Religious Life Under Theocracy: The Case of Iran

ABDOLMOHAMMAD KAZEMIPUR
ALI REZAEI

The occurrence of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, followed by a large-scale Islamization of society,
resulted in some unique developments with regard to religious life in this country. Over the past two decades, there
has been a lively debate among social scientists about the nature of such developments, and over their implications
for other Middle Eastern and Islamic societies. Most of the contributions to this debate so far have been limited
to the examination of different theoretical possibilities, without strong references to empirical evidence. In the
present study, we attempt to address this shortcoming in the existing literature on religious developments in Iran
by relying on a rich set of empirical data recently gathered through a large-scale national survey of values and
attitudes in Iran. Through a composite index of religious sentiments, we explored the magnitude and the nature
of religious sentiments among groups of different age and gender. Also, we examined changes with regard to
religiosity in the period between 1975 and 2001. The outstanding finding is that the establishment of a theocratic
regime in Iran has led to the transformation of the nature of faith, marked by a noticeable shift from organized
to a more personalized religion, in which the emphasis is placed on beliefs rather than on practices. Also,
among both beliefs and practices, more emphasis is placed on those with a purely individual nature, or with a
social nature but organized through civic and nongovernmental bodies, as opposed to those commanded by the
government. The article ends with a brief discussion of the implications of such developments for the existing debate
among sociologists of religion on secularization and de-secularization. Our findings indicate that any linear
perspective on the demise or survival of religion in society will unreasonably brush aside the fact that religion is
not merely a social institution, but also a cultural resource that individuals may draw upon, depending on their
surrounding sociopolitical circumstances and their reading of those circumstances.

INTRODUCTION

The unexpected rise of new religious revivalist movements in different parts of the world
during the last quarter of the 20th century posed a serious challenge to universal validity of the
secularization theory and resulted in some modifications in the way the theory was initially
formulated. The early versions of this theory argued that social and political modernization, along
with the rise of modern science, would lead to an inevitable decline in the significance of religion
in both public life and individual minds (Berger 1967; Glasner 1977; Martin 1978; Fenn 1978; see
also Ausmus 1982). However, the recent emergence of social and political movements inspired
by religion, as well as the absence of a noticeable decline in the level of religious affiliation in the
highly industrial and modern America, sent alarming signals for the historical validity and uni-
versal generalizability of secularization theory (see, e.g., Berger 2001; Sherkat and Ellison 1999).
Part of the problem with secularization theory was that it had a clear European bias from the
outset. True, later on, modifications were made in order to account for the American experience
(Hadden 1987; Warner 1993), but those later attempts hardly undermined the Eurocentric
underpinning of the theory. They either ruled out the contrasting American evidence as American
exceptionalism, a deviation from the European norm, or as a supporting example in which
religion had undergone secularization from within, an internal secularization (Casanova 1994).
Even after annexing the American dilemma, the secularization debate still kept a fairly strong
Western bias, as religious developments in other parts of the world never became an important
part of the debate, a clear reflection of the then predominant modernization perspective. The

Abdolmohammad Kazemipur is an Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Lethbridge, Lethbridge,

Alberta, Canada T1K 3M4. E-mail: abdie.kazemipur@uleth.ca
Ali Rezaei is a Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Sociology, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, Canada. E-mail:
arezaei@ucalgary.ca

Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 42:3 (2003) 347361

348 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

coming under attack of this Western bias, however, resulted in a rejuvenation of the sociological
studies of religion and the broadening of the focus of such studies. But, even then, the bulk of
empirically informed literature revolved around the Western world.
The present study attempts to push these boundaries farther by examining the religious
developments in Iran, a non-Western country that has been in the spotlight in all the debates about
the contemporary role of religion in the past two and a half decades. Despite this centrality, and
the fact that the occurrence of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 is often cited as an evidence
of the revival of religion in the modern age, there has been little or no systematic study of what
this development involved in term of the religious life of Iranians. An empirical examination of
the Iranian experience can broaden the scope of sociological studies of religion because the
1979 Islamic Revolution made Iran perhaps the only country in todays world with the so-called
caesaropapist embrace of throne and altar, a marked contrast with the separation of church and
state in Western cases upon which the secularization theory so heavily rests.
The two main questions of concern here are: (1) To what extent the Islamization project, the
massive institutional de-secularization that swept across the country in the postrevolutionary era,
has been accompanied by a parallel de-secularization at the individual level, that is, in the minds
and hearts of those so heavily subjected and exposed to the Islamization project? In other words,
has the institutional de-secularization made the society more or less religious, both in terms of the
number of religious individuals and the strength of their faith? (2) Regardless of the degree (or
quantity) of religiosity, has the establishment of a theocratic regime in Iran in the aftermath of the
1979 Islamic Revolution led to any change in the nature and the quality of faith in the country?

CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND

Throughout 19781979, Iran was the scene of a surprising event: a massive social revolution
in the name of Allah, which eventually led to the establishment of an Islamic regime. The extent to
which the masses participated in this revolution was certainly both unprecedented and unexpected,
but more surprising was that these masses found in Islam an expression of their frustrations and
their hopes. The surprising nature of this development stemmed from the fact that it emerged in
the wake of more than 50 years of heavy modernization of the economy and intense secularization
of social and cultural life in Iran. The secularization project had severely curtailed the influence
of religion in its major institutional territories: the control of religious institutions over land was
severely limited; the family law, which was along the lines of the traditional Islamic law, was
modified to reflect more secular views such as granting women the right to work outside the home,
to vote, and to divorce, and at the same time, limiting mens right to divorce; the publication of the
schools religious textbooks became monopolized in the hands of government, as opposed to the
clerical institution; the justice and education systems were freed from the influence of clergy and
the seminaries; and, most conspicuously, the constitutional power of the religious authorities to
veto and stop any rules and regulations that they would find un-Islamic was systematically ignored
(see Abrahamian 1982; Hashemi Refsanjani 1998; Amuzegar 1991; Faghfoory 1993). Despite
all these systemic and institutional efforts to secularize the society and to limit the influence of
religion in public life, one did not have to look hard to notice the signs of a triumphant return of
religion to the public scene on the eve of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
Soon after the revolution, the new regime launched a heavy Islamization project, making
drastic changes in political, legal, cultural, and, less dramatically, economic domains, in order to
make them reflect the so-called Islamic principles. Shortly after, it began an ambitious cultural
revolution, aiming to transform the higher education system. The Islamization project eventually
reached its climax by touching upon subtle issues such as the designation of seats in public places
(public transit system, classrooms, offices, etc.), a restrictive dress code as an embodiment of
the Islamic rules governing modest dressing, and the banning of a wide range of music styles as
corrupt and westoxicated.
RELIGION AND THEOCRACY 349

These developments clearly marked a return of religion to the institutional scene in Iran.
The half-century-long concentrated efforts toward secularizing the society had given way to
de-secularization. What is less known is whether or not this far-reaching institutional de-
secularization was accompanied by an individual or subjective de-secularization. In other
words, given the parallelism between the institutional and individual aspects of secularization
suggested by the early secularization theorists, is it fair to assume a similar parallelism when
it comes to de-secularization? Or, as the latter seculariztion theorists suggested, could the in-
stitutional and individual aspects vary in different directions? Does the presence of a theocratic
regime exert any influence on the way these two aspects of secularization and/or de-secularization
operate? A systematic examination of the current state of the faith in Iran has the potential to shed
light on some of these questions.
The debate on the match or the mismatch between institutional and individual de-
secularization (or religiosity), however, treats individual religiosity in a rather simplified fash-
ion, understanding it in terms of either a simple dichotomy of presence/absence or, at most, a
continuum. What is ignored is the possibility for religiosity to have more than one dimension.
Understanding individual religiosity (and individual de-secularization, for that matter) as a multi-
dimensional phenomenon leads to the possibility of it taking many forms and switching between
different forms. This is a great departure from the view that treats religiosity as one thing, which
is either present or absent.
A multidimensional view of religiosity is not entirely new. As early as the 1960s, Glock and
Stark (1965) raised the point that some of the conflicting findings of the research on religion were
due to the fact that the researchers had been looking at different things as indicators of religiosity.
As an effort to transcend these conflicting findings, they suggested five possible dimensions of
religiosity: experiencial, ritualistic, ideological, intellectual, and cognitive. More importantly,
they noted that being religious on one dimension does not necessarily imply religiosity on
other dimensions (1965:22). For example, they suggested that those who scored high on ritual
observance and biblical literacy tended to score low on religious belief and religious feeling, and
vice versa (1965:22). Although there have been some other studies on this topic, little has been
added to the original ideas proposed by Glock and Stark.
The recent emergence of rational choice theory as the potential new paradigm in soci-
ology of religion has created a theoretical platform, using which the seemingly settled debate on
dimensions of religiosity can be reincorporated into the existing debates. The basic premise of the
rational choice theorythat individuals approach religion in a rational way, trying to maximize
their benefits and minimize the costs, and that they run a cost-benefit analysis in reference to
their preferences and within their limitationsimplies that religious behaviors are likely to be
diverse and multifaceted, with differential emphases placed on these different facets by various
individuals (Young 1997; Bibby 1993).
It is interesting to see the situation of Iran in terms of these different dimensions, which were
originally developed in reference to the Western Christian societies that have a clear separation of
church and state. The specific questions of concern here are: (1) As far as religious sentiments and
behaviors in Iran are concerned, do they show such a multifaceted nature? (2) If religiosity in Iran
is also a multifaceted phenomenon, how is it different from the one found in other societies, given
the unique institutional de-secularization taking place in Iran ever since the Islamic Revolution
in 1979?

