DECEMBER 2013 VOL 25 ISSUE 12

IHS Janes
Intelligence Review
The magazine of IHS Janes Military and Security Assessments Intelligence Centre ihs.com/janes

Drawing down
Afghanistans future post-2014

TDemo
Inner city
Hizbullahs urban training facilities

OFC_JIR1312.indd 1 14/11/2013 14:24:10

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 IHS Janes
TM

CONTENTS Volume 25 | Issue 12 | December 2013

Intelligence Review

8 14 54

Terrorism & Insurgency

8 Turning point With President 14 Battle ready With the number of Hizbullahs training facilities
Hamid Karzai to step down and for urban operations increasing, IHS Janes examines the use of
international forces soon to leave, these centres and their effect on the groups tactical capabilities.
Afghanistan is preparing for a
transition. IHS Janes details three 20 Soft target Attacks against schools and civilians in northeast
FOCUS

possible scenarios for the country. Nigeria indicate that Boko Haram is prepared to escalate its
campaign in reaction to the countrys state of emergency.
[PA: 1515066]

Country Risk Watch
4 All talk No deal agreed after Iran nuclear negotiations
7 Holding re Myanmar armed groups support ceasere
China Watch
54 Suspicious smiles Russia and Chinas economic,
political, and security relations appear to be blooming.
Resource Watch
56 Marking territory Borderisation has caused conict
between Moscow and Tbilisi, affecting a section of oil
pipeline that passes briey through a disputed region.
REGULARS
International Security
24 Tomorrows world Discussions are ongoing about what form
UN Security Council reform should take. IHS Janes examines the
various proposals and their potential implications.
28 Strait talking Taiwan is uneasy about Chinas growing military
power, despite increasing political ties between the two.
State Stability
34 Conformity versus criminality IHS Janes examines the risks of
demobilised insurgents joining Colombias criminal organisations.
40 Neighbourhood watch Russia has voiced concern about threats
from Afghanistan spreading into Central Asian countries. IHS

Janes assesses Moscows efforts to bolster security in the region.

Interview
58 Emotional vote Bernd Borchardt, head of the EU Rule
of Law Mission in Kosovo, discusses the recent elections. Serious & Organised Crime
44 Faceless crime Technology is increasingly becoming available
to help internet users maintain anonymity. IHS Janes investigates
illegal activities facilitated by this and the problems in tackling it.
Combined effort
Regional security co-operation in Asia
NEXT MONTH

[PA: 17585376]
Proliferation and Procurement
Delicate path 48 Proliferation game Increased proliferation of cruise and air
The future of Russo-Georgian relations TDemodefence missile systems provides smaller states with advanced
military capabilities, which is in turn affecting strategic thinking.

ihs.com/janes December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 3

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 COUNTRY RISK WATCH For further in-depth coverage go to ihs.com/janes

Iran nuclear talks likely to lead to

December 2013, Volume 25, Number 12 only temporary repeal of sanctions
Editorial
Editor: Matthew Clements MEDA AL ROWAS AND FIRAS ABI ALI by preventing inspectors from accessing
Deputy Editor: Robert Munks
First led online: 11 November sites such as Parchin. Rowhani also needs to
Section Editors ensure that Iran is allowed to enrich uranium,
Terrorism & Insurgency: Matthew Henman
Proliferation & Procurement: Karl Dewey and Emily Chorley
NEGOTIATIONS ON IRANS nuclear programme although the exact extent of enrichment
ended without a deal being concluded on 10 levels is likely to be negotiable, as would be
Regional Editors November. Protracted negotiations between temporary suspensions.
Africa: Natznet Tesfay Americas: Laurence Allan
Asia: Omar Hamid, Pacic: Neil Ashdown Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, The US policy appears to be to give Iran as-
Europe-CIS: Matthew Clements United Kingdom, and United States, plus Ger- surances about the absence of US intent to at-
Middle East: David Hartwell
many) over the exact extent of inspections, tack, in exchange for Iran making its nuclear
Deputy Chief Sub-Editor: Sarah Brown
and sanctions relief and repeal, are likely programme more open to inspections. The US
Senior Sub-Editor: Erena Laird
Sub-Editors: Nisa Ali, Alice Burton, Peter Cogram, Damian before a nal deal is agreed. This is despite the probably accepts that the Iranians will gain
OLoughlin, Harriet Sinclair International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the knowledge required to build a nuclear
Design signing an agreement on broader inspections weapon. As such, Washington will want to
Head of Design: Roberto Filistad
Chief Designer: David Playford
with Iran on 11 November. ensure that a reliable inspections regime is in
Production
The US believes that the sanctions pro- place, allowing the US to detect any Iranian
Director EMEA, Production Services: David Ward gramme is pushing Iran to the negotiating
Production Controller: Martyn Buchanan table. It is therefore unlikely to compromise
General
Security Publisher: Zbyszko Tabernacki
the robustness of its sanctions regime before The US is unlikely
Iran makes major concessions, including
Director, EMEA Editing and Design: Sara Morgan
Group Publishing Director: Sean Howe ratication of additional protocols to the to compromise its
sanctions regime
Senior Vice President IHS &
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
Managing Director IHS Janes: Michael Dell
which would allow no-notice inspections of
before Iran makes
Subscriptions
Email: janes@subscription.co.uk suspected nuclear sites. The issue of sudden
Tel: (UK/RoW) +44 (0)1858 438 756 inspections is likely to be a sticking point for
(USA toll-free) +1-800 824 0768
Advertising: The Editor and Publisher reserve the right to refuse
Iran, which would demand that military sites major concessions
advertising for whatever reason. IHS Janes gives no warranties, allegedly not related to the nuclear pro-
conditions, guarantees or representations, express or implied, as to the
content of any advertisements, including but not limited to compliance gramme be exempt.
with description and quality or tness for purpose of the product or
service. IHS Janes will not be liable for any damages, including without For Iran, suspending enrichment would be attempt to use that knowledge to build a
limitation, direct, indirect or consequential damages arising from any
use of products or services or any actions or omissions taken in direct the least problematic measure as it could be deliverable nuclear weapon.
reliance on information contained in advertisements.
easily classied as a foreign policy victory to Despite positive political rhetoric, IHS
Editorial Policy: Contributors opinions do not necessarily reect
those of the publisher or editor and while every precaution has been its domestic audience. The justication for Janes assesses that a speedy reconciliation is
taken to ensure that the information contained in this journal is accurate
and timely, no liability is accepted by them for errors or omissions, this would probably be on the basis of retain- unlikely, and there is little chance of outright
however caused. Articles and information contained in this publication
are the Copyright 2013 IHS (unless otherwise stated) and cannot be
ing sufficient stockpiles for civil purposes and sanctions reversal over the coming year.
reproduced in any form without the written permission of the publisher.
The publisher cannot accept responsibility for loss or damage to
centrifuges, as opposed to any compromise Mistrust on both sides is likely to ensure that
uncommissioned photographs, manuscripts or magnetic media. The affecting sovereignty and its right to enrich early concessions are easily reversible. Israel,
editor welcomes correspondence, contributions, photographs and
illustrations, as well as letters. uranium and develop a nuclear programme. as the country whose national security is
Voluntary Submissions: IHS Janes will assume that, by making
submissions, contributors conrm that all material kindly submitted
This is also an easily reversible measure for most immediately affected by Irans nuclear
may be edited or amended at Janes discretion and is provided free Iran (a primary concern for Israel), and there programme, and a close ally of the US, will
of copyright and/or that there is no restriction on its use in Janes
Intelligence Review or any other Janes publication, either in hard copy is little chance that Tehran would agree to dis- lobby hard to prevent the West from granting
or electronic or other formats. Credits or acknowledgements may not be
given in certain circumstances. mantling any part of its nuclear programme, Iran substantive sanctions relief without rst
Editorial Ofce: JIR, Sentinel House, 163 Brighton Road, as sought by Israel. obtaining veriable controls to limit Irans
Coulsdon, Surrey CR5 2YH. Tel. (+44) 020 8700 3700 Fax. (+44) 020
7287 7765 e-mail: jir@janes.com Although US president Barack Obama and capacity to progress towards nuclear weapon
Periodicals postage paid at Jamaica NY 11431. US Postmaster: Send Iranian president Hassan Rowhani, with development.
address changes to Janes Intelligence Review, Air Business Ltd., c/o
Worldnet Shipping Inc., 156-15, 146th Avenue, 2nd Floor, Jamaica, explicit backing from Supreme Leader Ayatol- A best-case scenario for Iran would be small
NY 11434, USA.

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lah Ali Khamenei, are serious about reaching
a deal on Irans nuclear programme, both will
be constrained by more intransigent domestic
actors. Rowhanis team must demonstrate
to the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps
TDemo
(IRGC) that he is protecting Irans right to a
civil nuclear programme and the sovereignty
of its military sites, which Tehran claims
are unrelated to the nuclear programme,
breakthroughs accompanied by the easing of
the sanctions regime in a manner that would
temporarily alleviate Irans foreign currency
shortages and improve its access to global
markets. However, the actual removal of
sanctions will probably be retained by the US
and the European Union as a nal card that is
only played after the IAEA is given full access
to suspicious sites as it sees t.

4 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013 ihs.com/janes

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 For further in-depth coverage go to ihs.com/janes COUNTRY RISK WATCH

Suicide attack by Russian Islamist militant on

bus highlights threat beyond North Caucasus
MATTHEW CLEMENTS
First led online: 22 October (updated)

A BUS IN the southern Russian city of

Volgograd was struck by a suspected suicide
bomber on 21 October, killing six people and
injuring 28. According to local law enforce-
ment officials, the bomber was a female
named Naida Asiyalova, reportedly the wife
of Dmitry Sokolov, an Islamist convert serv-
ing with militants in the North Caucasus
republic of Dagestan.
According to video footage of the explosion
shown on Russian news channels, the attack
occurred at around 1405 local time. Media
reports published after the event, which cited
Russian law enforcement officials, suggested
the bomber had initially visited two shopping
centres in Volgograd, but instead targeted the
densely packed bus in an effort to cause the
maximum number of casualties.
The attack illustrates the ability of mili-
tants from the North Caucasus to undertake A bus damaged by a suspected suicide attack
that killed six people in Volgograd, Russia, on
relatively basic, individual suicide attacks
21 October. PA: 1518082
beyond their usual area of operations, which
is centred on the republics of Chechnya, Dag-
estan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria. Olympic Games in February 2014, to be held place around the Olympics make a successful
This capability was further illustrated on 25 in Sochi, Krasnodar region, which abuts the attack against one of the main venues unlike-
October when the security forces uncovered North Caucasus. Dokka Umarov, the leader of ly. There is a heightened risk of attack against
a workshop constructing explosive suicide the militant Caucasus Emirate, called in July softer targets such as transport infrastructure
vests in the Dagestani town of Khasavyurt. for attacks on the Games. in Sochi and the surrounding area, most likely
This has particular relevance for the Winter The stringent security measures put in an individual suicide or car bomb attack.

Peace talks unlikely after TTP installs hardline leader

ASAD ALI
First led online: 11 November
THE MILITANT TEHRIK-E-TALIBAN Pakistan
(TTP) announced Maulana Qazi Fazlullah
as its new leader on 7 November. The ap-
pointment was triggered by the death of
former TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud in an
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strike on 1
November in North Waziristan. Fazlullah is
the rst person from outside the Mehsud clan
to head the TTP and is known as a religious
hardliner among its leadership.
Fazlullahs candidacy was supported by
Mullah Omar, head of the Afghan Taliban,
to avert a rift in the TTP leadership between
the Mehsuds, according to a report in Paki-
stani newspaper The News on 8 November.
Fazlullah headed a two-year insurgency in
Swat, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, in
2007-09, before a military operation ousted
his militants.
Since then, Fazlullah has remained active
in orchestrating militant attacks in Pakistan.
He claimed responsibility for the attack that
killed an army general in September 2013,
after which he subsequently threatened to
launch a similar attack targeting Chief of
TDemo
Army Staff General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani.
Mehsuds death reduced the likelihood of
peace talks with the Pakistani government,
which the ruling Pakistan Muslim League-
Nawaz (PML-N) has been pushing for since
coming to power in May.
Fazlullahs appointment further dimin-
ishes the chances of any talks given his own
opposition to negotiating with the govern-
ment. More importantly, the army is now
probably no longer willing to support the
civilian government in its efforts to get the
militants to the negotiating table, largely due
to Fazlullahs role in the Swat insurgency.
The risk of TTP revenge attacks will be
severe over the next few months. The TTP is
likely to focus on Western targets, and gov-
ernment and military assets, in improvised
explosive device (IED) attacks, particularly in
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Karachi.

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 COUNTRY RISK WATCH
Widespread looting
likely as Venezuela
imposes price cuts
DIEGO MOYA-OCAMPOS
First led online: 12 November
VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT NICOLS
Maduros decision to force electronic ap-
pliance retailers to sell goods at reduced
prices generated long queues outside shop
premises, while outbreaks of looting have
been reported in at least eight cities.
Maduro announced a package of eco-
nomic measures related to imports, price,
and foreign exchange controls in early No-
vember, which are likely to lead to further
government intervention in the economy.
Maduro is opting to blame the private
sector for conducting an economic war
against his government rather than adopt-
ing corrective policy measures to deal with
growing ination, the economic decit,
and the intensifying shortages of food and
basic goods.
It is unlikely that the government
will take steps to improve the countrys
gloomy economic situation given that it
does not appear to be tackling the under-
lying causes of the problem. The busi-
ness environment is likely to deteriorate
further, with more price controls and
economic intervention measures adding
to the already high tax and regulatory
burdens for companies.
The increased risk of looting linked to
the governments anti-business rhetoric
constitutes unprecedented hostility to-
wards the private sector in Venezuela. The
governments ambiguous response to the
looting it condemned it but justied the
peoples response by blaming the private
sector is likely to encourage similar
events in the one-year outlook. This could
backre on Maduro should anxieties and
discontent continue to run high.
Should further incidents of looting
eventually take place, these could well
spread to other urban centres across the
country. IHS Janes assesses that wide-
spread civil unrest and looting similar to
the 27 February 1989 nationwide Cara-
cazo riots would signal that Maduro has
lost popular support, and would have the
potential to destabilise his government
and lead to direct or indirect military
intervention.
6 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013
004-007_JIR1312_News.indd 6
For further in-depth coverage go to ihs.com/janes
Dissident Irish republicans step
up attacks against state ofcials
EOIN RYAN
First led online: 30 October (updated)
SECURITY SERVICES IN Northern Ireland
intercepted a viable parcel bomb addressed
to Theresa Villiers, UK secretary of state for
Northern Ireland, at Stormont Castle on
29 October. The device was discovered at
ministerial buildings, having passed through
security checks at postal sorting offices.
This was the fourth such improvised
explosive device (IED) discovered since
25 October, when two viable letter bombs
intended for the Chief Constable of the Police
Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), Matt
Baggott, and the PSNI Commander in Lon-
donderry, John Burrows, were found at Mal-
lusk and Lisburn sorting offices respectively.
A similar IED targeted the Public Prosecution
Service on the Limavady Road in Londonderry
on 28 October.
Dissident republican organisations are
most likely to have been responsible for the
parcel bombs, although there have been no
claims of responsibility. As these groups are
concerned about penetration by UK intelli-
gence, claims of responsibility have not always
been issued for operational reasons (for
example not providing the security service
with intelligence about key actors). If major
arrests were to follow these latest incidents, it
TDemo
would probably reduce the republican groups
operational capability. However, the letter
bomb campaign marks an expansion of tactics
and the dissident republicans target list. It
also represents a relatively low-risk and high-
prole activity for dissident groups, whereas
direct attacks on security forces have a greater
chance of being disrupted under tight secu-
rity surveillance. That said, two pipe bombs
thrown at police vehicles in Newtownabbey
(Belfast) and Charlotte Street (Londonderry)
in October indicate that attacks on the PSNI
and UK military personnel remain the dissi-
dent groups main focus. This was emphasised
after dissident republicans were blamed for
an attempted attack on 9 November in which
an IED was planted under the car of a former
PSNI officer in east Belfast. A routine security
check discovered the device, which bomb
disposal experts said was similar to one that
killed PSNI officer Ronan Kerr in April 2011.
There has been a spike in attacks by the
New IRA and the Belfast Brigades of glaigh
na hireann (ONH) in recent months and it is
likely that this trend will continue. There is a
strong possibility that additional devices will
be sent through the mail system. Further-
more, dissident groups are intent on increas-
ing disruptive attacks ahead of the 2016
centenary anniversary of the declaration of
Irish independence.
Police at the scene near Cullyhanna village,
Northern Ireland, where a dissident republican-
style rocket launcher was found in August.
PA: 1515083
ihs.com/janes
14/11/2013 14:44:22
 For further in-depth coverage go to ihs.com/janes COUNTRY RISK WATCH

Myanmar ethnic groups agreement to support

ceasere reduces likelihood of militant attacks
ANTON ALIFANDI
First led online: 5 November

ALL BUT ONE of Myanmars 18 armed ethnic

groups signed a draft agreement to sup-
port a nationwide ceasere agreement on 2
November.
Following a four-day conference in Laiza,
Kachin State, some of the most important
ethnic groups in Myanmar including the
Karen National Union (KNU) and the New
Mon State Party (NMSP) agreed on a
nationwide ceasere ahead of negotiations
with the government. The only group that
did not sign, the Restoration Council of Shan
State, said that it agreed in principle to the
ceasere but wanted more time to consult
with groups in Shan State before committing
to it. The conference in Laiza was followed by
a two-day conference between ethnic groups
representatives and the government in the
Kachin capital Myitkyina.
IHS Janes assesses that the near-unanimity Residents wave ags as they welcome the
among the ethnic groups to support a cease- arrival of representatives of ethnic rebels in
Myitkyina, Myanmar, on 3 November. PA: 1518139
re will increase the likelihood of an agree-
ment with the government by the end of
the year. Until a year ago, it seemed unlikely areas. Although armed ethnic groups rarely engaged in heavy clashes with government
that the government would be able to forge a target foreign companies, they control much troops involving mortar and artillery re. A
ceasere with all the ethnic groups. of the illegal trade in the border areas and can lasting peace deal before the 2015 general
A nationwide ceasere would go some way disrupt infrastructure projects. election is uncertain, with both sides still far
to resolve ethnic conicts in Myanmar and The larger armed groups such as the Kachin apart on issues such as the establishment of a
improve the security situation in the border Independence Army (KIA) have in the past federal state and a federal army within it.

Senegalese peace talks unlikely to stop insurgents

MARTIN ROBERTS
First led online: 12 November
THE SENEGALESE GOVERNMENT and insur-
gents from the southern province of Casa-
mance have agreed on an agenda for peace
talks to end a three-decade-old conict.
The deal was conrmed on 10 November by
the Community of SantEgidio, a Rome-based
charity that specialises in peace mediation,
and the group said a timeframe for negotia-
tions had also been agreed. SantEgidio re-
leased no details, but other sources quoted by
Radio France International said the subjects
for discussion would be a ceasere, disarma-
ment, reintegration of former combatants,
and the development of Casamance.
However, the question of independence
the stated aim of the Casamance Movement
of Democratic Forces (Mouvement des Forces
Dmocratiques de Casamance: MFDC) or
even of greater autonomy, does not appear to
be on the agenda.
The rst negotiations brokered by
SantEgidio took place in October 2012, and
were followed in December by the release
of eight hostages held by the wing of the
MFDC run by Salif Sadio. It is not clear why
TDemo
it has taken so long to resume talks, but once
again the negotiations have failed to include
two other active wings of the MFDC run by
Csar Atoute Badiat and Lama Sambou. They
have not explained their non-participation,
but both sections of the highly factionalised
MFDC have concentrated for some years on
smuggling, banditry, and illegal trade, to the
exclusion of the groups original political
aims of independence or greater autonomy.
Badiats men even took 12 demining experts
hostage in May 2013, releasing nine men
after 70 days; the three women were freed
after three weeks.
The failure to include all groups or address
the key issue suggests that persistent raids,
highway robbery, and attacks on security
targets will continue in Casamance, which
will further prevent the start of gold mining
exploration.

ihs.com/janes December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 7

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 FOCUS
Turning
Afghanistan prepares for presidential transition
With President Hamid Karzai due to step down and international forces soon to leave,
Afghanistan is preparing for a transition. Alex Strick van Linschoten details three
scenarios exploring how tribal politics and the Taliban will affect the countrys future.
X KEY POINTS
Amid the drawdown of international
military forces, the presidential
election in April 2014 is likely to
produce a weak president initially
beholden to the outgoing incumbent,
Hamid Karzai.
Ethnic and sectarian tensions are not
currently serious risks, and security
is unlikely to be an existential threat
to the Afghan state in the short-to-
medium term.
The ability of the Taliban and armed
opposition to carry out visually striking
but ultimately low-impact attacks
on Afghan cities and government
personnel will not necessarily signify a
failure of the transition process.
A
fghanistan is preparing to face the fu-
ture without a substantial in-country
presence of foreign military forces.
The political and security transition has been
several years in the making, but the election
on 5 April 2014 will mark a denitive new de-
parture when President Hamid Karzai who
has been in power since December 2001 will,
in theory at least, make way for a new leader.
At least 330 United States military bases
have been closed down, and by the end of
2014 most international combat forces under
the aegis of NATOs International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) will have left the
country. The exact speed of the military
drawdown has not been nalised as there is
8 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013
008-013_JIR1312_F8_Afghanscenarios.indd 8
point
currently no legal framework to cover foreign
troops remaining after 2014. A meeting of
tribal elders and political leaders was called by
Karzai for 19 November, when the nal tenor
of the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) was
due to be agreed. The agreement will set out
the legal framework under which US troops
could remain in Afghanistan after 2015, but is
also likely to include provisions for new mili-
tary hardware donations to the Afghan army,
as well as security guarantees against foreign
interference. US representatives have stated
that the Afghan government must make a
decision soon, and have issued repeated warn-
ings about the possibility that all US troops
will be withdrawn from Afghanistan.
Political engagement between the US and
the Afghan Taliban is currently at a stand-
still; Washington has chosen to pursue BSA
negotiations as its top priority, and the Taliban
is dealing with internal fragmentation and
unclear mandates from its senior leadership.
Taliban delegates in Doha are nding it hard to
move forward under these conditions.
Furthermore, a spate of meetings aiming
to encourage closer co-operation (not least on
political reconciliation) between Pakistani and
Afghan government delegations in mid-2013
led to little practical progress. Even widely
publicised planned releases of Taliban prison-
ers by the Pakistani government, which could
have spurred peace talks, have not happened.
TDemo
Risk in December 2013
In order to provide a scenario-based analysis
of how the transition in Afghanistan over the
next year might develop, it is rst necessary
to assess the countrys stability. This can
be established by examining ve stability
factors: political, social, economic, military/
security, and external.
Political stability
The presidential election is an important
political transition at the heart of the entire
process, but a great deal of uncertainty re-
mains for both Afghans and the international
community.
At a minimum, it seems Karzai will leave
office following the April 2014 election,
having said that he will stand down. He is
constitutionally debarred from running for a
third term. However, the president has acted
unpredictably in the past and has failed to
designate a clear successor. Consequently,
intense political jockeying has arisen.
Serious contenders to replace Karzai include
the main opposition candidate from the 2009
election, Abdullah Abdullah; the prominent
former mujahideen-era commander and
religious cleric Ustad Sayyaf; and the former
minister of foreign affairs Zalmai Rassoul, who
is believed to be Karzais personal preference.
Uncertainty also remains about Karzais role
after the election, following suggestions by his
press officer that he will live just outside the
presidential palace (the Arg) or in a palace of
his own.
Even if the election manages to produce a
consensus candidate that everyone can agree
on, the new president will be weak and with-
out much power of his own. Karzais tenure
ihs.com/janes
14/11/2013 11:43:36

demonstrated that this was not necessarily a
major hindrance, but the environment since
the 2001 invasion was unique in Afghan his-
tory. Ultimately, whoever next leads the coun-
try will probably remain beholden to Karzai,
at least initially, confusing political procedure
and the lines of power.
Moreover, the negotiation process with
the Taliban has stalled. Taliban delegates are
refusing to meet the Afghan government, and
initial talks hosted by the Qatari government
in Doha collapsed in June following contro-
versy over the ying of the Taliban ag when
their office was officially opened. This, and the
resultant public discussion about the nature
of the future Afghan state, seem to have reo-
pened debate about the constitution, an idea
even committed technocrats such as Ashraf
Ghani, a presidential candidate and architect
of the Afghan government post-2001, are
willing to publicly entertain.
Elsewhere, the provincial councils created
as part of the post-2001 governance system are
less important to the functioning of the entire
state, but provincial council elections due to
be held at the same time as the presidential
poll on 5 April will be strongly contested.
Members of these councils are able to wield
a considerable amount of power through
patronage and by administering aid and recon-
struction funding. From conversations on the
ground, IHS Janes assesses that there is less
public appetite for amending local systems of
governance, even among the armed opposi-
tion. This suggests that the foundation of the
Afghan state may be less vulnerable than is
often depicted in mainstream international
media. The new government will have to
satisfy greater expectations among the public
ihs.com/janes
008-013_JIR1312_F8_Afghanscenarios.indd 9
than in previous decades, due to high rates of
urbanisation which is growing by an estimat-
ed 6% per year according to the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), the high-
est rate in South Asia. The country also has a
large youth population; in 2007, more than
50% of the population were under 18 years
old, according to UNICEF. The governments
task will not be made easier by the substan-
tial but largely unquantiable drawdown in
money and international support, presenting a
potentially longer-term problem.
It is highly likely that corruption histori-
cally a major problem afflicting Afghanistan
will endure into 2015 as the last of the
major international nancial streams starts
to wane. Moreover, as sources of nance dry
up, accountability mechanisms are also being
minimised; senior US and UK diplomats told
IHS Janes that there is less appetite in govern-
ment for the public shaming of officials than
in the past, and the reform of the judiciary
and efficacy of ombudsmen are likely to slow
to a halt because international leverage will
evaporate after 2015.
The US Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), John F
Sopko, stated in early October that only 21% of
Afghanistan would be accessible to US civilian
oversight personnel by the time transition is
nished, while the non-governmental organi-
sation (NGO) Transparency Internationals
current Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)
ranks Afghanistan at 174 out of 176 countries
monitored. Revenue collection targets for
2012 mandated by the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) were 30% less than
planned although the exact gure
was not available because the IMF
TDemo Afghan National Police prepare to join a patrol with
German army soldiers outside Kunduz in September
2011. By the end of 2014, most international troops will
have left the country.
FOCUS
report was not publicly released and this
was, to a large degree, on account of increased
corruption at customs collection points,
according to Sopko.
There is some internal pressure for govern-
ance reform from Afghan politicians, civil
society members, and younger generation
activists, but this will be ineffectual as long as
the old guard of mujahideen-era leaders con-
tinues to exert inuence over the government
and power structures.
It is possible that the next government will
seek to devolve power and will exert less inu-
ence on a provincial and district level (as was
the case when Zahir Shah reigned until 1973),
and this would assuage tensions from the
bottom up. Broadly speaking, even the armed
opposition is not seeking to raze the central
Afghan government and start afresh, and any
genuine reform process would help solidify
lower-level government structures.
Meanwhile, rumours of so-called ghost
brigades in the Afghan National Army (ANA)
have previously fuelled concerns about a coup.
However, Karzai has proven highly skilled in
manipulating the power structures to make
a coup unlikely. Military morale is uneven,
and even though the ANA is spread out across
the country, the appetite for a coup among
the senior leadership is difficult to identify
because of the lack of a clear candidate to take
the lead. Moreover, turnover in the ministries
of defence and interior is high, with large
numbers of presidential appointees. This also
PA: 1515442
December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 9
14/11/2013 11:43:38
 FOCUS
makes the likelihood of a coup low in the
short-to-medium term. Nevertheless, army
and police units in the provinces are likely to
be politicised during the election, although
not on ethnic grounds.
Social stability
Afghan society is divided and fractious in
many ways, but this rarely boils over into com-
munal conict. Ethnic and sectarian tensions
are not currently serious risks, and attacks of
a purely ethnic or sectarian nature have been
highly sporadic, despite there being ample
precedent in the civil war that followed the
departure of Soviet troops in 1989 and the fall
of the Afghan government in 1992.
Moreover, those at the head of groups cur-
rently ghting in the conict (whether state
institutions, militia leaders, or the armed
opposition) have not turned to sectarian or
ethnic slogans to stir tensions. This is not to
say that the fractured nature of the Afghan
population and past experiences prevent
recurrences of conict, but it is unlikely in
the short term. Outside powers interfering in
Afghanistan from Saudi Arabia seeking to
indirectly confront Iran over its perceived nu-
clear ambitions, to India manoeuvring against
Pakistan could nevertheless trigger divides in
the medium term.
In order for those tensions to erupt into
violence, it is likely that an atmosphere of
insecurity and impunity would have to exist
to levels similar to those currently seen in the
Pakistani city of Karachi, for example. Yet
levels of crime particularly theft and violent
crime are relatively low in Afghanistan.
10 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013
008-013_JIR1312_F8_Afghanscenarios.indd 10
Afghan president Hamid Karzai in Kabul on 15
October 2013. Karzai is due to step down at
the next presidential election in April 2014, but
is still likely to hold considerable power over
his successor. PA: 1515443
There is a large amount of non-violent
crime and corruption, particularly in sectors
linked to government circles, in part because
the large foreign subsidies and NGO project
disbursements mean that this is the easiest
way to gain pecuniary advantage. Judicial
corruption is extremely high, which is unsur-
prising in a country where provincial judges
earn salaries of a few hundred US dollars per
month. This is a fraction of the salary earned
by an interpreter for the US military, for ex-
ample. Most Taliban ghters enter prison with
the expectation that it is possible to secure re-
lease through these means, according to Talibs
consulted by IHS Janes in Kandahar and Kabul.
Crime nevertheless looks set to increase as the
transition progresses. Militia forces such as the
Afghan Local Police (ALP), installed around
the country by international military forces,
are already the source of some such crime, and
the Afghan National Police (ANP) has a poor
reputation among the local populace.
Separately, there will be signicant health
risks following the international drawdown.
A smaller NGO presence will have fewer re-
sources with which to tackle serious country-
wide health issues such as maternal mortality
or diseases including polio, and insecurity
outside urban centres will mean that access to
remote areas will become harder.
Even organisations such as the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
currently nd themselves unable to secure
TDemo
guarantees of safe passage throughout the
country, to a large extent because of the
fragmentation of the armed opposition and
the multiplicity of armed groups in the south
and southeast that may take orders from the
senior Taliban leadership. Internally Displaced
Persons (IDPs) are on the rise, and this will
continue throughout the transition period;
more than 34,000 people were displaced in
May 2013 alone. These people are not for the
most part at risk of starvation, although the
cold winter weather between December and
March will affect thousands across the country
and, as in previous years, many will die in IDP
camps or settlements.
Economic stability
The withdrawal of international military
forces from Afghanistan and a drawdown
in assistance will be a serious shock for the
Afghan system. Articially sustained for over
a decade, the Afghan economy has run at a
decit since 2001. Taxation and customs rev-
enue collection only started to be a priority for
the government after 20092010, most likely
because the impending transition focused the
government on revenue collection as a means
of making the Afghan state sustainable.
The closure of international military bases
across the country already means that many
Afghans are now unemployed. Bases that
have laid off local workers prior to closure
have suffered increased numbers of attacks,
although high rates of unemployment have
been a historic norm in Afghanistan and there
will be fewer targets for discontent once most
international troops have departed.
Infrastructure decay has already started to
take place in areas where international troops
and organisations have left. Buildings and ve-
hicles, in particular, are not being maintained,
and many have simply been abandoned; an
uneven electricity supply will continue for as
long as international payments underpin its
provision, but the infrastructure is not likely
to be maintained without previous levels of
oversight by international bodies. Indeed,
some large cities such as Kandahar may return
to the 2010 electricity averages of two hours
every other day. In such a climate, large pro-
jects such as the rehabilitation of the Kajaki
dam hydropower plant are unlikely to be
nished. The Kajaki dam is potentially able to
provide power for much of southern Afghani-
stan, but the failure to install a third turbine
and repeated Taliban attacks on the facility
and its access road have left it half nished.
Taken as a whole, uncertainty about transi-
tion has led to a depreciation of the Afghan
currency from around AFN48: USD1 in Janu-
ary 2005 to the current rate of almost AFN57.
Property prices in both urban and rural areas
ihs.com/janes
14/11/2013 11:43:49

