BAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS PURISIMA

G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO,
ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.

HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as Commissioner of
Bureau of Customs, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A. 9335 was
enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the
Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue
targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund)
and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with
at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax
reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law transforms the
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters as they will do their best only in
consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the
constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification
or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other government agencies.

In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as it
lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials
may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does
not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the
President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable
target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.

Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the
doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the
enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative
participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.

Issues:

Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives limitation to officials and employees of the BIR and
the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.

Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix revenue targets to the President.

Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the creation of a congressional oversight
committee.

Discussions:

The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, which states that the guaranty of equal
protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the State.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality.

The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation
or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.

To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs the following: (1) the completeness test and (2)
the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in
the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be
sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegates authority, announce the legislative policy and identify
the conditions under which it is to be implemented.

Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, it is clear that congressional oversight is not
unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to
implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and
balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it
prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.

Rulings:

The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation
or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should
logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the
common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national government through the collection of taxes,
customs duties, fees and charges.

Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through which the
State exercises one of its great inherent functions taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and
intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC
under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.

R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the
implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said Act. Moreover, the Court
has recognized the following as sufficient standards: public interest, justice and equity, public convenience and
welfare and simplicity, economy and welfare.33 In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.

The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for
the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC
and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist.
Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be
considered moot and academic.

Sultan Osop Camid vs. The Office of the President

G.R. No. 161414 January 14, 2005

Facts:

The municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur, is a town that is not supposed to exist yet is actually insisted by some as
alive and thriving. The creation of the putative municipality was declared void ab initio by the Supreme Court four
decades ago, but the present petition insists that Andong thrives on and, hence, its legal personality should be given
judicial affirmation.

xxx

The factual antecedents derive from the ruling in Pelaez vs.Auditor General in 1965. Then President Diosdado
Macapagal issued several Executive Orders creating 33 municipalities in Mindanao.

President Macapagal justified the creation of these municipalities citing his powers under Sec.68 of the Revised Admin.
Code. Then VP Emmanuel Pelaez filed a special civil action for a writ of prohibition alleging that the EOs were null and
void, Sec. 68 having been repealed by RA 2370, and said orders constituting an undue delegation of legislative power.

After due deliberation, the SC ruled that the challenged EOs were null and void since Sec. 68 of the Revised Admin.
Code did not meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of legislative power to the executive branch.

Among the EOs annulled was EO 107 which created the Municipality of Andong.

Petitioner represents himself as a current resident of Andong and alleged that Andong has metamorphosed into a full-
blown municipality with a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential services for the municipality and its
constituents, despite the fact that no person has been appointed, elected or qualified to serve any of the local
government offices of Andong since 1968.

Camid imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of DILG in not classifying [Andong] as a regular existing
municipality and in not including said municipality in its records and official database as [an] existing regular
municipality. He argues that Pelaez has already been modified by supervening events consisting of subsequent laws
and jurisprudence, particularly citing Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez wherein the court affirmed the unique
status of the Municipality of San Andres as a de facto municipal corporation. Camid also cites Sec. 442(d) of the
Local Government Code of 1991 as basis for the recognition of the impugned municipality.

Issue:

Whether the judicial annulment of the Municipality of Andong continues despite the petitioners allegation that Andong
has thrived into a full-blown municipality

Held:

Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and exercised
corporate functions with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or objection for
period long enough to afford title by prescription. What is clearly essential is a factual demonstration of the continuous
exercise by the municipal corporation of its corporate powers, as well as the acquiescence thereto by instrumentalities
of the state. Camids plaint should have undergone the usual administrative gauntlet and, once that was done, should
have been filed first with the Court of Appeals, which at least would have had the power to make the necessary factual
determinations. Petitioners seeming ignorance of the principles of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
hierarchy of courts, as well as the concomitant prematurity of the present petition, cannot be countenanced.

The question as to whether a municipality previously annulled by the Supreme Court may attain recognition in the
absence of any curative/reimplementing statute has never been decided before. The effect of Sec. 442(d) of the Local
Government Code on municipalities such as Andong warrants explanation.
EO 107 which established Andong was declared null and void ab initio in 1965 by the Supreme Court in Pelaez vs.
Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965), along with 33 other EOs. The phrase ab initio means from the beginning.
Pelaez was never reversed by the SC but was rather expressly affirmed in the cases of Municipality of San Joaquin v.
Siva, Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, and Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya. No subsequent ruling declared Pelaez
as overturned/inoperative. No subsequent legislation has been passed since 1965 creating the Municipality of Andong.
Given these facts, there is hardly any reason to elaborate why Andong does not exist as a duly constituted
municipality.

Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled that the President has no power to create municipalities yet limited its nullificatory
effects to the particular municipalities challenged in actual cases before this Court. With the promulgation of the LGC
in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly created by executive order but not judicially
annulled Sec. 442(b) of the LGC deemed curative whatever legal defects to title these municipalities had labored
under.

There are eminent differences between Andong and municipalities such as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban. Most
prominent is the fact that the EO creating Andong was expressly annulled by the SC in 1965. Court decisions cannot
lose their efficacy due to sheer defiance by the parties aggrieved.

Sec. 442(d) of the LGC does not serve to affirm/reconstitute the judicially dissolved municipalities which had been
previously created by presidential issuances/EOs. The provision only affirms the legal personalities of those
municipalities which may have been created using the same infirm legal basis, yet were fortunate enough not to have
been judicially annulled. On the other hand, the municipalities judicially dissolved remain inexistent unless recreated
through specific legislative enactments.

The legal effect of the nullification of a municipality in Pelaez was to revert the constituent barrios of the voided town
back to their original municipalities.

If there is only a strong impulse for the reconstitution of the municipality nullified in Pelaez, the solution is through the
legislature and not judicial confirmation of void title. The time has come for the light to seep in and for the petitioner
and like-minded persons to awaken to legal reality.

CAMID VS OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, GR No. 161414, January 17, 2005

(ARTICLE X Section 10: Creation, Abolition, Change of boundaries)

FACTS:
This is a petition for Certiorari arguing the existence of Municipality of Andong in Lanao Del Sur. This decision have
noted the earlier decision of Pelaez where the Executive orders of Former President Macapagal creating 33
Municipalities of Lanao Del Sur was considered null and void due to undue delegation of legislative powers. Among the
annulled executive orders is EO107 creating Andong. The petitioner herein represents himself as resident
of Andong (as a private citizen and taxpayer). Camid contends/argues the following:

(1) Municipality of Andong evolved into a full-blown municipality (since there is a complete set of officials appointed to
handle essential tasks and services, it has its own high school, Bureau of Post, DECS office, etc.

(2) 17 barangays with chairman;

(3) he noted agencies and private groups recognizing Andong and also the CENRO and DENR Certification of land area
and population of Andong.

In the Certification of DILG, there is an enumeration of existing municipalities including 18 0f the33 Municipalities
invalidated in Pelaez Case. Camid fi nds this as an abuse of discretion and unequal treatment for Andong.
Likewise, Camid insists the continuing of EO 107, arguing that in Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez, the Court
affirmed in making San Andres a de facto municipal corporation. San Andres was created through an executive order.
Thus, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Municipality of Andong be recognized as a de facto municipal corporation

HELD:
SECTION 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government
Code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.chan

Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and exercised
corporate functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interru ption
or objection for period long enough to aff ord title by prescription. The C e r t i fi c a t i o n h a s
n o p o w e r o r i t d o e s n o t b e a r a n y a u t h o r i t y t o c r e a t e o r r e v a l i d a t e a municipality. Should the case of
Andong be treated same as the case of San Andres? No, for the following reasons:

(A) There are facts found in the San Andres case that are not present in the case at bar:

(1) The Executive Order creating San Andres was not invalidated in Pelaez Case,
(2) The municipality existed for 30 years before it was questioned and
(3) The municipality was classified as a fifth class municipality and was included in the legislative district in
the House of Representatives apportionment.
( B ) A n d o n g d i d n o t m e e t t h e r e q u i s i t e s s e t b y L o c a l G o v e r n m e n t C o d e o f 1 9 9 1 S e c . 4 2 p a r. d
r e g a r d i n g municipalities created by executive orders. It says:
Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such.
Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have
their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall
henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.

(C) The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the municipality are
eloquent indicia (indicators) that the State does not recognize the existence of the municipality.

(D) The Ordinance appended in the 1987 Constitution (which apportioned seats for the House of Representatives
to the diff erent legislat ive districts in the Philippines, enumerates the various municipalities encompassed
in the various districts) did not include Andong.

