Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Case Digests
Anti-Fencing Law P.D. 1612
Abad, J.:
Facts:
Sonia Delgado, wife of herein respondent, brought a Nissan Safari from Mel Dimat.
Spouses Delgado where driving along E. Rodriguez Ave. when they were apprehended by
the Traffic Management Group (TMG), afterwards they found out that the vehicle was a
stolen property. Samson and Mantequilla, the registered owner of the vehicle, filed
charges against Mel Dimat for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. On his defense he
claims that he did not know Mantequilla, and that he bought it in good faith for
value.
The RTC found him to guilty and which the CA affirms with modification.
Issue:
Whether or not Dimat knowingly sold for gain the Nissan Safari which was earlier
stolen.
Ruling:
The elements of fencing are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the
accused, who took no part in the robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses,
keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner
deals in any article or object taken during that robbery or theft; (3) the accused
knows or should have known that the thing derived from that crime; and (4) he intends
by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another.
Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn Casino where the latter gave
the Nissan Safari to him as collateral for a loan. Tolentino supposedly showed him
the old certificate of registration and official receipt of the vehicle and even
promised to give him a new certificate of registration and official receipt already
in his name. But Tolentino reneged on this promise. Dimat insists that Tolentinos
failure to deliver the documents should not prejudice him in any way. Delgado
himself could not produce any certificate of registration or official receipt.
Based on the above, evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not
properly documented. He said that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of
registration and official receipt. But this certainly could not be true because, the
vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had no documents to show. That Tolentino
was unable to make good on his promise to produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed
to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the
same to Sonia Delgado who apparently made no effort to check the papers covering her
purchase. That she might herself be liable for fencing is of no moment since she did
not stand accused in the case.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October 26, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR 29794.
SO ORDERED.
Facts:
Jovita Rodriguez hired Pacita Linghon as a household helper. Sometime in October
Pacita contacted his brother, Macario, and asked him to sell some jewelries, which
the latter obliged and sold them to Ernesto. After sometime Jovita found out that her
jewelries were gone and accused Pacita for stealing the same, which was then proved
by the court. Later on Jovita filed against Ernesto Francisco for violation of PD
1612 or Anti-Fencing Law.
Accused contends that he did not know Pacita and he only saw her during the
preliminary investigation, and that he never had transactions with Macario. RTC ruled
against him which was affirmed by the CA.
Accused then petitioned that the court erred in proving him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt and that there was no sufficient evidence to prove that he was liable for PD
1612.
Issue:
Whether or not there is sufficient quantum of evidence for the accused to be liable
for PD 1612.
Whether or not he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of
fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object
or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or theft, and prescribes a
higher penalty based on the value of the property.33 The stolen property subject of
the charge is not indispensable to prove fencing. It is merely corroborative of the
testimonies and other evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove the crime of
fencing.
We agree with the trial and appellate courts that the prosecution mustered the
requisite quantum of evidence, on the basis of the testimony of Jovita, that Pacita
stole the subject jewelry from the locked cabinet in the main house of her then
employer. Jovita testified on her ownership of the jewelry and the loss thereof, and
narrated that Pacita had access to the cabinet containing the pieces of jewelry.
It bears stressing that, in the absence of direct evidence that the accused had
knowledge that the jewelry was stolen, the prosecution is burdened to prove facts and
circumstances from which it can be concluded that the accused should have known that
the property sold to him were stolen. This requirement serves two basic purposes: (a)
to prove one of the elements of the crime of fencing; and, (b) to enable the trial
court to determine the imposable penalty for the crime, since the penalty depends on
the value of the property; otherwise, the court will fix the value of the property at
P5.00, conformably to our ruling in People v. Dator.
In the absence of a conclusive or definite proof relative to their value, this Court
fixed the value of the bag and its contents at P100.00 based on the attendant
circumstances of the case. More pertinently, in the case of People vs. Reyes, this
Court held that if there is no available evidence to prove the value of the stolen
property or that the prosecution failed to prove it, the corresponding penalty to be
imposed on the accused-appellant should be the minimum penalty corresponding to theft
involving the value of P5.00.47
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19110 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED
of the crime of violating P.D. No. 1612 for the prosecutions failure to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
Facts:
Christine Diokno owns several jewelries which were stolen by their houseboy Manzo.
The latter sold the same to Gabriel Capili and that he having the knowledge that the
articles are stolen. Diokno filed a criminal complaint against Manzo, which was found
guilty of qualified theft and against Capili for violation of PD 1612. The accused
denies all the allegations against him.
RTC ruled him liable of Fencing and it was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is liable for Anti-Fencing Law.
Ruling:
Fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another,
shall buy receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy
and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of
value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.[12] The essential elements of the crime of
fencing are:
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft; and
4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for
another.[13]
The first element or the fact of theft was proved by prosecution witness, Christine
Diokno (DIOKNO) who testified that several pieces of jewelry, watches and money were
stolen from her mothers bedroom. She reported the theft to the police who after
conducting an investigation, concluded that her houseboy, Michael Manzo (MANZO),
committed the offense. Consequently, a criminal case was filed against MANZO. In
her testimony, DIOKNO stated that the major items that were taken consisted of two
diamond rings each having a diamond solitaire of three (3) carats each, a pair of
diamond earrings each having a diamond solitaire of two point five (2.5) carats, a
diamond cross with twelve (12) half (1/2) carat diamond, her mothers wedding band,
an emerald set consisting of an emerald ring set with diamonds with a pair of
matching earrings, a sapphire set consisting of two sapphire rings set with diamonds
and matching earrings, a South Sea pearl set consisting of a ring and two pairs of
matching earrings also set with diamonds, three cultured pearl necklaces with
matching cultured pearl earrings set with diamonds, a topaz set consisting of two
rings with diamonds and one with rubies with a set of matching earrings, a cameo set
consisting of a ring, matching earrings and a brooch all set with diamonds and four
solid gold watches, a Rolex, Piaget, Universal Geneve and a Gabriel Peregaux. She
alleged that the total value of the items amounted to approximately three million
(P3,000,000.00) pesos. In court, DIOKNO identified some of the recovered stolen
items consisting of a set of pearl earrings with two small diamonds (Exhibit A),
a gold chain with pendant (Exhibit B) and old United States dollar coins (Exhibit
C).[14]
DIOKNOs testimony is corroborated by MANZO, who admitted that he stole the jewelry
from DIOKNO. And that after stealing the jewelry, he delivered them to the
petitioner, GABRIEL with the information that the jewelry was stolen and for the
purpose of selling the same. He identified GABRIEL in court as the person to whom he
delivered the stolen jewelry. MANZO testified that GABRIEL was not a participant in
the theft of the jewelry and that he told GABRIEL that the jewelry was stolen. He
also established the fact that the petitioner agreed to pay fifty thousand
(P50,000.00) pesos for the stolen jewelry which clearly manifests intent to gain on
the part of the petitioner. Consequently, MANZOs testimony proves the second,
third and fourth elements of the crime of fencing.
At any rate, the law does not require proof of purchase of the stolen articles by the
accused as mere possession thereof is enough to give rise to a presumption of
fencing. GABRIEL, who was in possession of at least two of the stolen items, has not
rebutted this presumption.