METHODOLOGY

Data

The present study relies largely on a rich set of data collected through a large-scale na-
tional survey in Iran in 2001 (for more details, see Office of National Projects 2001). This
350 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

data set, called the Survey of National Values and Attitudes, contains the responses of more
than 16,000 men and women from the countrys 24 provinces to a wide range of questions,
including about 20 questions related to religion. The large size of the sample, along with its
random nature, gives a great deal of confidences in the representativeness of the information
it contains. We have compared the findings of this survey with the reported results of another
survey, conducted in 1975, which also contained questions on a number of religious behav-
iors and attitudes. The latter survey was conducted under the auspices of the Iranian National
Broadcasting Organizations Center for Public Opinion and Social Research. During the four
weeks of its implementation, 5,000 respondents (15 years of age and above) in 23 cities and
52 villages were interviewed using a questionnaire containing 126 questions. A multistaged
cluster sampling procedure was used to determine respondents in 24 urban and 52 rural areas
of the country (Asadi 1977:2). In every province, one or more cities and some villages were
selected in the first stage of this procedure. Data analysis was done using only 4,420 question-
naires. The survey was, in fact, meant to be the first phase of an on-going longitudinal study
of opinion trends in Iranian society (Asadi 1977:1). It took two years before its first report was
circulated on a very limited basis. To the best of our knowledge, this is the only large-scale sur-
vey of attitudes in Iran before the revolution of 1979 and, in this sense, it constitutes a unique
document.
The less-than-perfect match between the two surveys employed here limits our ability to
zoom in on the details of the issues of interest in this study, but it allows a grasp of the general
trends. Out of more than 100 questions on each survey, only a few questions related to religious
sentiments and/or behaviors have been utilized in this study. In the Appendix, the questions used
in the two surveys are listed, along with the aspect of religious sentiments/behaviors that we think
each question reflects.

Statistical Strategy

To address the research questions cited earlier, a wide range of statistical methods was utilized.
We first used the multidimensional scaling (MDS) procedure in order to decompose religiosity
into its constituting dimensions. Then, for each of the dimensions identified, a composite index
was developed. The indices were developed so that they would vary from 0 to 1, representing the
lowest and the highest possible degrees of religiosity, respectively. The indices thus developed
were then used as new variables and entered into statistical models using better-known procedures,
such as correlation. Of these three steps, MDS procedure is less frequently used and, hence, we
will discuss it in more detail below.
MDS has a function similar to factor analysis, except that it operates on categorical variables,
as opposed to the interval variables required for factor analysis. MDS, also known as perceptual
mapping, is a procedure that allows a researcher to determine the perceived relative image of
a set of objects (firms, products, ideas, etc.). The purpose of MDS is to transform respondents
judgments of similarity or preferences into distances represented in multidimensional space. The
resulting perceptual map, also known as a spatial map, shows the relative positioning of all
variables (Hair et al. 1998).
The basic function of MDS is to sort out variables or cases that show similarity in their
behaviors and/or characteristics. It attempts to find the structure in a set of distance measures
between objects or cases by assigning observations to specific locations in a conceptual space
(usually two or three dimensional) such that the distances between points in the space match
the given dissimilarities as closely as possible. In many cases, the dimensions of this conceptual
space can be interpreted and used to further understand the data. On occasions when researchers
have objectively measured variables, they can use multidimensional scaling as a data reduction
technique (MDS will compute distances from multivariate data, if necessary). MDS can also be
applied to subjective ratings of dissimilarity between objects or concepts. Additionally, MDS can
RELIGION AND THEOCRACY 351

handle dissimilarity data from multiple sources, as is the case when researchers have multiple
raters or questionnaire respondents (Hair et al. 1998).

FINDINGS

It was mentioned earlier that the secularization thesis implies a two-facet process: one at the
institutional level and the other at the individual level. One of the main questions in this study is
whether the heavy institutional de-secularization happening in Iran since the Islamic Revolution
has been accompanied by a similar trend at the level of individual religiosity. The examination of
the validity of such a hypothesis requires a longitudinal survey of opinions specifically designed
to measure the degrees of religiosity. Such data do not exist in this case; however, the two surveys
conducted in 1975 and 2001 can shed some light on the changes in religious attitudes and practices
of Iranians during the last quarter of the 20th century. The first of these surveys was conducted
less than four years before the revolution, allowing us to see the impact of the revolution. The
only limitation is that the questions asked do not perfectly match; hence only a less-than-perfect
comparison can be made.
In the two surveys conducted in 1975 and 2001, there were questions on the frequency of
observing individual religious practices and participating in religious functions. Table 1 indicates
that during the period of intense institutional de-secularization in Iran, there has been little change
in the religious behaviors of people, as far as the individual practices are concerned. The fact that
none of such changes are statistically significant implies that the individual aspects of religiosity
have not been greatly affected by the massive institutional de-secularization that has been occurring
in this period.
The participation of people in collective religious practices, however, has gone through an
entirely different path. Table 2 shows that in 1975, 42 percent of the people interviewed participated
in collective prayers either always or most of the times. In 2001, this proportion dropped
to about 20 percent of respondents. The change in the proportion of those who have never
participated in collective prayers is in a similar direction. On the other hand, an opposite trend
can be seen for those who sometimes or seldom participate in collective prayers, representing
more than half of all respondents in 2001. This is in clear contrast with the trends observed for
the individual aspect of religiosity, indicating a significant drop in the number of those at the two
extremes, and an equally noticeable increase in the number of infrequent participants.
To better capture the longitudinal aspect of changes in the degree of religiosity over the
mentioned period, and in the absence of solid and comparable data on religious beliefs and