have decreased signicantly over the past
three years, and the real estate market is swift-
ly contracting. The withdrawal of interna-
tional businesses and their money will lead to
a rapid slowdown in GDP growth, as shown in
IHS Global Insights forecast of 2.9% real GDP
growth in 2013 (down from 11.9% in 2012),
with 4.7% forecast for 2014. This growth,
moreover, was in part the result of gains in the
services industry. This is unlikely to persist
beyond 2015, especially as the reason for
much of the service industrys existence (the
presence of foreign troops and organisations)
will cease to exist.
In the banking sector, condence is already
low following the 2010 Kabul Bank scandal,
in which more than USD900 million went
missing or was lost in loans to associates of the
senior tiers of the Afghan government. As a re-
sult of the scandal, a special tribunal and a trial
led to two senior management officials being
sentenced to prison terms of ve years. The
growth in the value of deposits has declined
to 12.5% over the past three years from an
average of 80% in 200509. Commercial loans
have also declined by 20% since 2010, and
micronance loans have similarly decreased.
More positively, a new railway link between
Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan
is scheduled for completion by 2015 and will
boost regional trade for Afghanistan in the
face of a difficult trading environment with
Pakistan. However, the rail infrastructure
needed for several natural resource extrac-
tion projects does not currently exist. Afghan
government expectations of a swift start to
several mining projects such as the Chinese
involvement in the Aynak copper mine in Log-
ar province are unlikely to be fullled in the
short-to-medium term. Already able to draw
on other copper supplies, China is concerned
about safety and corruption, and is likely to
wait to see the post-transition landscape.
Military and security stability
Security is unlikely to be an existential threat
to the Afghan state in the short-to-medium
term. Afghan security forces have taken the
lead in responsibility for military planning
over the past two years, and have proven able
to handle the serious threat that the Taliban
previously posed, limiting the armed opposi-
tion to assassinations and visually striking
urban operations with a limited number of
ghters that usually end within 48 hours.
A continuation of the current stalemate is
highly likely. Afghan security forces will be
able to counter or make deals with the armed
ihs.com/janes
008-013_JIR1312_F8_Afghanscenarios.indd 11
opposition for at least a few years, unless
political instability causes a fracturing of the
army and/or police.
The government has a tentative hold on the
major cities and provincial centres, and is able
to prevent Taliban activity for the most part.
This is aided by their continued use of militias,
currently numbering around 25,000 and set to
rise to 30,000 under ISAFs funding approval.
This effective control is even true in places
such as Kandahar, long a bastion of Taliban
inuence, and military transition has now
occurred across the country, with Afghans
taking the lead for security. Foreign troops,
in particular special forces, will nevertheless
remain active. As of 1 October, there were still
more than 86,000 troops in-country (of which
60,000 were US forces), according to ISAF
statistics. More than 70% of those are located
in the south and south-east of the country.
A serious issue for Afghan security forces
is their failures in logistics an area that was
never prioritised by international military
forces, which had their own systems that
took up the slack of the Afghan decit. From
medical evacuation capabilities to the supply
of spare parts for weapons and vehicles, the
Afghan army will be severely limited going
into 2015. A result of this realisation, which
is likely to already have been appreciated by
senior military planners, is that the spread of
the Afghan army will probably be retracted
to supply hubs and urban centres; large
swathes of the provinces will simply cease to
be actively patrolled or garrisoned. Moreover,
the professionalism of security forces in the
absence of international monitors has always
been a concern, albeit less so for the ANA than
for the ANP. Anecdotal evidence available
to IHS Janes suggests that a large proportion
of crime in a province such as Helmand, for
example, is committed by police officers, and
the withdrawal of oversight and monitoring is
likely to increase this tendency.
Highlighting the physical perils facing
Afghan security forces in the future, approxi-
mately 400 Afghan army and police person-
nel are being killed in action every month,
according to testimony given to the US Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on 11 July by a
senior Department of Defense official. How-
ever, these gures have always been high, and
it seems unlikely that they will threaten the
security forces ability to operate.
TDemo
External stability
A key milestone still absent from the transi-
tion is the signing of the BSA with the US. The
FOCUS
BSA is important for Afghanistans relation-
ship with the international community be-
cause a failure to sign would see a precipitous
end to US (and probably other international
partners) military involvement by the end of
2014. This would be coupled with a reduc-
tion in the amount of funding provided from
2015 onwards, because of concerns about
corruption in the absence of any independ-
ent and/or international monitoring. Karzai
seems to believe that the US will not leave
Afghanistan for regional and strategic reasons,
and accordingly is negotiating the BSA with
the expectation that he can delay and push for
terms almost indenitely.
This would call into question much interna-
tional engagement, not only military support
but also backing from nancial and devel-
opment-focused multilateral institutions.
Opacity in the BSA negotiations means that
either a successful or an unsuccessful conclu-
sion is possible. However, there is a higher risk
of Afghanistan losing the support of foreign
nancial institutions post-2015 over corrup-
tion, combined with the conditionality of aid
being transferred into Afghan government
coffers, which adds a great deal of uncertainty
into the environment.
If the BSA is signed, a strong clause is likely
to be included guaranteeing Afghan sovereign-
ty against external aggression. Such a clause is
most likely to be implicitly directed towards
Pakistan. Although Kabul is unlikely to go
to war with Islamabad, the transition period
has already led to an increased engagement
with all of Afghanistans neighbours, whether
directly or by proxy means. Tensions may be
allayed by the election of a presidential candi-
date favourable to Pakistan, but other regional
powers will also continue to seek to exert
inuence. Indeed, politically directed funding
from external sources is likely to increase dur-
ing the 20145 period and onwards.
India, Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia (and
to a lesser extent the countries of Central
Asia) are likely to escalate their involvement
in this way. In the short term, this is unlikely
to overly destabilise Afghan politics, but if it
continues unchecked its effects could lead to a
return to more widespread violence.
Risk factors Risk in December 2013
Political risk Critical
Social risk High
Economic risk Critical
Military & security risk Critical
External risk Signicant
Total country risk High
December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 11
14/11/2013 11:43:53
 FOCUS
Scenarios
The following three scenarios assess Afghanistans political transition in 2014 amid the international military drawdown and the upcoming presidential
election, as well as the extent to which the armed political opposition will be contained or accommodated.
Scenario 1: Peaceful transition and violence contained
Probability Low
T
his best-case scenario is what would
happen in Afghanistan if the transi-
tion went to plan. The ANA and ANP
are already taking the lead across the country
in military matters, and the total registered
number of irregular militia forces (includ-
ing the ALP) has reached close to 50,000.
Nevertheless, the loyalty of irregular forces
to the Afghan state and to the rule of law
remains questionable.
In this scenario, these forces would
combine together and manage to contain
violence from affecting urban centres for
the most part. The security implementation
would not be awless, but most large-scale
attacks would be prevented or swiftly con-
tained. The ANA would not start to disinte-
grate in the short term, particularly while it
continues to receive external funding.
In rural areas, this scenario posits that
government forces would continue to keep
up the pressure against the Taliban and its
allies. For this, they would use a combination
of night raids and more conventional sweep
operations. This is less likely, in part because
Scenario 2: Messy transition and insurgent integration
Probability High
T
his scenario is the default pathway for
Afghanistan, in which there are no
major surprises; it offers a logical con-
clusion to the transition process, and as such
is mostly predicated on a continuation of the
countrys current situation and dynamics.
In this scenario, the handover of political
control to a new president in the April 2014
election would lead to signicant political
turmoil, but the levels of violence would be
managed by the Afghan National Security
Forces and associated militia forces. Corrup-
tion and economic difficulties would contin-
ue, but these would not contain the seeds for
heightened levels of instability. Moreover,
12 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013
008-013_JIR1312_F8_Afghanscenarios.indd 12
areas fully transitioned to ANA control have
seen less proactive engagement of this kind
and more of a tendency to make deals with
opposition forces instead. The ANA and ANP
also suffer from acute logistics issues, making
such operations difficult to sustain.
The insurgency would not pose the exis-
tential threat to the state that it appeared to
in 200708. Popular support for the armed
opposition would sink to new lows and the
narrative of jihad against occupation would
lose its potency for young Afghans after the
departure of most foreign troops in 2014.
This has already happened to some
extent, although the effects of a drop in
support for the Taliban would not neces-
sarily mean a boost in the Afghan states
popular legitimacy. In the short-to-medium
term, the administrative weaknesses of the
government would be likely to continue,
including corruption and generalised inef-
ciency at all levels.
This scenario could also potentially include
a successful deal with the Taliban following
the presidential election. If the Taliban lead-
ership judged that the new government were
substantively different from its predecessor,
the departure of foreigners and their cash
ow might temper the extent to which cor-
ruption is lucrative and/or endemic.
External interference would continue, but
either the levels of this intervention would
remain stable, or excessive activity by one
country would be balanced out by another.
There remains the possibility for an exter-
nally fuelled scenario similar to the early
1990s civil war, but this would be extremely
unlikely in the short term; any such dynam-
ics would take at least one year to manifest.
There would be no major changes to the
TDemo
armed opposition, either in structure or
tactics. Trends that have been ongoing for
the past two years such as fragmenta-
tion, a loosening of command-and-control
it might be willing to negotiate with the new
state organs. This is less likely, because the
system of government and the involvement
of power brokers with a history of involve-
ment in the violent politics of the past three
decades will not change.
In the absence of a deal, the Taliban would
be increasingly fragmented and publicly
divided. The failure to meaningfully inte-
grate within state structures would lead to a
fall in support and its recruitment base. The
impetus for large-scale attacks would increas-
ingly come from Pakistani-affiliated groups or
those who could never reintegrate with the
state, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader
of Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin.
However, despite the possibility of some
elements of this scenario coming to pass, the
overall relative probability remains low.
Risk factors Scenario one
Political risk High
Social risk Signicant
Economic risk High
Military & security risk High
External risk Signicant
Total country risk High
structures, and a widening divide between
the military and political wings of the Taliban
would continue, but with no short-term
disintegration of the Taliban. In part, this is
because the benets not available to the Tali-
ban over the past 12 years will become avail-
able after 2015. This could take the form of
integration into the post-Karzai governmen-
tal structure, or more simply be measured
in territory seized as Afghan security forces
cease to control the same geographical spread
as at present.
There might be an increased role for Paki-
stani or foreign groups, but this would not
present a signicant threat to the state. In
places where international forces withdraw,
such as has already occurred in parts of the
ihs.com/janes
14/11/2013 11:43:53
 FOCUS

east, the Afghan troops replacing them have
often made deals with the armed opposition,
similar to the situation in the late 1980s and
early 1990s.
Political instability would peak around
the time of the presidential and provincial
be unable to interact with the state in any fraught with instability, but is unlikely to
meaningful way, and would have signicant- be enough to call the viability of the Afghan
ly less leverage. In general, this period would state into question in the short term.
involve intervention from internal and exter-
nal actors, but there would be action taken Risk factors Scenario two
among Afghan political groups and stake- Political risk Critical

council elections on 5 April 2014. The diverse holders to preserve the broad status quo. Social risk High

candidate list would mean strongly contested These measures could include the system Economic risk Critical

results. In 2009, the post-election wrangling of political rule, the constitution, and the Military & security risk High

took two-and-a-half months. During the mechanisms of patronage coupled with the External risk Signicant

2014 elections, international actors would conict economy. This scenario is therefore Total country risk High

Scenario 3: Violent transition with external meddling

Probability Moderate remove most of the inuence of these inter- campaign, without the buffer against opera-
national actors, and could well set the stage tions designed purely to target civilians that

I
n this scenario, the election would be a
catalyst for political discontent to con-
tinue throughout the period of transition
and into 2015. The outcome would be con-
tested and a nal result would either not be
announced, or would be violently disputed.
The extent to which many Afghan political
actors particularly the older generations
have stated their belief in rearmament sug-
gests that this is a possibility, even though
such a development would be strongly
discouraged by international actors. Interna-
tional mediation could be rejected or unable
to force a decision on the part of Afghan
political players after the election.
for politically inspired conict on or around
the time of the April 2014 elections.
Moreover, the Taliban might make some
symbolic victories in early 2015. These would
be most likely to occur in the south or east,
in areas of little strategic value, but still not
without propaganda signicance. This could
be a district centre, or in the east, and poten-
tially the fall of provincial capitals for brief
periods. Backed up by extensive propaganda
output by the Taliban, this would contrib-
ute to the ongoing sense of mistrust in the
Afghan state and its ability to stay the course
in the longer term.
This post-transition scenario posits an
parts of the Afghan Taliban had sought to
enforce. This could involve an increase in
targeting international staff in Kabul. When
combined with the political instability,
weak leadership, and the absence of foreign
forces preventing the various Afghan armed
forces from ghting each other, this violent
environment would create the groundwork
for future conict, ongoing instability, and
the likelihood that Afghanistan would once
again become a problem affecting the wider
international community in the future.
Risk factors Scenario three
Political risk Critical

A precondition for this scenario would increased role of outside groups mainly Social risk High

be a no vote at the jirga scheduled to take Pakistani that would shoulder more of the Economic risk Critical

place at the end of November in Kabul. Under larger spectacular operations and carry out Military & security risk Critical

these terms, international troops would exit sectarian attacks. Such groups would con- External risk Critical

Afghanistan almost completely. This would tinue the suicide bombing and assassination Total country risk Critical

Conclusion

The presidential election is likely to be
messy whoever wins. The extent to which
this political instability leads to uncertainty
or violence depends on whether Afghan
political elites feel that 2015 represents a
chance to reshape the political future of the
country to their advantage. It also depends
on the perception of external countries in
this regard.
The new Afghan leader will most likely
be weak and their primary task after 2015
will simply be to shore up the system and
prevent internal and external attempts to
further weaken the basic structures of
the state.
In security terms, Afghanistan will not
precipitously disintegrate following the
departure of most international troops by
the end of 2015, but the signicant drop
in media coverage and presence across
the country will make event monitoring
substantially more challenging.
Regardless of whether the handover
process moves more or less accord-
ing to plan, there will invariably be some
manifestation of the armed opposition
able and willing to carry out attacks on the
Afghan government and foreign targets
inside Afghanistan.
The ability of this opposition to carry out
visually striking but ultimately low-impact
TDemo
attacks on Afghan cities and government
personnel will not necessarily signify a seri-
ous failure of the transition process.
This article was first published online at
ihs.com/janes on 11 November 2013.
XON THE WEB
Disquiet on the Western front
Security transition in Afghanistan
Afghanistans new spy chief injured in
Taliban bomb attack
Author
Alex Strick van Linschoten is a writer/
researcher. He is co-author of An Enemy
We Created and co-editor of Poetry of
the Taliban and My Life With the Taliban.
ihs.com/janes

ihs.com/janes December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 13

008-013_JIR1312_F8_Afghanscenarios.indd 13 14/11/2013 15:30:21

 TERRORISM & INSURGENCY
Battle
ready
Hizbullah expands its urban training facilities
As Hizbullahs ghting force undergoes expansion, the number of its training facilities
for urban operations is also increasing. Nicholas Blanford examines the groups use of
these centres and the effect they are likely to have on its tactical capabilities.
X KEY POINTS
Hizbullah has built at least three
Military Operations in Urban Terrain
(MOUT) facilities in Lebanon to
expand the capabilities of its ghting
force, in preparation for future conict
with Israel and its current intervention
in Syrias civil war.
The incorporation of urban warfare
skills into Hizbullahs training
programme underlines the broadening
tactical capabilities of the group since
its last conict with Israel in 2006.
Unusually, the MOUT facilities, as well
as other newly constructed training
camps in Lebanon, have been built
in the open and are visible to satellite
and aerial reconnaissance, suggesting
that Hizbullah has sacriced its
customary secrecy for the necessity
of accelerated training of its cadres.
A
s the Lebanese militant group
Hizbullah has evolved over the past
20 years, there has been a growing
emphasis on urban warfare to complement
its traditional focus on rural guerrilla ghting.
The threat of striking against Israeli settle-
ments across the Lebanese border represents
a key element in Hizbullahs arsenal; at the
same time, its ghters have also become
increasingly embroiled in urban combat while
supporting government forces in Syria. This
comes at a time when the militant group has
14 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013
014-019_JIR1312_F1_TI_Hizbullah.indd 14
been undergoing an unprecedented expansion
in its ghting force.
In response, Hizbullah has been expand-
ing its training facilities, and in particular its
Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT)
sites. This development is conrmed by both
photography and satellite imagery analysed
by IHS Janes, which has identied three main
MOUT sites. This expansion of training facili-
ties without consideration for their identica-
tion suggests that the need for concealment
is outweighed by the need to provide training
for its growing force, a priority probably
driven by its experiences in Syria. Neverthe-
less, although the short-term priority is in
Syria, the urban training programme and
experience gained there will provide Hizbul-
lah with a highly capable core of ghters to be
utilised against Israel in the event of a future
conict, or within Lebanon itself during any
resurgence of inter-factional violence.
The evolution of urban operations
From its formation in 1982 until the turn of
the century, Hizbullahs conict against the
Israel Defence Force (IDF) was fought mainly
in the hills and valleys of rural south Lebanon,
which favoured the organisations then typi-
cal hit-and-run guerrilla-style warfare.
However, after Israeli helicopters destroyed
TDemo
a Hizbullah training camp at Ain Dardara
in the northern Bekaa Valley in June 1994,
killing more than 40 recruits, static training
facilities were largely abandoned.
Following the IDF withdrawal from south
Lebanon in May 2000, one of the main activi-
ties undertaken by Hizbullah was the covert
construction of a sophisticated underground
defence network of bunkers, tunnels, and
rocket-ring platforms. Confronted by a
powerful Israeli conventional force, Hizbullah
opted to adapt its low-signature offensive op-
erations of the 1990s to a defensive role. The
bunkers and tunnel networks offered the IDF
and Israeli Air Force (IAF) few visible targets
and allowed Hizbullah to mount surprise am-
bushes against advancing troops and armour.
Most of these military preparations were
conducted in the rural areas of the southern
border district. Nevertheless, some defensive
underground facilities were built in villages
and towns in south Lebanon, especially those
adjacent to the border with Israel.
The strategy worked effectively, as the
Israelis discovered in the July to August 2006
conict. The low-signature underground
and camouaged facilities, combined with
advanced anti-armour systems such as the
AT-14 Kornet and a sophisticated bre-optic
communications system, helped Hizbullah
halt the IDF ground offensive by the time a
ceasere came into effect on 14 August 2006.
Notably, for the rst time in the 24-year
Hizbullah-Israel conict, much of the ght-
ing occurred in an urban environment. IDF
armour struggled in the narrow streets of Bint
Jbeil, the largest Shia-populated town in the
southern Lebanon border district. Hizbullah
ihs.com/janes
14/11/2013 14:42:32

Arab village-style MOUT compound
Astrium imagery depicts a Hizbullah MOUT complex near Taraya, Lebanon. Image dated 16 May 2013. Photographs illustrate the rooess nature of the MOUT
installations and their different layouts. Photography by Nicholas Blanford.
militants red rocket-propelled grenades
from windows at close range against IDF
tanks and detonated improvised explosive de-
vices (IEDs) hidden in the rubble of destroyed
buildings. After a few unsuccessful attempts
to seize Bint Jbeil and other nearby villages,
the IDF resorted to artillery shelling and air
strikes to essentially raze the town to the
ground and subdue the Hizbullah defenders.
Hizbullahs rst serious urban combat was
therefore essentially of a defensive nature and
based on the ghters intimate knowledge of
the terrain and careful pre-war preparations.
Urban warfare techniques were not part of
Hizbullahs regular training programme be-
fore 2006. However, after the war, offensive
urban warfare was introduced into Hizbullahs
training programme to prepare the cadres for
the next conict with Israel.
Urban training complexes
Hizbullahs military preparations for the next
war with Israel began as soon as the 2006 con-
ict ended. Large quantities of new and more
advanced rockets and missiles were smug-
gled into Lebanon and a broad recruitment
ihs.com/janes
014-019_JIR1312_F1_TI_Hizbullah.indd 15
TERRORISM & INSURGENCY
Israeli-style MOUT compound
CNES 2013, Distribution Astrium Services / Spot Image S.A./ IHS: 1486993
drive was launched, the scale of which was
unprecedented in the groups history.
Alongside basic training conducted in
the Bekaa Valley, urban warfare skills were
included for the rst time, with training
being conducted in Iran and Lebanon. There
is a sophisticated training camp for urban
warfare in Iran. There are some here [in Leba-
non] too, but on a smaller scale, Hajj Abbas, a
veteran Hizbullah combatant, told IHS Janes
in July 2013.
The rst known MOUT site to be con-
structed in Lebanon appeared around 2008
at the Beit Mubarak training camp in the hills
south of Janta in the eastern Bekaa Valley. It
consists of two parallel rows of three small
single-room rooess cinder block buildings
approximately 4 m by 4 m, forming a street.
At one end of the street is a longer structure,
17 m by 4 m, perpendicular to the two rows of
buildings. The camp includes ring ranges, a
suspected driver training track, and bunkers
TDemo
sunk into the sides of the valley. The MOUT
site was provisionally identied by IHS Janes
imagery analysis in 2009. The purpose of the
site was conrmed in March 2013 when a
Israeli-style MOUT compound
Hizbullah propaganda video broadcast on the
partys Al-Manar television channel showed
ghters manoeuvring along the street and
entering the buildings, which were decorated
in Israels national ag. A video shot of the
MOUT site compared with a satellite image of
the Beit Mubarak facility conrmed they were
the same.
A second identical MOUT site was con-
structed at a new training camp northeast of
the Bekaa Valley village of Khreibe. The date
of construction is unclear, but satellite image-
ry comparisons show that it was some time
before May 2011. Like its earlier counterpart,
the site consists of two parallel rows of three
cinder block buildings, although this site has
longer structures at the end of each row. The
MOUT site is part of a training ground that in-
cludes ring ranges, small shipping container-
sized buildings, and metal-roofed utility
buildings. In the rst half of 2012, ve larger
buildings measuring 13 m by 5 m were built
70 m south of the MOUT site. A 3 September
2013 satellite image obtained by IHS Janes
shows the ve buildings connected to the
MOUT facility by an asphalt road. It is unclear
December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 15
14/11/2013 14:42:32
 TERRORISM & INSURGENCY
whether the ve buildings are an extension of
the MOUT facility.
The third identied MOUT facility is the
most recently constructed and is located in
the hills behind the village of Taraya on the
western ank of the Bekaa Valley. It is sub-
stantially larger in scale than the two earlier
sites and appears to consist of three main
components. The rst, on the northeast edge
of the facility, is similar to the two smaller
MOUT facilities at Beit Mubarak and Khreibe,
although the parallel rows consist of nine
buildings each instead of three. The second
component is another street at the southern
end of the site, although this one includes a
row of nine rooess multi-room cinder block
buildings approximately 10 m by 4 m lying
in a northwest to southeast orientation. The
nine buildings are anked on either side by
parallel rows of six or seven of the smaller 4 m
by 4 m structures. At the southeast end of the
site is a two-storey cement-walled building
with water tanks on the roof, which appears
to be one of only two habitable structures at
the site.
The third and most signicant component
of the Taraya MOUT facility is the cluster of
Hizbullah leader Sheik Hassan Nasrallah deliv-
ers a speech from a secret location during a
rally at the south Lebanon-Israel border village
of Aita, Lebanon, on 16 August 2013. As a re-
sult of its expanding ghting force, Hizbullah is
increasing the number of its training facilities
for urban operations. PA: 1515069
16 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013
014-019_JIR1312_F1_TI_Hizbullah.indd 16
buildings that appears to represent the centre
of a typical Arab village, unlike the other
MOUT sites, which closely resembled the lay-
out of Israeli settlements. Most of the build-
ings are four-roomed, rooess, and single-sto-
rey. There is at least one two-storey and one
three-storey building. The Arab village also
includes a mosque with two silver domes. A
water tower is located behind the mosque. sprawling camp believed to have been estab-
The differences between the two types of vil-
lage are also highlighted by the neat layout of
the Israeli streets, reecting the high levels
of urban planning seen in Israel, compared
with the more chaotic nature of the Arab are discernible across the parts of Lebanon un-
streets, which reect the less planned nature
of most urban areas in locations such as Syria
and Lebanon.
Local residents in the Bekaa Valley told IHS
Janes that they have been aware of the con-
struction activity in a Hizbullah-controlled
security pocket on the edge of Taraya over the
past 18 months, but the sites specic purpose
is generally unknown to them. IHS Janes has
obtained photographic images of the site
from high ground, which, along with satel-
lite images, conrms the facility as a MOUT
site. No personnel or vehicles were visible,
TDemo
and there were no obvious utility links such
as electricity poles and lighting that would
suggest a genuine construction project. The
lack of roofs, doors, and glass windows in the
houses further attest to the facility being a
MOUT site.
The Taraya MOUT facility is not the only
visible training ground in the area. Another
lished in early 2012 is located 2 kilometres
(km) south of the Taraya facility near the
village of Shmistar.
Other training camps or military positions
der Hizbullah control. They run in scale from
small hilltop outposts consisting of two or
three camouaged huts hidden beneath trees,
to a 19 km facility set among mountains in
south Lebanon with numerous small ship-
ping container buildings, a suspected assault
course, several ring ranges, and a possible
fenced-off IED test site.
The unusual aspect of this post-2006 prolif-
eration of training facilities and military bases
is their visibility from the air. Although they
are generally constructed away from publicly
accessible areas that grant ground views of the
ihs.com/janes
14/11/2013 14:42:52

