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Ibn Khaldun and the Philosophy of History

Imadaldin Al-Jubouri on the medieval Islamic philosopher who pioneered the scientific
understanding of history.

Some consider the Italian philosopher Vico (1668-1744) to have been the founder of
philosophy of history; others give the credit to the French philosopher Montesquieu (1689-
1755). In fact, the Arabic philosopher and historian ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) was the first
pioneer to discover that history, like any other science, required research. It is the science of
circumstances and events and its causes are profound, thus it is an ancient, original part of
wisdom and deserves to be one of its sciences.

In his The Introduction (1377), ibn Khaldun also wrote, History is an art of valuable
doctrine, numerous in advantages and honourable in purpose; it informs us about bygone
nations in the context of their habits, the prophets in the context of their lives and kings in the
context of their states and politics, so those who seek the guidance of the past in either
worldly or religious matters may have that advantage.

Ibn Khalduns theory divided history into two main parts: the historical manifest and the
historical gist. According to him, history should not limit itself to recording events, but
should examine environments, social mores and political bases: True history exists to tell us
about human social life, which is the worlds environment, and the nature of that environment
as it appears from various events. It deals with civilisation, savagery and tribalism, with the
various ways in which people obtain power over each other, and their results, with states and
their hierarchies and with the peoples occupations, lifestyles, sciences, handicrafts and
everything else that takes place in that environment under various circumstances.

Ibn Khalduns method relied on criticism, observation, comparison and examination. He used
scientific criticism to analyse accounts of historical events, the sources of these accounts and
the techniques used by historians, examining and comparing various different accounts in
order to get rid of falsifications and exaggerations and obtain some objective idea of what had
actually happened. Many accounts contained lies because they had been written to flatter
some ruler or to further the interests of some sect, the newsmakers and storytellers
deliberately cheating and falsifying things for their own purposes. Ibn Khaldun, therefore,
urged the historian to become erudite, accurate in observation and skilled in comparing text
with subtext in order to be capable of effective criticism and clarification.

Although ibn Khaldun strongly believed in God, he never mentioned any celestial aim for
history, or any divine end at which history would come to stop. He states, in fact, the past is
like the future, water from water, which seems to imply that human history has no end. Ibn
Khaldun went further to criticise other historians for imposing metaphysical ideas upon
historical events to make the latter appear subordinate to the gods or to divine providence,
turning history, properly a science, into something more closely akin to the arts and literature.

As a result, some Muslims and Westerners seized his concept of history to denounce ibn
Khaldun as an atheist, a charge of which he was innocent; his point was that the science of
history was not subject to metaphysics and could not be made so. Ibn Khaldun never
questioned the existence of God. His work, according to him, was inspired by God, pure
inspiration, which should be evidence enough of his belief in God.

However, his views on prophecy are crystal clear, unlike those of certain of his predecessors
in Muslim philosophy, in particular Alfarabi (870-950) and Avicenna (980-1037). As an
experimental philosopher he was interested in the holy experiments of the Prophet
Mohammed (570-632), which means he cannot have seen history as having no end. If the
existence of God is regarded as an absolute fact and His prophets and their religious
experiments as proof of this fact, then the statement that in history the past is just like the
future must mean it consists of a continuous series of events not stopping with any nation, but
continuing in cycles.

Ibn Khaldun believed even the minutest of facts should be scrutinised in analysing historical
events, since these were not simple phenomena, but complex. He regarded history as far from
easy to study, being the knowledge of qualitative events and their causes in depth. Since
metaphysical theories of history were in his view irrelevant, Ibn Khaldun imported the idea of
causality from the theoretical field of philosophy into the practical arena of history by
concentrating on the worldly causes and reasons of historical events. His method was
directly inductive, relying on the senses and the intellect without referring to any other norm.
There was, in his view, a yawning void between the abstractive and the experimental, the first
being based on logic and second on the reality of the sensible world. The subject of divine
knowledge was an invisible spirit unable to be subjected to experimentation and of which
there was no sensory evidence, so there could be no certain proof of it in this world. Since the
sensible and the non-sensible thus had no terms in common, ibn Khaldun banished the
abstractive or divine world from his logical syllogisms. This is precisely the approach taken
by modern positivism, and even pragmatism followed in ibn Khalduns footsteps during its
early stages.

In his diagnosis of the causes of lies in history, ibn Khaldun identifies a number of reasons,
such as: sectarianism, misplaced trust in the sources, ignorance of some hidden purpose and
the wish to flatter rulers. Hence, many historians, copyists and tellers have made the mistake
of accepting untrue accounts or recording events that did not take place because they have
relied on report alone, without bothering to research its sources closely for truth or falsehood,
compare it with anything else or apply their own intelligence to it. In this they have showed
themselves to be poor historians. For example, al-Masudi and various other Arab historians
accepted that the Israelite armies led by the Prophet Moses numbered 600,000 or more men
aged twenty and upwards. If we examine this tale carefully it is clearly false. When Jacob and
his kinsmen entered Egypt there were only seventy of them. Only four generations separated
Jacob and Moses. Where, then, did Moses get this huge multitude of youths and men? The
Israeli themselves, moreover, reported that Solomons army numbered 12,000 and his horses
1400, while calling his kingdom the vigour of their state and an expansion of their reign.

Al-Masud also succeeded in ignoring physical reality. How exactly was this huge army
squeezed into the maze? How could so massive a force have been lined up and moved in so
limited an area of land? In the area of historical knowledge al-Masud did no better.
Historically each kingdom was manned by a certain number of garrisons according to its size.
A kingdom having six hundred thousand or more fighters would have had borders far
exceeding the limits of the ancient kingdom of Israel.
In his prescription of requirements for a historian, ibn Khaldun stated that several things
were essential if a historian were to be qualified to deal with historical events and stories:

1. An understanding of the rules of politics and the nature of people.

2. Knowledge of the natural environment and how it differs according to time and place.

3. Acquaintance with the social environments of the various different nations in terms of way
of life, morals, incomes, doctrines and so forth.

4. An understanding of the present time and an ability to compare it with the past.

5. Knowledge of the origins and motives of states and sects, their declared principles, their
rules and major events in their histories.

To achieve a critical understanding of historical events, then, the historian must study the
general circumstances of the period with which he is dealing and compare the particular
events in which he is interested. He should then explore any similar events that have taken
place at other periods along with the general circumstances of these periods. When he has
completed these two main stages he should be able to recognise events as reasonable and
probably true, or unacceptable and almost certainly false. Certain events need only be studied
separately, along with the general circumstances of their periods, to know which parts of
them must be true or false.

In his analysis of the intellect, ibn Khaldun believes the intellect has limits it cannot exceed
and that these prevent it from reaching a complete understanding of God and His attributes.
This is its reality, and man cannot upgrade it or increase its level of capability. Ibn Khaldun
insisted that the intellect could not he aware of the reality of the soul and the divine or of
anything else existing in the higher world, because it was incapable of reaching, knowing or
proving it. We can be aware only of what is material; if a thing is immaterial we can neither
prove it nor base any proof upon it.

Ibn Khaldun offered the intellect little encouragement to dwell on metaphysics, preferring to
emulate Algazel (1059-1111), by dealing a final and near-fatal blow to philosophical thought
by the Arabic-Islamic intellect. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that in closing one door
ibn Khaldun threw open to the human mind an entirely new one: the sociology and
philosophy of history.

Since the 18th century, the western world has taken ibn Khaldun seriously, especially as his
scientific ideas were very much like those that were to develop much later on in human
history. He has, however, still not taken his rightful place as the founder of philosophy of
history and the pioneer of sociology, although translations of his historical and social treatises
have helped to some extent.

I.M.N. Al-Jubouri 2005

Imadaldin Al-Jubouri has written several books in Arabic and in English. His History of
Islamic Philosophy has just been published.
https://www.al-islam.org/history-muslim-philosophy-volume-2-book-4/chapter-46-ibn-khaldun

Ibn Khaldun wrote no major work in fields accepted in the Muslim philosophic tradition or
which he considered to be the proper fields of philosophic investigation logic, mathematics,
physics, and metaphysics politics, ethics, and economics.1 Consequently, he was not
regarded by his contemporaries, or by subsequent Muslim students of philosophy, as a
philosopher (failssuf) in the sense in which al-Farabi, ibn Sina, and ibn Rushd were identified
as such. Nevertheless, both his contemporaries and later Muslim students of history and
society were aware that ibn Khaldun had made the most significant contribution to these
specialized fields through his undertaking a scientific investigation of them.

It was, however, the enhanced interest in the study of history and society in modern times
which led to the devotion of increased attention of ibn Khalduns thought, to the recognition
of his rank as a major Muslim thinker, and to the judgment that he was equal, if not superior,
to the other well-known Muslim philosophers. This was in part the result of the higher
prestige, and of the peculiar theoretical importance, which history and the sciences of society
(as compared to the theoretical part of traditional philosophy) have come to enjoy in modern
times.