We also disagree with the petitioner that the prosecution failed to prove the value
of the stolen items.
PARDO, J.:
Facts:
Rosalita Lim is the owner of Bueno Metal Industries and Manuelito Mendez was her
employee. Sometime in February Mendez left the company. Afterwards Lim found out that
some brass propellers and screws and boats spare parts were missing. Later on Mendez
was found to be the one who stole the articles and confessed to Lim that he sold the
same to Ramon Tan. Lim then instituted charges against Ramon Tan for violation of PD
1612. Petitioner denies the allegation stating that he was engaged in selling
hardware parts. That he never bought the stolen articles and talked to Mendez.
RTC ruled against him which the CA affirms.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution has successfully established the elements of fencing
as against petitioner.
Ruling:
Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 is "the act of any person who, with
intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep,
acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in
any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to
him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The law
on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design
to commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of
robbery or theft.
Short of evidence establishing beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the essential
elements of fencing, there can be no conviction for such offense.13 "It is an ancient
principle of our penal system that no one shall be found guilty of crime except upon
proof beyond reasonable doubt (Perez vs. Sandiganbayan, 180 SCRA 9)."14
In this case, what was the evidence of the commission of theft independently of
fencing?
Complainant Rosita Lim testified that she lost certain items and Manuelito Mendez
confessed that he stole those items and sold them to the accused. However, Rosita Lim
never reported the theft or even loss to the police. She admitted that after
Manuelito Mendez, her former employee, confessed to the unlawful taking of the items,
she forgave him, and did not prosecute him. Theft is a public crime. It can be
prosecuted de oficio, or even without a private complainant, but it cannot be without
a victim. As complainant Rosita Lim reported no loss, we cannot hold for certain that
there was committed a crime of theft. Thus, the first element of the crime of fencing
is absent, that is, crime of robbery or theft has been committed.
There was no sufficient proof of the unlawful taking of another's property. True,
witness Mendez admitted in an extra-judicial confession that he sold the boat parts
he had pilfered from complainant to petitioner. However, an admission or confession
acknowledging guilt of an offense may be given in evidence only against the person
admitting or confessing.15 Even on this, if given extra-judicially, the confessant
must have the assistance of counsel; otherwise, the admission would be inadmissible
in evidence against the person so admitting.16 Here, the extra-judicial confession of
witness Mendez was not given with the assistance of counsel, hence, inadmissible
against the witness. Neither may such extra-judicial confession be considered
evidence against accused.17 There must be corroboration by evidence of corpus delicti
to sustain a finding of guilt.18 Corpus delicti means the "body or substance of the
crime, and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that the crime has been actually
committed."19 The "essential elements of theft are (1) the taking of personal
property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking away was done with
intent of gain; (4) the taking away was done without the consent of the owner; and
(5) the taking away is accomplished without violence or intimidation against persons
or force upon things (U.S. vs. De Vera, 43 Phil. 1000)."20 In theft, corpus delicti
has two elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that
it was lost by felonious taking.21 In this case, the theft was not proved because
complainant Rosita Lim did not complain to the public authorities of the felonious
taking of her property. She sought out her former employee Manuelito Mendez, who
confessed that he stole certain articles from the warehouse of the complainant and
sold them to petitioner. Such confession is insufficient to convict, without evidence
of corpus delicti.22
What is more, there was no showing at all that the accused knew or should have known
that the very stolen articles were the ones sold him. "One is deemed to know a
particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or awareness thereof, or is
aware of the existence of something, or has the acquaintance with facts, or if he has
something within the mind's grasp with certitude and clarity. When knowledge of the
existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is
established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence unless he
actually believes that it does not exist. On the other hand, the words "should know"
denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain
the fact in performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon
assumption that such fact exists. Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness
about a fact. Since the court cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and state with
certainty what is contained therein, it must determine such knowledge with care from
the overt acts of that person. And given two equally plausible states of cognition or
mental awareness, the court should choose the one which sustains the constitutional
presumption of innocence."23
Without petitioner knowing that he acquired stolen articles, he can not be guilty of
"fencing".24
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. C.R. No. 20059 and hereby ACQUITS petitioner of the offense charged in
Criminal Case No. 92-108222 of the Regional Trial Court, Manila.1wphi1.nt
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 121592 July 5, 1996
Facts:
Herein petitioner is trying to run for Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna but he was
disqualified by COMELEC on the grounds that petitioner has been sentenced by final
judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. The petitioner was sentenced for
violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. He now petitions for the nullity of the resolution
issued by the COMELEC.
Issue:
Whether or not PD 1612 or Anti-Fencing Law involves moral turpitude.
Ruling:
The Court in this case shall nonetheless dispense with a review of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, inasmuch as petitioner after
all does not assail his conviction. Petitioner has in effect admitted all the
elements of the crime of fencing. At any rate, the determination of whether or not
fencing involves moral turpitude can likewise be achieved by analyzing the elements
alone.
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item,
object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or
for another.
Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual knowledge by the "fence"
of the fact that property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious
deprivation of one's rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft
which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. And although the
participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in point in time and in
degree, both the "fence" and the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded
one's peaceful dominion for gain thus deliberately reneging in the process "private
duties" they owe their "fellowmen" or "society" in a manner "contrary to . .
. accepted and customary rule of right and
duty . . . , justice, honesty . . . or good morals." The duty not to appropriate, or
to return, anything acquired either by mistake or with malice is so basic it finds
expression in some key provisions of the Civil Code on "Human Relations" and "Solutio
Indebiti", to wit:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
The same underlying reason holds even if the "fence" did not have actual knowledge,
but merely "should have known" the origin of the property received. In this regard,
the Court held:
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed
resolutions of the COMELEC dated May 6, 1995 and August 28, 1995 are AFFIRMED in
toto. SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for review of the decision made by the Sandiganbayan. In July 22,
1996, Dr. Rico S. Jacutin, then the City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City was
charged before the Sandiganbayan, the crime of Sexual Harassment by Ms. Juliet Yee,
a 22 year old fresh graduate of Bachelor of Science of Nursing who was seeking
employment in the office of the accused. On the pretext of undergoing a physical
examination relative to a family planning research, Ms. Yee was asked to expose her
body and allow her private parts to be mashed and be stimulated by the accused.
ISSUES:
Petitioner can not be convicted of the crime of sexual harassment in view of the
inapplicability of Republic act No. 7877 to the case at bar.
HELD:
The above contentions of petitioner are not meritorious. Section 3 of Republic Act
7877 provides:
"SEC. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. Work,
education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer,
employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor,
coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral
ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment, demands,
requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether
the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said
Act.
"(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed
when:
"(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-
employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual
favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal
to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the
employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee."
Petitioner was the City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City, a position he held
when complainant, a newly graduated nurse, saw him to enlist his help in her desire
to gain employment. He did try to show an interest in her plight, her father being a
boyhood friend, but finding no opening suitable for her in his office, he asked her
about accepting a job in a family planning research project.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23799,
finding Dr. Rico Jacutin y Salcedo GUILTY of the crime of Sexual Harassment defined
and punished under Republic Act No. 7877, particularly Sections 3 and 7 thereof, and
penalizing him with imprisonment of six (6) months and to pay a fine of Twenty
Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, is
AFFIRMED. The Sandiganbayans award of moral and exemplary damages are MODIFIED;
instead, petitioner is ordered to indemnify the offended party, Juliet Yee, in the
amount of P30,000.00 and P20,000.00 by way of, respectively, moral damages and
exemplary damages. Costs against petitioner.
