[G.R. NO.

166719 : March 12, 2007]

SILANGAN TEXTILE MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, TRADEWORLD SYNERGY, INCORPORATED,

and CELLU INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED, Petitioners,* v. HON. AVELINO G. DEMETRIA, PRESIDING
JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, LIPA CITY, BRANCH 85, and LUZON SPINNING MILLS,
INCORPORATED, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Luzon Spinning Mills, Incorporated (LSMI) filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa City, Branch 85,
a Complaint dated 23 August 2000, for Collection of Sum of Money 1 against Silangan Textile Manufacturing
Corporation (STMC). In its Complaint, LSMI alleged that from 19 November 1998 to 14 June 1999, Anita,
Jimmy and Benito, all surnamed Silangan, in their capacity as stockholders and officers of STMC ordered
111,161.60 kilograms of yarn, valued in the total amount of P9,999,845.00. The yarns were delivered at the
office of STMC as evidenced by delivery receipts.2 In payment of the yarns, STMC issued 34 postdated
checks in the total amount of P9,999,845.00. Among these postdated checks are the following:

Check No. Date Amount

0239973 5-12-99 P317,952.00
0239990 1-05-99 316,125.00
0239991 1-05-99 229,110.00
0239992 1-07-99 288,771.00
0239994 1-12-99 200,025.00
0239995 1-12-99 287,748.00
0296801 1-29-99 207,970.00
0296802 1-30-99 206,127.00
0296803 2-01-99 316,577.00
TOTAL 2,370,405.003

When presented for payment, the foregoing postdated checks were dishonored for the reason, "Drawn
Against Insufficient Fund" (DAIF). LSMI demanded from STMC the immediate payment of the
obligation.4 STMC failed and refused to heed the demand of LSMI; hence, the latter filed the Complaint
before the RTC.

In accordance with the prayer of LSMI, and finding the same to be sufficient in form and substance, the RTC
issued a writ of preliminary attachment against STMC's properties.5 In this connection, a notice of
attachment on the properties in the name of STMC covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. 202686 and
No. 202685 was issued.6

Apparently, LSMI had already previously instituted before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Lipa City,
Branch 1, criminal cases against the Silangans for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Thus, STMC was
prompted to file a Motion, praying to dismiss the civil Complaint before the RTC, to cite STMC's lawyer for
contempt for forum shopping, and to discharge the writ of preliminary attachment issued by the trial
court.7 After LSMI filed its Comment/Opposition to the motion of STMC, the RTC resolved the said motion by
denying it for lack of merit.8
The RTC held that:

For forum-shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transactions and same essential facts and
circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action, subject matter and issues (PRC v. CA, 292
SCRA 155). Forum-shopping also exists where the elements of litis pendencia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other (Alejandro v. CA, 295 SCRA 536).

In the case at bar, the two (2) cases, one for violation of BP 22 and the other for collection of sum of money
although concerning the same amount of money are distinct litigations, neither involving exactly the same
parties nor identical issues.

The accused in the criminal cases for violation of BP 22 are the persons who signed the worthless checks
while the defendants in the instant case are the corporations which have outstanding obligations to the
plaintiff. Hence, there is no identity of parties in the aforesaid cases.

As to whether or not the requisites prescribed by law for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
have been complied with, record show (sic) that the contents of the affidavit required for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment were incorporated in the complaint, verified and certified as correct by Mr.
Vicente Africa, Jr. Thus, there was substantial compliance of Section 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. 9

The Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Discharge Attachment and Admit Counter-bond 10 filed by
STMC were denied by the RTC in its Order dated 9 April 2001. 11

STMC elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court12 which was dismissed by the appellate court in a Decision13 dated 25 October 2004, holding that:

But it is also true that when the bounced check involved is issued by a corporation, B.P. Blg. 22 imposes the
criminal liability only on the individual/s who signed the check, presumably in keeping with the principle that
generally only natural persons may commit a crime. Thus:

"Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed
the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act."

We hold, at any rate, that with respect to the civil liability, the corporation concerned should bear the
responsibility, the drawing of the bum check being a corporate act. And a corporation has a legal personality
of its own different from that of its stockholders/officers who signed the check/s.

Accordingly, since the herein petitioners, as drawers of the checks in question, are not parties to the
criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the private respondent was and is not prohibited from filing an
independent civil action against them.