But the more important reason for the singular interest in ibn Khaldun in modern times lies in
the conclusions of his investigations in history and society. To the moderns, these
conclusions appear to be more scientific than either the conclusions of the legal investigation
of Muslim jurists or the politico-philosophic investigations of Muslim philosophers. Perhaps
on the analogy of the revolt of modern science against traditional philosophy, and especially
of modern political philosophy and social science against traditional political philosophy, it
has been assumed that ibn Khaldun must have attempted a similar, or parallel, revolt against
traditional Muslim philosophy in general, and against traditional Muslim political philosophy
in particular.

Because of its important implications for the understanding of ibn Khalduns thought, this
crucial assumption deserves critical examination. The larger context of the present work
seems to warrant an inquiry into the precise relationship between ibn Khalduns new science
and the Muslim philosophic tradition. This relationship has been for the most part viewed in
the perspective, and under the influence, of the modern philosophic and scientific tradition. In
the present work, in contrast, the reader comes to ibn Khaldun through the preceding Greek
and Muslim philosophic tradition, which ibn Khaldun knew and in relation to which he can
be expected to have taken his bearing.

The reader, thus, must be shown, on the basis of ibn Khalduns conception of philosophy and
science, and of his conception of the relation between his new science and the established
philosophic science, whether he was in fundamental agreement with that tradition (in which
case it must be shown what the specific character of his contribution to that tradition was), a
new, but a novel doctrine.

That this procedure is the sound historical procedure is usually admitted. But what has not
been seen with sufficient clarity is that, in addition to providing the proper historical
perspective for the understanding of ibn Khalduns thought, it is of fundamental importance
to elicit the basic principles or premises of his new science, and thus contribute to the
understanding of its true character.
B

Ibn Khalduns place in the history of Muslim philosophy, and his contribution to the Muslim
philosophic tradition, must be determined primarily on the basis of the Introduction
(Muqaddimah) and Book One of his History (Kitab al-Ibar).2 That a work exploring the
art of history, and largely devoted to an account of universal history,3 should concern itself
with philosophy is justified by ibn Khaldun on the ground that history has a dual character:
(a) an external (zahir) aspect which is essentially an account of, or information about, past
events, and (b) an internal (batin) aspect. With respect to this latter aspect, history is
contemplation (theory: nazar) and verification (tahqiq), a precise causal explanation of things
generated (kainat) and their origins (or principles: mabadi), and a profound science (ilm) of
the qualities and causes of events; therefore, it is a firm principle part (asl) of wisdom
(hikmah), and deserves, and is well fitted, to be counted among its sciences.4

Whatever ibn Khalduns position concerning the relation between wisdom and philosophy
may have been (ibn Rushd, who was the last of the major Muslim Philosophers whom ibn
Khaldun studied, considered that the two had become identical in his own time),5 he
frequently uses the expressions wise men (hukama) and philosophers (Falasifah) inter-
changeably, and it is certain that he identifies the sciences of wisdom with the philosophic
sciences.6 Furthermore, in his classification and exposition of the various sciences, he defines
the basic characteristics of these sciences, enumerates them, and makes ample reference to
the Greek and Muslim authors, who represent the specific philosophic tradition which he
accepts as the tradition.

Ibn Khalduns definition of the philosophic sciences is based on an emphatic and clear-cut
distinction, if not total opposition, between the sciences which are natural to man as a rational
being (therefore, he names them also natural [tabiiyya]) and rational or intellectual
[aqliyyah] sciences)7and the legal, transmitted, or positive sciences based on the divine law,
which are the special property of a particular religious community. In contrast, the
philosophic sciences are those which a human being can understand by (virtue of) the nature
of his thought and the subjects, the problems, the ways of demonstration, and the modes of
teaching to which he is guided by perception, until his contemplation and investigation lead
him to understand the true from the false in as far as he is a human being possessing
thought.8

The philosophic sciences are classified into four fundamental sciences or groups of sciences:
logic, mathematics, physics, and metaphysics or the divine science.9 This is followed by a
concise history of these sciences (especially among the ancient Persians, the Greeks and the
Muslims) which emphasizes (a) the relation between the rise and development of these
sciences, and cultural development and prosperity, and their decline subsequent to cultural
disintegration, and (b) the anti-philosophic attitude of the divine laws and religious
communities, which led (especially in cases where sovereigns adopted this attitude, or
religious orthodoxy was able to determine the type of learning pursued in the community) to
deserting the philosophic sciences.10

The philosophic sciences reaching the Muslims were those of the Greeks.11 Of the Greek
philosophic schools ibn Khaldun mentions specifically those of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle,
and also the commentators of Aristotle, i.e. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, and
others. Aristotle is singled out as the most well-grounded of them in these sciences.12
Muslims recovered these sciences from the disuse to which they had fallen among the
Byzantines, and after a period of searching for, acquiring, and translating the works preserved
among the latter, Muslim scholars studied these Greek philosophic sciences, became skilled
in their various branches, reached the highest level of proficiency in them, and surpassed
some of their predecessors.

Although they differed with Aristotle on many issues, they generally recognized him as the
foremost teacher (Muallim-i Awwal). Of Muslim philosophers, ibn Khaldun mentions by
name al-Farabi, ibn Sina, ibn Bajjah, and ibn Rushd. He indicates the decline of the
philosophic sciences in Western Islam after the disintegration of cultural life in that region,
and refers to reports concerning the then flourishing state of these sciences in Persia and
eastward, and their revival and spread in Western Europe.13

Thus, there seems to be little doubt that when ibn Khaldun says that the study of the internal
aspect of history is to be made one of the sciences of wisdom, he does not simply mean that it
deserves a systematic, rational, and scientific study in general. What he means is much more
specific and precise. The study of the internal aspect of history, if it is to be properly
scientific, must be recognized as a significant part of, and is to be pursued as belonging to,
one of the philosophic sciences or one of a group of the philosophic sciences (of the Socratic
school)14 epitomized in the works of Aristotle and also in those of the Muslim philosophers
who belonged to that school and concentrated primarily on the exposition of the works of
Aristotle.

To which of these sciences or groups of sciences does the investigation of the internal aspect
of history belong? To answer this question, a fuller statement of the character and principles
of this investigation is needed. Ibn Khaldun first formulates what this investigation is to
comprise, and how it is to be conducted through a critique of Islamic historiography and the
examination of the causes of the errors of historians in the Introduction, in which he
illustrates the distinction between the external and internal aspects of history and establishes
that these errors are primarily due to the ignorance of the nature and causes of historical
events, both in so far as these are permanent and homogeneous as well as in so far as they
change and are heterogeneous

Then, in the first part of the introduction to Book One, the true character of history is said to
be identical with information about human association, which is the culture (umran) of the
world, and the states which occur to the nature of that culture...(and) all that is engendered in
that culture by the nature of (these) states.15 The primary cause of errors in transmitting
historical information (and, consequently, in writing an untrue account of history), thus,
becomes ignorance of the nature of the states of culture.

The states of culture and what is engendered in them is considered to form a part of all
engendered things, whether essences or acts, each of which inevitably has a nature specific to
its essence and to its accidental states. What the historian needs for examining historical
reports, and for distinguishing the true from the false, is knowledge of the matters of
engendered [existents] and the states in existents16 so as to be able to examine and
determine the possibility or impossibility of the occurrence of the events themselves. Thus,
the basic principles (i.e. the subject-matter, problems, method, and end) of a new
investigation emerge, and are finally formulated as follows:
The rule for distinguishing truth from falsehood in the [investigation of historical]
information on the grounds of possibility and impossibility is for us to contemplate human
association, which is culture, and to distinguish the states pertaining to its essence and
required by its nature, what is accidental and need not be reckoned with, and what cannot
possibly occur in it. If we do that, it would be for us a rule in distinguishing truth from
falsehood in [historical] information, and veracity from lying, in a demonstrative manner
admitting of no doubt. Then, if we hear about some states taking place in culture, we shall
know scientifically what we should judge as acceptable and what we should judge as
spurious. This will be for us a sound criterion by which historians will pursue the path of
veracity and correctness in what they transmit. This is the purpose of this First Book of our
work. It is, as it were, a science independent by itself. For it has a subject (namely, human
culture and human association) and has [its own] problems (i.e. explaining the states that
pertain to its essence one after the other).17

We then have a seemingly independent science the subject of which is human association or
culture, the problems of which are the essential states of culture, the method is that of strict
demonstration, and the end is that it be used as a rule to distinguish the true and the veracious
from the false and the spurious in historical reports. To which philosophic science or group of
sciences does this science belong, and in what way could it be characterized as a firm and
principal part of philosophy?

That it does not belong to the logical or the mathematical sciences needs little argument.
Logic is defined by ibn Khaldun as the science which makes the mind immune to error in
seizing upon unknown problems [or questions] through matters already realized and known.
Its advantage is in distinguishing error from correctness in the essential and accidental
concept and judgments, which he who contemplates aims at in order that he may understand
the verification of truth in generated [things], negatively and positively.18 Logic is an
organon of thought and a propaedeutical science making rules used in the contemplation of
all generated things, and in ascertaining the sound definitions of their essences and accidents.
Since the subject and problems of the science of culture are said to belong to generated
things, it will have to use the rules devised by the logical arts, but it is not itself concerned
with the problems of how to achieve sound abstractions or how to distinguish them from
those unsound.

