Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5275 August 25, 1953

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUANITO DASIG, BALBINO GABUNI and MARCELINO DAYAO, defendants-appellants.

Domingo L. Vergara for appellants Juanito Dasig and Marcelino Dayao.

Perfecta E. de Vera for appellant Balbino Gabuni.
Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Ramon L. Avancea for appellee.

LABRADOR, J.:

Defendants in the above-entitled case appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Isabela,
finding them guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide, and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Norberto Ramil, in the sum of P4,000, and the complainant,
Jacinta Galasinao, in the sum of P190, and to pay the costs of the prosecution.

The record discloses that in the evening of December 23, 1949, at about midnight, while Norberto Ramil
and his wife, Jacinta Galasinao, and their daughter and son, Segunda and Domingo, respectively, were
sleeping in their house situated not far away from the municipal building of Antatet (now Luna), Province
of Isabela, the said spouses were suddenly awakened by the barking of dogs and the grunting of pigs.
Ramil got up and walked quietly towards a window, to find out what the dogs were barking at, but just
then two persons who had entered the house faced him. The wife heard these persons talking in
whispers and saw them in front. She lighted a lamp, and as she did so the two intruders levelled their
guns at her husband and demanded from him to produce his pistol. As the husband could not produce
any pistol and said he had none at all, they fired at him. He used his two hands to protect himself, but to
no avail. As he received the shots, he fell down in a stooping position and then slumped on the floor, face
downwards. The wife and her two children, who had already been awakened, cried for help, but the
intruders levelled their guns at them, commanding them to keep quiet and threatening to kill if they did not
do so. For fear, they had to stop. The intruders then went inside the bedroom and ran-sacked the
contents of the trunk which contained their valuables. P10 in cash and jewels worth P180 were taken
away.

The Chief of Police of Antatet, who lived around twenty meters away from the house of Ramil, heard
three pistol shots, so he repaired to the municipal building to fetch one of his policemen, then they passed
by the house of the Mayor, and together with him they proceeded to the house of Ramil. When they
reached it the robbers were already gone. They found Ramil already dead with gun-shots wounds on the
left eye, in the right breast, at the back, and at the left index finger. They questioned the wife, who
recounted, to them what had happened. The chief of police found a fired bullet, caliber .32, inside the
truck, four empty .22 caliber cartridges near the dead body, three empty .32 caliber shells, one near the
broken box inside the bedroom and the other two five meters from the house of the deceased, and three
.45 caliber empty shells under the house just below the body the dead body. The following day, a
physician of Antatet performed an autopsy on the dead body of Ramil and he found four gunshot wounds
in the places already indicated above. When he opened the chest cavity, he discovered a .22 caliber slug
right at the heart.

The above facts are not contradicted. The evidence, upon which the judgment of conviction is based,
consists of the testimony on one, Jose Mallillin, that of Andres Bumanglag, which in part corroborates
Mallillin's testimony, and the findings of a ballistic expert of the Philippine Constabulary to the effect that
the empty .32 caliber cartridges found under the house of Ramil had been fired from the Llama auto-pistol
possessed by, and licensed in the name of, Mallillin, and that the .32 caliber slug, Exhibit C, which was
found inside the trunk, had also been fired therefrom. These findings were based on the fact that the
striations found in the said bullet are identical with and congruent to those which he fired from the same
Llama auto-pistol, and the pin marks at the empty .32 caliber cartridges are identical with and congruent
to that found at an empty cartridge fired from the same pistol.

Mallillin was formerly a school teacher of Antatet and had resided there, but on the date of the robbery he
was living in a contiguous town, Cauayan. He testified as follows: On the evening in question, while he
was on his way home, he saw four persons near a checkpoint, and as he passed by, two of them got hold
of him and a third snatched his pistol away and compelled him to follow them. The four were later
recognized by him to be the defendants Balbino Gabuni, Juanito Dasig and Marcelino Dayao, and Sergio
Eduardo. They boarded a jeep, which was parked near the road and in which there were two others
whom Mallillin did not recognize, and then they drove to the junction of the Cabatuan-Antatet roads. Here
they all went down and walked towards Antatet.

When the party was around 100 meters from the municipal building, he saw his companions talking to
Andres Bumanglag. Taking Bumanglag aside, he informed the latter that he had been held up. Upon
Mallillin' suggestion, his companions asked Bumanglag how the house of Ramil could be entered, and the
latter answered that it could be done through a window near the well. They also asked further information
from him, and thereafter he was allowed to go away, but with the warning that if he would squeal, he
would be put to death.

After Bumanglag had left, they went to a place around fifty meters from the House of Ramil, the intended
victim. Here they waited till about midnight when they approached the house. Gabuni then ordered
Mallillin to stay in a place beside the road. Dasig and Eduardo then gave him their shoes for him to keep,
while the five, including the two unknown persons, approached the house. Dasig and Eduardo entered
the house through the window, while Gabuni stayed at the door in front. Gabuni gave his carbine to
Dayao and Mallillin's Llama pistol to Dasig, while Eduardo held a .22 caliber pistol.

Five minutes after the three had gone up the house, Mallillin heard three shots. Then he heard a voice
calling for help. He got frightened, so he hurriedly went away bound for Cauayan. While still in Antatet, he
heard the policemen of Antatet exchange shots with his companions. He arrived in Cauayan at about one
o'clock. At around 4:30 that morning, Sergio Eduardo called at his house and asked for their shoes, and
as he went away, he warned Mallillin not to squeal, otherwise he would be killed. Mallillin asked for his
pistol and was informed that it was with Marcelino Dayao. That same morning he went to Dayao and got it
from the latter. Juanito Dasig also called at his house that same morning, warning him that if he would
squeal, he would be in a bad fix, informing him further that their two companions, whom Mallillin had not
recognized, had gone to Manila to fetch some more of their companions until they reach as many as
twenty.

The above is Mallillin's version. He was apprehended by the authorities on December 31, 1949. Four
days before his arrest, he further said, he had decided, after consultation with his wife, to go to the chief
of police of Cauayan to ask him to accompany him to Cabatuan, where he was going to relate all that had
happened, but that it so happened that when he saw the chief of police, the latter had no time to hear him
as he was going away and was then ready with his baggage to go to Manila.

When Mallillin was taken to Constabulary barracks on December 31, 1949, he had a talk with Lieutenant
Panis of the Constabulary. Panis promised him that he would be used as a state witness if he would
disclose all that he knew about the robbery. With this promise Mallillin made a complete disclosure of the
above facts to Lieutenant Panis. His statement was put in writing, although it was not sworn to before the
justice of the peace until January 3, 1950. His affidavit was introduced at the trial as Exhibit 4-Gabuni,
Exhibit 3-Dasig-Dayao, and contains substantially the same facts testified to by him during the trial.
The testimony of Andres Bumanglag is to the effect that that same evening, he had been playing guitar
with two companions at the house of one Labog, and that when they went home and as they were
approaching his house, he was suddenly held up by two persons. When brought to a group to which the
two belonged, he recognized Mallillin, Gabuni, chief of police of Cauayan, and Dasig. He was asked
about the number of policemen of Antatet, the arms that they had, the caliber of the arms, and the
persons who had firearms. Finally, they asked him to draw a sketch of the house of Norberto Ramil and
its position in relation to the house of the mayor, as well as the position of the window through which
entrance could be gained into the house. Bumanglag was very much frightened because, at the
beginning when he re-fused to answer the questions that they asked him, he was kicked and threatened
by the group. Besides, Mallillin had informed him that he himself had been held-up, and that he should tell
what they asked him, he was kicked and threatened by the group. Besides, Mallillin had informed him that
he himself had been held-up, and that he should tell what they asked him, other-wise both of them would
be killed. After getting all the information they desired, Bumanglag was allowed to go home. A few
minutes after he went to bed he heard some shots, and stray bullets hit his house and a kapok three
nearby, so he and his family had to go down the house to seek shelter from stray bullets.

On January 3, 1950, Andres Bumanglag also made an affidavit before Lieutenant Panis, which was
sworn to by him before the justice of the peace of Antatet. In this affidavit, Exhibit 5-Gabuni, he mentions
the fact that before the robbery a group of persons, four of whom were armed, came and asked
information from him about the house of Norberto Ramil, and that on that occasion he also saw Mallillin
with them, who told him that he was held saw held up by the group.

The trial court gave credit to the testimonies of Mallillin and Bumanglag as above outlined, and together
with the identification made by the wife of Ramil of one of the appellants by the latter's stature, and on the
further ground that the cartridges and some of the bullets found in the premises had been fired from the
Llama pistol of Mallillin, held that the crime of robbery with homicide had been committed by the accused-
appellants herein, and sentenced them as above indicated.

In this court the attorneys for the appellants contend that inasmuch as Mallillin's confession was obtained
by a promise made by the Constabulary Lieutenant Panis that Mallillin would be excluded from the
information and made a state witness, Mallillin's confession is not admissible against him and neither
should it be admissible against the appellants herein. It is evident that counsel misunderstands the
application of the principle in evidence that a confession secured through promise of immunity is not
admissible. The evidence submitted against the appellants is not the confession made by Mallillin; it is his
testimony given in open court. There is, therefore, no occasion to invoke the principle of evidence in
question.

The most important claim of the defendants-appellants is that inasmuch as Mallillin was an accomplice in
the crime and his testimony contains flaws in many particulars, the maxim Falsus in uno falsus in
omnibus should be applied to the whole of his testimony, and the judgment of conviction would then have
no leg to stand on. There are certainly many points or particulars in Mallillin's testimony which can not
stand careful scrutiny. First of all, we have the supposed compulsion or hold-up which he claims he was
subjected to. Mallillin admits that the defendants-appellants had been his companions in various games,
like poker, "pekyo", etc. Then there is the circumstance that the supposed hold-up took place in the center
of the town. According to some defense witnesses, Mallillin had also been telling of robberies that might
take place in town. It is unreasonable, therefore, to conclude that Mallillin was not an unwilling companion
in the commission of the crime.

But, on the other hand, we find that his testimony is corroborated by evidence worthy of credit. That he
was present on the occasion of the robbery can not be denied, because his Llama pistol was proven to
have been fired at the scene of the robbery, as cartridges and bullets proved to have been fired from the
said pistol had been found in the house where the robbery was committed. And the fact that appellants
had been companions of Mallillin in many gambling games points to the close acquaintance between
them and them unity of purpose as well. While his story that it was not he who furnished the data about
the climbing of the house and its surroundings, his statement that Juanito Dasig and Sergio Eduardo
were the ones who went inside the house is corroborated by the inmates of the house to the effect that
only two of the robbery entered the house.

Again, the testimony about the different arms used, a carbine in the possession of Dayao, a pistol given
Eduardo by Gabuni these facts are corroborated by the finding of .22 caliber slugs and empty shells in
the heart of the victim and in the house and in the premises. The testimony of Mallillin that Gabuni carried
a .45 caliber pistol, which was his service pistol as chief of police, is also untrue because the examination
of the .45 caliber bullet found in the premises shows that it was not fired from the service pistol of Gabuni.
But Mallillin's assertion may be due to innocent error on his part. He perhaps thought that the pistol that
Gabuni carried was his service pistol. But Gabuni may have planned to avoid identification by using a
firearm different from that which he used as member of the police force.

Then there is the corroboration of the testimony of Mallillin given by Andres Bumanglag, whom the trial
court considered as a trustworthy witness. We find nothing from the record which would justify us in
reversing the appraisal of the above testimony and the credit given this corroborating witness by the trial
court.

It has been stated that the rule (Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus) invoked is not a mandatory rule of
evidence, but rather a permissible one, which allows the jury or the court to draw the inference or not to
draw it as circumstances may best warrant. (70 C.J. 783.) The unbelievable allegation of Mallillin, that he
was forced into joining the band against his will, arises from the natural desire of an accomplice to shift
the blame to his co-conspirators and exculpate himself; while his assertion that the gun Gabuni carried
was his service pistol maybe an innocent mistake on Mallillin's part. His claim that it was Bumanglag who
indicated where access to the victim's house may be had may also be untrue, be-cause Mallillin had been
said to have been in the house. Do these flaws and defects render his testimony wholly inadmissible
under the rule invoked?

We take advantage of this opportunity to explain the true scope of this much invoked and abused rule of
(Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus.) Professor Wigmore states that this rule ceased to be the rule in
England as early as the beginning of the eighteenth century. He criticizes the board rule as unsound,
because not true to human nature; that because a person tells a single lie, he is lying throughout his
whole testimony, or that there is strong possibility that he is so lying. The reason for it is that once a
person knowingly and deliberately states a falsehood in one material aspect, he must have done so as to
the rest. But it is also clear that the rule has its limitations, for when the mistaken statement is consistent
with good faith and is not conclusively indicative of a deliberate perversion, the believable portion of the
testimony should be admitted. Because though a person may err in memory or in observation in one or
more respects, he may have told the truth as to others. (III Wigmore, Secs. 1009-1015, pp. 674-683.)
There are, therefor, these requirements for the application of the rule, i.e., that the false testimony is as to
a material point, and that there should be a conscious and deliberate intention to falsify. (Lyric Film
Exchange, Inc. vs. Cowper, 1937, 36 Off. Gaz., 1642.)

The rule is also carefully considered in the case of the Santisima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283, 5 Law. Ed. 454,
thus:

Where a party speaks to a fact in respect to which he cannot be presumed liable to mistake, as in
relation to the country of his birth, or his being in a vessel on particular voyage, or living in a
particular place, if the fact turn out otherwise, it is extremely difficult to exempt him from the
charge of deliberate falsehood; and courts of justice, under such circumstances, are bound upon
principles of law and morality and justice to apply the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.
What ground of judicial belief can there be left when the party has shown such gross insensibility
to the difference between right and wrong, between truth and falsehood.

In the case of Godair vs. Ham National Bank, 80 N.E., 407, the Supreme Court of Illinois made the
following very illuminating expression of the scope of the rule:
 As to the second criticism, it has uniformly been held by this Court that the maxim, "falsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus," should only be applied in cases where a witness has knowingly and willfully
given false testimony. Chittenden vs. Evans, 41 Ill. 251; City of Chicago vs. Smith, 48 Ill.
107; United States Express Co. vs. Hutchings, 58 Ill. 44; Pope vs. Dodson, Id. 360; Guliher vs.
People, 82 Ill. 145; Swan vs. People, 98 Ill. 610; Hoge vs. People, 117 Ill. 35, 6 N.E.
796; Freeman vs. Easly, 117 Ill. 317, 7 N.E. 856; Overtoom vs. Chicago & Eastern Illinois
Railroad Co., 181 Ill. 323, 54 N.E. 898; Matthews vs. Granger, 196 Ill. 164, 63 N.E. 658.

In City of Chicago vs. Smith, supra, on page 108 of 48 Ill., it was said: "As to the eight instructions
asked by the defendant and refused, we are of opinion, under the authority of the case
of Brenman vs. People, 15 Ill. 511, it should not have been given. There the court say it does not
follow, merely because a witness makes an untrue statement, that his entire testimony is to be
disregarded. This must depend on the motive of the witness. If he intentionally swears falsely as
to one matter, the jury may properly reject his whole testimony as unworthy of credit. But, if he
makes a false statement through mistake or misapprehension, they ought not to disregard his
testimony altogether. The maxim, 'falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus,' should only be applied in
cases where a witness wilfully and knowingly gives false testimony.

And in Pope vs. Dodson, supra, on page 365 of 58 Ill.: "The tenth instruction in the series given
for appellee is palpably erroneous. It told the jury that, if the witness Lovely, "has sworn falsely in
any material statement," the jury might disregard her entire statement except so far as it was
corroborated. A witness cannot be discredited simply on the ground of an erroneous statement. It
is only where the statements of a witness are willfully and corruptly false in contradicted on a
material point," then the jury had the right to disregard his whole testimony unless corroborated
by other testimony. The court said (page 146 of 82 Ill.): 'The instruction was clearly erroneous.
When analyzed, it plainly tells the jury that "if they believe, from the evidence, that Alfred F. Foote
has been contradicted on a material point, then the jury have a right to disregard his whole
testimony unless corroborated by other testimony." This is not the law. . . If the witness, whether
defendant or otherwise, is shown, by proof, to have sworn wilfully and knowingly false on any
material matter, his evidence may be rejected so far as it is not corroborated. . . The mere fact,
however, that he is contradicted as to some material matter is not enough to warrant the rejection
of his evidence altogether.

In Overtoom vs. Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Co., supra, the court instructed the jury that
"if they believe any witness has testified falsely, then the jury may disregard such witness'
testimony except in so far as it may have been corroborated." In disposing of this instruction the
court said (page 330 of 181 Ill., page 901 of 54 N.E.): "A witness may have testified falsely upon
some matter inquired about from forgetfulness or honest mistake, and in such case the jury would
not be authorized to disregard his entire testimony, whether corroborated or not. It is the corrupt
motive, or the giving of false testimony knowing it to be false, that authorizes a jury to disregard
the testimony of a witness and the court to so instruct them."

With the above limitations of the rule in mind, it is clear that the maxim should not apply in the case at bar
for three reasons. First, there is sufficient corroboration on many grounds of the testimony. Second, the
mistakes are not on the very material points. Third, the errors do not arise from an apparent desire to
pervert the truth, but from innocent mistakes and the desire of the witness to exculpate himself though not
completely.

The next legal question to decide is whether the credible evidence submitted, together with that adduced
on behalf of the defendants, prove beyond reasonable doubt that it was the three appellants who
participated in the commission of the crime. The evidence submitted by the appellants of their defenses of
alibi are not satisfactory to us. That presented by appellant Juanito Dasig, which consists of the testimony
of the nurse, that on the night in question Dasig was in his house because his wife was suffering from
stomach-ache, is not satisfactory for the reason that the nurse did not positively state that the date when
she went to attend Dasig's wife was December 23, 1949. This date was included in the leading questions
propounded by counsel for appellants, where the date is insiduously joined with another fact and witness'
affirmative answer may refer to the more important fact contained in the answer, not to the date. Thus,
the first question asked was as follows:

"Q: Do you remember having attended to the wife of Juanito Dasig sometime or around
December 23, 1949? A. yes, sir." (t.s.n., p.174)

The affirmative answer may well mean that she did actually attend, and may not imply that she did so on
December 23, 1949. Another question was:

Q. How many days previous to that trip of yours on December 24, 1949? Was it the day
previous? A. Previous. (t.s.n. p. 176)

This question is a leading question. The witness also connects the night of the robbery with a trip
supposedly made by her with one Dr. Modales. But as to this occasion of the trip, her answer as to the
date is also ambiguous, thus:

Q. Do you remember the date of that trip of yours with Dr. Modales when you left him in Antatet?
A. It seems to me it was on December 24, 1949. (t.s.n., p. 175; Emphasis supplied)

On cross-examination, however, this witness testified that she never keeps a record of the cases that she
attends to every day, and on being asked what cases she attended in December, 1949, she answered
that she can not tell unless she saw her record. Its date, therefore, December 23, 1949, was not
remembered by her but put into her mind by the leading questions of the counsel. To convince the court
that the attendance took place on December 23rd, it was necessary for her to have shown that that date
appeared in the record she kept.

The alibi presented by Gabuni is to the effect that on December 23, he and Sergeant Tamani were
together the whole day and evening, and during the evening Gabuni stayed at home. That Gabuni and
Sergeant Tamani should stay in a barrio two kilometers away, on patrol, from nine in the morning to six in
the evening, of fully nine hours, is hard to understand. For them to spend four more hours drinking and
eating together in a restaurant, evidently without their returning to their offices to report the results of their
supposed mission, is still harder to believe. But for them to eat again at the home of Gabuni, after they
had already eaten in a restaurant, is the height of improbability. Gabuni must have been on vacation that
day, not on duty. If Gabuni was really and actually on patrol on hat day, why was not the police blotter
submitted? But even if the above story, improbable as it is, were assumed to be true, and his claim that
he was at his house at ten in the evening and woke up at six in the morning, also true, it is still not
impossible for him to have gone down the house after ten o'clock in the evening to join the commission of
the robbery, and come back at home in time to be there and wake up at six o'clock in the following
morning.

Neither can the defense of alibi presented by appellant Marcelino Dayao stand the test of careful scrutiny.
That Dayao was with his witnesses on certain days and on the occasions mentioned, in the case of
witnesses Silverio Anies and Jauna Molina on the presentation of the latter's claim, and in the case of
witness Daniel Yuson on the occasion of a night of gambling, may be assumed to be true. But their
assertion that it was on the precise date, December 23, 1949, that they saw or were with Dayao is difficult
to believe. Human memory on dates or days is frail, and unless the day is an extraordinary or unusual
one for the witness, there is no reasonable assurance of its correctness. Dayao's witnesses did not prove
that some extraordinary or unusual thing had happened on that day, that would have made them
remember it. As to Anies, the presentation of the claim is admitted by him to be a common occurrence,
such that he had to admit he can not remember the dates when other similar applicants saw him. As to
witness Yuson, the playing of mahjong was also a common pastime. Neither Anies nor Yuson presented
any writing or book entry where the event or occasion they mentioned took place. The trial court did not
believe their testimony, and we are unable to find that its conclusion is not borne out by human
experience.

Having found that sufficient admissible evidence, worthy of credit, has been adduced to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the defendants-appellants were the ones who perpetrated the robbery in question,
and the evidence with which they sought to prove their defenses of alibi having been found to be
unsatisfactory, we must affirm, as we hereby affirm, the judgment appealed from, with costs against the
appellants.

So ordered.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and Bautista Angelo,
JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 176389 December 14, 2010

ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 176864

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO
FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG, Appellants.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

Brief Background

On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and Jennifer,
seven, were brutally slain at their home in Paraaque City. Following an intense investigation, the police
arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a
frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real perpetrators remained a
mystery especially to the public whose interests were aroused by the gripping details of what everybody
referred to as the Vizconde massacre.

Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it had solved the
crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she witnessed
the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong"
Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and
Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after
the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public prosecutors filed an
information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al. 1

The Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 274, presided over by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino,
tried only seven of the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large. 2 The
prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating her testimony. These
included the medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the security guards of Pitong
Daan Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of the Webbs household, police officer Biongs former
girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellitas husband.

For their part, some of the accused testified, denying any part in the crime and saying they were
elsewhere when it took place. Webbs alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was then
across the ocean in the United States of America. He presented the testimonies of witnesses as well as
documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense presented witnesses to show
Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony.

But impressed by Alfaros detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it, the trial court
found a credible witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank
testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations. The trial court remained unfazed by significant
discrepancies between Alfaros April 28 and May 22, 1995 affidavits, accepting her explanation that she
at first wanted to protect her former boyfriend, accused Estrada, and a relative, accused Gatchalian; that
no lawyer assisted her; that she did not trust the investigators who helped her prepare her first affidavit;
and that she felt unsure if she would get the support and security she needed once she disclosed all
about the Vizconde killings.

In contrast, the trial court thought little of the denials and alibis that Webb, Lejano, Rodriguez, and
Gatchalian set up for their defense. They paled, according to the court, compared to Alfaros testimony
that other witnesses and the physical evidence corroborated. Thus, on January 4, 2000, after four years
of arduous hearings, the trial court rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty as charged and
imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four months, and one day to twelve
years. The trial court also awarded damages to Lauro Vizconde.3

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision, modifying the penalty imposed on
Biong to six years minimum and twelve years maximum and increasing the award of damages to Lauro
Vizconde.4 The appellate court did not agree that the accused were tried by publicity or that the trial judge
was biased. It found sufficient evidence of conspiracy that rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Fernandez,
and Estrada equally guilty with those who had a part in raping and killing Carmela and in executing her
mother and sister.

On motion for reconsideration by the accused, the Court of Appeals' Special Division of five members
voted three against two to deny the motion,5 hence, the present appeal.

On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a Resolution granting
the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmelas cadaver,
which specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping of the NBI. The Court granted the request
pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence6 to give the accused and the prosecution access to
scientific evidence that they might want to avail themselves of, leading to a correct decision in the case.
Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the specimen,
the same having been turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows, however, that the specimen
was not among the object evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in the case.

This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the
governments failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial of his right to due process.

Issues Presented

Accused Webbs motion to acquit presents a threshold issue: whether or not the Court should acquit him
outright, given the governments failure to produce the semen specimen that the NBI found on Carmelas
cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that would prove his innocence.

In the main, all the accused raise the central issue of whether or not Webb, acting in conspiracy with
Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed Carmela and
put to death her mother and sister. But, ultimately, the controlling issues are:

1. Whether or not Alfaros testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying Webb,
Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as the persons who
committed it, is entitled to belief; and

2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaros
testimony that he led the others in committing the crime.

The issue respecting accused Biong is whether or not he acted to cover up the crime after its
commission.

The Right to Acquittal

Due to Loss of DNA Evidence

Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland,7 that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of violation of
his right to due process given the States failure to produce on order of the Court either by negligence or
willful suppression the semen specimen taken from Carmela.

The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and, consistent with this, semen
specimen was found in her. It is true that Alfaro identified Webb in her testimony as Carmelas rapist and
killer but serious questions had been raised about her credibility. At the very least, there exists a
possibility that Alfaro had lied. On the other hand, the semen specimen taken from Carmela cannot
possibly lie. It cannot be coached or allured by a promise of reward or financial support. No two persons
have the same DNA fingerprint, with the exception of identical twins.8 If, on examination, the DNA of the
subject specimen does not belong to Webb, then he did not rape Carmela. It is that simple. Thus, the
Court would have been able to determine that Alfaro committed perjury in saying that he did.

Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the semen specimen at this
late stage. For one thing, the ruling in Brady v. Maryland9 that he cites has long be overtaken by the
decision in Arizona v. Youngblood,10 where the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process does not
require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless the
latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police. Here, the State presented a
medical expert who testified on the existence of the specimen and Webb in fact sought to have the same
subjected to DNA test.

For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist, the
country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet
recognized its admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen secure even
after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-
accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime.

Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webbs application for DNA testing, he allowed the proceeding
to move on when he had on at least two occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court
to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and the other accused. 11 They raised the DNA
issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as an error committed by the trial court in rendering its
decision in the case. None of the accused filed a motion with the appeals court to have the DNA test done
pending adjudication of their appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had in the meantime passed
the rules allowing such test. Considering the accuseds lack of interest in having such test done, the State
cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it would be required to produce the semen specimen at
some future time.

Now, to the merit of the case.

Alfaros Story

Based on the prosecutions version, culled from the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals,
on June 29, 1991 at around 8:30 in the evening, Jessica Alfaro drove her Mitsubishi Lancer, with
boyfriend Peter Estrada as passenger, to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center parking lot to buy shabu
from Artemio "Dong" Ventura. There, Ventura introduced her to his friends: Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb,
Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian,
and Joey Filart. Alfaro recalled frequently seeing them at a shabu house in Paraaque in January 1991,
except Ventura whom she had known earlier in December 1990.

As Alfaro smoked her shabu, Webb approached and requested her to relay a message for him to a girl,
whom she later identified as Carmela Vizconde. Alfaro agreed. After using up their shabu, the group
drove to Carmelas house at 80 Vinzons Street, Pitong Daan Subdivision, BF Homes, Paraaque City.
Riding in her car, Alfaro and Estrada trailed Filart and Rodriguez who rode a Mazda pick-up and Webb,
Lejano, Ventura, Fernandez, and Gatchalian who were on a Nissan Patrol car.

On reaching their destination, Alfaro parked her car on Vinzons Street, alighted, and approached
Carmelas house. Alfaro pressed the buzzer and a woman came out. Alfaro queried her about Carmela.
Alfaro had met Carmela twice before in January 1991. When Carmela came out, Alfaro gave her Webbs
message that he was just around. Carmela replied, however, that she could not go out yet since she had
just arrived home. She told Alfaro to return after twenty minutes. Alfaro relayed this to Webb who then
told the group to drive back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center.

The group had another shabu session at the parking lot. After sometime, they drove back but only Alfaro
proceeded to Vinzons Street where Carmela lived. The Nissan Patrol and the Mazda pick-up, with their
passengers, parked somewhere along Aguirre Avenue. Carmela was at their garden. She approached
Alfaro on seeing her and told the latter that she (Carmela) had to leave the house for a while. Carmela
requested Alfaro to return before midnight and she would leave the pedestrian gate, the iron grills that led
to the kitchen, and the kitchen door unlocked. Carmela also told Alfaro to blink her cars headlights twice
when she approached the pedestrian gate so Carmela would know that she had arrived.

Alfaro returned to her car but waited for Carmela to drive out of the house in her own car. Alfaro trailed
Carmela up to Aguirre Avenue where she dropped off a man whom Alfaro believed was Carmelas
boyfriend. Alfaro looked for her group, found them, and relayed Carmelas instructions to Webb. They
then all went back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center. At the parking lot, Alfaro told the group
about her talk with Carmela. When she told Webb of Carmelas male companion, Webbs mood changed
for the rest of the evening ("bad trip").
Webb gave out free cocaine. They all used it and some shabu, too. After about 40 to 45 minutes, Webb
decided that it was time for them to leave. He said, "Pipilahan natin siya [Carmela] at ako ang mauuna."
Lejano said, "Ako ang susunod" and the others responded "Okay, okay." They all left the parking lot in a
convoy of three vehicles and drove into Pitong Daan Subdivision for the third time. They arrived at
Carmelas house shortly before midnight.

Alfaro parked her car between Vizcondes house and the next. While waiting for the others to alight from
their cars, Fernandez approached Alfaro with a suggestion that they blow up the transformer near the
Vizcondes residence to cause a brownout ("Pasabugin kaya natin ang transformer na ito"). But Alfaro
shrugged off the idea, telling Fernandez, "Malakas lang ang tama mo." When Webb, Lejano, and Ventura
were already before the house, Webb told the others again that they would line up for Carmela but he
would be the first. The others replied, "O sige, dito lang kami, magbabantay lang kami."

Alfaro was the first to pass through the pedestrian gate that had been left open. Webb, Lejano, and
Ventura followed her. On entering the garage, Ventura using a chair mounted the hood of the Vizcondes
Nissan Sentra and loosened the electric bulb over it ("para daw walang ilaw"). The small group went
through the open iron grill gate and passed the dirty kitchen. Carmela opened the aluminum screen door
of the kitchen for them. She and Webb looked each other in the eyes for a moment and, together, headed
for the dining area.

As she lost sight of Carmela and Webb, Alfaro decided to go out. Lejano asked her where she was going
and she replied that she was going out to smoke. As she eased her way out through the kitchen door, she
saw Ventura pulling out a kitchen drawer. Alfaro smoked a cigarette at the garden. After about twenty
minutes, she was surprised to hear a womans voice ask, "Sino yan?" Alfaro immediately walked out of
the garden to her car. She found her other companions milling around it. Estrada who sat in the car asked
her, "Okay ba?"

After sitting in the car for about ten minutes, Alfaro returned to the Vizconde house, using the same route.
The interior of the house was dark but some light filtered in from outside. In the kitchen, Alfaro saw
Ventura searching a ladys bag that lay on the dining table. When she asked him what he was looking for,
he said: "Ikaw na nga dito, maghanap ka ng susi." She asked him what key he wanted and he replied:
"Basta maghanap ka ng susi ng main door pati na rin ng susi ng kotse." When she found a bunch of keys
in the bag, she tried them on the main door but none fitted the lock. She also did not find the car key.

Unable to open the main door, Alfaro returned to the kitchen. While she was at a spot leading to the
dining area, she heard a static noise (like a television that remained on after the station had signed off).
Out of curiosity, she approached the masters bedroom from where the noise came, opened the door a
little, and peeked inside. The unusual sound grew even louder. As she walked in, she saw Webb on top
of Carmela while she lay with her back on the floor. Two bloodied bodies lay on the bed. Lejano was at
the foot of the bed about to wear his jacket. Carmela was gagged, moaning, and in tears while Webb
raped her, his bare buttocks exposed.

Webb gave Alfaro a meaningful look and she immediately left the room. She met Ventura at the dining
area. He told her, "Prepare an escape. Aalis na tayo." Shocked with what she saw, Alfaro rushed out of
the house to the others who were either sitting in her car or milling on the sidewalk. She entered her car
and turned on the engine but she did not know where to go. Webb, Lejano, and Ventura came out of the
house just then. Webb suddenly picked up a stone and threw it at the main door, breaking its glass frame.

As the three men approached the pedestrian gate, Webb told Ventura that he forgot his jacket in the
house. But Ventura told him that they could not get in anymore as the iron grills had already locked. They
all rode in their cars and drove away until they reached Aguirre Avenue. As they got near an old hotel at
the Tropical Palace area, Alfaro noticed the Nissan Patrol slow down. Someone threw something out of
the car into the cogonal area.
The convoy of cars went to a large house with high walls, concrete fence, steel gate, and a long driveway
at BF Executive Village. They entered the compound and gathered at the lawn where the "blaming
session" took place. It was here that Alfaro and those who remained outside the Vizconde house learned
of what happened. The first to be killed was Carmelas mother, then Jennifer, and finally, Carmella.
Ventura blamed Webb, telling him, "Bakit naman pati yung bata?" Webb replied that the girl woke up and
on seeing him molesting Carmela, she jumped on him, bit his shoulders, and pulled his hair. Webb got
mad, grabbed the girl, pushed her to the wall, and repeatedly stabbed her. Lejano excused himself at this
point to use the telephone in the house. Meanwhile, Webb called up someone on his cellular phone.

At around 2:00 in the morning, accused Gerardo Biong arrived. Webb ordered him to go and clean up the
Vizconde house and said to him, "Pera lang ang katapat nyan." Biong answered, "Okay lang." Webb
spoke to his companions and told them, "We dont know each other. We havent seen each otherbaka
maulit yan." Alfaro and Estrada left and they drove to her fathers house.12

1. The quality of the witness

Was Alfaro an ordinary subdivision girl who showed up at the NBI after four years, bothered by her
conscience or egged on by relatives or friends to come forward and do what was right? No. She was, at
the time she revealed her story, working for the NBI as an "asset," a stool pigeon, one who earned her
living by fraternizing with criminals so she could squeal on them to her NBI handlers. She had to live a life
of lies to get rewards that would pay for her subsistence and vices.

According to Atty. Artemio Sacaguing, former head of the NBI Anti-Kidnapping, Hijacking, and Armed
Robbery Task Force (AKHAR) Section, Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI since November or
December 1994 as an "asset." She supplied her handlers with information against drug pushers and other
criminal elements. Some of this information led to the capture of notorious drug pushers like Christopher
Cruz Santos and Orlando Bacquir. Alfaros tip led to the arrest of the leader of the "Martilyo gang" that
killed a police officer. Because of her talent, the task force gave her "very special treatment" and she
became its "darling," allowed the privilege of spending nights in one of the rooms at the NBI offices.

When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her about it and she was piqued.
One day, she unexpectedly told Sacaguing that she knew someone who had the real story behind the
Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing showed interest. Alfaro promised to bring that someone to the NBI to tell
his story. When this did not happen and Sacaguing continued to press her, she told him that she might as
well assume the role of her informant. Sacaguing testified thus:

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. Atty. Sacaguing, how did Jessica Alfaro become a witness in the Vizconde murder case? Will
you tell the Honorable Court?

xxxx

A. She told me. Your Honor, that she knew somebody who related to her the circumstances, I
mean, the details of the massacre of the Vizconde family. Thats what she told me, Your Honor.