Moreover, the civil liability of the accused Silangan(s), the signatories of the checks in the criminal cases, is
based on Article 20 of the Civil Code as declared in Banal v. Tadeo, Jr.

On the other hand, the liability of petitioners corporations arose from contract. Under Article 31 of the Civil
Code and also Section 1(a), Rule 111 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the offended party
has the right to institute a separate civil action when its nexus is liability not arising from the crime, like a
liability arising from contract.

In fine, there is no violation of SC Administrative Circular No. 57-97, now Section 1(b) of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The civil actions for the liability of the Silangans as the signatories to the
subject checks are deemed included in the criminal actions filed against them. The separate action filed
against the petitioners corporations for the recovery of the purchase price of the yarn sold to them did not
detract from it as this is an entirely different suit.

xxx
WHEREFORE, for being deficient both in form and in substance, the instant petition is DISMISSED, with
costs against the petitioners.

STMC filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution
dated 24 January 2005.14

Hence, the instant petition.

STMC submits the following issues for our resolution:

I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conclusion of public respondent
Judge Demetria that the certification against forum-shopping is inapplicable in this case? cralaw library

II. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conclusion of the public respondent
Judge Demetria when it failed to apply Section 1(b), Rule 111 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure? cralaw library

III. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conclusion of the public respondent
Judge Demetria when it issued the writ of preliminary attachment in favor of the private respondent.

In its first assigned error, STMC argues that LSMI through its Operation Manager, Mr. Vicente Africa,
failed to certify under oath that he had earlier filed criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
against the Silangans before the MTC. These cases are as follows:

Case Number Name of Accused

(a) 00-0295 to 00 - 0299 and 00-305 Anita Silangan and Benito Silangan
(b) 00-0294, 0300-04 and 306-09 Anita Silangan and Jimmy Silangan
(c) 00-1246 Anita Silangan and Benito Silangan
(d) 99-2145 to 99-2154 99-2154 Anita Silangan and Benito Silangan

The criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and the collection of sum of money have the
same issues, i.e., the recovery of the subject checks. The subsequent filing of the civil case for sum of
money constitutes forum shopping.

Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present, or when a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in another. There is forum shopping when the following elements concur:
(1) identity of the parties or, at least, of the parties who represent the same interest in both actions; (2)
identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the latter is founded on the same set of facts; and (3)
identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will amount
to res judicata in the action under consideration or will constitute litis pendentia.15

We grant the petition.

The case of Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corporation 16 is instructive.
In that case, Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation (HIMC) instituted before the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City a complaint for recovery of sum of money against respondent Asia Dynamic Electrix
Corporation (ADEC). The complaint alleged that ADEC purchased from HIMC various electrical conduits and
fittings amounting to P1,622,467.14. ADEC issued several checks in favor of HIMC as payment. The checks,
however, were dishonored by the drawee bank on the ground of insufficient funds/account closed. Before
the filing of the case for recovery of sum of money before the RTC of Mandaluyong City, HIMC had already
filed separate criminal complaints for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against the officers of ADEC, Gil
Santillan and Juanito Pamatmat. They were docketed as I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 01-00300,
respectively, and were both pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City. These cases
involved the same checks which were the subjects of Civil Case No. MC-01-1493 before the RTC of
Mandaluyong City.

In holding that the civil case filed subsequent to the criminal cases was deemed instituted in the criminal
cases, this Court held:

It is clear from the records that the checks involved in I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300 are
the same checks cited by petitioner in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493. The Court will certainly not allow
petitioner to recover a sum of money twice based on the same set of checks. Neither will the Court allow it
to proceed with two actions based on the same set of checks to increase its chances of obtaining a favorable
ruling. Such runs counter to the Court's policy against forum shopping which is a deplorable practice of
litigants in resorting to two different fora for the purpose of obtaining the same relief to increase his chances
of obtaining a favorable judgment. It is a practice that ridicules the judicial process, plays havoc with the
rules on orderly procedure, and is vexatious and unfair to the other parties of the case. 17

In dismissing Civil Case No. MC-01-1493, this Court applied and interpreted Supreme Court Circular No. 57-
97 effective 16 September 1997, which reads:

1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the
corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such action separately shall be allowed or recognized.

