Professional Documents
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SYNOPSIS
Accused-appellant Gonzalo Baldogo, a convicted felon serving sentence at the Iwahig Prison and Penal Farm, was
again convicted of murder and kidnapping by the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. He was
sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death in the murder case and reclusion perpetua in the kidnapping case.
On automatic review, appellant averred that he had nothing to do with, and hence, should not be claimed for, the
death of Jorge Camacho, the victim, and the kidnapping and detention of Julie Camacho. Appellant claimed that he
was acting under duress because he was threatened by Edgardo Bermas, a fellow inmate of the penal colony, with
death unless he did what Bermas ordered him to do. IHcSCA
The Supreme Court affirmed appellant's conviction. The Court rejected appellant's claim that he was acting under
duress when he committed the alleged crimes. Appellant's insistence that he was forced by Bermas, under pain of
death, to cooperate with him in killing Jorge and kidnapping and detaining Julie was merely an afterthought. The
testimony of Julie, and the inculpatory acts of appellant no less, showed that the latter acted in concert with Bermas
and was himself a principal by direct participation. The Court also ruled that kidnapping was committed even Julie
was not locked up. Julie was seized and taken from her house through force and dragged to the mountain. Since
then, she was restrained of her liberty by and kept under the control of appellant and Bermas. She was prevented
from going back home for a period of about six days. Patently then, appellant was guilty of kidnapping and illegally
detaining Julie. The Court, however, modified the penalty of death imposed by the trial court by reducing it to
reclusion perpetua, there being no established aggravating or mitigating circumstances in the commission of the
crime of murder.
SYLLABUS
2. ID.; ID.; FLIGHT; CONSTITUTES POTENT EVIDENCE OF CONFABULATION AND GUILT. The
flight of both accused-appellant and Bermas from the house of Julio Sr. to the mountain where they found refuge
after killing Jorge, and their motive to kill Jorge Jr. and kidnap and detain Julie in conjunto constitute potent
evidence of their confabulation and of their guilt for the death of Jorge and kidnapping and detention of Julie.
3. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; ABSENCE OF ILL MOTIVE TO FALSELY TESTIFY
ENTITLES TESTIMONY OF WITNESS TO FULL PROBATIVE WEIGHT. The Court has repeatedly held that
the testimony of a minor of tender age and of sound mind is likewise to be more correct and truthful than that of an
older person so that once it is established that they have fully understood the character and nature of an oath, their
testimony should be given full credence and probative weight.
4. ID.; ID.; DENIAL; CANNOT PREVAIL OVER CATEGORICAL, POSITIVE, AND UNEQUIVOCAL
IDENTIFICATION. The bare denial by accused-appellant of the crimes charged constitutes self-serving negative
evidence which cannot prevail over the categorical and positive testimony of Julie and her unequivocal identification
of accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crimes charged. ETHaDC
6. ID.; EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES; DURESS; THE FEAR MUST BE WELL FOUNDED AND
IMMEDIATE AND ACTUAL DAMAGES OF DEATH OR GREAT BODILY HARM MUST BE PRESENT;
COMPULSION MUST BE OF SUCH CHARACTER AS TO LEAVE NO OPPORTUNITY TO ACCUSED FOR
ESCAPE OR INTERPOSE SELF-DEFENSE IN EQUAL COMBAT. For duress to exempt accused-appellant of
the crimes charged, "the fear must be well-founded, and immediate and actual damages of death or great bodily
harm must be present and the compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to accused for
escape or interpose self-defense in equal combat." Accused-appellant is burdened to prove by clear and convincing
evidence his defense of duress. He should not be shielded from prosecution for crime by merely setting up a fear
from, or because of, a threat of a third person." As Lord Dennan declared in Reg. Vs. Tyler, "No man from fear of
circumstances to himself has the right to make himself a party to committing mischief on mankind."