TABLE 1
THE FREQUENCY OF PRACTICING DAILY
PRAYERS, 1975, 2001 (%)

Never Sometimes Always

1975 6 11 83
2001 6 12 82

Significant at 0.05 level; N(1975) = 4,420, N(2001) =
16,769.

The question in 2001 survey asks about the frequency of
practicing daily prayers and Ramadan fasting.

This category combines both never and seldom
responses in 2001 survey.

This category combines both always and most of the
time responses in 2001 survey.
352 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

TABLE 2
THE FREQUENCY OF PARTICIPATING IN
COLLECTIVE PRAYERS (%)

Never Seldom Sometimes Most of the Time Always

1975 29 14 14 16 26
2001 23 26 31 14 6

Significant at 0.05 level.

In 1975 survey: Frequency of Visiting the Mosque.

For 1975 survey, Seldom is defined as 23 Times a Month;
Sometimes as Once a Week; Most of the Time as 23 Times a
Week; and Always as Everyday.

practices, we chose to use the respondents impression about the relative influence of religion
or the strength of peoples religious sentiments and beliefs in the near future. The most inter-
esting aspect of the findings, shown in Table 3, is the changes in the proportion of those who
were not certain about the answer to this question. In 1975, the absolute majority of respondents
(61 percent) belonged to this category; in 2001, this proportion dropped to only 3 percent, indicat-
ing that people have become more aware of, or sensitive to, the future of religion in their society.
Along this line, there has been a noticeable drop in the proportion of people who believed that
people would be more religious in the future, from 26 to 16 percent. The response that picked
up most of these dropouts is, interestingly enough, the less religious option; the proportion
of people who believed that people would be less religious rose from 9 to 54 percent. In sum,
the establishment of the theocratic regime has created, if nothing else, more sensitivity among
people about the role of religion in their society as well as its influence on the future and, for an
overwhelming majority of them, this influence is viewed to be declining.
To summarize, in 1975, despite the fact that the institutional secularization was in full swing,
a high proportion of people had strong religious beliefs and were observant of individual religious
practices; this situation did not change much in the next quarter-century. However, over the
same period, the degree of engagement in collective religious practices, and the views about the
significance of religion in the future changed noticeably, and mostly in a declining fashion. An
important question here is this: Are these changes generational, indicating that they are the
results of the replacement of an older generation by a younger one that has been coming of age in
the last quarter of century? Or, alternatively, are they indicators of a sweeping social change that
has affected all segments of population more or less the same way? The breakdown by age of the
data shown in Table 4 allows for a tentative examination of these two scenarios. Another reason
for considering age is our belief that the future sentiments of a population are more accurately
reflected in the opinions of the younger individuals, who have a wider range of contacts with
people at work, school, and leisure.
Table 4 shows that in 1975 a larger proportion of the younger age groups believed that
people were becoming more religious, and that, with only one exception (those 65 and older),
the proportions systematically dropped as age increased. In contrast, in 2001, a much smaller
proportion of younger age groups express optimism that people will be stronger believers in the
future, and this proportion rises as age increases. On the other hand, the proportion of those who
believed that people were becoming less religious jumped significantly from one-digit numbers to
values between 41.7 percent for the oldest group (65 and older) and 59.5 percent for the youngest
(1524). Here, again, the proportion of those who could not think of an answer experienced a free
fall from the values in the range of 50s and 60s down to virtually zero. The noticeable changes
along the columns of Table 4, combined with changes along the rows, signify a development
that is both social and generational. Not only the younger generations have become less
RELIGION AND THEOCRACY 353

TABLE 3
THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION, OR STRENGTH OF
PEOPLES RELIGIOUS SENTIMENTS, IN THE FUTURE,
1975, 2001 (%)

Dont Know/
More Same Less Undecided

1975 26 4 9 61
2001 16 30 54 3

Significant at 0.05 level.

