Macadangdang vs.

CA [1980]

FACTS:

Elizabeth Mejias is married to Crispin Anahaw. Sometime in Marcg 1967 she allegedly had
intercourse with Antonio Macadangdang. Elizabeth alleges that due to the affair, she and her
husband separated in 1967.

October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days after the illicit encounter) she gave birth to a baby
boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites held on December 24, 1967.

April 25, 1972 Elizabeth filed a complaint for recognition and support against Rolando.

February 27, 1973 lower court dismissed the complaint.

Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court. They ruled that minor Rolando to be
an illegitimate son of Antonio Macadangdang. A motion for reconsideration was filed but it was
denied.

ISSUE:

WON the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate child of the spouses Elizabeth
Mejias and Crispin Anahaw. YES

HELD:

In Our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its pronouncements on the value of
baptismal certificates. It thus ruled that while baptismal and marriage certificates may be
considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the
sacraments on the dates therein specified but not the veracity of the states or declarations
made therein with respect to his kinsfolk and/or citizenship (Paa vs. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31,
1967). Again, in the case of Fortus vs. Novero (L-22378, 23 SCRA 1331 [1968]), this Court held
that a baptismal administered, in conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest
who baptized the child, but it does not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements
contained in the certificate that concern the relationship of the person baptized. Such
declarations and statements, in order that their truth may be admitted, must indispensably be
shown by proof recognized by law.

The separation of Elizabeth and Crispin was not proven. The finding of the court of appeals that
Elizabeth and Crispin were separated was based solely on the testimony of the wife which is
self-serving. Her testimony is insufficient without further evidence.

Judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts

The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court

When the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence and is
contradicted by evidence on record.

Art. 225 of the CC provides that : Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the
celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the
separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
 Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical
impossibility of the husband's having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty
days of three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:

(1) By the impotence of the husband;

(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately, in such a way that access was not
possible;

(3) By the serious illness of the husband.

Art. 256: The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress

Art. 257: Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception of the child,
but there was no physical impossibility of access between her and her husband as set forth in
Article 255, the child is prima facie presumed to be illegitimate if it appears highly improbable,
for ethnic reasons, that the child is that of the husband. For the purposes of this article, the
wife's adultery need not be proved in a criminal case

During the initial 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child, there was no
concrete or substantial proof that was presented to establish physical impossibility of access
between Elizabeth and Crispin.

Elizabeth and Crispin continued to live in the same province, therefore there is still the
possibility of access to one another.

The baby was born seven months after the first illicit intercourse and seven months from the
separation of the spouses.

Under Art. 255 of the CC the child is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate child of the
spouses. (note the baby was not premature). This presumption becomes conclusive in the
absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of access between the spouses in the first
120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child.

The presumption of legitimacy is based on the assumption that there is sexual union in
marriage, particularly during the period of conception.

In order to overthrow the presumption it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there
was no access as could have enabled the husband to be the father of the child. Sexual
intercourse is to be presumed when personal access is not disproved.

Policy of law is to confer legitimacy upon children born in wedlock when access of the husband
at the time of the conception was not impossible and there is the presumption that a child so
born is the child of the husband and legitimate even though the wife was guilty of infidelity
during the possible period of conception.