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. And what did you say?

xxxx
A. I was quite interested and I tried to persuade her to introduce to me that man and she
promised that in due time, she will bring to me the man, and together with her, we will try to
convince him to act as a state witness and help us in the solution of the case.

xxxx

Q. Atty. Sacaguing, were you able to interview this alleged witness?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. No, sir.

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. Why not?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. Because Jessica Alfaro was never able to comply with her promise to bring the man to me.
She told me later that she could not and the man does not like to testify.

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. All right, and what happened after that?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. She told me, "easy lang kayo, Sir," if I may quote, "easy lang Sir, huwag kayong"

COURT:

How was that?

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. "Easy lang, Sir. Sir, relax lang, Sir, papapelan ko, papapelan ko na lang yan."

xxxx

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. All right, and what was your reaction when Ms. Alfaro stated that "papapelan ko na lang yan?"

WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. I said, "hindi puwede yan, kasi hindi ka naman eye witness."

ATTY. ONGKIKO:

Q. And what was the reply of Ms. Alfaro?

 WITNESS SACAGUING:

A. Hindi siya nakakibo, until she went away.

(TSN, May 28, 1996, pp. 49-50, 58, 77-79)

Quite significantly, Alfaro never refuted Sacaguings above testimony.

2. The suspicious details

But was it possible for Alfaro to lie with such abundant details some of which even tallied with the physical
evidence at the scene of the crime? No doubt, yes.

Firstly, the Vizconde massacre had been reported in the media with dizzying details. Everybody was
talking about what the police found at the crime scene and there were lots of speculations about them.

Secondly, the police had arrested some "akyat-bahay" group in Paraaque and charged them with the
crime. The police prepared the confessions of the men they apprehended and filled these up with details
that the evidence of the crime scene provided. Alfaros NBI handlers who were doing their own
investigation knew of these details as well. Since Alfaro hanged out at the NBI offices and practically lived
there, it was not too difficult for her to hear of these evidentiary details and gain access to the documents.

Not surprisingly, the confessions of some members of the Barroso "akyat bahay" gang, condemned by
the Makati RTC as fabricated by the police to pin the crime on them, shows how crime investigators could
make a confession ring true by matching some of its details with the physical evidence at the crime
scene. Consider the following:

a. The Barroso gang members said that they got into Carmelas house by breaking the glass panel of the
front door using a stone wrapped in cloth to deaden the noise. Alfaro could not use this line since the core
of her story was that Webb was Carmelas boyfriend. Webb had no reason to smash her front door to get
to see her.

Consequently, to explain the smashed door, Alfaro had to settle for claiming that, on the way out of the
house, Webb picked up some stone and, out of the blue, hurled it at the glass-paneled front door of the
Vizconde residence. His action really made no sense. From Alfaros narration, Webb appeared rational in
his decisions. It was past midnight, the house was dark, and they wanted to get away quickly to avoid
detection. Hurling a stone at that glass door and causing a tremendous noise was bizarre, like inviting the
neighbors to come.

b. The crime scene showed that the house had been ransacked. The rejected confessions of the Barroso
"akyat-bahay" gang members said that they tried to rob the house. To explain this physical evidence,
Alfaro claimed that at one point Ventura was pulling a kitchen drawer, and at another point, going through
a handbag on the dining table. He said he was looking for the front-door key and the car key.

Again, this portion of Alfaros story appears tortured to accommodate the physical evidence of the
ransacked house. She never mentioned Ventura having taken some valuables with him when they left
Carmelas house. And why would Ventura rummage a bag on the table for the front-door key, spilling the
contents, when they had already gotten into the house. It is a story made to fit in with the crime scene
although robbery was supposedly not the reason Webb and his companions entered that house.

c. It is the same thing with the garage light. The police investigators found that the bulb had been
loosened to turn off the light. The confessions of the Barroso gang claimed that one of them climbed the
parked cars hood to reach up and darken that light. This made sense since they were going to rob the
place and they needed time to work in the dark trying to open the front door. Some passersby might look
in and see what they were doing.

Alfaro had to adjust her testimony to take into account that darkened garage light. So she claimed that
Ventura climbed the cars hood, using a chair, to turn the light off. But, unlike the Barroso "akyat-bahay"
gang, Webb and his friends did not have anything to do in a darkened garage. They supposedly knew in
advance that Carmela left the doors to the kitchen open for them. It did not make sense for Ventura to risk
standing on the cars hood and be seen in such an awkward position instead of going straight into the
house.

And, thirdly, Alfaro was the NBIs star witness, their badge of excellent investigative work.lavvphil After
claiming that they had solved the crime of the decade, the NBI people had a stake in making her sound
credible and, obviously, they gave her all the preparations she needed for the job of becoming a fairly
good substitute witness. She was their "darling" of an asset. And this is not pure speculation. As pointed
out above, Sacaguing of the NBI, a lawyer and a ranking official, confirmed this to be a cold fact. Why the
trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to see this is mystifying.

At any rate, did Alfaro at least have a fine memory for faces that had a strong effect on her, given the
circumstances? Not likely. She named Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez as one of the culprits in the Vizconde
killings. But when the NBI found a certain Michael Rodriguez, a drug dependent from the Bicutan
Rehabilitation Center, initially suspected to be Alfaros Miguel Rodriguez and showed him to Alfaro at the
NBI office, she ran berserk, slapping and kicking Michael, exclaiming: "How can I forget your face. We
just saw each other in a disco one month ago and you told me then that you will kill me." As it turned out,
he was not Miguel Rodriguez, the accused in this case.13

Two possibilities exist: Michael was really the one Alfaro wanted to implicate to settle some score with
him but it was too late to change the name she already gave or she had myopic vision, tagging the wrong
people for what they did not do.

3. The quality of the testimony

There is another thing about a lying witness: her story lacks sense or suffers from inherent
inconsistencies. An understanding of the nature of things and the common behavior of people will help
expose a lie. And it has an abundant presence in this case.

One. In her desire to implicate Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart, who were
supposed to be Webbs co-principals in the crime, Alfaro made it a point to testify that Webb proposed
twice to his friends the gang-rape of Carmela who had hurt him. And twice, they (including, if one believes
Alfaro, her own boyfriend Estrada) agreed in a chorus to his proposal. But when they got to Carmelas
house, only Webb, Lejano, Ventura, and Alfaro entered the house.

Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez supposedly stayed around Alfaros car, which was
parked on the street between Carmelas house and the next. Some of these men sat on top of the cars
lid while others milled on the sidewalk, visible under the street light to anyone who cared to watch them,
particularly to the people who were having a drinking party in a nearby house. Obviously, the behavior of
Webbs companions out on the street did not figure in a planned gang-rape of Carmela.

Two. Ventura, Alfaros dope supplier, introduced her for the first time in her life to Webb and his friends in
a parking lot by a mall. So why would she agree to act as Webbs messenger, using her gas, to bring his
message to Carmela at her home. More inexplicably, what motivated Alfaro to stick it out the whole night
with Webb and his friends?

They were practically strangers to her and her boyfriend Estrada. When it came to a point that Webb
decided with his friends to gang-rape Carmela, clearly, there was nothing in it for Alfaro. Yet, she stuck it
out with them, as a police asset would, hanging in there until she had a crime to report, only she was not
yet an "asset" then. If, on the other hand, Alfaro had been too soaked in drugs to think clearly and just
followed along where the group took her, how could she remember so much details that only a drug-free
mind can?

Three. When Alfaro went to see Carmela at her house for the second time, Carmella told her that she still
had to go out and that Webb and his friends should come back around midnight. Alfaro returned to her
car and waited for Carmela to drive out in her own car. And she trailed her up to Aguirre Avenue where
she supposedly dropped off a man whom she thought was Carmelas boyfriend. Alfaros trailing Carmela
to spy on her unfaithfulness to Webb did not make sense since she was on limited errand. But, as a
critical witness, Alfaro had to provide a reason for Webb to freak out and decide to come with his friends
and harm Carmela.

Four. According to Alfaro, when they returned to Carmelas house the third time around midnight, she led
Webb, Lejano, and Ventura through the pedestrian gate that Carmela had left open. Now, this is weird.
Webb was the gang leader who decided what they were going to do. He decided and his friends agreed
with him to go to Carmelas house and gang-rape her. Why would Alfaro, a woman, a stranger to Webb
before that night, and obviously with no role to play in the gang-rape of Carmela, lead him and the others
into her house? It made no sense. It would only make sense if Alfaro wanted to feign being a witness to
something she did not see.

Five. Alfaro went out of the house to smoke at the garden. After about twenty minutes, a woman
exclaimed, "Sino yan?" On hearing this, Alfaro immediately walked out of the garden and went to her car.
Apparently, she did this because she knew they came on a sly. Someone other than Carmela became
conscious of the presence of Webb and others in the house. Alfaro walked away because, obviously, she
did not want to get involved in a potential confrontation. This was supposedly her frame of mind: fear of
getting involved in what was not her business.

But if that were the case, how could she testify based on personal knowledge of what went on in the
house? Alfaro had to change that frame of mind to one of boldness and reckless curiosity. So that is what
she next claimed. She went back into the house to watch as Webb raped Carmela on the floor of the
masters bedroom. He had apparently stabbed to death Carmelas mom and her young sister whose
bloodied bodies were sprawled on the bed. Now, Alfaro testified that she got scared (another shift to fear)
for she hurriedly got out of the house after Webb supposedly gave her a meaningful look.

Alfaro quickly went to her car, not minding Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart who sat
on the car or milled on the sidewalk. She did not speak to them, even to Estrada, her boyfriend. She
entered her car and turned on the engine but she testified that she did not know where to go. This woman
who a few minutes back led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house, knowing that they were decided
to rape and harm Carmela, was suddenly too shocked to know where to go! This emotional pendulum
swing indicates a witness who was confused with her own lies.

4. The supposed corroborations

Intending to provide corroboration to Alfaros testimony, the prosecution presented six additional
witnesses:

Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims,
testified on the stab wounds they sustained14 and the presence of semen in Carmelas
genitalia,15 indicating that she had been raped.

Normal E. White, Jr., was the security guard on duty at Pitong Daan Subdivision from 7 p.m. of June 29
to 7 a.m. of June 30, 1991. He got a report on the morning of June 30 that something untoward happened
at the Vizconde residence. He went there and saw the dead bodies in the masters bedroom, the bag on
the dining table, as well as the loud noise emanating from a television set.16

White claimed that he noticed Gatchalian and his companions, none of whom he could identify, go in and
out of Pitong Daan Subdivision. He also saw them along Vinzons Street. Later, they entered Pitong Daan
Subdivision in a three-car convoy. White could not, however, describe the kind of vehicles they used or
recall the time when he saw the group in those two instances. And he did not notice anything suspicious
about their coming and going.

But Whites testimony cannot be relied on. His initial claim turned out to be inaccurate. He actually saw
Gatchalian and his group enter the Pitong Daan Subdivision only once. They were not going in and out.
Furthermore, Alfaro testified that when the convoy of cars went back the second time in the direction of
Carmelas house, she alone entered the subdivision and passed the guardhouse without stopping. Yet,
White who supposedly manned that guardhouse did not notice her.

Surprisingly, White failed to note Biong, a police officer, entering or exiting the subdivision on the early
morning of June 30 when he supposedly "cleaned up" Vizconde residence on Webbs orders. What is
more, White did not notice Carmela arrive with her mom before Alfaros first visit that night. Carmela
supposedly left with a male companion in her car at around 10:30 p.m. but White did not notice it. He also
did not notice Carmela reenter the subdivision. White actually discredited Alfaros testimony about the
movements of the persons involved.

Further, while Alfaro testified that it was the Mazda pick-up driven by Filart that led the three-vehicle
convoy,17 White claimed it was the Nissan Patrol with Gatchalian on it that led the convoy since he would
not have let the convoy in without ascertaining that Gatchalian, a resident, was in it. Security guard White
did not, therefore, provide corroboration to Alfaros testimony.1avvphi1

Justo Cabanacan, the security supervisor at Pitong Daan Subdivision testified that he saw Webb around
the last week of May or the first week of June 1991 to prove his presence in the Philippines when he
claimed to be in the United States. He was manning the guard house at the entrance of the subdivision of
Pitong Daan when he flagged down a car driven by Webb. Webb said that he would see Lilet Sy.
Cabanacan asked him for an ID but he pointed to his United BF Homes sticker and said that he resided
there. Cabanacan replied, however, that Pitong Daan had a local sticker.

Cabanacan testified that, at this point, Webb introduced himself as the son of Congressman Webb. Still,
the supervisor insisted on seeing his ID. Webb grudgingly gave it and after seeing the picture and the
name on it, Cabanacan returned the same and allowed Webb to pass without being logged in as their
Standard Operating Procedure required.18

But Cabanacan's testimony could not be relied on. Although it was not common for a security guard to
challenge a Congressmans son with such vehemence, Cabanacan did not log the incident on the
guardhouse book. Nor did he, contrary to prescribed procedure, record the visitors entry into the
subdivision. It did not make sense that Cabanacan was strict in the matter of seeing Webbs ID but not in
recording the visit.

Mila Gaviola used to work as laundry woman for the Webbs at their house at BF Homes Executive
Village. She testified that she saw Webb at his parents house on the morning of June 30, 1991 when she
got the dirty clothes from the room that he and two brothers occupied at about 4.a.m. She saw him again
pacing the floor at 9 a.m. At about 1 p.m., Webb left the house in t-shirt and shorts, passing through a
secret door near the maids quarters on the way out. Finally, she saw Webb at 4 p.m. of the same day. 19

On cross-examination, however, Gaviola could not say what distinguished June 30, 1991 from the other
days she was on service at the Webb household as to enable her to distinctly remember, four years later,
what one of the Webb boys did and at what time. She could not remember any of the details that
happened in the household on the other days. She proved to have a selective photographic memory and
this only damaged her testimony.

Gaviola tried to corroborate Alfaro's testimony by claiming that on June 30, 1991 she noticed bloodstains
on Webb's t-shirt.20 She did not call the attention of anybody in the household about it when it would have
been a point of concern that Webb may have been hurt, hence the blood.

Besides, Victoria Ventoso, the Webbs' housemaid from March 1989 to May 1992, and Sgt. Miguel Muoz,
the Webbs' security aide in 1991, testified that Gaviola worked for the Webbs only from January 1991 to
April 1991. Ventoso further testified that it was not Gaviola's duty to collect the clothes from the 2nd floor
bedrooms, this being the work of the housemaid charged with cleaning the rooms.

What is more, it was most unlikely for a laundrywoman who had been there for only four months to
collect, as she claimed, the laundry from the rooms of her employers and their grown up children at four
in the morning while they were asleep.

And it did not make sense, if Alfaros testimony were to be believed that Webb, who was so careful and
clever that he called Biong to go to the Vizconde residence at 2 a.m. to clean up the evidence against him
and his group, would bring his bloodied shirt home and put it in the hamper for laundrywoman Gaviola to
collect and wash at 4 a.m. as was her supposed habit.

Lolita De Birrer was accused Biongs girlfriend around the time the Vizconde massacre took place. Birrer
testified that she was with Biong playing mahjong from the evening of June 29, 1991 to the early morning
of June 30, when Biong got a call at around 2 a.m. This prompted him, according to De Birrer, to leave
and go to BF. Someone sitting at the backseat of a taxi picked him up. When Biong returned at 7 a.m. he
washed off what looked like dried blood from his fingernails. And he threw away a foul-smelling
handkerchief. She also saw Biong take out a knife with aluminum cover from his drawer and hid it in his
steel cabinet.21

The security guard at Pitong Daan did not notice any police investigator flashing a badge to get into the
village although Biong supposedly came in at the unholy hour of two in the morning. His departure before
7 a.m. also remained unnoticed by the subdivision guards. Besides, if he had cleaned up the crime scene
shortly after midnight, what was the point of his returning there on the following morning to dispose of
some of the evidence in the presence of other police investigators and on-lookers? In fact, why would he
steal valuable items from the Vizconde residence on his return there hours later if he had the opportunity
to do it earlier?

At most, Birrers testimony only established Biongs theft of certain items from the Vizconde residence
and gross neglect for failing to maintain the sanctity of the crime scene by moving around and altering the
effects of the crime. Birrers testimony failed to connect Biong's acts to Webb and the other accused.

Lauro Vizconde testified about how deeply he was affected by the loss of her wife and two daughters.
Carmella spoke to him of a rejected suitor she called "Bagyo," because he was a Paraaque politicians
son. Unfortunately, Lauro did not appear curious enough to insist on finding out who the rejected fellow
was. Besides, his testimony contradicts that of Alfaro who testified that Carmela and Webb had an on-
going relation. Indeed, if Alfaro were to be believed, Carmela wanted Webb to come to her house around
midnight. She even left the kitchen door open so he could enter the house.

5. The missing corroboration

There is something truly remarkable about this case: the prosecutions core theory that Carmela and
Webb had been sweethearts, that she had been unfaithful to him, and that it was for this reason that
Webb brought his friends to her house to gang-rape her is totally uncorroborated!
For instance, normally, if Webb, a Congressmans son, courted the young Carmela, that would be news
among her circle of friends if not around town. But, here, none of her friends or even those who knew
either of them came forward to affirm this. And if Webb hanged around with her, trying to win her favors,
he would surely be seen with her. And this would all the more be so if they had become sweethearts, a
relation that Alfaro tried to project with her testimony.

But, except for Alfaro, the NBI asset, no one among Carmelas friends or her friends friends would testify
ever hearing of such relationship or ever seeing them together in some popular hangouts in Paraaque or
Makati. Alfaros claim of a five-hour drama is like an alien page, rudely and unconnectedly inserted into
Webb and Carmelas life stories or like a piece of jigsaw puzzle trimmed to fit into the shape on the board
but does not belong because it clashes with the surrounding pieces. It has neither antecedent nor
concomitant support in the verifiable facts of their personal histories. It is quite unreal.

What is more, Alfaro testified that she saw Carmela drive out of her house with a male passenger, Mr. X,
whom Alfaro thought the way it looked was also Carmelas lover. This was the all-important reason Webb
supposedly had for wanting to harm her. Again, none of Carmelas relatives, friends, or people who knew
her ever testified about the existence of Mr.X in her life. Nobody has come forward to testify having ever
seen him with Carmela. And despite the gruesome news about her death and how Mr. X had played a
role in it, he never presented himself like anyone who had lost a special friend normally would. Obviously,
Mr. X did not exist, a mere ghost of the imagination of Alfaro, the woman who made a living informing on
criminals.

Webbs U.S. Alibi

Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi.

a. The travel preparations

Webb claims that in 1991 his parents, Senator Freddie Webb and his wife, Elizabeth, sent their son to the
United States (U.S.) to learn the value of independence, hard work, and money. 22 Gloria Webb, his aunt,
accompanied him. Rajah Tours booked their flight to San Francisco via United Airlines. Josefina Nolasco
of Rajah Tours confirmed that Webb and his aunt used their plane tickets.

Webb told his friends, including his neighbor, Jennifer Claire Cabrera, and his basketball buddy, Joselito
Orendain Escobar, of his travel plans. He even invited them to his despedida party on March 8, 1991 at
Faces Disco along Makati Ave.23 On March 8,1991, the eve of his departure, he took girlfriend Milagros
Castillo to a dinner at Bunchums at the Makati Cinema Square. His basketball buddy Rafael Jose with
Tina Calma, a blind date arranged by Webb, joined them. They afterwards went to Faces Disco for
Webb's despedida party. Among those present were his friends Paulo Santos and Jay Ortega.24

b. The two immigration checks

The following day, March 9, 1991, Webb left for San Francisco, California, with his Aunt Gloria on board
United Airlines Flight 808.25 Before boarding his plane, Webb passed through the Philippine Immigration
booth at the airport to have his passport cleared and stamped. Immigration Officer, Ferdinand Sampol
checked Webbs visa, stamped, and initialed his passport, and let him pass through. 26 He was listed on
the United Airlines Flights Passenger Manifest.27

On arrival at San Francisco, Webb went through the U.S. Immigration where his entry into that country
was recorded. Thus, the U.S. Immigration Naturalization Service, checking with its Non-immigrant
Information System, confirmed Webb's entry into the U.S. on March 9, 1991. Webb presented at the trial
the INS Certification issued by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service,28 the computer-generated
print-out of the US-INS indicating Webb's entry on March 9, 1991,29 and the US-INS Certification dated
August 31, 1995, authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, correcting an earlier
August 10, 1995 Certification.30

c. Details of U.S. sojourn

In San Francisco, Webb and his aunt Gloria were met by the latters daughter, Maria Teresa Keame, who
brought them to Glorias house in Daly City, California. During his stay with his aunt, Webb met
Christopher Paul Legaspi Esguerra, Glorias grandson. In April 1991, Webb, Christopher, and a certain
Daphne Domingo watched the concert of Deelite Band in San Francisco.31 In the same month, Dorothy
Wheelock and her family invited Webb to Lake Tahoe to return the Webbs hospitality when she was in
the Philippines.32

In May 1991, on invitation of another aunt, Susan Brottman, Webb moved to Anaheim Hills,
California.33 During his stay there, he occupied himself with playing basketball once or twice a week with
Steven Keeler34 and working at his cousin-in-laws pest control company.35 Webb presented the
companys logbook showing the tasks he performed,36 his paycheck,37 his ID, and other employment
papers. On June 14, 1991 he applied for a driver's license 38 and wrote three letters to his friend Jennifer
Cabrera.39

On June 28, 1991, Webbs parents visited him at Anaheim and stayed with the Brottmans. On the same
day, his father introduced Honesto Aragon to his son when he came to visit. 40 On the following day, June
29, Webb, in the company of his father and Aragon went to Riverside, California, to look for a car. They
bought an MR2 Toyota car.41 Later that day, a visitor at the Brottmans, Louis Whittacker, saw Webb
looking at the plates of his new car.42 To prove the purchase, Webb presented the Public Records of
California Department of Motor Vehicle43 and a car plate "LEW WEBB."44 In using the car in the U.S.,
Webb even received traffic citations.45

On June 30, 1991 Webb, again accompanied by his father and Aragon,46 bought a bicycle at Orange
Cycle Center.47 The Center issued Webb a receipt dated June 30, 1991.48 On July 4, 1991,
Independence Day, the Webbs, the Brottmans, and the Vaca family had a lakeside picnic. 49

Webb stayed with the Brottmans until mid July and rented a place for less than a month. On August 4,
1991 he left for Longwood, Florida, to stay with the spouses Jack and Sonja Rodriguez.50 There, he met
Armando Rodriguez with whom he spent time, playing basketball on weekends, watching movies, and
playing billiards.51 In November 1991, Webb met performing artist Gary Valenciano, a friend of Jack
Rodriguez, who was invited for a dinner at the Rodriguezs house.52 He left the Rodriguezs home in
August 1992, returned to Anaheim and stayed with his aunt Imelda Pagaspas. He stayed there until he
left for the Philippines on October 26, 1992.

d. The second immigration checks

As with his trip going to the U.S., Webb also went through both the U.S. and Philippine immigrations on
his return trip. Thus, his departure from the U.S. was confirmed by the same certifications that confirmed
his entry.53 Furthermore, a Diplomatic Note of the U.S. Department of State with enclosed letter from
Acting Director Debora A. Farmer of the Records Operations, Office of Records of the US-INS stated that
the Certification dated August 31, 1995 is a true and accurate statement. And when he boarded his plane,
the Passenger Manifest of Philippine Airlines Flight No. 103,54 certified by Agnes Tabuena55 confirmed his
return trip.

When he arrived in Manila, Webb again went through the Philippine Immigration. In fact, the arrival stamp
and initial on his passport indicated his return to Manila on October 27, 1992. This was authenticated by
Carmelita Alipio, the immigration officer who processed Webbs reentry. 56 Upon his return, in October
1992, Paolo Santos, Joselito Erondain Escobar, and Rafael Jose once again saw Webb playing
basketball at the BF's Phase III basketball court.
e. Alibi versus positive identification

The trial court and the Court of Appeals are one in rejecting as weak Webbs alibi. Their reason is
uniform: Webbs alibi cannot stand against Alfaros positive identification of him as the rapist and killer of
Carmela and, apparently, the killer as well of her mother and younger sister. Because of this, to the lower
courts, Webbs denial and alibi were fabricated.

But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the accused is truly innocent, he
can have no other defense but denial and alibi. So how can such accused penetrate a mind that has been
made cynical by the rule drilled into his head that a defense of alibi is a hangmans noose in the face of a
witness positively swearing, "I saw him do it."? Most judges believe that such assertion automatically
dooms an alibi which is so easy to fabricate. This quick stereotype thinking, however, is distressing. For
how else can the truth that the accused is really innocent have any chance of prevailing over such a
stone-cast tenet?

There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard against slipping into hasty
conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a case. A positive declaration
from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not automatically cancel out the
accuseds claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can make as positive an identification as a truthful
witness can. The lying witness can also say as forthrightly and unequivocally, "He did it!" without blinking
an eye.

Rather, to be acceptable, the positive identification must meet at least two criteria:

First, the positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness. She is credible who
can be trusted to tell the truth, usually based on past experiences with her. Her word has, to one who
knows her, its weight in gold.

And second, the witness story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently contrived. A
witness who testifies about something she never saw runs into inconsistencies and makes bewildering
claims.

Here, as already fully discussed above, Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet the above criteria.

She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience. She had been
hanging around that agency for sometime as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and
squealing on them. Police assets are often criminals themselves. She was the prosecutions worst
possible choice for a witness. Indeed, her superior testified that she volunteered to play the role of a
witness in the Vizconde killings when she could not produce a man she promised to the NBI.

And, although her testimony included details, Alfaro had prior access to the details that the investigators
knew of the case. She took advantage of her familiarity with these details to include in her testimony the
clearly incompatible act of Webb hurling a stone at the front door glass frames even when they were
trying to slip away quietlyjust so she can accommodate this crime scene feature. She also had Ventura
rummaging a bag on the dining table for a front door key that nobody needed just to explain the physical
evidence of that bag and its scattered contents. And she had Ventura climbing the cars hood, risking
being seen in such an awkward position, when they did not need to darken the garage to force open the
front doorjust so to explain the darkened light and foot prints on the car hood.

Further, her testimony was inherently incredible. Her story that Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada,
Rodriguez, and Filart agreed to take their turns raping Carmela is incongruent with their indifference,
exemplified by remaining outside the house, milling under a street light, visible to neighbors and
passersby, and showing no interest in the developments inside the house, like if it was their turn to rape
Carmela. Alfaros story that she agreed to serve as Webbs messenger to Carmela, using up her gas, and
staying with him till the bizarre end when they were practically strangers, also taxes incredulity.

To provide basis for Webbs outrage, Alfaro said that she followed Carmela to the main road to watch her
let off a lover on Aguirre Avenue. And, inexplicably, although Alfaro had only played the role of
messenger, she claimed leading Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house to gang-rape Carmella, as if
Alfaro was establishing a reason for later on testifying on personal knowledge. Her swing from an emotion
of fear when a woman woke up to their presence in the house and of absolute courage when she
nonetheless returned to become the lone witness to a grim scene is also quite inexplicable.

Ultimately, Alfaros quality as a witness and her inconsistent, if not inherently unbelievable, testimony
cannot be the positive identification that jurisprudence acknowledges as sufficient to jettison a denial and
an alibi.

f. A documented alibi

To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence 57 that (a) he was
present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.58

The courts below held that, despite his evidence, Webb was actually in Paraaque when the Vizconde
killings took place; he was not in the U.S. from March 9, 1991 to October 27, 1992; and if he did leave on
March 9, 1991, he actually returned before June 29, 1991, committed the crime, erased the fact of his
return to the Philippines from the records of the U.S. and Philippine Immigrations, smuggled himself out of
the Philippines and into the U.S., and returned the normal way on October 27, 1992. But this ruling
practically makes the death of Webb and his passage into the next life the only acceptable alibi in the
Philippines. Courts must abandon this unjust and inhuman paradigm.

If one is cynical about the Philippine system, he could probably claim that Webb, with his fathers
connections, can arrange for the local immigration to put a March 9, 1991 departure stamp on his
passport and an October 27, 1992 arrival stamp on the same. But this is pure speculation since there had
been no indication that such arrangement was made. Besides, how could Webb fix a foreign airlines
passenger manifest, officially filed in the Philippines and at the airport in the U.S. that had his name on
them? How could Webb fix with the U.S. Immigrations record system those two dates in its record of his
travels as well as the dates when he supposedly departed in secret from the U.S. to commit the crime in
the Philippines and then return there? No one has come up with a logical and plausible answer to these
questions.

The Court of Appeals rejected the evidence of Webbs passport since he did not leave the original to be
attached to the record. But, while the best evidence of a document is the original, this means that the
same is exhibited in court for the adverse party to examine and for the judge to see. As Court of Appeals
Justice Tagle said in his dissent,59the practice when a party does not want to leave an important
document with the trial court is to have a photocopy of it marked as exhibit and stipulated among the
parties as a faithful reproduction of the original. Stipulations in the course of trial are binding on the
parties and on the court.

The U.S. Immigration certification and the computer print-out of Webbs arrival in and departure from that
country were authenticated by no less than the Office of the U.S. Attorney General and the State
Department. Still the Court of Appeals refused to accept these documents for the reason that Webb failed
to present in court the immigration official who prepared the same. But this was unnecessary. Webbs
passport is a document issued by the Philippine government, which under international practice, is the
official record of travels of the citizen to whom it is issued. The entries in that passport are presumed
true.60
The U.S. Immigration certification and computer print-out, the official certifications of which have been
authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, merely validated the arrival and departure
stamps of the U.S. Immigration office on Webbs passport. They have the same evidentiary value. The
officers who issued these certifications need not be presented in court to testify on them. Their
trustworthiness arises from the sense of official duty and the penalty attached to a breached duty, in the
routine and disinterested origin of such statement and in the publicity of the record. 61

The Court of Appeals of course makes capital of the fact that an earlier certification from the U.S.
Immigration office said that it had no record of Webb entering the U.S. But that erroneous first certification
was amply explained by the U.S. Government and Court of Appeals Justice Tagle stated it in his
dissenting opinion, thus:

While it is true that an earlier Certification was issued by the U.S. INS on August 16, 1995 finding "no
evidence of lawful admission of Webb," this was already clarified and deemed erroneous by no less than
the US INS Officials. As explained by witness Leo Herrera-Lim, Consul and Second Secretary of the
Philippine Embassy in Washington D.C., said Certification did not pass through proper diplomatic
channels and was obtained in violation of the rules on protocol and standard procedure governing such
request.

The initial request was merely initiated by BID Commissioner Verceles who directly communicated with
the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, USA, bypassing the Secretary of Foreign Affairs which is the
proper protocol procedure. Mr. Steven Bucher, the acting Chief of the Records Services Board of US-INS
Washington D.C. in his letter addressed to Philip Antweiler, Philippine Desk Officer, State Department,
declared the earlier Certification as incorrect and erroneous as it was "not exhaustive and did not reflect
all available information." Also, Richard L. Huff, Co-Director of the Office of Information and privacy, US
Department of Justice, in response to the appeal raised by Consul General Teresita V. Marzan, explained
that "the INS normally does not maintain records on individuals who are entering the country as visitors
rather than as immigrants: and that a notation concerning the entry of a visitor may be made at the
Nonimmigrant Information system. Since appellant Webb entered the U.S. on a mere tourist visa,
obviously, the initial search could not have produced the desired result inasmuch as the data base that
was looked into contained entries of the names of IMMIGRANTS and not that of NON-IMMIGRANT
visitors of the U.S..62

The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy of travel
documents like the passport as well as the domestic and foreign records of departures and arrivals from
airports. They claim that it would not have been impossible for Webb to secretly return to the Philippines
after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the U.S., and openly return to
the Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel between the U.S. and the Philippines, said the lower
courts took only about twelve to fourteen hours.

If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view, it might as well tear the rules of evidence
out of the law books and regard suspicions, surmises, or speculations as reasons for impeaching
evidence. It is not that official records, which carry the presumption of truth of what they state, are
immune to attack. They are not. That presumption can be overcome by evidence. Here, however, the
prosecution did not bother to present evidence to impeach the entries in Webbs passport and the
certifications of the Philippine and U.S. immigration services regarding his travel to the U.S. and back.
The prosecutions rebuttal evidence is the fear of the unknown that it planted in the lower courts minds.

7. Effect of Webbs alibi to others

Webbs documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to him, but also
with respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts
the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaros testimony will not hold
together. Webbs participation is the anchor of Alfaros story. Without it, the evidence against the others
must necessarily fall.

CONCLUSION

In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts about the
innocence of the accused since an open mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it
entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send an
innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to ones inner being, like a piece of meat lodged
immovable between teeth.

Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the testimony of an NBI asset
who proposed to her handlers that she take the role of the witness to the Vizconde massacre that she
could not produce?

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December 15, 2005 and
Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and ACQUITS
accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez,
Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which they were charged for failure
of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately
RELEASED from detention unless they are confined for another lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for
immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to report the action
he has taken to this Court within five days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. Nos. 138874-75

Plaintiff-Appellee,

Present:

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.

PUNO,
- versus - PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAAGA alias "PACO"; AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias CORONA,
"WESLEY"; ALBERTO CAO alias "ALLAN CARPIO MORALES,
PAHAK"; ARIEL BALANSAG, DAVIDSON CALLEJO, SR.,
VALIENTE RUSIA alias "TISOY TAGALOG"; AZCUNA,
JAMES ANTHONY UY alias "WANGWANG"; TINGA,
and JAMES ANDREW UY alias "MM", NAZARIO, and
Accused-Appellants. GARCIA, JJ.
 Promulgated:

July 21, 2005

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

At bar are four (4) motions for reconsideration separately filed by appellants (1) Francisco Juan

Larraaga, (2) Josman Aznar, (3) Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Cao and Ariel Balansag, and (4) James Anthony

Uy and James Andrew Uy, assailing our Decision dated February 3, 2004 convicting them of the crimes

of (a) special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and (b) simple kidnapping and

serious illegal detention, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City in
Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-45303 and 45304 is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN

LARRAAGA alias PACO; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN
ADLAWAN alias WESLEY; ALBERTO CAO alias ALLAN PAHAK; ARIEL
BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias MM, are found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH by lethal injection;

(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN

LARRAAGA alias PACO; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN
ADLAWAN alias WESLEY; ALBERTO CAO alias ALLAN PAHAK; ARIEL
BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias MM, are found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and are sentenced
to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA;

(3) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellant JAMES ANTHONY UY, who
was a minor at the time the crime was committed, is likewise found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
with homicide and rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA; in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, he is declared guilty of simple kidnapping
and serious illegal detention and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of TWELVE (12) years
of prision mayor in its maximum period, as MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years
of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as MAXIMUM;

(4) Appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Marijoy and
Jacqueline, in each case, the amounts of (a) P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity, (b)P25,000.00 as temperate damages, (c) P150,000.00 as moral damages,
and (d) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is
unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to
the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and the death penalty can be
lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

In accordance with Article 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by

Section 25 of RA No. 7659, upon the finality of this Decision, let the records of this case
be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for the possible exercise of Her
Excellencys pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.