In 2001 survey: . . . five years from now.

optimistic about the future significance and influence of religion in society, but also the older
generations show a drastic change in this regard, compared to those in the same age group a quarter-
century ago.
We should read these trends with a caveat, however. There exists the possibility that peoples
perception of what constitutes a religious person might have changed in the period between
the two surveys, partly as a consequence of the new roles that religion adopted in the post-
revolutionary period. The wording of the questions in the two surveys does not provide ground
for a solid support of either side of this argument.
One of the reasons that the perceptions of religion can change over time is that religion
and religiosity are not necessarily unidimensional phenomena; rather, they can consist of many
components, the relative weight of each may change over time. Although the lack of more elaborate
data in 1975 survey does not allow for a comparison of the possible changes in peoples perceptions

TABLE 4
THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION OR STRENGTH OF
PEOPLES RELIGIOUS SENTIMENTS IN THE FUTURE,
1975, 2001 (%)

Dont Know/
More Same Less Undecided

1975
1524 37.0 2.0 10.0 51.0
2534 25.0 4.0 11.0 60.0
3544 21.0 4.0 9.0 66.0
4554 20.0 5.0 6.0 69.0
5564 16.0 5.0 7.0 72.0
65 and older 21.0 2.0 10.0 67.0
2001
1524 11.1 28.5 60.4 0.0
2534 15.6 31.7 52.7 0.0
3544 19.0 29.9 51.1 0.0
4554 21.6 28.9 49.5 0.0
5564 22.0 29.2 48.7 0.1
65 and older 27.1 27.2 45.7 0.0

Significant at 0.05 level.

In survey 2001: . . . five years from now.
354 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

FIGURE 1
EUCLIDEAN DISTANCE MODEL

Individual Aspect Collective Aspect

Friday Congregations
Practice Aspect

Collective Prayers

Observing religious practices

Considering oneself a religious person
Feeling close to God
Religion helps solve lifes problems

A B
Beliefs Aspect

There is a life after death D C

Frequency of asking God for help
No right to public lecture for atheists
No governmental job for atheists
Religion not merely a personal matter
No atheist book to be published
No church-state separation
Religious person is not merely one with a decent heart

of what religion is, it is possible to decompose the nature of the faith using 2001 survey data. This
issue is addressed below, with the employment of MDS.
MDS produced a very interesting pattern of relationships among the religion-related variables.
In general, MDS generated a conceptual space on the basis of two latent dimensions, and identified
a total of four distinct clusters of variables, each of which pointed to a certain aspect of religious
beliefs and/or practices. The perceptional mapping of these variables is shown in Figure 1. The
variables used in generating Figure 1 are based on 14 questions on different aspects of religious
life in the 2001 survey. A list of those variables, along with the exact wording of the questions
asked, and also a brief description of what each involves is included in the Appendix.
MDS generated clustered variables using two dimensions. Dimension 1, illustrated by the
vertical line in the middle, splits the perceptional space into two areas. The variables located on
the right of this line seem to be associated with the social and collective aspect of religiosity, while
the variables to the left of the line are more pertinent to the individual aspect. Dimension 2, on
the other hand, divides the perceptional map into two halves, with the upper half containing vari-
ables related to religious practices and experiences, and the lower half highlighting those related
to religious beliefs. In total, therefore, the conceptual space can be divided into four quarters:
(A) individual religious practices/experiences; (B) collective religious practices/experiences; (C)
collective religious beliefs; and (D) individual religious beliefs.
Of the four aspects of religiosity identified above, A, B, and D are close to what the existing
literature on various dimensions of religion has already found. Variables clustered in Area A
roughly correspond with individual practices/experiences, or the experiences that have some sort
of utilitarian purpose. Those in Area B correspond clearly with the practices that are conducted
collectively, such as collective prayers in the mosque and participating in Friday Congregations.
Items in Area D highlight some sort of experiential or cognitive state of mind, as opposed to
practices or utilitarian views. It is noteworthy that there is a close proximity between the two
individual aspects of religiosity, beliefs and experiences/practices, indicating that these two can,
in a sense, be considered part of one broad cluster of the individual dimension of religiosity. More
interesting, however, is that Area C includes variables associated with beliefs about the collective
RELIGION AND THEOCRACY 355

TABLE 5
THE MEAN OF FOUR INDICES (DIMENSIONS)
OF RELIGIOSITY, 2001

Mean SD N
Index of individual beliefs 0.9078 0.1234 18,314
Index of religiopolitical beliefs 0.5992 0.0094 16,880
Index of collective practices 0.3268 0.2585 17,880
Index of individual practices 0.7211 0.1540 18,162

aspects of religious life. In this area one can find variables measuring the respondents views on
whether the government should allow atheists to hold governmental jobs or run for public office,
whether atheists should be allowed to deliver public lectures and/or publish their ideas in books
and in the press, and, finally, whether religion is a purely private and personal matter. The close
proximity of the items in Area C indicates a strong correlation among them.
The cluster of variables in Area C is clearly a unique feature of religious beliefs, experiences,
and practices in Iran, where a theocratic government rules the country. At the heart of this cluster
lies the view that having a job in government and enjoying the freedom of expression are not
rights but priveleges, the beneficiaries of which should be determined on the basis of their beliefs
about religion. Interestingly enough, this particular cluster of variables has noticeable distances
from all other clusters, indicating that these items are not necessarily predicated on the basis of
other aspects of religiosity. They seem to be more of a political than religious nature.
Using the clusters identified through MDS, four separate indices were developed to gauge the
different aspects of religiosity. Each of these indices varies from 0 to 1, representing the lowest
through highest degrees of religiosity, respectively. Table 5 shows the average value of each index
in the sample. It is clear that, unlike the popular belief about the predominance of collective
practices among people of Muslim faith, individual beliefs and practices register the highest
average values (0.9078 and 0.7211, respectively); the lowest value, on the other hand, is reported
for collective practices such as participation in collective prayers and/or Friday Congregations
(0.3268). The political-religious aspect reports a moderate value of 0.5992.
The correlations among these different indices of religiosity, reported in Table 6, show some
interesting patterns. First, the strongest correlations are found between individual beliefs and
individual practices, though in absolute terms the correlation coefficients are moderate. Second,
the weakest coefficients are found between the religiopolitical index and all other indices of
religiosity. Third, interestingly enough, all such weak correlations are negative, indicating that
the more religious a person is in other aspects of their religiosity, the less he or she would