REPUBLIC VS. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, digested

GR # L-20620 August 15, 1974 (Constitutional Law Eminent Domain, Elements of Taking)

FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the government in 1947 refused to
extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of just
compensation, the government argued that it had taken the property when the contract of lease commenced and not
when the proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the government
commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the essential elements of the taking of property under the
power of eminent domain, namely (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than
a momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.

ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has entered and occupied the
property as lesse.

HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959.

The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for more than a
momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise informally
appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment thereof.

In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and occupied the property under a
contract of lease.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Carmen M. Vda. De Castellvi, et al.

G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974 Case Digest

FACTS: In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease agreement over a
land in Pampanga with Castellvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castellvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956, the
AFP refused because of the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected
and already established on the property. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959,
however, the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in question.

ISSUE: Whether or not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just compensation
should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year.

The requisites for taking are:

1. The expropriator must enter a private property;

2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;
3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities;
4. The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
beneficial enjoyment of the property.

Only requisites 1, 3, and 4 were present. It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes of
eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the
property as lessee thereof.
Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with
the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for
eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of
court, on August 10, 1959. The taking of the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the just
compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain
was filed.

REPUBLIC vs. LIM (GR no. 161656) - Digest

FACTS:
In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action for expropriation of a land in Lahug, Cebu City for the purpose of
establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. The said lots were registered in the name of Gervasia and
Eulalia Denzon. The Republic deposited P9,500 in the PNB then took possession of the lots. Thereafter, on May 1940,
the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation.
The Denzons appealed to the CA but it was dismissed on March 11, 1948. An entry of judgment was made on April 5,
1948.

In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots,
but it "denied knowledge of the matter." On September 6, 1961, Lt. Cabal rejected the claim but expressed willingness
to pay the appraised value of the lots within a reasonable time.

For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the Denzons successors-in-interest,Valdehueza
and Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages against the Republic and AFP
officers in possession of the property.

On November 1961, Titles of the said lots were issued in the names of Valdehueza and Panerio with the annotation
"subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and939 upon
previous payment of a reasonable market value".

On July 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are the owners
and have retained their right as such over lots because of the Republics failure to pay the amount of
P4,062.10,adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on their land titles, they were
ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic.

They appealed the CFIs decision to the SC. The latter held that Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered owners
of Lots 932 and 939, there having been no payment of just compensation by the Republic. SC still ruled that they are
not entitled to recover possession of the lots but may only demand the payment of their fair market value.

Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim, herein respondent, as security for
their loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in 1976. The lot title was
issued in his name.

On 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the RTC against the petitioners herein. On 2001,
the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Lim, declaring that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the lot with all the
rights of an absolute owner including the right to possession. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA. In its Decision
dated September 18, 2003, it sustained the RTC Decision saying: ... This is contrary to the rules of fair play because
the concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners
of the land,but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered "just"...

Petitioner, through the OSG, filed with the SC a petition for review alleging that they remain as the owner of Lot 932.

ISSUE:
Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay respondents predecessors-in-interest
the just compensation therefor pursuant to the judgment of the CFI rendered as early as May 14, 1940.

HELD:
One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived of his private property
without due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due process is that there must be just
compensation whenever private property is taken for public use. Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of our Constitution
mandates: "Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." The Republic disregarded the
foregoing provision when it failed and refused to pay respondents predecessors-in-interest the just compensation for
Lots 932 and 939.

The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republics delay is contrary to the rules of fair play. In jurisdictions similar
to ours, where an entry to the expropriated property precedes the payment of compensation, it has been held that if
the compensation is not paid in a reasonable time, the party may be treated as a trespasser ab initio.

As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated the Republic to pay respondents predecessors-in-
interest the sum of P16,248.40 as "reasonable market value of the two lots in question." Unfortunately, it did not
comply
and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Courts mandate. It is tantamount to confiscation of private
property. While it is true that all private properties are subject to the need of government, and the government may
take them whenever the necessity or the exigency of the occasion demands, however from the taking of private
property by the government under the power of eminent domain, there arises an implied promise to compensate the
owner for his loss.
There is a recognized rule that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only
upon full payment of the just compensation. So, how could the Republic acquire ownership over Lot 932 when it has
not paid its owner the just compensation, required by law, for more than 50 years? Clearly, without full payment of just
compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the landowner to the expropriator.