Appellants anchor their motions on the following grounds:

A. LARRAAGA

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN BARRING LARRAAGA AND THE

NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI) REGIONAL
DIRECTOR FLORENCIO VILLARIN FROM TESTIFYING;

II

THE POLICE PLANTED EVIDENCE ON APPELLANTS;

III

LARRAAGA SUFFICIENTLY PROVED HIS ALIBI;

IV
THE TRIAL COURT PREVENTED THE INTRODUCTION OF KEY
DEFENSE EVIDENCE;

THE CORPSE FOUND IN THE RAVINE WAS NOT THAT OF

MARIJOY; AND

VI

PROSECUTION WITNESS RUSIA WAS A COACHED WITNESS. [1]

B. AZNAR

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL

COURT DID NOT VIOLATE THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED TO DUE
PROCESS OF LAW.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN (A) DISCHARGING DAVID

RUSSIA AS STATE WITNESS; AND (B) CONVICTING THE
APPELLANTS MAINLY ON THE BASIS OF THE TESTIMONY OF
RUSIA.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF

APPELLANT AZNAR.

IV

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH

PENALTY ON THE APPELLANTS.[2]

C. ADLAWAN, BALANSAG, CAO

PROSECUTION WITNESS RUSIA IS NOT QUALIFIED TO BE A STATE

WITNESS UNDER PARAGRAPHS (D) AND (E), SECTION 17 OF THE
REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
 II

RUSIAS TESTIMONY AND THAT OF THE OTHER PROSECUTION

WITNESSES WERE INCREDIBLE, INCONSISTENT, AND
UNWORTHY OF BELIEF.

III

BIAS AND PREJUDICE AGAINST THE DEFENSE WERE GLARINGLY

DISPLAYED BY THE COURT A QUO WHICH GREATLY AFFECTED
THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.

IV

THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FOR THE CRIME

CHARGED HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.[3]

D. JAMES ANDREW AND JAMES ANTHONY UY

ACCUSED JAMES ANDREW S. UY WAS, LIKE HIS YOUNGER

BROTHER JAMES ANTHONY S. UY, A MINOR AT THE TIME THE
OFFENSES AT BAR ALLEGEDLY HAPPENED LAST JULY 16, 1997;
II

THE IDENTITY OF THE DEAD BODY OF THE WOMAN FOUND IN

TAN-AWAN, CARCAR, CEBU LAST JULY 18, 1997 WAS NEVER
CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED THUS THE NEED FOR ITS
EXHUMATION FOR DNA TESTING;[4]

In his supplemental motion for reconsideration dated March 25, 2004, Larraaga submitted a

separate study of Dr. Racquel Del Rosario-Fortun, Forensic Pathologist, to show that the examination

conducted by the prosecution expert witnesses on the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar is inadequate.

In a similar supplemental motion for reconsideration[5], Aznar submitted to this Court the

Affidavit dated February 27, 2004 of Atty. Florencio Villarin, Regional Director of the National Bureau of

Investigation, Central Visayas, to show that: (1) the police investigation of this case was flawed; (2) he
(Aznar) was arrested in 1997 not because of his involvement in this case but because he had in his

possession a pack of shabu and firearms; and (3) David Rusia is not a credible witness.

On July 15, 2004, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment [6] praying that the four (4)

motions for reconsideration be denied with finality, there being no new argument raised. He responded

to appellants assignments of errors by exhaustively quoting portions of our challenged Decision.

In his consolidated comment[7] to Aznars supplemental motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor

General enumerated the grounds why Atty. Villarins Affidavit should not be given consideration. On

February 15, 2005, Aznar filed a reply alleging that the Solicitor General read out of context certain

portions of the Affidavit. He argued that the

Affidavit only exposes the flawed investigation of the Chiong case and that, at the time of his arrest, there

was no evidence against him. On March 4, 2005, the Solicitor General filed a rejoinder stating that Aznars

reply actually supports the undersigned counsels (Solicitor Generals) position that Atty. Villarins

Affidavit is utterly inadequate to prove his innocence or at least even acquit them on reasonable doubt,

thus, it would be useless to call for new trial on the basis of such Affidavit. On March 29, 2005, Aznar

filed a sur-rejoinder insisting that the Affidavit should be given due consideration.

Except for the motion filed by appellants Uy brothers with respect to James Andrews alleged

minority, we find all the motions bereft of merit.

At the inception, let it be emphasized that the filing of a motion for reconsideration does not

impose on us the obligation to discuss and rule again on the grounds relied upon by the movant which

are mere reiteration of the issues previously raised and thoroughly determined and evaluated in our

Decision being questioned. In Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco,[8] we ruled that, "this

would be a useless formality of ritual invariably involving merely a reiteration of the reasons already set

forth in the judgment or final order for rejecting the arguments advanced by the movant."

The foregoing principle applies squarely to the motions filed by appellants Larraaga, Aznar,

Adlawan, Cao and Balansag, it being apparent that the points raised therein are not neoteric matters

demanding new judicial determination. They are mere rehash of the arguments set forth in their

respective briefs which we already considered, weighed and resolved before we rendered the Decision

sought to be reconsidered.
 However, in view of the severity of the penalties for the crimes charged, we deem it necessary to

stress once more our basis in convicting appellants.

The following is a prcis of the issues submitted by appellants in their motions:

This Court erred

first, in according credence to Rusias testimony;

second, in rejecting appellants alibi;

third, in holding that the trial court did not violate their right to due process when it excluded the

testimony of other defense witnesses; and

fourth, in holding that the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar was not that of Marijoy.

In deciding a criminal case, the policy of the courts is always to look at the case in its entirety. The

totality of the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense are weighed, thus, averting

general conclusions from isolated pieces of evidence. This means that an appeal of a criminal case opens

its entire records for review.[9]

Appellants vigorously contend that we should not have sustained Rusias testimony hook, line

and sinker, owing to his tainted record and reputation. However, it must be stressed that Rusias

testimony was not viewed in isolation. In giving credence to Rusias testimony, the trial court took into

consideration the physical evidenceand the corroborative testimonies of other witnesses. Thus, we find

no reason why we should not uphold the trial courts findings.

We reiterate our pronouncement in our Decision that what makes Rusias testimony worthy of

belief is its striking compatibility with the physical evidence. Physical evidence is one of the highest

degrees of proof. It speaks more eloquently than all witnesses put together. [10] The presence of Marijoys

ravished body in a deep ravine at Tan-awan, Carcar with tape on her mouth and handcuffs on her

wrists certainly
bolstered Rusias testimony on what actually took place from Ayala Center to Tan-awan. Indeed, the
details he supplied to the trial court are of such nature and quality that only a witness who actually saw

the commission of the crimes could furnish. Reinforcing his testimony is its corroboration by several

other witnesses who saw incidents of what he narrated. Rolando Dacillo and Mario Minoza witnessed

Jacquelines two failed attempts to escape from appellants near Ayala Center. Benjamin Molina and

Miguel Vergara recognized Rowen as the person who inquired from them where he could find a vehicle

for hire on the evening of July 16, 1997. Alfredo Duarte saw Rowen when he bought barbeque and

Tanduay at Nenes Store while the white van, driven by Cao, was waiting on the side of the road and he

heard voices of quarreling male and female emanating from the van. And lastly, Manuel Camingao and

Rosendo Rio testified on the presence of Larraaga and Josman at Tan-awan, Carcar at dawn of July 17,

1997. All these bits and pieces of story form part of Rusias narration. Now, with such strong anchorage on

the physical evidence and the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, why should we not accord credence

to Rusias testimony? Even assuming that his testimony standing alone might indeed be unworthy of

belief in view of his character, it is not so when considered with the other evidence presented by the

prosecution.

II

Appellants likewise claimed that we should have not sustained the trial courts rejection of

their alibi. Settled is the rule that the defense of alibi is inherently weak and crumbles in the light of

positive declarations of truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. [11] Being evidence that is

negative in nature and self-serving, it cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution

witnesses who testify on clear and positive evidence.[12] On top of its inherent weakness, alibi becomes

less plausible as a defense when it is corroborated only by relatives or close friends of the accused. [13]

This case presents to us a balance scale whereby perched on one end is appellants alibi supported by

witnesses who were either their relatives, friends or classmates, while on the other end is the positive

identification of the herein appellants by the prosecution witnesses who were not, in any way, related to

the victims. With the above jurisprudence as guide, we are certain that the balance must tilt in favor of

the latter.
Besides, a thorough examination of the evidence for the prosecution shows that the appellants
failed to meet the requirements of alibi, i.e., the requirements of time and place.[14] They failed to establish
by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to be at the Ayala Center,
Cebu City when the Chiong sisters were abducted. What is clear from the evidence is that Rowen,
Josman, Ariel, Alberto, James Anthony and James Andrew were all within the vicinity of Cebu City on
July 16, 1997.

Not even Larraaga who claimed to be in Quezon City satisfied the required proof of physical
impossibility. During the hearing, it was shown that it takes only one (1) hour to travel by plane from
Manila to Cebu and that there are four (4) airline companies plying the route. One of the defense
witnesses admitted that there are several flights from Manila to Cebu each morning, afternoon and
evening. Indeed, Larraagas presence in Cebu City on July 16, 1997 was proved to be not only a
possibility but a reality.Four (4) witnesses identified Larraaga as one of the two men talking to Marijoy
and Jacqueline on the night of July 16, 1997. Shiela Singson testified that on July 16, 1997, at around 7:20
in the evening, she saw Larraaga approach Marijoy and Jacqueline at the West Entry of Ayala Center.
The incident reminded her of Jacquelines prior story that he was Marijoys admirer. Shiela confirmed that
she knows Larraaga since she had seen him on five (5) occasions. Analie Konahap also testified that on
the same evening of July 16, 1997, at about 8:00 oclock, she saw Marijoy and Jacqueline talking to two
(2) men at the West Entry of Ayala Center. She recognized the two (2) men as Larraaga and Josman,
having seen them several times at Glicos, a game zone, located across her office at the third level of Ayala
Center. Williard Redobles, the security guard then assigned at Ayala Center, corroborated the foregoing
testimonies of Shiela and Analie. In addition, Rosendo Rio, a businessman from Cogon, Carcar, declared
that he saw Larraaga at Tan-awan at about 3:30 in the morning of July 17, 1997. The latter was leaning
against the hood of a white van.[15] And over and above all, Rusia categorically identified Larraaga as one
of the participes criminis.

Taking the individual testimonies of the above witnesses in relation with that of Rusia, we are
convinced that Larraaga was indeed in Cebu City at the time of the commission of the crimes and was
one of the principal perpetrators thereof.

At this juncture, it bears mentioning that this case is not the first time that Larraaga was charged

with or complained of pruriently assaulting young female students in Cebu. Months before the abduction

of Marijoy and Jackie, the parents of a certain Rochelle Virtucio, complained about Larraagas attempt to

snatch their young daughter and drag her in a black, stylish Honda Civic. It happened just near the gate

of Rochelles school, thus, showing his impudence. We quote a portion of the transcript of stenographic

notes dated September 23, 1998, thus:

ATTY. HERMOSISIMA:
Your Honor please, this is a . Inspector Era handed to this representation a copy of a
Letter dated September 25, 1996, addressed to the Student Affairs Office, University of
San Carlos,P. del Rosario Street, Cebu City, and this is signed by Leo Abayan and
Alexander Virtucio and noted by Mrs. Aurora Pacho, Principal, University of San
Carlos, Girls High School, and for the record, I will read the content:
 TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:

We the parents and guardians of Rochelle Virtucio, a first year high

school student of your University of San Carlos-Girls High School, are
writing your good office about an untoward incident involving our
daughter and another student of your school.

xxxxxx

That last Monday at around 5:00 PM, Rochelle and other classmates,
Michelle Amadar and Keizaneth Mondejar, while on their way to get a
ride home near the school campus, a black Honda Civic with five
young male teenagers including the driver, suddenly stopped beside
them, and simultaneously one of them, which was later identified as
FRANCISCO JUAN LARRANAGA, a BSHRM I student of your
school, grabbed Rochelle by her hand to try to get Rochelle to their
vehicle. She resisted and got away from him. Sensing some people
were watching what they were doing, they hurriedly sped away.

We are very concerned about Rochelles safety. Still now, she is

suffering the shock and tension that she is not supposed to experience
in her young life. It is very hard for us parents to think about what
shed been through.[16]

The presence of such complaint in the record of this case certainly does not enhance Larraagas chance of

securing an acquittal.

III

Larraaga and Aznar bewail our refusal to overturn the trial courts exclusion of Professor Jerome

Bailen and Atty. Florencio Villarin, NBI, Regional Director, as defense witnesses. Professor Bailen was

properly excluded. First, he is not a finger-print expert but an archaeologist. And second, his report

consists merely of the results of his visual inspection of the exhibits already several months old. Anent

Atty. Villarins failure to testify before the trial court, suffice it to say that his belated Affidavit, which

Aznar submitted via his supplemental motion for reconsideration dated May 5, 2004, raises nothing to

change our findings and conclusions. What clearly appears in said Affidavit is a man trying to impress

people that he was the one responsible for solving the Chiong case and for that, he deserves a promotion.
The trial court, at the onset, must have seen such immateriality in his intended testimony. Indeed, we

agree with the Solicitor Generals observation that such Affidavit is neither helpful nor encouraging to

Aznars cause. We quote his keen reflection on the matter:

xxxxxx

Third. Atty. Villarins affidavit, in paragraphs 19 and 20 thereof,

acknowledged that the body found in the Carcar ravine was that of Marijoy. This
assertion immediately conflicts with accused-appellant Aznars claim in his
Motion for Reconsideration that the corpse was not Marijoys. Surely, something
is amiss in accused-appellant Aznars recollection of his defense.

Fourth. Atty. Villarin confirmed in paragraph 24 of his affidavit that accused-

appellant Francisco Larranaga was a suspect in the subject crimes. Evidently, this
statement completely supports this Honorable Courts findings in its Decision
dated February 3, 2004.

Fifth. In paragraph 30 of Atty. Villarins affidavit, he stated that: The arrest of

Juzman Aznar was the major breakthrough in the investigation of the case
because witnesses came out and identified Juzman Aznar as one of those
allegedly seen talking to the victims on the night they disappeared. Hence,
accused-appellant Aznar was in the beginning already a first-grade suspect in
the Chiong sisters celebrated abduction and killing.

Sixth. Atty. Villarin admitted in paragraph 36 of his affidavit that: x x x I did

not take this against [Supt. Labra] for preempting our next move to get Juzman
Aznar as we were already placing him under surveillance because I knew
[Supt. Labra] did it in his honest desire to help solve the crime x x x. Clearly,
this statement is not an indictment of the investigation that the police undertook
in the subject crimes.

Seventh. Paragraphs 37 to 40 are nothing but personal tirades against alleged

influence peddling by Mrs. Thelma Chiong, mother of the victims, and the
purportedly undue promotions of the lawyers and police officers who unearthed
the evidence against accused-appellants and successfully prosecuted the
latter. In executing the affidavit, it appears that Atty. Villarin would want to
impress that he, rather than those promoted, deserved the promotion.

Eighth. Atty. Villarins inability to testify in the criminal cases was not due
solely to the prosecutions action. Whether he ought to testify or not was an
argument openly discussed in court. Hence, for the resulting inability, Atty.
Villarin has no one to blame but the defense lawyers who did everything to make
a mockery of the criminal proceedings.

And lastly, there is nothing in Atty. Villarins affidavit of the quality of a

smoking gun that would acquit accused-appellants of the crimes they have been
convicted. For he did not finish the police investigation of the subject crimes; this
is the long and short of his miniscule role in the instant case. Indeed, judging by
the substance of his affidavit, he would not be testifying in case a new trial is
held on anything that has not been said and rejected heretofore, except his
 own unsubstantiated opinions (i.e. not facts as required by evidentiary rules),
his self-congratulatory remarks, and his unmitigated frustration over failing to
get a promotion when almost everyone else did. [17]

Neither can we entertain at this late stage Dr. Fortuns separate study to show that the examination

conducted on the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar is inadequate. Such study cannot be classified as

newly-discovered evidence warranting belated reception. Obviously, Larraaga could have produced it

during trial had he wished to.

IV

Knowing that the prosecutions theory highly rests on the truth of Rusia testimony, appellants
endeavor to destroy it by claiming that the body found at the foot of a deep ravine in Tan-awan, Carcar
was not that of Marijoy. We must reiterate the reasons why we cannot give our assent to such
argument. First, Inspector Edgardo Lenizo,[18] a fingerprint expert, testified that the fingerprints of the
corpse match those of Marijoy.[19] Second, the packaging tape and the handcuff found on the dead body
were the same items placed on Marijoy and Jacqueline while they were being detained.[20] Third, the body
had the same clothes worn by Marijoy on the day she was abducted. [21]And fourth, the members of the
Chiong family personally identified the corpse to be that of Marijoy [22] which they eventually buried.
They erected commemorative markers at the ravine, cemetery and every place which mattered to
Marijoy. As a matter of fact, at this very moment, appellants still fail to bring to the attention of this Court
any person laying a claim on the said body. Surely, if the body was not that of Marijoy, other families
who had lost someone of similar age and gender as Marijoy would have surfaced and claimed the body.
The above circumstances only bolster Rusias narration that Rowen and Ariel pushed Marijoy into the
deep ravine, following Josmans instruction "to get rid" of her.

On the issue raised by appellants Uy brothers that James Andrew was only seventeen (17) years

and two hundred sixty two (262) days old at the time the crimes were committed, the records bear that on

March 1, 1999, James Andrews birth certificate was submitted to the trial court as part of the Formal

Offer of Additional Evidence,[23]with the statement that he was eighteen (18) years old. On March 18,

1999, appellants filed a Manifestation of Erratum correcting in part the Formal Offer of Additional Evidence

by alleging that James Andrew was only seventeen (17) years old.[24]

Now, James Andrew begs leave and prays that this Court admits at this stage of the proceedings

his (1) Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office, and (2) Baptismal Certificate. He

prays that his penalty be reduced, as in the case of his brother James Anthony.

The entry of James Andrews birth in the Birth Certificate is not legible, thus it is extremely difficult for us

to determine the veracity of his claim. However, considering that minority is a significant factor in the
imposition of penalty, we find it proper to require the Solicitor General (a) to secure from the Local Civil

Registrar of Cotobato City, as well as the National Statistics Office, a clear and legible copy of James

Andrews Birth Certificate, and thereafter, (b) to file an extensive comment on the motion for

reconsideration filed by James Andrew and James Anthony Uy, solely on James Andrews claim of

minority.

Insofar as James Anthony is concerned, we maintain his conviction and penalty, there being

nothing in his motion which warrants a reconsideration of our Decision.

In resolving the instant motions, we have embarked on this painstaking task of evaluating every

piece and specie of evidence presented before the trial court in response to appellants plea for the reversal

of their conviction. But, even the element of reasonable doubt so seriously sought by appellants is an ignis

fatuus which has eluded any intelligent ratiocination of their submissions. Verily, our conscience can rest

easy on our affirmance of the verdict of the trial court, in light of appellants clear culpability which

demands retribution.

WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration filed by appellants Francisco Juan Larraaga,

Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Cao and Ariel Balansag are hereby DENIED. The Solicitor

General is DIRECTED (a) to secure from the Local Civil Registrar of Cotobato City, as well as the

National Statistics Office, a clear and legible copy of James Andrews Birth Certificate, and (b) within ten

(10) days therefrom, to file an extensive comment on the motion for reconsideration filed by James

Andrew and James Anthony Uy, solely on James Andrews claim of minority. The motion is

likewise DENIED insofar as James Anthony Uy is concerned.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

JULIUS CACAO y PRIETO, G.R. No. 180870

Petitioner,

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
 ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. January 22, 2010
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

In order to safeguard its citizenry from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs on their physical and mental well-being, the State
pursued an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs and other similar
substances.[1] However, in our desire to totally eradicate this social ill, we must adhere to the constitutional pronouncement that in
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.[2] This case illustrates once more
our faithful adherence to said constitutional requirement.

Factual Antecedents

For review is the Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR

No. 29985 dated July 27, 2007 affirming in toto the Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 13 in
Criminal Case No. 11489-13 dated November 25, 2005 finding herein petitioner Julius Cacao y Prieto (Cacao) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 12 years and one day to 15 years and ordering
him to pay a fine of P400,000.00. Also assailed is the Resolution[5] of the CA dated December 11, 2007 denying the motion for
reconsideration.

On October 15, 2004, two separate informations were filed against Joseph Canlas y Naguit[6] and Cacao[7] indicting them for
violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 before the RTC of Laoag City. Insofar as pertinent to this petition, we shall quote
the information only against Cacao in Criminal Case No. 11489-13 which reads:
That on or about the 14th day of October, 2004, at Laoag City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously [sic]
have in his possession, control and custody 1 plastic sachet of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu
containing a total of 1.6 grams including plastic sachets [sic] without any license or authority, in violation of
the aforesaid law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]

When arraigned on November 30, 2004, Cacao pleaded not guilty.[9] Thereafter trial on the merits followed.

The inculpatory facts, as unveiled by the prosecution in its evidence given during the trial, were briefly synthesized by the Office
of the Solicitor General, viz:
On October 14, 2004, at around 7:45 in the evening, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Celso Pang-ag of the Intelligence
and Operation Section of the Laoag City Police Station received a telephone call from an informant about a
drug session being held inside Room 5 of the Starlight Hotel located at Barangay 5, Ablan
Avenue, Laoag City.

Acting on the information, PO3 Pang-ag, together with PO2 Jonel Mangapit, went immediately to the
Starlight Hotel to determine the veracity of the report. Upon arrival at the target area, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2
Mangapit approached the lady clerk manning the information counter of Starlight Hotel and inquired about
the alleged drug session at Room 5 of the hotel.
 The lady clerk informed PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit that the roomboy of the hotel was about to deliver
a softdrink to Room 5 and they could follow him if they [so wish]. Thus, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit
followed the roomboy to Room 5. Upon arrival, the roomboy knocked at the door and a woman, later
identified as Mylene, opened the door wide enough to enable the police officers to look inside.

PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit saw petitioner seated on top of the bed sniffing shabu while Joseph Canlas
was on the floor assisting petitioner sniffing shabu. At this juncture, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit arrested
petitioner and Joseph and confiscated from them the drug paraphernalia, glass tooter, scissors, lighters and
plastic sachets.

PO2 Mangapit frisked petitioner and recovered from him one plastic sachet containing shabu.

After informing petitioner and Joseph of their constitutional rights, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit brought
them to the Laoag City Police Station and turned them over to the police officer on duty while the confiscated
items were turned over to SPO3 Loreto Ancheta.

The Philippine National Police (PNP) laboratory conducted an examination on the specimen recovered from
appellant and his companion which tested positive for shabu.[10]

Cacao professed his innocence and presented his defense in this wise:

In the afternoon of 14 October 2004, petitioner was waiting for a ride going home along the National Road at
the rotunda of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. Joseph Canlas [who was on his way to] Laoag City aboard his
motorcycle x x x pulled over and asked the petitioner if the latter could spare a moment to estimate a work he
wanted to be done in his house. Admittedly, the petitioner is a contractor. Petitioner agreed and they both
boarded Canlas motorcycle for Laoag City.

While in Laoag City, petitioner and Canlas stopped at the public market for the latter to collect [loan
payment] as he is also a money lender. Petitioner stayed [by] Canlas motorcycle. When Canlas returned, it
was then that they decided to have chicks (or womanize). They then proceeded to Starlight Hotel located
along Ablan Ave., Laoag City on board Canlas motorcycle.

x x x at the Starlight Hotel, petitioner asked for a room and [was given] Room 5 x x x. Thereafter, Canlas
stayed inside Room 5 while petitioner went out to the hotels counter to wait for the woman they [had]
contacted. Present at the counter at the time was the lady cashier [named] Cherry Corpuz.

In about thirty (30) minutes, a tricycle-for-hire arrived with a man and a woman on board as passengers. The
tricycle went inside the hotel and stopped right in front of the counter where the petitioner and the lady
cashier were. After alighting from the tricycle, the woman companion inquired where Room 5 is [and was
directed] by the lady cashier. The woman [who] alighted from the tricycle in the company of another male
person was later on identified to be Mylene Daquioag. Thereafter, Mylene Daquioag proceeded to Room 5
while the male companion stayed behind with the petitioner at the hotels counter. When petitioner could not
wait [any] longer because there was only one woman who arrived, he x x x asked the male companion of
Mylene Daquioag if another woman is coming. The male companion answered in the negative. A couple of
minutes [later], petitioner followed to Room 5 so he could [sic] go home instead because it was then getting
late.

Upon entering the room, petitioner saw Mylene Daquioag and Canlas seated at the table inside the room. He
also saw Mylene Daquioag offer something contained in plastic x x x to Canlas. The latter refused as he said
it is a woman that he was asking [for].

Barely a moment after entering Room 5, the two then heard a knock on the door from the outside. Mylene
Daquiaog immediately stood up and told the petitioner and Canlas that they are (her) companions.

As soon as the door was unlocked by Mylene Daquioag, several policemen barged inside the room with their
guns drawn out. Petitioner was shoved to the bed by one of the police. He was later bodily searched but
 nothing was found from [sic] him except his wallet containing cash of about P 7,000.00. The wallet was later
turned over to the petitioners wife at the Police Station of Laoag, City. The P7,000.00 was never seen again.

As petitioner was made to sit at [sic] the bed, one of the police officers pointed to a plastic sachet on the
floor. It was about two (2) meters away from him and about a meter from the police pointing [to] it. The
same police then explained that the plastic sachet belongs to the petitioner. Immediately, petitioner cried foul
on the assertion.

Due to the suddenness of events, the petitioner was not as much as able to notice what the other police did to
Canlas.

Without much ado, the petitioner and Canlas were apprehended, handcuffed and brought to the Laoag City
Police Station. Charges were later on filed against them.[11]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On November 25, 2005, the trial court rendered its judgment finding Cacao guilty of the offense charged and sentenced him
accordingly, viz:

WHEREFORE x x x

The accused Julius Cacao is likewise found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged of illegal
possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride weighing 1.3987 grams in Criminal Case No. 11489 and is
therefore sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWELVE (12) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS and to pay the fine of Four hundred thousand (P400,000.00)
pesos, Philippine Currency.

The sachets of shabu confiscated from the accused are all confiscated in favor of the Government, the same
to be disposed as the law prescribes. Cost de oficio.

SO ORDERED.[12]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Aggrieved by the Decision of the trial court, Cacao interposed an appeal to the CA. On July 27, 2007, the appellate court
rendered judgment affirming Cacaos conviction. It held that the circumstances obtaining in this case validly cloaked the arresting
officers with the authority to search and seize any contraband or prohibited material which may be used as proof of the offense of
which Cacao is charged. It also ruled that there is no proof that the police officers compelled Cacao to admit a crime. As to the
alleged contradictory statements, the appellate court ruled that they refer only to minor details which are not sufficient to
overthrow the probative value accorded them by the trial court.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration[13] but the motion was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution[14] dated on December
11, 2007.

Issues

In this petition, Cacao ascribes to the trial court the following errors:
 I. The lower court gravely erred in ruling that the guilt of the accused was proven
beyond reasonable doubt considering the myriad material inconsistencies, discrepancies, and
incredible statements in the prosecution evidence.[15]

II. The lower court gravely erred in failing to lend credence to the critical testimony of
Benedict Villanueva.[16]

III. The lower court erred in not finding that the crucial first link in the chain of custody of
the specimen subjected for examination was not proven.[17]

IV. The lower court gravely erred in declaring that the defense of frame-up cannot be given
weight.[18]

V. The lower court gravely erred in relying on the weakness of the defense.[19]

VI. The lower court gravely erred in failing to find that the presumption of innocence of the
petitioner stands unrebutted, hence, his conviction is erroneous.[20]

Our Ruling

We find merit in the petition.

As a general rule, factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the CA are entitled to great weight and respect and will
not be disturbed on appeal. However, if there is any indication that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstances which
would substantially affect the disposition of the case,[21] we will not hesitate to review the same. In this case, we find it imperative
to review the factual findings of the trial court because of certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
on material points.
Jurisprudence holds that in prosecution of cases involving illegal possession of prohibited drugs, the prosecution must establish
with moral certainty the elemental act of possession of a prohibited substance coupled with the fact that such possession is not
authorized by law. Essential, however, in a drug-related case is that the identity of the dangerous drug be established beyond
reasonable doubt.[22] Since the dangerous drug constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a
judgment of conviction,[23] it behooves upon the prosecution to establish and prove with certainty that the dangerous drug
presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same item recovered from his possession.

We have scrutinized in detail the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and found not only glaring inconsistencies on material
points but more importantly a failure to identify indubitably the prohibited drug allegedly confiscated from Cacao.

The testimonies of the prosecutions principal witnesses are

inconsistent as to who delivered the prohibited drug to the
evidence custodian.

PO3 Celso Pang-ag (Pang-ag) and PO2 Jonel Mangapit (Mangapit) both testified that it was the latter who brought the item
confiscated from petitioner to the evidence custodian, SPO3 Loreto Ancheta (Ancheta). Thus:

Q: What about the two plastic sachets you confiscated from the possession of the accused Joseph and the one
plastic sachet which Jonel Mangapit confiscated from the possession of Julius Cacao as well as the
drug paraphernalia you mentioned, what did you do with them?
A: We turned over the confiscated drug paraphernalia and the one I confiscated to the evidence custodian,
SP03 Loreto Ancheta and the one confiscated by P02 Mangapit was also turned over by him to the
evidence custodian, sir.
Q: Who was the evidence custodian whom you and Jonel Mangapit turned over the items you said?
A: SPO3 Loreto Ancheta, Sir.[24]
Mangapit corroborated Pang-ags testimony that it was he who delivered to Ancheta the item he seized from Cacao. Thus:

Q: How about the one big plastic sachet you were able to seize from the right front pocket of accused Cacao,
what did you do?
A: I turned it over to the evidence custodian, Sir.

Q: Who was that evidence custodian to whom you turned over that plastic sachet?
A: SP02 Loreto Ancheta, Sir.[25]

The foregoing assertions are totally at odds with the testimony of Ancheta, the evidence custodian. The latter denied that it was
Mangapit who delivered the item allegedly recovered from Cacao. Instead, he repeatedly and categorically declared that it was
SP03 Balolong (Balolong) from whom he received the plastic sachet of shabu.

Q: Who delivered to you the specimen allegedly confiscated from the possession of Cacao?
A: SP03 Balolong, Sir.[26]

During his cross-examination, Ancheta confirmed his declaration that it was Balolong and definitely not Mangapit who
handed to him the plastic sachet of shabu. Ancheta testified thus:

Q: You said that it was officer Balolong who handed to you the plastic sachet of shabu which was allegedly
taken from the possession of accused Julius Cacao, did I hear you right?
A: Julius Cacao, yes sir.

Q: It was not officer Mangapit who handed to you the plastic sachet of shabu?
A: Balolong, sir.

Q: It was not Mangapit?

A: No sir.[27]
When confronted with the afore-quoted testimony of Ancheta, Mangapit cannot explain the variance. He just gave a sweeping
answer I do not know.[28]

We cannot understand why the courts below did not doubt or suspect the patently inconsistent and contradictory testimonies of
the principal witnesses of the prosecution. Contrary to the findings of the appellate court, we are of the considered view that this
contradiction is not so inconsequential or minor but a discrepancy touching on substantial and significant matter which could well
affect the credibility of the witnesses.

The prosecution failed to satisfactorily establish that the

item presented in court was the same item confiscated from
Cacao.

The patent inconsistency between the testimonies of Mangapit and Pang-ag, on one hand, and the testimony of Ancheta on the
other hand, necessarily leads us to doubt that the plastic sachet of shabu identified in court is the same item that was allegedly
seized and confiscated from petitioner. If the version of Mangapit is to be believed, then the most lamentable aspect pertains to
his failure to identify the seized item with certainty. For sure Mangapit, who is the most competent person to make the proper
identification being the officer who confiscated the item from Cacao, never actually identified the same:

Q: If shown to you again that one big plastic sachet where you put markings would you be able to recognize
and identify the same?
A: Yes, sir.
 Q: Giving to you an already opened brown envelope with several contents, will you please sort out [the]
contents and bring out that big plastic sachet you claimed you confiscated from the custody of
accused Cacao?
A: (Witness sorting out the contents of the plastic bag containing several items). (Witness examining the
plastic sachet mounted on the bond paper marked as Exhibit B-1).

Q: Are the markings you claimed which were placed in the plastic sachet still visible and readable?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Will you please read for record purposes the markings?

A: Initial JPC and my signature, sir.
(Witness pointing to the initials and signature written on a darker masking tape on the plastic sachet).[29]

Verily, there was no actual and effective identification of the subject specimen. After sorting out the contents of the plastic bag,
witness Mangapit merely pointed to the initial and signature written on a masking tape attached to the plastic sachet. At no
instance did he make a categorical and accurate declaration that the sachet contained the shabu allegedly confiscated from Cacao.

The only other person who could have identified the subject drug is Pang-ag. However, we cannot lend credence to his supposed
identification, the same not being also positive, certain and unequivocal. Besides, there is no showing that this witness actually
saw the shabu at the time it was allegedly seized from petitioner. In fact, Pang-ag is even incompetent to make the identification
since from all indications, he has never been in possession of it.

Be that as it may, any identification made by these witnesses on the item allegedly seized from petitioner is rendered meaningless
and bereft of probative value in view of the categorical denial of the evidence custodian that he received the same from
Mangapit. It is now clearly evident from the records that the sachet of shabu which the evidence custodian received, marked and
submitted for examination and later presented in court is not the same sachet of shabu which Mangapit claimed to have
confiscated from petitioner and subsequently transmitted to the evidence custodian.

Moreover, considering the testimony of Ancheta, it was Balolong who forwarded the seized item. It is quite strange that Ancheta
would point to Balolong as the sender of the seized items if he had no basis in saying so. However, our own scrutiny of the
records failed to show the role of Balolong in the operation since admittedly, the only lawmen who participated therein were
Mangapit and Pang-ag. In fact, as testified to by Mangapit, Balolong proceeded to the hotel after the operation.[30] How then was
Balolong able to get hold of the confiscated substance when he was neither a party to nor present during the operation? Who
entrusted the substance to him assuming that somebody requested him to submit it for safekeeping? These are only some of the
lingering questions which must be answered convincingly and satisfactorily so as to ensure that there had been no substitution,
contamination or tampering with the sachet of shabu allegedly taken from petitioner. It must be noted that Balolong was never
presented to testify in this case. Thus, there is no evidence to prove that what was turned over to the evidence custodian by
Balolong and later presented in court was the same substance recovered from petitioner. The failure to establish the chain of
custody is fatal to the prosecutions case. There can be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts
persist on whether the item confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to be the prohibited drug.[31] In People
v. Casimiro,[32] citing People v. Mapa,[33] we acquitted the accused for failure of the prosecution to establish the identity of the
prohibited drug which constitutes the corpus delicti. Equally true in Zarraga v. People,[34] we also acquitted the accused in view
of the prosecutions failure to indubitably show the identity of the shabu.

At this juncture, it must be stressed that the corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes the drug itself. This means that
proof beyond reasonable doubt of the identity of the prohibited drug is essential.[35]

Likewise, our ruling in People v. Gutierrez[36] on chain of custody rule is instructive. Thus:

As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires the presentation of the seized
prohibited drugs as an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
 question is what the proponent claims it to be. This would ideally cover the testimony about every link in the
chain, from seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that everyone
who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, to include, as much as
possible, a description of the condition in which it was delivered to the next in the chain.