FACTS:
Petitioner is a public school teacher of Pandan Elementary School, Pandan,
Mambajao, Camiguin Province. Respondent Eduardo O. Wahiman is the father of AAA,
an elementary school student of the petitioner.AAA claimed that on August 16, 1995,
petitioner asked her to be at his office to do an errand. Once inside, she saw him
get a folder from one of the cartons on the floor near his table, and place it on his
table. He then asked her to come closer, and when she did, held her hand, then
touched and fondled her breast. She stated that he fondled her breast five times,
and that she felt afraid. A classmate of hers, one Vincent B. Sorrabas, claiming to
have witnessed the incident, testified that the fondling incident did happen just as
AAA related it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he could be guilty of acts of sexual harassment, grave misconduct,
which was a different offense from or what is not alleged in the formal charge filed
against him at the inception of the administrative case.
HELD:
It is clear that petitioner was sufficiently informed of the basis of the charge
against him, which was his act of improperly touching one of his students. Thus
informed, he defended himself from such charge. The failure to designate the offense
specifically and with precision is of no moment in this administrative case. The
formal charge, while not specifically mentioning RA 7877, The Anti-Sexual Harassment
Act of 1995, imputes on the petitioner acts covered and penalized by said
law. Contrary to the argument of petitioner, the demand of a sexual favor need not
be explicit or stated. In Domingo v. Rayala, it was held, It is true that this
provision calls for a demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor. But it
is not necessary that the demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor be
articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with
equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. The CSC found, as did the CA, that
even without an explicit demand from petitioner his act of mashing the breast of AAA
was sufficient to constitute sexual harassment. Moreover, under Section 3 (b) (4) of
RA 7877, sexual harassment in an education or training environment is committed
(w)hen the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive
environment for the student, trainee or apprentice. AAA even testified that she
felt fear at the time petitioner touched her. It cannot then be said that the CSC
lacked basis for its ruling, when it had both the facts and the law. The CSC found
the evidence presented by the complainant sufficient to support a finding of grave
misconduct. It is basic that factual findings of administrative agencies, when
supported by substantial evidence, are binding upon the Court.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the
decision of the CA in CA-GR SP No. 51900 is hereby AFFIRMED.
FACTS:
Before this Court are three Petitions for Review on Certiorari. All three petitions
stem from the same factual antecedents.
On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo, then Stenographic Reporter III at the
NLRC, filed a complaint for sexual harassment against Rogelio Rayala, then NLRC
Chairman, before Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma of the Department of Labor and
Employment. Upon receipt of the Complaint, the DOLE Secretary referred the Complaint
to the OP, Rayala being a presidential appointee. But was instructed to proceed with
the investigation. Secretary Laguesma submitted a copy of the Committee Report to the
OP. The OP then, thru Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora found Rogelio Rayala guilty
of the grave offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct and orders his dismissal.
Rayala filed a motion for reconsideration with the Court of Appeals, which then led
to the filing of Petition by Ma. Lourdes Domingo assailing the modifications made by
the Court of Appeals. Rayala, on his part also filed a petition with the Supreme
Court. The same way that the Republic thru theOffice of the President also filed a
petion with the Supreme Court. The reason why the Supreme Court directed the
consolidation of the three petitions.
ISSUES:
All the issues raised in these three cases can be summed up whether Rogelio Rayala
committed sexual harassment.
HELD:
It is noteworthy that the five CA Justices who deliberated on the case were unanimous
in upholding the findings of the Committee and the OP. They found the assessment made
by the Committee and the OP to be a "meticulous and dispassionate analysis of the
testimonies of the complainant (Domingo), the respondent (Rayala), and their
respective witnesses." 38 They differed only on the appropriate imposable penalty.
That Rayala committed the acts complained of and was guilty of sexual harassment
is, therefore, the common factual finding of not just one, but three independent
bodies: the Committee, the OP and the CA. It should be remembered that when supported
by substantial evidence, factual findings made by quasi-judicial and administrative
bodies are accorded great respect and even finality by the courts.39 The principle,
therefore, dictates that such findings should bind us.40
Indeed, we find no reason to deviate from this rule. There appears no valid ground
for this Court to review the factual findings of the CA, the OP, and the
Investigating Committee. These findings are now conclusive on the Court. And quite
significantly, Rayala himself admits to having committed some of the acts imputed to
him.
Yet, even if we were to test Rayalas acts strictly by the standards set in Section
3, RA 7877, he would still be administratively liable. It is true that this provision
calls for a "demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor." But it is not
necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in
a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude,
from the acts of the offender. Holding and squeezing Domingos shoulders, running
his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations
with her, giving her money allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future
privileges, and making statements with unmistakable sexual overtones all these acts
of Rayala resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual favor.
In yet another case, this Court declared:
As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by more exacting work ethics. He failed
to live up to his higher standard of responsibility when he succumbed to his moral
perversity. And when such moral perversity is perpetrated against his subordinate, he
provides a justifiable ground for his dismissal for lack of trust and confidence. It
is the right, nay, the duty of every employer to protect its employees from oversexed
superiors.60
It is incumbent upon the head of office to set an example on how his employees should
conduct themselves in public office, so that they may work efficiently in a healthy
working atmosphere. Courtesy demands that he should set a good example.61
Rayala has thrown every argument in the book in a vain effort to effect his
exoneration. He even puts Domingos character in question and casts doubt on the
morality of the former President who ordered, albeit erroneously, his dismissal from
the service. Unfortunately for him, these are not significant factors in the
disposition of the case. It is his character that is in question here and sadly, the
inquiry showed that he has been found wanting.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the October 18, 2002 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026 is AFFIRMED. Consequently, the petitions in
G.R. Nos. 155831, 155840, and 158700 are DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
FACTS:
Challenged via Petition for Review on Certiorari are the Decision dated June 29, 2006
and Resolution dated April 2, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
93165 which nullified the Decision dated July 19, 2004 of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as modified, finding Victorio N. Medrano guilty of sexual harassment in
the administrative complaint against him and dismissed the said complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. Sometime in May, 2003, Ma. Ruby A. Dumalaog, a teacher at Jacobo Z.
Gonzales Memorial National High School in Bian, Laguna, filed a sworn letter-
complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman charging her superior-herein respondent,
Officer-In-Charge of the school and concurrently the principal of San Pedro
Relocation Center National High School in San Pedro, Laguna, with violation of
Republic Act No. 7877 docketed as OMB-L-C-03-0613-E.
ISSUES:
Whether the petition has become moot and academic, Ma. Ruby having executed an
affidavit of desistance and the criminal case having been dismissed due to her lack
of interest to prosecute the same;
HELD:
The Court holds in the negative. The flaw in respondent's argument that the execution
of Ma. Ruby's Affidavit of Desistance and the dismissal of the criminal case must
result in the dismissal of the administrative case is that it ignores the whale of a
difference between those two remedies. In Gerardo R. Villaseor and Rodel A. Mesa v.