It is only necessary to add here, first, that ibn Khaldun accepted, without reservation,
Aristotelian logic as found in the logical writings of Aristotle (with the addition of Porphyrys
Isagoge) and the commentaries of al-Farabi, ibn Sina, and ibn Rushd. Thus, logic for him
deals with the mental forms abstracted from things and useful in the knowledge of the
essences and the truths of things. Its central aim is demonstration or the syllogism
producing certainty, and the identity of the definition and [the thing] defined, i.e., the
subjects dealt with in the Posterior Analytics or The Book of Demonstration.19 Ibn
Khaldun doubts the validity of the attempts of Muslim dialectical theologians (Mutakallimun)
who concentrate on purely formal syllogism and forgo the fruits of the works of the ancients
in the field of material logic.20

Secondly, ibn Khaldun repeatedly emphasizes that the science of culture must be a
demonstrative science in the sense specified here, to the exclusion of dialectical, rhetorical,
and poetic arguments which are based on commonly known and commonly accepted
premises rather than on self-evident, necessary, and essential premises, or premises that are
the conclusions of syllogisms based on such premises, as required by posterioristic logic.
As to the mathematical sciences, they are concerned with measurements or quantities, either
theoretically, such as the study of pure numbers, or practically as applied arts. In the latter
case, they are useful in the study of culture, since they acquaint us with the mathematical
properties of things, such as the stars, which exercise an influence on culture, and form the
bases of many of the crafts which are an important aspect of cultural life.21 But although the
science of culture makes use of the conclusions of the mathematical sciences and is
concerned with quantity as one of the categories of all generated things, its subject is not
quantity as such, but the nature and causes of a specific generated thing which is culture.

This leaves us with natural sciences and metaphysics, or the sciences of natural and divine
existents. Since the study of generated things, their natures, their states, and all that is
engendered in them,22 is the specific subject of natural science or natural philosophy, the
new science of that specific generated thing which is culture seems to form a part of natural
philosophy and to belong to it by virtue of its subject. This statement must now be amplified
by giving answers to: (a) why does the new science of culture deserve to be a natural science
and counted among the natural sciences, and (b) how does ibn Khaldun establish it as a firm
and principal part of natural philosophy?23

Natural science is defined by ibn Khaldun as follows:

Then [after logic], the contemplation among them [i.e. the philosophers] turns to: [a] the
sensible, viz bodies of the elements, and those generated from them (viz minerals, plants and
animals), celestial bodies, and natural motions, or the soul from which motions emerge, etc.
This art is named natural science, and it is the second of these (philosophic) sciences. Or
[b] the contemplation turns to the matters that are beyond nature.24

This is explained further in the second and more elaborate definition supplied by ibn Khaldun
in his own way:

[Natural science] is the science which inquires about the body with respect to what adheres
to it, viz. motion and rest. Thus, it contemplates the heavenly and elemental bodies, and what
is begotten from them (man, animals, plants, and minerals), what is generated inside the earth
(spring, earthquakes), in the atmosphere (clouds, vapours, thunder, lightning, and
thunderbolts), etc, and the principle of motion in bodies, i.e. the soul in its various species in
man, animals, and plants.25

Then he mentions the standard works on natural science. The physical parts of the
Aristotelian corpus, which have been followed, explained, and commented on by Muslim
authors, the most well-known and reliable of these being ibn Sina in the corresponding parts
of three major works (Shifa, Najat and Isharat), and ibn Rushd in his summaries of, and
commentaries on, Aristotles works on physical sciences, with the difference that ibn Sina
seems to disagree with Aristotle on many problems of natural science, while ibn Rushd
remains in close agreement with him.26

These statements point to a conception of the character and scope of natural science, and the
order of its parts, which is not ibn Khalduns own, but one which was elaborated by ibn Sina
and ibn Rushd on the basis of a tradition initiated in Muslim philosophy by al-Farabi, and
which has a firm foundation in Aristotles own writings on nature. Following the scheme
suggested by Aristotle, e.g. in the opening chapter of Meteorology,27 these philosophers
included within natural science or natural philosophy the works beginning with the Physics
and ending with the De Anima and the Parva Naturalia, and arranged their objects, order, and
rank, as follows: (1) the general or first principles of all natural existents or of all that is
constituted by nature, or the first causes of nature and all natural motion (Physics), (2) the
simple or primary parts of the world, or the stars ordered in the motion of the heavens (On
the Heaven and the World), (3) the motion of the natural elements, or their generation and
corruption, alteration and growth (On Generation and Corruption), and (4) the accidents and
affections common to the elements (Meteorology).

Then follows the study of particular existents that are generated and corrupted: (5) the
minerals which are the simplest and closest to the elements (On Minerals), (6) plants (On
Plants), (7) animals (The Parts of Animals, etc.), and (8) the general principles of the soul and
its parts (On the Soul), followed by the particular powers of the soul and the accidents
existing in plants and animals by virtue of their possessing soul (Parva Naturalia).28

According to this scheme, the science of the soul, which is the form of animal and plant
bodies, falls within the scope of the science of nature, and the science of the intellect, which
is one of the faculties of the soul, falls to the connection of nature to soul, and of soul to
intellect, and the study of these connections certainly did not mean, nor did it lead to, the
reduction of one to the other. For the scheme was not merely a deductive one by which the
more complex is deduced from the more simple or the particular from the general, but a
methodological plan of investigation beginning with the general and simple and leading to
the particular and complex, recognizing their substantial heterogeneity, and using
observation, enumeration, and induction, to a greater extent than, and in conjunction with,
syllogistic reasoning.

Furthermore, the study of soul and intellect leads the investigator to matters that are beyond
nature, and that could no more be, strictly speaking, considered within the scope of a natural
investigation, but in this case, these matters cannot claim the advantages enjoyed by natural
investigation which are solidly based on human experience and perception. One could then
perhaps speak with ibn Rushd of the possibility of delimiting the investigation of soul and
intellect to what corresponds most to the manner of investigation conducted, and, thus,
arrives at explanations similar in character to those given by natural science taking this to
be more fitting to the purpose of Aristotle.29

But to grant the difficulties raised by this scheme does not alter the fact that both for Aristotle
and the Muslim philosophers mentioned above, the inclusion of the study of soul and intellect
within the general science of nature is legitimate. Consequently, the study of man and of all
that concerns man is considered an integral part of the study of nature or of natural science.
This does not hold true only for his body in so far as it shares common properties with all
natural bodies, for the properties of generation and corruption which he shares with all
composite things, and for the faculties of his soul which he shares with plants and other
animals, but also for his specific differentiae as a rational being: his sociability and his
association with others and co-operation with them in the development of the arts, his
appetites and desires, his purposeful, organized social activity, his practical and theoretical
intellect, and his ability to comprehend things through visions, dreams, and prophecy, and to
use what he comprehends in ordering his political life. All such matters are dealt with in the
science of the soul.30
Human association or culture, as ibn Khaldun conceived it, is a natural property of man as a
rational being. He intended to investigate its modes or states, the various accidents that occur
in it, and its generation and corruption; and to develop this investigation into a full-fledged
inquiry or science. Since the basis of mans sociability, and its primary manifestations, can
legitimately fall within the scope of natural science, the elaboration of this natural property of
man, and the investigation of the various aspects of social organization to which it leads man,
can also legitimately belong to natural science and be counted as one of the natural sciences.

Whether the new science will in fact prove well-fitted to be considered a natural science, will
of course depend on whether it will remain loyal to the method of investigation followed in
the natural sciences. Ibn Khaldun was aware of the fact that the subject he intended to
investigate had been studied in contexts other than natural science, notably in the Muslim
legal sciences and in the practical philosophic sciences. Thus, even if he had insisted on a
science of human association or culture which had to be a part of philosophy or wisdom, he
could have chosen to study it as a practical science.

The reason for not choosing this alternative will be discussed in a subsequent chapter.31 It is
sufficient in the present context to insist that what he sought was a natural science of human
association. He examined the works of Plato and Aristotle, and of Muslim thinkers, and
found32 that they had not elaborated such a science before. Thus he set out to make good this
deficiency in the natural sciences. But if he is to succeed in his effort, he must show
unequivocally that the new science is indeed being firmly established on the foundation of
natural philosophy.