Finally, petitioners defenses of denial and frame-up are concededly inherently weak and commonly used in drug-related
cases. However, it must be stressed that conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the
strength of the evidence of the prosecution.

Based on the foregoing, we are of the considered view that the quantum of evidence needed to convict, that is proof beyond
reasonable doubt, has not been adequately established by the prosecution. While as a rule we desist from disturbing the findings
and conclusions of the trial court especially with respect to the credibility of witnesses, we must bow to the superior and
immutable rule that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt because the law presumes that the accused
is innocent unless and until proven otherwise. Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself
override the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent unless overcome by strong, clear and compelling
evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29985 dated
July 27, 2007 affirming in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 11489-
13, and its Resolution dated December 11, 2007 denying the motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.Petitioner Julius Cacao y Prieto is ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 181354 February 27, 2013

SIMON A. FLORES, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set
aside the August 2 7, 2004 Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan, First Division (Sandiganbayan), in Criminal
Case No. 16946, finding petitioner Simon A. Flores (Flores) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Homicide, and its November 29, 2007 Resolution2 denying his motion for reconsideration.

Flores was charged with the crime of Homicide in an Information, dated July 9, 1991, filed before the
Sandiganbayan which reads:
That on or about the 15th day of August, 1989, at nighttime, in the Municipality of Alaminos, Province of
Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, a
public officer, being then the Barangay Chairman of San Roque, Alaminos, Laguna, while in the
performance of his official functions and committing the offense in relation to his office, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with intent to kill, shoot one JESUS AVENIDO with an M-16 Armalite
Rifle, thereby inflicting upon him several gunshot wounds in different parts of his body, which caused his
instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said JESUS AVENIDO.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

During his arraignment, on August 26, 1991, Flores pleaded "Not Guilty" and waived the pre-trial.
Thereafter, the prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: Paulito Duran, one of the
visitors (Duran); Gerry Avenido (Gerry), son of the victim; Elisa Avenido (Elisa), wife of the victim; and Dr.
Ruben Escueta, the physician who performed the autopsy on the cadaver of the victim, Jesus
Avenido (Jesus).

For its part, the defense presented as witnesses, the accused Flores himself; his companion-members of
the Civilian Action Force Group Unit (CAFGU), Romulo Alquizar and Maximo H. Manalo; and Dr. Rene
Bagamasbad, resident physician of San Pablo City District Hospital.

The Version of the Prosecution

On August 15, 1989, on the eve of the barangay fiesta in San Roque, Alaminos, Laguna, certain visitors,
Ronnie de Mesa, Noli de Mesa, Marvin Avenido, and Duran, were drinking at the terrace of the house of
Jesus. They started drinking at 8:30 oclock in the evening. Jesus, however, joined his visitors only at
around 11:00 oclock after he and his wife arrived from Sta. Rosa, Laguna, where they tried to settle a
problem regarding a vehicular accident involving one of their children. The drinking at the terrace was
ongoing when Flores arrived with an M-16 armalite rifle.4

Duran testified that Jesus stood up from his seat and met Flores who was heading towards the terrace.
After glancing at the two, who began talking to each other near the terrace, Duran focused his attention
back to the table. Suddenly, he heard several gunshots prompting him to duck under the table. Right after
the shooting, he looked around and saw the bloodied body of Jesus lying on the ground. By then, Flores
was no longer in sight.5

Duran immediately helped board Jesus in an owner-type jeep to be brought to a hospital. Thereafter,
Duran, Ronnie de Mesa and Noli de Mesa went home. Jesus was brought to the hospital by his wife and
children. Duran did not, at any time during the occasion, notice the victim carrying a gun with him.6

Gerry narrated that he was going in and out of their house before the shooting incident took place,
anxiously waiting for the arrival of his parents from Sta. Rosa, Laguna. His parents were then attending to
his problem regarding a vehicular accident. When they arrived, Gerry had a short conversation with his
father, who later joined their visitors at the terrace.7

Gerry was outside their house when he saw Flores across the street in the company of some members of
the CAFGU. He was on his way back to the house when he saw Flores and his father talking to each
other from a distance of about six (6) meters. Suddenly, Flores shot his father, hitting him on the right
shoulder. Flores continued shooting even as Jesus was already lying flat on the ground. Gerry testified
that he felt hurt to have lost his father.8

Elisa related that she was on her way from the kitchen to serve "pulutan" to their visitors when she saw
Flores, from their window, approaching the terrace. By the time she reached the terrace, her husband
was already lying on the ground and still being shot by Flores. After the latter had left, she and her
children rushed him to the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. 9
As a consequence of her husbands untimely demise, she suffered emotionally. She testified that Jesus
had an average monthly income of Twenty Thousand Pesos (20,000.00) before he died at the age of
forty-one (41). He left four (4) children. Although she had no receipt, Elisa asked for actual damages
consisting of lawyers fees in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (15,000.00) plus Five Hundred
Pesos (500.00) for every hearing, and Six Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (6,500.00) for the funeral
expenses.10

Dr. Ruben Escueta (Dr. Escueta) testified that on August 17, 1989, he conducted an autopsy on the
cadaver of Jesus, whom he assessed to have died at least six (6) hours before his body was brought to
him.11

Based on the Autopsy Report,12 it appeared that the victim suffered four gunshot wounds in the different
parts of his body, specifically: on the medial portion of the left shoulder, between the clavicle and the first
rib; on the left hypogastric region through the upper right quadrant of the abdomen; on the tip of the left
buttocks to the tip of the sacral bone or hip bone; and on the right flank towards the umbilicus. The victim
died of massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage due to laceration of the liver.

The Version of the Defense

To avoid criminal liability, Flores interposed self-defense.

Flores claimed that in the evening of August 15, 1989, he, together with four members of the CAFGU and
Civil Service Unit (CSU), Maximo Manalo, Maximo Latayan (Latayan), Ronilo Haballa, and Romulo
Alquizar, upon the instructions of Mayor Samuel Bueser of Alaminos, Laguna, conducted a ronda in
Barangay San Roque which was celebrating the eve of its fiesta.13

At around midnight, the group was about 15 meters from the house of Jesus, who had earlier invited them
for some "bisperas" snacks, when they heard gunshots seemingly emanating from his house. Flores
asked the group to stay behind as he would try to talk to Jesus, his cousin, to spare the shooting practice
for the fiesta celebration the following day. As he started walking towards the house, he was stopped by
Latayan and handed him a baby armalite. He initially refused but was prevailed upon by Latayan who
placed the weapon over his right shoulder, with its barrel or nozzle pointed to the ground. Latayan
convinced Flores that such posture would gain respect from the people in the house of Jesus.14

Flores then proceeded to the terrace of the house of Jesus, who was having a drinking spree with four
others. In a calm and courteous manner, Flores asked Jesus and his guests to cease firing their guns as
it was already late at night and to save their shots for the following days fiesta procession. Flores claimed
that despite his polite, unprovocative request and the fact that he was a relative of Jesus and the
barangay chairman, a person in authority performing a regular routine duty, he was met with hostility by
Jesus and his guests. Jesus, who appeared drunk, immediately stood up and approached

him as he was standing near the entrance of the terrace. Jesus abruptly drew his magnum pistol and
poked it directly at his chest and then fired it. By a twist of fate, he was able to partially parry Jesus right
hand, which was holding the pistol, and was hit on his upper right shoulder.15

With fierce determination, however, Jesus again aimed his gun at Flores, but the latter was able to
instinctively take hold of Jesus right hand, which was holding the gun. As they wrestled, Jesus again fired
his gun, hitting Flores left hand.16

Twice hit by bullets from Jesus magnum pistol and profusely bleeding from his two wounds, Flores, with
his life and limb at great peril, instinctively swung with his right hand the baby armalite dangling on his
right shoulder towards Jesus and squeezed its trigger. When he noticed Jesus already lying prostrate on
the floor, he immediately withdrew from the house. As he ran towards the coconut groves, bleeding and
utterly bewildered over the unfortunate incident that just transpired between him and his cousin Jesus, he
heard more gunshots. Thus, he continued running for fear of more untoward incidents that could follow.
He proceeded to the Mayors house in Barangay San Gregorio, Alaminos, Laguna, to report what had
happened. There, he found his ronda groupmates.17

The incident was also reported the following day to the CAFGU Superior, Sgt. Alfredo Sta. Ana.

Decision of the Sandiganbayan

On August 27, 2004, after due proceedings, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed decision18 finding
Flores guilty of the offense charged. The Sandiganbayan rejected Flores claim that the shooting was
justified for failure to prove self-defense. It gave credence to the consistent testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses that Flores shot Jesus with an armalite rifle (M16) which resulted in his death. According to the
Sandiganbayan, there was no reason to doubt the testimonies of the said witnesses who appeared to
have no ill motive to falsely testify against Flores. The dispositive portion of the said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case No. 16946 finding the accused Simon A.
Flores GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and to suffer the penalty of 10 years
and 1 day of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to 17 years, and 4 months of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum. The accused is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Fifty
Thousand Pesos (50,000.00) as civil indemnity for the death of Jesus Avenido, another Fifty Thousand
Pesos (50,000.00) as moral damages, and Six Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (6,500.00) as actual or
compensatory damages.

SO ORDERED.19

Flores filed a motion for the reconsideration. As the motion did not contain any notice of hearing, the
Prosecution filed its Motion to Expunge from the Records Accuseds Motion for Reconsideration."20

In its Resolution, dated November 29, 2007, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for being a mere
scrap of paper as it did not contain a notice of hearing and disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration of accused Flores is considered
pro forma which did not toll the running of the period to appeal, and thus, the assailed judgment of this
Court has become FINAL and EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.21

Hence, Flores filed the present petition before this Court on the ground that the Sandiganbayan
committed reversible errors involving questions of substantive and procedural laws and jurisprudence.
Specifically, Flores raises the following

ISSUES

(I)

WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE
CREDIT TO PETITIONERS CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE

(II)

WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, COMMITTED SERIOUS BUT REVERSIBLE

ERRORS IN ARRIVING AT ITS FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
 (III)

WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR IN NOT

ACQUITTING PETITIONER OF THE CRIME CHARGED22

The Court will first resolve the procedural issue raised by Flores in this petition.

Flores claims that the outright denial of his motion for reconsideration by the Sandiganbayan on a mere
technicality amounts to a violation of his right to due process. The dismissal rendered final and executory
the assailed decision which was replete with baseless conjectures and conclusions that were contrary to
the evidence on record. He points out that a relaxation of procedural rules is justified by the merits of this
case as the facts, viewed from the proper and objective perspective, indubitably demonstrate selfdefense
on his part.

Flores argues that he fully complied with the requirements of Section 2 of Rule 37 and Section 4 of Rule
121 of the Rules of Court when the motion itself was served upon the prosecution and the latter, in fact,
admitted receiving a copy. For Flores, such judicial admission amounts to giving due notice of the motion
which is the intent behind the said rules. He further argues that a hearing on a motion for reconsideration
is not necessary as no further proceeding, such as a hearing, is required under Section 3 of Rule 121.

Flores argument fails to persuade this Court.

Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court reads:

SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and
shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of
the motion.

Section 2, Rule 37 provides:

SEC. 2. Contents of motion for new trial or reconsideration and notice thereof. The motion shall be
made in writing stating the ground or grounds therefore, a written notice of which shall be served by the
movant on the adverse party.

xxxx

A pro forma motion for new trial or reconsideration shall not toll the reglementary period of appeal.

Section 4, Rule 121 states:

SEC. 4. Form of motion and notice to the prosecutor. The motion for a new trial or reconsideration shall
be in writing and shall state the grounds on which it is based. X x x. Notice of the motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be given to the prosecutor.

As correctly stated by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Sec. 2 of Rule 37 and Sec. 4 of Rule
121 should be read in conjunction with Sec. 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Basic is the rule that every
motion must be set for hearing by the movant except for those motions which the court may act upon
without prejudice to the rights of the adverse party.23 The notice of hearing must be addressed to all
parties and must specify the time and date of the hearing, with proof of service.

This Court has indeed held, time and again, that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court,
the requirement is mandatory. Failure to comply with the requirement renders the motion defective. "As a
rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary
period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading." 24

In this case, as Flores committed a procedural lapse in failing to include a notice of hearing, his motion
was a worthless piece of paper with no legal effect whatsoever. Thus, his motion was properly dismissed
by the Sandiganbayan.

Flores invokes the exercise by the Court of its discretionary power to review the factual findings of the
Sandiganbayan. He avers that the ponente as well as the other members of the First Division who
rendered the assailed decision, were not able to observe the witnesses or their manner of testifying as
they were not present during the trial.25 He, thus, argues that there was palpable misapprehension of the
facts that led to wrong conclusions of law resulting in his unfounded conviction.

His contention is likewise devoid of merit.

"It is often held that the validity of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that the ponente only
took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial, unless there is a showing of grave abuse
of discretion in the factual findings reached by him."26

"Moreover, it should be stressed that the Sandiganbayan, which functions in divisions of three Justices
each, is a collegial body which arrives at its decisions only after deliberation, the exchange of view and
ideas, and the concurrence of the required majority vote."27

In the present case, Flores has not convinced the Court that there was misapprehension or
misinterpretation of the material facts nor was the defense able to adduce evidence to establish that the
factual findings were arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the Court sustains the
Sandiganbayans conclusion that Flores shot Jesus and continued riddling his body with bullets even after
he was already lying helpless on the ground.

Flores insists that the evidence of this case clearly established all the elements of self-defense. According
to him, there was an unlawful aggression on the part of Jesus. He was just at the entrance of Jesus
terrace merely advising him and his guests to reserve their shooting for the fiesta when Jesus
approached him, drew a magnum pistol and fired at him. The attack by Jesus was sudden, unexpected
and instantaneous. The intent to kill was present because Jesus kept pointing the gun directly at him. As
he tried to parry Jesus hand, which was holding the gun, the latter kept firing. Left with no choice, he was
compelled to use the baby armalite he was carrying to repel the attack. He asserts that there was lack of
sufficient provocation on his part as he merely requested Jesus and his drinking buddies to reserve their
shooting for the following day as it was already late at night and the neighbors were already asleep.

In effect, Flores faults the Sandiganbayan in not giving weight to the justifying circumstance of self-
defense interposed by him and in relying on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses instead.

His argument deserves scant consideration.

The issue of whether Flores indeed acted in self-defense is basically a question of fact. In appeals to this
Court, only questions of law may be raised and not issues of fact. The factual findings of the
Sandiganbayan are, thus, binding upon this Court.28 This Court, nevertheless, finds no reason to disturb
the finding of the Sandiganbayan that Flores utterly failed to prove the existence of self-defense.

Generally, "the burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt rather than upon the accused that he was in fact innocent." If the accused, however, admits killing
the victim, but pleads self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted to him to prove such defense by
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on his part.
To escape liability, it now becomes incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear and convincing
evidence all the elements of that justifying circumstance.29

In this case, Flores does not dispute that he perpetrated the killing of Jesus by shooting him with an M16
armalite rifle. To justify his shooting of Jesus, he invoked self-defense. By interposing self-defense,
Flores, in effect, admits the authorship of the crime. Thus, it was incumbent upon him to prove that the
killing was legally justified under the circumstances.

To successfully claim self-defense, the accused must satisfactorily prove the concurrence of the elements
of self-defense. Under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, any person who acts in defense of his
person or rights does not incur any criminal liability provided that the following circumstances concur: (1)
unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack
of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

The most important among all the elements is unlawful aggression. "There can be no self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person
who resorted to self-defense."30 "Unlawful aggression is defined as an actual physical assault, or at least
a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. In case of threat, it must be offensive and strong,
positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. It presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or
imminent dangernot merely threatening and intimidating action. It is present only when the one
attacked faces real and immediate threat to ones life."31"Aggression, if not continuous, does not
constitute aggression warranting self-defense."32

In this case, Flores failed to discharge his burden.

The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayans assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative
value of evidence on record. As correctly noted by the Sandiganbayan, the defense evidence, both
testimonial and documentary, were crowded with flaws which raised serious doubt as to its credibility, to
wit:

First, the accused claims that Jesus Avenido shot him on his right shoulder with a magnum handgun from
a distance of about one (1) meter. With such a powerful weapon, at such close range, and without hitting
any hard portion of his body, it is quite incredible that the bullet did not exit through the accuseds
shoulder. On the contrary, if he were hit on the part where the ball and socket were located, as he tried to
make it appear later in the trial, it would be very impossible for the bullet not to have hit any of the bones
located in that area of his shoulder.

Second, Simon Flores executed an affidavit on September 2, 1989. Significantly, he did not mention
anything about a bullet remaining on his shoulder. If indeed a bullet remained lodged in his shoulder at
the time he executed his affidavit, it defies logic why he kept mum during the preliminary investigation
when it was crucial to divulge such fact if only to avoid the trouble of going through litigation. To wait for
trial before finally divulging such a very material information, as he claimed, simply stretches credulity.

Third, in his feverish effort of gathering evidence to establish medical treatment on his right shoulder, the
accused surprisingly did not bother to secure the x-ray plate or any medical records from the hospital.
Such valuable pieces of evidence would have most likely supported his case of self-defense, even during
the preliminary investigation, if they actually existed and had he properly presented them. The utter lack
of interest of the accused in retrieving the alleged x-ray plate or any medical record from the hospital
militate against the veracity of his version of the incident.

Fourth, the T-shirt presented by the accused in court had a hole, apparently from a hard object, such as a
bullet, that pierced through the same. However, the blood stain is visibly concentrated only on the area
around the hole forming a circular shape. Within five (5) hours and a half from 12:00 oclock midnight
when he was allegedly shot, to 5:35 a.m. in the early morning of August 16, 1989, when his wounds were
treated, the blood would naturally have dripped down to the hem. The blood on the shirt was not even
definitively shown to be human blood.

Fifth, Jesus Avenido arrived at his house and joined his visitors who were drinking only at 11:00 oclock in
the evening. Both parties claim that the shooting incident happened more or less 12:00 midnight. Hence,
it is very possible that Jesus Avenido was not yet drunk when the incident in question occurred. Defense
witnesses themselves noted that the victim Jesus Avenido was bigger in built and taller than the accused.
Moreover, the victim was familiar and very much experienced with guns, having previously worked as a
policeman.1wphi1 In addition, the latter was relatively young, at the age of 41, when the incident
happened. The Court therefore finds it difficult to accept how the victim could miss when he allegedly shot
the accused at such close range if, indeed, he really had a gun and intended to harm the accused. We
find it much less acceptable to believe how the accused allegedly overpowered the victim so easily and
wrestled the gun from the latter, despite allegedly having been hit earlier on his right shoulder.

Finally, it hardly inspires belief for the accused to have allegedly unlocked, with such ease, the armalite
rifle (M16) he held with one hand, over which he claims to have no experience handling, while his right
shoulder was wounded and he was grappling with the victim.33 (Underscoring supplied citations omitted)

The foregoing circumstances indeed tainted Flores credibility and reliability, his story being contrary to
ordinary human experience. "Settled is the rule that testimonial evidence to be believed must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must foremost be credible in itself. Hence, the test to
determine the value or credibility of the testimony of a witness is whether the same is in conformity with
common knowledge and is consistent with the experience of mankind."34

The Court also sustains the finding that the testimony of Dr. Bagamasbad, adduced to prove that Flores
was shot by Jesus, has no probative weight for being hearsay. As correctly found by the Sandiganbayan:

The testimony of defense witness Dr. Bagamasbad, cannot be of any help either since the same is in the
nature of hearsay evidence. Dr. Bagamasbads testimony was a mere re-statement of what appeared as
entries in the hospital logbook (EXH. "8-a"), over which he admitted to possess no personal knowledge.
The photocopy of the logbook itself does not possess any evidentiary value since it was not established
by the defense that such evidence falls under any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 3, Rule 130,
which pertain to the rules on the admissibility of evidence.35 x x x

Granting for the sake of argument that unlawful aggression was initially staged by Jesus, the same
ceased to exist when Jesus was first shot on the shoulder and fell to the ground. At that point, the
perceived threat to Flores life was no longer attendant. The latter had no reason to pump more bullets on
Jesus abdomen and buttocks.

Indeed, the nature and number of the gunshot wounds inflicted upon Jesus further negate the claim of
self-defense by the accused. Records show that Jesus suffered four (4) gunshot wounds in the different
parts of his body, specifically: on the medial portion of the left shoulder, between the clavicle and the first
rib; on the left hypogastric region through the upper right quadrant of the abdomen; on the tip of the left
buttocks to the tip of the sacral bone or hip bone; and on the right flank towards the umbilicus. According
to Dr. Ruben Escueta, who performed the autopsy on the victim, the latter died of massive intra-
abdominal hemorrhage due to laceration of the liver.36 If there was any truth to Flores claim that he
merely acted in self-defense, his first shot on Jesus shoulder, which already caused the latter to fall on
the ground, would have been sufficient to repel the attack allegedly initiated by the latter. But Flores
continued shooting Jesus. Considering the number of gunshot wounds sustained by the victim, the Court
finds it difficult to believe that Flores acted to defend himself to preserve his own life. "It has been held in
this regard that the location and presence of several wounds on the body of the victim provide physical
evidence that eloquently refutes allegations of self-defense."37
"When unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any justification to kill or wound the
original aggressor. The assailant is no longer acting in self-defense but in retaliation against the original
aggressor."38Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by
the injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression still
existed when the aggressor was injured by the accused.39

The Court quotes with approval the following findings of the Sandiganbayan, thus:

x x x. The difference in the location of the entry and exit points of this bullet wound was about two to three
inches. From the entry point of the bullet, the shooting could not have taken place when accused and his
victim were standing and facing each other. Another bullet entered through the medial portion of the
victim's buttocks and exited through his abdominal cavity. A third bullet entered through the left
hypogastric region and exited at the upper right quadrant of the victim's abdomen. The respective
trajectory of these wounds are consistent with the testimony of prosecution witnesses Elisa B. Avenido
and Arvin B. Aveniclo that the accused shot Jesus Avenido while the latter was already lying on the
ground. Moreover, according to Arvin Avenido, the first shot hit his father on the right shoulder making
him fall to the ground. Hence, even on the assumption that unlawful aggression initially existed, the same
had effectively ceased after the victim was first shot and fell to the ground. There was no more reason for
the accused to pull the trigger, at least three times more, and continue shooting at the victim. 40 (Emphasis
in the original)

The means employed by a person claiming self-defense must be commensurate to the nature and the
extent of the attack sought to be averted, and must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful
aggression.41 In this case, the continuous shooting by Flores which caused the fatal gunshot wounds
were not necessary and reasonable to prevent the claimed unlawful aggression from Jesus as the latter
was already lying flat on the ground after he was first shot on the shoulder.

In fine, the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in finding accused Flores guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 177743

Plaintiff-Appellee,

Present:
 CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

- versus - BERSAMIN,

VILLARAMA, JR., and

*
PEREZ, JJ.

Promulgated:

ALFONSO FONTANILLA

y OBALDO, January 25, 2012

Accused-Appellant.

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

An indispensable requisite of self-defense is that the victim must have mounted an unlawful aggression
against the accused. Without such unlawful aggression, the accused cannot invoke self-defense as a justifying
circumstance.

The accused prays for the review and reversal of the decision promulgated on June 29, 2006, [1] whereby
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for murder handed down by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 34, in Balaoan, La Union.

Antecedents
 At around 9:30 p.m. on October 29, 1996, Jose Olais was walking along the provincial road in Butubut
Oeste, Balaoan, La Union when Alfonso Fontanilla suddenly struck him in the head with a piece of wood
called bellang.[2] Olais fell facedown to the ground, but Fontanilla hit him again in the head with a piece of stone.
Fontanilla desisted from hitting Olais a third time only because Joel Marquez and Tirso Abunan, the sons-in-law of
Olais, shouted at him, causing him to run away. Marquez and Abunan rushed their father-in-law to a medical clinic,
where Olais was pronounced dead on arrival.[3]

On April 25, 1997, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of La Union filed an information for murder
against Fontanilla in the RTC, viz:

That on or about the 29th day of October 1996, along the Provincial Road at Barangay
Butubut Oeste, Municipality of Balaoan, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and with
evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and strike with a long coconut night stick and thereafter hit with a stone the head
of Jose Olais, thereby inflicting on the latter head wounds which caused the death of the latter,
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

The accused pleaded not guilty.

The State presented Marquez and Abunan as its witnesses. They claimed that they were only several meters away
from Olais when Fontanilla struck him; that they shouted at Fontanilla, who fled because of them; and that they
were able to see and to identify Fontanilla as the attacker of their father-in-law because the area was then well-
lighted.[5]

Dr. Felicidad Leda, the physician who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of Olais, attested that her post-
mortem examination showed that Olais had suffered a fracture on the left temporal area of the skull, causing his
death. She opined that a hard object or a severe force had hit the skull of the victim more than once, considering
that the skull had been already fragmented and the fractures on the skull had been radiating.[6]

SPO1 Abraham Valdez, who investigated the slaying and apprehended Fontanilla, declared that he had
gone looking for Fontanilla in his house along with other policemen; that Fontanillas father had denied that he was
around; that their search of the house had led to the arrest of Fontanilla inside; and that they had then brought
him to the police station.[7] Valdez further declared that Fontanilla asserted that he would only speak in court. [8]
 At the trial, Fontanilla claimed self-defense. He said that on the night of the incident, he had been
standing on the road near his house when Olais, wielding a nightstick and appearing to be drunk, had boxed him in
the stomach; that although he had then talked to Olais nicely, the latter had continued hitting him with his fists,
striking him with straight blows; that Olais, a karate expert, had also kicked him with both his legs; that he had thus
been forced to defend himself by picking up a stone with which he had hit the right side of the victims head,
causing the latter to fall face down to the ground; and that he had then left the scene for his house upon seeing
that Olais was no longer moving.[9]

Fontanillas daughter Marilou corroborated her fathers version. [10]

On June 21, 2001, the RTC declared Fontanilla guilty as charged, and disposed thusly:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment declaring he
accused ALFONSO FONTANILLA Y OBALDO @ Carlos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of MURDER as defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, Sec. 6, and thereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA TO DEATH and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos ( P50,000.00).

SO ORDERED.[11]

The RTC rejected Fontanillas plea of self-defense by observing that he had no necessity to employ a big
stone, inflicting upon the victim a mortal wound causing his death[12] due to the victim attacking him only with bare
hands. It noted that Fontanilla did not suffer any injury despite his claim that the victim had mauled him; that
Fontanilla did not receive any treatment, and no medical certificate attested to any injury he might have suffered,
having been immediately released from the hospital;[13] that Fontanillas failure to give any statement at the time
he surrendered to the police was inconsistent with his plea of self-defense;[14] and that the manner of attack
against Olais established the attendance of treachery.[15]

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC, holding that Fontanilla did not establish the indispensable element of
unlawful aggression; that his failure to report the incident to the police at the earliest opportunity, or even after he
was taken into custody, negated the plea of self-defense; and that the nature of the victims injury was a significant
physical proof to show a determined effort on the part of Fontanilla to kill him, and not just to defend himself. [16]
The CA ruled that treachery was attendant, because Olais had no inkling that a fatal blow was looming upon him,
and because Fontanilla was inconspicuously hidden from view when he struck Olais from behind, rendering Olais
unable to retaliate.[17]

Nonetheless, the CA rectified the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death to only reclusion
perpetua upon noting the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, and disposed as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Balaoan, La Union, Branch 34, in Criminal Case No. 2561 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that appellant Fontanilla is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. No cost.

SO ORDERED.[18]

The accused is now appealing, insisting that the CA erred because:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IGNORING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS CLAIM OF SELF-
DEFENSE.

II.

EVEN GRANTING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT KILLED THE VICTIM, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY
ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER WHEN THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

III.

FURTHERMORE, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE SPECIAL
PRIVILEGE[D] MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE AND THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.

Ruling
 We affirm the conviction.

Fontanilla pleaded self-defense. In order for self-defense to be appreciated, he had to prove by clear and
convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.[19] Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful
aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing, for there is nothing to repel. [20] The
character of the element of unlawful aggression is aptly explained as follows:

Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in
defense of oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is
whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person
defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the
accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a)
there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or,
at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b)
imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with
physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the
aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending
or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be
merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another
with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful
aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand
to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming
to throw a pot.[21]

By invoking self-defense, however, Fontanilla admitted inflicting the fatal injuries that caused the death of
Olais. It is basic that once an accused in a prosecution for murder or homicide admitted his infliction of the fatal
injuries on the deceased, he assumed the burden to prove by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence the
justifying circumstance that would avoid his criminal liability.[22] Having thus admitted being the author of the
death of the victim, Fontanilla came to bear the burden of proving the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of
the court,[23] and he would be held criminally liable unless he established self-defense by sufficient and satisfactory
proof.[24] He should discharge the burden by relying on the strength of his own evidence, because the Prosecutions
evidence, even if weak, would not be disbelieved in view of his admission of the killing. [25] Nonetheless, the burden
to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt remained with the State until the end of the proceedings.
 Fontanilla did not discharge his burden. A review of the records reveals that, one, Olais did not commit
unlawful aggression against Fontanilla, and, two, Fontanillas act of hitting the victims head with a stone, causing
the mortal injury, was not proportional to, and constituted an unreasonable response to the victims fistic attack
and kicks.

Indeed, had Olais really attacked Fontanilla, the latter would have sustained some injury from the
aggression. It remains, however, that no injury of any kind or gravity was found on the person of Fontanilla
when he presented himself to the hospital; hence, the attending physician of the hospital did not issue any medical
certificate to him. Nor was any medication applied to him. [26] In contrast, the physician who examined the cadaver
of Olais testified that Olais had been hit on the head more than once. The plea of self-defense was thus belied, for
the weapons used by Fontanilla and the location and number of wounds he inflicted on Olais revealed his intent to
kill, not merely an effort to prevent or repel an attack from Olais. We consider to be significant that the gravity of
the wounds manifested the determined effort of the accused to kill his victim, not just to defend himself. [27]

The CA and the RTC found that treachery was attendant. We concur. Fontanilla had appeared out of
nowhere to strike Olais on the head, first with the wooden stick, and then with a big stone, causing Olais to fall to
the ground facedown. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack effectively denied to Olais the ability to
defend himself or to retaliate against Fontanilla.

The imposition of reclusion perpetua by the CA was warranted under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code,[28] which prescribes reclusion perpetua to death as the penalty for murder. Under the rules on theapplication
of indivisible penalties in Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code,[29] the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is
imposed if there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances. Yet, the Court points out that the RTC
erroneously imposed RECLUSION PERPETUA TO DEATH as the penalty. Such imposition was bereft of legal
justification, for reclusion perpetua and death, being indivisible, should not be imposed as a compound, alternative
or successive penalty for a single felony. In short, the imposition of one precluded the imposition of the other.

The Court also modifies the limiting of civil damages by the CA and the RTC to only the death indemnity
of P50,000.00. When death occurs due to a crime, the damages to be awarded may include: (a) civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim; (b) actual or compensatory damages; (c) moral damages; (d) exemplary
damages; and (e) temperate damages.[30]

Accordingly, the CA and the RTC should also have granted moral damages in addition to the death
indemnity, which were of different kinds.[31] The death indemnity compensated the loss of life due to crime, but
appropriate and reasonable moral damages would justly assuage the mental anguish and emotional sufferings of
the surviving family of Olais.[32] Although mental anguish and emotional sufferings of the surviving family were not
quantifiable with mathematical precision, the Court must nonetheless strive to set an amount that would restore
the heirs of the deceased to their moral status quo ante. Given the circumstances, P50,000.00 should be
reasonable as moral damages, which, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, [33] we are bound to award despite the
absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs mental anguish and emotional suffering. The rationale for doing so
rested on human nature and experience having shown that:

xxx a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the
part of the victims family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when
a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing
not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his
love, affection and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has
been done to them.[34]

Another omission of the CA and the RTC was their non-recognition of the right of the heirs of the victim to
temperate damages. The victims wife testified about her familys incurring funeral expenses of P36,000.00, but
only P18,000.00 was backed by receipts. It is already settled that when actual damages substantiated by receipts
sum up to lower than P25,000.00, temperate damages of at least P25,000.00 become justified, in lieu of actual
damages in the lesser amount actually proved by receipts. It would obviously be unfair to the heirs of the victim to
deny them compensation by way of actual damages despite their honest attempt to prove their actual expenses by
receipts (but succeeding only in showing expenses lower than P25,000.00 in amount).[35] Indeed, the heirs should
not be left in a worse situation than the heirs of another victim who might be nonetheless allowed temperate
damages of P25,000.00 despite not having presented any receipts at all. With the victims wife having
proved P18,000.00 worth of expenses, granting his heirs temperate damages of P25,000.00, not only P18,000.00,
is just and proper. Not to do so would foster a travesty of basic fairness.

The Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed in criminal cases as part of the civil
liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. [36] The Civil Code permits
such damages to be awarded by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.[37] In light of such legal provisions, the CA and the RTC should
have recognized the entitlement of the heirs of the victim to exemplary damages on account of the attendance of
treachery. It was of no moment that treachery was an attendant circumstance in murder, and, as such, inseparable
and absorbed in murder. As well explained in People v. Catubig:[38]

The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified
otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a
two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the
private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the
prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to
the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation
of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in
its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of
damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers
thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private
offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is
qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a
distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability
of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance,
 whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary
damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.

For the purpose, P30,000.00 is reasonable and proper as exemplary damages, [39] for a lesser amount would not
serve result in genuine exemplarity.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on June 29, 2006 by the Court of Appeals, subject to
the MODIFICATION of the civil damages, by ordering accused Alfonso Fontanilla y Obaldo to pay to the heirs of
Jose Olais P25,000.00 as temperate damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages in addition to the P50,000.00
as death indemnity and the P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus interest of 6% per annum on such amounts from
the finality of the judgment.

The accused shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 121802. September 7, 2000]

GIL MACALINO, JR., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.

DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking reversal of the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals[2] dated August 31, 1995, in CA-G.R. CR No. 14513, convicting petitioner Gil Macalino, Jr. of the
crime of Frustrated Homicide.
The record shows that on January 5, 1987, Provincial Fiscal Victoriano L. Tizon filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Siquijor an Information charging Gil Macalino, Jr. with frustrated homicide, defined
and penalized under Article 249 in relation to Article 250 of the Revised Penal Code, which was allegedly
committed as follows:

That at about 8:00 oclock in the evening of March 23, 1986, at the wharf area of Larena, Siquijor, situated at North
Poblacion, Larena, Siquijor, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused with intent
to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloneously stabbed one Fely Pono Garcia, using a bladed
weapon, hitting the victim at the mid clavicular line, subcostal area (1) left; which injury would have caused the
death of the victim had not been due to a timely and expert medical attendance extended to him and not by virtue of
the assailants spontaneous desistance.
Contrary to the Provisions of the RPC.[3]

Arraigned on September 7, 1989, petitioner Gil Macalino, Jr., assisted by his counsel, pleaded Not
Guilty.[4]
The pertinent facts are the following:
Victim Fely Garcia testified that on March 23, 1986, at around 8:00 oclock in the evening, he was in
front of Virgies Store at the wharf area of Larena, Siquijor with his friends, Salvador Rocamora and June
Uzarraga, to have a drinking spree.[5] While waiting for their companions, Gil Macalino, Jr., along with his
father and two other brothers, Manny and Ogie, arrived on board a jeep at Nicarter Mahusay Eatery,
which was located beside Virgies Store.[6] Fely Garcia approached the Macalinos to talk about the
incident that happened between them on March 17, 1986 and to ask for forgiveness. [7] The March 17,
1986 incident involved a fistfight between the two younger brothers of Macalino, Jr. and the group of Fely
Garcia, which resulted in the filing of a case against the group of Fely Garcia before the Metropolitan Trial
Court. Macalino, Jr. did not reciprocate his plea for forgiveness and told Fely Garcia that he had another
purpose, after which Fely Garcia went back to Virgies Store.[8]
A few minutes later, Fely Garcia saw the Macalino brothers advancing towards him at Virgies
Store. Santos Junjun Garcia, a brother of Fely Garcia, went near his brother, Fely Garcia, but the latter
shoved him away. Upon reaching Fely Garcia, Macalino, Jr. suddenly stabbed Fely Garcia. [9] The knife
used was a rambo knife about 9 inches long with a jagged edge. [10]After Fely Garcia was hit on the
stomach, he ran for a distance of about 30 meters towards the wharf, and then fell down. Fely Garcia was
brought to Siquijor Provincial Hospital where he was treated for one (1) month. For the said medical
treatment, Fely Garcia spent P9,000.00.[11]
Salvador Rocamora, Jr. corroborated the testimony of Fely Garcia on all material points. He further
testified that Macalino, Jr. attempted to incite trouble in front of Virgies Store which drew the ire of Santos
Garcia. Santos tried to assault Macalino, Jr. but Salvador and Fely Garcia pushed him away. Turning to
his right, after pushing Santos Garcia, Salvador saw Macalino, Jr. pulling back the hunting knife from the
body of Fely Garcia.[12]
Dr. Timoteo J. Badoy, Jr., physician at Siquijor Provincial Hospital testified that on March 23, 1986,
he treated a certain Fely Garcia for a stab wound on the stomach.[13] He issued a certification that
contains the following findings:
Stab wound, mid-clavicular line, subcostal area (L) with:
1. Perforated penetrated jejunum
2. Hemoperitoneum
3. Hypovolemia[14]
Dr. Timoteo Badoy, Jr. likewise declared that the injury sustained by Fely Garcia was fatal and that
he might have died if he had not been given medical attention. Dr. Badoy opined that a pointed and
sharp-edge instrument caused the wound.[15]
Patrolman Fortunato S. Ates, member of the Siquijor Integrated National Police, was at the Larena
wharf on the evening of March 23, 1986. While waiting for the departure of the boat, he heard someone
shouting, Help, there is a stabbing incident, Pano is stabbed.[16] Ates immediately rushed to the scene of
the crime and saw Macalino, Jr. still holding the bladed weapon. Ates introduced himself as a policeman
and asked Macalino, Jr. to drop his weapon. Macalino, Jr. did not resist the arrest by Ates who later
turned Macalino, Jr. over to a certain Lt. Balimbingan.
The defense gave a different version of the incident.
Gil Macalino, Sr., father of the accused, testified that at about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of March
23, 1986, he and some employees of the Department of Agriculture were having a despedida party in
Tugawe Beach in Cang-alwang, Siquijor.[17] Suddenly, Alex Bonachita appeared in a motorcycle, and
challenged the group asking Who is brave among you?[18] Before leaving, Alex Bonachita told them that
he would be waiting for them at Larena.[19] Threatened, Macalino, Sr. sought assistance from the PC
headquarters at Caipilan and was provided with security by Lt. Balimbingan.
Macalino, Sr. met Lt. Balimbingan at the Larena wharf that same evening and upon seeing him, the
latter just nodded at him.
While Macalino, Sr. was waiting for his co-employees to board the ferryboat at the Larena wharf,
Fely Garcia approached him and asked in a provocative manner, What now sir? Taken by surprise,
Macalino, Sr. answered Why?[20] After such brief exchange of words, the boat signaled for departure so
Macalino, Sr. returned to the restaurant.[21] However, before he could get out of the restaurant, a
commotion occurred at the wharf which was about 2 to 3 meters away from the restaurant. [22] Later on, he
learned of the stabbing incident and that his son, Macalino, Jr., was involved. The authorities brought
Macalino, Jr. to the PC headquarters at Caipilan. While in jail, his son complained of some pain. Macalino
Sr. accompanied his son to Lazi Medicare and Community Hospital in Siquijor where he was confined for
more than two weeks.[23]
Dr. Magdalena Tan-Lim, physician of Lazi Medicare and Community Hospital treated Macalino, Jr.
on March 24, 1986.[24] Macalino, Jr. was admitted in the hospital from March 24 to April 2, 1986. The
medical certificate indicated the following injuries suffered by Macalino, Jr.: hematoma on the left cheek
and traumatic injury hypogastric region.[25]
Vice-Mayor Soledado Lomosad, a resident of Larena, Siquijor for more than 62 years testified on the
reputation and character of the Garcia brothers. He stated that the Garcias were troublemakers and, in
fact, several criminal cases had been filed against them.
Petitioner Gil Macalino, Jr. testified that at around 8:00 oclock in the evening of March 23, 1986, he
was fetched at the instance of his father from his house in Bontod, Larena. He was asked to drive a
vehicle taken by his fathers companion.[26] Upon reaching the vehicle parked on the side of Nicarter
Mahusay Eatery, his father came out of the restaurant and told him to stay. While sitting on the drivers
seat, Lt. Balimbingan approached him and asked where his father was. Macalino, Jr. called his father who
was then inside the Nicarter Mahusay Eatery, and thereafter, Macalino, Sr. and Lt. Balimbingan had a
conversation.[27]
Lt. Balimbingan approached Macalino, Jr. for the second time and told him to settle his differences
with the Garcias. At that instance, Macalino, Jr. alighted from the jeep and walked with Lt. Balimbingan
toward Virgies Store. After Lt. Balimbingan left, Fely Garcia and Santos Garcia arrived and approached
him. He noticed that something was bulging on the right side of Santos Garcias waist. Santos Garcia
asked him, What now, do you wish to fight and immediately after, Santos Garcia kicked him. Macalino, Jr.
was thus forced to bend down and before he could straighten up, Fely Garcia boxed him on the left side
of his face causing him to reeled around. After that, he heard a shout saying Watch out from behind
Jun. Macalino, Jr. then immediately faced the Garcia brothers. At that time, he noticed that Santos was
holding a knife in his right hand. He immediately held Santos hand and took hold of the knife, all in a span
of one minute. Upon seeing Fely Garcia, together with his companions, [28] rushing towards him, he drew
the knife from the scabbard and stabbed Fely Garcia.[29] While still holding the knife, a certain man in
civilian clothes approached Macalino, Jr. The man identified himself as Patrolman Ates and ordered him
to drop his weapon. Macalino, Jr. willingly complied with the order.[30]
On November 9, 1992, the trial court rendered its decision convicting petitioner Gil Macalino, Jr., the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds, and so holds, that Gil Macalino, Jr. is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Frustrated Homicide defined and penalized in Art. 249 in relation to Art. 250 in the Revised Penal Code and
judgment is hereby rendered sentencing the accused Gil Macalino, Jr., applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to
an imprisonment of Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of Prision Correccional as minimum to Ten
(10) years of Prision Mayor as maximum together with all the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to pay the
amount of NINE THOUSAND PESOS (P9,000.00) for actual damages, THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00)
for compensatory damages and FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00) for moral damages and to pay the
costs.

SO ORDERED.[31]

On December 14, 1992, Macalino, Jr. filed a Motion for Reconsideration [32] but, the same was denied
for lack of merit.[33]
Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals. Except for the
deletion of the awards for actual and moral damages, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court, thus:

WHEREFORE, except for the deletion of the awards for actual and moral damages, the appealed judgment is hereby
AFFIRMED, in all other respects. No pronouncement as to costs.

Hence, petitioner filed this appeal and interposed two (2) assigned errors, to wit:
I

THE KNIFE IN QUESTION IS OWNED BY THE BROTHER OF [sic] SANTOS GARCIA, WRENCHED
SAID KNIFE INTENDED TO HARM THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER AND USED BY PETITIONER IN
STABBING ONCE FELY GARCIA WHILE ATTACKING THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WITH
COMPANIONS OF SAID VICTIM; TO DISABLE THE SUPERIOR STRENGTH THAT WILL HARM
THE ACCUSED; SAID EVIDENCE UNCONTRADICTED AND UNREBUTTED BY THE
PROSECUTION, THEREFORE, THE SELF-DEFENSE OF ACCUSED UNREBUTTED.

II

THE CONVICTION CONCLUDED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND APPROVED BY THE
COURT OF APPEALS IS BASED ON PROBABILITIES, SURMISES, CONJECTURES AND
SUPPOSITION, INSTEAD OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS
NO AUTHORITY OR EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY, AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION.[34]

Thus, petitioners grievances deal with issues of facts, which, in turn, eventually hinge upon the credibility
of the witnesses.
In weighing the version of the prosecution as well as of the defense, the trial court found the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses more credible. It is a settled doctrine that, as a general rule, this
Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in the appreciation of evidence and credibility of
witnesses for it is only the trial court that had the opportunity to observe, weigh and assess these
matters. Only when it is evident in the records that some facts or circumstances of weight and influence
have been overlooked by the trial court which, if considered, would affect the result, will this Court act
otherwise.[35] In the present case, no cogent reason justifies our departure from the aforecited rule. Fely
Garcia accurately narrated the manner of how Macalino, Jr. stabbed him, thus:
PROSECUTOR DOMINGUEZ:
While you were already back at the store of Virgie Gomez, did you know what these Macalino brothers
do?
A They approached towards us.
Q And when they approached you, were you still standing with your companions Salvador Rocamora
and June Uzarraga?
A Yes.
 xxx xxx xxx
Q What happened when they were already in front or near you, can you recall what happened?
A Yes.
Q What happened.
A I was stabbed.
Q Who stabbed you?
A Gil Macalino, Jr.
Q Do you know Gil Macalino, Jr. personally?
A Yes.
Q If he is in the courtroom this morning, can you point to him?
A Yes.
Q Will you please point to him?
A That one (witness pointed to a man who answered when asked that his name is Gil Macalino, Jr.).
Q What did he use in stabbing you?
A A hunting knife.
Q Will you please describe how the stabbing incident started?
A While I was standing in front of Virgies store, they approached us and my younger brother Junjun
Garcia thought that I was being ganged up, so he went near me and I shoved him aside.
ATTY. FUA:
Your Honor please, we move for the deletion of the thinking of his brother Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
After I shoved him aside, I was hit here (witness pointed to the right side of his body showing a scar).
COURT:
Q Who was the younger brother of yours?
A Santos Garcia, Jr.
PROSECUTOR DOMINGUEZ:
Q Do you mean to say that this is the scar of the wound that was inflicted on you by the accused, Gil
Macalino, Jr.?
A Yes.[36]
For his part, prosecution witness Salvador Rocamora testified in this wise:
ATTY. FUA:
Q As far as Gil Macalino, Jr. actuations can you tell if Gil Macalino, Jr. was looking for trouble?
A I could not tell.
Q You could not tell because he was only listening to the advise [sic] of Lt. Balimbingan and his
actuations were not looking for trouble?
 A Yes.
Q And so when Junjun Garcia arrived, you pushed him away because to your mind there was no
reason why he should rushed to Gil Macalino, Jr., is that correct?
A Mine was only to pacify Junjun Garcia because I dont want trouble and I dont want him to be
involved in a trouble.
Q But until that moment when you pacified Junjun Garcia you were certain that Gil Macalino, Jr. did
not yet stab Fely Garcia?
A When Junjun Garcia rushed towards Gil Macalino, Jr. the first to parry him was Fely Garcia and
Junjun Garcia was pushed towards me, so I have to push him out and when I pushed him out, I
turned my head and I saw that Fely Garcia was being stabbed, and I saw the hunting knife being
pulled out, and after that I could not remember, after I pushed out Junjun Garcia, Fely Garcia was
facing already with Gil Macalino, Jr.
Q As far as you can remember this Junjun Garcia was not able to rush at the accused here Gil
Macalino, Jr. he was prevented by Fely Garcia and by you, is that correct?
A Yes.
Q And as far as you can remember Fely Garcia had not touched at all Gil Macalino, Jr., is that correct?
A Yes.
Q You are saying to the court, therefore, that on that entire evening of March 23, 1989 this Gil
Macalino, Jr. never sustained any injury, which was inflicted by the Garcia brothers?
PROSECUTOR DOMINGUEZ:
Objection, Your Honor. The witness would be incompetent. This witness testified that he followed Fely
Garcia to the hospital and he would not know whether there was anything that transpired during
that . After that.
COURT:
That is why the question is being asked. Let the witness answer.
A I cannot be certain about that because after the incident, I followed Fely Garcia to the hospital, so
that I could not know anymore what happened the rest of the evening.
COURT:
You mean the Court to understand that before you left the scene, you never saw Gil Macalino, Jr.
being inflicted with injuries from the hands of any Garcia?
A I have never seen it.[37]
Based on the above testimonies, Santos Junjun Garcia had no opportunity to go near Macalino,
Jr. How can Macalino, Jr., therefore, wrested the knife from the former? The Court of Appeals, in
conformity with the observation of the trial court, stated that:

There is sustainable basis for the trial courts observation that it was unbelievable for appellant to have wrested
subject knife from Santos (Junjun) Garcia, Jr. Aptly rationalized and concluded the lower court:

xxx xxx xxx

x x x It is unbelievable that, alone at the time of the scuffle between him and Pano Garcia and Santos Garcia, Jr. he
was able to wrest away the knife from Santos Garcia, Jr. And the knife was still in its scabbard when he wrested it
from Santos Garcia. If Santos Garcia, Jr. really did wield the knife against Gil Macalino, Jr. surely Santos Garcia Jr.
would have wielded the knife without scabbard. It is improbable that he got the knife from Santos Garcia, Jr.,
scabbard and all. The truth of the matter is that in all probability the knife was his own and he drew it from its
scabbard and stabbed Pano Garcia with it.[38]

Nonetheless, assuming arguendo that the questioned knife was actually owned by Santos Garcia,
and that Macalino, Jr. merely used the same to ward off the attack of Fely Garcia, the question that now
arises is: Would the act of stabbing Fely Garcia still be justified? We answer in the negative.
In this appeal, Macalino, Jr. reiterates his contention before the Court of Appeals that he acted in
self-defense. He tries to maintain a posture of innocence, and to support his claim of self-defense, he
presented a medical certificate[39] showing hematoma on his left cheek and traumatic injury hypogastric
region.
In pleading self-defense, petitioner in effect admitted that he stabbed the victim. It was then
incumbent upon him to prove that justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court, relying on the
strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. The reason is that even if the
prosecution evidence were weak, such could not be disbelieved after petitioner admitted the fact of
stabbing the victim.[40] Hence, the burden of proof shifts to the petitioner, who must establish with clear
and convincing evidence all of the elements of self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[41]
In the present case, petitioners claim of self-defense does not persuade us. His version of the
events, does not support finding of unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual,
sudden and unexpected attack or an imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude; there has to exist a real danger to the life or personal safety of the person claiming
self-defense. Nothing of that sort could reasonably be said of the actuation of the Garcia brothers. At
most, they merely displayed a threatening or intimidating attitude. This is evident from the testimony of
petitioner himself, and we quote:
PROS. DOMINGUEZ:
What was the position of Junjun Garcia[42] when you saw him after you turned your back?
A He was holding this way (witness demonstrates his two hands as if holding something).
Q And it was in this position when you were able to get hold of the arm including the handle of the
knife?
A Not the handle but the hand that was holding the knife.
Q You mean to say that you held the hand before any trusting motion was made?
A Not yet because he made an attempt to draw the scabbard.
xxx xxx xxx
PROS. DOMINGUEZ:
In the middle of the fifth paragraph[43] do you remember having testified to this When I heard a shout
from my brother Elpedio who was standing near the jeep at that time, in vernacular Bantay sa
luyo, Jun. Sensing that I was gravely in danger, I immediately made an about face when I
discovered that Santos Garcia, Jr. had already drawn his knife and was making a thrust towards
my stomach. Do you remember having testified to this?
A He just made an attempt to draw.
Q So you are now repudiating the statement that you made in this counter affidavit in this particular
portion the fact that he was already thrusting you?
A Yes.
xxx xxx xxx
 PROS. DOMINGUEZ:
When you were able to grab the knife together with the scabbard was the snap button that includes
the handle of the knife already opened?
ATTY FUA:
We will object to that, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
So it is established that it is the same knife and there is a scabbard and over that scabbard is a little
snap, [sic] that is closed by a snap. You agree [sic] that?
PROS. DOMINGUEZ:
Yes, Your Honor.
Was that snap already opened or closed when you got possession of the knife?
A It was opened.
Q Can you demonstrate how long did it take you to wrest the knife and to unsheath [sic] it?
A One minute [sic] more or less when I grabbed for it.
Q And did you not say that when you turned around you saw Junjun Garcia already holding a knife
and you also saw Fely Garcia also holding his knife?
A Yes, he was holding also a knife.
Q And the knife that was held by Pano Garcia did not have any scabbard, it was already bare blade?
A I was not able to notice whether there was a scabbard but he must have been holding the knife.
Q When you tried to take hold of the hand of Junjun Garcia which held the knife and also tried to wrest
the knife from him did you have to employ both of your hands?
A Yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And this process took you one minute?
A Yes, more or less.
Q And Fely Garcia who was only about one meter from you and also holding a knife was not able to
do anything in that one meter while both of your hands was employed in holding the arm of
Junjun Garcia?
A I did not notice because my intention was to the knife?[44]
The court finds it incredible that Fely Garcia did not, even once, make use of his knife in attacking
Macalino, Jr. if such was indeed his intention. Incidentally, Macalino, Jr. admitted he was not alone that
night. He even testified that his three younger brothers were in the crime scene and in fact one of them
gave him a warning, Watch out from behind, Jun. Macalino Jr. should have presented his brothers who
were present in the crime scene, to corroborate his testimony, but he did not.
In the case of People v. Jotoy,[45] we ruled that:

But even if We assume that it was the deceased who attacked the accused with a knife, as the latter would make Us
believe, We still hold that there was no self-defense because at that point when the accused was able to catch and
twist the hand of the deceased, in effect immobilizing him, the unlawful aggression had already ended. Thus, the
danger having ceased, there was no more need for the accused to start stabbing the deceased, not just once but five
(5) times.

We reiterated the same rule in People vs. Tampon,[46]

Even granting arguendo that the initial act of aggression came from Entellano as alleged by the appellant, we still
cannot sustain his plea of self-defense. As testified by the appellant, he grappled with Entellano for the knife and
was able to take possession of the same. At this point, it was no longer necessary for appellant to stab Estellano in
order to protect himself. His subsequent act of stabbing the now unarmed Estellano belies his claim that he acted in
self-preservation, and indicates nothing more than the preserve desire to kill.

In sum, petitioner failed to prove self-defense by clear and convincing evidence. His testimony
suffers seriously from want of credibility; it is more of denial, which, like alibi, is inherently a weak defense
and can easily be concocted.[47]
Therefore, we find no error in the trial court in finding petitioner Gil Macalino, Jr. responsible for
stabbing the victim Fely Garcia.
With regards to damages, the Court of Appeals is correct in deleting the award of actual or
compensatory damages and moral damages. Moral damages cannot be awarded without factual basis or
proof of physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury. [48] Likewise, the court can only grant actual or
compensatory damages for such expenses if supported by receipts.[49]
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated August 31, 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 14513 is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 95851 March 1, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,

vs.
MANOLO VILLANUEVA alias "BOY" VILLANUEVA, accused.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

It was the town fiesta of San Pablo, Laguna. But what could have augured an otherwise festive
atmosphere was preempted by the discovery of the lifeless body of a barrio lass sprawled on the cold
cement floor of their conjugal home. Blood was oozing out of her mouth. She was six months pregnant.
The suspected assailant was her husband who allegedly beat her to death after she slapped him earlier
in front of his friends.
Charged with and convicted of parricide with unintentional abortion MANOLO VILLANUEVA also known
as "Boy" Villanueva is now before us still professing innocence. He claims that he was watching a live
concert when his wife, Nora Magpantay, 19, committed suicide by taking sodium cyanide. She was
supposedly burdened with family problems and wanted to follow the footsteps of her sister who had
earlier taken her life.

But the evidence shows otherwise. Isidro Magpantay, father of Nora, testified that on 14 January 1989, at
around five or six o'clock in the afternoon, he went to the house of his daughter where she and Manolo
were engaged in a heated argument. Manolo was drunk. After seeing his son-in-law slap his daughter,
Isidro felt bad and left.1

The following morning, at around five o'clock, Isidro was informed by Manolo's parents that Nora had
poisoned herself.2 Forthwith, Isidro went to the hospital to look into the-medical records of his daughter.
But failing to find any, he proceeded to the funeral parlor where he saw his lifeless daughter with
contusions on the right cheek, breast, abdomen and at the back of her left ear. Her mouth was swollen.
Her forearms were raised; he straightened them.3

To augment the testimony of Isidro and to refute altogether the alibi of the accused, 15-year old Abigail
Bandoy narrated that on 14 January 1989, at around seven-thirty in the evening, while in the house of
Manolo and Nora, she witnessed the accused mauling Nora for about fifteen (15) minutes, striking Nora
several times in the stomach below her left breast and in different parts of her body over Nora's incessant
pleas "[t]ama na Boy." But Manolo would not stop until Nora fell unconscious on the cement floor. Then
Manolo left. After making sure he had already gone Abigail went home leaving Nora behind.4

Dr. Nida Glorioso, City Medical Officer, recounted that on 15 January 1989, at around nine-fifteen in the
morning, she examined the cadaver of Nora and found a "contusion on the left cheek including the lateral
aspect of the eye"5which could have been caused by a clenched fist, a kick, a piece of wood, a broken
bottle or any hard object.6 She also noticed a "bloody mucoid discharge com(ing) out from her
mouth."7 She then proceeded to open her abdomen to determine the presence of poison as it was alleged
by the victim's husband that his wife had poisoned herself. The abdomen of the victim however failed to
emit the characteristic odor of a chemical poison, negating the allegation that the victim had poisoned
herself.

Nevertheless, to completely rule out poisoning as the cause of death the victim's stomach and intestines
were sent to the PC Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City, for a "chemical analysis."8 Capt.
Luena E. Layador of he PC Crime Laboratory disclosed that "[t]oxicological examination conducted on the
above-mentioned specimen gave NEGATIVE result to the tests for common metallic, non-metallic, volatile
and non-volatile poisons, cyanides, organic phosphates, organic chlorides." 9 Thus, Dr. Glorioso
concluded that "[i]n view of the negative result of the toxicological examination from the P.C. Crime Lab.,
Camp Crame, Q.C., . . . and considering the contusio-ecchymosis, cheek, lateral aspect of eye, left, the
CAUSE OF DEATH is SHOCK DUE TO CEREBRAL CONCUSSION secondary to a severe blow on the
head.10

Manolo Villanueva however has a different tale. He averred that on 14 January 1989, at around six-thirty
in the evening, he went home to change his clothes since he was going to watch the concert of singer
Randy Santiago at Canossa College in San Pablo City later that evening. As he was about to leave their
house, his wife tried to stop him. His mother who saw them even reprimanded him. 11 Nevertheless, at
around seven-thirty, he left the house. 12He returned at around two-thirty the following morning. After
knocking at the door, calling out to his wife but failing to get a response for about thirty minutes, he
forcibly opened the door only to find his wife lying prostrate on the floor of their living room. He then
noticed the bottle of sodium cyanide, which he was using for poisoning rats, already empty. 13

On cross-examination, Manolo admitted that on 14 January 1989 he was slapped by his wife in front of
his friends which resulted in a little misunderstanding ("tampuhan"). Although embarrassed, according to
him, he nonetheless did not get angry. He merely ushered his wife back to their house and then left
again.14

Sherwin Isleta, 17, took the witness stand for the defense. His house is adjacent to the conjugal home of
Manolo and Nora with only a party wall separating the two houses. He said that on 14 January 1989 at
around eight o'clock in the evening, he saw Nora sitting near the gate in front of their house, apparently
waiting for someone. 15 That was the last time he saw her. At around three o'clock the following morning
he was awakened by the loud knock on the neighbor's door and repeated calls for Nora. A little later he
heard Manolo screaming, "Nora, Nora, why did you do this?16

In its Decision of 27 April 1990 the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Br. 31,17 ruled

A close scrutiny of the evidence discloses that: on January 14, 1989, between 5:00 P.M.
and 6:00 P.M. at their house, accused and his wife, Nora, quarreled with the former
slapping the latter in the presence of Isidro Magpantay who, after half an hour stay
thereat, left them; accused also left and went to his hangout; at 6:30 P.M.; accused
returned and in the presence of his friends, was slapped by his wife; between 7:30 P.M.
and 8:00 P.M., accused mauled his wife by giving her several fist blows, thereby causing
her to fall and hit her head on the cemented floor; also between the same period of time,
accused left their house and attended a concert with his friend, Nick Dalisay, from 9:00
P.M. up to 2:00 A.M. of the following day; at 3:00 A.M. of January 15, 1989, accused
found the lifeless body of his wife on the cemented floor in the bedroom of their house; at
9:15 A.M., Dr. Glorioso conducted an autopsy on the cadaver and found contusions on
the different parts of the body notably, on the left cheek and eye; and, deceased could
have died between 9:00 P.M. of January 14, 1989 and 12:00 A.M. of January 15, 1989
(citations omitted).18

and held that the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt that accused is guilty of
parricide with unintentional abortion. The accused was initially sentenced to suffer the death penalty
which is the penalty for parricide, the more serious crime, applied in its maximum period. But since the
death penalty could not at that time be imposed under the 1987 Constitution, the penalty for parricide
under Art. 246, The Revised Penal Code, was reclusion perpetua, the penalty next lower to death.
However, instead of imposing reclusion perpetua the trial court sentenced the accused to suffer life
imprisonment.19

A careful review of the transcript of stenographic notes shows that save for minor inconsistencies in the
statements of prosecution witnesses which even enhance their truthfulness as they erase any suspicion
of being rehearsed, their testimonies were consistent, in accord with one another, and were given in
simple, straightforward manner, mentioning details of the incident that could not have been merely
concocted. Thus, their averments among others included the fact that accused was slapped by the victim
in front of his friends which caused him extreme embarrassment, leading to a heated argument and
escalating into the mauling of the victim. Matter-of-factly, the manner in which the witnesses for the state
testified and their narration of events bear the hallmarks of candidness and sincerity.

And neither do we find material discrepancies or substantial inconsistencies in their testimonies which
may engender serious doubt on their reliability and veracity. Except for witness Isidro Magpantay to
whom bias is imputed by reason of his being the father of the victim who allegedly despised accused as
his son-in-law, there appears to be no motive on the part of Abigail and Dr. Glorioso to testify falsely. The
absence of evidence as to improper motives actuating the principal witnesses for the prosecution strongly
tends to sustain the conclusion that no such improper motives existed, and that their testimonies are
worthy of full faith and credit.20 There was no reason at all for Abigail and Dr. Glorioso to lie and
incriminate the accused. More so with Abigail who was then only fifteen (15) years old when she took the
witness stand. It has been held that the testimony of a minor of sound mind is likely to be more correct
and truthful than that of an older person, so that once established that the former has fully understood the
character and nature of an oath, his testimony should be accorded full credence. 21 What is more, the
eyewitness account of Abigail conforms with the autopsy findings, making her testimony even more
reliable and faithworthy.

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses to which the lower court has given full faith lead to a fair and
reasonable inference that the accused was indeed responsible for the death of the victim. Isidro
Magpantay narrated that he witnessed the misunderstanding between his daughter and her husband who
was then reeking with liquor, which the latter even admitted on cross-examination. Abigail Bandoy was an
eyewitness to the altercation between the spouses which led to the fatal mauling of the victim. And Dr.
Nida Glorioso, after examining the deceased and taking into consideration the result of the tests,
concluded that the cause of death was "shock due to cerebral concussion secondary to a severe blow on
the head," contrary to the submission of the accused that his wife had poisoned herself. Certainly, the
circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain leading to a logical conclusion that the accused, to
the exclusion of others, perpetrated the crime.

In brief, as this Court has repeatedly ruled, the alibi and denial of the accused cannot prevail over the
positive testimony of prosecution witnesses and their clear identification of him as the perpetrator of the
crime.22 Thus, against the strength of the evidence of the prosecution, the arguments of the defense have
proved to be unavailing.

The submission of the accused that the trial court erred in lending credence to the testimony of the father
of the deceased who has shown his dislike and bias against the former even before the death of Nora is
unsustainable. Isidro Magpantay merely narrated that, the last time he saw his daughter alive was in the
afternoon before she died when she and her husband were quarreling. While he may have previously
manifested his enmity towards the accused, Isidro only testified that he saw his daughter and the accused
in a heated altercation, which per se is not incriminatory, and which the accused himself even admitted,
downplaying it as a mere "tampuhan." It has long been settled that relationship of the prosecution witness
to the victim does not necessarily categorize him as biased and interested and thus tarnish his
testimony. 23 In fact, it is highly doubtful that Isidro would aid in the prosecution of the accused simply
because he disliked the latter. For sure, he would like to send the real killer of his daughter to jail, and not
just anyone whom he despised. Hence, there is no reason why Isidro's testimony should not be believed.

The contention of the accused that the deceased should have suffered more contusions, and not merely
on the "left cheek including the lateral aspect of the eye," considering the numerous blows she
supposedly received from him as narrated by witness Abigail, is ungrounded. We have repeatedly said
that absence of external injuries does not rule out the possibility that a blow had in fact been administered
by the offender. 24

The proposition of counsel of the accused that the toxicological examination performed by Dr. Glorioso
was very limited," 25 and that her conclusions were merely based on her opinion and not on medical
findings is likewise untenable.26 In fact, we find this amusing coming as it does from counsel who has
neither presented his qualifications nor cited any medical authority in forming such self-serving
conclusions. We thus sustain the opinion of Dr. Glorioso who certainly appears to be more competent in
the field of medicine than counsel who simply proffered speculations that have remained unsubstantiated.

Thus, even the assertion of the accused that his wife took sodium cyanide is very doubtful, not only
because her toxicological examination yielded negative result for the presence of poison, but also
because the pieces of broken bottle which supposedly contained the poison were also found negative for
"volatile, non-volatile and metallic poisons." 27

The defense, contending that "the prosecution should not have been allowed to spring a surprise," then
seeks to nullify the account of rebuttal witness Abigail Bandoy that the accused mauled the victim, and
binds the prosecution to its earlier statements that the rebuttal witness will testify only for the purpose of
rebutting the alibi of the accused that he attended the concert of Randy Santiago.
We are not persuaded. The Court finds it difficult to believe that the defense was surprised by the
testimony of witness Abigail considering that it was able to subject her to a grueling and rigorous cross-
examination, ceaselessly trying to elicit contradictory statements from her. If indeed the defense was
caught flat-footed, as it now makes it appear, then it could not have extensively cross-examined the 15-
year old witness. Suffice it to state that what Abigail said she saw and where she was at the time of the
incident are the natural and logical allegations to show that "the accused was not in the Randy Santiago
show," 28 which is the essence of the testimony of the rebuttal witness, as stated by the prosecutor, to
refute the denial of the accused.

The accused also takes to task the testimony of Abigail because of her delay in reporting the incident.
She witnessed the mauling of the victim on 14 January 1989. Yet, she executed an affidavit only on 23
January 1990, or after more than one year. Abigail however explains that she was not aware that the
victim had died as a result of the mauling and that a case was filed against the accused since after the
mauling she left for Manila to continue her schooling. Hence, it was only sometime in November 1989
when she learned that Nora was dead, and only on 23 January 1990 that a case was filed against the
accused. We thus accept the elucidation of Abigail. She has satisfactorily shown that she was indeed in
Manila to continue her studies, and was not well-posted on developments in the province. It was only
some ten (10) months later when she returned to San Pablo that she learned of Nora's death.

It has been repeatedly held that delay in divulging the name of the perpetrator of a crime, if sufficiently
explained, does not impair the credibility of the witness and his testimony nor destroy its probative
value.29 And, the failure of a witness to report at once to the police authorities the crime he had witnessed
cannot be taken against him for it is not uncommon for a witness to a crime to show some reluctance
about getting involved in a criminal case. 30 It has become judicial knowledge that prosecution witnesses
are, more often than not, afraid to testify. This was manifested by the prosecutor in the instant case.
Hence, in one case, 31 we said that fear of reprisal is a valid excuse for the momentary silence of
prosecution witnesses.

Thus the testimony of defense witness Sherwin Isleta that he saw Nora at around eight o'clock in the
evening before she was found dead has lost its relevance as it has not shown that the accused was
precluded from having mauled the victim and causing her eventual death. In fine, we uphold the
pronouncement of the trial court that "[t]he defense of alibi raised by the accused showing that he was at
the Canossa College in San Pablo City (watching the concert of singer Randy Santiago) with a friend,
Nick Dalisay, who was not even presented in Court, at the time when his wife could have allegedly died
even if true is still of no moment as his act (mauling) committed prior thereto is the one in issue."32

Consequently, we affirm the conclusion of the trial court that accused Manolo Villanueva is guilty of
parricide with unintentional abortion, for a husband who with violence kills his pregnant wife, occasioning
the death of the fetus, is guilty of parricide with unintentional abortion.33

Applying Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code which in part provides that "[w]hen a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies . . . the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period," accused should be sentenced to death, the maximum period
of the penalty for parricide which is the more serious crime. 34 However, in view of Sec. 19, par. (1), Art.
III, of the 1987 Constitution, which proscribes the imposition of the death penalty, and the inapplicability of
R.A. 7659 which restores the death penalty, considering that the act charged was committed prior to the
effectivity of said statute, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, which is the proper penalty as
prescribed by The Revised Penal Code, and not life imprisonment as erroneously imposed by the trial
court. Time and again this Court has said that reclusion perpetua is not the same as life imprisonment.
The former entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes eligible for
parole, and carries with it accessory penalties.35

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from finding accused MANOLO VILLANUEVA also known as
"BOY" VILLANUEVA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty of life imprisonment should instead
be reclusion perpetua, and consistent with existing jurisprudence, the civil indemnity for the death of the
victim and the award for moral damages should be as they are increased to P50,000.00 and P30,000.00,
respectively, while the actual damages and costs of P3,000.00 remain.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 100513. June 13, 1997]

SEVERINO ANTONIO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

[G.R. No. 111559. June 13, 1997]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CARLITO ANTONIO, accused-appellant.

DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

These cases have been consolidated in a Resolution[1] by this Court dated September 19, 1994 to
avoid possible conflicting decisions that may arise as they involve the same facts and incidents.
G.R. No. 100513 is a petition for review of the decision [2] of the Court of Appeals[3] promulgated on
April 30, 1991 in CA-G.R. CR No. 07956, affirming with slight modifications the decision [4] of the Regional
Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 72, finding the petitioner Severino Antonio guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder.
On the other hand, G.R. No. 111559 is an appeal from the decision [5] dated December 11, 1992, of
the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 74, in Criminal Case No. 6741-MN, finding also the accused-
appellant Carlito Antonio y Linao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder by direct
participation.[6]
Antecedent facts follow:
On July 25, 1988, an Information[7] was filed against both Severino Antonio and Carlito Antonio,
blood brothers, charging them with the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code,[8] before the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 72, in Criminal Case No.
6741-MN, committed as follows:

That on or about January 20, 1988, in the Municipality of Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, and confederating together with one (1) alias Oryo and one
(1) John Doe, whose true named (sic) and whereabouts are still unknown and who are still at large, mutually
helping one another, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, armed with gun, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said firearm one GONZALO GUTIERREZ,
thereby inflicting upon the victim gunshot wounds at the back and head, which directly caused his death.

Subsequently, a warrant of arrest was issued against both accused, but only Severino Antonio was
arrested on August 18, 1988 and subsequently tried. At that time, his co-accused Carlito Antonio, an
overseas contract worker, was abroad. Hence, the arrest warrant could not be served against him and
trial had to proceed without his participation.
Petitioner Severino Antonio pleaded not guilty and thereafter trial proceeded as to him.
On September 18, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment finding Severino Antonio guilty of murder,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Severino Antonio GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal
Code. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, and applying the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, said accused is hereby sentenced to a prison term ranging from TWELVE (12)
YEARS of prision mayor, as minimum, to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with all the accessory penalties thereof. He is also ordered to pay the
heirs of GONZALO GUTIERREZ the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND ( P 30,000.00 ) PESOS as indemnification for
the latters death.

Cost against the accused.

SO ORDERED.[9]

From this Decision,[10] petitioner Severino Antonio appealed to the Court of Appeals. [11] On April 30,
1991, the appellate court affirmed the aforesaid decision[12] of the court a quo with slight modifications,
appreciating the presence of conspiracy and treachery, but not the circumstance of evident
premeditation. The decretal portion of said decision states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding appellant Severino Antonio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder, qualified by treachery. The imposable penalty is from reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua. (People vs. Melgar, 137 SCRA 718), since death penalty, which was prescribed in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, has already been abolished by the 1987 Constitution (People vs. Guevarra,
155 SCRA 327, 335). There being no other modifying circumstances attending the commission of the crime, and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended, appellant Severino Antonio is sentenced to the penalty of,
from fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Gonzalo Gutierrez the sum of P50,000.00 (People vs. Sison, G.R. No.
86453, September 14, 1990) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

With this modification, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in all other respects.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[13]

Petitioner Severino Antonio moved to have the decision reconsidered, but the same was denied in a
Resolution[14] dated June 20, 1991; hence, he filed the instant petition for review on certiorari[15] with this
Court.
Before us, petitioner pleads for his acquittal by raising the following errors:

I
 THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IGNORING THE VERY CONVINCING REAL EVIDENCE OF
THE GUNSHOT WOUNDS BELYING THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTIONS
EYEWITNESSES.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE STORIES OF THESE
EYEWITNESSES IN THE LIGHT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THIS CASE.

III

IT WAS ALSO AN ERROR FOR THE RESPONDENT COURT TO SACRIFICE TRUTH FOR A
DUBIOUS TECHNICALITY AND IGNORING THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE IN THE ONGOING
TRIAL OF CO-ACCUSED CARLITO ANTONIO.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN STATING FINDINGS OF FACTS WITHOUT STATING
FROM WHICH THEY ARE BASED; AS INDEED IT MADE FINDINGS OF FACTS NOT SUPPORTED BY
ANYTHING ON RECORD.[16]

Carlito Antonio was in turn arrested on June 23, 1990 pursuant to an alias warrant of arrest dated
June 18, 1990. He was tried under the same Information,[17] by the lower court.
When arraigned, accused-appellant Carlito Antonio, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not
guilty. After the prosecution rested its case, the appellant filed a Demurrer to Evidence dated April 16,
1991, but the same was denied by the trial court in its Order [18] dated July 16, 1991.
After trial, the court a quo rendered its decision dated December 11, 1992, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, and finding the accused, CARLITO ANTONIO y LINAO guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder by direct participation, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the amount of Thirty Thousand ( P 30,000.00 )
Pesos Philippine Currency. With costs of suit against the accused.

SO ORDERED.[19]

Aggrieved by the trial courts decision,[20] accused-appellant Carlito Antonio appealed his case to us.
In his appellants brief, the herein appellant raises the following assignment of errors:

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO GIVE IMPORTANCE TO THE GUNSHOT WOUNDS.

II

IT LIKEWISE ERRED IN EXCUSING THE ADMITTED CONTRADICTIONS AND

INCONSISTENCIES OF THE PROSECUTIONS WITNESSES AS TRIVIAL, INSIGNIFICANT AND
UNIMPORTANT.

III
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.

IV

NO SUFFICIENT MOTIVE FOR THE KILLING WAS SHOWN. [21]

On the other hand, the Solicitor General maintains that the trial courts decision [22] convicting
accused-appellant Carlito Antonio should be affirmed and further prays that the civil indemnity awarded
by the court a quo should be increased to P50,000.00 from the award of P 30,000.00.[23]
The undisputed facts involving the charge of murder against both accused, as culled from the
records of both the trial court[24] and appellate court[25] follows:

The accused CARLITO ANTONIO and SEVERINO ANTONIO are the brothers-in-law of the victim, Gonzalo
Gutierrez, the latter being the husband of the accused elder sister, Mrs. Priscilla Antonio-Gutierrez x x x. The victim
and his family together with Carlito and his family, Severino, Areng, Betty and Erly lived in separate houses situated
in the Antonio compound which is owned by the mother of the Antonios.

At about 7:00 oclock in the evening of July 20, 1988, Jaime Robles, a candidate for councilor but lost, was in
Barangay Wawa, Tangos, Navotas, Metro Manila, on a house to house visit to thank people or voters who supported
him in the local election. He was then conversing with Luis Pantaleon and Jonathan Narciso. On the other hand,
Reynaldo Gutierrez was also there on Santos Street, and was talking to one Sony Sengco, when his father Gonzalo
Gutierrez arrived in the place on his way to their residence nearby. Reynaldo followed his father. Suddenly Carlito
Antonio, x x x appeared from behind of the latter, and at close range fired at him in the back. When Gonzalo
stumbled after walking a few steps, he was picked up by appellant Severino Antonio, brother of Carlito Antonio, and
one Oryo, held him by the two arms and dragged him across the street near the gate of the Abalos compound. Oryo
held a knife. Both Severino Antonio and Oryo forced Gonzalo to kneel down, and while the latter was in that
position, Carlito Antonio, grabbing Gonzalos head by the hair, poked a pistol on his left temple. Gonzalo pleaded for
forgiveness and that he be brought to the hospital.

It appears that Gonzalo Gutierrez was claiming ownership of the compound which belonged to the mother of
Gonzalos wife and the Antonio brothers; Gonzalo was saying that he was the master or boss naghari-harian of the
place, which the Antonio brothers strongly resented. To the plea of Gonzalo, Carlito replied that he must die now,
and fired his gun at the head of Gonzalo. Reynaldo could not do anything to protect his father because he was afraid,
and another one, a companion, was holding a gun warning him not to move or else he would also be killed. All that
he could say was a plea to stop the shooting; tama na, tama na. Still not satisfied, Carlito fired his gun, hitting
Gonzalo on the neck. All the four (4) assailants fled from the scene. Gonzalo was brought by Reynaldo to the house,
together with his brother Camilo Gutierrez, who arrived, while Robles went to the Office of the Barangay to seek the
assistance of the police, but there was no officer around, so he went home. Robles auntie Sonia arrived, and
informed Robles that Gonzalo (Along) was killed. Robles told her that he already knew about it and suggested that
he already be brought to the funeral parlor.

The case was investigated by the police of Navotas. One of the investigators was Cpl. Wilfredo Mendoza. The latter
was informed by Reynaldo Gutierrez that one of the killers of his father was appellant Severino Antonio. Not
knowing how to file the case, Reynaldo did not go to the police headquarters not until April 22, 1988, when he gave
his written statement to PFC. Manolo Rodriguez narrating how his father, Gonzalo, was shot and killed by Carlito
Antonio, appellant Severino Antonio, one Oryo and still another person, and how the four hatched the plan at about
noon time at the seashore which he (Reynaldo) overheard when he passed by.

An autopsy was performed by Dr. Benjamin Dizon, Municipal Health Officer of Navotas. His examination showed
that the cause of death of Gonzalo Gutierrez was multiple gun shot wounds on the head, neck and back. In the
course of his post-mortem examination, he prepared a human sketch, where he depicted and indicated that he found
bullet wounds on the head, the point of entry on the left temple and the point of exit was on the forehead or tuktok;
bullet wounds on the back of the neck below the right ear as the point of entry and wound on the back below the left
armpit as point of exit; and bullet wound on the back, on the left side near the waistline as the point of entry, and
wound on the front left side below the ribs as the point of exit. x x x.

For the defense, Carlito Antonio averred that on the day the incident happened, he left his house at around 10:00
a.m. to go to the Magsaysay Lines at T.M. Kalaw St., Manila, in connection with his job application as a seaman. He
stayed in that office until 4:00 p.m. of that day. After that, he proceeded to his aunt Clarita Guevarra and arrived
there at 5:30 p.m.. There he saw a child of her cousin named Vener. He stayed there up to 10:00 p.m. as he
was exchanging stories with her aunt. The accused-appellant also presented two (2) witnesses in the person of Mrs.
Filomena Antonio Besido and Mrs. Clarita Guevarra which substantially corroborated his testimony. [26]

The Court, after a thorough evaluation and painstaking review of the records of these cases,
conformably with the existing laws and jurisprudence on the matter, is of the firm position that the herein
petition lacks merit.
As the first and second assigned errors of the brothers Antonio in these consolidated cases are
identical, we shall discuss them jointly.
Both the herein petitioner Severino Antonio and accused-appellant Carlito Antonio contend that the
testimonies of the prosecutions two principal witnesses, Reynaldo Gutierrez and Jaime Robles, on the
nature and position of the gunshot wounds sustained by the victim, Gonzalo Gutierrez, and how these
were inflicted, do not correspond with, and are belied by, the physical evidence as depicted in the
testimony of Navotas Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Benjamin Dizon, the Government doctor who
conducted the post-mortem examination of the victim.They both assail the trial court for giving more
weight to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses despite certain errors, inconsistencies and
contradictions in their declarations. In particular, they assert the following:

Gunshot wounds B-1 and B-2 do not tally with the eyewitness account. The slug in B-1 went inside the back portion
of the head and exited at the front while the assailant was at the left side of the victim who were both standing. But
the eyewitnesses testified that Gonzalo who was kneeling then was pleading to Carlito, Carlito was holding his hair,
answered cruelly kailangang mamatay ka, then pulled the trigger as the gun was pointed at his temple.

Gunshot B-2 had its slug entering at the lower behind at the right ear and exiting at the right area with the assailant
in a much higher level. The eyewitnesses account had the shot fired immediately after the shot at the temple as the
victims head hang down. They evidently again mistook the point of entry and exit from one another. Note that the
doctor denied the possibility that Gonzalo was in a kneeling position even as the Fiscal led him to answer in such a
manner.[27]

After carefully examining the records of these cases, we find the above-quoted allegations to be
untenable. The court sees no reason to set aside the findings of fact of the trial court, which are
supported by the testimony of witnesses who have no reason whatsoever to testify falsely against the
accused-brothers. A witness testimony ought to be entitled to great weight when his accusing words are
directed against a close relative.[28] It goes beyond logic and normal human experience for a kinsman to
prosecute a blood relative. He risks the ire and reprisal of other relatives, if he were not guided by truth
and motivated by a quest for justice. Time and again, we have ruled in a catena of authorities that the
findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses should not be disturbed because the trial judge is
in a better position to rule on questions of fact, he having observed the deportment of the witnesses and
their manner of testifying during the trial,[29] except when it appears in the record that the trial court had
overlooked, ignored, or disregarded some fact or circumstance of weight or significance that, if
considered, would alter the result.[30] The petitioner and accused-appellant failed to demonstrate that their
case falls under such an exception. Thus, as elucidated by the court a quo:

The medico-legal findings on the cause of death of the victim, Gonzalo Gutierrez confirms the eye witnesses
accounts of the incident. Dr. Benjamin Dizon who autopsied the remains of the deceased confirmed that three (3)
shots were fired at the victim, with his medical finding that, the victim sustained three (3) bullet wounds, to wit: a)
bullet wounds on the head, the point of entry on the left temple and the point of exit on the forehead Tuktok; b)
bullet wounds on the back of the neck below the right ear as the point of entry, and wound on the back below the
armpit as the point of exit; c) bullet wound on the back, on the left side near the waistline as the point of entry, and
the wound on the front side below the ribs as point of exit.

The finding of the doctor as to the location of the points of entry and exit of the bullet wounds sustained by the
victim, is consistent and conformable with the eyewitnesses testimony. To the mind of the Court, any variance
thereof as to the exact location and nature of the wounds would be inconsequential and trivial matters and would not
affect the credibility of the witnesses. It is common experience that the human eye and mind could not perceive with
mechanical precision and with exactitude all the details of an incident. Especially in this case when a murder was
committed and the eyewitnesses to the gruesome killing are the close relatives of the victim and the assailants. xxx

In no occasion or instance that this Court entertains doubt as to the credibility of the prosecutions witnesses. It
always adheres to the legal principle or doctrine that, the testimony itself must not only be credible but also the
source thereof. xxx[31]

As to the other alleged contradictions and inconsistencies regarding the testimony of the
prosecutions witnesses, we find that they relate only to trivial, insignificant and unimportant matters and
consequently do not materially impair or impugn the very testimony of said witnesses. Accordingly, it has
been held by this Court in the case of People vs. Daen, Jr.[32] that, a witness is not expected to remember
an occurrence with perfect recollection down to insignificant and minute details. Errorless testimonies
cannot be expected especially when a witness is recounting details of a harrowing experience [33] and as
long as the mass of testimony jibes on material points, the slight clashing statements dilute neither the
witnesses credibility nor the veracity of their testimony. Such inconsistencies on minor details would even
enhance credibility as these discrepancies indicate that the responses are honest and unrehearsed. [34]
We find that the positive testimony of eyewitnesses, like Gutierrez and Robles, has a greater
probative value than the hypothetical statements made by a witness who was not even present at
the locus criminis, like Dr. Dizon.
The petitioner and accused-appellant further contend that the delay in reporting the crime to the
police was inexcusable and unreasonable and that the reasons given therefor are mere conjectures and
suppositions not supported by evidence on record. Therefore, they allege that the delay in reporting the
crime to the police authorities casts doubt on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
To this contention, we find no merit.
The delay on the part of eyewitnesses Reynaldo Gutierrez and Jaime Robles, assuming there was
any, was not unreasonable. It is a well-established rule needing minimal discussion that delay or
vacillation in reporting a crime, if sufficiently explained, does not impair the credibility of witnesses and
their testimony nor destroy its probative value.[35] Delay of a witness in revealing to the authorities what he
knows about a crime does not render his testimony false, for the delay may be explained by the natural
reticence of most people and their abhorrence to get involved in a criminal case. [36] And, the natural
reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information to the police authorities in criminal cases is consistent
with normal behavior and is a matter of judicial notice.[37]
In the case at bench, Reynaldo Gutierrez sufficiently accounted for the delay in reporting the crime to
the police, while Jaime Robles explained the reason for his reluctance to be involved in the case. The
Court of Appeals ruled on the matter in this manner:

It would appear that, out of sheer ignorance or lack of sufficient education, and his being in a state of helplessness,
witness Reynaldo Gutierrez was not able to go to the police headquarters and give his statement not until much later.

However, when Cpl. Wilfredo Mendoza was investigating the case, he was already informed by Reynaldo that one
of the killers of his father was appellant Severino. xxx
There can be no doubt as to the presence of Reynaldo Gutierrez at the scene of the killing to enable him to witness
the shooting of his father, as the same is confirmed by the other present witness Jaime Robles who was also present
at the scene of incident. As a matter of fact, witness Reynaldo was prevented from extending any help to his
beleaguered father, as one of the companions of appellant held him at bay by poking a gun at him. And as soon as
the killers left, Reynaldo went to approach his father and brought him to their home. If Reynaldo was not there to
witness the incident, appellant could have easily checked with Sony Sengco, with whom witness was talking
immediately before his father was shot, and appellant could have made him as his witness to dispute the witness
claim that he was there after the scene of the shooting.

As to the witness Jaime Robles, it would appear that he did not want to be involved as he simply went to the
barangay office to look for a policeman, and having failed to find one he simply went home. It appears that Robles is
related to both the family of appellant and the deceased. He is the cousin of the Antonios by his father side; he is
also the cousin of the deceased by his mother
side. He was terriblydepressed and saddened about the whole affair, since the parties involved are his relatives. Be
that as it may, we do not find said witness to be a false one. As we examined the records, he testified in a clear and
straight forward manner, responsive and positive, indicating that he is a truthful witness. We find no motive why he
should testify falsely against appellant if the truth was that he was not there at the scene and witnessed the
commission of the crime. Hence, not withstanding the fact that he did not come forward and report the incident to
the police authorities, like other persons or bystanders who were present and saw the incident and did not also take
the trouble to go to the police station, witness Jaime Robles credibility was not affected thereby. It is well-known
that eyewitnesses to killings usually do not want to undergo the trouble and inconvenience of an investigation and of
appearing in court, being grilled by lawyers and being exposed to reprisal from the accused (People vs. Medrana,
110 SCRA 130, 141). Initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information about a criminal case and their
unwillingness to be involved in criminal investigations are common and do not affect their credibility (People vs.
Untalasco, 125 SCRA 159, 170)." [38] (Underlining supplied)

As to the assigned error, to wit:

The trial court, of course, denied the demurrer. But it did not say there was proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
accuseds guilt. Neither did it consider the various points raised by the accused against the testimonies of the alleged
two eyewitnesses. The trial court merely stated that there is a prima facie proof the accused , and that the two
eyewitnesses pinpointed to the accused Carlito Antonio as the triggerman.'[39]

we find the contention to be not well-taken. Judicial action on a motion to dismiss or demurrer to the
evidence is left to the exercise of sound judicial discretion. Unless there is a grave abuse thereof,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the trial courts denial of a motion to dismiss may not be disturbed. [40] In
the case at bench, the trial court, after hearing the evidence presented by the prosecution, was convinced
that said evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding of guilt. In its Order dated July 16, 1991 denying
appellants Demurrer to Evidence filed on April 12, 1991, the trial court stated that:

In clear contrast with the case at bar, the prosecution has at least shown prima facie the guilt of the accused, or as
frequently stated, the essential element of the crime charged. The
uncontroverted facts remainthat the deceased Gonzalo Gutierrez was shot three (3) times on the different parts of his
body at Navotas, Metro Manila in the 20th day of January 1988 at around 7:00 P.M. The doctor who conducted the
autopsy and postmortem examination on the body of the deceased testified that the cause of death was gunshot
wounds. That the two (2) witnesses,
namely: Reynaldo Gutierrez and Jaime Robles testified thatthey saw the actual killing
and pinpointed to the accused Carlito Antonio as the triggerman. As to the motive of the killing, the Court took note
that even the accused admitted that there was existing familyfeud between the deceased and the accused-
brothers, Carlito and Severino Antonio.[41] (Underlining supplied)

Hence, although the trial court did not expressly state in its Order [42] denying appellants demurrer to
evidence that there was proof beyond reasonable doubt, such degree of proof was actually existing and
present in the aforesaid Order. The prosecution was successful in proving every fact and circumstance
essential to show the guilt of the accused. The court a quofound: (a) the uncontroverted facts remain that
the deceased Gonzalo Gutierrez was shot three (3) times on the different parts of the body at Navotas,
Metro Manila in the 20th day of January 1988 at around 7:00 P.M.; (b) two (2) witnesses,
namely: Reynaldo Gutierrez and Jaime Robles testified that they saw the actual killing and pinpointed the
accused Carlito Antonio as the triggerman; and (3) the accused admitted that there was an existing family
feud between the deceased and the accused-brothers, Carlito and Severino Antonio.[43]
Furthermore, in denying a demurrer to evidence, the court need not state that the prosecution has
established proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is sufficient that words of similar import, such as those
stated in this case the essential elements of the crime charged, [44] - be present to indicate that there was
a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused.Therefore, the trial court did not commit
any error in its Order dated July 16, 1991 denying the appellants demurrer to evidence for there was
sufficient compliance.
Going now to the alibi interposed by the accused-appellant, we find the same to be bereft of merit.
It is undisputed jurisprudential rule that, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove
not only that he was at some other place at the time the crime was committed but that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime.[45] This the appellant failed
to prove. Moreover, alibi becomes less plausible as a defense when it is mainly established by the
accused himself and his immediate relatives and not by credible persons. [46] Besides, positive
identification where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which if not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.[47]
In the instant case, the herein accused-appellant and petitioner was definitely identified and
established as having been in the Antonio compound at about 6:00 P.M. of January 20, 1988 by no less
than their elder sister, Priscilla A. Gutierrez.[48] Moreover, Carlito Antonio was positively identified by
prosecution witnesses Reynaldo Gutierrez and Jaime Robles as the one who shot and killed, together
with co-accused Severino Antonio and a certain Oryo, the victim Gonzalo Gutierrez on January 20, 1988
at Wawa, Navotas, Metro Manila.[49] Thus, the trial court stated:

On the other hand, witnesses, Reynaldo Gutierrez and Jaime Robles had positively identified the assailants and their
testimonies corroborate each other on material points. Both of them testified that they personally witnessed the
killing of Gonzalo Gutierrez by accused, Carlito Antonio and his co-conspirators on the fateful evening of January
20, 1988 in Wawa, Tangos, Navotas, Metro Manila. They positively identified Carlito Antonio as the gunwilder(sic)
and narrated in a detailed and straight-forward manner how the latter fired his gun at the back of the victim while he
was walking towards his house. Thereafter, Severino and Oryo grasped the hands of the victim, and dragged the
latter about four (4) meters away towards the gate of the Ablola family, where they forced the victim to kneel
down. Carlito Antonio then grabbed the victims head by hair and pointed a gun on his left temple and after a few
exchange of words squeezed the trigger. After the shot, the victims head hanged forward lumungayngay and at this
precise moment Carlito shot again the victim on his neck.[50]

Finally, while in his fourth assigned error, accused-appellant Carlito Antonio contends that:

Aside from a vague reference to a family dispute (which was uncorroborated and the specifics of which are not
stated), there is no clear motive for the killing. With such a brutal, merciless assault, the rage of the assailants must
have been great. What brought such anger? What impelled such demonic act? Theres no answer from the
prosecutions evidence.[51]

it is our holding that this argument is without merit, because motive is not essential to convict when there
is no doubt as to the identity of the culprit.[52] The fact that the witnesses had positively and categorically
identified the accused as the malefactors, negatives the need for establishing the motive for the killing of
the victim.[53]
But, the motive behind the killing of Gonzalo Gutierrez was in fact satisfactorily established by the
testimony of prosecution witness Reynaldo Gutierrez when the latter testified that:
 Q. By the way, do you know any personal misunderstanding exist between your father and your
uncles before January 20, 1988?
A. Yes, sir. There was.
Q. What was that?
A. About our land, sir.
Q. You said there was a misunderstanding between your father and the two (2) accused about
your land will you please tell this honorable court what is that misunderstanding about the
land?
A. Because they say that my father wants to act as King in our compound.
Q. They complain that your father was acting as a king in your compound, what compound are
you referring to ?
A. The land of my grandmother, sir.
Q. You said it was the land of your grandmother, in that compound, who was residing?
A. Our house is near the house of my uncles, sir.
Q. You said your house is near the house of your uncles, who are these uncles?
A. They are Tiyo Caring, Sebing, Areng, Betty and Erly.
Q. These Caring and Sebing, are they the same accused Carlito Antonio and Severino Antonio
in this case?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You stated that it was complained or rather they complained that your father was acting as a
King in this compound, who made that complaint that your father is naghahari-harian.
A. My uncle, sir.
Q. Who in this particular, among your uncles?
A. Carlito Antonio, Sir.
Q. You said that the compound where your house and the houses of your uncles situated is
owned by your grandmother, whose grandmother you are referring to?
A. My grandmother in my mother side, sir.[54] (Underlining supplied)
Priscilla Gutierrez, another prosecution witness likewise corroborated the above-quoted
testimony. We quote relevant portions of her testimony:
Q. It is admitted by the defense that you are a sister of the accused, Carlito Antonio and
Severino Antonio, now will you please tell the Honorable Court who among the three (3) of
you is the eldest?
A. I am the one, sir.
Q. It is also admitted by the defense that you Carlito Antonio and Severino Antonio live in the
same compound?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In whose compound do you and accused, Severino and Carlito Antonio live?
A. To our mother, sir.
 Q. Do you want to tell this Honorable Court that the land on which your houses are erected are
owned by your mother?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How long have you and your brothers Severino and Carlito been neighbors in the compound
owned by your mother before January 20, 1988?
A. It has been a long time, about 20 years now, sir.
Q. As neighbors, did your husband get along with your brothers Carlito and Severino?
A. Before we were in good terms but later on we have a misunderstanding between them, sir.
Q. What was that misunderstanding between your husband and your brother, Carlito?
A. They are claiming that we are occupying a bigger portion of the lot and saying that my
husband was and I quote, 'NAGHAHARI-HARIAN.[55] (Underlining supplied)
As to civil indemnity, we hold that the amount of P30,000.00 awarded by the trial court in Criminal
Case No. 6741-MN dated December 11, 1992,[56] to the heirs of the victims should be increased
to P50,000.00, in line with present jurisprudence.[57]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review in G.R. No. 100513 is DISMISSED for
lack of merit, while the judgment appealed from in G.R. No. 111559, except for the above mentioned
modification, is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 177827

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

ANSELMO BERONDO, JR. Promulgated:

y PATERES,
Accused-Appellant. March 30, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case
 This is an appeal from the November 7, 2006 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 00386 entitled People of the Philippines v. Anselmo Berondo, Jr. y Pateres which held accused-appellant
Anselmo Berondo, Jr. guilty of homicide. The CA Decision modified the September 23, 2003 Decision[2] in
Criminal Case No. 11760-02 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8 in Malaybalay City, which held accused-
appellant liable for murder.

The Facts

At around 11:30 p.m. of February 13, 1999, after joining the Miss Gay competition at New Danao,
Sinaysayan, Kitaotao, Bukidnon, Herbert Nietes, Jr. walked home to Puntian, Quezon, Bukidnon. While on the way,
he suddenly heard a gunshot from nearby. Feeling afraid, he ran towards the grassy area by the roadside to
hide. After about five minutes, he saw accused-appellant, Julie Tubigon, and Jesus Sudario, each holding a knife,
walk towards the road and take turns in stabbing a person who was already slumped on the ground. He recognized
the three as they are his townmates. Thereafter, he ran away from the area and went to Bato-Bato, Sinaysayan,
Kitaotao, Bukidnon, where he spent the night. The next day, he learned that the person stabbed was Genaro
Laguna. He later testified that he did not reveal what he had witnessed to anyone because he was afraid of getting
involved.[3]
At about the same time, Pedro Tero, who was also walking along the road towards Puntian, saw Tubigon
shoot Laguna. After the victim fell, about five to six persons whom he did not recognize went near the victim. He
then immediately ran away from the scene and no longer saw what had happened next to the victim. On the
following day, he told a certain Hoseas Sagarino what he saw but did not report it to the authorities. [4]

Two years after the incident, Nietes and Tero admitted to Dolores, Lagunas widow, that they had witnessed
the crime. They then reported the matter to the police and, accordingly, executed their respective sworn
statements. Thereafter, an Information for robbery with murder was filed against accused-appellant, Tubigon, and
Sudario. The Information reads:

That on or about the 13th day of February 1999, in the evening, at Purok 2, barangay West
Dalurong, [Kitaotao], [Bukidnon], Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent
to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally take, rob and carry away cash
amounting to SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS [PhP 6,500], belonging to GENARO
LAGUNA, to his damage and prejudice in the aforementioned amount;

That on the occasion of the said Robbery, the above name accused, acting on the same
conspiracy, and to enable them to consummate their desire, with intent to kill by means of force
and taking advantage of superior strength, armed with a firearm with an unknown caliber, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally attack, assault and shoot GENARO LAGUNA,
inflicting upon his person multiple stab and gunshot wounds, which caused the instantaneous
death of GENARO LAGUNA to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of GENARO
LAGUNA in such amount as may be allowed by law.

Contrary to and in Violation of Article 294 in relation to Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended by R.A. 7659.[5]
Trial proceeded only against accused-appellant because the two other accused remained at-large.
 In his defense, accused-appellant denied any involvement in the killing of Laguna. He claimed that in the
evening of February 13, 1999, he was with his wife and daughter watching the activities during the Araw ng New
Danao (New Danao Day) at the Poblacion, New Danao, Sinaysayan. When the activities ended at about two oclock
in the morning of the next day, they went home together. Hours later, Geno Laguna, the victims cousin, told him
about the incident and together they proceeded to the place where the victims body was found. Further, he alleged
that prosecution witness Nietes was his daughters former sweetheart. Their relationship became unfriendly after
Nietes acted rudely against accused-appellants daughter.[6]

On September 23, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the accused ANSELMO BERONDO JR. y PATERES is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the crime of MURDER under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code and is sentenced to the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. The accused is further
ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Genaro Laguna the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (PhP50,000.00) as actual damages and civil indemnity in the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (PhP50,000.00).

SO ORDERED.

The case was appealed to the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

Affirming the decision of the trial court, the appellate court found credible Nietes testimony pointing to
accused-appellant as one of the persons who stabbed the victim. It dismissed the imputation of ill motive against
Nietes and held that the clear and straightforward manner in which he testified is worthy of belief. Also, it held that
Nietes delay in reporting the crime was reasonable considering that eyewitnesses have a tendency to remain silent
rather than imperil their lives or that of their family.

The CA, however, found that the prosecution failed to prove the attendance of the qualifying circumstance
of abuse of superior strength. It held that no evidence was presented to prove that the three accused purposely took
advantage of their numerical superiority. Thus, accused-appellant was held guilty only of homicide and not murder.

The CA also modified the award of damages. Finding that there was absence of proof of actual damages,
the CA instead awarded temperate damages in the amount of PhP 50,000.

The fallo of the November 7, 2006 CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is modified. In lieu of murder, the Court
finds appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and he is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to twelve (12) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of Genaro Laguna the amount of fifty
thousand pesos (Php 50,000.00) as temperate damages and fifty thousand pesos (Php 50,000.00)
as civil indemnity.[7]
 Hence, we have this appeal.

The Issues

In a Resolution dated August 22, 2007, this Court required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they
so desired. On October 25, 2007, accused-appellant, through counsel, signified that he was no longer filing a
supplemental brief. Thus, the following issues raised in accused-appellants Brief dated November 16, 2004 are now
deemed adopted in this present appeal:
I.
The court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of [homicide] despite the
prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

II.
The court a quo gravely erred in giving weight and credence to the incredible and inconsistent
testimony of the prosecution witnesses.[8]

In essence, the case involves the credibility of the prosecution eyewitnesses and the sufficiency of the
prosecution evidence.

The Ruling of the Court

The appeal is without merit.

Accused-appellants guilt is anchored only on the testimony of Nietes. Accused-appellant, however, faults
Nietes for belatedly reporting the identities of the assailants. He claims that the delay impaired Nietes credibility;
thus, the latters testimony should be disregarded.

We disagree. Delay in revealing the identity of the perpetrators of a crime does not necessarily impair the
credibility of a witness, especially where sufficient explanation is given. [9] No standard form of behavior can be
expected from people who had witnessed a strange or frightful experience. [10] Jurisprudence recognizes that
witnesses are naturally reluctant to volunteer information about a criminal case or are unwilling to be involved in
criminal investigations because of varied reasons. Some fear for their lives and that of their family; [11] while others
shy away when those involved in the crime are their relatives [12] or townmates.[13] And where there is delay, it is
more important to consider the reason for the delay, which must be sufficient or well-grounded, and not the length of
delay.[14]
In this case, although it took Nietes more than two years to report the identity of the assailants, such delay
was sufficiently explained. Nietes stated that he feared for his life because the three accused also lived in the same
town and the incident was the first killing in their area. He only had the courage to reveal to Dolores what he had
witnessed because his conscience bothered him.

Despite the delay in reporting the identities of the malefactors, Nietes testified in a categorical,
straightforward, and spontaneous manner, and remained consistent even under grueling cross-examination. Such
bears the marks of a credible witness.[15]
 As regards the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence, we affirm the findings of the CA that the crime
committed was only homicide and not murder. As correctly noted by the appellate court, the attendant circumstances
of conspiracy and abuse of superior strength were not proved, thus:
The Court notes that witness Nietes Jr. was not able to identify the person who shot the
victim. It was witness Tero who said that it was accused Julie Tubigon, but he did not witness the
stabbing. Witness Nietes Jr. did. No evidence exists to show the events preceding the attack and
those occurring after. The simultaneity of the delivery of stabs by the three assailants alone is not
sufficient to prove conspiracy.

The Court likewise finds error in finding that the killing of the deceased was committed
with abuse of superior strength, because no evidence was presented to prove that the accused
purposely took advantage of their numerical superiority.
Absent clear and convincing evidence of any qualifying circumstance, conviction should
only be for homicide.[16]

On the award of damages, the appellate court did not grant actual damages due to lack of proof of actual
expenses, but instead granted temperate damages in the amount of PhP 50,000. Under Article 2224 of the Civil
Code, temperate damages may be recovered when pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved
with certainty. In this case, it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim incurred funeral and burial expenses
although the exact amount was not established. In line with current jurisprudence, the amount of temperate damages
should, however, be decreased to PhP 25,000. [17]

The CA also properly awarded civil indemnity as such is given without need of proof other than the fact of
death as a result of the crime and proof of accused-appellants responsibility for it.[18] The trial court, however, failed
to award moral damages. Moral damages are awarded without need of further proof other than the fact of the
killing.[19]Thus, PhP 50,000 in moral damages is additionally awarded in favor of the heirs of the victim.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the November 7, 2006 CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00386 with MODIFICATIONS. As modified, the dispositive portion of the CA Decision shall read:

WHEREFORE, the accused ANSELMO BERONDO JR. y PATERES is found GUILTY

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve
(12) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.He is likewise
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity, PhP 25,000 as
temperate damages, and PhP 50,000 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-37945 May 28, 1984

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ADRIANO CAETE and JOSE BILOG alias BOY, defendants-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Benjamin L. Bargas and Teresita Cruz Sison for defendants-appellants.

RELOVA, J.:

Charged and convicted of the crime of murder by the then Court of First Instance of Palawan the two (2) accused, Adriano Caete and Jose
Bilog, were both sentenced to the maximum penalty of death and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased, Douglas Bilog, in the
sum of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay proportional costs.

The People's version of the facts is as follows:

Accused Jose Bilog and Douglas Bilog were brothers. They were owners of adjoining ricelands adjacent to the
Inagawan-Sub Colony at Puerto Princess, Palawan (p. 10, tsn, Jan. 4, 1973, Anonas). They were not in good terms
and always quarrelled because Jose resented the fact that Douglas has received a bigger share of the lands inherited
from their parents. (pp. 12, 20, tsn., Anonas).