Sandiganbayan and Louella Mae Oco-Pesquerra (Office of the Special Prosecutor,
Ombudsman), the Court stressed the distinct and independent character of the remedies
available to an offended party against any impropriety or wrongdoing committed by a
public officer, thus:
Significantly, there are three kinds of remedies available against a public officer
for impropriety in the performance of his powers and the discharge of his duties:
(1) civil, (2) criminal, and (3) administrative.These remedies may be invoked
separately, alternately, simultaneously or successively. Sometimes, the same offense
may be the subject of all three kinds of remedies.
Defeat of any of the three remedies will not necessarily preclude resort to other
remedies or affect decisions reached thereat, as different degrees of evidence are
required in these several actions. In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt
is needed, whereas a mere preponderance of evidence will suffice in civil cases. In
administrative cases, only substantial evidence is required.
It is clear, then, that criminal and administrative cases are distinct from each
other. The settled rule is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different
from administrative matters, such that the first two will not inevitably governor
affect the third and vice versa. Verily, administrative cases may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings.
At any rate, an affidavit of desistance (or recantation) is, as a rule, viewed with
suspicion and reservation because it can easily be secured from a poor and ignorant
witness, usually through intimidation or for monetary consideration. And there is
always the probability that it would later be repudiated, and criminal prosecution
would thus be interminable. Hence, such desistance, by itself, is not usually a
ground for the dismissal of an action once it has been instituted in court
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision of June
29, 2006 and Resolution of April 2, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 93165 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals which is directed to decide the
case on the merits.
III. PLUNDER LAW R.A. 7080
Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted
under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA
7659, wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned
that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the
constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to
subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because,
according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with
the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the
element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of
which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to
due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Issue:
Is the Plunder Law void for being vague?
Ruling:
This Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA
7659, is constitutional. This due to the fact that Congress is not restricted in the
form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in
a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so
long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole
act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well defined
parameters which would unable the accused to determine the nature of his violations.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those
who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its
validity will be sustained.
When the Plunder Law speaks of combination, it is referring to at least two (2)
acts falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Section 1, par.
(d), e.g. raids on the public treasury in Section 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and
fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Section 1,
par. (d), subpar. (3). To constitute a series there must be two (2) or more overt
or criminal acts falling under the same category or enumeration found in Section 1,
par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation, and raids on the public treasury. The
term pattern is sufficiently defined in Section 4, in relation to Section 1, par.
(d), and Section 2 of the Plunder Law.
View that precision must be the characteristic of penal legislation for the Supreme
Court to define what is a crime is to go beyond the so-called positive role in the
protection of civil liberties or promotion of public interests. A statute which is so
vague as to permit the infliction of capital punishment on acts already punished with
lesser penalties by clearly formulated law is unconstitutional.
Facts:
In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, then President of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal
complaints against the former President and members of his family, his associates,
friends and conspirators were filed with the respondent Office of the Ombudsman. The
petitioner, Jose Jinggoy Estrada invokes the equal protection clause of the
Constitution in his bid to be excluded from the charge of plunder filed against him
by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 7080 is
unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him and denies him the equal
protection of the laws. Next, petitioner contends that the plunder law does not
provide sufficient and complete standards to guide the courts in dealing with accused
alleged to have contributed to the offense.
Ruling:
In the crime of plunder, therefore, different parties may be united by a common
purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts
have a commonality to help the former President amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-
gotten wealth, as the amended information alleged the different participation of each
accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge is that each of
them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
amassing, accumulation, and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former
President Estrada.
The crime of Plunder is punished by R.A. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. 7659,
with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. The Court has declared the anti-
plunder law constitutional for being neither vague nor ambiguous on the thesis that
the terms series and combination are not unsusceptible to firm understanding.
The essence of the law on plunder lies in the phrase combination or series of overt
or criminal acts. A person cannot be prosecuted for the crime of plunder if he
performs only a single criminal act.
It is utterly unacceptable, neither right nor just, to cast criminal liability on one
for the acts or deeds of plunder that may have been committed by another or others
over which he has not consented or acceded to, participated in, or even in fact been
aware of. The petitioner should not have been charged with the serious crime of
plunder in the amended information considering that his participation is only limited
to paragraph (a) thereof alleging a single crime of bribery
JV Ejercito, Petitioners
vs.
Sandiganbayan, Respondent
Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Victor Ejercito owns two bank accounts that were the subjects of
the subpoenas filed by the Sandiganbayan in lieu of the Criminal Case No. 26558,
People vs. Estrada et. al. Ejercito filed various motions to quash the such
subpoenas, in which he claimed that his bank accounts are covered by R.A. No. 1405
(The Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) and do not fall under any of the exceptions stated
therein. He further claimed that the specific identification of documents in the
questioned subpoenas, including details on dates and amounts, could only have been
made possible by an earlier illegal disclosure thereof by the EIB and the Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) in its capacity as receiver of the then Urban
Bank. The disclosure being illegal, he concluded, the prosecution in the case may
not be allowed to make use of the information.
Ruling:
Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty
and no reason why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making
bank deposits confidential and, undoubtedly, cases for plunder involve unexplained
wealth. The crime of bribery and the overt acts constitutive of plunder are crimes
committed by public officers, and in either case the noble idea that a public
office is a public trust and any person who enters upon its discharge does so with
the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his duty, is open to public
scrutiny applies with equal force.
The plunder case [now pending] with the Sandiganbayan necessarily involves an inquiry
into the whereabouts of the amount purportedly acquired illegally by former President
Joseph Estrada, and the subject matter of the litigation cannot be limited to bank
accounts under his name alone, but must include those accounts to which the money
purportedly acquired illegally or a portion thereof was alleged to have been
transferred.
If the criminal acts that make up the crime of plunder are categorized as exceptions
to the confidentiality rule, with more reason that the more serious crime of plunder
should be considered as falling within the same exception. It can be readily gleaned
that the gravamen of plunder is the amassing, accumulating or acquiring of ill-gotten
wealth by a public officer, his family or close associates; a plain reading of the
definition of plunder and the manner by which it may be committed as provided in R.A.
7080 reveals that its policy also rests upon the fundamental tenet that public
office is a public trust.
Considering the mind-boggling sums of money that flowed out of the petitioners
Trust Account and its nexus to former President Estradas alleged Jose Velarde
account, it is logical for the prosecution to pursue the theory that the money in the
said trust account forms part of the unexplained wealth of the latter. Marquez vs.
Desierto, 359 SCRA 772 (2001), which applied and interpreted the power of the Office
of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (8) of R.A. 6770 cannot be given retroactive
application judge-made laws are to be applied prospectively.
Facts:
Petitioner et al. were charged with plunder before the Sandiganbayan. They assailed
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner contends that since none of the
accused holds a position with Salary Grade "27" and higher, jurisdiction over the
case falls with the Regional Trial Court. 7 On the other hand, respondent
Sandiganbayan's position is that Republic Act No. 7080 which defines and penalizes
the crime of "plunder" vests in the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction thereof, and since it
is a special law, it constitutes an exception to the general law, Republic Act No.
