society, and that rights may be protected and preserved. The
duty is public, and the end to be accomplished is public; the
individual advantage or loss results from the proper and
thorough or improper and imperfect performance of a duty for
which his controversy is only the occasion. The judge
performs his duty to the public by doing justice between
individuals, or, if he fails to do justice as between individuals,
he may be called to account by the State in such form and
before such tribunal as the law may have provided. But as the
duty neglected is not a duty to the individual, civil redress, as
for an individual injury, is not admissible." (Bold underscoring
is part of the original text)
Re: Legal Researcher Jintalan
The complaint against Legal Researcher Jintalan was similarly
bereft of factual and legal merit. There is no question that Legal
Researcher Jintalan's participation in the implementation of the
writ of execution was upon the prior authorization of Judge Gella
in order to assist Sheriff Jintalan in her proceedings to implement
the writ of execution. To hold Legal Researcher Jintalan
administratively liable is to unreasonably disregard his having
acted in the execution proceedings upon official authority of the
court itself, and would be a travesty of justice.
Re: Sheriff Jintalan
The OCA's recommendation to hold Sheriff Jintalan
administratively liable for simple neglect of duty is well-taken.
With the implementation of the writ of execution being her purely
ministerial duty, Sheriff Jintalan must perform her duty strictly to
the letter. She thus knew that the levied personal properties of
Hernandez must be kept safely in and under her direct custody,
not in and under the custody of any of the parties. 12 Her bringing
of such personal properties to the warehouse of Vicente Bonaobra
despite being aware that the latter was the plaintiff's brother and
her attorney-in-fact for purposes of the case signified that she let
herself serve as the "special deputy" of the winning
litigant. 13 Therein lay the irregularity. Verily, she did not live up to
the standards prescribed by her office. Her conduct as a court
personnel must be beyond reproach and free from any suspicion
that could taint the Judiciary. She should avoid any impression of
impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official
duties. 14
Sheriff Jintalan was thereby guilty of simple neglect of duty the
failure to give proper attention to a task expected of an employee,
thus signifying a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or
indifference. Simple neglect of duty is punishable by suspension
of one month and one day to six months. 15 Under the established
circumstances, the penalty for Sheriff Jintalan is suspension
without pay for one month and one day.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the administrative
complaints against Judge Victor C. Gella and Legal Researcher
Clarince B. Jintalan of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, in
Sorsogon City; and PRONOUNCES Sheriff Rowena B.
Jintalan GUILTY of SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY and,
accordingly, SUSPENDS her from office for one month and one
day without pay, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same
or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Hernandez v. Gella, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2356, [June 9, 2014])
10. ALANO v. SAHI
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. P-11-3020. June 25, 2014.]
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 10-3525-P)
PRESIDING JUDGE JUAN GABRIEL HIZON ALANO, MARY
ANNABELLE A. KATIPUNAN, SUZEE WONG JAMOTILLO,
ANALIE DEL RIO BALITUNG, EDWINO JAYSON OLIVEROS
AND ROBERTO BABAO DOO, complainants, vs. PADMA
LATIP SAHI, COURT INTERPRETER I, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT
TRIAL COURT (MCTC), MALUSO, BASILAN, respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
The present administrative matter arose from a Verified
Complaint 1 for Gross Inefficiency, Gross Insubordination, and for
being Notoriously Undesirable, filed by complainants Presiding
Judge Juan Gabriel Hizon Alano (Judge Alano), Mary Annabelle
A. Katipunan (Katipunan), Suzee Wong Jamotillo (Jamotillo),
Analie Del Rio Balitung (Balitung), Edwino Jayson Oliveros
(Oliveros), and Roberto Babao Doo (Doo), of the 2nd Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Maluso, Basilan, against respondent
Padma Latip Sahi (Sahi), Court Interpreter I, of the same court.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) summarized the
complainants' charges against respondent Sahi, thus:
Complainant Judge Alano claims that when he assumed office as
presiding judge of the 2nd MCTC, Maluso, Basilan on 18 February
2004, he immediately met with the staff of the said court regarding
ethical and work related standards. He even made sure that each
of the staff members knows his or her job description well, with
emphasis on respondent Sahi, since he learned that the latter is
not performing her job to prepare minutes of proceedings,
calendar and keep records of calendared cases. From then on,
complainant Judge Alano noticed that respondent Sahi has been
grossly inefficient in performing her duties and such issue was
even raised during their Judicial Service Team Meetings.
Complainant Judge Alano alleges that from the day he resumed
office, respondent Sahi never prepared any court calendar or
minutes. He further alleges that respondent Sahi does not know
how to speak the Yakan and Visayan dialects, which is necessary
for her position. Also, complainant Judge Hizon gathered that even
prior to 2004, it was Mary Annabelle A. Katipunan (one of the
complainants) who prepared the minutes of proceedings, calendar
of cases and kept records of the same. Respondent Sahi also
abused her position when she required one of the complainants,
Suzee Wong Jamotillo, Court Stenographer I, to fill up her Income
Tax Return to include names of children that are not her own. She
also required complainant Analie Del Rio Balitung to prepare a
promissory note in favor of a party litigant in an election protest
before another court.