The ire of Jose against his brother became unbearable that on or about April 28, 1971, he got his father's shotgun and
waylaid Douglas at the bridge leading their house. A tragic incident was averted only when Concepcion the wife of
Douglas, informed her uncle, Cervancia, of Jose's evil scheme. Cervancia immediately went after Jose and succeeded
in retrieving the gun from the latter and tried to settle their differences (p. 10, tsn, Anonas).

Through the intercession of Mr. Aniceto Gamo, a Chief of Section in the Inagawan-Sub Colony, Jose Bilog had allowed
his farm to be worked by Nicasio Dayao, a prisoner at the Colony (pp. 4-5, 13, tsn, Duero). Sometime in May, 1971
while Dayao was working in the ricefield, Jose Bilog offered him P300.00 if he (Dayao) would kill Douglas. Dayao
asked Jose Bilog why he wanted his brother liquidated. Jose replied that Douglas poisoned their mother and if Douglas
would not be liquidated he (Douglas) would eventually kill all of them in the family (p. 7, tsn., Duero). Dayao rejected
the proposal and offer of reward. He explained to Jose that he could not kill Douglas because he has many children to
think about (p. 8, tsn., Duero).

On April 19, 1972, at about 5:00 p.m., Concepcion Bilog saw from the window of their house in the ricefield, Jose Bilog
riding on a bicycle going towards the ricefield. On that occasion she saw Jose Bilog converse with two colonists (pp. 6-
7, 10, tsn., Jan. 4, 1973, Anonas).

Almost at the same time on that day, Angel Rebong, a prisoner of the colony was sent by Aniceto Gamo to get some
palay from Roming who lived near the ricefield of Jose Bilog (p. 53, tsn., Duero). On the highway, Angel Rebong met
Jose Bilog who was then riding a bicycle. Jose told him not to mention to anybody what he might see in the ricefield
(pp. 35, 49, 53, tsn., Duero). Angel however, did not see anything unusual in the ricefield so he went directly to the
house of Roming. He left Roming's place at about 6:00 p.m. and reported to Mr. Gamo that he failed to get the palay.
Thereafter, he returned to the General Services Barracks in the colony's compound. He reached his hut at about 7:00
p.m. (pp. 36-37, tsn., Duero).

At about 5:00 o'clock that same afternoon, Antonio Cabig, an inmate of the Colony was on his way from the Colony's
PX to the Coconut Division (pp. 64-66, tsn, Duero). He passed the ricefield of Jose Bilog and saw Douglas and Jose
drinking wine in the latter's hut. They were seated in front of a table with about five bottles of 'Cuatro Cantos' gin on it
(p. 92, tsn., Duero). When Cabig was 3 or 4 meters from the hut, Douglas saw him and offered him a drink. He
accepted the drink but stayed outside the hut (pp. 68, 93, tsn., Duero). Not long thereafter, two persons arrived and
joined the drinking party. Appellant Adriano Caete also arrived and joined the group. He sat beside Jose Bilog (pp. 90,
93, tsn., Id.).

When those around the table were already drunk, Jose (Boy) Bilog stood up and drew from his waist a "laring," a
bladed instrument about 1-1/2 feet long. Suddenly, Jose stabbed Douglas at the front part of his body (pp. 75, 77, 114,
tsn., Id.). Cabig witnessed the incident, but could not tell how many stab blows Jose Bilog delivered. He noticed that the
knife embedded in Douglas' body. At this juncture, Caete got hold of the knife and stabbed Douglas on the stomach
(p. 144, tsn., Id.). Douglas stood up and fought his assailants with karate blows (p. 118, tsn., Id.). The two persons who
had arrived earlier helped Jose and Caete by hitting Douglas with a piece of wood. When Boy Bilog caned for
assistance, a colonist, one Roming, came and helped them until Douglas fell dead. The victim was then dumped in a
nearby canal. Caete got the 'laring' and proceeded to the Colony's brigade with it (p. 140, tsn., Duero).
 When Angel Rebong arrived in his hut, Dugguan Abao, his hut-mate, informed him that appellant Adriano Caete came
to their hut with blooded clothes. Caete got Angel's clothes and wore them and left his blooded clothes (pp. 37-38,
tsn., Duero). Angel then left for the General Services Barracks because he was to perform guard duty at 8:00 p.m.
There he saw appellant Caete wearing his black pants and Vonnel T-Shirt. The latter told him that he got his (Angel's)
clothes because he had no clothes to wear (pp. 39, 44, 59, tsn., Duero).

On April 27, 1972, police investigators received information about the persons seen at the scene of the crime prior to its
commission. They took into custody Adriano Caete and Angel Rebong and brought them to Puerto Princess for
interrogation. When they reached Puerto Princess, Adriano Caete informed Angel Rebong that he killed Douglas Bilog
(p. 57, tsn., Duero). Upon investigation, appellant Caete readily admitted that he together with Jose Bilog, Pedro
Macabihag and Ramon Dealogo killed Douglas Bilog. Caete then voluntarily gave a written statement. (Exhibit "C";
pp. 157, 158-159, tsn. Duero). Later, he led Sgt. Maduro to his quarters in the Colony and surrendered the fatal knife
(pp. 162, 180, tsn., Id.). On June 22, 1972 Caete gave another statement. This time he stated that only he and Jose
Bilog had a hand in the killing of Douglas (p. 177, tsn., Duero).

Dr. Oscar Magtang, Rural Health Physician at Puerto Princess, Palawan conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of
Douglas Bilog. He found 26 injuries, twenty-four (24) of which were incised and stab wounds scattered all over the
body, particularly on the face, head, chest, abdomen, back, arms, and fingers of both hands. There were abrasions on
the neck and lower abdomen. Death was due to severe hemorrhage (pp. 55-58, tsn. Anonas). Dr. Magtang made a
written report, Exhibit "F" (p. 53, tsn. Id.). According to said doctor, the most severe of these wounds were those
inflicted on the left mammary region of the chest going vertically downward and injuring the heart, and the stab wound
on the abdomen (pp. 60-61, tsn., Anonas).

Adela Pereyna, Chief, Record and Document Section and Parcel Investigation, of the Iwahig Penal Colony testified that
per records in her custody Adriano Caete was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Cebu of robbery on
September 7, 1960; that he transferred to Davao Penal Colony for work assignment bearing Serial No. 34831-P; that
he escaped while serving sentence on January 10, 1963, but was captured and recommitted to prison on the following
day; that he escaped again on April 7, 1964; that on August 6, 1966, he was committed to the Iwahig Penal Colony
after having been convicted of robbery by the Court of First Instance of Ormoc City; that because he did not reveal his
Identity, he was included in the list of new arrivals and given serial No. 55791-P; that at the Verification and
Identification Section, his Identity was established as the same Adriano Caete who was previously given Serial No.
34831-P and who escaped from the Davao Penal Colony or, April 7, 1964; that he was prosecuted for evasion of
sentence in the. Davao Court of First Instance with the aggravating circumstance of recidivism; and, that his term of
sentence was due to expire on August 23, 1975 (pp. 41-43, tsn. April 16,1973, Anonas; Exh. "D", p. 109, Rec). (pp. 4-
10, Appellee's Brief).

Appellant Adriano Caete assails the decision against him and submits that the lower court erred (1) in not rejecting his extra-judicial
confession, Exhibit "C", notwithstanding that the case was merely concocted, incredible and in conflict with the People's evidence; (2) in not
finding that there were at least seven (7) possibilities or versions as to who committed the crime and in not acquitting him on reasonable
doubt; (3) in finding that the crime was committed in conspiracy with the attendance of evident premeditation, price, treachery and in not
finding that Caete should have been found guilty only of physical injuries or at most homicide.

On the other hand, appellant Jose Bilog claims that the lower court erred (1) in giving credit to the testimony of prosecution witness Antonio
Cabig, notwithstanding that said witness is "known to be a confirmed degenerate and an admitted perjurer"; (2) in disregarding his defense of
alibi; and (3) in not acquitting him on reasonable doubt.

Appellant Caete subjects that the extra-judicial admission, Exhibit "C", should have been disregarded, not due to violence in the taking
thereof, but on the ground that the same had been successfully explained by him; that the contents thereof were merely concocted and this
is supported by the evidence of the prosecution; that aside from the irreconciliable conflict between what' is contained in his extra-judicial
confession and what prosecution witness Antonio Cabig testified in court, said extra-judicial confession contains statements which are
strikingly incredible; and that the credibility of prosecution witness Cabig as to the participation of appellant Caete in the killing of Douglas
Bilog is doubtful.

The contention is utterly without merit. The findings of the trial court is entitled to great weight that Caete's retraction was merely a last
minute effort at exculpation, considering that his extra-judicial confession, Exhibit "C", given in April 1972, was freely and voluntarily given.
The fact is, there was no evidence presented that said confession was obtained as a result of violence, torture, intimidation or promise of
reward or leniency, nor that the investigating officer could have been motivated to concoct facts narrated in said confession.

Besides, even with the exclusion of said Exhibit "C", there is the testimony of Antonio Cabig who witnessed the incident from the time Jose
Bilog stabbed his brother on his breast up to the time Douglas fell after receiving the thrust of Caete. Hereunder is Cabig's testimony
regarding the horrifying incident:

Q You said that Douglas Bilog was killed, do you know the persons who killed ...

Q Do you know how Douglas was killed?

A Yes, sir.
 Q In what way was he killed'?

A Douglas was drunk and he was stabbed by Boy Bilog.

Q Where?

WITNESS:

A He was stabbed near the hut and near the river.

COURT: (To Witness)

Q Did you see by your own eyes when that incident happened?

A Yes, sir.

FISCAL DILIG:

Q Who was the companion of Boy Bilog when he hit Douglas Bilog?

A Caete.

Q When you said Caete, was he the same person whom you have just pointed to?

A Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL DILIG:

Q You said that Boy Bilog hit with this bladed instrument marked as Exh. "B" Douglas Bilog was
Douglas Bilog hit?

A Yes, sir.

FISCAL DILIG:

Q In what part of the body of Douglas Bilog was hit?

A At the back of the body and here at the front.

Q After Boy Bilog hit his brother Douglas, do you know what happened to the knife marked as
Exh. "B"?

A Yes, sir.

Q What happened to that weapon marked as Exh. "B"?

A The knife dropped in the hand of Boy Bilog. After the knife was dropped, Douglas Bilog stood
up and he was hit again.

COURT: (To witness)

Q By whom?

A He was hit again by Cenete.

FISCAL DILIG:
 Q You said that Douglas Bilog was hit by Adriano Caete. What instrument did Caete stab
Douglas?

A The same knife used by Boy Bilog.

Q And in what particular part of the body of Douglas was stabbed by Caete with the same
weapon marked as Exh. "B"?

A At the left side and on the breast.

Q And after Douglas was hit and stabbed by Caete on the side and breast, do you know what
happened to Douglas?

A Douglas stood up and the two civilians helped in clubbing Douglas.

Q After that, what happened?

A Douglas fell down.

Q And after Douglas Bilog had fallen down, what did you do, if any?

A I went home already to the Coconut Section.

Q Prior to that incident, did you already personally know Jose Bilog.

A Yes, sir.

(TSN, pp. 77-78, January 8, 1973 hearing)

Likewise, appellant Jose Bilog's alibi cannot prevail over the positive Identification of Cabig. He points out that on the day of the incident,
April 19, 1972, he was in his house doing household chores as his wife was in Puerto Princess doing some marketing. On this score, the
lower court rightfully observed:

Jose Bilog's alibi has no merit. His house is but three kilometers away from the place of the incident and he was seen
by the widow of the deceased leaving his house on a bicycle about 4:00 o'clock that afternoon. At 5:00 o'clock, he was
met by Angel Rebong at the highway while riding his bicycle and at 6:00 o'clock late in the afternoon, Antonio Cabig
saw him drinking liquor with the deceased in his hut in the banana plantation (pp. 154-155, Rec.).

The defense of alibi cannot be believed where the distance between two barrios is only eight kilometers and can be
traversed by walking one and one-half hour (People vs. Manangan, L-32733, Sept. 11, 1974, 59 SCRA 31). (pp. 9-10,
Appellee's Brief).

Aside from the fact that courts exercise great caution in accepting alibi because it is easily concocted, it may be proper to repeat what one
author said about alibi as a defense: "it is a reason with a bad reputation."

Again, We agree with the findings of the trial court that "while Jose Bilog tried to shift the blame at Caete, Caete too wanted the Court to
believe that it was Jose Bilog who did the heinous act. Repudiating his confession, Caete tried to convince the Court that he was simply
offered P1,000.00 in consideration of his admission of the crime. On cross- examination, however, Caete slipped and admitted that the
P1,000.00 consideration was offered for him to execute the killing. It is therefore evident that Caete's testimony disowning the crime is but a
last minute attempt at exculpation."

The killing of Douglas Bilog was qualified by treachery because the attack was unexpected and sudden, and the victim had no chance to
defend himself. Likewise, the aggravating circumstance of price was present in the commission of the crime and this affects not only the
person who received the money or the reward but also the person who gave it. (People vs. Talledo, 58 Phil. 539).

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED but, for lack of necessary votes, the sentence is modified in that both appellants
shall each suffer Reclusion Perpetua only, and shall indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Douglas Bilog in the sum of P30,000.00.
Costs against both appellants.

SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Gutierrez, Jr., and De la Fuente, JJ.,
concur.

Teehankee, J., concur in the result.

Aquino, J., took no part.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 148919. December 17, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. TERESA CORPUZ y VARGAS and MARCY SANTOS y
JAVIER, appellants.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

When the question boils down to the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies, this Court
almost always relies upon the assessment made by the trial court which had the distinct advantage of
having observed their demeanor, conduct and manner of testifying.

The Case

For review before this Court is the May 30, 2001 Decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malabon City (Branch 170) in Criminal Case No. 20334-MN. The RTC found Teresa V. Corpuz and Marcy
J. Santos guilty of violating Section 15 of Article III of Republic Act (RA) 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (RA 7659). The dispositive portion of the
appealed Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds both accused Teresa Corpuz y Vargas and Marcy Santos y
Javier guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended
by Republic Act 7659, and considering that the total aggregate quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride is
286.678 grams, and there being no modifying circumstances hereby sentences each of them to suffer penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay jointly and severally the fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), plus
cost of the suit.

The three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride subject matter of this case are
hereby forfeited in favor of the government, and the Office-in-Charge, Office of the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby
directed to turn over the aforesaid items to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition. [2]

The Information, dated January 6, 1999, charged appellants as follows:

That on or about the 4th day of January, 1999 in the Municipality of Malabon, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one
another, being private persons and without authority of law, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell and deliver in consideration of the amount of P300,000.00 to a poseur- buyer [t]hree (3) heat-sealed
transparent plastic bags each marked Exhibit A-1, A-2, & A-3, with white crystalline substance weighing 99.784,
105.812 and 81.082 grams when subjected to chemistry examination gave positive results for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu which is a regulated drug. [3]

During their arraignment on February 18, 1999, appellants, assisted by their counsel, [4] pleaded not
guilty.[5] After trial in due course, the lower court rendered its assailed Decision.

The Facts
Prosecutions Version

In its Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecutions version of the facts as
follows:

On January 4, 1999, around 6 oclock in the evening, a confidential police informant, a.k.a. Josie, went to the Special
Anti-Narcotics Enforcement Team at Camp Gen. Pantaleon, Imus, Cavite and informed team leader Inspector
Nolasco Cortez of a transaction that involved appellants Teresa Corpuz (alias Tess) and Marcy Santos (alias Mar) as
sellers of three hundred (300) grams of shabu worth P300,000.00. It appears that prior to Josies arrival at Camp
Pantaleon, the information was already relayed to Cortez through telephone.

Acting on the information, Inspector Cortez formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation designating PO3 Albert
Colaler as the poseur-buyer with SPO2 Joseph Yatco and PO1 Aldrin Agravante as back-up arresting
officers. Colaler was handed a marked P1,000-peso bill which he placed over a bundle of boodle money. The plan
was for Josie to introduce Colaler as an interested shabu buyer. As a pre-arranged signal, Colaler would remove his
white b[a]ll cap to signify that the evidence was already with him.

The buy-bust was to take place along Rizal Avenue in Malabon, near a Jollibee outlet and a church. Prior to the
operation, the team coordinated with the Malabon Police Station.

The buy-bust team arrived at the scene around 11:15 in the evening. The police back-up immediately positioned
themselves at a strategic location while Colaler and Josie waited. When appellants arrived, Josie introduced Colaler
who was asked by appellant Tess if he had the money with him. Colaler showed her the boodle money but told Tess
he would not give it to her unless he saw the shabu first.Thereupon, appellant Mar[cy] took out from his belt three
(3) transparent plastic containing white substance and gave them to Tess. The exchange was then
consummated. Mar was about to open the plastic bag with the boodle money when Colaler immediately removed his
white b[a]ll cap -- the pre-arranged signal. The two (2) back-up officers showed up and introduced themselves as
police officers. They arrested appellants and recovered from them the boodle money. Appellants [were] thereafter
taken and booked at Camp Pantaleon.

Based on the chemistry report prepared by Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo of the PNP Crime Laboratory, the
qualitative examination conducted on the specimen confiscated from appellants indicated that the same was indeed
methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu.[6] (Citations omitted)

Defenses Version

Appellants, on the other hand, argue that their guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Their version of the facts is as follows:
On January 4, 1999 at around 5:30 P.M., [Appellant Teresa Corpuz] was sleeping at her house when awakened by a
knock at the door. She stood and opened the door only to see Zeny and her three (3) female companions at the door
step. Zeny said, her friends need her service being a manghihilot. After she administered hilot to a certain Josie, she
went out to buy food. Upon her return, she saw one of the companions of Josie talking to somebody through the
cellular phone by the doorstep. They then [talked] about their lives while drinking softdrinks and Josie took pity on
her and promised to introduced [sic] her to her (Josie) boss who allegedly helps people like the accused. Josie then
asked her to accompany them to Jollibee since they were unaccustomed to Malabon and for fear that they might be
victimized by hold-uppers. However, Josie first asked her company in buying medicine at Mercury Drug Store,
which is just nearby the food chain. This is because Josie had difficulty in breathing on account of asthma.Coming
from the drug store, they proceeded to Jollibee. As soon as Josies boss arrived, they went out of the store where she
was introduced to the former whom she eventually came to know to be Lt. Cortez in Cavite. Moments [later] a
tricycle came behind the car. There were three (3) persons on board. One of them approached Josie and gave [her]
something gift-wrapped about three to six inches in size. She was surprised why the man has attempt[ed] to run
away immediately after bringing out the wrapped thing. Nonetheless, Josie was able to take hold of the said thing
before the man fled. She was only three steps behind Josie when she witnessed the shocking and swift incident. A
shooting spree ensued in pursuit of the [speeding] tricycle. One of the female companion[s] of Josie then handcuffed
her while another male person pushed her inside the car. She was not able to do anything except to cry after being
told that not to speak a word against and just to explain her side when they arrived in Cavite. Reaching the place, Lt.
Cortez showed to her the packets. She denied knowing anything [about] what was wrapped. Whereupon, Lt. Cortez
open[ed] the pack and she saw three (3) separate plastic bags with white crystalline substance inside. She was told
that the contents are Shabu. Lt. Cortez also asked her whether she is aware of the penalty attached to the
[possession] of illegal drugs which she denied knowing neither the identity of the owner of the same. The police
officer then exhibited to her list of names wherein hers does not appear. She was queried whether she knows those
persons listed and again she denied.Lt. Cortez finally read the names and forced her to single out a particular one in
exchange for her freedom. She likewise added that she is not aware if Josie and her companions were also arrested.

On other hand, Marcy Santos gave a different scenario:

He said that he was on his way home after having gone [to] Monumento. He was not able to reach his destination
because Inday a.k.a. Teresa Corpuz saw him in C-4 and requested him to go with her in going to Mercury Drug
located at the town proper where they would buy medicine. Corpuz was with her son and two women
companions. They went to Jollibee, afterwhich, he brought Teresas son home by taking a ride near Seven Eleven
Store where he [was] noticed and [they] immediately arrested him. He told them that he does [not] know anything
but was instead advised to explain when they reach[ed] their office.He was then shoved inside the car and
admonished not to shout. At Imus, Cavite, he was forced to admit that he was the one carrying the wrapped
thing. He, however, claimed that he was only standing at the place. Santos denied having sold or received any
money involving drug transaction.[7]

Ruling of the Trial Court

After a judicious assessment of the evidence submitted by both parties, the RTC ruled that the
prosecution had been able to prove with certainty all the elements of the illegal sale of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. It described as clear and straightforward the poseur-buyers
testimony, which was amply corroborated by the other members of the buy-bust team.[8]
Further, the RTC rejected appellants defense of denial. Not only was it inconsistent and
contradictory, it also failed to achieve the intended purpose. [9] It likewise held that the entrapment and the
arrest of appellants were not effected haphazardly. Furthermore, it held that no ill motive could be
attributed to the police officers who had conducted the buy-bust operation.[10]
Hence, this appeal.[11]
 The Issue

In their Brief, appellants assign the following errors for the Courts consideration:
I

Trial court erred in not finding that the buy-bust operation was in fact tainted by abuse on the part of the police
authorities;

II

The trial court also erred in finding that the case of the prosecution is strong and the version of the accused is
weak.[12]

In the main, this Court will take up two issues: the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence,
particularly the buy-bust operation; and the defense of denial.

The Courts Ruling

The appeal is not meritorious.

Main Issue:
Sufficiency of the Buy-Bust Operation

Appellants argue that the buy-bust operation conducted was tainted with abuse of authority. They
aver that if indeed they were validly arrested after having allegedly been caught in flagrante delicto, there
was no reason for the police to ask Appellant Corpuz to single out a name from a list shown to her in
exchange for her freedom -- a scheme known in street parlance as palit ulo.[13]
The contention is untenable.
Many times, this Court has already ruled that a buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which has
repeatedly been accepted to be a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. [14] The
elements necessary for the prosecution of the illegal sale of drugs are as follows: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor.[15]
What is essential in a prosecution for the illegal sale of prohibited drugs is proof that the transaction
or sale actually took place and the presentation in court of the corpus delicti,[16]which has two elements:
(1) proof of the occurrence of a certain event and (2) a person's criminal responsibility for the act. [17]
Further, in a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, a case becomes a contest of
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies. In such a situation, this Court generally relies upon the
assessment by the trial court, which had the distinct advantage of observing the conduct or demeanor of
the witnesses while they were testifying.[18] Hence, its factual findings are accorded respect -- even
finality -- absent any showing that certain facts of weight and substance bearing on the elements
of the crime have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied. [19] We find no reason to
deviate from this rule in the case before us. [20]
The principal witnesses clearly established the elements of the crime: an illegal sale of the
dangerous drug actually took place, and appellants were the authors thereof. The testimony of PO3
Albert Colaler, the poseur-buyer, was clear and straightforward. It was amply corroborated by the
testimonies of SPO1 Joseph Yatco and PO1 Aldrin Agravante, the back-up police officers during the
entrapment.[21] PO3 Colaler narrated the circumstances leading to the arrest of appellants as follows:
Q Where were you assigned as policeman on January 4, 1999?
A I was assigned at Special Anti-Narcotics Enforcement Team, Camp Gen. Pataleon, Imus,
Cavite, sir.
Q At around 6:00 oclock in the morning on that day January 4, 1999 where were you?
A I was in our office, sir.
Q What happened while you were there?
A On or about 6:00 oclock in the afternoon a confidential informant arrived and informed our
team leader, Insp. [N]olasco Cortez, about his transaction that said confidential informant
will have a transaction with two persons whose names were Teresa Corpuz and Marcy
Santos who are both residing at Taong, Malabon, sir.
Q What happened next after that conversation of the confidential informant with Insp. Cortez?
A He also informed us that the two friends have an interested buyer from Cavite willing to buy
shabu with a quantity of 300 grams worth P300,000.00, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q After this conversation with the confidential informant and Insp. Cortez what happened?
A Based on the information, our team leader Insp. Nolasco Cortez formed a team to conduct
buybust operation and I will act as poseur-buyer with members of the team, SPO2 Joseph
Yatco and PO1 Aldrin Agravante as back-up arresting officers, sir.
Q What preparations were made in connection with that supposed transaction?
A I was given P1,000.00 bill and I placed marking with my initial/alias AL on the neck of picture
of the person appearing on said bill, sir.
Q What else did you do?
A After placing AL, the money was placed on top of the [boodle] money then I placed the money
inside a transparent plastic, sir.
Q After that where did you proceed?
A After that we talked about our pre-arranged signal which is to remove my white b[a]ll cap
signa[l]ing that the evidence is already with me, sir.
Q Where did you proceed next?
A After that on or about 9:30 in the evening we left our office and went to the target area
wherein the suspects and our confidential informant will meet and while approaching the
place our confidential informant called alias Tess saying that we are coming, sir.
Q Where is that target place that you mentioned?
A Rizal Avenue, Malabon, near Jollibee and church, sir.
Q What time did you arrive at the target place?
A We arrived [on] or about 11:15 in the evening, sir.
Q What happened when you arrived at the target place?
A While my companions, SPO1 Yatco and PO1 Agravante, were positioned strategically at a
certain place, the confidential informant and I waited at the place agreed upon, sir.
Q What is the exact place that you positioned yourself with the confidential inf[o]rmant?
A In front of the church, before entering, where our vehicle was parked, sir.
Q What happened while you were waiting?
A After a few moments, alias Tess and Ma[r] arrived, sir.
Q How do you know they are alias Tess and Ma[r] who arrived?
A After the duo arrived they greeted the confidential informant and the latter introduced me to
the duo, sir.
Q Your confidential informant is a boy?
A Girl, sir.
Q After you were introduced to Tess and Mar what happened next?
A After I was introduced as buyer of shabu, alias Tess asked if I have the money to be used as
payment for shabu, sir.
Q What was your answer?
A I told her the money is with me and I showed the [boodle] money, sir.
Q How did you show the money?
A When she asked about the money I showed her the plastic wherein the [boodle] money was
amounting to P300,000.00 wherein the P500.00 bill as on top, sir.
Q What happened next after you [showed] that plastic containing the money?
A After they have seen the money, I asked them if they brought the shabu, sir.
Q What were you wearing at that time?
A Pants and polo and shoes, sir.
Q What happened next?
A After asking that question, Mar put out the three transparent plastic with white substance
which he took from his belt-bag and which he handed to alias Tess, sir.
Q After these three packs coming from Mar were turned over to Tess what did Tess do with
these?
A She handed the same to me and I saw that they were of good [quality]. I gave to alias Tess
the [boodle] money, P300,000.00, as payment and she gave it to Mar. sir.
Q You said you considered these three packs as good quality of what?
A White granules suspected to be shabu, sir.
Q After you delivered the [boodle] mo[ney] to Tess what happened next?
A When she was holding the money [interrupted]
Court:
The money was delivered to Mar.
Pros. (witness)
Q After the money was delivered to Mar, what happened next?
 A When Mar was about to open the said plastic containing the money I took off my b[a]ll cap to
signal my companions and then SPO1 Yatco and PO1 Agravante arrived and we
int[ro]duced ourselves as policemen. SPO1 Yatco arrested alias Tess and PO1 Agravante
arrested Mar and [re]covered the [boodle] money, sir.[22]
Without doubt, the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the elements of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs[23] and to prove the charge of illegal sale of shabu.[24] The clear, straightforward and
consistent testimonies of PO3 Colaler and other members of the entrapment team were concurrent on
material points, replete with relevant details, and sufficiently supportive of the RTCs
conclusions.[25] Absent any persuasive evidence showing that they testified falsely, the logical conclusion
is that no such improper motive existed, and that their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit. [26]
Further, the collective testimonies of these prosecution witnesses were corroborated by the physical
evidence on record as contained in Chemistry Report No. D-0011-99.[27] Upon laboratory examination, the
white crystalline substance found in appellants possession, was positively identified as methamphetamine
hydrochloride.[28]
While appellants allege that the buy-bust operation was tainted with abuse, they have not advanced
any reason why the lower court should have disbelieved the testimony of PO3 Colaler. [29] Except for their
self-serving statements, they have likewise failed to present evidence to establish that the police
operation was tainted with abuse of authority.[30]
Instead, the facts show that appellants were apprehended in flagrante delicto during a buy-bust
operation. Their arrest falls within the ambit of Section 5(a) [31] of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure on arrests without a warrant.[32] Their unsubstantiated charge that the entrapping officers
abused their authority in conducting the buy-bust operation cannot prevail over the categorical and
unshaken testimonies of the latter, who caught appellants red-handed.[33]
The police officers allegedly asked Appellant Corpuz to single out a name from the list shown to her
in exchange for her freedom. The fact that appellants have not filed a single complaint against them
evidently shows that the formers allegation of abuse of authority was a mere concoction.[34]
With nothing to substantiate such malicious accusation, credence shall be given to the narration of
the incident by the prosecution witnesses, as they are police officers who are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner.[35] This presumption of regularity has not been sufficiently
controverted by appellants.[36] Certainly, it must prevail over their unfounded allegations. [37]

Second Issue:
Defense of Denial

The defense of denial, like alibi, is invariably viewed with disfavor by courts, because it can easily be
concocted. It is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.[38] As has been held, denial is a weak form of defense, particularly when it is not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.[39]
Appellant Corpuz claims that on the day of the incident, she was introduced to Josie, whom she later
accompanied to Jollibee. Thereafter, she was given a wrapped package by unknown persons and then
arrested by the police.[40] Evidently, her claim now -- that in the middle of the night, she accompanied a
person she had just met for the first time -- tests the limits of credibility.[41]
Similarly unbelievable is the story of Appellant Santos that after they had gone to Mercury Drug
Store, he was asked by Appellant Corpuz to bring home her son. [42] Moreover, Appellant Santos did not
offer any satisfactory explanation why the police officers would single him out from among the crowd
milling around Seven-Eleven on that particular day and arrest him for no apparent reason. [43] The records
show that there was no prior surveillance conducted against appellants.[44]
 Evidently, the defense of denial resorted by appellants is weakened by their conflicting and
irreconcilable statements on the witness stand.[45] As correctly pointed out by the RTC, it is difficult to
understand why they presented two different stories about the events prior to their apprehension, when
they had a common stand on the issue.[46] Verily, their denial cannot prevail over the prosecution
witnesses positive testimonies.[47]

Alleged Inconsistencies

Appellants further claim that there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of the police officers, who
were the principal prosecution witnesses.[48] We are not convinced.
There were no such material inconsistencies. Rather, those testimonies complemented one another
in giving a complete picture of how the illegal sale of the prohibited drug had transpired, and how it led to
appellants apprehension in flagrante delicto.[49] At the very least, whatever inconsistencies there were in
PO3 Colalers testimony were minor and did not detract from the veracity and the weight of the
prosecution evidence.[50]
What is material and indispensable is that the sale of the illegal drugs was adequately
established;[51] the prosecution eyewitness clearly identified both appellants as the offenders, [52]and the
substance itself was presented before the court.[53] The exact denomination of the genuine bills that had
been placed on top of the boodle money is not a critical fact. It is enough that the prosecution proved that
money had been paid to appellants for the sale and the delivery of shabu. [54]
On the basis of such evaluation and analysis, the trial court clearly committed no error in according
greater weight to the positive identification and forthright declarations made by the prosecution
witnesses.[55] Bare denials cannot prevail over their positive identification of appellants as the persons
who sold the shabu.[56]
Under Section 15 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by RA 7659, the sale of
regulated drugs without proper authority is penalized with reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from P500,000 to P10,000,000.[57] Under Section 20 thereof, the penalty in Section 15, Article III shall be
applied if the dangerous drug involved is, in the case of shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride, 200
grams or more.[58]
As early as People v. Simon,[59] this Court has already recognized the suppletory application of the
rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code to the Dangerous Drugs Act after the amendment of the
latter by RA 7659 on December 31, 1993.[60] Since there were no mitigating or aggravating circumstances
attending appellants violation of the law, and the aggregate quantity of shabu seized was 286.678
grams, reclusion perpetua is the penalty that may be imposed, pursuant to Article 63[61] of the Revised
Penal Code. [62]
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the fine is
increased to P500,000. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 183819

Plaintiff-Appellee,

Present:

- versus -
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,*
ARSENIO CORTEZ y MACALINDONG a.k.a. Archie,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
Accused-Appellant.
VELASCO, JR., and

PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:

July 23, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Accused-appellant Arsenio M. Cortez appeals from the Decision dated September 20, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02269, affirming the March 21, 2006 Decision in Crim. Case No. 13003-D of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 164 in Pasig City. The RTC found him guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
 The Facts

In an Information dated October 28, 2003, Cortez was charged with the crime of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II,
RA 9165, allegedly committed as follows:

On or about October 26, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, not being lawfully authorized to sell any dangerous drug, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to SPO2 Dante Zipagan, a police
poseur-buyer, one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing four (4) centigrams
(0.04 gram) of white crystalline substance, which was found positive to the tests for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.

Contrary to law.[1]

When arraigned, Cortez entered a plea of not guilty.

During the pre-trial conference and as shown by the Pre-Trial Order,[2] the defense admitted the
authenticity and due execution of the prosecutions Exhibit B, the memorandum requesting laboratory
examination of a substance suspected of being shabu, and Exhibit C, Physical Science Report No. D-2061-
03E dated October 26, 2003. The defense also manifested that it would interpose the defense of denial.

To prove its case, the prosecution presented in evidence the testimonies of SPO2 Dante Zipagan and PO1
Michael Espares, both members of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU), Pasig City Police Station. On the
other hand, the defense presented Arsenio M. Cortez himself, and one Pedrito T. de Borja.

Version of the Prosecution

On October 26, 2003, at about 2 oclock in the morning, a confidential informant reported to the Pasig City
Police SDEU that a certain Archie was selling shabu in the vicinity of Brgy. Buting, Pasig City. Upon being apprised
of this bit of information, SDEU Chief P/Insp. Melbert Esguerra held a briefing, formed a four-man team to conduct
a buy-bust operation, and designated SPO2 Zipagan to act as team leader poseur-buyer. Two (2) PhP 100 bills to be
used as buy-bust money were handed to SPO2 Zipagan who then put his initials DZ on the bill notes. A pre-
operation report was made and submitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency which then gave it control
number 2610-03-01.
 Thereafter, the team, composed of, among others, PO1 Espares and SPO2 Zipagan, with the informant,
proceeded to the target area. SPO2 Zipagan and the informant proceeded ahead of the group. At the corner of San
Guillermo and E. Mendoza streets, they located the target person whereupon the informant introduced the
poseur-buyer to Archie. When asked how much he wanted to buy, SPO2 Zipagan replied PhP 200 worth only and
gave alias Archie the marked money. Thereafter, Archie took out from his right pocket and handed to SPO2
Zipagan a heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance. Thereupon, SPO2
Zipagan executed the pre-arranged signal, by removing his hat, signifying the consummation of the
transaction. SPO2 Zipagan then introduced himself and announced the sellers arrest.

Meanwhile, the back-up police operatives, who were 10 meters away, upon noticing the pre-arranged
signal, rushed toward their team leader to help him hold Archie.SPO2 Zipagan then directed Archie to empty his
pocket. From his left pocket, Archie brought out with his left hand the buy-bust money. PO1 Espares later testified
having witnessed this particular episode.