From this Supreme Court Circular was adopted Rule 111(b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
which reads:

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

In the Hyatt case, the Court further negated the claim that there are no identity of parties and causes of
action in the criminal and civil complaints for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 where a criminal case
against the corporate officers is filed ahead of the civil case against the corporation. The parties in the civil
case against the corporation represent the same interest as the parties in the criminal case. As to the issue
of identity or non-identity of relief sought, this Court held that the criminal case and the civil case seek to
obtain the same relief. Thus:

With the implied institution of the civil liability in the criminal actions before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasig City, the two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action
predominating the civil. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender to deter him and
others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform or rehabilitate him
or, in general, to maintain social order. The purpose, meanwhile, of the civil action is for the restitution,
reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason
of the delictual or felonious act of the accused. Hence, the relief sought in the civil aspect of I.S. No. 00-01-
00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300 is the same as that sought in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493, that is, the
recovery of the amount of the checks, which, according to [HIMC], represents the amount to be paid by
[ADEC] for its purchases. To allow [HIMC] to proceed with Civil Case No. MC 01-1493 despite the filing of
I.S. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300 might result to a double payment of its claim. 18

The purpose of Section 1(b) of Rule 111 is explained by Justice Florenz D. Regalado, former chairman of the
Committee tasked with the revision of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. He clarified that the special rule on
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 cases was added because the dockets of the courts were clogged with such
litigations and creditors were using the courts as collectors. While ordinarily no filing fees are charged for
actual damages in criminal cases, the rule on the necessary inclusion of a civil action with the payment of
filing fees based on the face value of the check involved was laid down to prevent the practice of creditors of
using the threat of a criminal prosecution to collect on their credit free of charge. 19

Applying the Hyatt case to the case before us, the dismissal of Civil Case No. 00-0420 before the RTC is
warranted. It is not denied that LSMI likewise filed several criminal complaints against the officers of STMC
before the MTC prior to the filing of Civil Case No. 00-0420. As provided in Supreme Court Circular No. 57-
97, as re-echoed in Rule 111, Section 1(b), of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the civil action now
filed against STMC arising from its issuance of the bouncing checks is deemed instituted in the criminal
cases filed against its officers pending before the MTC.

Finally, as to the prayer of STMC for the discharge of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment issued by the RTC,
Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. - At the commencement of the action or at any
time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have the property of the adverse party
attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the following cases:

(a) In an action for the recovery of a specified amount of money or damages, other than moral and
exemplary, on a cause of action arising from law, contract, quasi-contract, delict or quasi-delict against a
party who is about to depart from the Philippines with intent to defraud his creditors.

x x x

SEC. 2. Issuance and contents of order. - An order of attachment may be issued either ex parte or upon
motion with notice and hearing by the court in which the action is pending, or by the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court, and must require the sheriff of the court to attach so much of the property in the Philippines
of the party against whom it is issued, not exempt from execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy the
applicant's demand, unless such party makes deposit or gives a bond as hereinafter provided in an amount
equal to that fixed in the order, which may be the amount sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand or the
value of the property to be attached as stated by the applicant, exclusive of costs. Several writs may be
issued at the same time to the sheriffs of the courts of different judicial regions.

SEC. 3. Affidavit and bond required. - An order of attachment shall be granted only when it appears by the
affidavit of the applicant, or of some other person who personally knows the facts, that a sufficient cause of
action exists, that the case is one of those mentioned in Section 1 hereof, that there is no other sufficient
security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action, and that the amount due to the applicant, or the
value of the property the possession of which he is entitled to recover, is as much as the sum for which the
order is granted above all legal counterclaims. The affidavit, and the bond required by the next succeeding
section, must be duly filed with the court before the order issues.

Attachment is an ancillary remedy. It is not sought for its own sake but rather to enable the attaching party
to realize upon relief sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal action. 20 Being an ancillary
or auxiliary remedy, it is available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant
to preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the
ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case. They are provisional because they constitute temporary
measures availed of during the pendency of the action and they are ancillary because they are mere
incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action. 21

A writ of preliminary attachment is a species of provisional remedy. As such, it is a collateral proceeding,

permitted only in connection with a regular action, and as one of its incidents; one of which is provided for
present need, or for the occasion; that is, one adapted to meet a particular exigency. 22 On the basis of the
preceding discussion and the fact that we find the dismissal of Civil Case No. 00-00420 to be in order, the
writ of preliminary attachment issued by the trial court in the said case must perforce be lifted. 23

Wherefore, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 25
October 2004 and Resolution dated 24 January 2005 affirming the Resolution dated 9 April 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court of Lipa City, Branch 85, are hereby reversed and set aside. Civil Case No. 00-0420
before the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City, Branch 85, is ordered DISMISSED. The attachment over the
properties by the writ of preliminary attachment issued by the same trial court is hereby ordered LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. L-56565. June 16, 1988.]