Complainant Judge Alano claims that in all cases he heard since
2004, he was the one who would usually interpret the testimonies
of the witnesses into English, to avoid inconvenience and delay in
the proceedings. He also claims that respondent Sahi's
performance deteriorated to a point bordering to recklessness,
resulting in her consecutive unsatisfactory ratings for the first and
second semesters of 2008.
Furthermore, complainant Judge Alano asserts that when
respondent Sahi was assigned in the Office of the Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court, Basilan Province, her stay was no longer
extended and she was directed by the Court to return to her official
position at the 2nd MCTC, S[u]misip-Maluso-Lantawan, Basilan in
A.M. No. 08-12350-MCTC dated March 2010. Complainant Judge
Alano also asserts that from the time that respondent Sahi
reported back to office, she was not in the office for more than a
month and worse, her Daily Time Records from August 2009 to
May 2010 bore no signature of those authorized to sign the same.
On 28 July 2009, complainant Judge Alano claims that respondent
Sahi again received an unsatisfactory rating due to her poor
performance and unjustified failure to perform her duties. Even
worse, the very next day, after respondent Sahi received her
Notice of Unsatisfactory Rating, complainant Judge Alano again
called her attention due to her inexcusable errors in formatting and
grammar.
On 16 September 2010, respondent Sahi calendared only one
case. In the morning of the same day, a representative from the
Provincial Prosecutors' Office approached complainant Katipunan
regarding the cases that are calendared on that day, since
respondent Sahi failed to post a copy outside the courtroom.
Consequently, at around 1:00 o'clock of the same day, respondent
Sahi failed to call the case for hearing, as she was not around.
However, the court's logbook shows that she was present at that
time. Because of respondent Sahi's inefficiency and stubborn
refusal to perform her duties, complainant Judge Alano decided to
relieve her of her duties and designated complainants Jamotillo
and Balitung as acting court interpreters.
As to the allegations that respondent Sahi's action is notoriously
undesirable, complainants claim that the latter even tried to
implicate them when she was sued for extortion in A.M. No. 08-
29960-P. They also claim that respondent Sahi always acted with
indifference and aloofness towards them and other court staff in
and out of the office. Moreover, complainants assert that
respondent Sahi would always manipulate her officemates to do
her job and falsely implicate those who would do otherwise. They
also assert that respondent Sahi's superiority complex and
condescension, brought about by her being a senior employee
coupled by her ominous hypocrisy, has earned her the reputation
of being notoriously undesirable. 2
In her Comment 3 dated July 11, 2011, respondent Sahi
vehemently denied the charges against her and asserted that the
allegations in the Verified Complaint are maliciously concocted lies
which are just part of complainant Judge Alano's scheme to get
back at her for earlier filing a complaint for grave abuse of authority
against said Judge. Respondent Sahi contended that in just a
short period of time from complainant Judge Alano's assumption
as presiding judge of the 2nd MCTC for Sumisip, Maluso and
Lantawan, Basilan, the latter already ousted three court personnel
from the service, including former Clerk of Court Akil Pawaki, who,
said Judge pressured to retire. She also refuted complainant
Judge Alano's charge that she does not know how to speak the
Yakan and Visayan dialects, calling attention to the fact that she
had been a court interpreter for years and had served several
judges without any complaint of such nature. Respondent Sahi
further averred that she did not expect a good performance rating
from complainant Judge Alano since the said Judge already
disliked her from the very beginning. She insisted that she should
not be held solely liable for the clerical errors pointed out by
complainant Judge Alano because when she approached said
Judge, he ignored her, and even worse, at one time, he placed his
clutch bag on top of his table and pulled out his gun. Lastly,
respondent Sahi alleged that because of the unfair treatment she
received from complainant Judge Alano, she suffered a stroke,
leaving her with no choice but to resign from the service. Hence,
she argued that the administrative complaint against her was
already moot and academic and should be dismissed.
In its Report dated September 20, 2011, the OCA recommended
that:
1. The instant administrative complaint against Padma Latip Sahi,
Court Interpreter I, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Maluso, Basilan
be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter; and
2. Respondent Sahi be held GUILTY for Inefficiency and
Incompetence in the Performance of Official Duties and be meted
the penalty of fine equivalent to her two (2) months salary, to be
paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice. 4
In a Resolution 5 dated November 28, 2011, the Court re-
docketed the instant administrative complaint against respondent
Sahi as a regular administrative matter and required the parties to
manifest if they were willing to submit the case for resolution on
the basis of the records/pleadings filed within 10 days from notice.
Only complainants submitted their Manifestation dated February
16, 2012. 6 Respondent Sahi's failure to file the required
manifestation despite notice was deemed a waiver of her right to
do so. Resultantly, the Court considered the case submitted for
resolution.
HELD:
The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA that respondent
Sahi is administratively liable for inefficiency and incompetence in
the performance of official duties.
The charge that respondent Sahi was remiss in her duties as court
interpreter has been duly proven. Not only do the complainants
corroborate one another, but the documentary evidence supports
the charge.