The History was originally divided by ibn Khaldun into an Introduction (Muqaddiman)
and three Books. The Introduction deals with the problem of history in general, Book One
contains the new science of culture, Book Two contains the history of the Arabs and other
peoples (except the Berbers) down to ibn Khalduns own time, and Book Three contains the
history of the Berbers in Western Islam.33

Muqaddimah is a technical term meaning premise. It can be generally defined as that upon
which what follows depends and which does not itself depend upon that which follows.34 It
can be a general discussion or explanation introducing a subject, a book, or a science, the
emphasis here being upon what needs to precede these rather than that upon which they
strictly depend. In this sense the Introduction precedes the three Books and is a useful
discussion clarifying the problems that are to follow. But this Introduction together with
Book One came also be known as the Muqaddimahi, as an introduction to the last two books,
or the historical account proper. This is a usage which is closer to the technical definition of
the word, since, as ibn Khaldun explains, the writing of a correct historical account depends
upon a prior understanding the science of culture.

The proper technical definition of muqaddimah, however, which is the specific definition
used by logicians in the study of syllogism, induction, and analogy, is that upon which the
soundness of the proof depends, without an intermediary or a proposition made a part of
syllogism or an argument.35 Such a premise should be veracious and properly related to the
question or problem. It is of two kinds: (a) definitive (such as being primary, based on
observation or experience, or on multiple authoritative reports, or being the conclusion of a
syllogism based on such premises and (b) based on opinion (generally known or accepted
notions, etc.)36

These can be made the premises of a single syllogism or argument, or of a whole science. In
this latter case, they are named the premise(s) of the science and are defined as those upon
which the setting out upon the science depends, and upon which its problems depend.37
Apart from the general usages mentioned above, ibn Khaldun uses muqaddimah in this
specific logical sense,38 and the first section of Book One, which treats human culture in
general, is made up of six such premises. Since the new science depends upon the
character of these premises, we must examine them in detail.

1. Association is Necessary for Man

Ibn Khaldun presents this premise or proposition as being the same as what the wise men
express when they say that man is political by nature, i.e., he cannot dispense with
association, which in their technical usage is the polis, and this is the meaning of
culture.39 It is significant, however, that ibn Khaldun substitutes, here at the outset,
necessary for by nature and his explanation of the first premise indicates that this
substitution was deliberate on his part. For, the way he grounds the need for association in
human nature is by explaining that, while the animal nature of human beings are the same
as those of the rest of the animals (in that like them they cannot exist except through
nourishment and self-defence), they are inferior to some animals in that the ability of a single
human being cannot possibly be equal to meeting his needs for nourishment and self-defence.

Therefore, man associates with others and develops the arts and tools, and the social
organizations, necessary for nourishing and defending himself, not because his specifically
human nature is essentially superior to the rest of the animals, or because he needs these
arts and tools and organization to satisfy his specifically human needs, but because his natural
constitution is deficient for conducting a solitary life, and because without associating with
others he remains helpless and unable even to exist.40

Thus, ibn Khaldun, while purporting simply to explain what the philosophers meant by
man is political by nature, in fact concentrates on those traits of mans animal nature which
render association a necessary condition for the very life and continued existence of man.
Nevertheless, he emphasizes that this premise and its explanation as he presents them are also
based on the conclusions of the investigation of animal and human natures conducted by the
philosophers and confirmed by the investigation of the organs of the human body conducted
by Galen more specifically, that the demonstration of this premise was presented by the
philosophers41 referring to the appropriate passages of De Anima and the commentaries of
them.42

On the surface, ibn Khalduns only object is to the attempt of the philosophers to add a
rational proof of prophecy to their demonstration of the political nature of man, while in fact
he seems also to object to the widening of the scope of the proposition in such a manner as to
state that association is necessary for mans well-being in addition to its being necessary to
his existence. What he seems to indicate is that the study of human nature within the scope of
natural science cannot demonstrate this proposition in this wider sense; therefore the science
of culture must restrict itself to accepting the proposition in its narrower sense, susceptible to
demonstration within natural science, only. In other words, according to him, the study of
culture should be a sociological one without ethical extensions.
2. Distribution of Culture on Earth

This premise simply recounts what has already been explained by the wise men who have
contemplated the states of the world relative to the shape of the earth, the generation of
animals and of human species, and the inhabited parts of the earth; it is a summary of the
geography of the seven zones and the information available concerning the conditions
prevailing in each.43 Here, ibn Khaldun restates the various conclusions demonstrated in
such parts of natural philosophy as the investigation of the nature of elements of generation
and corruption, of minerals, and of localities of animals,44 and completes them through such
information as has been supplied by observation and authenticated multiple reports found in
the works of astronomers, and, in particular, in the works of Greek and Muslim geographers
like Ptolemy, al-Musudi, and al-Idrisi.45 It is also in these works that the word umran,
which ibn Khaldun used as a technical term indicating the subject of his new science, is most
frequently encountered.

3. Temperate and Intemperate Zones and the Influence of the Atmosphere upon the
Colour of Human Beings and many of their States

This premise is again based on the investigation of the nature of generated beings, and the
nature of heat and cold and their influence upon the atmosphere and the animals generated in
it, proving that the colour of human beings and many of their arts and modes of life are
caused by atmospheric conditions.46 The only specific authority he invokes here is ibn Sinas
rajaz poem on medicine.47 He refutes the errors of genealogists which he attributes to their
inattention to the natural basis of such matters as colours and other characteristic traits.48

Throughout, the emphasis is upon the natural (in contrast to the specifically human or the
divine) basis of culture as a whole, for in addition to relatively, elementary things (such as
colour and other bodily traits, and the manner of preparing food and housing), ibn Khaldun
indicates the dependence of even the highly complex aspects of culture (such as the sciences,
political authority, and whether there are prophets, religions, and divine Laws) upon the
nature of the elements and their effects upon the atmosphere.49

4. Influence of the Atmosphere upon the Habits of Character (akhlaq) of Human Beings

Ibn Khaldun indicates that the valid causal explanation of this premise has been established in
the proper place in philosophy where gladness and sadness are explained as the expansion
and contraction of the animal spirit, and are related to the more general premise establishing
the effect of heat in expanding the air.50 This completely natural explanation, founded on the
properties of the elements, is made the basis of mirth, excitability, levity, etc. In contrast, the
opinion of al-Masudi (copying Galen and al-Kindi), which attributes these habits of
characters to the weakness or power of the brain, is considered inconclusive and
undemonstrated.51

5. Effects of the Abundance and Scarcity of Food upon the Bodies and Habits of Character
of Human Beings

The causal explanation of this premise is based on the investigation of the quantity of food
and the moisture it contains in the various localities of animals, their action in expanding and
contracting, and in increasing and decreasing the moisture of the stomachs of all animals,
including human beings, and the effect of this upon the coarseness or delicacy of bodies, and
upon the habits of character of human beings, including their piety and religion.52 This
natural causal explanation is based on experience and confirmed by the students of
agriculture.53

6. Classes of those who perceive the Unseen (ghaib) among Human Beings by Natural
Disposition or by Exercise

6. Classes of those who perceive the Unseen (ghaib) among Human Beings by Natural
Disposition or by Exercise54

This premise is introduced in a discussion on prophecy and dream-vision which deals with
(1) practical guidance as the aim of prophecy, and (2) the signs of prophetic mission: (a) the
psychological state at the time of revelation, (b) good character prior to embarking upon the
prophetic mission, (c) the call to religion and worship, (d) noble and pedigree, and (e)
marvels and miracles. The difference between the dialectical theologians and the
philosophers concerning how marvels and miracles take place through the power of God or
through the power of the prophet himself. The philosophers assert the latter on the basis that
the prophetic soul, among them, has essential properties from which these invasions (of
nature) (khawariq) emanate through his (i.e. the prophets) power and the obedience of the
elements to him in this generation (of these invasions of nature).55

As distinct from this introduction, ibn Khaldun presents his own statement (qual) in which he
sets down the interpretation of the true meaning (haqiqah) of prophecy as explained by men
of verification (muhaqqiqun), and mentions the real meaning of soothsaying, dream-vision,
etc. The verified interpretation which ibn Khaldun adopts as the basis for his explanation of
the true meaning of these phenomena proves to be a summary recapitulation of the entire
subject of natural science, i.e., the observable world (alam) and the observable effects of
unseen powers, sensible bodies, the elements, the spheres, the generable (minerals, plants,
and animals ending in man), and the human soul and its powers.

These powers are again arranged in an ascending order: (1) the active powers, (2) the
apprehensive powers which include (a) external senses, (b) internal senses, i.e. (i) common
sense, (ii) imagination, (iii) estimation, (iv) memory, and (v) the power of thought which the
philosophers call the rational calculative (natiqah) power.

They all ascend to the power of thought (intellect) the instrument of which is the middle
hollow of the brain. It is the power by which take place the movement of deliberation and the
turn toward intellection, the soul is moved by it (i.e. this power) constantly through the
longing instituted in it (i.e. the soul) towards that (intellection), to deliver (itself) from the
abyss of potency and preparedness which belongs to human (nature) and to come out into act
in its intellection (with which) it makes itself like the Heavenly Spiritual Host and comes at
the lowest rank of the Spiritualities when it apprehends without bodily instruments. Thus, it
moves constantly and turns toward that (intellection).