SC ruled in earlier cases that expropriation of lands consists of two stages. First is concerned with the determination of
the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise. The second is
concerned with the determination by the court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." It is only
upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed In Republic v. Salem
Investment Corporation, we ruled that, "the process is not completed until payment of just compensation." Thus, here,
the failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57 years rendered the
expropriation process incomplete.

Thus, SC ruled that the special circumstances prevailing in this case entitle respondent to recover possession of the
expropriated lot from the Republic.

While the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to
recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation
within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall
have the right to recover possession of their property. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes
property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court
of Appeals, we defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the
property owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered "just."

Makati vs CA
Facts:

Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private respondent Admiral Finance Creditors
Consortium, Inc. After hearing, the RTC fixed the appraised value of the property at P5,291,666.00, and ordered
petitioner to pay this amount minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00 which was earlier released to private
respondent. It then issued the corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds of the
petitioner which was deposited in PNB. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that its funds at the
PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds
without the proper appropriation required under the law. The RTC denied the motion. CA affirmed; hence, petitioner
filed a petition for review before the SC.

Issue:

1. Are the funds of the Municipality of Makati exempt from garnishment and levy upon execution?

2. If so, what then is the remedy of the private respondents?

Held:

1. Yes. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless
otherwise provided for by statute. More particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or personal, which
are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the
municipality. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and
exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from
execution. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public
funds an amount corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision, no levy under execution may be validly
effected on the public funds of petitioner.

2. Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no legal recourse. Where a municipality
fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the
claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary
appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefor.

For three years now, petitioner has enjoyed possession and use of the subject property notwithstanding its inexcusable
failure to comply with its legal obligation to pay just compensation. Petitioner has benefited from its possession of the
property since the same has been the site of Makati West High School since the school year 1986-1987. This Court will
not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation proceedings it had in
fact initiated. The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and
justice. (Municipality of Makati vs. CA, G.R. Nos. 89898-99, October 1, 1990)

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS v. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA (G.R. No. L-24693)
Facts:
The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 for being violative of the due process clause,
contending that said ordinance is not only arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also vague, indefinite and
uncertain, and likewise allege the invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination.

Ordinance No. 4760 has the following provisions:

1. Refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in the lobby in
open view;
2. prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old;
3. usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively (tax issue also);
4. making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and
5. cancellation of license for subsequent violation.

The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioners. Hence, the appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause.

HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws enacted by Congress (in this case Mun Board) is
valid. W/o a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity, the presumption stays. As in this case, there was only a
stipulation of facts and such cannot prevail over the presumption. Further, the ordinance is a valid exercise of Police
Power. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices
hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in
doing any business other than legal but also increases the revenue of the LGU concerned. And taxation is a valid
exercise of police power as well.

The due process contention is likewise untenable, There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a
standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a
substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of
reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. Nothing
in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinances nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement.

On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It was not violative of
due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is
restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the
general well-being.

The Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and lifted the injuction on the Ordinance in question

MMDA vs. Bel-Air Village Association (G.R. No. 135962)

Facts:
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting the former to open its private road,
Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the
perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.

Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary
injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court
denied issuance of a preliminary injunction. On appeal, the appellate court ruled that the MMDA has no authority to
order the opening of Neptune Street, and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is
lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.

MMDA said it has the authority to open Neptune St. because it is an agent of the Government endowed with police
power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. From the premise of police powers, it follow then that it need
not for an ordinance to be enacted first.

Hence this petition.

Issue:
Does MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers?

Ruling:
According to SC, Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. Police power is lodged primarily in the National
Legislature, which the latter can delegate to the President and administrative boards, LGU or other lawmaking bodies.

LGU is a political subdivision for local affairs. Which has a legislative body empowered to enact ordinances, approved
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the province/city/municipality.

The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development authority." All its functions are administrative in nature.The
powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,implementation,
preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no
syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power

In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the LGUs, acting through
their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune
Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.

Wherefore, the petition is denied.

Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. (G.R. No. 111097)
Facts:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce
Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino during the
Christmas season.
Civil organizations angrily denounced the project. Petitioners opposed the casinos opening and enacted Ordinance No.
3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit and canceling existing business permit to the establishment for the
operation of the casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of the casino and providing a penalty for
its violation.

Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that they both violated Presidential Decree No.
1869. Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the Local Government Code, they have the police power authority to
prohibit the operation of casino for the general welfare.