sites, they are clearly exposed to aerial surveil-
lance. Hizbullah is skilled at camouaging its
military activities and has engaged in decep-
tive practices in the past, such as camouag-
ing its bunker network in southern Lebanon
and deploying decoy positions to mislead IAF
surveillance or human intelligence assets on
the ground. However, the plethora of facili-
ties scattered across south Lebanon and the
Bekaa Valley would suggest that they are not
all decoys.
The more simple explanation is that Hizbul-
lah does not mind if the sites are spotted as
they have little military value beyond train-
ing. Since the end of the 2006 war, Hizbullah
and Israel have avoided overt hostilities along
the Blue Line the United Nations name for
Lebanons southern border. This has allowed
Hizbullah some leeway in conducting its
training programme more openly.
Hizbullah does not hide the fact that it is
training its cadres and appears unconcerned
if the facilities are monitored by Israeli aerial
assets. The camps would almost certainly be
destroyed in the event of renewed conict,
but they are relatively inexpensive to con-
struct and could be rebuilt quite easily.
Furthermore, the expansion of Hizbul-
lahs ghting force since 2006 from around
300400 full-time ghters to around 5,000
has necessitated an increase in the number of
basic training facilities.
Israels urban combat training
Israel has signicantly increased the num-
ber of MOUT facilities it operates in recent
years as part of the lessons learned from
the month-long conict with Hizbullah in
2006. The IDF at that time was ill-prepared
to meet the military challenge posed by
Hizbullah, which had evolved consider-
ably over the previous six years in terms
of training, tactics, weapons systems, and
deployment. Hizbullahs use of bunker and
tunnel networks and camouaged rocket
ring posed considerable difculties for
IDF ground forces, as well as for the Israeli
Air Force.
Much of the combat was set in an urban
environment in the towns and villages
of south Lebanon. Although the IDF had
previous experience ghting in urban areas
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, it was the
rst time since the 1982 invasion of south
Lebanon that it had fought in built-up areas
of the country, and against an opponent
ihs.com/janes
014-019_JIR1312_F1_TI_Hizbullah.indd 17
A screen grab from Hizbullahs Al-Manar television channel shows ghters training at the Beit Mubarak
MOUT facility, about to enter a building decorated in the Israeli ag. The layout of the MOUT facilities at
Beit Mubarak and Khreibe closely resembles that of a typical Israeli settlement.
Training for Israel
Since the end of the 2006 war with Israel,
Hizbullah ghters have hinted that they are
being trained to mount operations inside
Israel in the event of another conict. For in-
stance, in February 2011, Hizbullah secretary-
general Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah alluded to
the possibility that his ghters could enter
Israel in the next war. The major accomplish-
ment of the Resistance is that it complicated
that had developed specic tactics for an
urban environment.
The IDF claims that Hizbullahs prepara-
tions for another conict with Israel are
conned mainly to urban areas in south
Lebanon, rather than the rural hills and
valleys as before 2006. Given expectations
that much of any future war with Hizbullah
would be waged in an urban environment,
the IDF has increased its MOUT facili-
ties to better prepare troops for another
encounter with Hizbullah and overcome the
deciencies of the past. In 2010, the IDF
announced that it intended to increase
the number of its MOUT sites by 50%
by the end of 2011, bringing the total to
around 22. The IDFs Ground Forces Com-
mand also decided that urban warfare
training should amount to one-quarter of a
soldiers training.
TDemo
The largest facility is the Urban Warfare
Training Center at the Tzeelim training
TERRORISM & INSURGENCY
PA: 1515068
the possibility of Israel occupying Lebanon.
Even more, today, Israel is concerned that
Hizbullah might liberate Galilee I tell the
Resistance ghters to be prepared for the day
when war is imposed on Lebanon, he said.
These comments came during one of
Nasrallahs periodic deterrence speeches
in which he attempted to strike a balance
against the capabilities and possible plans
of the IDF in the next war. He stated that if
base in the Negev desert in southern Israel.
The 41,000 m facility was built in 2006 and
funded mainly by US military aid. Known as
the Baladia, Arabic for village, the facility
includes over 600 structures, with shops,
eight-storey buildings, a market place, a
cemetery, a large mosque, a hospital, and
tunnels to simulate those found in the Pal-
estinian Territories and south Lebanon.
In addition, the Eliakim training centre is
designed specically for the south Leba-
non theatre. Set among the hills of south-
ern Mount Carmel in northern Israel, which
resemble the terrain of south Lebanon,
troops learn how to manoeuvre through
an environment laced with IEDs, rocket-
launching sites, and tunnel and bunker
systems. A mock southern Lebanese
village, complete with bunkers and tunnels
beneath the houses, has been constructed
at the centre and is of comparable size to
the Hizbullah MOUT facility at Taraya.
December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 17
14/11/2013 14:43:06
 TERRORISM & INSURGENCY
central Beirut was bombed, Tel Aviv would
be struck by Hizbullahs missiles; if the Israeli
navy imposed a blockade of Lebanese ports,
Hizbullah would threaten Israel-bound ves-
sels with its anti-ship missiles; and if Israel
invaded Lebanon, Hizbullah would in turn
invade Israel.
However, specics of the urban training are
unknown Hizbullah cadres are not permit-
ted to discuss military matters at all, and their
rare private comments on the subject tend
to lack details. The purpose of any operations
conducted inside Israel in the next war is
likely not to be to liberate territory, but to
conduct sabotage and hit-and-run attacks to
generally sow panic and confusion on Israels
homefront, as well as scoring propaganda
points with an Arab audience.
One of the possible goals is to seize part or
all of one or more Israeli settlements that abut
the Lebanese border. There are approximately
18 potentially vulnerable Israeli settlements
lying beside the border. Many of these are
only connected to the rest of Israel by a single
road, which could be cut off by an attacking
force. Some, such as Manara and Misgav Am,
lie adjacent to the border fence and on top of
an escarpment, potentially facilitating Hizbul-
lahs seizure of the settlements and subse-
quent defence against IDF rescuers. The IDF
maintains approximately 30 outposts along
Lebanons 110 km southern frontier, but few
of them lie inside the border settlements. A
swift assault by Hizbullah units amid diver-
sionary re could allow the attackers time
to seize a border settlement and cut the ap-
proach roads before the IDF has had a chance
to react. Furthermore, the IDF announced
in September 2013 that it was planning to
withdraw troops deployed as guards in nine
communities on Israels northern border
after it was assessed by the IDF that existing
security measures were sufficient.
The idea of Hizbullah seizing Israeli border
settlements may have been developed before
2006. In 2002, IHS Janes was told by sources
close to Hizbullah in south Lebanon that one
of the plans in the event of a major war with
Israel was to capture a border settlement and
hold the residents hostage. Such a feat, if
successful, would place tremendous pressure
on an Israeli government, especially during a
time of war.
The tactic was not exploited in the 2006
conict because Hizbullah fought in a reactive
and defensive manner, in the hope of ending
the ghting as quickly as possible and before
too much damage was inicted on its forces.
18 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013
014-019_JIR1312_F1_TI_Hizbullah.indd 18
Israeli-style MOUT compound
Astrium imagery details the MOUT training complex and support facilities at the Khreibe training complex.
Image dated 3 September 2013.
The propaganda video aired in March
2013 showing Hizbullah ghters practicing
storming homes decorated in the Israeli ag
at the Beit Mubarak MOUT site was a delib-
erately conveyed indicator that this tactic is
among the organisations battle plans for the
next war.
Training for Syria
Nevertheless, it is Hizbullahs ongoing
involvement in the Syrian civil war, and not
planning for a future conict with Israel, that
has given urgency to the recent expansion
in its MOUT training programme. Several
thousand Hizbullah ghters are estimated
to be in Syria ghting on behalf of Syrian
president Bashar al-Assad, according to
international and regional diplomatic and
intelligence sources who spoke to IHS Janes.
Syria is a key ally of Iran and Hizbullah, and
they collectively form a political and military
alliance dubbed the axis of resistance against
Israel and Western policies in the Middle East.
The survival of the Assad regime is therefore
of critical importance for Hizbullahs future
viability and for Irans ability to extend its
inuence into the Arab-Israeli arena.
Hizbullah ghters are believed to have been
serving in Syria from early 2012, according to
TDemo
sources close to the party who spoke to IHS
Janes. The ghters were initially conned
mainly to the southern Damascus suburbs
and a cluster of villages opposite Lebanons
Rooess single-room target buildings
CNES 2013, Distribution Astrium Services / Spot Image S.A./ IHS: 1486995
northern border, which, although inside
Syria, were populated by Lebanese Shias. It is
probably no coincidence that construction on
the Taraya MOUT site began in early 2012 as
Hizbullahs role in Syria was becoming more
pronounced, and the Arab village at the site
appears to have been constructed with Syria
in mind.
In May 2013, Nasrallah admitted for the
rst time that his cadres were ghting in
Syria. His conrmation came at the onset of
a 17-day assault against the rebel-held town
of Qusayr, 8 km north of the border with
Lebanon. The operation was spearheaded
by Hizbullah with the backing of Syrian air
power and artillery. We have been trained
very well but this was a new kind of combat
for us, Hajj Abbas, who served a seven-day
tour in Qusayr, told IHS Janes.
The rebels had prepared extensive de-
fences in the months preceding the assault,
digging tunnels, booby-trapping buildings,
and planting IEDs. Hizbullah split the town
into 16 sectors and assigned code numbers to
different buildings and objectives, according
to published reports and IHS Janes interviews
with Hizbullah ghters. Between 1,200 and
1,700 Hizbullah ghters were deployed into
Qusayr, according to sources in the party and
published reports. Each combat unit consisted
of between three and ve ghters.
Once the assault began on 19 May, Hizbul-
lah sent in engineering teams to remove
ihs.com/janes
14/11/2013 14:43:10

MOUT training complex and
support facilities
Astrium imagery depicts a new training complex established between 2010 and 2011 near Khreibe,
Lebanon. Image dated 3 September 2013.
booby traps and IEDs, allowing the combat
units to advance. The engineers saved us a
lot of headaches and saved us time. They
would clear a building then radio to us that
building number three or building number
four had been cleared and we could move in,
Abbas said.
The ghters avoided open doorways and
windows and instead blasted holes through
connecting walls for access. They made
extensive use of snipers armed with Dragunov
Conclusion
The battle for Qusayr was the rst time
Hizbullah has mounted a major offensive
operation in an urban environment, offering
an opportunity to put its new MOUT skills
into practice. Since then, Hizbullah cadres
have fought in Deraa in southern Syria, the
Eastern Ghouta region outside Damascus,
and Homs, Syrias third city.
There is a growing conviction among
Hizbullah ghters who spoke to IHS Janes
that the group could soon be called on
to spearhead a fresh offensive, this time
against rebel forces holding the Qalamoun
region, a mainly arid mountainous land-
scape between Damascus and Homs,
and adjacent to Lebanons eastern border.
Both Hizbullah and rebel sources have
told IHS Janes that they have undertaken
ihs.com/janes
014-019_JIR1312_F1_TI_Hizbullah.indd 19
Weapons range
Weapons range
Weapons range
CNES 2013, Distribution Astrium Services / Spot Image S.A./ IHS: 1486994
SVD 7.62 mm sniper ries and even employed
Improvised Rocket-Assisted Munitions
(IRAMs) consisting of a warhead of unknown
size boosted by a 107 mm rocket. The short-
range system proved highly effective against
rebel defences. One video captured by a
Hizbullah ghter and shown to IHS Janes por-
trayed a building in the centre of Qusayr being
struck by an IRAM and collapsing in rubble.
Rebel ghters interviewed by IHS Janes in the
aftermath of the battle repeatedly referred to
preparations for a confrontation in the
strategic area and expect the campaign to
be waged before the winter rains begin in
earnest in December.
The MOUT training in Iran and Lebanon
has helped expand Hizbullahs battleeld
capabilities in terms of the long-standing
confrontation with Israel as well as in as-
sisting the Syrian army in its efforts against
rebel forces. Although the training has
allowed Hizbullah to handle the relative
novelties of urban combat, the real benet
of the Syria campaign for Hizbullahs future
ghting capabilities rests with the invalu-
able combat experience in both urban and
TDemo
rural environments gained by hundreds of
post-2006 recruits, an advantage that their
IDF opponents cannot claim.
TERRORISM & INSURGENCY
Hizbullahs capability of bringing down entire
buildings and demolishing earth barricade
defences with its missiles.
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were
also dispatched over Qusayr to scout rebel
positions, although it is unclear whether the
UAVs belonged to Hizbullah or the Syrian
army. The Hizbullah drones [UAVs] were a
big threat to us because they would pin-point
our posts then Hizbullah would hit us with
mortar re, one Syrian rebel ghter told IHS
Janes. The rebels also spoke of Hizbullahs
ability to advance under re and outank
their opponents. They had a smart tactic of
attacking us from the front while other units
attempted to ank us. But they would always
leave a small gap through which we could
retreat, one rebel ghter said.
Nonetheless, the assault on Qusayr took
longer than Hizbullah had anticipated and
casualties were relatively high. Between
70 and 110 Hizbullah ghters are estimated
to have been killed in Qusayr, according to
sources close to the group, testimony to the
difficulties of ghting in an urban environ-
ment, despite MOUT training and careful
pre-operational planning.
Towards the end of the battle, the surviving
rebel forces had been squeezed into a small
sector in northern Qusayr. We squashed
them into the northern part of the town and
then pinned them down with sniper re,
Abbas said. The battle ended with a heavy
artillery bombardment and a nal ground
push by Hizbullah as the rebels ed north
from the town.
This article was first published online at
ihs.com/janes on 29 October 2013.
XON THE WEB
Hizbullahs role in fall of rebel-held
Al-Qusayr raises risk of Sunni-Shia
ghting in Lebanon
Collision course Israel and Hizbullah
maintain readiness for war
Enemy at the gates Hizbullah
remains focused on conict with Israel
Author
Nicholas Blanford is a Beirut-based
correspondent for IHS Janes.
ihs.com/janes
December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 19
14/11/2013 14:43:31
 TERRORISM & INSURGENCY
target
Boko Haram widens campaign against civilians
Attacks against schools and civilians in northeast Nigeria indicate that the Boko
Haram militant group is willing to escalate its campaign in reaction to the countrys
state of emergency. Will Hartley looks at the attacks and the governments response.
X KEY POINTS
Suspected Boko Haram militants
carried out a series of high-prole
mass-casualty attacks in September
and October, undermining government
claims that security is being restored
in northern Nigeria.
Such attacks have escalated since the
declaration of a state of emergency
in three northern states in May, with a
number of deadly attacks on schools
in the region causing particular
concern.
Boko Harams recent targeting of
civilians, and students in particular,
appears to be retaliation for the local
populations co-operation with the
security forces, and the emergence of
civilian vigilante groups.
O
n 24 October 2013, suspected Boko
Haram jihadist militants launched
an attack on the Nigerian city of
Damaturu, capital of Yobe state, killing
several soldiers, policemen, and civilians, and
burning at least four police and security force
buildings. This attack came after suspected
militants from the group had killed more than
200 civilians in a succession of high-prole
mass-casualty attacks in rural areas of north-
ern Nigeria in September. These latter attacks,
which took place in Borno and Yobe states,
were the latest in a series of such operations
against soft targets conducted by suspected
Boko Haram militants since early-to-mid
20 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013
020-023_JIR1312_F9_BokoTI.indd 20
Soft
2013, and represent a departure from the
groups previous focus on targeting security
force facilities and personnel.
The high number of civilian casualties has
undermined repeated government claims
that the threat posed by Boko Haram was be-
ing contained following President Goodluck
Jonathans declaration of a state of emergency
in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states in May.
Indeed, this apparent trend towards attacks
on civilians, particularly in rural areas, is itself
seemingly a response by Boko Haram to the
changing operational environment created by
the state of emergency.
Around 8,000 military and Joint Task Force
(JTF) personnel have been deployed to the
three states since May, where they have en-
gaged in search and destroy missions, backed
by air strikes, aimed at uprooting Boko Haram
from areas where it had established control.
Curfews and other restrictions on move-
ment have been introduced, and the entire
telephone network across the three states
has been shut down in a bid to disrupt Boko
Harams ability to co-ordinate operations. The
authorities have also encouraged the emer-
gence of local vigilante groups popularly
known as the Civilian JTF in towns across
the region.
Although Boko Harams shift towards at-
tacks on softer civilian targets is partly a sim-
ple tactical adaptation to this more restrictive
TDemo
operating environment, and a means of as-
serting its relevance, it also appears aimed at
punishing local populations for their co-oper-
ation with the security forces, and dissuading
them from continuing to participate in
initiatives such as the Civilian JTF. This has
been particularly evident in the escalation of
the groups campaign against schools, which
have been the target of a series of increasingly
lethal attacks in recent months.
September massacres
The deadliest of the September attacks
attributed to Boko Haram occurred on 17
September, when gunmen carried out an
indiscriminate massacre of civilians travelling
on the highway between Maiduguri, the pro-
vincial capital of Borno, and Damaturu, the
provincial capital of Yobe. Militants disguised
in military uniforms set up a fake checkpoint
near the town of Benisheik, in Borno, and
then began executing travellers and burning
vehicles, including trucks carrying food to
local markets.
Locals also reported that the militants
burned multiple residences and other build-
ings in the area. An anonymous security
source stationed in Benisheik told Al Jazeera,
They came in droves, driving about 20 pick-
up trucks, adding that they were armed with
anti-aircraft guns.
At least 143 people were killed in the at-
tack, while a security source cited by Nigerian
newspaper This Day claimed that some of
the victims had been decapitated. We found
10 corpses by the road side near Benisheik
just before Ngamdu village; the victims were
beheaded and their heads placed on their
chests, said the source.
Two days later, on 19 September, suspected
ihs.com/janes
14/11/2013 14:41:46

Boko Haram militants carried out a similar
attack on the road between Maiduguri and
Bamboa, with police sources reporting that 16
civilians were killed.
Subsequently, on 26 September, suspected
Boko Haram militants killed six civilians in
Gamboru, a remote town in Borno near the
border with Cameroon. The following night,
the militants returned to the town and killed
a further 21 civilians. Reports gave no indica-
tion of any motive behind the attacks.
Finally, on 29 September, an unknown
number of suspected Boko Haram militants
attacked an agricultural college in Gujba,
a rural area around 50 kilometres south of
Damaturu. According to a surviving student,
the gunmen arrived on motorcycles and in
two all-terrain pickup trucks at around 0100
local time. Some of the gunmen were wear-
ing military uniforms, and they appeared to
know the layout of the compound, attacking
the four male dormitories while avoiding the
womens dormitory.
Inside the college, the gunmen executed
anyone they found. They started gather-
ing students into groups outside, then they
opened re and killed one group and then
ihs.com/janes
020-023_JIR1312_F9_BokoTI.indd 21
moved onto the next group and killed them,
said one survivor. The gunmen then went
on to attack residents living in the area
surrounding the school.
With the telephone network disabled, the
gunmen appear to have been able to take
their time in carrying out the massacre. The
following day, bodies were found in dormi-
tories, classrooms, and in the surrounding
bush, and unconrmed reports claimed some
had been decapitated. Forty students were
initially conrmed killed, but Nigerian news-
papers claimed the death toll rose to at least
78 following searches of the area.
School attacks
The massacre of students at Gujba was the
deadliest in a series of escalating attacks
against schools that have largely crippled the
education system in Borno and Yobe.
Boko Harams systematic targeting of state
and private schools began in late February
2012, when four schools in Maiduguri were
destroyed in nighttime arson attacks. This
came against the backdrop of a security crack-
down by the JTF, which had been deployed to
Borno state in June 2011 as part of Operation
TDemo
TERRORISM & INSURGENCY
Restore Order, and Boko Haram spokesman
Abu Qaqa claimed on 26 February that the
school attacks were retaliation for the alleged
harassment by security forces of teachers
and pupils at Islamic schools in Maiduguri.
We attacked the schools because security
operatives are going to Islamiyya schools
and picking [up] teachers, he said, adding,
Unless [Islamic] teachers are allowed to be,
we would be compelled to continue attacking
[state] schools.
Notably, Abu Qaqa stressed that the aim of
such retaliatory attacks was not to cause casu-
alties. We are attacking the public schools at
night because we dont want to kill innocent
pupils, he stated.
Although the authorities insisted no such
harassment of staff and pupils at Islamic
schools was occurring, similar low-level arson
and improvised explosive device (IED) at-
tacks targeting unoccupied schools began to
proliferate across the region from February.
Evidence subsequently emerged suggesting
that some attacks were being carried out by
children co-opted by Boko Haram. One Boko
Haram prisoner among a group of child sus-
pects granted amnesty on 31 May 2013 told
Vigilantes of the Civilian Joint Task Force
mount a checkpoint on the streets of
Maiduguri in Nigeria with knives and clubs
on 7 August 2013. Civilians have joined the
local security forces in response to increasing
attacks from Boko Haram. PA: 1515075
December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 21
14/11/2013 14:41:52
 TERRORISM & INSURGENCY
reporters he had been given barrels of petrol
and paid NGN5,000 (USD31) to set re to
schools in Maiduguri.
However, the restraint evident in the initial
attacks had been abandoned by March, when
arson attacks began to be punctuated by more
lethal operations in which teachers appeared
to be the primary targets. In a signicant
development, on 18 March, suspected Boko
Haram militants attacked three schools in
Maiduguri during class hours, killing one
teacher at each school, and wounding three
pupils. Subsequently, on 9 April, two teachers
were killed in their homes, and four officials
from the Borno State Feeding Commit-
tee were killed while they were inspecting
schools in Dikwa, Borno State.
In June, Boko Haram further escalated its
campaign, with students themselves becom-
ing the focus of attacks. On 16 June, two
teachers and seven students were killed in
an attack on a boarding school in Damaturu,
Jonathan acknowledged that the initial
gains made during the state of emergency
were in danger of being reversed
and the following day, nine students were
killed as they sat an exam at a private school
in Maiduguri.
In an audio statement sent to the Nigeria
Newsday website on 18 June, Abu Zinnira, a
purported Boko Haram spokesman, claimed
this escalation was retaliation for the increas-
ing involvement of local youth in the Civilian
JTF vigilante groups. We hereby declare an
all-out war on you because you have formed
an alliance with the Nigerian military and
police to ght our brethren, Abu Zinnira
stated. We call on any parent that values the
life of his son to stop him from exposing our
members. Otherwise he is dead.
This targeting of students continued on 6
July, when 41 students and one teacher were
killed in a small-arms attack at a boarding
school in Mamudo village near Potiskum,
Yobe. Children as young as 10 were shot,
while survivors reported that others were
burned alive when militants torched the
buildings.
The Mamudo attack caused public outrage,
and in a video statement issued days later,
Boko Haram emir Imam Abubakar bin Mo-
hammed (alias Abubakar Shekau) praised the
22 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013
020-023_JIR1312_F9_BokoTI.indd 22
attack but avoided claiming responsibility.
Our religion does not permit us to touch
small children and women, but we fully sup-
port the attack on the school in Mamudo, as
well as on other schools, he claimed.
Shekau also made clear that teachers were
considered a legitimate target, and that the
arson campaign against un-Islamic schools state schools destroyed by the militants, al-
would continue. Teachers who teach West-
ern education? We will kill them. We will kill
them in front of their students, and tell the
students to henceforth study the Quran,
Shekau said. We are going to burn down
the schools, if they are not Islamic religious
schools for Allah.
Deadly impact
Speaking in April, following the rst daytime
school attacks in March, and shortly before
schools were due to re-open in May after
holidays, Musa Inuwa, the commissioner
for education in Borno State, said, We are
appealing to parents to keep their children in
school and not to be intimidated.
However, with school attendance already
badly affected by the arson campaign, the
daytime attacks convinced many parents to
keep their children away from those schools
that still remained open, and many more have
followed suit as the attacks have escalated.
Although comprehensive gures are
unavailable, in May a Borno education official
claimed Boko Haram had burned or destroyed
50 of the states 175 schools, and that around stop these embarrassing attacks.
15,000 children had stopped attending
classes, while in October a spokesman for the
governor of Yobe reported that 209 schools
had been destroyed in the state. In some of
the worst affected areas, no schools remain
open, and in an October report, Makmid Ka-
mara, Amnesty Internationals researcher for
Nigeria, stated, The attacks have generally
crippled the education system in north-
eastern Nigeria. There is a lot of fear among
students, teachers, and parents.
TDemo
Boko Harams success in attacking local
education is of particular concern in a region
where under-development is viewed by the
government as one of the key underlying
drivers feeding the insurgency. School attend-
ance gures in the northeast were already
among the lowest in the country, even before
the attacks, with the 2010 Nigeria Education
Data Survey reporting secondary school enrol-
ment in Borno at only 28%.
The government has pledged to rebuild all
though no such funds are available for the pri-
vate schools that have been targeted. Further-
more, Boko Haram is seemingly deliberately
targeting schools that are renovated after
attacks, with the IRIN news agency reporting
in May that one school in the Gwange area of
Maiduguri had been renovated and then burnt
down again on four occasions.
In what may be considered another success
for Boko Harams campaign, the collapse
in attendance at secular state and private
schools has been accompanied by sharp rises
in enrolment in the regions Islamic schools,
which Boko Haram has explicitly stated will
not be attacked.
Security challenges
Reporting from the region has been heavily
restricted under the state of emergency, and
the government has used this opportunity to
present a positive account of its successes in
degrading Boko Harams capabilities. How-
ever, the recent series of civilian massacres,
and the school attacks in particular, have
severely undermined popular condence in
the progress being made, and have prompted
mounting criticism in national media.
Following the attack on the agricultural
college in Gujba, President Jonathan stated on
29 September, I held a meeting with service
chiefs on the killings of students in Yobe
State... We discussed and resolved that we
must do more... I have asked the service chiefs
to meet again now and see what we can do to
Reuters news agency cited a government
source present at the meeting who claimed
that special security cover would now be
provided in a bid to restore condence in state
schools, including the posting of soldiers at
schools across the region.
Jonathan also acknowledged that the initial
gains made during the state of emergency
were in danger of being reversed as Boko
Haram adapted, and hinted that the secu-
rity forces would themselves adapt to the
evolving threat. When I declared a state of
emergency things calmed down. Now they are
looking for soft targets... If the drum is chang-
ing, we must change steps, he added.
ihs.com/janes
14/11/2013 14:42:11

In a subsequent speech on 13 October, Jona-
than also acknowledged that Boko Haram had
exposed the countrys limited security capa-
bilities, but stressed that this was being used
as an opportunity to overhaul the security
services. Before the advent of Boko Haram,
our security infrastructure was very poor, our
security people, army, navy, air force, police
were all doing nothing. We were challenged
by Boko Haram to improve, he said. Every
day, security chiefs now think of how to con-
tinue to improve on capacity building.
However, securing all schools across the re-
gion is likely to prove a signicant challenge,
and also risks exposing small, isolated units of
soldiers to attack. Nigerias Daily Trust news-
paper cited several unnamed defence sources
on 7 October which claimed that the military
had suffered heavy losses in September that
had gone largely unreported, and that opera-
tions were being hampered by logistical prob-
lems as well as operational blunders. One
source said, Almost all the units in the eye of
the storm have under-stocked armouries.
The limited ammunition available to units
on operations was identied as a particular
problem, with the sources claiming it had led
to security forces frequently being out-
gunned, and on occasions, routed. The sources
cited a 13 September engagement in which
an officer and dozens of soldiers under his
command were killed near Gubio in Borno
State when they ran out of ammunition after
being ambushed. Similarly, speaking after the
17 September massacre of travellers near Ben-
isheik, General Mohammed Yusuf revealed
that troops had run out of ammunition while
trying to repel the militants.
There has also been mounting criticism of
the telecommunications shutdown, which
was initially implemented in Adamawa,
Borno, and Yobe on 15 May, the day after
the declaration of the state of emergency.
Subsequently, on 19 June, Borno State also
shut down the satellite telephone network,
which the military claimed was being used to
co-ordinate the school attacks.
However, the telecommunications
shutdown has heightened the vulnerability
of targets in remote rural areas, which have
no way of alerting security forces in nearby
towns in the event of an attack. Following
the 6 July massacre at the Mamudo boarding
school, Yobe governor Ibrahim Gaidam called
for the shutdown to be lifted, blaming it for
the slow security force response. A farmer,
whose property adjoined the school, was
cited by The Guardian newspaper on 14 July as
ihs.com/janes
020-023_JIR1312_F9_BokoTI.indd 23
TERRORISM & INSURGENCY
stating, I saw the gunmen sneaking into the
school compound in hordes but I couldnt call
any soldiers for help. During the 24 October
attack on Damaturu, international media
reports cited residents as saying it took more
than an hour for the military to respond to
the attack, despite it being a regional capital.
Such calls were also renewed following the
attack on the college in Gujba, where again
the disabled telephone network prevented
the security forces being notied of the attack
until too late, with the rst soldiers arriv-
ing two hours after the militants had left.
However, as yet the authorities have given no
indication that the ban might be lifted.
Conclusion
Given that Boko Haram translates as West-
ern education is forbidden, it is perhaps
not surprising that Western-type schools
are increasingly a focus of attacks by the
group. However, it is unlikely that the recent
escalation in school attacks, and the mas-
sacres of students in particular, are driven by
ideology alone.
Although Boko Haram has regularly criti-
cised the role played by Western-type schools
in undermining local Islamic values, schools
were not a focus for attacks during the rst
years of the groups campaign, while state-
ments accompanying the beginning of the
arson attacks in 2012 emphasised that they
were intended solely as reciprocity for the
perceived harassment of Islamic schools, and
casualties were avoided for over a year after
the attacks began.
Furthermore, Alkali Wakil, a lawyer
who represents Boko Haram suspects and
describes herself as a personal friend of the
groups deceased founder, Mohammed Yusuf,
argues that the belief that Boko Haram op-
poses Western education is a misunderstand-
ing. She told IRIN in April 2012 that Yusuf
wasnt against Western education, and nor
are his followers. What he was against is the
inuence of Westerners on our culture The
leaders all have Western education, and their
children too are all in Western education.
Whether this remains accurate is unclear,
but it is likely that the increasingly brutal tar-
geting of teachers and students evident since
mid-2013 is part of the broader trend towards
the targeting of the civilian population in
general, which itself seems driven by factors
TDemo
associated with the state of emergency.
Attacks on soft civilian targets, particularly
in rural areas, are a pragmatic response to the
militarisation of urban areas since the security
crackdown, and serve as an effective counter
to the governments narrative that security is
being restored in the region.
Furthermore, as suggested by Abu Zinniras
June declaration of all-out war, it appears
Boko Haram or at least elements within the
loose-knit movement is seeking to punish
the population, and especially the youth, for
its participation via the vigilante groups in the
governments counter-insurgency campaign.
The leader of a vigilante group in
Maiduguri, Abubakar Mallum, told IRIN in
June, We know the [school] attacks are
aimed at rattling us to abandon the task we
have started of exposing [Boko Haram] mem-
bers in our area. They are just using students
as scapegoats.
However, there is evidence that this
strategy is proving counter-productive, and
is only strengthening popular resistance to
Boko Haram. The group has declared war on
youths in Maiduguri and Damaturu, which
has motivated many young men to join
[vigilante groups], Mallum stated. The bat-
tle line has been drawn. Youths have realised
they either ght by exposing Boko Haram or
they risk being killed by Boko Haram.
As such, although the high number of civil-
ian casualties in recent months has under-
mined condence in the progress being made
in countering Boko Harams insurgency, they
are nevertheless indicative of a growing cleav-
age between Boko Haram and the population
within which it operates, a development that
has the potential to signicantly constrain
the groups capabilities and inuence over the
longer term.
This article was first published online at
ihs.com/janes on 12 November 2013.
X ON THE WEB
Nigerian city raid undermines militarys
claim that Boko Haram ghters cannot
stage major offensives
Burning curve Assessing Africas
arc of instability
Hard target Can Nigerias army cope
with Boko Haram?
Author
Will Hartley is a freelance counter-
terrorism analyst specialising in Africa,
and a former head of IHS Janes
Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JTIC).
ihs.com/janes
December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 23
14/11/2013 14:42:11
 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
world
Tomorrows
Prospects for UN Security Council reform
Discussions are ongoing about what form UN Security Council reform should take,
although such talks are characterised by a lack of consensus. IHS Janes examines
the various proposals and the implications of any of these being implemented.
X KEY POINTS
Saudi Arabias refusal to take up a
seat on the United Nations Security
Council has reinvigorated discussion
about potential reform of the council.
However, there is a lack of consensus
on what this reform might involve,
meaning that there is little prospect of
meaningful progress in the medium-
to-long term.
Frustration with this lack of reform
could encourage a shift towards
using regional groupings to carry out
peacekeeping operations, although
still within the context of a UN
mandate.
S
audi diplomacy is known for its dis-
cretion, its preference for negotiating
through back-channel discussions,
and its unwillingness to come out strongly
into the open. For this reason, it was particu-
larly signicant when Saudi Arabia turned
down a non-permanent seat on the United
Nations Security Council on 18 October,
citing the bodys failure to full its responsi-
bility to keep world peace, and specically its
failure to resolve the situation in Syria.
The statement by the Saudi ministry of
foreign affairs added that Saudi Arabia has
no other option but to turn down Security
Council membership until it is reformed and
given the means to accomplish its duties.
As well as specifying the Syrian conict,
the statement referred to the unresolved
Palestinian issue, and what it termed the
UNs failure to remove weapons of mass
24 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013
024-027_JIR1312_F7_UNSC.indd 24
destruction (WMDs) from the Middle East.
This gesture by Saudi Arabia was timed to
create maximum impact. The country had
just been elected as one of the 10 non-perma-
nent members of the Security Council; this
was the rst time Saudi Arabia had been se-
lected, and is a position for which it had been
campaigning for several years. Turning down
such a coveted role which would have sat
it alongside the ve permanent members of
the Security Council (China, France, Russia,
the United Kingdom, and the United States
known as the P5) for a two-year period
signies a major gesture of protest and will
add weight to the countrys call for Security
Council reform.
Reform potential
The fact that Saudi Arabia has pointedly
referred to the Syrian conict comes as little
surprise. Riyadh has become increasingly
frustrated with the lack of UN action to
resolve the conict, most recently dem-
onstrated in early October when Minister
for Foreign Affairs Prince Saud al-Faisal bin
Abdulaziz al-Saud refused to give a speech at
the UN General Assembly, citing Syria as the
reason. Saudi Arabias frustration is grounded
in the fact that the UNs founding charter
tasks the Security Council with maintaining
international peace, but the council has been
unable to agree on a common approach to the
Syrian conict.
Technically, the Security Council is the
TDemo
most senior body responsible for interna-
tional security operations, and is charged
with establishing peacekeeping operations,
imposing international sanctions, and
authorising military action in order to resolve
conict. In theory, such decisions are taken
by the 15-member Security Council and
must be supported by all 193 members of the
General Assembly.
The Security Council has experienced
several success stories since its inception
in 1946, such as Sierra Leone and Liberia in
the 1990s and 2000s, where it sanctioned
peacekeeping operations that helped bring
an end to civil conict, and overseeing the
separation of Sudan and South Sudan in 2011.
UN peacekeepers are currently present in 16
countries, either as UN-led missions or in co-
ordination with other organisations, such as
the UN/African Union (AU) Hybrid Operation
in Darfur (also known as the African Union -
United Nations Mission in Darfur: UNAMID).
However, there have also been some
high-prole failures, particularly in situations
where the Security Council might have been
expected to full its obligations to resolve
conict but did not do so. Recently, these
have included Iraq, Sri Lanka, and Syria, as
well as more historical conicts such as Viet-
nam, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
in 1979, when an attempt to condemn the
Soviet actions was prevented by Moscows
veto. As with Syria at present, the main
reason behind the Security Councils failure
to act in these cases was its inability to reach
a consensus on what action to take, and
specically the inability of the P5 to reach
an understanding.
Each of the P5 countries holds a veto,
meaning that action by the Security Council
cannot be authorised if even one P5 member
uses its veto. For example, China and Russia
ihs.com/janes
14/11/2013 11:44:47