10. ID.; KIDNAPPING AND ILLEGAL SERIOUS DETENTION; INCLUDES NOT ONLY THE
IMPRISONMENT OF A PERSON BUT ALSO THE DEPRIVATION OF HIS LIBERTY IN WHATEVER FORM
AND WHATEVER LENGTH OF TIME. "Secuestrare" means sequestration. To sequester is to separate for a
special purpose, remove or set apart, withdraw from circulation. It also means to lock-up or imprison. "Encerrare" is
a broader concept than secuestrare. Encerrare includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the
deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. As explained by Groizard, "encerrar" es
meter a una persona cosa en parte de donde no pueda salir"; detener o arrestar, poner en prision, privar de la
libertad a alguno." He continued that "la detencion, la prision, la privacin de la libertad de una persona, en
cualquier forma y por cualquier medio por cualquier tiempo en virtud de la cual resulte interrumpido el libre
ejercicio de su actividad." On his commentary on the Spanish Penal Code, Cuello Calon says that the law "preve dos
modalidades de privacion de libertad, el encierro y la detencion. Encerrar significa recluir a una persona en un lugar
de donde no puede salir, detener a una persona equivale a impedirle o restringirle la libertad de movimiento. Para
que el sujeto pasivo no quiera permanecer en el sitio donde esta recluido, pues no es posible llamar encierro ni
detencion a la estancia de un a persona en lugar del que no quiere salir."
11. ID.; COMMISSION OF ANOTHER CRIME DURING SERVICE OF PENALTY IMPOSED FOR
ANOTHER PREVIOUS OFFENSE; THE EXCERPT OF THE PRISON RECORD OF APPELLANT IS NOT THE
BEST EVIDENCE OF QUASI-RECIDIVISM UNDER SECTION 3, RULE 130 OF THE REVISED RULES OF
COURT. Quasi-recidivism as defined in Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code is alleged in both Informations.
Accused-appellant is alleged to have committed murder and kidnapping while serving sentence in the penal colony
by final judgment for the crime of homicide. Quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance. The
prosecution is burdened to prove the said circumstance by the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself. In the
present case, to prove quasi-recidivism, the prosecution was burdened to adduce in evidence a certified copy of the
judgment convicting accused-appellant of homicide and to prove that the said judgment had become final and
executory. . . . . In this case, the prosecution adduced in evidence merely the excerpt of the prison record of accused-
appellant showing that he was convicted of homicide in Criminal Case No. 10357-R by the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio (Branch 6) with a penalty of from six years and one day as minimum to fourteen years, eight months and one
day as maximum and that the sentence of accused-appellant commenced on November 19, 1992 and that the
minimum term of the penalty was to expire on August 16, 1997. The excerpt of the prison record of accused-
appellant is not the best evidence under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court to prove the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and to prove that said judgment had become final and executory. Said
excerpt is merely secondary or substitutionary evidence which is inadmissible absent proof that the original of the
judgment had been lost or destroyed or that the same cannot be produced without the fault of the prosecution. The
barefaced fact that accused-appellant was detained in the penal colony does not prove the fact that final judgment for
homicide has been rendered against him. There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the crime,
accused-appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code.
SYLLABUS
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. The testimony of the complainant, although
uncorroborated, is credible and convinces us with moral certainty of the accused's guilt. No improper or ulterior
motive was shown why she would falsely testify against the accused, who was her neighbor. The latter categorically
admitted on cross-examination that he knew no reason why the complainant would charge him of rape and publicly
make known that fact. It is settled that where there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal witness
for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that the said witness was not so actuated
and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. (People vs. Simon, 209 SCRA 148 [1992], People vs. Corpuz,
222 SCRA 842 [1993].) The complainant's conduct in these cases further convinces us that she told the truth and
filed these cases solely to obtain justice. She reported the commission of the crime to the police authorities, allowed
an examination of her private parts, and thereafter suffered the ordeal of a public trial. It is difficult to believe that an
unmarried woman, like her, would tell a story of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts, and
thereafter permit herself to be the subject of a public trial unless she was motivated by an honest desire to seek
justice. No young decent Filipina would publicly admit that she had been criminally abused and ravished unless that
is the truth; it is her natural instinct to protect her honor. (People vs. Patilan, 197 SCRA 354 [1991].)
3. ID.; ID.; DENIAL, CANNOT PREVAIL OVER CREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINANT. The
accused's denial of sexual intercourse does not deserve even a passing glance. Denial is an inherently weak defense
and cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the complainant. (People vs. Macam, 238 SCRA 306
[1994]; People vs. Cobre, 239 SCRA 159 [1994].)
4. ID.; ID.; IMPLIED ADMISSION; RULE; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. The accused failed to
deny the testimony of Antonette that he had offered to pay P40,000.00 to amicably settle these cases. Such an offer
was an implied admission of guilt (People vs. Manuel, 198 SCRA 818 [1991]; People vs. Flores, 239 SCRA 83
[1994].) pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 27, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, which reads in part
as follows: In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to
be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of
guilt.
5. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; VIRGINITY, NOT AN ELEMENT THEREOF. That the laceration was
three months old does not prove that the accused had no carnal knowledge of Antonette on 20 October and 4
November 1992. Antonette established with moral certainty that the accused had raped her on those dates. Any prior
sexual intercourse which could have resulted in the hymenal laceration is irrelevant in these cases, for virginity is
not an element of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
7. ID.; ID.; LEWD DESIGNS, NEED NOT BE PROVED; CASE AT BAR. This Court cannot sustain the
finding of the trial court that although the complainant was brought against her will to the Queensland Motel in the
first case and to Cavite in the second case, the prosecution failed to prove the element of lewd designs. Lewd
designs means unchaste design. This Court finds that in both cases the principal purpose of the accused was to rape
the complainant and that her abduction was only a means to commit the rape. Rape, under any clime and
civilization, will always be unchaste. (People vs. Corpuz, 222 SCRA 842 [1993].) Thus, the abduction of the
complainant was obviously with lewd designs.
8. ID.; ID.; IMPOSABLE PENALTY; CASE AT BAR. The accused should be held liable for the complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape defined and penalized under Article 342 (forcible abduction) and Article 335
(rape) of the Revised Penal Code. Pursuant to Article 48 of the said Code, the penalty for the more serious crime,
which is rape, shall be imposed in its maximum period. Since the two rapes were committed with a deadly weapon,
the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 335, to be imposed in its
maximum period death. But since these cases were committed when the imposition of the death penalty was still
prohibited under the Constitution, (Section 19[1], Article III. The death penalty was reimposed in certain crimes by
R.A. No. 7659, which took effect on 31 December 1993.) only reclusion perpetua may be imposed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUFINO SAGUN, JR. AND JIM SAGUN, accused,
RUFINO SAGUN, JR., accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY MINOR INCONSISTENCIES. As far as inconsistencies in the
individual testimonies of Gabriel and Camacho are concerned, they refer to non-crucial details and, consequently,
cannot detract from their overall credibility (People vs. Delawin, G.R. Nos. 73762-63, 27 February 1987, 148 SCRA
257). Thus, although in his Affidavit (Exhibit "B") Gabriel stated that Jim Sagun and the victim fought with each
other, in open Court, he stated that there was no such fighting (TSN, 24 October 1988, pp. 107-108). This
inconsistency does not necessarily discredit Gabriel. "Generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself
but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant's statements. Omissions and misunderstandings by
the writer are not infrequent particularly under circumstances of hurry or impatience. For this reason, the infirmity of
affidavits as a species of evidence is much a matter of judicial experience" (Regalado, Compendium on Evidence,
Vol. II, p. 559, citing People vs. Mariquina, et al., 46 OG 6053; People vs. Mendoza, et al. G.R No. L-33127, 15
July 1981). Also, an "affidavit . . . will not always disclose the whole facts, and will oftentimes and without design
incorrectly describe, without the deponent detecting it, some of the occurrences, narrated . . ." (People vs. Andaya,
G.R. No. 63862, 31 July 1987, 152 SCRA 570 citing People vs. Tan, 89 Phil. 337, 1951).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT; ENTITLED TO GREAT WEIGHT AND RESPECT. In
the final analysis, the basic issue is one of credibility and it is well-settled that the findings of the Trial Court on this
point are entitled to great weight and respect and will generally not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that
said Court had overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the outcome of the
case (People vs. Jardiniano, G.R. No. L-37191, 30 March 1981, 103 SCRA 530, and a host of other cases). The
present case does not fall under any of the exceptions.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. From the established facts in the case at
bar, the trial court correctly considered the declaration of the victim a dying declaration and, therefore, admissible.
The declarant was conscious of his impending death. This may be gleaned not only from the victim's insistence right
after he reached their house that he should immediately be brought to the hospital and that he was becoming weaker
by the moment, but also from the serious nature of his wounds (People vs. Sarabia, 127 SCRA 100 [1984] and the
fact that the said victim died shortly afterwards (People vs. Araja, 105 SCRA 133 [1981]).
4. ID.; ID.; PART OF THE RES GESTAE; REQUISITES. For the admission of evidence as part of the res
gestae, it is required that (a) the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence, (b) the statements forming
part thereof were made before the declarant had the opportunity to contrive, and (c) the statements refer to the
occurrence in question and its attending circumstances (People vs. Siscar, 140 SCRA 316 [1985]).