8249.
Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case at hand.
Ruling:
No. None of the accused occupied positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or
higher.
The crime of "plunder" defined in Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, was provisionally placed within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
"until otherwise provided by law." Republic Act No. 8429, enacted on February 5, 1997
is the special law that provided for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
"otherwise" than that prescribed in Republic Act No. 7080.
Consequently, the Court rule that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the
crime of plunder unless committed by public officials and employees occupying the
positions with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office.
In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though none of the accused occupied
positions with Salary Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in
serious error of jurisdiction, entitling petitioner to the relief prayed for.
ARTEMIO G.R.No.151258
VILLAREAL,
Petitioner,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. G.R. No. 154954
x - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
- - x
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
- versus -
THE HONORABLE
COURT OF
APPEALS,
ANTONIO MARIANO
ALMEDA,
DALMACIO LIM,
JR., JUNEL
ANTHONY AMA,
ERNESTO JOSE
MONTECILLO,
VINCENT TECSON,
ANTONIO
GENERAL,
SANTIAGO RANADA
III, NELSON
VICTORINO,
JAIME MARIA G.R. No. 155101
FLORES II,
ZOSIMO MENDOZA,
MICHAEL MUSNGI,
VICENTE
VERDADERO,
ETIENNE
GUERRERO, JUDE
FERNANDEZ,
AMANTE PURISIMA
II, EULOGIO
SABBAN, G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
PERCIVAL
BRIGOLA, PAUL Present:
ANGELO SANTOS,
JONAS KARL B. CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
PEREZ, RENATO BRION,
BANTUG, JR., PEREZ,
ADEL ABAS, SERENO, and
JOSEPH REYES, JJ.
LLEDO,and RONAN
DE GUZMAN, Promulgated:
Respondents. February 1, 2012
x - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
- - x
FIDELITO DIZON,
Petitioner,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
x - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
- - x
GERARDA H.
VILLA,
Petitioner,
- versus -
MANUEL LORENZO
ESCALONA II,
MARCUS JOEL
CAPELLAN RAMOS,
CRISANTO CRUZ
SARUCA,
JR., andANSELMO
ADRIANO,
Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
SERENO, J.:
The public outrage over the death of Leonardo Lenny Villa the victim
in this case on 10 February 1991 led to a very strong clamor to put an end to
hazing. Due in large part to the brave efforts of his mother, petitioner Gerarda
Villa, groups were organized, condemning his senseless and tragic death. This
widespread condemnation prompted Congress to enact a special law, which became
effective in 1995, that would criminalize hazing. The intent of the law was to
discourage members from making hazing a requirement for joining their sorority,
fraternity, organization, or association. Moreover, the law was meant to counteract
the exculpatory implications of consent and initial innocent act in the
conduct of initiation rites by making the mere act of hazing punishable or mala
prohibita.
Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing activities in the
country.[5] Within a year of his death, six more cases of hazing-related deaths
emerged those of Frederick Cahiyang of the University of Visayas in Cebu; Raul
Camaligan of San Beda College; Felipe Narne of Pamantasan ng Araullo in Cabanatuan
City; Dennis Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval Training Center; Joselito Mangga of the
Philippine Merchant Marine Institute; and Joselito Hernandez of the University of the
Philippines in Baguio City.
Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this case
the general condemnation of a hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe a
fundamental principle in our criminal justice system [N]o act constitutes a
crime unless it is made so by law. Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Even if
an act is viewed by a large section of the populace as immoral or injurious, it
cannot be considered a crime, absent any law prohibiting its commission. As
interpreters of the law, judges arecalled upon to set aside emotion, to resist being
swayed by strong public sentiments, and to rule strictly based on the elements of the
offense and the facts allowed in evidence.
Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No. 151258
(Villareal v. People), G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), G.R. No. 155101
(Dizon v. People), and G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona).
FACTS
The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court of Appeals (CA) and the trial
court, are as follows:
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the
Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all
proceeded to Rufos Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of
Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during
the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be physical beatings,
and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last
for three days. After their briefing, they were brought to the Almeda Compound in
Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats
and insults from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and
walked towards the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans
delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional
forms of Aquilan initiation rites. These rites included the Indian Run, which
required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row
delivering blows to the neophytes; the Bicol Express, which obliged the neophytes
to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched
while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the Rounds, in which
the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the auxiliaries (the
Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation
rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee
blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the Auxies Privilege Round, in which
the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes.
During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity
principles. They survived their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day 9 February 1991 the neophytes were made
to present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to
memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles. Whenever they would give a
wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the
Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically
and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing that
they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for
the day officially ended.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35
Aquilans:
Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly
tried. On the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal
Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved
first.
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-
38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code. A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29 November
1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused commenced anew.
On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520) set aside the finding of
conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the
criminal liability of each of the accused according to individual participation.
Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the following Decision applied only to
the remaining 25 accused, viz:
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the
charge against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy
trial. Meanwhile, on different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court
denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano.[17]On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153 reversed the
trial courts Orders and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were
individually brought before this Court.
While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner
Villareal filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the
Notice, petitioner Villareal died on 13 March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that the
subject matter of the Petition previously filed by petitioner does not survive the
death of the accused.
G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People
As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling, which forfeited
Dizons right to present evidence during trial. The trial court expected Dizon to
present evidence on an earlier date since a co-accused, Antonio General, no longer
presented separate evidence during trial. According to Dizon, his right should not
have been considered as waived because he was justified in asking for a postponement.
He argues that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the hearing dates and in fact
insisted that he was ready to present
evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule, and not on an earlier hearing date.
Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he should have likewise
been acquitted, like the other accused, since his acts were also part of the
traditional initiation rites and were not tainted by evil motives. He claims that the
additional paddling session was part of the official activity of the fraternity. He
also points out that one of the neophytes admitted that the chairperson of the
initiation rites decided that [Lenny] was fit enough to undergo the initiation so
Mr. Villareal proceeded to do the paddling.Further, petitioner echoes the
argument of the Solicitor General that the individual blows inflicted by Dizon and
Villareal could not have resulted in Lennys death. The Solicitor General
purportedly averred that, on the contrary, Dr. Arizala testified that the injuries
suffered by Lenny could not be considered fatal if taken individually, but if taken
collectively, the result is the violent death of the victim.
Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was motivated by ill
will. He claims that Lennys father could not have stolen the parking space of
Dizons father, since the latter did not have a car, and their fathers did not work
in the same place or office. Revenge for the loss of the parking space was the
alleged ill motive of Dizon. According to petitioner, his utterances regarding a
stolen parking space were only part of the psychological initiation. He then
cites the testimony of Lennys co-neophyte witness Marquez who admitted knowing
it was not true and that he was just making it up.
Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill will was negated
by his show of concern for Villa after the initiation rites. Dizon alludes to the
testimony of one of the neophytes, who mentioned that the former had kicked the leg
of the neophyte and told him to switch places with Lenny to prevent the latters
chills. When the chills did not stop, Dizon, together with Victorino, helped Lenny
through a sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair. According to petitioner, his
alleged ill motivation is contradicted by his manifestation of compassion and concern
for the victims well-being.
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CAs
Decision dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No.