have vetoed UN resolutions proposing sanc-
tions on Syria, leaving the Security Council
little option but to seek solutions that the
two countries will approve. In September
2013, the Security Council voted unani-
mously to nd and destroy Syrias stockpile
of chemical weapons, but ongoing opposition
from China and Russia to further sanctions
or military intervention in Syria means that
these are unlikely, leaving the internal con-
ict largely unaffected.
Frustration with the voting mechanism
of the Security Council has prompted calls
for reform from several countries, and both
former UN secretary-general Ko Annan and
current secretary-general Ban Ki-moon have
appointed panels to come up with reform
proposals. In late 2004, the UNs High-Level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
issued a report recommending the expansion
of the Council to 24 members, with Annan
calling for the General Assembly to back
these reforms.
However, the reform was not passed, and
the momentum for change slowed in the
aftermath of the failed initiative. Part of
the reason for its failure was the inability of
various groups to agree on what form the
Security Council reform should take. In this
regard, some factions within the UN have
come up with their own reform proposals,
all with the stated aim of expediting the UN
Security Council decision-making process
and making the council more representative
of the global power balance.
ihs.com/janes
024-027_JIR1312_F7_UNSC.indd 25
Competing proposals
Many of the reform proposals advocate ex-
panding the Security Council from its current
membership of 15, which consists of ve per-
manent seats and 10 non-permanent rotating
seats. The proponents of such expansion
argue that the General Assembly has grown
signicantly since 1946, from 51 members to
193, but the Security Council has only grown
from 11 to 15, with the permanent members
remaining the same. In this view, the current
Security Council is anachronistic, as it does
not reect shifting geopolitical realities.
The leading proponents of reform along
these lines are the G4 (Brazil, Germany, India
and Japan); the Coffee Club (led by Italy and
currently comprising around 50 countries,
including Argentina, Canada, Egypt, Mexico,
Pakistan, South Korea, Spain, and Turkey);
and the Ezulwini Consensus (a position on
international relations and reform of the UN
agreed by several African governments).
Of these, the G4 probably has the highest
prole. Comprising four of the worlds largest
economies, the G4 countries are lobbying to
become permanent members of the Security
Council, as well as arguing for two permanent
African seats. They also argue that this would
be more representative on a regional basis,
ensuring that all regions have a voice in the
Security Council and can inuence decisions.
The group points to the fact that eight of the
UNs 16 current peacekeeping operations are
taking place in Africa, but the continent has
no permanent seat or veto right allowing
TDemo
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
it to inuence how these operations are
established and maintained.
The G4 countries argument is also based
on economic power, arguing that their grow-
ing geopolitical power should be translated
into representation within the Security
Council. Brazil and India also point to their
roles as representatives of developing econo-
mies, while Germany and Japan indicate their
economic and military power and, in Japans
case, its position as a developed Asian power.
These arguments have sparked vitupera-
tive opposition from other factions calling
for reform of the Security Council. Indeed,
the Coffee Club (also known as Uniting for
Consensus) group of countries has emerged
in opposition to the G4 proposals and has put
together its own reform proposition.
The group opposes the candidature of the
G4 for permanent seats, arguing that this
reform would simply perpetuate the existing
two-tier system whereby a small group of
countries are able to approve or veto deci-
sions without any input from other states.
Instead, the Coffee Club proposes expanding
the number of non-permanent members to
20 in order to give smaller states a chance to
sit on the council. This proposal was revised
in 2009 to suggest a new type of non-per-
manent member that would sit for between
three and ve years, giving them a chance to
implement more long-term policies. In both
cases, the non-permanent members would be
selected on a regionally representative basis.
Although the Coffee Club proposal claims
Security Council members at the UN head-
quarters on 27 September 2013, voting on a
resolution that would require Syria to give up
its chemical weapons. The Security Council
voted unanimously to secure and destroy
Syrias chemical weapons stockpile. PA: 1515074
December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 25
14/11/2013 11:44:50
 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Proposals for Security Council reform

Group Proposal Date proposed Veto stance
UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Expansion of Security Council to 24 seats, either through model A or model B. December 2004 No new vetos but P5 retain veto
Challenges and Change Model A proposes six new permanent seats and three new non-permanent seats; (model A);
B suggests eight new non-permanent seats with four-year terms. P5 retain veto (model B).

G4 (Brazil, Germany, India, Japan)
Coffee Club (led by Italy)
Ezulwini Consensus
Six new permanent seats. 2005 Allow veto to remain and extended
to new permanent members.
Non-permanent seats increased to 20. The introduction of three-to-ve-year terms 2005, Several options, including abolition
for non-permanent members, selecting from regional groups on a rotating basis. revised 2009 and restricted use.
Two new permanent seats and two new non-permanent seats, all for African 2005 New permanent seats to have a
countries, to be selected by the African Union. veto.

to offer a more representative Security
Council, much of its rationale is driven by
regional geopolitical concerns. For example,
Argentina and Mexico are strongly opposed
to Brazils campaign for a permanent seat,
as they view this as an attempt by Brazil to
promote itself as the leading Latin Ameri-
can country on the global stage. As a result,
Argentina Brazils traditional rival in South
America and Mexico, which is battling with
Brazil for the position of leading economy
in the region, are both unwilling to counte-
nance any reform in which Brazil would gain
a permanent seat. Similar considerations
apply in other regions: Pakistan is opposed
to Indias Security Council bid, while South
Korea opposes that of Japan.
Similarly, the reform proposal from the
Ezulwini Consensus aims to boost the role
of African countries on the Security Council,
without reference to other regions. The con-
sensus was reached by the 53 member states
of the AU in 2005 and calls for two new per-
manent seats and two new non-permanent
seats to be granted to African countries, with
the specic countries taking these seats to
be chosen by the AU. The new permanent
members would have the same veto powers
as the P5 as part of this proposal.
This AU position differs from the two other
proposals previously outlined as it does not
aim to be a comprehensive reform proposi-
tion. Instead, it focuses on laying out the
reforms that the AU wishes to see adopted,
which could then be incorporated into a
broader reform proposal. This means that
the Ezulwini Consensus is not necessarily
incompatible with other reform suggestions,
as long as the Africa-specic requirements
are met.
Impact of reforms
Should any of these reforms be adopted,
or another reform along similar lines, this
would represent the greatest shake-up of
the Security Council since 1963, when four
non-permanent seats were added. The most
immediate impact would be political, as the
sheer fact of the reform would assuage many
of the countries in various factions who have
been calling for greater representation on
the council. However, given the Security
Councils peacekeeping mandate, it would
necessarily have an impact on the bodys in-
ternational security operations and decisions.
Most immediately, reform might boost
participation in UN-led peacekeeping
operations, both in terms of funding and
personnel. Although many countries already
participate, viewing this as a way of bolster-
ing their international exposure and military
expertise, others have been unwilling to
contribute troops to operations of which they
may not approve, or in which they feel they
have had little stake in the decision-making
process. For instance, the UN has sometimes
experienced problems in securing sufficient
African troops to meet demands for opera-
tions in the region to be comprised primarily
of Africans. An example of this is the UN
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation
Mission in Mali (Mission multidimension-
nelle intgre des Nations Unies pour la
stabilisation au Mali: MINUSMA), which is
currently 6,000 troops short of its authorised
total deployment. Although this shortfall is a
result of several factors, not least the rapidly
growing number of African-based peacekeep-
ing operations and weak capacity on the part
of some African militaries, the lack of African
permanent representation on the Security
Council may also be a factor.
For this reason, over the past decade,
the AU has begun to play a greater role in
initiating and leading peacekeeping opera-
tions, viewing conicts in Africa as matters
that should be addressed by African-specic
organisations. A notable example of this
TDemo
is the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).
These missions are approved by the Security
Council, but reect an acknowledgement
that there is a greater desire for regional
leadership within the UN structure.
Beyond Africa, greater regional represen-
tation on the Security Council could also
encourage countries who have not previously
contributed many troops to do so. For exam-
ple, Brazil, which led its rst UN mission in
Haiti in 2004, could encourage more Latin
American militaries to follow suit. This would
have the cascade effect of providing more
militaries with exposure to UN training and
practices, therefore improving prospects for
international security co-ordination.
Another ramication of Security Council
reform would be involvement by more states,
whether permanent or non-permanent, in
the decision-making process. In particular,
more countries would be able to discuss and
vote on issues such as Syria. As most reform
proposals suggest a regionally representative
distribution for new members (formalising
the current rough distribution of non-per-
manent seats between ve regional blocs),
this would mean a greater likelihood that
countries from the region of conict would
be able to discuss the action to be taken. For
example, in the 2013 conguration of the
Security Council, there are no Middle Eastern
countries represented in discussions of the
Syrian conict.
Involvement by more countries would
potentially lend more legitimacy to decisions
made by the Security Council. Although all
UN member states are obliged to abide by the
decisions of the Security Council, this does
not prevent erce criticism of controver-
sial decisions, nor does it prevent members
refusing to contribute troops to military
actions they do not approve of. Expanding
the council would not prevent dissent over
its decisions, but it may lessen this dissent by
ensuring that more countries are invested in
the decision-making process and therefore
support its outcomes.
Another area that could be affected by
Security Council reform is the implementa-
tion of International Court of Justice (ICJ)

26 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013 ihs.com/janes

024-027_JIR1312_F7_UNSC.indd 26 14/11/2013 11:45:04


decisions. At present, all UN members are
obliged to abide by and implement ICJ deci-
sions and can be referred to the Security
Council if they do not do so. In practice,
this has proved difficult, as referrals against
the P5 countries or any of their allies can be
dismissed following a Security Council vote
or P5 veto. Expanding the council would
not necessarily remove this veto issue, but
could mean that a vote by a large majority of
council members in favour of implementing
an ICJ ruling would put greater pressure on
P5 members not to use their veto. As with
other decision-making processes, more buy-
in from member states would further add to
the legitimacy of ICJ decisions, potentially
discouraging countries from ignoring rulings.
Obstacles to reform
Despite long-term lobbying by the various
pro-reform groups, Security Council reform
has so far failed to move beyond the discus-
sion stage. There are several reasons for this,
not least the very existence of the pro-reform
groups, some of which such as the G4 and
the Coffee Club are directly contradictory
in their proposals. Although the Ezulwini
Consensus model could be incorporated into
a broader reform, the G4 and the Coffee
Club currently appear to cancel each other
out: there has not yet been any substantive
dialogue towards establishing a compromise
reform proposal that could incorporate
elements of each.
In addition, support from the P5 has
been limited. The P5 countries are crucial
to passing any reform, as any one of these
countries could veto a potential reform.
There is perhaps an inherent contradiction
in asking the P5 to approve any reform that
could be viewed as lessening their power,
both within the Security Council itself and in
terms of the geopolitical great power status
that is bestowed on the councils only ve
permanent members.
All P5 countries have expressed their
support for reform, such as US backing for
Indias bid for a permanent seat, but the
repeated failure to advance a reform agenda
may indicate that such support is merely
rhetoric. Indeed, the P5 countries have little
to gain and much to lose from a Security
Council reform that could dilute their domi-
nance, particularly if the reform addresses
the veto issue.
Reforming the veto is the most controver-
sial part of any reform proposal and would
experience the most difficulty in being passed
ihs.com/janes
024-027_JIR1312_F7_UNSC.indd 27
by the P5 members, who would be likely to
resist any attempt to remove the veto or
expand it to new members. All the reform
proposals except that of the UN High-Level
Panel propose amending the veto, with most
arguing for it to be expanded to the new
permanent members.
An alternative proposal albeit one rarely
discussed is for the veto to be removed
altogether. Under this argument, it is the use
of the veto that most impedes the Security
Council from performing its mandated duty
to keep the peace, as just one veto can halt
any action, as in the current case of China
and Russias veto of UN resolutions proposing
sanctions on Syria.
Although the use of the veto was particu-
larly useful during the Cold War, when it
helped ensure that Security Council action
could not be forced over the wishes of either
the eastern or western blocs, the mutual
deterrent effect of the veto might be less
necessary in the post-Cold War era. Should
the veto be removed, Security Council ac-
tion could then be approved by a two-thirds
majority vote.
However, if it would be difficult to win
approval from the P5 for expanding veto
powers, then removing the veto power would
be all-but impossible, as no P5 member would
be likely to agree to losing this power. For
this reason, most proposals focus on expand-
ing the veto to new members, although the
High-Level Panel is perhaps more realis-
tic in suggesting that only the P5 should
retain veto powers, even with the creation
of new permanent members. Indeed, this
might be the only form of reform that the
P5 would seriously consider, as it preserves
their veto right while acceding to demands
for an expanded and more representative
Security Council. However, a reform of this
type would run the risk of frustrating even
the new council members, as it could be
seen as somewhat tokenistic, by expanding
membership but not the use of the ultimate
voting right.
Outlook
Given the conicting arguments, it is
unlikely that Security Council reform will
be achieved in the medium-to-long term.
Instead, proponents of reform are likely to
continue lobbying for it, although no con-
TDemo
sensus has been reached on what exact form
this should take. This will ensure that the
status quo remains in place for the foresee-
able future, raising the prospect of further
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
frustration such as that of Saudi Arabia in
regard to Syria.
In the absence of any reform, there is a risk
that such frustration will become increas-
ingly widespread and could begin to affect
the functioning of the Security Council over
the long term. In such a scenario, member
states would become increasingly unwill-
ing to contribute to military intervention
or peacekeeping operations in protest at
the lack of reform. As a result, international
security operations could increasingly be
devolved to regional organisations, as has
already been the case with the AU. Given the
opprobrium that followed the US invasion
of Iraq in 2003 without a UN resolution, it
is extremely unlikely that frustration with
the Security Council would lead to regional
security organisations taking action without
a UN resolution. Indeed, the military action
undertaken by NATO in Libya in 2011 might
be a template for such devolution in future,
with NATO effecting military interven-
tion within the context of a UN resolution
authorising action.
Although this would preserve the primacy
of the Security Council as the pre-eminent
decision-making body, devolving action to
regional security organisations, whether
planned or not, could eventually result in a
less visible UN presence on the ground. With
the blue helmets of the UN peacekeepers be-
ing replaced by a diverse selection of regional
peacekeeping troops, the popular perception
of the UN as the ultimate arbiter of interna-
tional security could begin to fade.
However, this is a very long-term risk,
and one that opponents of Security Council
reform may view as worth taking in order to
preserve the status quo. With no immediate
risks forcing the council to consider reform, it
seems likely that hopes of far-reaching Secu-
rity Council reform will remain unrealised in
the medium term and most likely beyond.
This article was first published online at
ihs.com/janes on 8 November 2013.
X ON THE WEB
Crossing the red line chemical
weapons use in Syria
Highway to Sahel Mali develops
road map for political transition
ihs.com/janes
December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 27
14/11/2013 11:45:04
 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Strait
talking
Chinas military power grows in the Taiwan Strait
China is continuing to build up its military strength while increasing ties with Taiwan,
as Beijing maintains its claims on the island. J Michael Cole examines how the shifting
balance of forces raises the threat of blockade and armed conict facing Taiwan.
X KEY POINTS
Despite growing ties between
Taiwan and China, Beijing has never
abandoned the option of using force
to bring about reunication and tween Taiwan an island of 23 million people
continues to regard the island as a
core strategic interest.
The balance of military power in the
Taiwan Strait has shifted decisively to
Chinas advantage and will continue
to do so over the next decade,
making armed intervention by Beijing
theoretically practicable.
Nevertheless, strategic developments
will weigh on Beijing, including the
extent of the USs rebalancing of
policy towards Asia, the outcome of
Taiwans 2016 elections, social order
on the island, and the situation in
Hong Kong.
G
overnment officials in Beijing, Taipei,
and Washington, echoed by main-
stream media, have hailed relations
between the two countries across the Taiwan
Strait as the most encouraging in more than
60 years. However, an annual report issued by
Taiwans Ministry of National Defence (MND)
on 8 October offered an alternative outlook,
claiming that China remains the greatest
threat to the islands security and is acquiring
capabilities to ensure a successful invasion
and occupation by 2020. Beijing has never
28 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013
028-033_JIR1312_F6_China-Taiwan.indd 28
relinquished the military option to occupy
Taiwan, which it regards as a province await-
ing reunication, by force if necessary.
The National Defence Report 2013 was
released at a time of growing exchanges be-
defence establishment raise two important
with a democratically elected government
and China. Since the election of President Ma
Ying-jeou in 2008, representing the National
Peoples Party (Kuomintang: KMT), and his
re-election in January 2012 for a second and
nal four-year term, relations between the
two sides across the Taiwan Strait have, on the
surface, improved from previous years.
Since 2008, 19 bilateral agreements have
been signed, including the landmark Econom-
ic Co-operation Framework Agreement signed
on 29 June 2010. More such agreements are
expected before Ma steps down in 2014. Tai-
wans tourism industry has opened its doors to
China, which now constitutes the islands top
source of tourists. Co-operation now occurs
on a regular basis, from cultural links to Track
II diplomatic exchanges involving academics,
researchers, and officials from both sides.
Yet, despite the undeniable signs of rap-
prochement, contact between the two sides
remains largely limited to meetings between
KMT and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
officials at forums and, in the absence of of-
TDemo
cial relations, between Taiwans semi-official
Straits Exchange Foundation and its Chinese
counterpart, the Association for Relations
Across the Taiwan Strait.
Therefore, the MND reports claims of
increasing Chinese military capability and
possibly hostile intent have offered a sober
counterweight to notions of improving rela-
tions. Such reservations within the Taiwanese
questions: rst, whether the MNDs assess-
ment of Chinas future military capability is
credible and accurate; and second, whether
China even if it did possess the military ca-
pability to occupy the island would actually
consider it strategically within its interests to
pursue the option.
China losing patience
Unable to obtain the consent of the Taiwanese
public to move forward with more sensitive
forms of engagement with Beijing, such as the
signing of a proposed peace accord or a mili-
tary condence-building mechanism, Taipei
has been compelled to keep a certain distance
from cross-strait talks and agreements that
are political in nature. There is very low public
support for unication, alongside steadily
rising Taiwanese self-identity and support for
the status quo or de jure independence.
A poll by Taiwanese cable news channel
TVBS released on 30 October indicates that,
given only two choices (unication or inde-
pendence), 71% of Taiwanese would choose
independence, against 18% who favoured
unication. Offered three options (unica-
tion, independence, and the status quo), 64%
preferred the status quo, 24% independence,
ihs.com/janes
14/11/2013 11:45:53

and 7% unication. Such public sentiment has
forced the Ma administration to push political
talks which Beijing has long sought into
the future.
Chinese president and CCP secretary-
general Xi Jinping now appears to be losing
patience with the KMT and fears a return to
office in 2016 of the pro-independence Demo-
cratic Progressive Party (DPP), which ruled
Taiwan during 200008. Consequently, while
Beijing is striving to establish a peaceful
atmosphere and, through sustained political
warfare and propaganda efforts, to weaken
the enemys awareness, it has continued to
develop a military force capable of deterring
Taiwanese independence and coercing Taipei
into ending the delaying of political talks.
Such political warfare and propaganda
includes the orchestration of visits by DPP
officials and retired generals to China by
Chinese intelligence, co-opting retired gener-
als to support peaceful unication, and a
worldwide campaign to shape perceptions
about Taiwan regarding unication.
More openly than in recent years, the
National Defence Report 2013 contends that
the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), if called
upon to resolve the Taiwan issue, could do
so successfully. Resolution of the Taiwan issue
remains a core interest of the CCP and is an
essential stepping stone in Chinas emergence
as a superpower, states the report.
Although the report could be overstating
the presumed adversarys capabilities in order
ihs.com/janes
028-033_JIR1312_F6_China-Taiwan.indd 29
to justify higher budgetary requests, there is
little doubt that the balance of power in the
Taiwan Strait has shifted in Chinas favour and
that the gap will continue to widen over the
next decade.
Speaking on condition of anonymity, one of
the consultants who was involved in drafting
the National Defence Report 2013 told IHS
Janes that, with the document, the ministry
seemed to be aiming to sensitise the civilian
leadership and the general public to a greater
extent than previously to the nature of the
The Peoples Liberation Army already
has the capability to blockade Taiwan
and to occupy its outlying islands
threat from China and the serious challenges
that Taiwan faces in maintaining a balance of
forces in the strait.
In many ways, a more independent ap-
praisal of the threat from China is a major
departure from the earlier years of the Ma ad-
ministration. Formerly, military officials were
often reluctant to refer to China by name, lest
this conict with the Presidential Offices ef-
forts to improve relations with Beijing.
As the report notes, Chinas official defence
spending in 2013, set at CNY720.2 billion
(USD116.3 billion), is roughly 10 times that of
Taiwan. Strikingly, it also claims that the PLA
TDemo
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
benets from an immense hidden budget
for arms acquisitions and development that
is not included in the official budget, adding
that [Chinas] actual defence spending is
[therefore] two to three times the amount it
discloses (roughly USD232349 billion).
IHS Janes Defence Budgets assesses that
the Taiwanese MNDs claim is substantially
overstated, while nevertheless believing
total defence expenditure to be at least 15%
higher than stated in the official budget, at
around USD132 billion. A total expenditure
of two to three times higher as stated in the
Taiwanese report appears unlikely, unless
provision is made for expenditure on internal
security forces or some form of purchasing-
power-parity adjustment is made. Indeed,
IHS Janes assesses that the official Chinese
defence budget gure may now be closer to
reality than it has been in the past. That said,
the PLAs accounting systems do make it pos-
sible to maintain a hidden budget, for example
by excluding research and development on
dual-use scientic projects that may have a
military application or by excluding spending
on defence pensions.
Taiwans navy launches a surface-to-air SM-2
missile from a Kidd class destroyer during the
Hai-Biao (Sea Dart) annual exercises off the
northeastern coast of Taiwan on 26 September
2013. PA: 1454455
December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 29
14/11/2013 11:45:55
 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
IHS Janes assessment of military balance of forces
1,370,000
3,533
359
233 727
4 the capability to encircle Taiwan and attack
57
2013 IHS / David Playford: 1487002
Through annual double-digit growth in de-
fence spending for well over a decade, China
continues to strengthen its military prepara-
tions against Taiwan, and is actively develop-
ing and procuring new weapons platforms and
precision weapons, so when a dispute arises in
the Taiwan Strait, it can deter or delay a for-
eign military force [the US and possibly Japan]
from intervening, the report notes. It adds
that China plans to build comprehensive
capabilities for using military force against
Taiwan by 2020.
Cheng Yun-peng, director-general of the
Department of Strategic Planning at Taiwans
Ministry of National Defence, claried on
7 October that the date 2020 was a rough
estimate derived from current trends in the
Taiwan Strait, not the result of a scientic ap-
praisal of the situation.
Overall, with the current military balance
of power, the PLA already has the capability
to blockade Taiwan and to occupy its outlying
islands, although an amphibious assault on
Taiwan proper remains a daunting challenge,
30 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013
028-033_JIR1312_F6_China-Taiwan.indd 30
Notes:
IHS Janes gures are estimates of in-service materiel
[1] Include reservists of approximately 1,130,000 (Taiwan)
and 510,000 (China)
[2] Includes only major surface combatants (corvette,
frigate, destroyer, aircraft carrier)
[3] Includes amphibious assault ships, landing craft (all
types), hovercraft
Source: IHS Janes Military Capabilities Module
2,115,000
11,100
2,213
26 78
302 269
especially if US forces based in the Pacic were
to intervene in the early phase of a conict.
War footing?
It is apparent that [Chinas] thought on
driving unication with military force and
military preparations against Taiwan were not
adjusted as cross-strait relations improved,
the report continues. It offers the evidence
that the PLA has continued to carry out eld
exercises targeting Taiwan, with greater
focus on joint services operations, while
modernising and augmenting the tactical mis-
siles deployed by the Second Artillery Corps
against the island, which the report claims
number 1,400.
Chinese espionage efforts targeting, for
example, Taiwans defence acquisition pro-
grammes and command, control, communica-
tions computers, intelligence, surveillance
TDemo
and reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture have
also continued, with major spy cases in recent
years undermining condence in the Taiwan-
ese militarys ability to protect its secrets.
The most serious case to date was the 2011
jailing of General Lo Hsien-che on charges of
passing secrets to China from 2004 onwards,
in return for payment. The report notes that,
over the past decade, Chinas military mod-
ernisation drive has involved the acquisition,
development, and modication of a variety of
platforms. These include main battle tanks;
reconnaissance, transport, and attack helicop-
ters; aircraft carriers; amphibious landing ves-
sels; warships; nuclear-powered submarines;
stealth ghters/bombers; unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs); new tactical ballistic/cruise
missiles with longer ranges and/or a smaller
circular error probable (CEP); anti-radiation
weapons; long-range electronic jammers; and
air defence systems.
Although not every platform is congured
for action against the island, it appears highly
likely, despite Chinas claims to the contrary,
that the PLAs principal focus remains Taiwan,
and that units could be reassigned rapidly to
address this requirement.
Looking ahead, China reportedly has plans
to build two or three aircraft carriers, and the
PLA Navy (PLAN) has begun training pilots
for carrier-based operations, currently on the
domestically produced J-15. Once operational,
aircraft carriers will provide the PLAN with
the island from all sides, which will greatly
enhance its ability to secure air superiority in
the Taiwan Strait and beyond.
Meanwhile, the Second Artillery Corps is
expected to continue replacing ageing short-
range ballistic missiles, such as the Dong Feng
11 (DF-11), with more accurate and longer-
range ones, such as the DF-16. These can be
deployed further inside Chinas territory and,
therefore, beyond the range of Taiwanese (and
US) counter-strike forces.
Even during the period of dtente that
has characterised improved relations over the
past decade, the number of missiles in Chinas
arsenal has grown at a rate of about 100 per
year. By continually increasing the number
of missiles it targets at Taiwan, China will
further erode the islands ability to intercept
them with its PAC-3, Tien Kung II, and other
air defence systems. This will in turn leave Tai-
wans airelds, naval bases, command centres,
and radar sites more vulnerable to an initial
missile attack by China, which is the most
likely rst phase of a full invasion.
Aware that a US intervention on Taipeis
side would greatly complicate PLA efforts
to subdue Taiwan, and in preparation to
counter the so-called US strategic foreign
ihs.com/janes
14/11/2013 11:46:07
 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

policy pivot to Asia, China has also actively Improved relations between China and
sought to develop and deploy anti-access/ Taiwan saw the holding of the rst cross-
strait peace forum of experts and scholars
area denial (A2/AD) technology, such as the in Shanghai on 11 October 2013. PA: 1454456
DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile. By delaying
or even deterring external intervention by a
third party, China would increase its ability to
isolate Taiwan by operating inside the Taiwan
Strait and in the western Pacic, where the
PLAN now routinely holds exercises, in part
to familiarise its forces with the areas sea
environment.
Although the ability of the DF-21D to target
a carrier battle group in the middle of the
ocean remains unproven, there is the possibil-
ity that it could score a hit and sink a multi-bil-
lion-dollar US aircraft carrier. That threat may
be sufficient to force the US Seventh Fleet
to re-evaluate the wisdom of sending forces
to assist Taiwan. This factor plays a part in an
ongoing campaign of political warfare insti-
gated by Beijing to undermine Washingtons Taiwans arms acquisition efforts have also paid dividends by adding extra friction to the
willingness to come to its allys rescue in the been undermined by growing reluctance in process of arms sales to Taiwan and, by doing
event of war, and so bolster the impression of Washington to supply modern weapons to so, Beijing has succeeded in furthering the
isolation and inevitable defeat within Taiwan. Taipei over fears of technology transfer or of perception in Taiwan that the island faces
Besides anti-ship ballistic missiles, China angering Beijing, which often retaliates by being abandoned.
has also made substantial investments in the threatening to suspend military-military ties Given the political signals represented by
development of fast-attack, radar-evasive or by implementing targeted sanctions against continued US arms sales to the island, China
missile corvettes, large surface combatants, defence companies involved. For example, in is likely to continue, and probably intensify,
ship-borne UAVs, and naval surveillance orbit- January 2010, China halted planned military its campaign to convince Washington of its
ers to increase its situational awareness and exchanges with the US and threatened to deleterious impact on bilateral ties.
bolster target-acquisition capabilities in the
western Pacic.
A growing reluctance in Washington to
Strategic uncertainties
The National Defence Report 2013 comes at a supply modern weapons to Taiwan is
time of great strategic uncertainty for Taiwan.
In its ve years in office, the Ma administra-
because of fears of angering Beijing
tion has not once met the target of spending
3% of GDP on national defence, with the
amount hovering around 2.2%. This has left punish the rms involved following the noti- Consequently, after orders for six PAC-3 air
the islands military insufficiently funded cation to Congress of a USD6.4-billion arms defence units and 30 AH-64E attack helicop-
to meet the challenge from China. It has package to Taiwan. Lockheed Martin, United ters have been delivered to Taiwan from late
accumulated nearly USD18 billion in arms ac- Technologies, and Boeing were singled out by 2013, no major new arms acquisition from the
quisitions from the United States since 2000, Beijing for retaliation. US is likely in the foreseeable future. Moreo-
which it must now pay for. Through propaganda and bilateral fo- ver, Taiwanese officials are not known to have
Added to the substantial costs associated rums, such as the Sanya Initiative (a series sought future arms packages from Washing-
with plans to end conscription and create an of exchanges launched in 2008 and involv- ton, with Taiwan now focusing its efforts on
all-volunteer force, an ongoing programme ing retired US generals, academics, and the indigenous development of a small asym-
to refurbish the Republic Of China Air Force their Chinese counterparts), China has also metrical force to counter China.
(RoCAF)s 144 F-16A/Bs, and the rising main- endeavoured to convince key constituents in With the exception of a 500-tonne stealth-
tenance costs to keep ageing equipment ser- the US usually retired military officials that missile ship prototype, Taiwans domestic
viceable, the amount of money that the mili- arms sales to Taiwan, despite the provisions defence initiative has centred on the develop-
tary will be able to spend to acquire modern of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) 1979, ment and mass production of cruise missiles,
platforms from the US is expected to be highly are harmful to US-China relations. The TRA namely the Hsiung Feng 3 (HF-3) ramjet-
limited in the coming years, barring a major
TDemo
considers any effort to determine the future of powered supersonic carrier killer anti-ship
increase in defence spending or extraordinary Taiwan by other than peaceful means a threat missile and the HF-2E land-attack cruise
budgets approved by the Legislative Yuan, the to the peace and security of the western missile (LACM), which has a range of about
islands unicameral parliament. Pacic and to the US. This Chinese effort has 650 kilometres (km).