RICARDO L. COOTAUCO, Petitioner, v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. DOMINGO M.

ANGELES, Presiding Judge of Branch I, CFI, Camarines Norte, and FELIX L.
LUZARRAGA, Respondents.

DECISION

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

This is a contest which began in 1980 between two rival cockpit operators for the right to operate in the
one-cockpit town of Labo, Camarines Norte, whose population does not exceed 100,000 residents. The
temporary restraining order (later replaced by a writ of preliminary injunction) which the trial court issued,
and which the Court of Appeals declined to set aside, is before Us for determination.

The petitioner, Ricardo L. Cootauco, is a duly licensed operator of a cockpit, known as "Gallera Lapu-Lapu"
in Labo, Camarines Norte. In 1979 he built another cockpit in the new recreational zone in Bo. Bocal where
he planned to transfer the Gallera Lapu-Lapu. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The private respondent Felix L. Luzarraga, is the owner and operator of a rival cockpit, known as "Gallera
Plaridel" whose license was revoked by the Municipal Mayor of Labo on September 14, 1977, on
recommendation of the PC Provincial Commander because it was inside the residential district and near
public buildings and the church, in violation of Section 5 (c) of P.D. 449 (Cockfighting Law of 1974).

In 1979, Raul Luzarraga, brother of Felix, filed an application with the PC Regional Commander for a
Renewal Permit to Operate the "Plaridel Cockpit." The application was denied on the ground that the Plaridel
had been phased out or ceased to operate in 1977, hence, "the application for renewal is out of place."
Furthermore, as explained by PC General A. Racela: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Under Section 5(b) of PD 449, otherwise known as the Cockfighting Law of 1974, only one cockpit is
allowed to operate in a city or municipality with a population of not exceeding 100,000. There is no dispute
that the population of the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte is less than 100,000.

"Inasmuch as one cockpit has already been licensed or authorized to operate, represented by one Ricardo
Cootauco and Associates, it would be a wanton defiance of the above-quoted law to issue another license to
Mr. Raul Luzarraga who desires to re-open or resume operation of his cockpit, the Gallera Plaridel, which has
been earlier phased out and ceased to operate since 1977." cralaw virtua1aw library

On May 2, 1980, Luzarraga filed against Ricardo Cootauco, Sergio Cootauco, and Mayor Mario Villafuerte of
Labo in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte Civil Case No. 4753 entitled "Felix Luzarraga, plaintiff,
versus Ricardo Cootauco, Et Al., defendants" for Specific Performance, Annulment of Ordinance, Damages
with a Prayer for Preliminary injunction. The complaint prayed for annulment of the permit which Mayor
Villafuerte had issued to the Gallera Lapu-Lapu, as well as of the Municipal Councils Resolution No. 85
amending Municipal Ordinance No. 10, and also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to
stop the operation of the Lapu-Lapu and the construction of a new cockpit by the Cootaucos in Barangay
Bocal, Labo. The defendants filed separate answers to the complaint.

On June 2, 1980, the Court of First Instance issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining Cootauco and
his agents from proceeding with the construction of their new cockpit in Barangay Bocal and from
conducting cockfights therein. On June 4, 1980, Cootauco filed an urgent motion to lift the temporary
restraining order. The court set it for hearing together with Luzarragas application for a writ of preliminary
injunction.
chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

On June 9, 1980, the trial court issued an order of injunction whose dispositive portion reads as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant Ricardo Cootaucos Urgent motion to recall and set aside the
temporary restraining order of June 2, 1980 is hereby DENIED; and upon the filing of a bond by the plaintiff
Felix Luzarraga in the amount of P15,000.00, to respond to all damages which defendant Ricardo Cootauco
may sustain by reason of the writ of preliminary injunction if this Court finally decides that the plaintiff is not
entitled thereto, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued ordering defendant Ricardo Cootauco or any
other person, employee or agent, acting for him and in his behalf, to refrain from proceeding with the
further construction of the New Cockpit (not the old and existing Gallera Lapu-Lapu), situated at Barrio
Bokal, Labo, Camarines Norte, except to complete its unfinished pipe and plastic roofing on the eastern side,
the joining of the concrete fence at the rear and the placing of a door on the entrance to the premises; if
defendant Ricardo Cootauco still opts to do so; and, from conducting cockfight in the said new cockpit, until
further orders from this Court." cralaw virtua1aw library