15520, insofar as it acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.)
of the accused Aquilans of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries. According to
the Solicitor General, the CA erred in holding that there could have been no
conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity initiation had not yet been
criminalized at the time Lenny died.
In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court
should have been upheld, inasmuch as it found that there was conspiracy to inflict
physical injuries on Lenny. Since the injuries led to the victims death, petitioner
posits that the accused Aquilans are criminally liable for the resulting crime of
homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[29] The said article
provides: Criminal liability shall be incurred [b]y any person committing a
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, praying
for the reversal of the CAs Decision dated 25 October 2006 and Resolution dated 17
May 2007 in CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 and 90153.[30] The Petition involves the dismissal
of the criminal charge filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
Due to several pending incidents, the trial court ordered a separate trial
for accused Escalona, Saruca, Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S.
Fernandez, and Cabangon (Criminal Case No. C-38340) to commence after proceedings
against the 26 other accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) shall have terminated.
On 8 November 1993, the trial court found the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. As a result, the proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-38340 involving the nine
other co-accused recommenced on 29 November 1993. For various reasons, the
initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005, or almost 12 years
after the arraignment of the nine accused.
Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the criminal case involving
4 of the 9 accused, namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the
accused failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of
time. She also points out that the prosecution cannot be faulted for the delay, as
the original records and the required evidence were not at its disposal, but were
still in the appellate court.
ISSUES
DISCUSSION
In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending
resolution, this Court took note of counsel for petitioners Notice of Death of
Party.
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for
personal penalties is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast,
criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior
to final judgment. The term personal penalties refers to the service of personal
or imprisonment penalties, while the term pecuniary penalties (las pecuniarias)
refers to fines and costs, including civil liability predicated on the criminal
offense complained of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto).However, civil liability
based on a source of obligation other than the delict survives the death of the
accused and is recoverable through a separate civil action.
Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal
liability for both personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability
directly arising from the delict complained of. Consequently, his Petition is hereby
dismissed, and the criminal case against him deemed closed and terminated.
In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates for the
reception of evidence for accused-petitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and 22nd of
September; and the 5thand 12 of October 1993. The Order likewise stated that it
will not entertain any postponement and that all the accused who have not yet
presented their respective evidence should be ready at all times down the line, with
their evidence on all said dates. Failure on their part to present evidence when
required shall therefore be construed as waiver to present evidence.
The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the
Constitution itself. Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel This constitutional right includes the right to present evidence in
ones defense, as well as the right to be present and defend oneself in person at
every stage of the proceedings.
Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the
Rules of Court, Crisostomos non-appearance during the 22 June 1995
trial was merely a waiver of his right to be present for trial on such
date only and not for the succeeding trial dates
x x x x x
x x x x
The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present
evidence on 25 August 1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the
contrary, it should have considered the excuse of counsel justified, especially since
counsel for another accused General had made a last-minute adoption of
testimonial evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was
not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At any rate, the trial court pre-
assigned five hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to
impose its Order strictly, the most it could have done was to forfeit one out of the
five days set for Dizons testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of all his
pre-assigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to due process.
Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano should not have been dismissed, since they failed to assert their right to
speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She points out that the accused
failed to raise a protest during the dormancy of the criminal case against them, and
that they asserted their right only after the trial court had dismissed the case
against their co-accused Concepcion. Petitioner also emphasizes that the trial court
denied the respective Motions to Dismiss filed by Saruca, Escalona, Ramos, and
Adriano, because it found that the prosecution could not be faulted for the delay
in the movement of this case when the original records and the evidence it may
require were not at its disposal as these were in the Court of Appeals.
The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections
14(2) and 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. This right requires that there be
a trial free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays. The right is deemed
violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements of trial, or
when a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for
no cause or justifiable motive. In determining the right of the accused to speedy
trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of
postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. The conduct of both the
prosecution and the defense must be weighed. Also to be considered are factors such
as the length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the
prejudice wrought upon the defendant.
We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CAs dismissal of the case
against accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of
their right to speedy trial. The court held thus:
x x x x x
x x x x
5) The fact that the records of the case were elevated to the
Court of Appeals and the prosecutions failure to comply with
the order of the court a quo requiring them to secure
certified true copies of the same.
x x x x x
x x x x
x x x x x
x x x x
[T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact
that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals, and
the prosecutions failure to comply with the order of the court a quo
requiring it to secure certified true copies of the same. What is
glaring from the records is the fact that as early as September 21,
1995, the court a quo already issued an Order requiring the prosecution,
through the Department of Justice, to secure the complete records of the
case from the Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not comply with the
said Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated by the court a
quo in an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance
on the part of the prosecution. It is not stated when such order was
complied with. It appears, however, that even until August 5, 2002, the
said records were still not at the disposal of the trial court because
the lack of it was made the basis of the said court in granting the
motion to dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion x x x.
x x x x x
x x x x
This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended
Information was filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano,
Cabangon, Concepcion, and De Vera. On 29 November 1993, they were all arraigned.
Unfortunately, the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005 or
almost 12 years after arraignment.
The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice
system. It dictates that when a person is charged with an offense, and the case is
terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the
consent of the accused the accused cannot again be charged with the same or an
identical offense.[69] This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and
conscience.[70] It is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in idem found in the
common law of England and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence.[71] It found
expression in the Spanish Law, in the Constitution of the United States, and in our
own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the citizen, viz:
Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular
constitutional right, provides as follows:
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the
judgment in order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either
through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by
certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules. The requisites
for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a) there is a valid complaint or
information; (b) it is filed before a competent court; (c) the defendant pleaded to
the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him
or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the defendants express
consent.
This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower
courts acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter
in the following recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a
fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due
process; (2) where there is a finding of mistrial; or (3) where there has been a
grave abuse of discretion.
The third instance refers to this Courts judicial power under Rule 65 to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. Here, the party asking for the review must show the presence of a
whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a
patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to
a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law;
an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility; or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to
deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice. In such an event, the
accused cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy.
The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks the
reversal of (1) the acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et
al. for the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, both on the basis of a
misappreciation of facts and evidence. According to the Petition, the decision of
the Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law because private complainant and
petitioner were denied due process of law when the public respondent completely
ignored the a) Position Paper x x x b) the Motion for Partial Reconsideration x x x
and c) the petitioners Comment x x x. Allegedly, the CA ignored evidence when it
adopted the theory of individual responsibility; set aside the finding of conspiracy
by the trial court; and failed to apply Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. The
Solicitor General also assails the finding that the physical blows were inflicted
only by Dizon and Villareal, as well as the appreciation of Lenny Villas consent to
hazing.
In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess, and
reweigh the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties. In People v.
Maquiling, we held that grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court
simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the evidence. Mere errors of
judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, and not by an application for a writ of certiorari. Therefore,
pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, we are constrained to deny the
Petition contra Victorino et al. the 19 acquitted fraternity members.
We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and
Bantug the four fraternity members convicted of slight physical injuries.
Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy
similarly applies when the state seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against the
accused. We have also recognized, however, that certiorari may be used to correct an
abusive judgment upon a clear demonstration that the lower court blatantly abused its
authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
The present case is one of those instances of grave abuse of discretion.