TABLE 6
THE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR FOUR DIMENSIONS
OF RELIGIOSITY, 2001

Index of Index of
Index of Index of Religio- Collective Individual
Individual Beliefs political Beliefs Practices Practices

Index of individual beliefs 1.00 0.05 0.17 0.47

Index of religiopolitical beliefs 0.05 1.00 0.08 0.08
Index of collective practices 0.17 0.08 1.00 0.39
Index of individual practices 0.47 0.08 0.39 1.00

All correlation coefficients are significant at the 0.01 level.

356 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

subscribe to religiopolitical beliefs. Fourth, collective practices still show a good correlation with
individual beliefs and individual practices (more with the latter than the former), which reflects
the dual nature of collective practices; they are partly organized through state and partly by
communities. However, in MDS plots, it was obvious that the distance between participation
in Friday Congregations and other aspects of religiosity was more than the distance between
participating in collective practices and those variables.
The patterns observed in the tables highlight, once again, the impact of the Islamic Revolution
on the nature of the faith in Iran. The stronger tendency toward the individual aspects of religiosity,
along with less enthusiasm toward religion shown by the younger generation, clearly point to
the future direction of religious developments in Iran. Below, we discuss the nature of such
developments and make an attempt to provide a theoretical framework for a better understanding
of them.

DISCUSSION

For their study of religious life in America, Glock and Stark (1965) chose a brief but mean-
ingful title: Religion and Society in Tension. That title is also a good description of the religious
life in Iran, as revealed by the findings of the present study. We started with two major questions
in mind: (1) whether institutional de-secularization in Iran in the last quarter of the 20th century
has been accompanied by a similar trend at the individual level; and (2) what are the dimensions
of religiosity in Iran, and whether such dimensions correspond with those found in societies with
an official doctrine of church-state separation.
Let us discuss the latter question first. With regard to the components of religion, two patterns
stand out. First, Iranians do not seem to treat religion as an integrated package; instead, they
have broken the package into smaller pieces and have expressed differential levels of loyalty
toward those pieces. People of various ages, gender, and other social background characteristics
value different aspects of religiosity quite differently, depending on whether that aspect is more
belief-centered or practice-oriented, and also whether it is directed toward individual existence
or social/communal life. In this regard, the religious behaviors of Iranians seem to be evolving
along the lines suggested by the market model of religious adherence. Second, the religious
opinions of those surveyed in 2001 underscore the presence of a uniquely Iranian component of
religiosity, which we have called, in the absence of a better term, religiopolitical beliefs. This
aspect of religiosity involves views or decisions about whether or not one should enjoy certain
social privileges on the basis of ones views on religion or the degree and type of his or her
religiosity. This component, all by itself, singles out a group of believers for whom religion is
not a private and personal matter but a means for allocation of vital resources and/or warranting
certain rights (which turn into privileges when framed in this context). Since the leverage for
allocation of such resources is clearly in the hands of government, one may argue that this aspect
of religiosity in Iran is strongly related to the fact that there is a theocratic regime running the
country.
Now, back to the first main question on the relationship between institutional and individual
de-secularization. The data employed in this study revealed an interesting and unexpected trend.
Contrary to the implications of the secularization thesis, the institutional secularization going on
in prerevolutionary Iran for more than half a century did not result in a similar process at the
individual level; people remained noticeably religious and expected the religious sentiments to
intensify in near future. In a similar fashion, more than two decades of institutional Islamization of
the country in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution has not strengthened the religious sentiments
at the individual level; people in 2001 reported the same or a lower level of religiosity compared
to their peers 25 years ago. The contrast is much more visible in the case of younger generations.
As far as the relationship between the institutional and individual (de)secularization is concerned,
this implies that the two vary in opposite direction, though with a lag.
RELIGION AND THEOCRACY 357