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 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Road-mobile launchers for both the HF-3
(currently ship-based) and the HF-2E are
also in development. In December 2012,
reports emerged in the Taiwanese media
that Taiwans Chung Shan Institute of Sci-
ence and Technology (CSIST), the militarys
main research centre under the Armaments
Bureau, was developing a 1,200-km medium-
range surface-to-surface missile, with rst
deployment expected in 2015. The military
has refused to conrm whether such a missile
is in development.
Meanwhile, the RoCAF has launched a
programme to equip its indigenous defence
ghters, which are currently undergoing
mid-life upgrades at the Aerospace Industrial
Development Corp plant in Greater Taichung,
with the Wan Chien long-range air-to-surface
missile. Also developed by the CSIST, the Wan
Chien will be specically designed to target
airstrips in Chinas southeastern provinces,
and its deployment could begin in 2017.
The government is also encouraging greater
participation of the private sector in defence-
related research and development.
Besides being a cost-saving alternative to
overly expensive defence procurement from
Military occupation scenario
Based on forecast orders of battle, a Chi-
nese attack against Taiwan would begin
with a sustained political campaign, over
weeks, involving propaganda targeting
the island and its allies. China would then
move to embargo the island, followed by
efforts to disable Taiwans long-range
early-warning radar at Leshan in the
northern county of Hsinchu, and other air
defence systems, using a combination of
conventional missiles, anti-radiation mis-
siles, jamming, and sabotage.
Chinas Second Artillery Corps would
then be called upon to render air bases,
ports, and command-and-control sites
unusable through ballistic missile attacks,
and could also attempt a decapitation
strike against the islands political leader-
ship. Following that, PLA Air Force and
PLAN aircraft from Fujian province and
other coastal areas would try to rapidly
establish air superiority in the Strait and
beyond Taiwan in the western Pacic.
Simultaneously, Chinas A2/AD forces
would be kept at a high state of readiness,
while submarines and aircraft carriers
would be deployed in the western Pacic
32 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013
028-033_JIR1312_F6_China-Taiwan.indd 32
the US, Taiwans indigenous programme has
signalled a greater willingness by Taipei to
develop weapons that are more offensive in
nature. If deployed in sufficient numbers,
these could provide a more credible deterrent
against China than a purely defensive posture.
Yet it is doubtful whether these efforts
would be enough to convince Beijing that
the cost of an attempted invasion would be
too high. Furthermore, the balance of power
will be further widened in the coming decade
as the number of combat aircraft the RoCAF
maintains in service drops following the de-
commissioning of its ageing F-5s and Mirage-
2000s, and as its F-16s undergo upgrade work
between 2016 and 2022. No new aircraft will
replace the F-5s; efforts to acquire 66 F-16C/
Ds from the US have been stalled for years.
Although it is difficult to quantify levels
of troop morale, there is no doubt that the
Taiwanese military is fully aware that it has
lost the comparative advantage it enjoyed
during the 1990s. Added to Chinese political
warfare and propaganda, damaging espionage
cases, a sense of having been abandoned by a
longstanding ally, extremely low birth rates,
and the inability to attract enough recruits for
to deter US and/or Japanese intervention.
Using large transport aircraft, PLA special
forces would be dropped at air bases and
other key areas in Taiwan to secure control
of military sites, prevent airstrip repair, and
occupy government buildings.
A second wave of missile attacks,
augmented by air strikes, would saturate
Taiwanese army forces (artillery, main bat-
tle tanks, rocket launchers, road-mobile
missile launchers, and attack helicop-
ters) gathered along the coast before an
amphibious landing. Meanwhile, once the
risk to PLAN vessels had been neutralised,
missile frigates and destroyers from the
South and East Sea Fleet would cross
the Strait and provide theatre air-defence
around Taiwan in case of an external
intervention.
Earlier, warships from the North Sea
Fleet would have deployed to monitor US
Seventh Fleet and Japanese Navy move-
ments closely. Throughout the conict,
Chinese UAVs and surveillance satellites
TDemo
would provide imagery and accurate
target-acquisition data about Taiwanese
and US military forces in the Pacic.
an all-volunteer force, Taiwans military nds
itself in dire straits, something that Beijing
has surely noticed and will seek to exploit.
Taiwans MND suffered another serious
blow following the controversial death on 4
July 2013 of conscript Army Corporal Hung
Chung-chiu. Hung died of hyperthermia-
induced disseminated intra-vascular coagula-
tion while being held in the brig for bringing
a cell (mobile) phone with a camera onto the
military base.
His death led to two large protests in down-
town Taipei and the decision by Minister of
National Defence Kao Hua-chu to resign on 29
July. On 6 August, just six days after replacing
Kao, the new minister, Andrew Nian-zu Yang,
also resigned.
Yangs successor, General Yen Ming, a for-
mer chief of the general staff, took over on 7
August. He has assumed oversight of a military
force that, on 12 September, announced after
failing to meet enrolment goals that it was
delaying by two years to 2017 its plans to end
conscription and create an all-volunteer force
of 215,000, down from 235,000 at present.
The loss of public condence in Taiwans
military that has resulted from the Hung
scandal could have long-term effects on the
islands willingness and ability to defend
itself against Chinese aggression. Only public
relations efforts in the coming years, as well
as recruitment gures, will show whether the
damage was temporary or lasting. Neverthe-
less, the Taiwanese military arguably faces one
of its most serious crises in years.
Outlook
Ultimately, two key developments would
determine whether projections of a possible
PLA invasion of Taiwan in or by 2020 are cred-
ible. The rst would be engagement across the
Taiwan Strait maintaining a course deemed
acceptable by Beijing and perceived as favour-
able to its ultimate goal of unication. The
outcome of the 2016 presidential and legisla-
tive elections in Taiwan will be an important
factor in whether this develops, with a return
of the DPP representing a major obstacle in
Chinas campaign for peaceful unication
through economic, social, and cultural absorp-
tion. If this were to happen, Beijing could be
prompted to adopt more coercive measures,
including a military intervention, if a sudden
break in cross-strait exchanges were to occur,
which would be a possibility following a DPP
electoral victory. Likewise, a more cautious
incoming KMT administration, or a KMT
administration hampered by a DPP majority in
ihs.com/janes
14/11/2013 11:46:50

the legislature, could also revive this scenario.
The second key development would
be the emergence of a situation in which
Taiwan were racked by social disorder amid a
political crisis, which could prompt the PLA to
intervene to restore stability within what it
considers to be its territory. Although such a
situation is unlikely for the time being, greater
pressure by Beijing on the KMT to engage in
political talks is likely to engender serious
frictions within Taiwan, where protests over
proposed pacts with China, as well as other
issues, have already become much more
commonplace since 2012.
A further variable will be the extent and
scope of the US rebalancing of policy towards
Asia, a project whose direction remains uncer-
tain as Washington struggles with nancial
difficulties and political deadlock. Even if
such a pivot fully materialises, its impact
on the islands security will be contingent
on Taiwan clearly being made a component
of the US alliance. This remains unclear,
given Washingtons obvious preference for
ambiguity on the matter. By ensuring there
was no doubt that an attack on Taiwan would
lead to a timely and credible response to
defend the island in other words, by reaf-
rming the provisions of the TRA the US,
potentially with Japanese assistance, would
create disincentives to Chinese military
adventurism, although there would inevitably
be a cost in terms of Sino-US relations.
Conversely, if the US indicated that Taiwan
no longer fell within its sphere of security
guarantees by failing to include Taipei in the
pivot, or by denitively ending arms sales to
the island, Chinas calculations would differ
markedly and it could judge that its chances
of absorbing the territory at a relatively low
cost are good enough to attempt an inva-
sion. Although Beijing has long dreamed of
retaking the island by force, the next decade
is set to be the rst in which the PLA will be
able to act with the condence that it can
achieve its objectives.
Although economic integration can
diminish the risks of armed conict, it is no
guarantee that political actors will always act
rationally when it comes to the decision to
use force. As a core interest of China, Taiwan
arouses too many emotions within the CCP
and the PLA for predictions of rationality and
continuity to be entirely valid. Indeed, as a
natural barrier against the PLAs extension
beyond the rst island chain a geographical
line comprising the Aleutians, Borneo, Kuri-
les, Philippines, Ryukyus, and Taiwan and as
ihs.com/janes
028-033_JIR1312_F6_China-Taiwan.indd 33
Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou on a P-3C Orion submarine-hunting aircraft at the Pingtung Air
Force Base in southern Taiwan on 31 October 2013. Under Mas leadership, 19 bilateral agreements
have been signed with China since 2008.
a reminder of its century of humiliation at
foreign hands, Taiwan continues to exercise
an emotive effect on the Chinese political
class and general public.
Another related issue that will have an
effect on the likelihood of China using force
against Taiwan by 2020 is the situation in
Hong Kong. Strains between the Special
Administrative Region and the central gov-
ernment in Beijing have built over a range
of issues, including rising tensions over a
perceived attack on civil liberties, Beijings
supposed meddling in local politics, and foot-
dragging on universal suffrage.
Should the situation in Hong Kong con-
tinue to deteriorate, Chinas one country, two
systems formula, which Beijing has touted as
a possible mechanism for unication with Tai-
wan, could be further discredited. That would
expose even more sharply the incompatibility
of the political systems on the two sides of the
Taiwan Strait. By fuelling already strong op-
position within Taiwan to any form of political
union with China, such an outcome could, in
turn, add incentives for a military interven-
tion against the island.
Overall, therefore and barring a sudden
economic collapse of China or other regional
conicts IHS Janes assesses that by 2020 the
Chinese military will have sufficiently wid-
ened the gap between Taiwan and the PLA to
be able to successfully blockade the island and
secure full control of sea areas around it, as
well as to ensure air superiority over the Tai-
TDemo
wan Strait. The ability of the PLAAF to do so
will be a crucial component in Chinas ability
to launch an amphibious invasion, although
even under such a scenario, an attack by sea,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
PA: 1454457
using small craft as well as large transport ve-
hicles, will probably be a high-risk endeavour.
Having acquired the capabilities to launch
a successful assault against Taiwan, pressure
from an increasingly nationalistic Chinese
public on the hardline CCP and PLA to use
that arsenal to resolve the Taiwan issue will
grow. The temptation to do so will be even
greater should China experience high domes-
tic instability or an economic downturn.
If the US pivot does not clearly include
Taiwan, and given that Taiwan is highly
unlikely to agree to a political union under
the circumstances that are likely to prevail
during the coming decade, the possibility of
armed conict involving Taiwan and China by
or around 2020 will be the highest it has been
since the 1950s.
This article was first published online at
ihs.com/janes on 8 November 2013.
X ON THE WEB
Balancing act Elections spell
continuity in China-Taiwan relations
Strait spying Chinas intelligence
strategy towards Taiwan
Military might China develops its
strategic missile systems
Author
J Michael Cole is a Taipei-based defence
analyst and a former intelligence ofcer
with the Canadian Security Intelligence
Service in Ottawa.
ihs.com/janes
December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 33
14/11/2013 11:46:50
 STATE STABILITY
Conformity versus
Potential FARC integration poses new challenges
The Colombian government and the insurgent FARC appear to be inching slowly
towards a peace deal. Robert Munks assesses how the temptations of criminality and
modalities of demobilisation would be likely to act upon a post-conict FARC.
X KEY POINTS
Lucrative involvement in the drug
trade and illegal mining mean that
many members of Colombias
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia (FARC) insurgency
might not take part in any eventual
disarmament, demobilisation, and
reintegration (DDR) process, opting
instead to work within criminal
structures.
Several areas of the country notably
the Darin Gap bordering Panama,
the central Pacic seaboard, and the
southwestern border with Ecuador
contain FARC formations that are
currently most likely to morph into
criminality in the event of DDR.
In a worst-case scenario, increased
insecurity in some areas of Colombia
may be fuelled by criminally-motivated
FARC splinter groups clashing with
other criminal organisations.
A
fter nearly ve decades of violent
internal conict, Colombia may
nally be close to concluding a lasting
peace settlement with the countrys largest
left-wing insurgency, the Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). Formal
negotiations that began in October 2012 have
reached agreement on the rst two points of
a ve-point agenda, and talks are ongoing be-
tween government and FARC representatives
in Havana, Cuba, with international support.
The slow pace of the talks means that the
governments initially stated desire for a com-
prehensive peace deal to be signed by Novem-
ber 2013 is now out of reach. The government
34 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013
034-038_JIR1312_F4_FARC.indd 34
is now aiming to conclude a peace deal before
the presidential election in May 2014, and to
put the agreement to a public referendum on
the day of the election itself. However, what
currently seems to be more feasible is that the
agreement over the rst points of the agenda
land distribution and FARCs political
participation helps the talks to stay on track,
followed by a referendum.
Moreover, neither the government nor the
FARC have suspended their military opera-
tions while the negotiations have been taking
place. Aside from a two-month unilateral
ceasere that the FARC declared between 20
November 2012 and 20 January 2013, both
sides have maintained an intense tempo of
military activity.
Indeed, in October the FARC launched
a campaign dubbed Black October by
Minister of Defence Juan Carlos Pinzn that
has been marked by an extension of its of-
fensive across the country. This has included
an armed lockdown in the northern depart-
ment (province) of Choc, and more frequent
attacks on coal, energy, and oil infrastructure.
The FARC also stands accused by the govern-
ment of fomenting unrest by inltrating
other social protests, most notably in the
northeastern region of Catatumbo.
However, despite the twin tracks of peace
overtures and continued operational activity,
the portents for an eventual peace deal to be
signed are arguably better than at any time
since the FARC rst emerged as an agrarian-
based Marxist insurgency in 1964. The FARC
TDemo
is militarily weaker now than ever before
down from a peak of around 17,000 ghters
during its 1990s heyday to around 8,000
now, according to government estimates. Its
territorial spread is also vastly diminished,
down from a presence in more than 50% of
Colombias municipalities at the turn of the
millennium to just 11% currently, according to
gures provided to IHS Janes by the Colom-
bian Ministry of Defence in 2013.
Many of the groups leaders have been
killed, captured, or have died since 2008, and
those who remain are aware that the Colom-
bian military whose intelligence capabilities
have improved considerably since the early
2000s stands ready to neutralise more high-
and mid-ranking insurgents should the gov-
ernment give the order. Indeed, in response
to the FARCs latest offensive, the Ministry
of Defence has launched a major operation
in southeast Colombia, backed by 50,000
troops, to target leading FARC commanders.
Moreover, the international context is now
more favourable, with substantial backing
from key Western countries such as Norway,
the United Kingdom, and United States, as
well as crucial regional facilitation by Cuba
and Venezuela. The FARC can no longer rely
on the support both explicit and tacit that
it formerly received from officials in regional
left-leaning governments.
The range of indicators therefore suggests
that, despite the uncertainties and undoubted
reversals that lie ahead, the prospects for a
peace deal to be concluded in the medium
term are high. Incumbent president Juan
Manuel Santos, who announced the initial
exploratory dialogue with the FARC in August
2012, will almost certainly stand for re-elec-
tion in May 2014, hinting that he needs a fur-
ther mandate to bring the process to a close.
Hence, while a nal deal before mid-2014
is a slim possibility, if the talks are given an
ihs.com/janes
14/11/2013 14:40:52

injection of momentum, the possibility of set-
tlement of all ve agenda points later in 2014
or even into 2015 also remains high.
Such a scenario would raise the issue of
what sort of disarmament, demobilisation,
and reintegration (DDR) process the Colom-
bian government might enact to bring about
the FARCs denitive dissolution, and what
a post-demobilisation FARC might look like.
Many of its 67 active fronts (combat units) are
heavily involved in lucrative criminal activi-
ties, such as drug trafficking and illegal min-
ing, and many members would therefore be
loath to voluntarily forgo the sizeable prots
to be gained from such criminality if demobili-
sation incentives were insufficient.
Therefore, the transition to a durable peace
in Colombia would not be settled even if
a FARC demobilisation were secured. The
FARC could yet atomise into any number
of splinter groups, with many members
opting to join the criminal groups desig-
nated as bandas criminales (BACRIM) by the
Colombian government with which they
currently work. Many BACRIM members are
former right-wing paramilitaries of the Auto-
defensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), which
underwent a demobilisation process between
2003 and 2006.
However, many AUC members moved
directly into criminality. Jerry McDermott,
co-director of the Colombia-based security
thinktank InSight Crime, told IHS Janes,
There are two issues at play: which FARC
fronts will criminalise and which will opt to
continue the armed ideological struggle as
a sort of Continuity FARC. Many high-
ranking FARC commanders would probably
buy into the peace process, but many of the
mid-ranking commanders and rank-and-
le members could equally be seduced by a
continuing life of crime.
Temptations of criminality
Organised criminality in Colombia is big
business. Pinzn claimed in October 2012 that
the FARC could be earning USD3.5 billion
annually from the drug trade, money it earns
from providing protection to drug producers,
charging a gramaje (a tax on coca leaf cultiva-
tion) and, in more extreme cases, trafficking
drugs directly to export points for onwards
transhipment.
There are no empirical studies of the exact
number of FARC fronts or cadres that may
be involved in drug trafficking. IHS Janes has
identied references in open sources to drug
trafficking for at least one-fth of the FARCs
ihs.com/janes
034-038_JIR1312_F4_FARC.indd 35
Colombias FARC and criminality
Panama City
PANAMA
Gold
57 36
Cocaine
34
Gold
Cocaine
Fronts with particularly
close links to BACRIM 30
6 Cocaine
Marijuana
Cocaine 29
48
ECUADOR
Quito
FARC front at high risk of
mutating into criminal
enterprise
Close operational links
Fronts on Venezuelan border
Key criminal interest
Source: IHS Janes/InsightCrime
67 fronts, although this is not a denitive
assessment and the chance for localised
involvement of factions of fronts is also high.
The more expansionist of the FARCs drug
trafficking fronts also appear to maintain links
with international criminal gangs, such as the
Mexican Sinaloa Cartel.
Illegal mining, particularly of gold, may
have surpassed drugs as a revenue-generator
for some illegal groups, with the Spain-based
Toledo International Centre for Peace claim-
ing that gold mining now constitutes the
main income for many fronts in the north and
west of the country even though cocaine
remains the main source of funding over-
all. Colombian police attribute a tripling of
violent deaths in the northwestern province
of Antioquia in 2012 to a struggle for control
of illegal gold mining between the FARC and
the nationwide BACRIM, the Rastrojos and
the Urabeos.
However, elsewhere, the FARCs local
TDemo
co-operation with BACRIM can be close,
most notably in the northern departments
of Antioquia, Arauca, Choc, and Norte de
Santander, and in the western/southwestern
STATE STABILITY
59
Caracas
41
33rd Front: key for maintaining
33 cross-border mobility for senior
FARC commanders
Gold
Cocaine VENEZUELA
45
10
Bogot 16 Coltan
COLOMBIA
44
7
Cocaine 1
BRAZIL
PERU
0 260 km
2013 IHS: 1486992
departments of Cauca, Caquet, and Valle del
Cauca, which are key corridors for drug traf-
cking. Andy Webb-Vidal, CEO of Latin-IQ, a
risk consultancy specialised in Latin America,
told IHS Janes, The problem is that the FARC
already is as much a criminal organisation
as it is a political one. A number of fronts
are already deeply involved in drug traffick-
ing and other illegal activities with [former
AUC] paramilitaries, who demobilised only to
morph into criminal gangs.
The situation is further complicated by the
presence of Colombias second-largest insur-
gency, the Ejrcito de Liberacin Nacional
(ELN) in many areas of high criminality. The
approximately 2,000-strong ELN is currently
on the sidelines of the peace process, albeit
agitating to be included as a full participant,
and would most likely be included in a future
DDR programme either alongside or in addi-
tion to the FARC should the FARC process
prove successful.
Heavily criminalised FARC cadres are
among the least likely members to demobi-
lise if the peace talks with the government
are successful. However, evidence about
December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 35
14/11/2013 14:40:53
 STATE STABILITY

Colombias previous DDR experiences
Insurgents/group Date Process Outcome
Autodefensas Unidas de 200306 Many former right-wing paramilitaries of the AUC have Limited success
Colombia (AUC) moved into criminality and are now visible in the countrys
BACRIM. However, the AUC itself has been dismantled as
an organisation.
Ejrcito Popular de From 1991 Some former members transitioned into criminality, Partial success
Liberacin (EPL) particularly drug trafcking, in the northeast of Colombia,
and a small rump force of the EPL remains.
Movimiento 19 de Abril From 1989 The group was pardoned, demobilised, and then became Largely successful
(M-19) a legal political party. It reached a political high watermark
in the 1990s; some former members joined the Alternative
Democratic Pole (Polo Democrtico Alternativo: PDA)
individual fronts exact involvement in the departments of Antioquia and Choc
criminality and the level of control that is appears to present numerous elevated risk
exercised by the central governing secretariat factors. Topographically, the immediate
of the FARC remains uneven. border consists of the largely impenetrable
Some FARC commanders would be likely to Darin Gap, a forested region that represents
accept demobilisation terms precisely because the only physical break in the continental
they resent the drift towards criminality of Pan-American Highway. Two fronts with
many fronts that takes the group away from close operational ties are based in the area; the
its ideological underpinning. Such was the 250-strong 57th Front, closer to the border,
case of Medarno Maturana Largacha (alias El which is heavily implicated in cocaine traf-
Negro Toms), who surrendered to authori- cking and illegal gold mining; and the 34th
ties on 20 September and denounced the Front further inland, which has substantial
increasing connections of his 18th Front mining interests.
which currently operates in the northwestern A third formation, the 36th Front, also op-
departments of Crdoba and Antioquia with erates in the area, albeit with apparently loos-
local BACRIM. er operational connections to the other two.
Yet although many senior commanders Signicantly, according to InSight Crime, the
who retain ideological motivation may choose 36th Front is one of the FARCs most adept
to accept a potential peace deal, maintaining units in the construction and deployment of
the leaderships position that the FARC is not improvised explosive devices (IEDs), meaning
involved in the drug trade, a large number that it poses a high-risk threat to local security
of lower-level cadres will undoubtedly be force deployments. In addition, McDermott
tempted by the potential nancial incentives told IHS Janes, Drug trafficking operations
that criminality offers. Fronts located in or on a massive scale are also run by four fronts
close to areas of substantial coca leaf cultiva- in the east of the country, the 1st, 7th, 16th
tion may logically be most tempted by this and 44th, which are all under the command
option. Such areas include parts of Antioquia of one man, Albeiro Crdoba. Webb-Vidal
and southern Bolvar in the north; Choc, concurs that, The regions where there would
Cauca, and Valle del Cauca in the west; Arauca be least interest in DDR among FARC groups
and Norte de Santander in the northeast; and are those where illegal business activities such
the southwestern departments of Nario as drugs trafficking, fuel-smuggling, and other
and Putumayo. forms of contraband are most prevalent and
Plotting areas of high drug cultivation or lucrative. These are border areas where the
trafficking against areas of high prevalence of Eastern and Caribbean Blocs operate.
illegal mining operations suggests that there
are potentially six hotspots in Colombia Central control
where a conuence of drugs and illegal min- A key variable that will dictate the success or
ing could give rise to greater incentives for otherwise of any DDR process is the extent
criminality. Those areas parts of Antioquia, to which the FARCs seven-man central
Bolvar, Cauca, Choc, Norte de Santander, secretariat is able to maintain control of its
and Valle del Cauca contain some of the various fronts, particularly those that could
most peripheral territory in Colombia, located be tempted by criminality. An agreement
near border or coastal areas that are among
TDemo
signed by FARC commander-in-chief Rodrigo
the countrys most ungoverned spaces. Londoo Echeverri (alias Timochenko) and
Of particular note, the northwestern area of the secretariat could prove ultimately dif-
Colombia bordering Panama and comprising cult to enforce through the geographically
dispersed fronts and lower ranks, for reasons
both practical and ideological.
The FARC has suffered from severe com-
munications difficulties in recent years,
which have been driven by the Colombian
militarys success in exploiting vastly im-
proved capabilities in signals intelligence in
order to penetrate the insurgents electronic
communications. This has left many FARC
fronts communicating via human runners to
avoid interception.
Yet the extent to which the secretariat has
been hampered in communicating with its
eld commanders may be overplayed. The
FARC ceasere of November 2012 to January
2013 was adhered to by the majority of fronts,
with local non-governmental organisation
Nuevo Arco Iris recording an 87% reduction in
insurgent attacks during the period.
Notably, two attacks were carried out by
the Antioquia-based 36th Front shortly after
the ceasere came into operation, but the
Front claimed that this was due to a delay in
receiving notication of the suspension of op-
erations. IHS Janes Terrorism and Insurgency
Centre (JTIC) recorded six possible FARC at-
tacks during the period, while 13 ceasere vio-
lations were noted by the Colombian Conict
Research Analysis Centre, including three
attacks in Antioquia and four in Cauca. FARC
operations in Cauca are largely controlled by
Jorge Torres Victoria, alias Pablo Catatumbo, a
hardline military commander and secretariat
member who was formerly one of the highest-
ranking FARC cadres not to be included in the
Havana peace talks, although he subsequently
joined in April 2013.
Yet the overall number of attacks dur-
ing the ceasere, even at the upper limit of
estimations, is low compared with the normal
tempo of FARC activity. Moreover, the
resumption of attacks after the ceasere tar-
geting a wide range of security outposts and
energy installations hints at a high degree of
pre-planning and co-ordination probably com-
ing directly from the secretariat.
Overall, therefore, IHS Janes assesses that
the level of control exercised by the secre-
tariat is sufficient to ensure that the majority
of fronts will abide by the provisions of any
peace process. However, this does not mean
that localised dissent will be eliminated.
Moreover, there is likely to be a high degree of
secretariat control over operations carried out
under the FARC ideological badge, which will
not extend to members who choose to move
into criminality or to splinter groups whose
motivation is primarily criminal.