It may pass over altogether from human (nature) and its form of spirituality to the angelic
(nature) of the upper region, not by (any) acquiring (of something from outside), but by the
original and primary natural disposition toward it which God has placed in it.56 On the basis
of the structure and nature of the observable world, and the structure and nature of the human
soul, and on the basis of the natural powers inherent in the latter, ibn Khaldun proceeds to
classify and explain the various types of the activity of the soul in relation to the unseen
world.

Thus, ibn Khalduns own explanation of the foundation and the true meaning of these
phenomena can be seen to be indeed based on the explanations of the natural world, and of
the nature and powers of the human soul, as presented by most philosophers. Like them, he
considers all such activities to be grounded throughout in the natural properties of the human
soul which, in turn is closely related to the human body and the world of generation, of the
elements, of sensible bodies, and of their motion and rest.57 All other explanations are the
guesses and conjectures of those who are not well grounded in these matters or who accept
them from those who are not such, and are not based on demonstration or verification.58

These, then, are the premises, and the only premises, of ibn Khalduns new science of culture.
Even a superficial examination of them reveals that they are all conclusions of inquiries
undertaken by other sciences which are all natural sciences. The new science of culture,
therefore, does not make a clear, a first, or a true beginning; it is not a pre-suppositionless
science. It pre-supposes not only all the natural sciences that have provided it with premises,
but also the validity of their principles, the soundness of their procedures and explanations,
and the veracity of their judgments and conclusions.

The inquiry into the place of ibn Khalduns new science of culture within the Muslim
philosophic tradition thus indicates beyond reasonable doubt that (a) ibn Khaldun conceived
of the new science as a philosophic science, and that by philosophy he understood the
sciences originated by the Socratic school, and elaborated by Aristotle and his Muslim
followers, (b) the new science falls within the general scope of traditional natural science or
natural philosophy, and (c) more especially, all of its premises are drawn exclusively from the
various natural sciences, and, thus, it is indeed firmly grounded in these sciences because it
pre-supposes their conclusions, and builds itself on the firm foundation.

Ibn Khalduns science of culture was conceived by him as a contribution to the established
philosophic sciences within a limited field. The grounds for this science, or its basic
premises, were already established by traditional natural science or natural philosophy. No
philosopher before him had used these premises to develop a science of human association or
culture based exclusively on them. The Greek and Muslim philosophers, with whose works
on practical philosophy ibn Khaldun was acquainted, invariably found it necessary to proceed
by utilizing other premises which could not claim the same solidity and demonstrable
character as the premises provided by natural philosophy. Therefore, the understanding of the
specific character of ibn Khalduns contribution requires an examination of the relation
between his new science of culture and traditional Greek and Muslim political philosophy.
This will be attempted in Chapter 49 of this work.
http://www.muslimheritage.com/article/economic-theory-ibn-khaldun-and-rise-and-fall-nations

9. Ibn Khaldun's theory of the rise and fall of nations

Given political stability, for the rise of the nations, there must be:

a). A firm establishment of private property rights and freedom of enterprise,

b). Rule of law and a reliable judicial system for the establishment of justice,
c). The security of peace and the security of trade routes,
d). Low taxation in order to increase employment, production and revenues,
e). Less bureaucracy and a much smaller efficient army,
f). No government involvement in trade, production and commercial affairs,
g). No price fixing by the government,
h). A rule that does not give monopoly power to anyone in the market,
i). Stable monetary policy and independent monetary authority that does not play with the
value of money,
j). A larger population and a larger market for greater specialisation,
k). A creative education system for independent thinking and behaviour,
l). The collective responsibility and internal desire to establish a just system to encourage
good deeds and prevent vice.

10. Ibn Khaldun's theory of the rise and fall of nations

In summary, Ibn Khaldun is one of the few successful theoreticians, who has analysed the
behaviour of human beings and society as an integrated whole in their totality as part of
greater humanity, in the rise and fall of civilisation paralleled to the rise and fall of economic
surplus, respectively. For him, the cycle of civilisation has reached its end with the
destruction of superstructure. At the beginning, "the desire for a luxurious mode of life had
inspired men to perform heroic deeds, fights, to overcome difficulties, and to build - Now-
men fight again, but not for the hopes that they had once entertained. Motivated by the fear of
hunger, they fight for mere existence, and like the primordial man who fought out of the same
motive, they display the beast in man and return to the life of beasts."[32]

Ibn Khaldun does not give any clue, as far as a limited examination of his work can allow us
to judge, whether we could prevent the decline of a civilisation by instilling the dynamism of
personal responsibilities in individuals and through research and investment in science and
technology to generate further specialisation in goods and services in order to increase
economic surplus and keep government bureaucracy and large mercenary armies to a
minimum.

It remains a weighty question as to whether the decline of Greek, Roman and Islamic
civilisations could have been prevented. We are not sure whether Great Britain's relative
decline could have been prevented. The United States and Russia are trying hard to reduce
military expenditure and invest more in research, education, and technology to prevent their
relative economic competitiveness falling further vis--vis Japan and Germany in
international markets. It will be seen whether these policies will work in increasing economic
surplus.What is clear is that Ibn Khaldun had "discovered a great number of fundamental
economic notions a few centuries before their official births. He discovered the virtues and
the necessity of a division of labour before Smith and the principle of labour value before
Ricardo" and the role of government in stabilisation policy before Keynes.[33]
The reform movements in Eastern Europe are following the prescription of Ibn Khaldun by
privatisation policies and establishing private property rights. They are in the process of
getting rid of price controls on goods and services. Moreover, they emphasise the role of
entrepreneurship, initiative and free enterprise. Furthermore, they try to get rid of mercenary
armies and reduce bureaucracy. They are in the process of reducing the overall economic
activity and trading role of government.

It is clear that the policy recommendations of Ibn Khaldun for a civilised society are as
relevant today as they were during his time. The countries that follow his recommendations
will prosper and the ones that reject them will be in despair.
https://global.britannica.com/biography/Ibn-Khaldun

The Muqaddimah: Ibn Khaldns philosophy of history

In 1375, craving solitude from the exhausting business of politics, Ibn Khaldn took the most
momentous step of his life: he sought refuge with the tribe of Awld Arf, who lodged him
and his family in the safety of a castle, Qalat ibn Salmah, near what is now the town of
Frenda, Algeria. There he spent four years, free from all preoccupations, and wrote his
massive masterpiece, the Muqaddimah, an introduction to history. His original intention,
which he subsequently achieved, was to write a universal history of the Arabs and Berbers,
but before doing so he judged it necessary to discuss historical method, with the aim of
providing the criteria necessary for distinguishing historical truth from error. This led him to
formulate what the 20th-century English historian Arnold Toynbee has described as a
philosophy of history which is undoubtedly the greatest work of its kind that has ever yet
been created by any mind in any time or place, a statement that goes even beyond the earlier
eulogy by Robert Flint:

As a theorist on history he had no equal in any age or country until Vico appeared, more than
three hundred years later. Plato, Aristotle and Augustine were not his peers . . . .

But Ibn Khaldn went even further. His study of the nature of society and social change led
him to evolve what he clearly saw was a new science, which he called ilm al-umrn (the
science of culture) and which he defined thus:

This science has its own subject, human society, and its own problems, the social
transformations that succeed each other in the nature of society.

Indeed it is not too much to claim, as did a contemporary Arab scholar, Si al-ur, that in
Book I of the Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldn sketches a general sociology; in Books II and III, a
sociology of politics; in Book IV, a sociology of urban life; in Book V, a sociology of
economics; and in Book VI, a sociology of knowledge. The work is studded with brilliant
observations on historiography, economics, politics, and education. It is held together by his
central concept of aabiyyah, or social cohesion. It is this cohesion, which arises
spontaneously in tribes and other small kinship groups, but which can be intensified and
enlarged by a religious ideology, that provides the motive force that carries ruling groups to
power. Its inevitable weakening, due to a complex combination of psychological,
sociological, economic, and political factors, which Ibn Khaldn analyzes with consummate
skill, heralds the decline of a dynasty or empire and prepares the way for a new one, based on
a group bound by a stronger cohesive force.