How can such a perplexing trend be explained? How is it that the degree of religiosity has
declined at a time when the country is run by a theocratic regime with monopolistic control
over the broadcasting and education system? We think one source of the false expectations in
this regard is that, when talking about institutional (de)secularization, researchers tend to make
no distinction between successful and failed (de)secularization attempts. This distinction is
important because a failed secularization attempt can easily give rise to a de-secular opposition
wave and, by the same token, a failed de-secularization attempt may generate a secular opposition
discourse. These two possibilities seem to match perfectly with the nature of the developments in
Iran, as the country seems to have witnessed both types of unsuccessful attempts over the course
of the past five decades.
Let us add some empirical flesh to these abstract theoretical bones. In the suppressive pre-
revolutionary era in Iran, and given the absence of civil society institutions such as voluntary
organizations, trade unions, independent media, or any meaningful forum for debating public
issues, the religious institutions played the role of what Berger called plausibility structures,
whose function was to provide people with an alternative social and political identity. Religion had
become the alternative cultural resource to draw upon in resisting the psuedomodernist drive of
an authoritarian regime trying to impose its own version of true Iranian identity. This identity,
constructed as an amalgam of romanticized historical images of the Imperial (pre-Islamic) Iran
and a modern, secular Japan of the Middle East taking Iran to the gates of the great civiliza-
tion (the words of the last Pahlavi king) was so distant from the realities of social life in Iran
that it alienated even the very modern middle class that was created by the economic develop-
ment plans of the same regime. In the face of a suppressive regime using an authoritarian and
secular nationalism as its main legitimizing ideology, the opposition embraced alternative cul-
tural resources, such as political Islam, different versions of third-world Marxism, and, finally, an
anti-imperialist nationalism. Identity narratives were couched in the language and terminology
of these competing cultural resources.
Drawing upon religion as a cultural resource in constructing alternative political identities is
not without its precedents. It is a phenomenon one could also find visible in eastern Europe, most
notably in Poland, toward the end of the Communist era. Both as a unifying discourse and an
institutional space not entirely occupied by the state, religion provided resources for resistance,
collective protest movements, and constructing alternative social identities (Avery 1988; Ekjert
1991; Hall 1986). The important point to note here, however, is the fact that in both Iran and eastern
Europe, religious beliefs and practices were rediscovered, as opposed to merely continuing from
the past in a linear fashion.
A similar dynamic can be found in the post-revolutionary era. When religion becomes a
formal hegemonic political force and occupies formal public institutions, a reverse trend is set
in motion, that is, people start looking for other available cultural resources to draw upon in
resisting the political and cultural norms set by the state and its ideology. This reverse trend
has happened in Iran but not in eastern Europe because, in the latter, religion did not become a
part of, or the basis of, the new establishment. In post-revolutionary Iran, the state took over all
formal institutional spaces of religious collective activity and has since drawn upon religion as the
main cultural resource for political legitimization purposes. As a result, the alternative narratives
of social and political identity began shifting away from formal religion, and clustered around
other cultural resources, which, in the age of globalization, are no longer limited to nationalism
or Marxism. One closer look at social life in todays Iran reveals that such cultural resources are
increasingly found in the realms of art, sport, free press, and a variety of civic activities.
Beside this general trend, an additional factor catalyzing the re-secularization of the culture
in Iran was the fact that fierce political battles among factions in power required constant revisions
of the sacred principles already set as the dictums of the divine law. The sacred has been
constantly used and brought down to earth to resolve conflicts over power and authority; hence,
becoming mundane in the process. This is, perhaps, the most important internal source of
358 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION

re-secularization in Iran. Popular music, sports, and the vast realm of cultural consumption all
became sites of performing alternative cultural practices, which challenged, in a conscious way,
the ideological hegemony of the state. Things as simple as wearing a tie became contentious issues
in public political debates, to the extent that they were brought up by such important political
figures and representatives of religiopolitical aspect of religion as the leader of Tehrans Friday
Congregation. Dancing and shouting joyfully at soccer matches, waving a scarf on mountain
peaks away from the eyes of the moral police of the state, violating the strict dress code in
urban public spaces, listening to illegal music in taxis, and similar practices became ways of
challenging the ideal image of the faithful citizen that the state promoted. A full discussion of
these alternative practices and discourse, however, is beyond the focus of the present article.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We would like to thank the editor and anonymous reviewers of JSSR for their very helpful comments on an earlier
version of the article. Our special thanks goes, also, to Lori Beaman and Lynda Henderson for their input at various stages
of conducting this study and preparing the present manuscript.