Cootauco filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals on June 11, 1980 (CA-G.R. No. 10832-SP),
entitled "RICARDO COOTAUCO v. JUDGE DOMINGO ANGELES, ET AL." assailing the temporary restraining
order/writ of preliminary injunction issued by the lower court. Upon receipt of the petition, the Court of
Appeals enjoined the lower court "from proceeding with the pre-trial in Civil Case No. 4753 set for
September 29, 1980 and any other hearing in the said case, until further orders from this Court." (Annex J.)

However, on January 12, 1981, it denied the petition for certiorari and lifted the temporary restraining order
which it had issued. It held that the error, if any, of the respondent Judge in issuing the Order of June 2,
1980, was "an error of judgment correctible by appeal in due time, but definitely not one made in grave
abuse of discretion . . . ." (Annex K, Petition).

Cootauco appealed to the Supreme Court, praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which
this Court issued on April 29, 1981 upon the petitioners filing an injunction bond of P15,000. The writ
restrained the lower court "from enforcing the restraining and injunction orders dated June 2, 1980 and June
9, 1980 issued in Civil Case No. 4753 . . . and from taking any further action, and/or proceeding in said Civil
Case No. 4753" "effective immediately and until further order from this Court." (p. 152, Rollo.)

In a nutshell, the petition alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for certiorariand in
not holding that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
enjoining the operation of the petitioners new cockpit. chanrobles law library : red

The appeal is meritorious.

Under PD No. 449 dated May 9, 1974, otherwise known as the Cockfighting Law of 1974 [superseded since
1981 by PDs 1802, 1802-A, and by the Local Government Code of 1983 (B.P. Blg. 837)], the Chief of the
Constabulary was vested with authority to approve the issuance of licenses by the city and municipal mayors
for the operation of cockpits (Sec. 6). He could promulgate rules an regulations implementing the law in
order to effectively control and regulate cockfighting in the Philippines. City and Municipal Mayors could
issue licenses for the operation and maintenance of cockpits, subject to the approval of the Chief of
Constabulary or his authorized representative in the provinces.

A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy to which parties litigant may resort for the
preservation or protection of their rights or interests, and for no other purpose, during the pendency of the
principal action (Calo v. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445; Commissioner of Customs v. Cloribel, 19 SCRA 234). Thus,
Section 3, Rule 58 enumerates only three (3) grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, and they
are:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(a) That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of, or in the performance of an act or
acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

"(b) That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation or the non-
performance thereof would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; or

"(c) That the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some
act probably in violation of the plaintiffs rights respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render
the judgment ineffectual." cralaw virtua1aw library

The issuance of the injunction order by the trial court, at the instance of Luzarraga, to stop the petitioner
Cootauco from operating his cockpit at its new site in Barrio Bocal was improper for several reasons: First,
because the plaintiff Luzarraga had no right that needed to be protected or preserved by a writ of
preliminary injunction during the pendency of the case. The operation of petitioners cockpit did not, and
would not, violate any right of Luzarraga who was not operating, and had no license to operate, a cockpit.

Secondly, the status quo at the commencement of Civil Case No. 4753 and 1980 was that Cootauco was
duly licensed to operate, and was operating, the "Gallera Lapu-Lapu," had been authorized to transfer its
location to the new recreational zone in Barrio Bocal, and had constructed a new cockpit arena there which
was almost completed and was operational. On the other hand, the plaintiff Luzarraga was not operating the
"Gallera Plaridel" because his license had been cancelled in 1977, three (3) years before the filing of the
case. The issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction for the purpose of closing the new "Gallera Lapu-
Lapu" during the pendency of the case, disturbed that status quo instead of preserving it.

Thirdly, the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction would irreparably damage the petitioner because it
would, for no lawful cause, deprive him of the use of his license to operate his cockpit. On the other hand,
Luzarraga would not be prejudiced by the lifting of the writ for the simple reason that he does not for
want of a license operate a cockpit with which Cootaucos cockpit would compete.