It is difficult to overstress Ibn Khaldns amazing originality. Muhsin Mahdi, a contemporary

Iraqi-American scholar, has shown how much his approach and fundamental concepts owe to
classical Islamic theology and philosophy, especially Averroism. And, of course, he drew
liberally on the historical information accumulated by his predecessors and was doubtless
influenced by their judgments. But nothing in these sources or, indeed, in any known Greek
or Latin author can explain his deep insight into social phenomena, his firm grasp of the links
binding the innumerable and apparently unrelated events that constitute the process of
historical and social change.
One last point should be made regarding his basic philosophy of history. Clearly, for Ibn
Khaldn, history was an endless cycle of flowering and decay, with no evolution or progress
except for that from primitive to civilized society. But, in brief descriptions of his own age,
which have not received as much attention as they deserve, he showed that he could both
visualize the existence of sharp turning points in history and recognize that he was witnessing
one of them: When there is a general change of conditions . . . as if it were a new and
repeated creation, a world brought into existence anew. The main cause he gives for this
great change is the Black Death, with its profound effect on Muslim society, but he was fully
aware of the impact of the Mongol invasions, and he may also have been impressed by the
development of Europe, the merchants and ships of which thronged the seaports of North
Africa and some of the soldiers of which served as mercenaries in the Muslim armies.
http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ip/rep/H024.htm

2. Philosophy of history

The work on which Ibn Khaldun's reputation chiefly rests is the Muqaddima, the introduction
to his great history of the Arabs and Berbers, the Kitab al-'ibar, which is divided into a
further six books. In the first book he presents a general account of sociology, in the second
and third a sociology of politics, in the fourth a sociology of urban life, in the fifth a
sociology of economics and in the sixth a sociology of knowledge. The whole work is
studded with brilliant observations. Thus in the field of economics, Ibn Khaldun understands
very clearly the supply and demand factors which affect price, the interdependence of prices
and the ripple effects on successive stages of production of a fall in prices, and the nature and
function of money and its tendency to circulate from country to country according to demand
and the level of activity. In his writings on public finance, he shows why at the beginning of a
dynasty taxation yields a large revenue from low rates of assessment, but at the end a small
revenue from high rates of assessment. Elsewhere his observations on the evolution of the
Arabic language and script are masterly examples of sociological analysis, and his remarks
on the difference between acquiring a skill in a language and learning its grammar, and on the
use of intuition as opposed to logic in solving difficult problems, can still be read with profit.

However, it is Ibn Khaldun's views on the nature of the state and society which reveal most
clearly both his profundity and the originality that marks him off so sharply from his Muslim
predecessors and successors. Ibn Khaldun fully realised that he had created a new discipline,
'ilm al-'umran, the science of culture, and regarded it as surprising that no one had done so
before and demarcated it from other disciplines. This science can be of great help to the
historian by creating a standard by which to judge accounts of past events. Through the study
of human society, one can distinguish between the possible and the impossible, and so
distinguish between those of its phenomena which are essential and those which are merely
accidental, and also those which cannot occur at all. He analysed in detail the sources of error
in historical writings, in particular partisanship, overconfidence in sources, failure to
understand what is intended, a mistaken belief in the truth, the inability to place an event in
its real context, the desire to gain the favour of those in high rank, exaggeration, and what he
regarded as the most important of all, ignorance of the laws governing the transformation of
human society. Ibn Khaldun's attitude to the study of social phenomena is suffused with a
spirit which has caused several commentators to call him the founder of sociology. His
attempt at creating a theoretical structure for the analysis of history is a very impressive
contribution to the philosophy of history.

For Ibn Khaldun, human society is necessary since the individual acting alone could acquire
neither the necessary food nor security. Only the division of labour, in and through society,
makes this possible. The state arises through the need of a restraining force to curb the natural
aggression of humanity. A state is inconceivable without a society, while a society is well-
nigh impossible without a state. Social phenomena seem to obey laws which, while not as
absolute as those governing natural phenomena, are sufficiently constant to cause social
events to follow regular and well-defined patterns and sequences. Hence a grasp of these laws
enables the sociologist to understand the trend of events. These laws operate on masses and
cannot be significantly influenced by isolated individuals. There is very little talk of 'great
men' in Ibn Khaldun's books; while individuals do affect the course of events, their influence
is very limited.
The overwhelming impression given by Ibn Khaldun's writings is that society is an organism
that obeys its own inner laws. These laws can be discovered by applying human reason to
data either culled from historical records or obtained by direct observation. These data are
fitted into an implicit framework derived from his views on human and social nature, his
religious beliefs and the legal precepts and philosophical principles to which he adheres. He
argues that more or less the same set of laws operates across societies with the same kind of
structure, so that his remarks about nomads apply equally well to Arab Bedouins, both
contemporary and pre-Islamic, and to Berbers, Turkomen and Kurds. These laws are
explicable sociologically, and are not a mere reflection of biological impulses or physical
factors. To be sure, facts such as climate and food are important, but he attributes greater
influence to such purely social factors as cohesion, occupation and wealth. This comes out
very clearly in his discussion of national characters, for example of Arabs, Persians and Jews,
where he is careful to point out that what are regarded as characteristic features can be
explained by sociological factors such as nomadism, urbanization and oppression. Similarly,
different social groups, such as townspeople, nomads and traders, have their own
characteristics derived from their occupations.

Ibn Khaldun sees the historical process as one of constant cyclical change, due mainly to the
interaction of two groups, nomads and townspeople. These form the two poles of his mental
map; peasants are in between, supplying the towns with food and tax revenue and taking
handicrafts in return. Nomads are rough, savage and uncultured, and their presence is always
inimical to civilization; however, they are hardy, frugal, uncorrupt in morals, freedom-loving
and self-reliant, and so make excellent fighters. In addition, they have a strong sense of
'asabiya, which can be translated as 'group cohesion' or 'social solidarity'. This greatly
enhances their military potential. Towns, by contrast, are the seats of the crafts, the sciences,
the arts and culture. Yet luxury corrupts them, and as a result they become a liability to the
state, like women and children who need to be protected. Solidarity is completely relaxed and
the arts of defending oneself and of attacking the enemy are forgotten, so they are no match
for conquering nomads. Ibn Khaldun then traces very clearly the political and social cycle.
Nomads conquer territories and their leaders establish a new dynasty. At first the new rulers
retain their tribal virtues and solidarity, but soon they seek to concentrate all authority in their
own hands. Increasingly they rule through a bureaucracy of clients - often foreigners. As their
former supporters lose their military virtues there is an increasing use of mercenaries, and
soldiers come to be more important than civilians. Luxury corrupts ethical life, and the
population decreases. Rising expenditure demands higher taxes, which discourage production
and eventually result in lower revenues. The ruler and his clients become isolated from the
groups that originally brought them to power. Such a process of decline is taken to last three
generations, or about one hundred and twenty years. Religion can influence the nature of such
a model; when 'asabiya is reinforced by religion its strength is multiplied, and great empires
can be founded. Religion can also reinforce the cohesion of an established state. Yet the
endless cycle of flowering and decay shows no evolution or progress except for that from the
primitive to civilized society. Ibn Khaldun does occasionally refer to the existence of turning
points in history, and thought that he was himself witnessing one of them. The main cause for
this great change was the Black Death, which had a profound effect upon Muslim society,
together with the Mongol invasions; and he may also have been impressed by the
development of Europe, whose merchants and ships thronged the seaports of North Africa
and whose soldiers served as mercenaries in the Muslim armies. He suggests that a general
change in conditions can produce an entirely new social and political scene, rather as if a new
world had been created.
http://www.cis-ca.org/voices/k/khaldun_mn.htm

Ibn Khaldun's view on philosophy is similar to that of al-Ghazali, in the sense that he
attempted to reconcile mysticism and theology. In fact, Ibn Khaldun, according to
Issawi,

goes further than the latter [al-Ghazali] in bringing mysticism completely

within the purview of the jurisprudent (faqih) and in developing a model of
the Sufi shaykh, or master, as rather similar to the theologian. Philosophy was
regarded as going beyond its appropriate level of discourse, in that 'the
intellect should not be used to weigh such matters as the oneness of God, the
other world, the truth of prophecy, the real character of the divine attributes,
or anything else that lies beyond the level of the intellect' (Muqaddima 3, 38).
http://www.islamicpluralism.org/2469/origin-and-evolution-of-human-society-in-ibn

Origin and Evolution of Human Society in

Ibn Khaldun's Philosophy of Human
Development
by Noorudheen Musthafa
Madeenathunoor College of Islamic Science, Kozhikode, Kerala, India
March 11, 2015

Abstract

The philosopher Ibn Khaldun (1332 CE-1406 CE) lived in Tunis in North Africa. Recently,
vigorous discussion and dialogue has taken place regarding his magnum opus, the
Muqaddima [Prolegomena), in various academic disciplines, such as philosophy,
anthropology, historiography, geography, economics, psychology, political science, etc. The
work of Ibn Khaldun is used to explore the inner logic of the rise and fall of a civilization,
and the origin and evolution of human society. The Muqaddima is a diverse intellectual
exercise which brings together differing commentaries by Ibn Khaldun, much derived from
Hellenistic knowledge. Beyond a conventional understanding of the study of past human
societies, Ibn Khaldun sought to construct a sound synthesis for a philosophy of the
humanities. He submitted an aesthetic framework for historiography particularly, and the
humanities generally, through his Muqaddima.

Contemporary academic endeavors abound with different expressions of false consciousness

regarding the humanities. Academics in modern philosophy and the humanities have been
pressured to pursue the fault lines of colonial legacies. When all of knowledge is submitted to
a mature determinism based on Eurocentric intellectual conceptions, some of its ethics are
devalued, its contexts transformed, and contradictions revealed. There is a need to liberate
such readings of the social sciences from diverse and alternative indigenous platforms. The
Muqaddima sheds light on the foundation of such a methodology for humanities studies, and
shows a tendency to distinguish itself from a delegitimized liberal humanism. This paper
therefore offers a new solution for humanities studies in the light of Ibn Khaldun's philosophy
of human society. Along with textual interpretation, the paper subjects different normative
attitudes toward the humanities to comparative analysis. In addition to the study of the life
and teachings of Ibn Khaldun, brief commentaries are included on the classical concepts of
the Muqaddima and the need to find its possible role in contemporary humanities studies.