36 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013 ihs.com/janes

034-038_JIR1312_F4_FARC.indd 36 14/11/2013 14:40:55


Modalities of demobilisation
The government body tasked with overseeing
demobilisation in Colombia is the Agency for
Reintegration (Agencia Colombiana para la
Reintegracin: ACR), whose director, Alejan-
dro Eder, gave an interview on 3 October in
which he claimed that any peace agreement
could lead to as many as 40,000 demobili-
sations. In addition to a percentage of the
approximately 8,000-strong main FARC
force, this would include a further number of
people applying to gain the benets of DDR
who formerly worked in loose FARC support
networks.
Any future DDR process in Colombia
could, in the disarmament and demobilisa-
tion phases, be concluded relatively swiftly,
possibly within a matter of months. Colombia
has experience of previous demobilisation
initiatives most notably the AUC, a small
leftist insurgency known as the Ejrcito
Popular de Liberacin (EPL), and the 1980s
guerrilla group the Movimiento 19 de Abril
(M-19) and it would be able to draw on those
experiences to design a programme aimed
at avoiding previous pitfalls, particularly the
chance of former insurgents moving into
criminality. McDermott told IHS Janes, On
the DDR front, the paramilitary [AUC] model
was not very successful and the rebels have
rejected it. This is one of the key issues at the
negotiating table.
Reintegration, the third element of DDR,
presents greater challenges in terms of
reinserting former combatants into society
through assistance with nding employ-
ment, welfare benets, training, education,
and psychological support. The ACR claims to
have successfully reintegrated approximately
46,000 former combatants during the seven
years of its existence, many of whom were
Chief FARC negotiator Ivn Mrquez talks to
the media at the close of a round of peace
talks with Colombias government in Havana,
Cuba. It is thought that a peace agreement
may be reached, but not until after the next
election. PA: 1515433
ihs.com/janes
034-038_JIR1312_F4_FARC.indd 37
AUC members, suggesting that it would be
well-positioned to tackle the 40,000 further
demobilisations that could occur with a FARC
peace process.
However, this stage of DDR will be prob-
lematic precisely because of the criminality
aspect. Despite a booming legal economy
and a drive by the Colombian government
to attract foreign direct investment as the
security climate improves, large swathes of
the country remain beholden to criminal in-
terests. Work within the legal economy, often
in low-paid jobs with little security of tenure,
may be less appealing to many former FARC
cadres than the illicit alternatives. Therefore,
any mass-implementation DDR programme
would need to actively reduce the appeal of
criminality by ensuring that the legal option
offered a long-term, viably remunerated
solution.
Notable within the domestic framework,
the demobilisation of the M-19 may offer
a model for potential success. After being
Colombias second-largest insurgent group in
the 1980s, after the FARC, the M-19 moved
away from direct action after a bloody siege
at the Palace of Justice in November 1985, in
which around 100 people died. By the early
1990s, the group had demobilised, and had
transformed itself into a legal political move-
ment that renounced violence; the current
mayor of Bogot, Gustavo Petro, is a former
M-19 member.
Internationally, of the more than 60 formal
DDR initiatives that have been identied
worldwide since the early 1990s by Robert
Muggah, the research director of the Rio
de Janeiro-based Igarap Institute security
thinktank, the experience in Northern Ireland
is one that is likely to inform some aspects of
DDR modelling.
TDemo
STATE STABILITY
Northern Ireland parliamentarians
attended the Havana talks in May, and the
largely successful DDR process in North-
ern Ireland appears to be of interest to the
Colombian government.
Where the Northern Irish experience may
be relevant to a FARC DDR programme is
in the area of weapons decommissioning.
The Irish Republican Armys (IRA) internal
constitution specically advocated armed
struggle, and the FARCs leadership which
has made references to the Northern Ireland
experience on more than one occasion may
initially be reluctant to surrender its weapon-
ry in a country where the high overall levels
of gun ownership could then leave it feeling
threatened.
In this situation, historical precedent
will be weighing on the leadership: the
FARCs previous attempt to be involved in
the formation of a legal political party, the
Patriotic Union (Unin Patritica: UP), failed
in the late 1980s after a spate of political
violence and targeted assassinations, which
were attributed to right-wing paramilitaries
and drug gangs.
Hesitancy on the part of the FARC to
decommission comprehensively at the start
of a DDR process is therefore not surprising,
and is likely to be a stumbling block that could
require international mediation. Webb-Vidal
agrees that the nal DDR model is likely to
be a hybrid of many precedents. Santos
negotiators have been looking at different
models and examples, including the Northern
Ireland peace agreement, and others closer
to home, such as those that occurred in El
Salvador and Guatemala, he told IHS Janes.
But every situation is different, and I doubt
they would attempt to import one particular
model wholesale.
December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 37
14/11/2013 14:40:57
 STATE STABILITY
Alleged rebels from FARC are escorted by police in Cali, Colombia.
Although a FARC-government deal looks likely, the FARC will continue
operations to reinforce its military negotiating hand in Havana, Cuba.
Outlook
The prospects for a successful conclusion of
a FARC-government deal remain relatively
strong, despite a high possibility that the
whole process will be delayed until after the
Colombian election in May 2014, and poten-
tially into 2015. In the meantime, the FARC
will continue operations targeting energy
infrastructure and security forces in order to
reinforce its military negotiating hand in the
Havana talks.
If a peace deal is agreed, a potentially
signicant number of FARC cadres will not
accept demobilisation incentives, opting
instead for continuing lucrative interests in
criminal operations, either as FARC splinter
groups or moving into already established
criminal groups.
IHS Janes assesses that three areas of the
country are likely to present a particularly
high risk of FARC operatives morphing into
criminality. These are the northwestern
area comprising rural areas of Antioquia and
Choc, in particular the region abutting the
Darin Gap, where the overlapping drug and
mining interests of the 34th, 36th, and 57th
fronts will make criminality tempting; areas
of the western seaboard Cauca and Valle del
38 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013
034-038_JIR1312_F4_FARC.indd 38
PA: 1515435
Cauca that are under the control of Catat-
umbos Western Bloc, where control over the
strategic drug-trafficking corridors into the
port of Buenaventura will continue to offer
disincentives to demobilisation; and areas of
the southwestern border area neighbouring
Ecuador, where the nancially solvent 48th
Front will be loath to relinquish its drug-
related activities. The northern areas of Norte
de Santander and Magdalena Medio also carry
a higher risk.
Should a peace deal be concluded, it is also
highly likely that the secretariat will exercise
sufficient control to make DDR viable in
many of the non-peripheral areas of the coun-
try. Moreover, with the ideological goal of
an armed agrarian uprising no longer in play,
future criminal rumps of the FARC would be
more likely to abandon politically-motivated
attacks against security forces and economi-
cally symbolic infrastructure.
However, there is no assurance that a suc-
cessful DDR process would lead to an immedi-
ate or sustainable diminution in violence,
TDemo
particularly in rural areas where control is
contested by numerous illegal armed groups.
Indeed, in a scenario in which Colombias
security environment transitions from one of
insurgency (to be addressed largely through
military means) to one of widespread organ-
ised criminality (to be countered by police-led
law enforcement measures), there would be
a substantial risk of continued high levels of
violence in the country due to turf battles be-
tween new allegiances of criminal and former
FARC groups.
This article was first published online at
ihs.com/janes on 5 November 2013.
X ON THE WEB
Extracting peace FARC targets
energy and mining
Rise of the Urabeos Colombian
drug gang bids for market dominance
Hybrid cartels Colombian organised
crime networks
Author
Robert Munks is Deputy Editor of
IHS Janes Intelligence Review.
Additional research by IHS Country
Analyst Grant Hurst.
ihs.com/janes
ihs.com/janes
14/11/2013 14:41:11
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 STATE STABILITY
Neighbourhood
watch
Russias response to insecurity in Central Asia
Russia has announced its concerns about potential threats from Afghanistan
spreading into Central Asian countries. Roger McDermott and Zhulduz Baizakova
assess Russias efforts to bolster security in the region.
X KEY POINTS
Russia has publicly outlined its
concerns about insecurity in
Afghanistan spreading to Central
Asia following the withdrawal of
international forces in 2014.
Although Moscow has undertaken
various efforts to bolster security
in the region, including securing
basing rights, transferring
equipment to Central Asian states,
and strengthening the multilateral
Collective Security Treaty Organisation
(CSTO), the security capacity of the
regional states remains low.
The likelihood of Russia becoming
militarily involved in response to a
crisis in Central Asia remains low,
especially as Moscows primary
interest in the region is retaining its
political dominance.
R
ussian president Vladimir Putin an-
nounced in late September that the
multilateral Collective Security Treaty
Organisation (CSTO) would help Tajikistan
reinforce its borders with Afghanistan, provid-
ing a further example of the concern Russias
political-military leadership has about the
potential insecurity in Central Asia after the
withdrawal of international forces in 2014.
However, Russias policies in the region fre-
quently only address some of the symptoms
of these issues, rather than their underlying
causes. Since United States military forces
entered Afghanistan in 2001 to unseat the
Taliban, and the NATO involvement that
40 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013
040-043_JIR1312_F5_Asia.indd 40
followed, including the development of
supporting infrastructure within Central
Asia, Moscow has attempted to balance its
support for the stabilisation efforts with its
anti-Western rhetoric. Nevertheless, the
NATO drawdown from Afghanistan by the
end of 2014 transferring combat and security
responsibility from the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) to Afghan security
forces appears to have opened an opportu-
nity for the Kremlin to reassess its strategic
interests in Central Asia post-2014.
Russia frames its security planning for
the ISAF drawdown in terms of the need to
strengthen its southern periphery against
transnational threats including drug traffick-
ing, religious extremism, and terrorism, which
it believes will weaken security in Central Asia
post-2014, as stated in a number of official
reports published over the past two years.
The Kremlins political narrative criticises
the West for its intervention in Afghanistan,
while also reserving the right to castigate
NATO for its withdrawal before fully com-
pleting the stabilisation mission. Neverthe-
less, this narrative, convenient for the Russian
leadership to appeal to a domestic audience,
contains some elements of the countrys real
threat perception, while exaggerating its prog-
nosis of the potential impact on Central Asia.
Russian preparations
Russia is actively preparing its Central Asian
TDemo
allies for the post-2014 security environment
by strengthening the CSTO, promoting its
bilateral security relationships in the region,
boosting its military and security inuence,
and placing Afghanistan on the agendas of
the CSTO and the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO).
Due to Turkmenistans policy of neutrality
and Uzbekistans exit from the CSTO in late
2012, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan
are the three Central Asian states prioritised
by Russias security planning.
An interconnecting theme in Russias secu-
rity agenda in Central Asia links to promoting
the underlying message that, unlike the West,
Russia can be relied upon to stay the course.
This is reected in its military basing agree-
ments in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which
effectively cement existing Russian military
infrastructure in these states until 2042.
Russia also plans to donate a total of
USD200 million to Tajikistan and USD1.1
billion to Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan not only
obtains USD4.5 million annually for the lease
of its Kant air base to Russia, but Moscow has
also promised to sponsor the construction
of a hydropower plant, while also erasing its
USD180 million debt.
Russia has secured an extension to its air
base at Kant near Bishkek, which contrasts ge-
opolitically with the nearby US transit centre
at Manas, which is scheduled to close by June
2014 due to opposition from the Kyrgyz gov-
ernment. The underlying political message is
that Russia is a more durable security partner
than the United States. In Tajikistan, the Rus-
sian 201st military base has been secured until
2042 following the ratication of an extension
deal by the Tajik parliament in October 2013.
Equally, Moscow used the CSTO summit in
Sochi on 24 September to offer border security
ihs.com/janes
14/11/2013 11:48:03
 STATE STABILITY

assistance to Tajikistan. By 21 October, the
CSTO secretary-general Nikolai Bordyuzha
was describing such initiatives as being
about bigger nancial investments aimed at
supplying armour and vehicles, as well as at
setting up electric signalling systems or special
means for protecting the state border and
building border posts. Russia has also sought
to develop, train, and enhance the CSTOs Col-
lective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF), which
was established in June 2009.
Russia completed the deal with Tajikistan
regarding the 201st base in exchange for per-
mitting Tajik labour migrants to work in Rus-
sia for up to three years (compared with only
one year previously). However, according to
Tajik minister of defence Sherali Hayrulloyev,
the presence of the 201st base in the country
meets the spirit of strategic partnership
between Tajikistan and Russia and is aimed at
providing stability in the region. Hayrulloyev
also claims that the base can be used during
terrorist incursions into the country. Accord-
ing to the bilateral agreement, Russia also
committed to provide technical assistance to
modernise the Tajik army. Since 2005, Russia
has provided technical assistance to Tajikistan
worth a total of USD411 million.
The weakest points in Central Asias secu-
rity are its southern borders, particularly the
156 kilometre-long Uzbek-Afghan border and
the 1,344 km-long Tajik-Afghan border. In this
regard, Russia plans to dispatch forces located
in the 201st and Kant airbases to strengthen
and reinforce the borders in the event of an
emergency. However, such plans are subject to
change. Uzbekistan is no longer a member of
the CSTO and is therefore unlikely to permit
any CSTO forces on its territory.
Additionally, there is no agreement in place
between Russia and Tajikistan, or between
Tajikistan and the CSTO, for the deployment
of forces to its borders. Bordyuzha claimed
that Russia sees no need to dispatch Russian
border guards to Tajikistan as all Tajik border
guard services are fully manned. Neverthe-
less, in reference to the poor capabilities of the
Tajik security forces, Bordyuzha has argued
that Tajik border guards need extra and better
equipment and hardware, and that this should
be provided not only by Russia but by all CSTO
members. No such assistance plans have been
announced by any other CSTO member states.
Central Asian threat environment
Many Russian experts who spoke to IHS Janes
in October view the post-2014 Afghanistan
security environment through the prism of
confrontation with the West. Those experts
still retain the idea that a new Great Game
is unfolding between Russia and the West in
Central Asia, which limits the scope for secu-
rity co-operation.
Russias actual approach appears para-
doxical; on the one hand Moscow complains
about ISAF leaving Afghanistan while failing
to stabilise the situation completely, but on
the other some believe Russian geopolitical
interests will benet from Western forces
leaving Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, the same Russia experts also
agree that Moscow is focused on the threats
facing Central Asia post-2014. These include:
a possible return of the Taliban to power in
Afghanistan; the spillover of radicalism from
Afghanistan to neighbouring Central Asian
states; increased drug trafficking; and the
return of Central Asian militants, who had
been operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
to their home countries.
Central Asian governments generally lack
popular legitimacy, as illustrated by reports
from international election observer teams
suggesting a lack of democracy in elections
held in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmeni-
stan, and Uzbekistan over the past decade.
These governments therefore seek to keep
a tight grip on power through the authori-
tarian suppression of dissent. For instance,
the Kazakh security forces responded to
an outbreak of civil unrest in the western
region of Zhanaozen in December 2011 with
lethal force, leaving 11 people dead. From the
Russian perspective, this increases the risk
that the regional populations will be driven
to increased radicalism as a result. Russians
predominantly see the roots for Islamist ex-
tremism and radicalism in Central Asia in the
poor socio-economic conditions of the region
and the construction of a volatile atmosphere
of distrust among the youth populations.
Constitutionally, all Central Asian coun-
tries are secular. However, each of them has
their own disadvantages and specics when
it comes to being vulnerable to possible
radicalisation and the inuence of Islam-
ist extremism. Each country has a majority
Muslim population: in Kazakhstan this is
68-72% of the population; in Kyrgyzstan 75%;
in Tajikistan 85%; in Turkmenistan 93%; and
in Uzbekistan 96%. Islam in Central Asia is

Kyrgyz soldiers in operation during CSTO military manoeuvres at the

Koitash army base outside Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on 19 September
2011. Russia has sought to strengthen the CSTO as a means to provid-
ing a security response to emerging threats in Central Asia. PA:1515438

TDemo

ihs.com/janes December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 41

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 STATE STABILITY
Russian president Vladimir Putin speaks to Tajik president
Emomali Rakhmon during a meeting outside Moscow, Russia,
on 1 August 2013. Russia is concerned with boosting border
security in the Central Asian countries.
predominantly Sunni, but a small minority of
Shia Muslims live in Tajikistan. Despite the
focus on external threats emanating from
Afghanistan, there is a risk of radicalisation
and destabilisation emerging from within the
region. This risk is inuenced by a number of
factors: the poor economic situation, weak
governmental structures, corrupt leadership,
absence of constructive political succession
procedures, weak civil society, the lack of
comprehensive religious education, growing
urbanisation, a growing gap between rich and
poor, exploitation of the available natural
resources by the elite minority, and little
transparency or true democracy.
With Central Asia having been effectively
closed off from the rest of the Islamic world
during its 70 years under Soviet rule, the re-
gion has only relatively recently been exposed
to external inuences, including certain radi-
cal forms of Islam such as Salasm. The idea of
constructing an Islamic caliphate in Central
Asia as espoused by certain militant groups
such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU), which has been primarily based in
the Afghani-Pakistan border regions since
2001 could gain greater traction among the
domestic populations of Central Asian states
as a result of growing unrest.
In this context, the Ferghana Valley can
be seen as an area at particular risk of radical
Islamist inltration. The valley is located at
the intersection of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
and Uzbekistan. Furthermore, the regions
increasingly young population exerts
demographic pressure, a factor exacerbated
by high levels of unemployment and poverty.
42 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013
040-043_JIR1312_F5_Asia.indd 42
PA: 1515962
The area therefore presents a complicated
mixture of disputed border areas and inter-
ethnic tensions. There is not currently any
single group that is capable of unifying radical
sentiments in the region. Despite the publicly
expressed concerns among the regional gov-
ernments regarding the radical Islamist group
Hizb ut-Tahrir, this organisation remains
avowedly non-violent, instead calling for the
overthrow of secular governments through
peaceful action.
However, should militant groups such as
the IMU seek to return to Central Asia, utilis-
ing a potential lack of security in Afghanistan
post-2014, then areas such as the Ferghana
Valley could offer an attractive staging post.
According to the head of the Kazakhstan Insti-
tute for Strategic Studies, Bulat Sultanov, who
spoke to IHS Janes in September, one of the
greatest threats emanating from Afghanistan
is ethnically-Central Asian militant organisa-
tions that have been maintaining close links
with the militant groups that do operate in
Central Asia. An indication of this potential
threat was witnessed in Tajikistan on 23 Sep-
tember, when the security forces announced
that they had uncovered an audacious plot
to bomb a series of transport, political, and
security force targets in the capital Dushanbe
ahead of the 6 November presidential election.
According to the security forces, the leader of
the group, Alimurod Makhanov (alias Ustod),
had operated with the IMU in Pakistan before
TDemo
returning to Tajikistan. Although it is unlikely
that this small group of militants would have
been able to launch an attack on the scale al-
leged by the authorities, the presence of more
senior militants such as Makhanov, who are
able to garner supporters within the country,
points to a dangerous trend that is likely to
increase in the future.
Drug trafcking
Perhaps the most substantial interest Russia
currently has in Central Asia is combating drug
trafficking. According to estimates from the
UN Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) in
2012, 90 tonnes of Afghan-produced heroin
passed through Central Asia towards Russia,
where 21% of the worlds heroin is consumed.
However, this concern has not translated into
close co-operation with the West, and particu-
larly the US, on countering the problem. The
proposed Central Asian Counternarcotics Ini-
tiative by the US was not warmly received by
Moscow. In January 2013, Russia, in retalia-
tion against the US over human rights and the
Magnitsky Act, also withdrew from a 2002
agreement providing USD6 million per year in
assistance from the US for combating human
trafficking and the drug trade.
Currently around 30% of Afghan drugs
nd their way into Russian and European
markets through the Central Asian states. The
UN estimates that up to 80 tonnes of heroin
and 20 tonnes of opium is trafficked from
Afghanistan through Tajikistan annually. The
main transit points are located in Tajikistans
Kunduz and Gorno-Badakhshan provinces.
Another escalating development is that
increasing amounts of the drugs transited now
remain within Central Asia, with the transit
countries turning into consumers. This carries
serious political, economic, social and military
implications for the region.
Russias red lines in Central Asia
Threat perceptions, perspectives on the secu-
rity implications of the NATO drawdown in
Afghanistan, military capabilities, and security
capacities all differ widely between Russia
and its Central Asian allies. For instance, IHS
Janes assessment of Kazakhstans security
doctrine, as well as discussions with strategists
and specialists on Afghanistan, shows that
Kazakhstan expects no deterioration or major
shift in its security or in regional security
dynamics post-2014. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan show little sign of preparing for
a possible worsening security situation, and
Russia ostensibly exaggerates the NATO exit
for its own political purposes.
Seen from Moscows vantage point, as the
Western military footprint in the region mark-
edly declines, 2014 represents an opportunity
ihs.com/janes
14/11/2013 11:48:22

to tie its Central Asian partners into its Eura-
sian Economic Union project, which is due to
commence in January 2015.
Despite its bellicose rhetoric, the secu-
rity crises in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in
May-June 2010 and August-September 2012
respectively revealed Moscow to be surpris-
ingly circumspect about authorising armed
intervention in Central Asia. That pattern is
likely to persist well beyond 2014. This raises
an obvious question as to where the Kremlin
draws red lines in its Central Asian security
policy, what the scenarios and pathways
towards intervention may involve, and how
closely this is reected in real preparations
(see box, right).
Nonetheless, a closer analysis of Russian
security policy in Central Asia, including its
basing agreements, raises questions as to
whether the counter-terrorist capabilities
of the host countries are actually beneting.
Planned weapons and equipment donations
to Kyrgyzstan, which will be valued at an esti-
mated USD1.1 billion, extend only to materials
from Russian military stockpiles, meaning
this is a mechanism for Moscow to pass on
old hardware. According to a statement by
Russian minister of defence Sergei Shoigu in
June 2013, these supplies might start by the
end of the year. This will include small-arms,
armoured vehicles, artillery systems, and
communication systems, although Russian
officials have failed to reveal the exact type,
number, and class of the military hardware
and equipment. Although Kyrgyzstans
military and security forces will undoubtedly
benet from receiving even relatively obsolete
Russian equipment, the deciencies in the
training and organisation of these forces will
not be addressed.
Russias own military assets within
Central Asia are not trained or equipped for
counter-insurgency operations, and its wider
conventional forces possess limited strate-
gic mobility to deploy into Central Asia and
sustain operations over a protracted period.
Russia maintains air force assets at the CSTO
air base in Kant, though it is unclear how
these might be effectively employed during
a regional insurgency. In a crisis, the air base
could hypothetically be used to receive units
from the elite Russian airborne forces.
Similarly, the 201st military base in
Tajikistan consists mainly of combat infan-
try and military engineers, unsuited as rst
responders in the event of a crisis triggered
by militancy. Indeed, many of the person-
nel serving in the 201st base are 12-month
ihs.com/janes
040-043_JIR1312_F5_Asia.indd 43
Red lines for intervention
An enduring serious threat to the
disruption of energy supplies from
Central Asia to Russia; this would have
to be distinct from a small-scale attack
causing minor disruption, representing
an actual persistent source of threat
to Russias energy interests such as
oil and gas production and pipelines
in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, or
Uzbekistan.
Wide-scale attacks on Russian citi-
zens, as distinct from ethnic Russian
Central Asians, and failure of the host
country to respond sufciently.
Localised militant activity, for instance
in the Ferghana Valley or Tajikistans
remote Gorno-Badakhshan region,
which escalates beyond the host
countrys capacity to contain it.
Insurgency or revolution, the latter
most likely with foreign backing, result-
ing in a threat to the host regime.
A large-scale militant attack on Ka-
zakhstan threatening its sovereignty or
domestic stability.
serving conscripts, and consequently, ahead
of major Russian military exercises the base
is reinforced by more experienced contract
personnel from Yekaterinburg. In a security
crisis that left the Tajik security forces over-
stretched in the Rasht Valley in northern Ta-
jikistan in August-September 2012, there was
no Russian security involvement; although
the former barely coped in operations to deal
with the armed groups operated by regional
strongmen and the alleged Islamist militants
supporting them, Dushanbe made no request
for support to the Russian base.
Moscow could deploy military units to
support Special Forces operations, including
Federal Security Service (Federalnaya Sluzhba
Bezopasnosti: FSB) Alpha units, to protect its
energy supplies in Central Asia; however, such
a crisis would need to outstrip the capacity
of local security forces to cope, necessitating
Russias direct assistance.
Outlook
An insurgency within Central Asia that may
invoke a Russian response could only realisti-
TDemo
cally occur in Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan, as
these smaller, economically weaker countries
have a much lower security capacity than their
larger neighbours in the region. Scenarios
STATE STABILITY
involving Russian military units in combat
within Central Asia are paradoxically the
least likely to occur: Moscow would undoubt-
edly act militarily to protect its strategic ally,
Kazakhstan, if the state was either under
imminent danger of collapse, or threatened by
systemic instability.
Even though neither Kyrgyzstan nor
Tajikistan can provide sufficient security for
themselves, it is widely assumed by officials
interviewed by IHS Janes in both countries
that Moscow will come to their aid. As such,
there is little prospect of Western involve-
ment in aiding the security of Central Asia
beyond relatively limited supplies of equip-
ment and training. Until the political elite
ruling Central Asia changes, there is unlikely
to be any change in the total trust and con-
dence the Central Asian leadership places
upon Moscow.
Russia and its Central Asian partners do not
share a common or uniform perspective on
the threat environment in the region post-
2014, and consequently plans to strengthen
security remain merely rhetorical. The limited
steps Moscow has taken to date are aimed
at reassuring the region that its overarching
priority is to consolidate its geopolitical pres-
ence in Central Asia. Russian policymakers
are much more interested in putting as much
weight behind its Eurasian integration plans
as possible, and the narrative of deteriorating
security after the ISAF mission changes in
2014 ts that agenda. Thus, Moscows security
planning is inexorably linked to the reasser-
tion of its geopolitical power in the post-
Soviet space.
This article was first published online at
ihs.com/janes on 8 November 2013.
X ON THE WEB
Touching the void Security vacuum
issues in Central Asia
Northern exposure Afghan heroin
trafcking through Central Asia
Author
Roger McDermott is an afliated senior
analyst at the Danish Institute for
International Studies, Copenhagen,
specialising in Eurasian defence
and security. Zhulduz Baizakova is a
research afliate at the Institute for
Security and Cooperation Studies, Al-
Farabi Kazakh National University.
ihs.com/janes
December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 43
14/11/2013 11:48:27
 SERIOUS & ORGANISED CRIME

Faceless
Criminal groups turn to cyber technology
As awareness of the need for online privacy grows, technology is
increasingly becoming available to help internet users maintain
anonymity. Robert Pritchard investigates illegal activities facilitated by
such technology and the inherent problems in tackling it.
TDemo
Shutterstock: 1450624