Another issue raised by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals was the lower courts lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of Civil Case No. 4753. The courts have no authority to grant or cancel permits to
operate cockpits duly issued by the municipal or city mayors with the approval of the PC provincial
commander. Under P.D. No. 449, the power to approve or disapprove the issuance of cockpit licenses by the
city and municipal mayors was reposed in the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary. The denial by the PC
Provincial Commander of Luzarragas application for renewal of his cockpit license was appealable to the PC
Chief He should have exhausted that administrative remedy. In view of his failure to do so, his judicial
action was premature. The court had no jurisdiction to intervene and grant him relief. (Manuel v. Jimenez,
17 SCRA 55, Bongkawil v. Provincial Board of Lanao del Norte, 10 SCRA 327; Acting Collector of Customs v.
Caluag, 20 SCRA 204, Garcia v. Teehankee, 27 SCRA 937.)

We, therefore, hold that Civil Case No. 4753 was filed prematurely and that the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Norte does not have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case, hence all its proceedings therein
are null and void.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

We should mention, in this connection, that on January 16, 1981, barely four (4) days after the Court of
Appeals rendered its decision in CA-G.R. No. 10832-SP, the Philippine Gamefowl Commission (PGC) was
created under P.D. No. 1802-A. This decree has given to city and municipal mayors, with the concurrence of
their respective Sanggunians, the authority "to license and regulate regular cockfighting pursuant to the
rules and regulations of the Commission and subject to its review and supervision." As indicated by this
Court in Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 146 SCRA 294, the PGCs "power
of review includes the power to disapprove." The respondent should exhaust its remedies in the
Commission.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 10832-SP, and the orders dated
June 2, 1980 and June 9, 1980 and the writ of preliminary injunction which were issued by the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Camarines Norte in Civil Case No. 4753, are set aside. Civil Case No.
4753 is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 177486 December 21, 2009

PURISIMO BUYCO, Petitioner,

vs.
NELSON BARAQUIA, Respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Nelson Baraquia (respondent) filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City a
complaint1 against Dominico Buyco and Clemente Buyco (Buycos), for the establishment of a
permanent right of way, injunction and damages with preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order, to enjoin the Buycos from closing off a private road within their property which he
has been using to go to and from the public highway to access his poultry farm.

The Buycos died during the pendency of the case, and were substituted by Purisimo Buyco
(petitioner) and his brother Gonzalo.

Branch 39 of the Iloilo RTC granted respondents application for preliminary injunction.

By Decision2 of February 14, 2007, the trial court dismissed respondents complaint for failure to
establish the concurrence of the essential requisites for the establishment of an easement of right of
way under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code. 3 It accordingly lifted the writ of preliminary
injunction.

Respondent filed a notice of appeal of the trial courts decision. Petitioner filed too a notice of partial
appeal bearing on to the non-award of prayer for damages.

Respondent later filed with the trial court a motion to cite petitioner and his brother Gonzalo in
contempt, alleging that they had closed off the subject road, thus violating the writ of preliminary
injunction. The trial court, by Resolution of March 13, 2007, 4 noting that respondent received on
March 5, 2007 his copy of its decision while petitioner received his on February 21, 2007, held that
the February 14, 2007 decision had not yet become final and executory, hence, the writ of
preliminary injunction remained to be valid, efficacious and obligatory, rendering petitioners act of
closing the road on March 1, 2007 an indirect contempt of court. It thus declared petitioner and his
brother in contempt of court.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the trial courts March 13, 2007 Resolution, contending that a
preliminary injunction, once quashed, ceases to exist, and that he and his brother cannot be held
guilty of indirect contempt by mere motion.

By Resolution5 of April 18, 2007, the trial court set aside the March 13, 2007 Resolution
and granted petitioners motion for reconsideration, ruling that petitioner and his brother cannot be
held in contempt of court by mere motion and not by verified petition.