Keywords: Medieval Muslim Philosophy, Muqaddima, Discursive Tradition, Hellenistic

philosophy

Introduction

If anyone looks into the past of any of the social milieux around the planet, from the specific
platform of a living world, it is important to pursue a consistent perspective for global well
being. A 'nostalgic'/'back to the roots' phenomenon is necessary for today's productive
existence and for an effective orientation toward tomorrow. Understanding the past is always
important for an extension in the human intellect. Intellectual exercises in human history are
performed in different styles, in accordance with social institutions, the manufacture of
culture and geographical structures. While reviewing the human chronicle with its scenes of
diversity, such a statement will accord with available testimonies from various texts and
contexts. Without an overview of the events dealt with in the human discourses of the past, it
is very difficult to mould new inventions to the current age. Such a retrospective examination
will help to rejuvenate everyday interactions of ideas and objects.

According to evolutionary concepts, nothing in the world is ever new and there is no room
for the creation of the new. But all thought and its result represent changes of specific things,
with transformation happening in human discourse because of varied conditions in space and
time. The philosophy of renewal involves a continuous process in the world, day by day.
Such processes in the material world have been the concern of natural scientists. They are
used to elucidate developments in the material world or the world of objects with the optics
of natural substances, and implements that can see beyond the limits of time. The historical
materialism of Karl Marx is a philosophy related to the world of matter, in place of the
idealism of Hegel. The material world and ideal world were subjected to the disciplines of
philosophy centuries before, as in the historical encounter between the arts of reason and
revelation, while topics in medieval Islamic and Western philosophy reproduce the Greek
Peripatetic and Neo-Platonic discourses.

Let us take up an enigma: 'How to make cosmic observation instruments that can look back at
the history of human societies?' As such a question may concern the whole of science in
general and the social sciences in particular, a good and practical answer, wedded to the
reality of space and time, past and present, should be important.

The social sciences are an academic field related to the study of human society and social
relations. The term is used to refer to the plurality of disciplines outside natural science. This
paper introduces a medieval philosopher within a project of alternatives to the Eurocentric
context that dominates current thinking in human sciences. Ibn Khaldun, from the 14th
century, is renowned in both the East and the West for his Muqaddima [Prolegomena].
Hence, this paper is anchored in this particular work. Despite being introduced to and deeply
learned in Hellenistic philosophy, like other medieval scholars, Ibn Khaldun did not follow
that tradition blindly. His alternative historiography is that of a master. He chose to follow a
unique path. In the current 'knowledge economy' where human sciences are increasingly
subverted, a project exploring a medieval scholar would look less than fashionable at best.
But Ibn Khaldun's significance for today lies at the intersection of possibilities for dialogue
within his works on society, cultural economy and their historical evolution. Hence, this
paper sets for itself a task that is simple: an introductory glimpse of that scholar, his period
and his work. Toward the end of the paper, I bring in some recent theory from modern social
sciences about concerns similar to those that perplexed Ibn Khaldun, as an example of the
relevance of Ibn Khaldun within the modern academy.

Ibn Khaldun Life and Intellectual tradition

Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) is a fourteenth century medieval scholar of Berber origin, born and
raised in Tunis, a descendant of an immigrant family with branches in Islamic Spain and
Hadramaut in Southern Arabia. His complete name is Abu Zayd Abd Al-Rahman Ibn
Muhammad Ibn Khaldun Al-Hadrami. He was a scholar of religious science, natural science
and social sciences, and worked as a judge, lawyer, administrator and teacher in various areas
of the Muslim world. He lived in one of the most tumultuous centuries of history, because of
political imbalance in the medieval Muslim lands and natural calamities in Central Europe,
such as the spread of plague. He found himself affected by these fateful developments. While
he entered into his intellectual exercises, the social, political, cultural, economic and
geographical features of his environment influenced his thought deeply.

The Muqaddima is Ibn Khaldun's magnum opus in dealing with human society. It is an
introduction (thus, a Prolegomena) to his celebrated seven-volume work, "Kitabul Iber, Wa
divanul mub'tada wal khabar, fi ayyamil Arab, wal Ajam, wal Berber, wa min aa'sirihim wa
min daviil sulthanil Akbar [The Book of Lessons, Record of Beginnings and Events in the
History of the Arabs, Persians, and Berbers and their Powerful Contemporaries]" It
comprises the history of the fall and rise of Arab and Berber societies during the late of
medieval period.

In the Muqaddima, the author finds a new approach to social phenomena, after a unique
epistemological break with traditional philosophy. To him history is not merely a recorded
narrative, but a systematic science. He is therefore one of the forerunners of scientific history.
In contrast with the mass of historians, philosophers and social scientists who were his
contemporaries and preceded him, it is imperative to note that they could not have made such
an effective way for human studies as that which Ibn Khaldun created. The method used by
Ibn Khaldun for his philosophical understanding of society was something distinct from any
methodology previously known, because of its different way of representation, observation
and evaluation.

The Muqaddima and the science of human civilization

Kitabul Iber is a seven-volume history book, and is divided according to its literary outline:

The Muqaddima, its first part, is a detailed study of human society. Ibn Khaldun wrote under
the headings, 'Al-Umran', 'Al-Ijtima', 'Al-Bashari', which commonly mean 'studies about
society' or 'sociology'. The second part covers the history of Arabs, their generations; ancient
nations, including the Syrians, the Persians, the Jews, the Copts, the Greeks, and the Romans;
the advent of Islam, the life of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), the era of the first four
caliphs of Islam (Khulafa'u Al Rashida); the history of the Turks and the Franks, up to the 8th
C. AH (14th C. CE). The third volume is a history of the Umayyads, the Abbasids and of the
Berbers up to the life of the author. The fourth volume addresses the rise and fall of the
Fatimids, the Carmatians, and the Muslims in Spain. The fifth contains the story of the Seljuk
Turks, the Crusades and the Mamluks in Egypt. The sixth part is about the detailed
interconnections and political interventions among the Berbers. The seventh part is a unique
integration of various disciplines, and presents the author's effort to vindicate the merging of
such disciplines to support the study of human sciences.

Ibn Khaldun wrote the Muqaddima as an introduction to his history book Kitabul Iber, but his
introduction received a much wider reception than Kitabul Iber. The Muqaddima represented
a fascinating, new way of looking at the origin, evolution and fall of a civilization in general,
and medieval Muslim civilization in particular. In its introductory note, Ibn Khaldun
explained to the reader, briefly, the purpose of his work: 'In this book of mine, I shall discuss
as much of that as will be possible for me here in the Maghrib. I shall do so either explicitly
or implicitly in connection with the history of the Maghrib, in conformity with my intention
to restrict myself in this work to the Maghrib, the circumstances of its races and nations, and
its subjects and dynasties, to the exclusion of any other region. (This restriction is
necessitated) by my lack of knowledge of conditions in the East and among its nations, and
by the fact that secondhand information would not give the essential facts I am after' (Ibn
Khaldun/Rosenthal: 1969).

In the beginning, Ibn Khaldun wanted to carry out a deep inquiry into the rise of human
civilizations. Through his idiosyncratic historical approach, he found common features
among them. According to Ibn Khaldun's philosophy, the stage of nomadic life epitomized
the primitive level of humanity; then such communities progressed to the stage of nobility, in
the form of rulers, judges, etc., in an institutionalized format. He narrated clearly and
beautifully the journey of an individual human from his isolated origin to participation in a
state form. The inner logic of such incremental phenomena is the essential point in the
Muqaddima.

The Muqaddima attempts to define the reasons behind the common human creations of
society, and how these patterns result in the rise of historical power groups, which becomes
the rationale for step-by-step growth and decline. He found that solidarity and co-operation
was a prerequisite for the well-being of a civilization. A long period of individual cultivation
is inevitable for the growth of an authentic human altruism. Descent, family relations,
reciprocity, and empathy are the grounds for creation of human civilization. Human altruism
is the basic feature for such organic development. Nomadism, as the primitive stage of human
civilization, allows people to acquire an innate ability to organize their surroundings
according to hegemony. Later, Ibn Khaldun examines different stages in which power is
exhausted; finally society reaches systemic community as a state. Firstly, cultural hegemony
is broken, then political hegemony, thanks to social cohesion and human altruism. 'Social
systems, he [Ibn Khaldun] insisted, flourish most if human altruism is recruited by mild and
restrained political means, which respect the limits of altruism from the outset' (A. Gierer:
2001).