The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesain finding that
the four accused should be held guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to
the CA, because of the death of the victim, there can be no precise means to
determine the duration of the incapacity or medical attendance required. The
reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced. A review of that case would reveal that the
accused therein was guilty merely of slight physical injuries, because the victims
injuries neither caused incapacity for labor nor required medical attendance.
Furthermore, he did not die. His injuries were not even serious.
Since Penesa involved a case in which the victim allegedly suffered physical injuries
and not death, the ruling cited by the CA was patently inapplicable.
On the contrary, the CAs ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and
Bantug were liable merely for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own
findings of fact. According to the court, the four accused were found to
have inflicted more than the usual punishment undertaken during such initiation
rites on the person of Villa. It then adopted the NBI medico-legal officers
findings that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villas death was the multiple
traumatic injuries he suffered from the initiation rites. Considering that the CA
found that the physical punishment heaped on [Lenny Villa was] serious in
nature, it was patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to
slight physical injuries, which is a light felony.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be
liable for the consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that
intended. Thus, once a person is found to have committed an initial felonious act,
such as the unlawful infliction of physical injuries that results in the death of the
victim, courts are required to automatically apply the legal framework governing the
destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to discretion.
According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time)
punishable as a crime, the intentional infliction of physical injuries on Villa was
nonetheless a felonious act under Articles 263 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, in ruling against the accused, the court a quo found that pursuant to Article
4(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity members were guilty of
homicide, as it was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the physical
injuries they had intentionally inflicted.
The CA modified the trial courts finding of criminal liability. It ruled
that there could have been no conspiracy since the neophytes, including Lenny Villa,
had knowingly consented to the conduct of hazing during their initiation rites. The
accused fraternity members, therefore, were liable only for the consequences of their
individual acts. Accordingly, 19 of the accused Victorino et al. were acquitted;
4 of them Tecson et al. were found guilty of slight physical injuries; and the
remaining 2 Dizon and Villareal were found guilty of homicide.
The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case wherein the
perpetrator clearly commits a felony in order to take revenge upon, to gain advantage
over, to harm maliciously, or to get even with, the victim. Rather, the case involves
an ex ante situation in which a man driven by his own desire to join a society of
men pledged to go through physically and psychologically strenuous admission
rituals, just so he could enter the fraternity. Thus, in order to understand how our
criminal laws apply to such situation absent the Anti-Hazing Law, we deem it
necessary to make a brief exposition on the underlying concepts shaping intentional
felonies, as well as on the nature of physical and psychological initiations widely
known as hazing.
Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought. The
classical theory posits that a human person is essentially a moral creature with an
absolute free will to choose between good and evil. It asserts that one should only
be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears
unimpaired. The basic postulate of the classical penal system is that humans are
rational and calculating beings who guide their actions with reference to the
principles of pleasure and pain. They refrain from criminal acts if threatened with
punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of possible gain or advantage in committing
the crime. Here, criminal liability is thus based on the free will and moral blame of
the actor. The identity of mens rea defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful
purpose or criminal intent is the predominant consideration. Thus, it is not enough
to do what the law prohibits. In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is
necessary that the act be committed by means of dolo or malice.
The element of intent on which this Court shall focus is described as the
state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It refers to the
purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds. It does not refer
to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while intent concerns the result of
the act. While motive is the moving power that impels one to action for a
definite result, intent is the purpose of using a particular means to produce the
result. On the other hand, the term felonious means, inter alia, malicious,
villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose. With these elements
taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to
malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a
forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus
malus that the act or omission be done willfully, maliciously, with
deliberate evil intent, and with malice aforethought. The maxim is actus non
facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime is not committed if the mind of the person
performing the act complained of is innocent. As is required of the other elements of
a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing new. In fact, more
than a century ago, our national hero Andres Bonifacio organized a secret society
namedKataastaasan Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The Highest and
Most Venerable Association of the Sons and Daughters of the Nation). TheKatipunan, or
KKK, started as a small confraternity believed to be inspired by European
Freemasonry, as well as by confraternities or sodalities approved by the Catholic
Church. The Katipunans ideology was brought home to each member through the
societys initiation ritual. It is said that initiates were brought to a dark room,
lit by a single point of illumination, and were asked a series of
questions to determine their fitness, loyalty, courage, and resolve. They were made
to go through vigorous trials such as pagsuot sa isang lungga or [pagtalon] sa
balon. It would seem that they were also made to withstand the blow of pangherong
bakal sa pisngi and to endure a matalas na punyal. As a final step in the
ritual, the neophyte Katipunero was made to sign membership papers with the his own
blood.
Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy forced the fourth classmen
to do exhausting physical exercises that sometimes resulted in permanent physical
damage; to eat or drink unpalatable foods; and in various ways to humiliate
themselves. In 1901, General Douglas MacArthur got involved in a congressional
investigation of hazing at the academy during his second year at West Point.
The purported raison dtre behind hazing practices is the proverbial birth
by fire, through which the pledge who has successfully withstood the hazing proves
his or her worth. Some organizations even believe that hazing is the path to
enlightenment. It is said that this process enables the organization to establish
unity among the pledges and, hence, reinforces and ensures the future of
the organization. Alleged benefits of joining include leadership opportunities;
improved academic performance; higher self-esteem; professional networking
opportunities; and the esprit dcorp associated with close, almost filial,
friendship and common cause.
The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement that
with the exception of Villareal and Dizon accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug
did not have the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa or the other
neophytes. We shall no longer disturb this finding.
As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial
court and found that the two accused had the animus interficendi or intent to kill
Lenny Villa, not merely to inflict physical injuries on him. It justified its finding
of homicide against Dizon by holding that he had apparently been motivated by ill
will while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his fathers parking space
had been stolen by the victims father. As to Villareal, the court said that the
accused suspected the family of Bienvenido Marquez, one of the neophytes, to have had
a hand in the death of Villareals brother. The CA then ruled as follows:
The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and Marquez. It was
very clear that they acted with evil and criminal intent. The evidence
on this matter is unrebutted and so for the death of
Villa,appellants Dizon and Villareal must and should face the
consequence of their acts, that is, to be held liable for the crime of
homicide. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x
Atty. Tadiar During all these times that the van was being
rocked through and through, what were the voices or
utterances that you heard?
Atty. Tadiar And those utterances and threats, how long did
they continue during the rocking of the van which
lasted for 5 minutes?
x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x
Atty. Tadiar During the time that this rounds [of physical
beating] were being inflicted, was there any utterances
by anybody?
Atty. Tadiar Do you recall what were those voices that you
heard?
x x x x x x x x x
Atty. Tadiar Were there any utterances that you heard during
the conduct of this Bicol Express?
x x x x x x x x x
Atty. Tadiar You mentioned about Dizon in particular
mentioning that Lenny Villas father stole the parking
space allotted for his father, do you recall who were
within hearing distance when that utterance was made?
x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x
Atty. Tadiar Can you tell the Honorable Court when was the next
accusation against Lenny Villas father was made?
x x x x x x x x x
Judge Purisima Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court what they
told you to expect during the initiation?