On the lifetime of the writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court held that it is its "illumined opinion
that the matter of whether a writ of preliminary injunction remains valid until the decision annulling
the same attains finality is not firmly entrenched in jurisprudence, contrary to the position of the
defendants." It thereupon quoted a portion of the ruling in the 2006 case of Lee v. Court of
Appeals,6 to wit:

Furthermore, notwithstanding the stand of both parties, the fact remains that the Decision of the
Court of Appeals annulling the grant of preliminary injunction in favor of petitioners has not yet
become final on 14 December 2000. In fact, such Decision has not yet become final and executory
even on the very date of this Decision, in view of petitioners appeal with us under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The preliminary injunction, therefore, issued by the trial court remains
valid until the Decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the same attains finality, and violation
thereof constitutes indirect contempt which, however, requires either a formal charge or a verified
petition.7 (underscoring in the original decision)

Hence, this petition for review, raising a question of law whether the lifting of a writ of preliminary
injunction due to the dismissal of the complaint is immediately executory, even if the dismissal of the
complaint is pending appeal.

The petition is meritorious.

A writ of preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the
judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular
act or acts.8 It is merely a provisional remedy, adjunct to the main case subject to the latters
outcome.9 It is not a cause of action in itself.10Being an ancillary or auxiliary remedy, it is available
during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect
certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a
final judgment in the case.

The writ is provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the pendency of
the action and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon the result of the
main action.11

It is well-settled that the sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is
to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. It is usually granted when it is
made to appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is
committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable
injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of
the case.12

Indubitably, in the case at bar, the writ of preliminary injunction was granted by the lower court upon
respondents showing that he and his poultry business would be injured by the closure of the subject
road. After trial, however, the lower court found that respondent was not entitled to the easement of
right of way prayed for, having failed to prove the essential requisites for such entitlement, hence,
the writ was lifted.
1avvphi1

The present case having been heard and found dismissible as it was in fact dismissed, the writ of
preliminary injunction is deemed lifted, its purpose as a provisional remedy having been served, the
appeal therefrom notwithstanding.

Unionbank v. Court of Appeals13 enlightens:

"x x x a dismissal, discontinuance or non-suit of an action in which a restraining order or temporary

injunction has been granted operates as a dissolution of the restraining order or temporary
injunction," regardless of whether the period for filing a motion for reconsideration of the order
dismissing the case or appeal therefrom has expired. The rationale therefor is that even in cases
where an appeal is taken from a judgment dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does not
suspend the judgment, hence the general rule applies that a temporary injunction terminates
automatically on the dismissal of the action." (italics, emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The lower courts citation of Lee v. Court of Appeals 14 is misplaced. In Lee, unlike in the present
case, the original complaint for specific performance and cancellation of real estate mortgage
was not yet decided on the merits by the lower court. Thus, the preliminary injunction therein issued
subsisted pending appeal of an incident.

There being no indication that the appellate court issued an injunction in respondents favor, the writ
of preliminary injunction issued on December 1, 1999 by the trial court was automatically dissolved
upon the dismissal of Civil Case No. 26015.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution dated April 18, 2007 of the trial court
is REVERSED. The writ of preliminary injunction which Branch 39 of the Iloilo Regional Trial Court
issued on December 1, 1999 was automatically dissolved upon its dismissal by Decision of February
14, 2007 of Civil Case No. 26015.

G.R. No. L-5268 February 23, 1953

GREGORIO CRUZ, petitioner,

vs.
MANILA SURETY & FIDELITY CO., INC., CONCEPCION YNCIONG, assisted by her husband
Florentino de Leon, FILEMON LEONARDO and ANDREA YNCIONG, respondents.

Manaloto & Llamanzares for petitioner.

De Santos & Herrera for respondents.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 31 1951, which
reverses a judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal according to petitioner an
indemnity in the amount of P2,750.

This case stems from an action for forcible entry instituted by Concepcion and Andrea Enciong and
Filemon Leonardo in the Justice of the Peace Court of Paraaque, Rizal, against Gregorio Cruz,
docketed as civil case No. 12 wherein they obtained the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
upon filing a bond in the amount of P3,000. The bond was posted by Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.,
Inc. After the issuance of the writ, the plaintiffs took possession of the property in litigation and
harvested the palay standing thereon. Later, the writ was lifted when the defendant put up a counter
bond in the amount of P6,000. The land was returned but after the palay had been harvested.