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APPENDIX: DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF RELIGIOSITY AND THE SURVEY QUESTIONS USED TO MEASURE THEM
Aspect of Religious
Beliefs, Sentiments,
and Behaviors
IndividualPractice
IndividualBelief
Collective (political)Belief
Collective (political)Belief
Collective (political)Belief
Survey (2001) Question
Some people believe that faith/religion is one of the
best ways to overcome the lifes difficulties. How
strongly do you agree/disagree with such a belief?
(Strongly disagree/disagree/neutral/agree/strongly
agree)
How strongly do you agree/disagree with the idea that
all of our good/bad deeds in this world will be
awarded/punished in the other world? (Strongly
disagree/disagree/neutral/agree/strongly agree)
Some believe that the religious beliefs of an individual
is a personal and private matter, and there is nothing
wrong in socializing with those who is not religious.
How strongly do you agree/disagree with this idea?
(Strongly disagree/disagree/neutral/agree/strongly
agree)
Some believe that the books whose contents are in
conflict with religious beliefs should NOT be
allowed to be published. How strongly do you
agree/disagree with this idea? (Strongly
disagree/disagree/neutral/agree/strongly agree)
Some believe that the speakers who do not believe in
religion should NOT be allowed to have public
lectures. How strongly do you agree/disagree with
this idea? (Strongly disagree/disagree/neutral/agree/
strongly agree)
RELIGION AND THEOCRACY
Survey (1975) Question Remarks
The question gauges the personal feelings of the
respondent regarding how central religion is in his/her
life. It is also obvious that, in answering the question,
the respondent considers the degree to which religion
helps one overcoming his/her practical difficulties in
his/her life, as opposed to measuring such aspects as
abstract feeling toward heaven, etc.
The question highlights the existence or absence of a
belief in life after death.
The question singles out those who are of the opinion that
religious beliefs are not just a private matter, but they
are in the public sphere and, therefore, a legitimate
arena for government interference.
The question highlights the view that civil rights should
be accrued to an individual depending on his/her
beliefs about religion.
The question highlights the view that civil rights should
be accrued to an individual depending on his/her
beliefs about religion.
359

Aspect of Religious
Beliefs, Sentiments,
and Behaviors
IndividualBelief
IndividualPractice
Collective (political)Belief
Collective (political)Belief
Collective (political)Belief
APPENDIX (Continued )
Survey (2001) Question
How often do you ask God for help?
(Never/Seldom/Sometimes/Often/Always)
How often do you think you have got closer to God?
(Never/Seldom/Sometimes/Often/Always)
Some believe that a religious person is one who is
decent in heart, even if s/he does practise religious
rituals (such as praying, fasting, etc.). How strongly
do you agree/disagree with this idea? (Strongly
disagree/disagree/neutral/agree/strongly agree)
Some believe that religion will remain purer, if it stays
away from politics. How strongly do you agree/
disagree with this idea? (Strongly disagree/disagree/
neutral/agree/strongly agree)
Some believe that whoever is of the opinion that
religion should stay away from politics should NOT
be allowed to hold a governmental job. How strongly
do you agree/disagree with this idea? (Strongly
disagree/disagree/neutral/agree/strongly agree)
Do you think that, five years from now, people in our
society will be more religious, less religious, the
same?
360
Survey (1975) Question Remarks
The question looks more at the experiential aspect of
religion.
The question puts more emphasis on those aspects of
religiosity that are visible, so outsiders can judge
whether or not a person is religious. This variable loads
heavily alongside the items that emphasize that
privileges (rights) should be accrued to individuals
based on whether or not they are religious.
JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION
The question clearly distinguishes among those believe in
the separation of church and state, and those who do
not.
In your opinion, in the
future, there will more,
less, or the same level of
attention to religion?
(More/Less/the Same)
 APPENDIX (Continued )

RELIGION AND THEOCRACY

Aspect of Religious
Beliefs, Sentiments,
and Behaviors Survey (2001) Question Survey (1975) Question Remarks
IndividualPractice Do you observe the required religious practices If you are a Muslim, which one of the The examples included in the brackets all emphasize
(daily prayers, fasting, etc.) (Never/Seldom/ required religious duties (prayers, the individual aspect of religious practices.
Sometimes/Often/Always) fasting, . . .) do you observe, and how
often? (Always/Sometimes/Never)
CollectivePractice How often do you participate in collective prayers? Do you go to mosque for prayers? How Collective prayers are held in mosques three times a
(Never/Seldom/Sometimes/Often/Always) often? (Everyday/23 times a day, in the morning, at noon, and in the evenings.
week/Once a week/23 times a Normally, the morning ones are the quietest ones,
month) and the evening ones the most crowded. The daily
prayers that are often done individually and at
home can also be done collectively and in a
public place like the local mosque. Since the
revolution, the prayer leaders (Imams) are
increasingly appointed through governmental
bodies. The large number of people to see during
this function, mostly those from the same
neighborhood, is an attraction.
CollectivePractice How often do you participate in Friday Friday Congregations (prayers) are held once a
Congregations (prayers)? (Never/Seldom/ week at Friday noon. There is one large
Sometimes/Often/Always) congregation in each city, and the prayer leader
(Imam) is directly appointed through a
governmental body. The large number of people
to see during the function is an attraction by itself.
IndividualPractice To what extent do you consider yourself religious? The question does not specify what aspect of
(Not at all/Very little/Little/Average/Very religion it is looking at as a sign of religiosity.
much/Very very much/Perfectly) But the fact that most people in Iran identify
religiosity with individual practices, such as daily
prayers and fasting, qualifies it as a variable
related to the individual practice aspect of

361
religiosity.