Issue:
Whether the Ordinances are valid.

Ruling:
No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes
indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the
General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows:Sec. 16.

General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those
which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote
health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve
the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and
other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but
are in fact permitted by law.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that to be valid, an ordinance must
conform to the following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.

The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is
authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere
ordinance. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national
lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It
is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived
their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.Hence, it was not competent
for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings
for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy
motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra
vires and void.

Wherefore, the petition is denied.

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding

members of the Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN
NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.

Ponente: DAVIDE, JR.

FACTS:

Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by Peoples Initiative (Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the
COMELEC for an order (1) Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country; (2) Causing the
necessary publications of said Order and the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers
of general and local circulation; and (3) Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to
assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the
purpose. Delfin asserted that R.A. No. 6735 governs the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 is a valid exercise of delegated powers. Petitioners contend that R.A. No. 6375 failed to be an
enabling law because of its deficiency and inadequacy, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not (1) the absence of subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, (2) R.A. No. 6735 is adequate to cover the
system of initiative on amendment to the Constitution, and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid. .

HELD:

NO. Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The conspicuous silence in subtitles simply means that the main thrust of
the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation. Provisions COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of
initiative or amendments to the Constitution are declared void.

RATIO:

Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and interpretation. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide any subtitle on initiative
on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle
III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some
future law.

The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory
pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the
COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue
through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in each
legislative district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; and (4) to
verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters affidavits, and
voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.

Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot
be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known that the
petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under
Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was
merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which
should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order
directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:

PUNO, concurring and dissenting

I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Davide insofar as it orders the COMELEC to
dismiss the Delfin petition. I regret, however, I cannot share the view that R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 are legally defective and cannot implement the peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. I likewise submit
that the petition with respect to the Pedrosas has no leg to stand on and should be dismissed. (MELO and MENDOZA
concur)

VITUG, concurring and dissenting

I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for clarifying that the TRO earlier issued by the Court did
not prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas of their right to campaign for constitutional amendments.

[T]he TRO earlier issued by the Court which, consequentially, is made permanent under the ponencia should be held to
cover only the Delfin petition and must not be so understood as having intended or contemplated to embrace the
signature drive of the Pedrosas. The grant of such a right is clearly implicit in the constitutional mandate on people
initiative.

FRANCISCO, concurring and dissenting

There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Davide has prepared a scholarly and well-written
ponencia. Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his view that R. A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. (MELO and MENDOZA concur)

PANGANIBAN, concurring and dissenting

Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the majority, holds that:

(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the initiatory Delfin
Petition.

(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to be directly proposed by the people through initiative, there is no
implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions
insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.

(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, is void.

I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show the required number of signatures
in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines with at least 3% in every legislative district no public
funds may be spent and no government resources may be used in an initiative to amend the Constitution. Verily, the
Comelec cannot even entertain any petition absent such signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from the
majoritys two other rulings
Lina v. Pao (G.R. No. 129093)
Facts:
Private respondent Tony Calvento, was appointed agent by PCSO to install a terminal for the operation of lotto, applied
for a mayors permit to operate a lotto outlet in San Pedro,Laguna. It was denied on the ground that an ordinance
entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, Taon1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna prohibited gambling in the
province,including the operation of lotto. With the denial of his application, private respondent filed an action for
declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. The trial court rendered
judgment in favor of private respondent enjoining petitioners from implementing or enforcing the subject resolution.

Issue:
whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and the denial of a mayors permit
based thereon are valid

Held:
No. The questioned ordinance merely states the objection of the council to the said game. It is but a mere policy
statement on the part of the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit
the operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna. As a policy statement expressing the local governments
objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local governments autonomy to air its views which
may be contrary to that of the national governments.However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean
that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this
premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance
prohibiting the operation of lotto.

Moreover, ordinances should not contravene statutes as municipal governments are merely agents of the national
government. The local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers which have been conferred on them by
Congress. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. This
being the case, these councils, as delegates, cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those
of the latter. The question of whether gambling should be permitted is for Congress to determine, taking into account
national and local interests. Since Congress has allowed the PCSO to operate lotteries which PCSO seeks to conduct in
Laguna, pursuant toits legislative grant of authority, the province's Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot nullify the
exercise of said authority by preventing something already allowed by Congress.