In the meantime, Gregorio Cruz, the defendant, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action
for certiorariassailing the proceedings had in the forcible entry case then pending in the Justice of
the Peace Court of Paraaque, Rizal, which resulted adversely to the plaintiffs therein in that the
court declared all the proceedings null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

Five months thereafter, or on July 21, 1947, Gregorio Cruz initiated in the same Court of First
Instance of Rizal an action for damages against the same persons who succeeded in dispossessing
him of the property in the forcible entry case wherein for the first time he averred having incurred
losses in the total sum of P2,950 not only because of his dispossession of the property in litigation
but also because of the consequential damages he has suffered as a result of the institution of the
forcible entry case against him. In this case the bonding company was made a party defendant.
On October 28, 1947, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss contending, among other grounds,
that this action for damages has no legal basis because the same was not included in the judgment
rendered in the certiorari case as required by the Rules of Court (Rule 60, section 9; Rule 59,
section 20). This motion having been denied, the defendants filed their answer wherein they
reiterated the same special defense. And on November 25, 1947, the court rendered decision
ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P2,750 as damages and to pay the costs.
But when the case was taken to the Court of appeals, this decision was reversed and the defendants
were absolved from the complaint. Hence this petition for review.

One of the grounds on which the Court of Appeals has predicated its ruling that petitioner-appellant
its ruling that petitioner-appellant has no cause of action against respondent-appellees to recover the
damages which he has allegedly sustained as a result of the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction by the justice of the peace court Paraaque, Rizal, is the failure of said petitioner-appellant
to press his claim for damages in the forcible entry case wherein the writ was issued as expressly
required by section 9, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, in connection with section 20, Rule 59. Because
of such failure, the Court of Appeals says, the petitioner-appellant is now barred from instituting the
present action. This ruling is now assigned as error. We find this ruling of the Court of Appeals
correct. This is in line not only with the Rules of Court (section 20, Rule 59 and section 9, Rule 60),
but also with well-known jurisprudence on the mater. Thus, it has been held that "A claim for
damages suffered by reason of the issuance of a preliminary injunction must be presented in the
principal action, and judgment therefor must be included in the final judgment of the case. The
remedy is exclusive and by failing to file a motion for the determination of the damages on time and
while the judgment is still under the control of the court, the claimant loses his right to such
damages" (Casimiro Japco vs. The City of Manila, 48 Phil., 851, 855; citing Santos vs. Moir, 36 Phil.,
350; Somes vs.Crossfield, 9 Phil., 13; Macatansay vs. Municipality of San Juan de Bocboc, 9 Phil.,
19).

The procedure for the recovery of damages on account of the issuance of writ of attachment,
injunction, receivership, and replevin proceedings, as interpreted in the cases adverted to, requires
that the claim for damages should be presented in the same action which gave rise to the special
proceeding in order that it may be included in the final judgment of the case, and it cannot be the
subject of a seperate action. The philosophy of the ruling seems to be that the court that had acted
on the special proceeding which occasioned the damages has the exclusive jurisdiction to assess
them because of its control of the case. This ruling is sound and tends to avoid multiplicity of action.

We believe however, that the action of petitioner-appellant is not entirely lost it appearing from the
record that the forcible entry case pending in the case pending in the justice of the peace court of
Paraaque, Rizal, is still open and has not been dismissed by the court in the certiorari case. The
only import of the decision in the latter case is to declare the proceedings of the justice of the peace
court in connection with the issuance of preliminary injunction null and void for having been issued in
excess of its jurisdiction by it did not throw the case out of court. Petitioner herein may still press his
claim for damages before that court.

We notice that the Court of Appeals has likewise ruled that petitioner herein has no right to claim for
damages for the loss of the palay standing on the land in dispute on the sole premise that he is not
the lawful owner of the land as proven in registration cases No. 2011, No. 4, and No. 3, wherein the
ownership well says, the ownership of the land is one thing, and the ownership of the improvements
is another. The record does not seem to justify any finding relative to the improvements because the
evidence presented seems to have been limited to the ownership of the land. Petitioner may have
made the improvements in good faith although he may not be the lawful owner of the land. The claim
of petitioner that seem to be without reason or justification. We are, therefore, constrained to hold
that the finding to the effect that petitioner has no right to claim fro damages has no basis in the
evidence.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed in so far as it hold that petitioner has no right
to institute the present action for damages, but is reversed in all other respects, without prejudice on
the part of petitioner to presenting his claim for damages in the forcible entry case pending in the
justice of the peace court of Paraaque, Rizal, and without pronouncement as to costs.