In A.M. No. 08-12-350-MCTC dated March 10, 2010, respondent
Sahi was directed to report back to her official station at the 2nd
MCTC Sumipsip *-Maluso-Lantawan, Basilan, after her detail at
the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Basilan
Province, had already ended. Yet, respondent Sahi actually
reported back to her official station only on May 18, 2010.
Respondent Sahi did not give an explanation as to where she had
been reporting for work during the interval. Her Daily Time
Records from August 2009 to May 2010 were not signed by
authorized persons. HcDSaT
The calendar of cases actually prepared by respondent Sahi for
July 29, 2010 is just one example of her carelessness and
inattention to details. The calendar contained several errors (i.e.,
wrong name of accused and putting two different criminal cases
under one heading even though said cases have not been
consolidated) which may not only cause the court and the parties
confusion and unjustified delays, but may also make the court
appear inefficient in the eyes of the public. There is no showing
that respondent Sahi eventually corrected the errors despite being
instructed to do so by complainant Judge Alano.
There was also respondent Sahi's failure to prepare a calendar of
cases for September 16, 2010. A representative of the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor approached complainant Katipunan
about the hearing schedule as no calendar of cases was posted
outside the courtroom. At 1:00 p.m., respondent Sahi was not
around to call the lone case scheduled to be heard that day,
although the court's registry book showed that she logged in at
1:00 p.m. Fed up with respondent Sahi, complainant Judge Alano
already assigned her work to other court employees.
The foregoing incidents demonstrate respondent Sahi's
indifference to her work and lack of effort to improve despite
already receiving unsatisfactory performance ratings for the first
and second semesters of 2008.
Respondent Sahi's general denial carries little weight. As the
preceding paragraphs will show, there are specific charges against
her, supported by documentary evidence, which she had the
opportunity to directly address and explain, but she merely glossed
over. Her allegations that complainant Judge Alano was merely
retaliating against her after she filed an administrative case against
him; that the other complainants are mere stooges, subservient to
complainant Judge Alano; that Judge Alano had been pressuring
employees to leave the court; and that complainant Judge Alano
gave her unsatisfactory performance rating because he did not like
her from the very beginning, are all uncorroborated and self-
serving.
In contrast, complainants have adequately shown that respondent
Sahi's unsatisfactory performance ratings were warranted in view
of the error-filled output she had consistently produced and her
indifferent attitude towards her work. While it is true that
respondent Sahi is merely human and may commit mistakes, there
is simply no excuse for making the same mistakes repeatedly
despite her superior constantly calling her attention to correct
them. 7 Granting that respondent Sahi was not good at using
computers in the beginning, she should have taken steps to learn
and hone her computer skills which were essential to her work.
As the Court pronounced in Judge Domingo-Regala v. Sultan: 8
[N]o other office in the government service exacts a greater
demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an
employee than the judiciary. The conduct and behavior of
everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation
of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must
always be beyond reproach and must be circumscribed with the
heavy burden of responsibility. Public officers must be accountable
to the people at all times and serve them with the utmost degree
of responsibility and efficiency. Any act which falls short of the
exacting standards for public office, especially on the part of those
expected to preserve the image of the judiciary, shall not be
countenanced. It is the imperative and sacred duty of each and
everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing as a
true temple of justice. (Citations omitted.)
The Court further reminded court employees in Rodrigo-Ebron v.
Adolfo, 9 that as public officers, they are bound to discharge their
duties with care, caution, and attention which prudent men usually
exercise in the management of their affairs; and that the image of
a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of
the men and women who work in the judiciary, from the judge to
the lowest of its personnel.
Respondent Sahi's actuations fell short of these exacting
standards for court personnel.
During the pendency of the present administrative matter,
respondent Sahi suffered a stroke and resigned from office in
January 2011. Her claim for separation benefits and accrued leave
credits though cannot be processed and released for lack of
requirements. Nonetheless, respondent Sahi's resignation does
not render this case moot. Resignation is not a way out to evade
administrative liability when a court employee is facing
administrative sanction. 10
Section 46 (B) (4) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service (RRACCS) classifies inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official duties as a grave
offense and punishable by suspension ranging from 6 months and
1 day to 1 year, for the first offense, and dismissal for the second
offense. At the same time, Section 48 of the RRACCS allows the
Court to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the
determination of the penalty to be imposed on the erring public
employee.
The Court takes into account the following factors in determining
the proper penalty to be imposed against respondent Sahi: (a)
respondent Sahi can no longer be suspended because of her
resignation; (b) respondent Sahi's poor health condition as of the
moment; and (c) the delay in the processing of respondent Sahi's
separation benefits claim because of her failure to complete the
requirements. Consequently, the Court metes out upon
respondent Sahi the penalty of a fine equivalent to her salary for
two months, which she is to pay the Court within 30 days from
receipt of a copy of this Decision.
WHEREFORE, respondent Padma Latip Sahi is found GUILTY of
inefficiency and incompetence and is FINED an amount equivalent
to her two months salary, to be paid to the Court within 30 days
from receipt of a copy of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Alano v. Sahi, A.M. No. P-11-3020, [June 25, 2014], 737 PHIL
16-25)