44 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013 ihs.com/janes

044-047_JIR1312_F11_cybercrime.indd 44 14/11/2013 15:14:27


X KEY POINTS
Real world criminals are increasingly
utilising cyber techniques to aid their
activities, with examples including
the uncovering of an online drugs
marketplace and the hacking of a
major European ports computer
systems to allow drugs to ow
through unimpeded.
Criminal groups are able to utilise
online anonymity tools and currencies
to disguise their activity and confound
attempts by law enforcement
agencies to break up such networks.
The ability of criminal groups to hire
hackers and utilise relatively new
online technologies means that the
threat posed by such groups is likely
to increase in the future, particularly
as law enforcement agencies are
facing a constantly shifting target.
C
yber crime is big business. In July
2013, a report from antivirus com-
pany McAfee estimated that the
global cost of cyber crime (including cyber
espionage) was between USD300 billion and
USD1 trillion. However, this is a mercurial
topic, and concrete, widely accepted gures
are hard to nd.
Notably, current estimates tend to focus on
the costs to society associated with tradition-
al online criminal activity intellectual prop-
erty theft, credit card fraud, identity theft,
and more esoteric crimes, such as procuring
and running botnets (a network of compro-
mised computers that can be used for a variety
of criminal activities). Essentially, these are
crimes that exist entirely online.
However, cyber crime is changing, and it is
beginning to be used to facilitate real-world
criminal activity. For example, an online
marketplace for drug dealers called the Silk
Road demonstrated the ease with which
criminals can anonymously offer services over
the internet, and also how easy it is for buyers
to nd and procure these services. Another
example of cyber crime having a real-world
impact involved the hacking of the control
network at the Belgian port of Antwerp, rst
reported in October 2013, allowing drug traf-
ckers to retrieve shipping containers carrying
illicit shipments before they were checked by
customs officials.
What made the Silk Road remarkable was
Shutterstock: 1450624
the fact that, unlike most drug networks, it
was famous and was lauded among certain
internet user groups as a libertarian enclave,
ihs.com/janes
044-047_JIR1312_F11_cybercrime.indd 45
SERIOUS & ORGANISED CRIME
while also being condemned in the inter-
national media for the way it was evading
law enforcement. Meanwhile, the Antwerp
incident demonstrated how hidden dependen-
cies on internet-connected infrastructure can
be exploited by criminals to evade physical
security measures. The tools and techniques
that have made enterprises like this viable are
becoming more common and more resilient,
and pose a signicant and growing challenge
to law enforcement.
Drug trafcking activity
In October, after two-and-a-half years of op-
eration, the Silk Road was seized and closed by
the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
The founder, known online as Dread Pirate
Roberts, has been identied by US prosecu-
tors as Ross William Ulbricht, a 29-year-old
originally from Texas. He has been charged
with drug trafficking, money laundering, and
computer hacking, and is currently being held
in a detention centre in New York City. He has
denied all of the charges against him.
The Silk Road was founded in 2011, and in
June of that year featured in a report in the on-
line blog Gawker, outlining the easy and open
availability of drugs. This brought the Silk
Road to the attention of millions of internet
users, attracting a large amount of traffic to
the website. Further publicity followed, with
numerous news articles over the following
two years. By the time of the FBI raid, US law
enforcement estimated that USD1.2 billion
of trade had been processed through the site,
providing those running it approximately
USD80 million in commission.
The Silk Road acted as a marketplace, with
vendors getting star ratings and reviews from
customers, in a similar model to that used by
legitimate online marketplaces such as eBay.
Silk Road specically prohibited items that
caused harm or were intended to defraud,
sticking to the founders principles that noth-
ing that is not harmful should be prohibited.
Despite the high prole and large turnover,
the Silk Road and its approximately 1 million
registered users operated for a lengthy period
of time seemingly out of the reach of law
enforcement. There were two key elements to
the success of the Silk Road: a tool called TOR
(originally The Onion Router), which enables
anonymous internet browsing; and Bitcoin,
an entirely online, de-centralised currency.
TDemo
Both of these tools are widely used for entirely
legitimate purposes.
Also in October, head of Europol Rob Wain-
wight warned the media that the internet was
being used to facilitate drug trafficking. His
comments highlighted a cyber attack against
the port of Antwerp, which had been carried
out to facilitate the removal from the facility
of shipping containers holding drugs before
they could be inspected by customs and law
enforcement officials. Europol reported that a
drug gang had hired a group of hackers to gain
access to the ports computer systems. The
suspicious activity was rst noticed in 2011,
when port workers reported that entire ship-
ping containers were going missing.
Initial access to the computer system was
gained using a common technique called
spear phishing. Spear phishing involves
sending spoofed emails to staff at the target
organisation that contain malicious attach-
ments or links to malicious websites, which,
when opened, provide the hackers with access
to the computer network. Once control of a
computer on the port network was obtained,
the hackers were able to use other tools to ex-
pand their access, eventually gaining access to
the systems that tracked shipping containers.
With that access, it was possible for the gang
to locate shipping containers with the drugs
hidden inside them and remove them before
any inspection. This was apparently possible
due to the size and volume of traffic in the
port, which processes 8.63 million containers
each year.
Once the original compromise of the
port computers was discovered, access was
removed, although the purpose of the hacking
was not understood and it was not immedi-
ately associated with the broader smuggling
activity. To maintain access, the criminal gang
resorted to breaking into the offices and physi-
cally connecting hardware to the network that
restored its remote access.
In many ways the Silk Road and the attack
on the computer networks of Antwerp are
not surprising developments. Legitimate busi-
nesses are constantly looking for new ways to
use the internet, and criminals are doing the
same, nding ways to exploit the internet to
their advantage.
Online anonymity
A key enabler of the crossover between the
physical world of the drugs trade and black-
market online retailing, as demonstrated by
the Silk Road, is technology designed not for
criminal activity, but for entirely legitimate
purposes. This technology includes decentral-
ised currency and tools that provide anonym-
ity when browsing the internet.
Anonymity online is something many
December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 45
14/11/2013 15:14:31
 SERIOUS & ORGANISED CRIME
An employee of the Bavarian Criminal Investigation Department holds a seized
envelope and a bag of amphetamine in front of a table with further seized drugs
and money in Munich, Germany, on 9 July 2013. Investigators arrested a group
that had specialised in trading drugs anonymously online, with payments made
in Bitcoin and drugs being sent by mail.
people strive for, sometimes for specic rea-
sons, but often simply because they see it as
being important and a human right. TOR was
born out of a United States Naval Research
Laboratory project aimed at protecting gov-
ernment communications, which ultimately
grew to encompass a much broader user base.
TOR is an entirely free service, available to
anyone, that is simple to use. The TOR project
maintains a website providing support, and
the necessary tools can be downloaded. Once
installed, all user requests for internet services
are forwarded onto the TOR network. This
network consists of a large number of comput-
ers, or nodes. Each request from a TOR user
is passed from node to node, being encrypted
each time. The only information any single
node knows about any individual request
is the identity of the preceding node in the
chain, and where the request needs to be sent
next. Only the nal node knows the destina-
tion website, but it does not know where the
request originated. Multiple layers of encryp-
tion therefore ensure user anonymity.
The anonymity provided by TOR depends
on the goodwill of individual contributing
nodes (the TOR project provides specialised
software to allow people to turn their comput-
ers into contributing nodes); the more nodes
there are, the better the security provided by
the network. More nodes also means TOR
becomes more usable. TOR has been slowly in-
creasing in popularity since its release into the
public domain in 2002, but has suffered from
the fact that few users are willing to contrib-
ute computer resources to the network.
Nevertheless, it is extremely effective and
46 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013
044-047_JIR1312_F11_cybercrime.indd 46
PA: 1515079
robust. The leaks of classied national security
material by Edward Snowden in 2013 dem-
onstrated that both the US National Security
Agency (NSA) and the United Kingdoms
Government Communications Headquarters
(GCHQ) had put resources into defeating TOR.
The leaked documents appear to support the
assumption that, used properly, TOR provides
a very strong level of anonymity.
The ability to transfer large amounts of
money and to buy and sell goods without
governments or banks being able to interfere
has long been a desire of criminals. It is also
something in which many computer scien-
tists, mathematicians, and cryptographers
have been interested, motivated either by
libertarian ideals or simple scientic curiosity.
Although numerous currencies that would al-
low this level of freedom have been theorised,
and some implemented, few have ever caught
the publics imagination or become trusted
enough to be used on a large scale.
Bitcoin was rst outlined in an online paper
in 2008, with software implementation fol-
lowing in 2009. The true identity of Bitcoins
creators remains unknown. The paper and
software were released onto the internet
under a pseudonym, Satoshi Nakamoto,
which has never been concretely linked to an
individual or group; indeed, the quality and ro-
bustness of the rst software release strongly
suggested that it was the work of more than
one person.
TDemo
Bitcoin is completely distributed, without
any centralised infrastructure. Although
strictly speaking it is not anonymous as its
strength relies on the transparency of the
historical record of the currency used prop-
erly it is in reality extremely difficult to link
specic transactions to actual people. Bitcoins
initial popularity may well have been fuelled
by its suitability for black-market purchases,
but it is now accepted as payment by many
legitimate sites. The underlying principles be-
hind Bitcoin are complex but mathematically
provably robust, and have effectively provided
a currency that is extremely resistant to law
enforcement or government scrutiny.
The Snowden leaks and the raid on the Silk
Road have both had a signicant impact on the
development of technologies such as TOR and
Bitcoin. For instance, it was revealed during
a hearing following Ulbrichts arrest that the
FBI had inltrated the Silk Road website, with
one of the top-rated sellers actually working
for the authorities.
Despite the fact that the Silk Road was
uncovered by the FBI, the case illustrates that
the technologies work well. The weakness in
the system will always be people, and their
fallibility. Understanding how the Silk Road
ultimately failed will inform future projects,
making them more resistant to the efforts of
law enforcement investigations. Just over one
month after the seizure of the Silk Road, a
new version of the site was launched, branded
Silk Road 2.0, promising improved security.
However, it is the Snowden leaks that may
ultimately be of most signicant benet to
the online criminal. Snowden has certainly
provided useful information on the operations
of the NSA and other agencies. Although there
is much that can be learned from the leaked
documents about staying anonymous online,
and the documents appear to have veried
that TOR is effective, the most potent results
will be the general distrust and suspicion the
leaks have engendered.
Previously, those believing in pervasive on-
line intrusion by government agencies were in
the minority, whereas now that the reality ap-
pears to have been conrmed albeit possibly
a distorted, one-sided version of that reality as
told through selected releases by newspapers
more people will start to take online privacy
seriously. The fallout from the Snowden leaks
immediately led to a number of new secure
email projects, as well as wider discussion on
the effective implementation of a range of
other means of hiding user identity online.
These discussions are often led by extremely
well-informed and well-meaning individuals.
The results will be improved secure online
tools that are easier to use, and an increase in
online services being hosted from jurisdictions
ihs.com/janes
14/11/2013 15:14:32

that are traditionally less co-operative with
Western law enforcement, such as Russia.
New threats
The hacking of Antwerp port shows that drug
smuggling gangs are willing to embrace new
technology, and are also willing to hire tech-
nological capability when needed. Drug smug-
glers are traditionally not afraid to embrace
new technologies, and are often well funded.
Reports from Colombian law enforcement of-
cials on drug gangs have detailed submarines
developed specically for drug smuggling,
with the designs evolving from small breglass
semi-submersibles to far more capable steel-
hulled vessels. In light of innovation and risk-
taking on this scale, the adoption of computer
hacking should not come as a surprise.
Hacking as a service is a relatively new but
growing market. There is some evidence that
the Chinese state uses established domestic
hacker groups as part of its own campaign of
state-sponsored cyber espionage. A report by
security company Symantec in September de-
tailed the activities of a Chinese group it called
Hidden Lynx, and because of the range and
diversity of targets discovered, it concluded
that the group was offering services for hire.
The increasingly easy availability of hack-
ing as a service and the improving quality of
Conclusion
The modern world is completely depend-
ent on technology, which is increasingly
trusted implicitly. As has been demonstrat-
ed by recent events, these technologies
can be exploited. Western and developing
states have all pushed to increase the pool
of people with technical computing abilities
skills that are vital to modern econo-
mies. However, this has also increased the
pool of people who have the knowledge
and experience to exploit weaknesses in
modern technology.
Bitcoin and other similar currencies
make it possible to safely charge for hack-
ing services. TOR enables transactions to
be undertaken almost completely anony-
mously. The ability to operate anonymously
at a distance and yet with condence
in the payment mechanisms is a new
phenomenon. As more legitimate services
accept Bitcoin, it will become easier to turn
Bitcoins back into local currency without
looking suspicious, making detection of
money laundering extremely difcult.
ihs.com/janes
044-047_JIR1312_F11_cybercrime.indd 47
SERIOUS & ORGANISED CRIME
those services mean attacks like the one on
Antwerp port will happen more frequently. As
the use of technology to manage global trade
and provide security at borders grows, a bigger
attack space is being presented to would-be
hackers, and there is more opportunity for
malicious activity.
Since 2004, a convention issued by the
United Nations International Maritime Office
(IMO) has required that all commercial vessels
over 300 tonnes, and all passenger vessels,
carry a technology called Automatic Identica-
tion Systems (AIS). AIS broadcasts the identity
of the vessel, its current location, and other
details including cargo and course, to other
nearby ships and land stations. This informa-
tion is aggregated, and is publicly available
on a number of websites (usually as a paid-for
service). However, despite wide adoption,
there are issues with the AIS service. It has al-
ways been reliant on the honesty of the users,
and has not been entirely popular with some
shipping companies; some AIS beacons have
been congured to broadcast ship names such
as Dont be nosey, while others have simply
been disabled.
In October, researchers with security rm
Trend Micro presented ndings demonstrat-
ing more signicant issues with the protocol
itself, and also the aggregating services. Using
The next Silk Road is already up and
running; indeed, although it had the highest
prole, it was never the only such service in
operation. Disrupting TOR websites offer-
ing drugs and other illegal services is made
very difcult by the rapid emergence of
new sites offering the same services.
It is not currently clear how governments
will respond to these new tools. The leaks
detailing the capabilities of the NSA have
undoubtedly provided valuable guidance
to criminals, yet it may be the long-term re-
sponse to the level of government intrusion
into internet activity that is more damaging.
The sudden surge of interest in privacy
tools will bolster TOR services and lead to
renewed development of tools specically
designed to evade detection.
The challenge for law enforcement re-
mains signicant. The tools used in organ-
ised crime have legitimate uses and large
TDemo
groups of knowledgeable people work-
ing on them, making the results of their
work available for free. Likewise, hacking
these weaknesses, they were able to create
fake vessels, alter the position and declared
cargo of real vessels, and cause a variety of
other malicious effects. They were ultimately
able to undermine almost all of the data the
system provides. The implications of this re-
search are signicant, and the xes non-trivial:
AIS was built to be practical and resilient,
rather than highly secure. As use of the system
has become more prevalent, the system has
become more trusted. By the time the output
is aggregated onto a website showing the loca-
tions, identity, and cargo of shipping all over
the world, it is impossible to verify all of the
data, but it is used by shipping companies, and
more importantly by governments.
Shortly after the Trend Micro research
was released, an Iranian crude oil tanker
was detected obscuring its AIS identity off
the coast of Singapore, masquerading as a
smaller vessel. The reasons for this are unclear,
although the Iranian vessel was registered to
a company that has been sanctioned by the
US Office of Foreign Assets Control due to
connections with the Iranian oil trade, and the
identity it adopted had no such connections.
This demonstrates how AIS could be misused
to disguise or even fake entirely vessels
potentially involved in illegal activity such as
drug trafficking.
groups can be located anywhere and offer
services globally. Managing these new
threats will require signicant co-operation
between law enforcement bodies and new
approaches to conducting investigations,
which limits hopes of achieving success
over the short term.
This article was first published online at
ihs.com/janes on 13 November 2013.
XON THE WEB
Digital diplomacy Working towards a
cyber code of conduct
Virtual reality China takes industrial
espionage into cyber space
Author
Robert Pritchard is a cyber security
expert and founder of Abstract Blue
consulting.
ihs.com/janes
December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 47
14/11/2013 15:14:39
 PROLIFERATION & PROCUREMENT
Proliferation
game
Trading air defence systems and cruise missiles
The increased proliferation of cruise and air defence missile systems is providing
smaller states with advanced military capabilities. Sean OConnor outlines the key
proliferators and the impact this trade is having on strategic thinking.
X KEY POINTS
The increased proliferation of
advanced air defence systems and
cruise missiles is altering the strategic
landscape, allowing smaller states
to yield greater deterrent power
in response to potential military
intervention.
The main proliferators of cruise missile
and air defence systems are Russia
and China, while current international
treaties only provide real export
controls for cruise missile systems,
and not air-defence proliferation.
The impact of cruise missile and air
defence proliferation has been clearly
demonstrated by Syrias development
of deterrent capabilities, and the
likely expansion of such proliferation
will provide similar capabilities to a
growing number of states.
B
etween 2011 and 2013, Western gov-
ernments reacted very differently to
two separate attempts at the internal
regime change of a potential adversary. Rapid
Western intervention in Libya has contrasted
with the approach to the Syrian conict.
Although the reasons behind these different
approaches are numerous and complex, the
primary difference in military terms is that
Syria possesses advanced missile systems that
are unavailable to Libya.
This situation illustrates the strategic and
operational impact that the proliferation
48 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013
048-053_JIR1312_F3_PP.indd 48
of advanced air defence and cruise missile
technology can have. Indeed, the danger that
proliferation of advanced missile systems can
pose has been highlighted before, perhaps
most notably with the use of an advanced
anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) by Leba-
nese militant group Hizbullah against the
Israeli frigate INS Hanit in July 2006. These
incidents underscore the fact that prolifera-
tion efforts, which were previously focused
primarily on ballistic missiles, now include
the supply of advanced air defence systems
and cruise missiles.
At the end of the Cold War in 1991, cruise
missiles and advanced air defence systems
were found in the inventories of a select few
states, primarily Russia, the United States,
and larger Western European countries such
as France and the United Kingdom. Their
proliferation was limited because of their
nuclear delivery role (in the case of cruise
missiles) or their high cost. However, by the
turn of the century, proliferation of these
advanced weapon systems began to expand
beyond the native operators and their closest
allies. With the partial or total breakdown
of old political and military alliances, these
systems found their place in an expanding
export market, as systems once intended
to provide defence or deterrence against a
powerful adversary instead became weapons
TDemo
on the new battleeld of economics.
The result of the increased proliferation of
advanced offensive and defensive missile sys-
tems to countries previously unable to access
them is changing the strategic landscape and
creating a world in which traditional military
tactics and pressures may no longer apply. As
these systems effectiveness increases, future
conict zones will become far more danger-
ous, potentially representing a deterrent to
military intervention.
Key proliferators
The chief proliferator of advanced missile
systems is Russia. The countrys weapon
systems feature prominently in various
international defence exhibitions and are
tendered in most acquisition processes. The
primary market for Russian weapon sys-
tems is traditional Soviet-era states such as
Armenia and Azerbaijan, or export partners
such as North Korea, Syria, and Vietnam
countries that are already familiar with
Russian systems or possessing infrastructure
to support such weapons. In addition, Russia
is also making inroads into regions formerly
tied to Western alliances, including countries
in Latin America and Asia.
Signicant Russian systems offered for
export are variants of the S-300PMU (SA-
Grumble/SA-20 Gargoyle) strategic sur-
face-to-air missile (SAM) system, advanced
tactical SAM systems such as the Buk-M2E
(SA-17 Grizzly) and Antey-2500 based on
the S-300V (SA-23 Gladiator/Giant) and
the Klub (SS-N-27/30) and Bal-E (SSC-6
Stooge) cruise missile systems. Apart from
traditional export sales, Russia also en-
gages client states in the co-development of
ihs.com/janes
14/11/2013 14:19:59

advanced weapon systems, with examples be-
ing the Russo-Indian BrahMos cruise missile
a development of Russias native Yakhont
(SSC-5 Strobile) missile system and assis-
tance rendered to South Korea regarding the
KM-SAM system.
China also represents one of the newest
and potentially most signicant prolifera-
tors of advanced missile systems. Although
Chinas technological base suffered during
the cultural revolution of 196676, a signi-
cant leap in capability has occurred since the
late 1980s, assisted in part by the withdrawal
of expected Western assistance.
Chinese missile proliferation has largely
been composed of anti-ship missiles and
more traditional systems such as short-range
ballistic missiles. Initial strategic SAM ex-
ports failed to secure a signicant share of the
market, with only the ageing HQ-2 exported
to Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan. More
successful were exports of ASCMs, with the
C-802 exported to nine countries, including
Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, and Syria.
At present, Chinese missile exports are in-
creasing as the countrys arms industry gains
inroads into new markets. Although allies
such as Pakistan remain regular customers,
the diversication of Chinas proliferation
efforts is best expressed in Turkeys recent
ihs.com/janes
048-053_JIR1312_F3_PP.indd 49
PROLIFERATION & PROCUREMENT
selection of Chinas FD-2000 strategic SAM
system for its long-range air and missile
defence programme.
Although offering air defence systems and some cases restrict export entirely. However,
cruise missiles with similar performance to
Russian or Chinese systems, Western states
are not generally traditional proliferators.
Western states primarily export advanced
weapon systems among themselves, largely
The increased proliferation is creating
a world in which traditional military tactics
and pressures may no longer apply
to other countries that are technologically
capable of developing a similar capability but
choose to import for economic or political
reasons. As such, Western export activity is
often not viewed as proliferation, although
it can have the same destabilising effect as
proliferation by non-Western exporters.
The most commonly exported Western
systems that are relevant to proliferation are
strategic SAM systems and various ASCMs,
such as the US Patriot SAM system and the
Harpoon ASCM.
TDemo
Restricting trade
International agreements restrict the capa-
bilities of exported weapon systems, and in
inconsistent or incomplete accountability
under these agreements enables proliferation
to continue.
One of the most important anti-prolifer-
ation agreements is the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR). This is intended to
restrict the proliferation of systems capable
of carrying weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) payloads, including ballistic and
cruise missiles, as well as other systems
such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
The MTCR is a non-binding agreement with
no international legal penalty for non-
compliance, instead relying on enforcement
through internal legislation composed by the
signatories. The oft-cited effect of the MTCR
is to restrict the sale of included weapons
A Russian Klub-K anti-ship
cruise missile, in containerised
form, at a defence show near
Moscow. Such systems can
be easily disguised on civilian
vessels, creating a dangerous
proliferation problem. PA: 1331944
December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 49
14/11/2013 14:20:01
 PROLIFERATION & PROCUREMENT
Belarusian S-300PMU mobile air defence
missile systems seen during a parade marking
Independence Day in Minsk, Belarus, on 3 July
2013. Similar systems have been exported to
other countries by Russia. PA: 1515070
possessing a range greater than 300 kilome-
tres (km). However, this is not technically an
accurate interpretation, as actual implemen-
tation depends largely on the will and legisla-
tion of the signatories.
Existing as an agreement constituted
outside the United Nations, the MTCR is only
Modern, long-range strategic SAM
systems effectively limit the options an
adversary possesses during engagement
effective among signatories complying with
the agreed-upon limitations. China one
of the chief proliferators is not an MTCR
signatory. Although most missile exports fall
within MTCR guidelines, this is a function
of the design of most systems rather than
a desire to comply with the international
arrangement. With its export of the DF-3
intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)
to Saudi Arabia, in addition to the fact that
is has not signed the MTCR, China proved
willing to act as it sees t. This is in direct
50 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013
048-053_JIR1312_F3_PP.indd 50
contrast to Russia, for example, which as a
signatory of the MTCR will often offer export
variants of native systems with a limited
range or payload in order to comply with
MTCR restrictions.
Although counter-proliferation agree-
ments begin to have greater effect within the
UN, signicant loopholes remain. UN arms
sanctions normally reference restrictions on
weapons covered within the UN Register of
Conventional Arms (UNRCA), restricting the
sale of some or all of the weapons therein.
An example is UN Security Council Resolu-
tion (UNSCR) 1929, passed in June 2010 to
enhance existing sanctions against Iran.
TDemo
UNSCR 1929 states that weapon systems
banned from export to Iran consist of those
as dened for the purpose of the UNRCA. covered by the UNRCA, but this is not an
The UNRCA catalogues arms transactions
covering most types of weapon systems,
with a recent addition including small-arms.
Although ballistic and cruise missile systems
are catalogued, most SAM systems are not,
with the only exception being man-portable
air defence systems (MANPADS). Missile sys-
tems fall under Category VII of the UNRCA,
with published UN guidelines stating that
Category VII does not include ground-to-air
missiles, apart from MANPADS.
Therefore, although international agree-
ments and legislation restrict or bar the ex-
port of cruise missiles, strategic SAM systems
and their potentially destabilising effects
are wholly unregulated. Russia initially cited
UNSCR 1929 as the reason for cancelling a
planned sale of S-300PMU-2 strategic SAM
systems to Iran in September 2010, only to
later admit that it agreed with the US that
the resolution did not specically prevent
the sale.
UNSCR 1929 does require member states
to exercise vigilance and restraint over the
supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufac-
ture, and use of all other arms and related
materiel, referencing items not explicitly
outright restriction.
ihs.com/janes
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Proliferation impact
The impact of proliferation of SAM and
cruise missile systems varies depending on
the importer. Modern cruise missiles are de-
signed for either land-attack or anti-shipping
missions. Whereas land-attack cruise missiles
(LACMs) are traditionally subsonic, as this
allows increased fuel efficiency and range,
ASCMs are either subsonic or supersonic.
Supersonic weapons provide an advantage
by limiting the reaction time of anti-missile
defences. Coupled with sea-skimming ight
proles intended to reduce radar detection,
supersonic ASCMs represent potent anti-
shipping weapons.
Advanced strategic and tactical SAM
systems represent far more capable systems
than the extant Cold War-era systems em-
ployed by many countries. Advances in com-
puting power and radar technology combine
to provide modern SAM systems with the
capability to engage targets ranging from tra-
ditional combat aircraft to incoming missiles
and low observable targets such as aircraft
employing stealth technology. A modern,
long-range strategic SAM system such as the
S-300 serves as an airspace denial weapon,
effectively limiting the options an adversary
possesses during an engagement.
The July 2006 attack on the INS Hanit
highlights a proliferation issue made pos-
sible by advances in technology. As weapon
systems gain increasingly higher levels of
automation, the experience required for their
effective operation can diminish drasti-
cally. This attack during the war in 2006 was
undertaken by Hizbullah militants using a
suspected Chinese-made C-802 subsonic
ASCM sourced from Iran. The attack left four
crew members dead, but did not sink the
vessel. The proliferation of modern ASCMs to
Iran made their transfer to Hizbullah, and the
subsequent attack on the INS Hanit, possible.
Future ASCM proliferation may result in
additional opportunities for the transfer to
and employment by non-state actors. The
latest version of Russias Klub-K ASCM is of-
fered in a containerised variant, with system
components, operator stations, and launch
tubes concealed inside shipping containers.
Such a concealment method potentially
makes the system much harder to track and
target, adding a signicant unknown to the
threat environment of a given region. With
computer-based control interfaces and high
degrees of automation, the transfer of such a
system to a non-state actor will not result in a
signicant reduction of system effectiveness,
ihs.com/janes
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PROLIFERATION & PROCUREMENT
Battalion administrative
facilities and barracks
96L6E EW radar
Entry control point
Empty TEL revetment
Battery garrison
30N6E2 engagement radar
4 x 5P85TE2 transporter erector launchers
Astrium imagery depicts a Chinese S-300PMU-2 strategic SAM complex of the 16th Battalion, 4th SAM
Brigade, near Longtian in the Nanjing Military Region. Strategic SAM imports helped jump-start Chinas
domestic missile industry, resulting in the HQ-9, an S-300P series equivalent, which was recently selected
by Turkey in favour of Russian and Western SAM systems. Image dated 27 January 2013.
CNES 2013, Distribution Astrium Services / Spot Image S.A./ IHS: 1486999
as evidenced by Hizbullahs 2006 operation. a country with a highly developed defence
The impact of proliferation also often industry, access to those advanced systems
goes beyond an increase in military capa- often provides stepping stones for increasing
bility. When military capability increases, domestic capability. The leading example of
the threat picture associated with the host this method of development is China.
country is altered, an action that typically Iran also represents an importer of both
resonates throughout the associated region. Russian air defence missile systems and
Prime examples of this are Iran and China. If Chinese ASCMs. Following the 198088 war
a proliferator exports advanced systems to with Iraq, Iran reconstituted portions of its
Kapustin Yar
Kapustin Yar, situated in Russias south- checkout facility requires detailed analysis
west region of Astrakhan, is home to the of overhead imagery and a thorough
4th State Central Test Range, established knowledge of identiable system com-
in 1946 to begin testing captured Ger- ponents. High-resolution satellite im-
man missile systems and developmental agery provided to IHS Janes by Astrium
Russian designs. depicted S-125 Pechora-2M systems on
Currently, the centre hosts development a checkout pad at Kapustin Yar on 7 June
and test work for strategic and tactical 2013. The Pechora-2M is a modication
SAM systems, naval missile systems, of the Soviet-era Pechora SAM system
cruise and ballistic missiles, and associ- intended for the export market, with recent
ated components. customers including Egypt and Venezuela.
The 4th State Central Test Range Kapustin Yar is not the only proliferation-
represents a signicant area of interest for related complex requiring monitoring, with
proliferation analysis, particularly in the others including system production sites,
case of strategic SAM systems. South of additional test ranges in Russia and China,
the strategic SAM development complex and port facilities known to serve as
is a system checkout complex, where transhipment points for arms shipments.
TDemo
complete systems undergo evaluation Monitoring and analysis of these facilities
before service entry or export. is critical to developing a full understand-
Identication of export systems at the ing of the proliferation problem.
December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 51
14/11/2013 14:20:19
 PROLIFERATION & PROCUREMENT
EW radar checkout pad
S-300P/400
checkout pads
Target launch complex
Astrium imagery depicts the SAM checkout complex at Kapustin Yars 4th Central Test Range near
Volgograd, Russia. The Pechora-2M checkout pad hosts components probably intended for proliferation to
a foreign user as Russia does not operate the system. Image dated 7 June 2013.
military with Soviet/Russian arms, often
gaining new capabilities as a result.
While failing to import advanced Russian
strategic SAM systems due to the interna-
tional pressure exerted on Russia, Iran has
succeeded in acquiring the Tor-M1E (SA-15
Gauntlet) low- to medium-altitude SAM
system. Currently emplaced around nuclear
and missile-related complexes, the Tor-
M1E provides a credible, albeit limited, air
defence, with the advertised ability to engage
low-observable targets and precision guided
munitions potentially preventing a limited
strike on these facilities.
More signicant are Iranian imports of
Chinas C-802 ASCM. Original imports of
the 120-km range C-802 ended during the
mid-1990s following international pressure,
forcing Iran to begin a reverse-engineering
programme. The reverse-engineered weapon
system is known as the Noor. Initial efforts
proved technologically awed, achiev-
ing a range of only 30 km, but subsequent
upgrades provide the current iteration with a
range of 170200 km, the latter applying to a
derivative referred to as Qader, designed for a
land-attack role.
Although China continues to import
advanced Russian weapon systems, it also
expends signicant effort enhancing its
own domestic military capabilities. Often
these developments build from experience
with imported Russian weapon systems. A
52 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013
048-053_JIR1312_F3_PP.indd 52
Pechora-2M checkout pad
SNR-125M-2M target
engagment radar
2 x 5P73-2M launchers
Component
staging area
64N6/91N6 checkout pad
CNES 2013, Distribution Astrium Services / Spot Image S.A./ IHS: 1487000
key example is Chinas Shenyang J-11B, a
domestically equipped version of the Sukhoi
Su-27SK combat aircraft. Initially procur-
ing Su-27SK ghters from Russia, followed
by a licence production agreement, Chinas
aviation industry obtained knowledge and
previously unavailable technology, eventu-
ally eliminating the need to keep importing
or license-producing the Russian aircraft. The
same practice takes place within Chinas mis-
sile industry, where the HQ-9 strategic SAM
system has been designed from Russian SAM
technology imported in the 1990s.
The drawback to such activity from the
proliferators standpoint is that, although
proliferation provides an immediate source
of revenue, the end result can be a new
competitor on the market. This is illustrated
by Turkeys recent selection of the FD-2000,
an HQ-9 export variant, as its next strategic
SAM system over the European SAMP/T, US
Patriot, and a variant of the Russian S-300.
Continued competition between Chinese
and Russian manufacturers represents a po-
tential proliferation problem; as contracts are
negotiated and price terms debated, a result-
ant drop in price to secure a sale or a foothold
in a new market only serves to increase the
proliferation of such systems.
TDemo
However, in the Turkish case, selection
of the FD-2000 may not relate entirely
to a cost-related advantage over the other
competitors. Ostensibly NATO allies, Turkey
and Greece do not enjoy close diplomatic
relations due to various ongoing disputes,
including the Cyprus question. As Greece op-
erates the S-300PMU-1 and Patriot, Turkeys
selection of the FD-2000 possibly indicates
a desire to deploy a defensive system that is
unfamiliar to one of its potential adversaries.
According to international media reports, the
FD-2000 also represented a cheaper option
when compared with the other competitors.
Proliferation of advanced missile systems
does not necessarily represent a simple arms
sale. The capabilities these systems offer
their new owners can allow the seller to exert
a degree of inuence over a given region.
Following the sale of refurbished S-300PT
and S-300PS SAM batteries to Armenia in
2004 and 2010 respectively, Russia exported
the S-300PMU-2 to Azerbaijan in 2011. Arme-
nia and Azerbaijan are in opposition concern-
ing Nagorno-Karabakh, an ethnic-Armenian
majority region located within Azerbaijans
borders but held by Armenian forces since a
1994 treaty ended a bilateral conict. Neither
side enjoys a signicant qualitative military
advantage, although Azerbaijan has sought
to redress this through greatly increased
defence expenditure over the past eight
years. Through the supply of advanced SAM
systems to Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia
was able to strengthen its diplomatic position
with both countries, while enabling each to
deter the other from aerial encroachment.
System mobility also allows for rapid rede-
ployment near Nagorno-Karabakh, deterring
either side from offensive aerial operations in
the region.
Libya and Syria
Perhaps the most profound example of the
impact of advanced missile proliferation is
found in the context of the ongoing Syrian
conict. The effect of proliferation is also
noted when comparing the differing Western
approaches to the Libyan and Syrian crises.
The Libyan uprising began in early Febru-
ary 2011, with UNSCR 1973 backing Western
military intervention beginning that March.
The Western goal the establishment of a
no-y zone ostensibly to protect civilians
from government forces targeting rebels
necessitated the degradation of Libyan
air defences. Lacking modern air defence
systems or ASCMs capable of threatening
Western naval forces employed as cruise
missile platforms, Libyan air defences fell
rapidly. Before the conict, in 2010, Libya
had sought to purchase Russian S-300PMU-2
ihs.com/janes
14/11/2013 14:20:35