Judge Purisima You were also told beforehand that there would be
physical contact?
x x x x x x x x x
Judge Purisima So, you mean to say that beforehand that you would
have bruises on your body but that will be covered?
x x x x x x x x x
Judge Purisima Now, will you admit Mr. Marquez that much of
the initiation procedures is psychological in nature?
x x x x x x x x x
Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was conducted did not consist
only of physical initiation, meaning body contact, is
that correct?
Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that while Mr. Dizon was
initiating you, he said or he was supposed to have said
according to you that your family were responsible for
the killing of his brother who was an NPA, do you
remember saying that?
Atty. Jimenez He did not tell that to you. That is your only
perception, correct?
Atty. Jimenez Are you saying also that the others who jumped on
you or kicked you said something similar as was told to
you by Mr. Dizon?
Atty. Jimenez But the fact remains that in the Bicol Express for
instance, the masters would run on your thighs, right?
Atty. Jimenez This was the regular procedure that was followed by
the initiating masters not only on you but also on the
other neophytes?
According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed by the
CA to Dizon and Villareal were baseless, since the statements of the accused were
just part of the psychological initiation calculated to instill fear on the part of
the neophytes; that [t]here is no element of truth in it as testified by
Bienvenido Marquez; and that the harsh words uttered by Petitioner and Villareal
are part of tradition concurred and accepted by all the fraternity members during
their initiation rites.
x x x x x x x x x
Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizons behavior must not be
automatically viewed as evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa.
Rather, it must be taken within the context of the fraternitys psychological
initiation. This Court points out that it was not even established whether the
fathers of Dizon and Villa really had any familiarity with each other as would lend
credence to the veracity of Dizons threats. The testimony of Lennys co-neophyte,
Marquez, only confirmed this view. According to Marquez, he knew it was not true
and that [Dizon] was just making it up.Even the trial court did not give weight
to the utterances of Dizon as constituting intent to kill: [T]he cumulative acts of
all the accused were not directed toward killing Villa, but merely to inflict
physical harm as part of the fraternity initiation rites x x x. The Solicitor
General shares the same view.
The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent to inflict
physical injuries on Lenny Villa. Echoing the Decision of the trial court, the
Solicitor General then posits that since all of the accused fraternity members
conspired to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa and death ensued, all of them
should be liable for the crime of homicide pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised
Penal Code.
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to
266 of the Revised Penal Code, the employment of physical injuries must be coupled
withdolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is
fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer iniuria ex
affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be
found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical injuries under the
Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention
to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as to
incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting
physical injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in
an intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man
guilty unless his intentions are.
Lenny died during Aquilas fraternity initiation rites. The night before the
commencement of the rites, they were briefed on what to expect. They were told that
there would be physical beatings, that the whole event would last for three days, and
that they could quit anytime. On their first night, they were subjected to
traditional initiation rites, including the Indian Run, Bicol Express,
Rounds, and the Auxies Privilege Round. The beatings were predominantly
directed at the neophytes arms and legs.
In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to present
comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and
recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles. Late in the afternoon, they were once
again subjected to traditional initiation rituals. When the rituals were
officially reopened on the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, the neophytes were
subjected to another traditional ritual paddling by the fraternity.
These rituals were performed with Lennys consent. A few days before the
rites, he asked both his parents for permission to join the Aquila Fraternity.
His father knew that Lenny would go through an initiation process and would be gone
for three days. The CA found as follows:
Even after going through Aquilas grueling traditional rituals during the
first day, Lenny continued his participation and finished the second day of
initiation.
The underlying context and motive in which the infliction of physical injuries
was rooted may also be determined by Lennys continued participation in the
initiation and consent to the method used even after the first day. The following
discussion of the framers of the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law is enlightening:
SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse does
so it can be penalized under rape or acts of lasciviousness.
x x x x x x x x x
SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that
imposition? Because the distinguished Sponsor has said that he is not
punishing a mere organization, he is not seeking the punishment of an
initiation into a club or organization, he is seeking the punishment of
certain acts that resulted in death, et cetera as a result of hazing
which are already covered crimes.
SENATOR LINA. x x x
To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent
or deter the sororities or fraternities; that they should really shun
this activity called hazing. Because, initially, these fraternities
or sororities do not even consider having a neophyte killed or maimed
or that acts of lasciviousness are even committed initially, Mr.
President.
x x x x x x x x x
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been
charged therefore with the ordinary crime of homicide, mutilation, et
cetera, where the prosecution will have a difficulty proving the
elements if they are separate offenses.
x x x x x x x x x
During a discussion between Senator Biazon and Senator Lina on the issue of
whether to include sodomy as a punishable act under the Anti-Hazing Law, Senator Lina
further clarified thus:
But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want
to prohibit. That the defense of consent will not apply because the
very act of inflicting physical pain or psychological suffering is, by
itself, a punishable act. The result of the act of hazing, like death
or physical injuries merely aggravates the act with higher penalties.
But the defense of consent is not going to nullify the criminal nature
of the act.
So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the
offense if it is committed without consent of the victim, then the
whole foundation of this proposed law will collapse.
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the
core principle of mala in se adhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did
not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it created a special law on hazing,
founded upon the principle of mala prohibita. This dilemma faced by Congress is
further proof of how the nature of hazing unique as against typical crimes cast a
cloud of doubt on whether society considered the act as an inherently wrong conduct
or mala in se at the time. It is safe to presume that Lennys parents would not have
consented to his participation in Aquila Fraternitys initiation rites if the
practice of hazing were considered by them as mala in se.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to
rule against the trial courts finding of malicious intent to inflict physical
injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
existence of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as
required in mala in se cases, considering the contextual background of his death, the
unique nature of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the
accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised
Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa).
According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villas arms and thighs,
resulting from repeated blows to those areas, caused the loss of blood from his vital
organs and led to his eventual death. These hematomas must be taken in the light of
the hazing activities performed on him by the Aquila Fraternity. According to the
testimonies of the co-neophytes of Lenny, they were punched, kicked, elbowed, kneed,
stamped on; and hit with different objects on their arms, legs, and thighs. They were
also paddled at the back of their thighs or legs; and slapped on their
faces. They were made to play rough basketball. Witness Marquez testified on Lenny,
saying: [T]inamaan daw sya sa spine. The NBI medico-legal officer explained that
the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries suffered
by the latter. The relevant portion of the testimony is as follows:
There is also evidence to show that some of the accused fraternity members
were drinking during the initiation rites.
It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have been
prevented, or at least mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity accused Dizon
and Villareal restrained themselves from insisting on reopening the initiation
rites. Although this point did not matter in the end,
as records would show that the other fraternity members participated in the reopened
initiation rites having in mind the concept of seniority in fraternities the
implication of the presence of alumni should be seen as a point of review in future
legislation. We further note that some of the fraternity members were intoxicated
during Lennys initiation rites. In this light, the Court submits to Congress, for
legislative consideration, the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact
of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during
hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny Villa in the amounts
of 50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto and 1,000,000 as moral damages, to be
jointly and severally paid by accused Dizon and Villareal. It also awarded the amount
of 30,000 as indemnity to be jointly and severally paid by
accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment
of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-
resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that
would increase the applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.