According to Ibn Khaldun, the ideas of lineage and descent are imperative for creation of a
power stronger than any other. He pointed out in the Muqaddima, 'Compassion and affection
for one's blood relations and relatives exist in human nature as something God put into the
hearts of men. It makes for mutual support and aid, and increases the fear felt by the enemy
One feels shame when one's relatives are treated unjustly or attacked, and one wishes to
intervene between them and whatever peril or destruction threatens them.' (Ibn
Khaldun/Rosenthal: 1969). Ibn Khaldun expresses himself with audacity, risk, confidence
and frankness.

His style of thought favored an approach that contrasted with his intellectual background. His
scholastic skepticism is the distinctive factor of Ibn Khaldun's works, when placed among
that of other scholars in human history. There were numerous scholars of history and law, in
his own period and in the past, celebrated for their pre-eminent contribution to humanity.
Among them, Ibn Hisham [d. 9th c. CE], Al-Waqidi [8th-9th c. CE], Al-Baladhuri [d. 9th c.
CE], At-Tabari [9th-10th c. CE], and Al-Mas'udi [9th-10th c. CE] came from the Islamic
intellectual tradition. But most other works were full of serious historical errors, irrational
approaches and unwonted exaggerations. Ibn Khaldun questioned the accuracy of such
writings because of their lack of reasoning and of authentic solid witnesses in substance or
idea. Beyond producing a thorough history of human civilization, he desired to question
traditional views and to produce a distinctive, well-developed framework for humanities
study and epistemology. These are the reasons for considering Ibn Khaldun a giant
intellectual contributor to the writing of human history.

The Muqaddima and different conceptual systems

The conceptual generalization of the Muqaddima embodies the numerous disciplines that Ibn
Khaldun acquired from his traditional teachers. His intellectual nomadism gave him access to
various educational centres of the medieval Muslim world, at Cairo, Tunis, Fez, in Hijaz and
in Spain. Geo-political factors in Asia, Africa and Europe, cultural interaction with different
people where he went for knowledge, purchases, and services deeply influenced his
Muqaddima. In the beginning chapter of the Muqaddima, Ibn Khaldun says that the whole
Kitabul Iber in general and the Muqaddima in particular reflect his detailed life experience as
a student, teacher, administrator and judge.

He delved in the medieval Arab educational system, rooted in the rich scholastic tradition of
the classical Arab/Muslim intellect. His profound knowledge included Quranic exegesis,
Hadith Science, classical Arab literature, Islamic philosophy, theology, jurisprudence, logic,
astronomy, physics, biology, chemistry, geography, law and ethics and historiography. The
knowledge of his age dated back to the sixth century Prophetic heritage of the 'Ahlu Suffah'
(people of the platform, because they were poor and lived ascetically on a platform in the
Holy Mosque of Makkah). Textual representation conformed to his devotional remarks in the
Muqaddima and is the central focal point of Ibn Khaldun's methodology of intellectual
investigation. Once in the Muqaddima, he commented, 'a great change takes place in the
world, such as the transformation of a religion, or the disappearance of a civilization, or
something else willed by the power of God' (Ibn Khaldun/Rosenthal: 1969).

The concept of Asabiyyah is the central theme of the Muqaddima. Various translations to
English have been made in concern with this term. 'Solidarity', 'group feeling' and 'social
cohesion' are the most widely-used among them. Ibn Khaldun says, 'Sometimes, [leadership]
goes to some person from the lowest class of people. He obtains group feeling and close
contact with the mob for reasons that fate (al-miqdar) produces for him. He, then, achieves
superiority over the elders and people of the higher class when they have lost their own group
support." (Ibn Khaldun/Rosenthal: 1969). Asabiyyah refers to the 'common socialization' that
is integral to a good society and its power. The sustainability of Asabiyyah is the criterion for
the rise and fall of a civilization. It needs to be enacted among the known and unknown
members of the community together. When the society gets to the peak point of Asabiyyah,
then the character of that society is glorious in every condition. A widespread happiness,
luxury, comfort and tranquility are the important characteristics of a well-synthesized
Asabiyyah society. If it causes discomfort, then from that point the society will begin its
decline. The civilizational journey from nomadism to the settled stage is entwined with the
power of Asabiyyah. The end of Asabiyyah means the dissolution of present society with its
replacement by another noble lineage. Then, the power of culture and state transform from
the present lineage to the next group, as these are continuous natural phenomena happening
forever in the human world. To Ibn Khaldun, a networked continuity among different kinds
of popular identity is the prime feature of a triumphant civilization.

Asabiyyah is a much-used academic term from the work of Ibn Khaldun, which abounds with
numerous intellectual insights. He produced a synthesis of sociology and biology, and a new
method for social science, which is today called 'sociobiology'. Asabiyyah is very important
not only for the sociologists and historians, but also for evolutionary biologists. 'Modern
science in general and evolutionary biology in particular, aims to gain a deeper understanding
and explanation of the basic conditions of human cooperativity, which have been analyzed in
phenomenological and historical terms by Ibn Khaldun.' (A. Gierer: 2001). The Muqaddima
asserted it found the origins of the variety of 'civilizational metamorphoses' in Asabiyyah.
While studying any single fact in history Ibn Khaldun used to make a detailed survey of it,
with the help of different available perspectives that he brought together from various
multiple disciplines. Ibn Khaldun created such a method for historical veracity grounded in
the Islamic knowledge that he explored since his childhood. In that time there were many
other intellectual traditions in the world, like the Hellenic tradition, one of the grand
epistemological achievements in human history due to its extensive influence on philosophy
and logic. In the period when Ibn Khaldun lived, Neo-Platonic and Peripatic intellectualism
played a major part in every form of research into knowledge.

But Ibn Khaldun would not limit his mind to Hellenic knowledge, even as he mastered its
subjects. Hadith science as a unique discipline, much reputed in Islam, had great influence on
the construction of Ibn Khaldun's philosophy of human society. His subjective consideration
of facts provided accuracy in his historical understanding. The Muqaddima took all rituals,
traditions, etc., along with its social investigation, in a way that had not been accepted in
social studies before Ibn Khaldun.

In recent years, the anthropology of Islam and of Muslim societies particularly, gained much
popularity after the formation of the 'discursive tradition' concept of Talal Asad, showing a
close similarity to Ibn Khaldun's studies of human civilization. According to the concept of
'discursive tradition', studies that will best treat Islamic societies and Muslim civilizations
will focus on anticipations and continuities, rather than conflict and transformations. Asad
argues that Islam should be understood as a tradition consisting of 'discourses that seek to
instruct practitioners regarding the correct form and purpose of a given practice that,
precisely because it is established, has a history. An Islamic discursive tradition is simply a
tradition of Muslim discourse that addresses itself to the conceptions of the Islamic past and
future' (Talal Asad: 1986). Asad formed his discursive tradition contra the 'discursive
formation' of Michel Foucault, which emphasized contradictions and discontinuities. To
Asad, understanding is parallel to continuity, with roots traced back through previous
centuries, to the place where its fundamental, normative consciousness was created. Asad
asserts that a discursive tradition 'seeks to understand the historical conditions that enable the
production and maintenance of specific traditions, or their transformation, and the efforts of
practitioners to achieve coherence'.

Every society has its own identities, which comprise numerous cultural constraints, ritual
practices, devotional precepts, etc. For those who engage with the study of such societies, it is
imperative to consider all of its heterogeneous factors for a clear understanding of it. The
normative phase is a heritage of every civilization, and its folk phase may become involved
with any deviation from its textual or normative factor. Thus may come the transformation of
social ethics. But the normative phase is the fundamental factor of that living constellation.
While studying Muslim civilizations and Islamic society particularly, and the whole human
society and civilization generally, it is necessary to make an effective calculation of the
dissonance between the normative form and the folk form. And the status of that society,
whether it passed through any transformations, the crucial reasons for rise and fall, etc., only
can be understood with a unique philosophical balance between the living society and its
cultural foundations.
When Ibn Khaldun decided to study medieval North African Berbers and Arabs, his was an
effort to understand the normative factor of Muslim-majority populations. He studied the
rituals, tradition, beliefs and ethics of those communities, then introduced living objective
considerations. Ibn Khaldun additionally pondered natural science and logical reasoning.
Both Ibn Khaldun and Talal Asad pursue reason rather than acceptance of circumstances and
expectations lacking logical reasoning. Ibn Khaldun's philosophy of human society is
distinguished by its logical methodology and integration of reason and revelation.

Bibliography

Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddima, Darul Kutub, Lebanon, 1970.

F. Rosenthal, tr. with N.J. Dawood (eds.), The Muqaddimah of Ibn Khaldun, Princeton, 1969.

Talal Asad, 'The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam', Center for Contemporary Arab Studies,
Georgetown University, Washington, 1986).

Muhammad Abdullah Enan, Ibn Khaldun: His Life and Works, Kuala Lumpur, 2007.

Alfred Gierer, 'Ibn Khaldun on solidarity ("Asabiyyah"), Modern science on cooperativeness

and empathy: a comparison", in Philosophia Naturalis 38, 200

Samuli Schielke, Snacks and Saints; Mawlid festivals and the politics of festivity, piety and
modernity in contemporary Egypt, Amsterdam, 2006.