strategic SAM systems as part of a large-scale
military upgrade, but it had failed to nalise a
sale before the outbreak of hostilities.
The Syrian crisis began with anti-gov-
ernment protests in March 2011, escalating
to a civil war one month later, with Syrian
military forces launching offensives intended
to suppress pockets of resistance. Although
international condemnation of the govern-
ment of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad
quickly followed, Western efforts to establish
a no-y zone or gain approval for UN-sanc-
tioned military action faltered. A number
of complex political and diplomatic factors
inuenced this lack of action. However, from
a military perspective, the lack of Western
intervention in Syria is traced to two sides
of the proliferation argument: the presence
of advanced weapon systems in the Syrian
military, and the relationship between the
proliferator and its client.
As part of a programme to modify its age-
ing military, Syria ordered various military
systems from Russia and China between
2006 and 2010. Deliveries began in 2008
and continued into 2012, after the outbreak
of hostilities.
Chinese proliferation to Syria is limited to
advanced air defence radar systems providing
signicant increases in capability over extant
Soviet-era systems in service. Little men-
tion of Chinese radar sales to Syria is found
in open sources, apart from a Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute refer-
ence to a Type 120 radar sale in 2009. The
Type 120 is a 2D early warning (EW) system
deployed with Chinese HQ-9 SAM batteries
as a battery-level asset. The presence of the
Type 120 in Syria became known when rebel
forces captured the Dar Ta izzah EW complex
northwest of Aleppo in June 2012, releasing
video and handheld images of the complex on
the internet. Located at three additional EW
complexes in Syria, the Type 120 is joined by
the JYL-1 3D radar (one example co-located
with a Type 120 at the Kafr Buhum EW
complex), and the JY-27 (Wide Mat) 2D radar,
located at two additional EW complexes in
central Syria.
Advanced sensor presence provides the
Syrian EW network with modern systems
enjoying more robust electronic counter-
measure characteristics, and in the case of
the JY-27, a legitimate counter-stealth detec-
tion capability. Chinese sensor incorpora-
tion possibly results from alleged network
inltration by Israel, which rendered Syrias
Soviet-era sensor systems ineffective before
ihs.com/janes
048-053_JIR1312_F3_PP.indd 53
PROLIFERATION & PROCUREMENT
the September 2007 attack on the Deir ez-
Zour nuclear complex. With China exerting
signicant efforts in cyber warfare, imported
sensors are potentially more robust in the
face of Israeli inltration efforts.
Russian proliferation to Syria consists of
advanced SAM systems and modern ASCMs.
The Buk-M2E and S-125 Pechora-2M (SA-3
Goa) SAM systems represent signicant intended to hinder the Assad government.
capability increases over extant Soviet-era
systems, combining advanced sensors with
high mobility. The Bastion coastal-defence
system employs the Yakhont ASCM, a su-
personic, sea-skimming weapon designed to
defeat modern anti-missile countermeasures
deployed by surface combatants.
The result of Chinese and Russian prolif-
eration to Syria is the presence of a far more
robust offensive and defensive network than
previously faced by Western militaries. Its
presence presents one explanation for the
perceived Western shift in attitude compared
with Libya. The import of advanced ASCMs
serves to limit Western targeting options
within Syria, forcing LACM-ring surface
vessels to remain further offshore. Ad-
ditionally, advanced SAM systems provide de-
fensive capability against LACM strikes and
aerial incursions, with advanced EW sensors
providing indicators and target track data for
older, less advanced weapon systems, increas-
ing their effectiveness as a result.
In this case, the proliferation of weapon
Conclusion
The continued proliferation of both ad-
vanced SAM systems and cruise missiles
represents a destabilising inuence that is
capable of potentially limiting or deterring
military intervention in a given scenario,
as illustrated by Syria. As these weapon
systems become more capable and more
survivable, their comparatively cheap price
and substantial automation make them ex-
tremely sought after on the export market.
Currently, their proliferation and deploy-
ment reaches into the potential tinderbox
of the South China Sea. Vietnamese im-
port of Russian SAMs and ASCMs stands
with Chinese import and production of
similar systems to create the potential for a
destructive confrontation. With little to no
restriction on the export of these systems,
TDemo
the arms race in the South China Sea
represents only the latest example of an
expanding proliferation problem. Without
systems that are fully compatible with
international agreements has provided Syria
with the security to conduct its internal
affairs with a reduced chance of external
intervention. Furthermore, the presence of
Syria as a signicant arms trade partner with
Russia served to harden Russian resolve in
denying UN approval for offensive operations
For the rest of the world, the lesson of the
Syrian example is clear: advanced SAM sys-
tems and cruise missiles represent potential
deterrents to Western military interven-
tion. The less advanced air defence networks
of Iraq, Libya, and Serbia failed to deter or
signicantly hamper offensive military
operations against them. Syrias upgraded
network, coupled with the presence of
advanced ASCMs, remains untested outside
of limited Israeli cross-border operations, de-
spite the international outcry regarding the
Assad governments alleged actions during
the present crisis.
It is therefore in calculations about the
strategic balance of forces that the prolifera-
tion of such systems is of notable interest to
military planners. The relatively permissive
cost of the systems means that even coun-
tries with relatively modest conventional
military forces can potentially have access to
a force multiplier that will have a dispropor-
tionately dissuasive effect against even the
worlds most advanced militaries.
improvements to anti-proliferation agree-
ments or greater attention to the issue in
the UNSC, the threat will only increase.
This article was first published online at
ihs.com/janes on 4 November 2013.
XON THE WEB
Collision course Israel and Hizbullah
maintain readiness for war
Military might China develops its
strategic missile systems
End of an era The future of Russia-
US arms control
Author
Sean OConnor is an IHS imagery
analyst.
ihs.com/janes
December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 53
14/11/2013 14:21:55
 CHINA WATCH
Suspicious smiles
Sino-Russian relations
Russian prime minister Dmitry Medvedev visited China in late October to hold
high-level talks and oversee a major new energy deal. Mark Galeotti reports on the
countries economic, political, and security relations, which appear to be blooming.
X KEY POINTS
Ties between Moscow and Beijing go
beyond economics, and bear witness
to increasingly close security and
political co-operation.
Russia continues to have misgivings
about Chinas growing economic
leverage, particularly in its oft-
neglected Far East region and in
Central Asia.
Divergent long-term aims mean
that the current pragmatic alliance
between Russia and China is not a
relationship that can last indenitely.
A
fter Russian prime minister Dmitry
Medvedev returned from Beijing
and his latest meeting with Chinese
president Xi Jinping the fth since 2008,
when the last outstanding border disputes
between the two countries were resolved he
reiterated what has been a common assertion
in recent years: that relations between the
two countries have never been so cordial. The
two leaders last met in March, when Xi went
to Moscow on his rst foreign visit, just eight
days after he became Chinese leader. Moscow
has repeatedly compared this with United
States president Barack Obamas failure to
arrange an early summit after his own inau-
guration. After the March meeting, Russian
president Vladimir Putin hailed relations
between China and Russia as being the best
in their history.
There is some truth in these upbeat as-
sessments. China is hungry for energy and
resources to fuel its continued development,
while Russia nervously watching its own
attening economic growth rates is desper-
ate for exports. Consequently, the economic
foundations for closer ties are strong. The
two countries have committed themselves to
54 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013
054-055_JIR1312_F2_CW.indd 54
expanding bilateral trade from USD88 billion
in 2012 to USD100 billion by 2015.
The visit also marked the signing of two
new energy deals. State-owned Rosneft,
Russias largest oil producer, agreed to supply
Chinese rm Sinopec with 10 million tonnes
of crude oil a year over the next decade, worth
around USD85 billion. Novatek, Russias
second-largest natural gas producer, has
concluded a 15-year deal to provide lique-
ed natural gas to China National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC), Chinas largest oil and
gas company. Combined with a USD270 bil-
lion, 25-year deal signed between Rosneft and
CNPC in June, this makes China the largest
hydrocarbons market for Russia.
Beyond economic
This is not purely an economic relationship.
One of the bases of recent closer co-ordination
between Beijing and Moscow has been their
shared determination to constrain what
they regard as US efforts to shape the global
agenda. This was clearly behind Xis asser-
tion that both countries should continue to
enhance strategic co-ordination, maintain
the authority of the United Nations and its
Security Council, and safeguard the purposes
and principles of the UN Charter and the basic
norms governing international relations in a
bid to jointly promote world peace, stability
and development.
Such an attitude is not symptomatic of
Chinese and Russian reverence towards the
UN. Rather, Moscow and Beijing juxtapose
their outlook with what they perceive as US
willingness to act unilaterally.
These closer ties are also visible in security
co-operation. Under the terms of a major arms
TDemo
deal concluded in March, Russia is selling
China 24 Sukhoi Su-35 multirole combat air-
craft, while joint production will begin on four
Lada-class diesel-electric attack submarines.
China and Russia have been conducting joint
military exercises since 2005, but the scale has
been steadily increasing.
In mid-2013, Russian and Chinese troops
fought alongside each other in the Peace
Mission 2013 military exercises wargaming
combat scenarios against insurgents sup-
ported by unspecic foreign forces. Even more
assertive were the July 2013 Joint Sea 2013
naval exercises Chinas largest-ever exercise
with a foreign partner in which one subma-
rine and 18 surface vessels were deployed into
the Sea of Japan, including Russias Pacic
eet agship, the Slava-class cruiser Varyag.
The joint forces staged a simulated boarding
of a pirate vessel and tested tactics to defend
themselves against air and underwater attacks
from an enemy closely resembling the US
Navy. This follows Februarys simulated cruise
missile attacks by Russian Tupolev Tu-22M
Backre long-range strategic bombers on
a US Aegis-equipped cruiser deployed near
Japan and a ground-based US missile defence
site in Japan. It also comes after the decision
to deploy a new Project 18280-class electronic
intelligence ship, the Yuri Ivanov, of the mili-
tary Main Intelligence Directorate (Glavnoye
Razvedovatelnoye Upravlenie: GRU). This will
begin service in the Pacic in 2014.
Taken together, these examples of co-
operation certainly seem to show an impres-
sively close relationship. It is one that has
encouraged Putin to be more confrontational
in his dealing with Washington. His willing-
ness to take a strong line against intervention
in Syria, for example, was undoubtedly in part
because of Chinas open backing.
Beneath the surface
It is an interesting sign of Russian attitudes to-
wards China that Medvedev used a television
interview on his return home to encourage
people not to fear China and its rapid growth.
ihs.com/janes
14/11/2013 14:22:53

Reading between the lines, his efforts to
convince viewers that China could be
Moscows strategic partner with whom
co-operation was indispensible may hint
at misgivings within the Russian leadership
about the relationship.
In part, these are fears based on the widen-
ing economic and demographic gap between
the two countries. There are fears in Russia,
based only partly on realities on the ground,
that Beijing will become dominant in the Rus-
sian Far East, given the steady drift of Chinese
investment and migrants into the under-
populated and under-capitalised region. This
has been exacerbated by oods since mid-2013
in the Russian Far East that were badly and
belatedly handled by the government. Two
criminal cases were opened in late September
against local officials for alleged negligence in
the disaster response.
Medvedev has pledged RUB40 billion
(USD1.26 billion) in aid to the region, as well
as a long-term plan to encourage businesses
to move there and to stimulate much-needed
investment in infrastructure. However, this
seems to have done little to reassure local
elites that Moscow is genuinely committed to
developing the region.
In the absence of such reassurance, the
money owing in from China, as well as the
substantial opportunities in both legal and
illegal business across the border (especially
the export of timber) ensure that the Beijing
connection is a powerful one. In 2010-11, for
example, Moscow allocated only around USD1
billion in federal support for the Russian Far
East, but investment from China totalled
around USD3 billion.
Beijing and Moscow are also engaged in
power plays over Central Asia. Of all the coun-
tries of the region, only Uzbekistan trades
more with Russia than China does. In Septem-
ber 2013, Xi toured Central Asia, consolidating
Chinas position with almost USD100 billion
in deals for Turkmen gas, Kazakh oil, an Uzbek
gas pipeline, and investment in Kyrgyzstan.
Russian deputy minister of foreign affairs
Igor Morgulov appeared sanguine, saying that
Central Asia is an important area of Russia-
China relations in which the countries are
not competing with each otherbut adjusting
[their] policies to reect mutual interests.
However, one source in the Russian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs told IHS Janes that he feels
China is increasingly trying to buy Central
Asia from under [Russia].
These grounds for suspicion matter far more
to Moscow than Beijing. China is aware of its
ihs.com/janes
054-055_JIR1312_F2_CW.indd 55
Russian prime minister Dmitry Medvedev (right) with
Chinese premier Li Keqiang as he arrives for a state
visit in Beijing, China, on 22 October 2013. The two
leaders held high-level talks.
economic strength and that time is on its side.
It has shown that although it is happy to buy
Russian oil and gas, it has continued to stall
on one of Russias greatest goals: a long-term
deal to sell natural gas to China through a
dedicated pipeline.
Russian state-owned gas company Gazprom
sent a sizeable delegation to Beijing with
Medvedev but, once again, left empty-handed.
China is aware that new producers above
all the US will soon be entering the market,
and as a result it is unwilling to lock itself into
a xed price. Russia, meanwhile, is worried
about the shape of the market in the future,
and the risk it may pose to its present stake in
Europe, and is therefore keen to buttress its
position in China.
Outlook
While Moscow is parading its friendship with
Beijing, it continues to regard China as the
most serious long-term threat to its territo-
rial integrity and its hegemonic position over
Eurasia. Yet Russia has very few options at its
disposal. It needs Chinese support in order to
resist what it sees as Washingtons unipolar
ambitions in the world, and it has to sell its
latest weaponry to China for diplomatic and
economic reasons, even though it knows the
Chinese will immediately seek to reverse-
engineer, copy, and export the materiel.
There is still a deep-seated suspicion of
China in Russias political leadership, and an
TDemo
assumption that some day the relationship
will sour. This helps to explain why the inux
of money and migrants across the border
is treated as a strategic issue, and is also an
CHINA WATCH
PA: 1515436
unspoken reason behind efforts to bolster
Russian forces in the Far East.
The Russian Pacic Fleet is to get new ships,
including a Mistral-class amphibious assault
ship, Steregushchiy-class corvettes, and a
Borey-class ballistic missile submarine. Land
forces in the theatre are also being upgraded,
and a major exercise in July was implicitly
geared towards assessing how well they could
be mobilised against a threat from the south.
In short, at present, Beijing and Moscow
are successfully managing an asymmetric
relationship. However, they still have very
different long-term aspirations. Russia appears
to regard China as a pragmatic ally for now,
but a rival in geo-strategic terms in the future.
China considers Russia a convenient supplier
and investment opportunity, but a waning
power. This is not a relationship that can last
indenitely in its present form.
This article was first published online at
ihs.com/janes on 31 October 2012.
X ON THE WEB
United at sea China and Russia
demonstrate naval capabilities
Russian evolution The modernisation
of strategic capabilities
Author
Dr Mark Galeotti is Professor of Global
Affairs at New York Universitys SCPS
Center for Global Affairs.
ihs.com/janes
December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 55
14/11/2013 14:22:54
 RESOURCE WATCH
Marking territory
Baku-Supsa pipeline charts conictive course
As a borderisation process takes place in northern Georgia, the potential for conict
between Moscow and Tbilisi has risen. Mamuka Tsereteli examines the impact this
will have on a section of oil pipeline that passes briey through a disputed region.
X KEY POINTS
A small section of the Baku-Supsa
oil pipeline passes through Russian-
supported separatist territory in
northern Georgia, where a process
of borderisation has raised tensions
between Moscow and Tbilisi.
The demarcation of controlled territory
in the region does not have a direct
physical impact on the pipeline in the
short term, but could change the risk
prole in the longer term.
Even if the internal situation in
Georgia were to deteriorate or
security problems were to increase
in the restive North Caucasus region,
Russia would remain constrained
in its actions by its dependence on
European energy markets.
S
ince the Russia-Georgia conict of
August 2008, the Russian military
has deployed to two separatist regions
of Georgia. On 17 September 2013, Russian
troops based in the breakaway region of South
Ossetia began erecting barbed-wire fencing
alongside administrative borders separating
the region from the rest of Georgia.
The region is considered by the United Na-
tions to be part of Georgia, while Russia and
the Ossetians living in the region consider it
to be an independent state of South Ossetia,
which was itself brought denitively under
separatist control along with Abkhazia in
the 2008 conict.
According to the de facto South Ossetian
authorities, the new boundary follows the
administrative borderline between Georgia
and the so-called South Ossetia Autonomous
Region created by the Soviet authorities in the
1920s. This borderisation process restricts
movement for ethnic Georgian and Ossetians
56 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013
056-057_JIR1312_F12_RW.indd 56
of the region who need to trade, cultivate
land, or cross the separation line for medical,
educational, or other humanitarian reasons.
As a result, a major depopulation process is
underway in the region, with native Georgians
leaving for other areas of Georgia and Osse-
tians moving to the Russian republic of North
Ossetia, which borders Georgia in the north.
Russia, meanwhile, claims that it is follow-
ing a 2009 intergovernmental agreement with
South Ossetia, which delegates the protection
of South Ossetian borders to Russian border
guards. Russian deputy minister of foreign
affairs Grigory Karasin declared in June that
South Ossetia and Abkhazia had the right to
take such measures because any country
must move to control its territory and ensure
the security of its borders and its citizens.
Georgian authorities and the international
community have condemned the activities of
Russian forces in the region. EU High Repre-
sentative for Foreign Affairs and Security Poli-
cy Catherine Ashton on 1 October 2013 called
for the barriers to be removed and expressed
profound concern over the continued and
increasing activities by Russian security forces
to erect fences and other obstacles along ad-
ministrative boundary lines in Georgia. Such
activities which contravene Georgias terri-
torial integrity create signicant hardship for
residents on either side of the administrative
boundary lines and seriously challenge stabil-
ity and security in these regions.
This EU statement was echoed by the US
Department of State, and NATO secretary-
general Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who said
the fence-building does not contribute to a
peaceful resolution of the conict. He also
called on Russia to reverse its recognition
TDemo
of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of
Georgia as independent states.
By the end of October, the process of
erecting barbed-wire fences had stopped, but
it remained unclear whether this was a perma-
nent or temporary cessation of the activities.
Pipeline dilemma
This process also creates other problems. As
a result of the 2008 war, a 1.4 kilometre sec-
tion of the Western Route Export Pipeline
(WREP), also known as the Baku-Supsa oil
pipeline, passes through an area controlled by
separatists and Russian troops around the vil-
lage of Karapila. The 829 km-long Baku-Supsa
pipeline begins at the Sangachal Terminal near
the Azerbaijani capital Baku, and then passes
through Georgia to the Supsa Terminal on the
western Georgian Black Sea coast.
According to IHS World Markets Energy,
Azerbaijan has three pipelines transporting
crude oil to customers: the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, a northern route from
Baku to Novorossiisk on Russias Black Sea
coast, and the Baku-Supsa pipeline. The major-
ity of oil produced in Azerbaijan is exported as
crude oil, predominantly via the BTC pipeline.
The Baku-Supsa pipeline which began op-
erations in 1999, initially serving as the main
export outlet for Azerbaijan International
Operating Companys (AIOC) early oil output
lost its export primacy to the BTC once the
latter became operational in 2006. Neverthe-
less, exports via the Baku-Supsa pipeline stood
at 2.74 million tonnes in 2012.
BP Georgia, which manages the pipeline on
Georgian territory, had to suspend right-of-
way patrolling activity along the section of the
pipeline that passes through separatist-con-
trolled territory. In May 2013, Russian military
forces and the South Ossetian de facto govern-
ment began demarcation of the administrative
border in the area through which the pipeline
passes. This activity has since ceased.
The actual demarcation of the border in this
area may not have a direct physical impact for
the WREP, but could change the risk prole
ihs.com/janes
14/11/2013 14:23:18

in the longer term. Although BP Georgia has
no physical surface access to this short section
of the pipe, it has pipe integrity monitoring
capability through intelligent pigs (clean-
ing and inspection devices) that can monitor
anomalies in the system such as metal loss
through corrosion or illegal hot-tapping. Fur-
thermore, there are no overground facilities in
this section of the WREP, which reduces the
overall risk prole of this section.
As a sustainable solution for safe access to
the right of way, sponsors are considering
re-routing this section of pipeline outside
the South Ossetia administrative border.
This would be included within the scope of
the WREP Sectional Replacement Project,
and would eliminate the incremental risks
associated with the lack of access to the right
of way because of any conict. Currently, any
response activities taking place within this
disputed territory would require diplomatic
support from the government of Georgia and
most likely the international community.
Outlook
Georgia is the only neighbouring state of
Russia that has fought a military conict
with Moscow since the collapse of the Soviet
Union. The fundamental reason behind the
Russia-Georgia conict was Georgias strategic
desire to join the Euro-Atlantic security and
economic space, while Russias objective was
to prevent a sizeable Western military and
security presence in the former Soviet space.
For Russia, the conict was an opportunity
to demonstrate that former Soviet territory
remained its strategic domain. The outbreak
of armed hostilities signalled to the entire
world including Russias other neighbours,
Western powers, and most importantly, the
United States that Moscow was not ready to
see that sphere of inuence diminish.
Russia also wanted to avoid provoking
any confrontation with the West in 2008.
Russia attacked military airports elsewhere in
Georgia, the naval base at Poti, and the radar
system in Tbilisi, but did not target pipelines,
pumping stations, or any other major com-
mercial assets in Georgia. This approach was
designed to deliberately avoid direct confron-
tation with European countries, Turkey, and
the US, all of which had vested interests in the
operation of the major transit infrastructure in
Georgia. Indeed, this infrastructure served as a
partial security deterrent for Georgia in 2008.
Following Russias logic of 2008, it is
unlikely that Russian military or security
forces will seek to cause any problem for the
ihs.com/janes
056-057_JIR1312_F12_RW.indd 57
Baku-Supsa oil pipeline
Abkhazia
Tskhinvali
Supsa
GEORGIA
Baku-Supsa oil
pipeline
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
oil pipeline
Separatist
Georgian region
TURKEY
0 80 km
2013 IHS: 1487003 Note: Boundaries and course of pipeline are indicative only and imply no jurisdictional recognition
smooth functioning of the energy transit
infrastructure in Georgia in the immediate
future. Russia, for the time being, is not inter-
ested in direct confrontation with the West.
However, in the longer term, Russian ac-
tions will depend on internal dynamics within
the country, as well as the pace of Georgias
NATO integration process. If the internal po-
litical and economic situation remains stable,
Russia will continue to avoid confrontation
with the West, and there will be no threat to
transit infrastructure crossing Georgia.
Under this scenario, Russia would calculate
that it is in Russian security interests in the
North Caucasus region, which is beset by an
insurgency, to have a strong and stable Geor-
gia on its southern borders. Such an approach
should lead to greater security for the transit
infrastructure in Georgia.
However, if the internal situation in Georgia
were to deteriorate due to negative political
and economic developments, complemented
by security problems in the restive North Cau-
casus region, Russian actions could become
more unpredictable. Rebuffing Russias strate-
gic designs would be risky for its neighbours,
including Georgia, but Tbilisi would probably
TDemo
adopt a hedging strategy in this eventuality,
which would include strengthening its territo-
rial defences, substantially increasing the cost
for Russian intervention.
RESOURCE WATCH
RUSSIA
North Ossetia
South Ossetia
Karapila
Tbilisi
ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN
Yerevan
Georgia nevertheless remains aware that
a key element of its strategy is close engage-
ment and the concerted management of
its relationships with the European Union,
Russia, and the US. Russia greatly depends on
European energy markets, and maintaining its
European energy market share against the
backdrop of a growing supply potential from
other regions of the world is a decisive driver
for its actions. That could therefore serve
as a key balancing factor for Tbilisis future
dealings with Russia.
This article was first published online at
ihs.com/janes on 14 November 2013.
X ON THE WEB
Reform challenges ahead for new
Georgian Dream government
Armed clashes on Russian-Georgian
border kill 14 as Tbilisi cracks down
on instability
Author
Mamuka Tsereteli is Director of Research
at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of
Advanced International Studies at Johns
Hopkins University.
ihs.com/janes
December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 57
14/11/2013 14:23:18
 INTERVIEW
NAME
POSITION
BACKGROUND
PA: 1515081
G
iven the emotional load on
these elections, overall I con-
sider them to be a remarkable
success story for Kosovo, Bernd Borchardt
told IHS Janes. There were 18 people ar-
rested for fraud and intimidation attempts in
the whole of the country but real problems in
only two polling stations in the north.
Borchardt visited the north of Mitrovica
the largest town in North Kosovo, where the
attacks took place just a few days before the
poll. He blames the breakdown in security on
a simple lack of manpower. Each polling sta-
tion had between two and six police officers
stationed outside not enough to prevent an
attack by a gang of 30 men, as occurred in the
two largest stations in northern Mitrovica.
There are extremely limited resources. We
feel recruitment is too slow every time I
meet them, my Kosovo Police colleagues ask
when they will get reinforcements, he said.
The reason is that the integration of the for-
mer parallel police has not yet taken place.
Under an EU-brokered agreement to
normalise relations between Kosovo and
Serbia signed in April, Serbia has agreed to
dismantle the parallel security structures in
North Kosovo that it has funded since the
end of the war in 1999. Many of those officers
are reluctant to operate within Pristina-run
institutions, and so far there have been very
few applications to transfer. There is not yet
agreement on the process of that integration.
We expect applications once that process is
completed, said Borchardt.
He admits that EULEX faces frequent
criticism in Kosovo for its perceived failure to
take effective action against government cor-
ruption and war crimes. On a regular basis,
when I meet Kosovo friends, I am met with
58 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013
058_JIR1312_F10_INT.indd 58
Bernd Borchardt
Head of the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX)
The European Union Rule of Law Mission in
Kosovo (EULEX) became fully operational in
April 2009. It has a total of 2,250 staff, and an
annual budget of EUR111 million (USD148.8
million), with which it carries out monitoring
and executive functions. These focus particu-
larly on countering corruption, investigating
war crimes, and establishing the rule of law in
the Serb-majority enclave of North Kosovo,
which has been effectively cut off from the
rest of the country since the 199899 war.
this frustration which has to do with unreal-
istic expectations, he said, adding that there
is no proof that EULEX has refused to carry
out investigations where there was evidence.
He commented, If someone came up and
said you didnt arrest Mr X even though you
have perfect proof, then this is something I
could deal with. I havent received any calls
from [the European Union in] Brussels to
stop any investigations.
Nonetheless, the outgoing deputy head of
EULEX, Andy Sparkes, stated in an interview
with the Balkans Investigative Reporting
Network in January, There are occasions
when [stability] can sit very uneasily with the
requirements of the rule of law.
Borchardt says he has taken steps to
improve action against corruption, hiring a
former Transparency International officer
and identifying gaps in Kosovos anti-
corruption system. Rome wasnt built in a
day, he said, accepting that EULEX raised
expectations too high when it rst arrived. I
strongly believe that we have to do more PR
[to show how effective EULEX has been].
Nonetheless, he believes EULEX can be
proud of its achievements so far, with 430
cases adjudicated, including many against
high-ranking politicians and business gures,
and 240 more ongoing. Among its more
notable successes was the conviction of an
organ-trafficking gang in May. We feel it has
questioned this feeling of impunity that is
prevalent in parts of the population.
War crimes trials have been more problem-
atic. Fatmir Limaj, a senior member of the
TDemo
ruling Democratic Party of Kosovo (Partia
Demokratike e Kosovs: PDK) and a former
Kosovo Liberation Army commander, was
acquitted of war crimes charges for the third
Its efforts were tested on 3 November when
the rst municipal elections were held under
Kosovo law in the north, triggering violence
at polling stations that forced police and elec-
tion observers to ee. Bernd Borchardt took
over as EULEX head in February 2013, having
previously served as German ambassador to
Albania and deputy head of the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europes
Verication Mission in Kosovo, investigating
human rights violations.
time in September. The easier cases are
those with material proof wire-tapping,
computer forensics, said Borchardt. When
you have to rely on witnesses who have often
been very traumatised, then its hard to come
to a conclusion where everyone thinks its a
good verdict.
Borchardt says much of the missions most
vital work is less headline-grabbing, such as
returning property stolen during the war (for
which all 40,000 cases are due to be conclud-
ed by mid-2014), and establishing a digitised
population register (due by March). A lot
of these things are not so visible, but for the
day-to-day lives of the public they are hugely
important, he said. Another major focus has
been nding and returning the remains of
355 victims from the war, using aerial pho-
tography from before and after the conict to
identify grave sites, and carrying out joint ex-
cavations with Serbian authorities. Borchardt
said, There are still 1,700 cases open and this
is still very important for the families.
This article was first published online at
ihs.com/janes on 12 November 2013.
X ON THE WEB
Dissenting vote Kosovo prepares for
its rst elections
Radical route Salasm in the
Balkans
Author
Eric Randolph is a freelance analyst
who was based in Kosovo during the 3
November elections.
ihs.com/janes
ihs.com/janes
14/11/2013 14:23:40
 Our insight speaks for itself.
Our customers speak for it too.
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 Intelligence has changed. Have you?

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