5. ID.; ID.; WHERE ELEMENTS OF BOTH DYING DECLARATION AND STATEMENT AS PART OF
THE RES GESTAE ARE PRESENT, THE STATEMENT MAY BE ADMITTED AS BOTH. We have ruled
that while the statement of the victim may not qualify as a dying declaration because it was not made under the
consciousness of impending death (People vs. Palamos, 49 Phil. 601 [1926]), it may still be admissible as part of the
res gestae if it was made immediately after the incident (People vs. Reyes, 52 Phil. 538 [1928]), or a few hours
thereafter (People vs. Tumalip, 60 SCRA 303 [1974]). Definitely, the victim's statement in the case at hand was
made immediately after the incident, before he could even have the opportunity to contrive or concoct a story. Of
relevance, too, is the fact that on two occasions, first at their house, and later while he was being brought to the
hospital, he identified one and the same person as his assailant. Where the elements of both a dying declaration and
a statement as part of the res gestae are present, as in the case at bar, the statement may be admitted as a dying
declaration and the same time as part of the res gestae (People vs. Balbas, 122 SCRA 859 [1983]). cDSAEI
6. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; VICTIM WAS SUDDENLY
STABBED WITHOUT CHANCE OF PUTTING UP DEFENSE. It seems fairly established, that more, than one
person attacked the victim. While he was being stabbed by accused-appellant, some of the companions of accused-
appellant where holding the victim in a defenseless position. The manner in which the stabbing was done tended
directly and specially to ensure its execution, affording the victim no chance to put up any defense. This constitutes
alevosia. The killing, therefore, was qualified to murder. It is to be noted also that accused-appellant and his
companions were supposed to assist the victim home. However, instead of bringing him safely home, accused-
appellant and his companions ganged up on the victim, who had no inkling of any impending attack, having placed
himself in the safekeeping of persons who then turned vicious assailants.
8. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; ACTUAL DAMAGES; MUST BE DULY PROVED; CASE AT BAR. The
trial court likewise correctly awarded civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. However, we do not see how the
award of actual damages in the same amount may be justified in the light of the evidence tending to show that only
the total amount of P23,217.65 was actually spent. It is elementary that actual and compensatory damages, unlike
moral and exemplary damages cannot be left to the sole discretion of the court. The award of actual and
compensatory damages in the case at bar must, therefore, be reduced to the amount duly proved at the trial which is
to P23,217.65.
SYLLABUS
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTIONS. This rule admits of exceptions, such as when the evaluation was
reached arbitrarily or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance which could affect the result of the case. None of these exceptions exists in this case.
3. ID; ID.; ID.; WHEN A WOMAN SAYS THAT SHE HAS BEEN RAPED, SHE SAYS IN EFFECT ALL
THAT IS NECESSARY TO SHOW THAT SHE HAS BEEN RAPED. It is also settled that when a woman says
that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that she has been raped, and if her testimony
meets the test of credibility the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. Additionally, no married woman in
her right mind, like Cherry Tamayo, would subject herself to public scrutiny and humiliation in order to perpetuate a
falsehood. Neither would she take the risk of being alienated from her husband and her family. If Cherry Tamayo
then resolved to face the ordeal and relate in public what many similarly situated would have kept secret, she did so
simply to obtain justice.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY MINOR INCONSISTENCIES. To cast doubt on the
credibility of the complainant, the accused cites an inconsistency in the testimony of the complainant. He points out
that at first, the complainant said that her panties were removed by the accused while she was already lying down,
but later she said that it was before she was laid down on the ground that the accused stripped her of her panties. The
accused failed to elevate this inconsistency to the level of a major one sufficient to strip the complainant of
credibility. Being too trivial, such inconsistency does not rock the pedestal upon which the complainant's credibility
rests. In fact, it enhances her credibility, as it manifests spontaneity and lack of scheming.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALIBI; NOT GIVEN CREDENCE WHERE THERE IS NO PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY
FOR ACCUSED TO BE AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME DURING ITS COMMISSION. The alibi of the
accused thus maintains its weak and impotent state. For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must establish the physical
impossibility for the accused to be present at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The accused's
testimony placing himself somewhere else was corroborated by the testimony of Wilfredo and Emilia Manzano. But
he failed to establish physical impossibility because the alibi places him within only three kilometers from where the
crime was committed, a manageable distance to travel in a few minutes.
8. ID.; ID.; MORAL DAMAGES TO RAPE VICTIM INCREASED TO P40,000.00. Pursuant to the
current policy of this Court, the moral damages awarded by the trial court should be increased from P30,000.00 to
P40,000.00.