Lina v. Pao

G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001

Quisumbing, J.

Facts:

Private respondent Tony Calvento, was appointed agent by PCSO to install a terminalfor the operation of lotto, applied
for a mayors permit to operate a lotto outlet in San Pedro,Laguna. It was denied on the ground that an ordinance
entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, Taon1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna prohibited gambling in the
province,including the operation of lotto. With the denial of his application, private respondent filedan action for
declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporaryrestraining order. The trial court rendered
judgment in favor of private respondent enjoiningpetitioners from implementing or enforcing the subject resolution.

Issue:

whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Lagunaand the denial of a mayors permit
based thereon are valid

Held:

No. The questioned ordinance merely states the objection of the council to the saidgame. It is but a mere policy
statement on the part of the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit
the operation of the lotto systemin the province of Laguna. As a policy statement expressing the local
governmentsobjection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local governmentsautonomy to air its
views which may be contrary to that of the national governments.However, this freedom to exercise contrary views
does not mean that local governmentsmay actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress.
Given thispremise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as ameasure or
ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.Moreover, ordinances should not contravene statutes as municipal
governments aremerely agents of the national government. The local councils exercise only delegatedlegislative
powers which have been conferred on them by Congress. The delegate cannot besuperior to the principal or exercise
powers higher than those of the latter. This being thecase, these councils, as delegates, cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powershigher than those of the latter. The question of whether gambling should be permitted is
forCongress to determine, taking into account national and local interests. Since Congress hasallowed the PCSO to
operate lotteries which PCSO seeks to conduct in Laguna, pursuant toits legislative grant of authority, the province's
Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot nullify theexercise of said authority by preventing something already allowed by
Congress.

GARCIA ET AL. VS COMELEC

Posted by kaye lee on 10:58 AM
G.R. No. 111511 October 5, 1993
[Initiative and Referendum; Recall proceeding]

FACTS:
Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of Bataan in the 1992 elections. Some mayors, vice-mayors and members of
the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the province constituted themselves into a Preparatory
Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of petitioner Garcia. They issued Resolution No. 1 as formal initiation of
the recall proceedings. COMELEC scheduled the recall election for the gubernatorial position of Bataan.

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to annul the Resolution
of the COMELEC because the PRAC failed to comply with the "substantive and procedural requirement" laid down in
Section 70 of R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code 1991). They pointed out the most fatal defect of the proceeding
followed by the PRAC in passing the Resolution: the deliberate failure to send notices of the meeting to 65 members of
the assembly.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the people have the sole and exclusive right to initiate recall proceedings.
2) Whether or not the procedure for recall violated the right of elected local public officials belonging to the political
minority to equal protection of the law.

RULING:
1) No. There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have the "sole and exclusive right
to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone a single
mode, of initiating recall elections.
The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local government code
which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum . . ." By this constitutional mandate,
Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates.
What the Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of recall, whether one or many, to be chosen by
Congress should be effective. Using its constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it wise to enact an
alternative mode of initiating recall elections to supplement the former mode of initiation by direct action of the
people. The legislative records reveal there were two (2) principal reasons why this alternative mode of initiating the
recall process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action
of the people; and (b) to cut down on its expenses.

2) No. Under the Sec. 70 of the LGC, all mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang members of the municipalities and
component cities are made members of the preparatory recall assembly at the provincial level. Its membership is not
apportioned to political parties. No significance is given to the political affiliation of its members. Secondly, the
preparatory recall assembly, at the provincial level includes all the elected officials in the province concerned.
Considering their number, the greater probability is that no one political party can control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69
of the Code provides that the only ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss of confidence of the people.
The members of the PRAC are in the PRAC not in representation of their political parties but as representatives of the
people. By necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot be premised on mere differences in political party
affiliation. Indeed, our Constitution encourages multi-party system for the existence of opposition parties is
indispensable to the growth and nurture of democratic system. Clearly then, the law as crafted cannot be faulted for
discriminating against local officials belonging to the minority.
Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the recall process by a preparatory recall
assembly will not be corrupted by extraneous influences. We held that notice to all the members of the recall assembly
is a condition sine qua non to the validity of its proceedings. The law also requires a qualified majority of all the
preparatory recall assembly members to convene in session and in a public place. Needless to state, compliance with
these requirements is necessary, otherwise, there will be no valid resolution of recall which can be given due course by
the COMELEC.