Afterwards, the team hauled Archie to the Pasig City Police Station for investigation. The investigator, PO1
Clarence Nipales, then prepared a request for laboratory examination on the white crystalline substance subject of
the buy-bust operation. SPO2 Zipagan executed a sworn statement in connection with the arrest of Archie, who
was later identified as accused-appellant Cortez.

The seized transparent plastic sachet containing the white crystalline substance was forwarded to the
Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory Office on St. Francis St.,Mandaluyong City. P/Insp. Joseph M. Perdido,
Forensic Chemical Officer, conducted a qualitative examination on the said specimen weighing 0.04 gram. The
examined specimen tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The corresponding Report No.
D-2061-03E contained the following pertinent entries:

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

A One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with marking AMC 10-26-03 containing
0.04 gram white crystalline substance.

xxxx
 PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

To determine the presence of any dangerous drug.

xxxx

FINDINGS:

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result

to the tests for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

xxxx

CONCLUSION:

Specimen A contain Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. [3] x x x

Version of the Defense

Cortez denied committing the crime charged. His own version of what transpired may be summarized as
follows:

He recounted that on October 26, 2003, between 12 oclock midnight and 1 oclock in the morning, he was
in a house on Capt. Cortez St., Pateros, in bed with his live-in partner, Gina Flores, when he heard and answered a
knocking sound outside. At the door was someone he met thrice who used to pawn things to him. Once allowed
entry, the visitor offered to sell a cell phone. When Cortez expressed disinterest, the visitor took the cell phone
unit out and pressed the dial button. At that moment, the door suddenly opened and two persons entered,
followed later by two others.
 Afterwards, Cortez was alternately brought out and in the house. All the while, he kept on inquiring what
the case against him was all about only to be told to talk to the team leader. Finally, he was taken outside the
house for a ride in a car driven by the cell phone seller. They stopped at a gasoline station and then boarded a
tricycle which brought him to the Pasig City Police Station, where he was investigated and finally detained.

Pedrito, the second witness for the defense, testified in gist that in the morning in question, while he was
on his way home after buying a cigarette, he saw four persons banging the door of Cortezs house. Moments later,
he heard one of the intruders uttered, Kilala ko yan, kilala ko yan (I know him. I know him.). Then Cortez, followed
by Flores, asked about the intrusion but did not get a satisfactory answer.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

On March 21, 2006, in Crim. Case No. 13003-D, the RTC rendered judgment convicting Cortez of the
offense charged and sentenced him as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Arsenio Cortez y Macalindong a.k.a. Archie GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of selling shabu penalized under Section 5, Article II of
R.A. 9165 and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of life imprisonment and fine of Five
Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos with all the accessory penalties under the law.

The plastic sachet containing shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride (Exhibit E-1) is

hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government and turned over to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency for destruction.

SO ORDERED.[4]

The Ruling of the Appellate Court

Forthwith, Cortez went on appeal to the CA. On September 20, 2007, the CA rendered the assailed
decision, disposing as follows:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DENIED. The challenged
Decision is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.[5]

In so ruling, the appellate court dismissed suggestions of frame-up and Cortezs allegations regarding the
inability of the prosecution to prove that the drug presented in court was the same drug seized from him.

Cortez filed a Notice of Appeal which the CA gave due course. This Court, by Resolution of September 3,
2008, required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they so desired. To date, Cortez has not filed any brief,
while the People manifested that it is no longer filing any supplemental brief. Cortezs inaction and the
prosecutions manifestation indicate their willingness to submit the case on the basis of the records already on file,
thus veritably reiterating their principal arguments raised in the CA, which on the part of Cortez may be
formulated, as follows:

THE [CA] ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE
PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

Our Ruling

We sustain Cortezs conviction.

Buy-Bust Operation is a Form of Entrapment

As before the appellate court, Cortez decries that he was a victim of a frame-up, implying the illegality of
the buy-bust operation undertaken by the Pasig City anti-drug operatives.

Cortezs challenge about the legality of a buy-bust operation is already a closed issue. In People v.
Bongalon,[6] the Court elucidated on the nature and legality of a buy-bust operation, noting that it is a form of
entrapment that is resorted to for trapping and capturing felons who are pre-disposed to commit crimes. The
operation is legal and has been proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due
regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.[7] Entrapment should be distinguished from instigation
which has been viewed as contrary to public policy.

In American jurisdiction, the term entrapment generally has a negative connotation, because the idea to
commit the criminal act originates from the police, as opposed to the accused having a predisposition to commit
the crime.[8] In Sorrells v. United States, entrapment was defined as the conception and planning of an offense by
an officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the
trickery, persuasion or fraud of the officer.[9]

In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng, the Court laid down the distinction between entrapment and
instigation or inducement, to wit:

ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION.While it has been said that the practice of entrapping
persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and
while instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has
sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is
that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were
purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the decoy solicitation of persons
seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and
apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the
offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a
course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was
committed by him, free from the influence or instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent
of an owner acts as a supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution
for larceny, provided the original design was formed independently of such agent; and where a
person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public authorities,
and, being authorized by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the larceny is
nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal
sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a spotter, detective, or hired informer; but there
are cases holding the contrary.[10]

It is fairly clear that the concept of entrapment under the American criminal justice system bears a
similarity to the concept of instigation or inducement under the Philippine judicial setting. Such that once the
criminal intent arises from the police officers without any predisposition from the defendant to commit the crime,
both jurisdictions consider the act as illegal. Entrapment in the Philippines is, however, not a defense available to
the accused; instigation is, and is considered, an absolutory cause. [11]

In determining the occurrence of entrapment, two tests have been developed: the subjective test and the
objective test.[12] Under the subjective view of entrapment, the focus is on the intent or predisposition of the
accused to commit a crime.[13] Under the objective view, on the other hand, the primary focus is on the particular
conduct of law enforcement officials or their agents and the accuseds predisposition becomes irrelevant.[14] The
government agents act is evaluated in the light of the standard of conduct exercised by reasonable persons
generally and whether such conduct falls below the acceptable standard for the fair and honorable administration
of justice.[15]

Courts have adopted the objective test in upholding the validity of a buy-bust operation. In People v.
Doria, the Court stressed that, in applying the objective test, the details of the purported transaction during the
buy-bust operation must be clearly and adequately shown, i.e., the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and
the pusher, the offer to purchase, and the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the
sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. We further emphasized that the manner by which the
initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the
buy-bust money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be
subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an
offense.[16]

In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that the police officers used entrapment to nab Cortez in
the act of selling shabu. As aptly found below, it was the confidential informant who made initial contact with
Cortez when he introduced SPO2 Zipagan as buyer. SPO2 Zipagan then asked to buy PhP 200 worth of shabu and
paid using the previously marked money. Cortez then gave SPO2 Zipagan a plastic sachet containing what turned
out to be shabu. Then, upon the sending out of the pre-set signal, Cortez was arrested. The established sequence
of events categorically shows a typical buy-bust operation as a form of entrapment. The police officers conduct
was within the acceptable standard of fair and honorable administration of justice.
 Elements of the Crime Established; Chain of Custody Observed

In his further bid for acquittal, Cortez advances the matter of custodial chain. As he asserted in his
[17]
Brief, the apprehending police officers failed, after the buy bust, to make an inventory of the seized item and
mark the container of the substance allegedly recovered from him, thus raising doubts as to the identity of what
was seized.

We disagree.

In People v. Pendatun, the Court reiterated the essential elements of the crime of illegal sale of prohibited
drugs: (1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another and (2) he knew that what he had sold and
delivered was a prohibited drug.[18] All these elements were ably proved by the prosecution in the instant case. The
fact of sale and eventual delivery by Cortez, as seller, of a substance later identified as shabu to SPO2 Zipagan, as
buyer who paid PhP 200 for it, had been established. The Court considers the ensuing vivid account of SPO2
Zipagan on this point:

Q: When you arrived at the scene or the reported place, what transpired next, if any?

A: I asked the other operatives to position themselves in a viewing distance and I myself[,]
together with the informant[,] proceeded to the corner of San Guillermo and Mendoza
Street to locate the suspect.

Q: How far where your companions were from you and [the] suspect during the conduct of the
actual buy-bust?

xxxx

A: More or less ten (10) meters.

xxxx

Q: Were you able to in fact locate the subject?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How were you able to locate him[?] [Did] you know him personally before the operation?

A: Only the informant, sir, knew the suspect.

Q: And what transpired when you [located] the suspect?

A: I [was] introduced by the informant to the suspect that I will buy a shabu, sir.

Q: And what happened after that?

A: The suspect asked me if how much I will buy, sir.

Q: What did you tell him?

A: Only 200 pesos.

Q: And 200 pesos worth of shabu is how many in terms of grams?

A: I could not.. (discontinued)

Q: You do not know?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And what did the subject person tell you or do after that?

A: I gave the money and then he dipped his right hand on his right pocket and gave me on (1)
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance.

Q: When you said that the person gave you the one (1) transparent plastic sachet you meant that
it was actually in your possession at the precise time, you already took possession of the
sachet?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Will you describe what was inside the plastic sachet at that time?

A: It contains white crystalline substance, sir.

Q: And at that very moment[,] what transpired after you have already obtained the plastic sachet
from the suspect?

A: I gave my pre-arrange[d] signal to my other co-operatives.

Q: And what happened next?

A: I introduced myself to the accused and I [held] him [as] my two (2) co-operatives helped me in
holding the said accused, sir.

Q: Did you announce your arrest on the accused?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: By the way, what was the name of this person from whom you bought this white crystalline
substance contained in the plastic sachet?

A: He [was] identified later on as Arsenio Macalindong Cortez.

xxxx

Q: After you announced the arrest of the accused and you have obtained the illegal substance
and recovered the buy-bust money, to where did you bring the accused?

A: In our office in Pasig City Police Station, sir.

Q: And [did] you conduct an investigation?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: In connection with the investigation conducted on the accused, what documentation from
your recollection was ever prepared?

A: He made a request to examine the recovered evidence.

Q: Who made the request?

A: Our investigator, sir. x x x

Q: Are you familiar with the signature of your police investigator? By the way, who was the
investigator who made the report?

A: PO1 Nipales.

Q: If said request will be shown to you will you be able to identify it?

A: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q: You mentioned that the substance was confiscated from the accused [and] was forwarded to
the crime laboratory, is that correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Was there a report given by a crime laboratory on the examination conducted?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: When was the report returned or forwarded back to you[?] [W]as it on the same day?

A: I could not remember.

Q: But you were able to get a hold of the copy?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: How about the substance, was there any markings made on said substance before it was
forwarded to the crime laboratory?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who made the markings?

A: I, sir.

Q: And if said markings or the substance contained the markings is again shown to you, will you
still be able to identify [it] again?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Showing to you this plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance with sub-markings.

I have this plastic sachet with white crystalline substance with markings AMC 10-26-03 with
additional marking D-2061-03E enclosed in quotation letter A JMP. At the back portion
Exhibit E-1 1-29-04. Can you go over this piece of evidence, plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substances, you tell this Honorable Court which markings did you place among
the markings which according to you [you] made on said plastic sachet?

A: Capital letter AMC, sir, and the date the accused [was] arrested.

xxxx

Q: Aside from that[,] were there any other markings made by you, the other markings D-2061-
03E JMP, whose markings was that?

A: I do not know.
Q: What relation has this piece of plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, is that
the same plastic sachet which was taken from the accused during the buy-bust operation?

A: Yes, sir, this is the same evidence.

Q: Meaning, this was the crystalline substance which was shown to you by the accused during
the buy-bust operation?

A: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q: Do you know what was the result of the laboratory examination?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Tell the court what was the result?

A: It gave positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

Q: Were you able to get hold of the Physical Science Report of the said substance?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: If said result will be shown to you will you still be able to identify it?

A: Yes, sir.
 Q: Im showing to you this Physical Science Report No. D-2061-03E, is this the report you were
referring to?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Can you go over the result specifically the finding and the conclusion, please read for the
benefit of the court the contents of the findings?

A: Findings: Qualitative findings conducted on the above-stated specimen gave positive result to
the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.[19] x x x (Emphasis added.)

PO1 Espares, who provided back-up assistance to SPO2 Zipagan in the buy-bust operation, corroborated
the foregoing testimony.

Without a trace of equivocation, the trial court held that the prosecution has proved the elements of the
crime charged. The trial court wrote:

From the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the identities of the buyer and the
seller were sufficiently shown. The object and consideration were also identified in open court.
The buy-bust money was marked and formally offered in evidence x x x and the object which is
the 0.04 gram of shabu was also identified and offered in evidence as Exhibit E-1. The object
which is the 0.04 gram of white crystalline substance was tested positive to the tests for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, after a laboratory examination conducted
by P/Insp. Joseph M. Perdido, a Forensic Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory x x x.
Report No. D-2061-03E submitted by said Forensic Chemical officer was marked and formally
offered in evidence as Exhibits C and C-1. The testimony of the Forensic Chemical Officer was
dispensed with by both the public prosecutor and the defense counsel after they made some
stipulations. Moreover, the testimony of SPO2 Dante Zipagan as regards the transaction that
took place on October 26, 2003 was corroborated by PO1 Michael Espares and supported by
documentary as well as object evidence as enumerated beforehand.

Therefore, in the opinion of the court, the elements mentioned above are sufficiently
proven by the prosecution.[20]
 This brings us to the matter of the custodial chain.

It bears stressing that in every prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the presentation in
evidence of the seized drug, as an integral part of the corpus delicti, is most material.[21] It is, therefore, essential
that the identity of the prohibited drug be proved with moral certainty. Even more than this, what must also be
established with the same degree of certitude is the fact that the substance bought or seized during the buy-bust
operation is the same item offered in court as exhibit. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in
that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.[22]

As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit
be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it
to be. In context, this would ideally cover the testimony about every link in the chain, from seizure of the
prohibited drug up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that everyone who touched the exhibit
would describe how and from whom it was received, to include, as much as possible, a description of the condition
in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.[23]

To be sure, testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always
impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. Cognizant of this fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA
9165 on the handling and disposition of seized dangerous drugs provide as follows:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall
take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph
shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements
 under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

A close examination of the IRR of RA 9165 readily reveals that the custodial chain rule admits of
exceptions. Thus, contrary to the brazen assertions of Cortez, the prescriptions of the IRRs Sec. 21 need not be
followed with pedantic rigor as a condition sine qua non for a successful prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs. Non-compliance with Sec. 21 does not, by itself, render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from the accused inadmissible in evidence.[24] What is essential is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the
guilt or innocence of the accused.[25]

In the instant case, there had been substantial compliance with the legal requirements on the handling of
the seized item. Its integrity and evidentiary value had not been diminished. The chain of custody of the drugs
subject matter of the case has not been shown to have been broken. The factual milieu of the case yields the
following: After SPO2 Zipagan confiscated the 0.04 gram of shabu in question, as well as the marked money,
following Cortezs arrest, the seized sachet of suspected shabu was without delay brought to the Pasig City police
station and marked as AMC 10-26-03. Immediately thereafter, the confiscated substance, with a letter of request
for examination, was referred to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination to determine the presence of any
dangerous drug. Per Report No. D-2061-03E, the specimen submitted contained methamphetamine hydrochloride.
The examining officer, P/Insp. Perdido, duly marked the sachet with his initials, JMP. The contents of the seized
plastic sachet had been found to be the same substance identified and marked as Exhibit E-1 and adduced in
evidence in court.

In Malillin v. People,[26] the Court stressed the importance of the testimonies of all persons, if available,
who handled the specimen to establish the chain of custody. Thus, the prosecution offered the testimony of SPO2
Zipagan who first had custody of the seized shabu. The testimony of the next handling officer, P/Insp. Perdido,
was, however, dispensed with after the public prosecutor and the defense counsel stipulated that Exhibit E-1[27] is
the same specimen mentioned in Exhibits B-1[28] and C-1,[29] and that the said specimen was regularly examined by
the said witness.[30]

It would, thus, appear that the chain in the custody of the illicit drug purchased from Cortez had
been prima facie established as unbroken. Or at the very least, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
item had not, under the premises, been compromised.
 Defense of Denial is Weak

Cortezs main defense of denial cannot prevail over the affirmative and credible testimony of SP02 Zipagan
pointing Cortez as the seller of the prohibited substance. Denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing proof,
is negative and self-serving evidence and of little, if any, weight in law. As it can easily be fabricated, in fact a
common standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of RA 9165, [31] denial is inherently
weak.[32] And the Court is at loss to understand how Cortez can with a straight face set up the defense of denial
after having been caught in possession of the prohibited substance for which he received PhP 200 from SPO2
Zipagan.

The conclusion may perhaps be different if the police authorities have a motive in falsely charging Cortez
with illegal peddling of shabu. But the element of ill motive does not obtain under the premises, as determined by
the trial court:

Moreover, SPO2 Dante Zipagan and PO1 Michael Espares are police officers who are
presumed to have regularly performed their duties in the absence of proof to the contrary (see
Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court). The evidence offered by the defense failed to show
any ill motive from the prosecution witnesses that would impel them to arrest the accused,
Arsenio M. Cortez.[33]

Lest it be overlooked, Cortez declared not knowing any of the arresting police officers, having first met
them only when they arrested him. This reality argues against the idea that these operatives would falsely testify,
or plant evidence, against him. Cortez, on cross-examination, testified, as follows:

Q: Did Zipagan approach you to ask for anything?

A: No, sir.

Q: Did any of the three (3) other police officers who arrested you x x x [approach] you and [ask
you for] anything?
 A: No, sir.

Q: Did you previously know these three (3) police officers previous to your arrest?

A: No, sir.

Q: Do you know if all these four (4) police officers had an [axe] to grind against you or you had
any misunderstanding against with them previous to your arrest?

A: This is the first time I saw the police officers.[34]

In all then, we uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties and find that the
prosecution has discharged its burden of proving Cortezs guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02269 finding accused-
appellant Arsenio Cortez guilty of the crime charged is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

March 31, 2014

G.R. No. 191727

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MANUEL APLAT y SUBLINO and JACKSON DANGLAY y BOTIL, Accused
MANUEL APLAT y SUBLINO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This is an appeal from the November 27, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 03156 which affirmed the November 5, 2007 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 61, Baguio City, finding appellant Manuel Aplat y Sublino (appellant) and his co-accused Jackson
Danglay y Botil (Danglay) guilty of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 in Criminal Case No. 26080-R and thereby sentencing
each of them to suffer the penalties of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.

Factual Antecedents

In an Information3 dated April 19, 2006, appellant and Danglay were charged with Violation of Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165, thepertinent portion of which reads:

That on or about the 12th day of April 2006, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and with in the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver one (1) brick of dried
marijuana leaves with fruiting tops wrapped in a newspaper weighing 950 grams, more or less, for
[P]1,500.00 to PO3 PHILIP R. FINES, a bona fide member of the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Baguio
City Police Office, who acted as poseur-buyer, knowing fully well that said drug is a dangerous drug and
that the sale and delivery of such drug is prohibited without authority of law to do so, in violation of the
aforementioned provision of law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Appellant and Danglay pleaded not guilty to the charge upon their separate arraignment held on
September 14, 2006 and June 22, 2006, respectively.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presents its version of the facts in the following manner:

At around 3:00 p.m. of April 12, 2006, SPO4 Edelfonso L. Sison (SPO4 Sison), while on duty at the
Baguio City Police Office Drug Enforcement Section,4 received information from a civilian informant that
his acquaintance named "Manuel" was looking for a prospective buyer of dried marijuana leaves.
Forthwith, SPO4 Sison instructed the informant to get in touch with Manuel and accept the latters offer.
The informant acceded and shortly thereafter returned to tell SPO4 Sison that Manuel accepted the offer
to buy and that the sale would take place between 4:30 to 5:00 p.m. of the same day in front of JR Bakery
along Kayang corner Hilltop Streets, Baguio City.

SPO4 Sison immediately relayed the information to his superior, Police Senior Inspector Damian Dulnuan
Olsim (P/Sr. Insp. Olsim), who, acting on the same, organized a buy-bust team for Manuels entrapment.
The team was composed of SPO4 Sison as team leader, PO3 Philip R. Fines (PO3 Fines) as poseur-
buyer, with PO3 Robert Sagmayao (PO3 Sagmayao) and PO2 Roy C. Mateo (PO2 Mateo) as back-ups.
PO3 Fines was provided with one P1,000.00 bill and one P500.00 bill as buy-bust money.5 He
photocopied the bills and had them authenticated by Prosecutor Victor Dizon and then coordinated the
operation with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency.

Accompanied by the informant, the team proceeded to the target area, which is only about 50 meters
away from their office. Upon arrival thereat at about 4:30 p.m., PO3 Fines and the informant posted
themselves at the terminal of Sablan-bound passenger jeepneys, just across JR Bakery. Simultaneously,
the rest of the team members took strategic positions at the loading area of the jeepneys bound for Plaza
Quezon Hill where they would wait for the pre-arranged signal from the poseur-buyer. Not long thereafter,
two men, one with a sando plastic bag, arrived from Upper Kayang. Manuel, who turned out to be the
appellant, approached the informant and asked where the buyer was. The informant pointed to PO3
Fines and introduced him as the prospective buyer. After a brief conversation, appellant demanded the
payment from PO3 Fines who immediately handed to him the marked money. Upon receipt, appellant in
turn took an item wrapped in a newspaper from the sando bag held by his companion, later identified as
Danglay, and gave the same to PO3 Fines. PO3 Fines smelled and assessed the item and once
convinced that it was a brick of marijuana leaves, tapped appellants shoulder as a signal to his
companions that the sale was already consummated. With the brick in hand, PO3 Fines then introduced
himself as a police officer and with the aid of SPO4 Sison arrested appellant. Danglay, on the other hand,
was arrested by PO3 Sagmayao and, when frisked by the latter, was found possessing 1 bricks of
suspected marijuana.6 After appellant and Danglay were apprised of their violation and constitutional
rights, the team brought them to the police station.

At the police station, PO3 Fines marked the suspected marijuana brick he bought from appellant with
"PRF, 04-12-06, BB" representing his initials, date of operation and the word buy-bust. PO3 Sagmayao,
on the other hand, marked the confiscated bricks from Danglay with "RPS, 04-12-06." They likewise
placed their signatures on the sando plastic bag. Appellant and Danglay were also identified at the police
station and the suspected dried marijuana leaves inventoried 7 and photographed8 in their presence as
well as of the representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ), the media and an elected barangay
official. After a preliminary test on the bricks were made at their office, PO2 Mateo brought on the same
day the confiscated items to the Regional Crime Laboratory at Camp Baldo Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet for chemistry examination per request of P/Sr. Insp. Olsim. 9 Forensic Chemist Officer P/Sr. Insp.
Emilia Gracio Montes10 then examined the bricks and found them positive for marijuana, a dangerous
drug.11Version of the Defense

Appellant and Danglay interposed the defense of denial. Both claimed that there was no buy-bust
operation, no money recovered and no bricks of marijuana seized from them. They averred that they
were just having their snacks at the JR Bakery when they were suddenly arrested and brought to the
police station.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision dated November 5, 2007, the RTC found appellant and Danglay guilty as charged. The
dispositive portion of the RTC Decision with its corresponding amendment12 reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding both the accused GUILTY beyond any reasonable doubt in
Criminal Case No. 26080-R and both are hereby sentenced to suffer LIFE IMPRISONMENT and each to
pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the costs.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, appellant and Danglay separately appealed to the CA13 wherein they questioned the chain of
custody of the subject drugs and the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against them.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Like the RTC, the CA gave credence to the police officers narration of the incident as prosecution
witnesses. It brushed aside for being minor inconsistencies the discrepancies in the testimonies of the
said witnesses regarding the details of the buy-bust operation, the actual color of the bag containing the
subject drugs as well as who was carrying the same. Moreover, the CA rejected appellant and Danglays
defense of denial as they were caught in flagrante delicto during a legitimate entrapment operation. Thus,
on November 27, 2009, the CA affirmed the amended RTC Decision, viz:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated November 5, 2007, as amended by the Order dated
November 14, 2007, in Criminal Case Nos. 26080-R xxx of the RTC,Branch 61,Baguio City,isAFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.14

Undeterred, appellant interposed the present appeal.15

Issue

The sole issue presented for the Courts consideration is whether appellants guilt for the illegal sale of
marijuana, a dangerous drug, was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Our Ruling

The appeal is bereft of merit.

The alleged defects in the prosecutions version of the incident as well as in the testimonies of its
witnesses, as pointed out by appellant, do not affect the material points of the crime charged.

In his quest for the reversal of his conviction, appellant asserts that there was no valid buy-bust operation
since, per the prosecutions version, a mere exchange of goods and money without any negotiation,
particularly on the quantity and value of the drugs, transpired between him, as the alleged seller, and PO3
Fines, as the poseur-buyer. Moreover, PO3 Fines merely looked at the confiscated item which was then
wrapped in paper and packing tape and did not even inspect the same prior to his handing over of the
marked money to appellant.

Appellants arguments fail to impress. While it may be true that it was the informant who brokered the
transaction, appellant and the poseur-buyer talked to each other after the informant introduced to
appellant PO3 Fines as the prospective buyer. As testified to by PO3 Fines, appellant demanded the
money from him after their brief conversation. And upon receipt of the item from appellant, he
immediately smelled and assessed the contents of the wrapped item and found the same to be a brick of
marijuana.16

Appellant further challenges the legality of the buy-bust operation by adverting to the alleged
inconsistency between the testimony of PO3 Fines, who claims that he did not notice who was carrying
the plastic bag containing the alleged dangerous drug or where it came from, and that of SPO4 Sison,
who stated that it was Danglay who was carrying the bag. He also invites the Courts attention to the
conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to the color of the bag. While PO3 Fines
mentioned a red colored bag, SPO4 Sison and PO3 Sagmayao stated that Danglay was carrying a blue
coloredsando bag.

The Court, however, finds that the CA correctly agreed with the appellee that the perceived
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are insufficient to diminish their credibility.
Indeed, the inconsistencies alluded to by the appellant refer merely to minor details and collateral matters
that do not in any way affect the material points of the crime charged. As held in People v.
Castro,17 "[i]nconsistencies on minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their
declaration, their veracity or the weight of their testimonies". "It is perfectly natural for different witnesses
testifying on the occurrence of a crime to give varying details as there may be some details which one
witness may notice while the other may not observe or remember."18

Elements of the crime adequately established; Buy-bust operation regularly conducted.

"In prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following must be proven: (1) that the transaction
or sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that the
buyer and seller were identified."19 "The commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs
requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction, which happens the moment the buyer
receives the drug from the seller. Settled is the rule that as long as the police officer went through the
operation as a buyer and his offer was accepted by appellant and the dangerous drugs delivered to the
former, the crime is considered consummated by the delivery of the goods. 20

In this case, the prosecution was able to establish that a sale of one brick of marijuana for P1,500.00 took
place between PO3 Fines, as buyer, and appellant as seller.1wphi1 The brick of marijuana was
presented before the trial court as Exhibit "O." PO3 Fines positively identified appellant as the seller. It is,
therefore, beyond doubt that a buy-bust operation involving the illegal sale of marijuana, a dangerous
drug, actually took place. Moreover, such buy-bust operation, in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary and based on the facts obtaining in this case, was regularly carried out by the police operatives.

"A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose
of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan."21 In this regard, police
authorities are given a wide discretion in the selection of effective means to apprehend drug dealers and
the Court is hesitant to establish on a priori basis what detailed acts they might credibly undertake in their
entrapment operations for there is no prescribed method on how the operation is to be conducted. As
ruled in People v. Salazar,22 a buy-bust operation deserves judicial sanction as long as it is carried out
with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards, such as in this case.

The police officers alleged non- compliance with the requirements under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165
was raised by appellant for the first time on appeal; Chain of Custody properly observed in this case.

Appellant harps on the buy-bust teams alleged deviation from the mandated procedure in taking post-
seizure custody of the dangerous drug as provided under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. In his Brief,
appellant contends that the physical inventory and marking of the subject illegal drug were not made in
his presence and at the place of seizure. Such omission, he asserts, cast grave doubt on whether the
drug submitted for laboratory examination, and subsequently presented as evidence in court, was the
very same drug allegedly sold by him.

Appellants insinuation hardly lends credence.

Before anything else, it must be stressed that appellant raised the police operatives alleged non-
compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165 for the first time on appeal. We have painstakingly scrutinized the
transcripts of stenographic notes in this case and found no instance wherein appellant at the very least
intimated during trial that there were lapses in the safekeeping of the seized item which affected its
integrity and evidentiary value. Neither did he try to show that doubts were cast thereon. Such belated
attempt on the part of appellant to raise this issue at this point in time can no longer be entertained.
Following our ruling in People v. Sta. Maria,23 several subsequent cases24 teem with pronouncement that
objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject
the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise
the question for the first time on appeal. The above ruling finds proper application in the present case.

Be that as it may, the fact that the inventory and marking of the subject item were not made onsite is of no
moment and will not lead to appellants exoneration. From a cursory reading of Section 21(a) 25 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165, it can be gleaned that in cases of warrantless seizures,
as in this case, inventory and marking of the seized item can be conducted at the nearest police station or
office of the apprehending authorities, whichever is practicable, and not necessarily at the place of
seizure. As held in People v. Resurreccion,26 "marking upon immediate confiscation" does not exclude the
possibility that marking can be done at the police station or office of the apprehending team. 27 Thus, in
the present case, the apprehending team cannot be faulted if the inventory and marking were done at
their office where appellant was immediately brought for custody and further investigation.

Moreover, "[t]he integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a showing
of bad faith, ill will or proof that the evidence has been tampered with."28 Notably here, appellant, upon
whom the burden of proving that the inventory and marking of the item was not done in his presence,
failed to overcome such presumption. While he admitted that there was an inventory, appellant insists
that he does not remember if he was present when the same was made. But the photographs29 taken
during the inventory before the representative of the DOJ, media and a barangay official belie appellants
protestation.

It bears stressing that the Court has already held in numerous cases30 that non-compliance with Section
21, Article II of RA 9165 is not fatal and will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is that the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items was properly preserved and safeguarded through an unbroken chain
of custody, as further illustrated below.

To wrap up, the totality of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, both testimonial and documentary,
clearly shows an unbroken chain of custody as follows: Immediately after the brick of marijuana was
handed to PO3 Fines and the arrest of appellant was made, the buy-bust team brought him and the
seized item to the police station. Thereat, PO3 Fines marked the wrapping of the brick with "PRF, 04-12-
06, BB" referring to his initials, date of operation and "buy- bust" and affixed his signature thereon.31 An
inventory of the seized item was thereafter conducted and the corresponding certificate of inventory was
signed by representatives from the DOJ, media and an elected barangay official.32 Afterwards, the seized
item was forwarded by PO2 Mateo, a member of the team, to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory for
forensic examination through a request for laboratory examination 33 prepared and signed by P/Sr. Insp.
Olsim. Upon chemical examination, P/Sr. Insp. Montes found the brick of marijuana, which contained the
same marking placed by PO3 Fines, positive for marijuana as reflected in her Chemistry Report No. D-
016-2006.34 When presented in court during the trial, PO3 Fines positively identified the marked brick of
marijuana as the same brick of marijuana appellant sold to him.35 Hence, the Court agrees with the
following pronouncement of the CA:

x x x In view of the properly documented accounts of the marking, transfer, and submission to chemistry
examination, which ensured the prudent preservation thereof by the apprehending team, we find no
reason to rule that the identity and integrity of the subject drugs has been compromised. xxx 36

Appellant's defense of denial must fail.

Against the credible and positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses duly supported by
documentary evidence, appellant's defense of denial and frame- up necessarily crumble. 1bis line of
defense cannot prevail over the established fact that a valid buy-bust operation was indeed conducted
and that the identity of the seller and the drug subject of the sale are proven. Moreover, such defenses
have been invariably viewed by the court with disfavor for they can easily be concocted and are common
and standard defense ploys in most cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act.37

The Imposable Penalty

Appellant sold and delivered a brick of marijuana, a dangerous drug, weighing 931.4 grams. Under
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the sale of dangerous drug, regardless of its quantity and purity, is
punishable by life imprisonment to death and a fine of P500,000.00 to P10 million. With the advent of RA
934638 the penalty of death cannot, however, be imposed and consequently, appellant has to be meted
only the penalties of life imprisonment and payment of fine. Hence, the Court sustains the penalties of life
imprisonment and payment of fine of P500,000.00 imposed by the RTC upon appellant, as affirmed by
the CA, for being in accordance with law.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CR-H.C.
No. 03156 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 61, finding appellant
Manuel Aplaty Sublino guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 26080-R of illegal sale of
dangerous drug and sentencing him to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine ofP500,000.00 and the
costs of suit, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 132558. May 9, 2000]

BEBERISA RIO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION and SOCIAL

SECURITY SYSTEM, respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.: PANGANIBAN

Death benefits under the Labor Code, as amended, are awarded only when the cause of death is listed
as an occupational disease by the Employees Compensation Commission, or when the claimant presents
proof that the working conditions increased the risk of contracting the fatal disease.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside
the June 30, 1997 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA)[2] in CA-GR SP No. 41257. The dispositive
portion of the challenged CA Decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission is

AFFIRMED, and the petition DISMISSED."[3]

The Decision of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) affirmed by the CA disposed as
follows:

"Based on the foregoing medical findings, it would appear that the etiology of deceaseds
ailment which caused his death is not attributable to his employment. Since the ailment is
not deemed work-connected, the instant claim for death benefits cannot be given due
course.

"WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Social Security System appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED, and the instant case is dismissed for want of merit."[4]

Petitioner also assails the January 29, 1998 Resolution [5] of the appellate court denying reconsideration.

The Facts

Virgilio T. Rio Sr., husband of herein petitioner, was employed by Allied Port Services Inc. as stevedore
since July, 1982. His duties included: (1) handling of steel cargoes; (2) loading and unloading of silica
sand; (3) handling, loading and unloading of lumber products; (4) supervising other stevedores; and (5)
performing other related work.[6]
On July 19, 1992, Virgilio Rio collapsed while working at the South Harbor, Manila. He was rushed to the
Philippine General Hospital (PGH) because of "melena, fever, chills and abdominal pains 8 days [prior to
confinement] x x x." He died three days later. According to the Medical Certificate issued by Fe B. Bais,
chief of the PGH Medical Records Division, the cause of death was "uremia [secondary] to chronic renal
failure. Chronic glomerulonephritis. x x x"[7] Misspped

Petitioner Beberisa Rio, his spouse, filed a claim for death benefits before the Social Security System
(SSS). However, the SSS denied the claim in this wise: [8]

"The cause of death of your husband cannot be considered work-connected because

based on the clinical abstract you submitted, your husband had already on and off attack
of edema and hypertension which are signs of kidney disease even before his
employment with the company."[9]

On appeal, the ECC affirmed the findings of the SSS.[10] Ruling that petitioner failed to present relevant
evidence to establish the causal connection between the deceaseds ailment and his work as stevedore,
the ECC held:

"Moreover, medical evaluation suggests that Uremia is the sine qua non of chronic renal
failure. It results from the retention in the blood of urea and other end products of
metabolism normally excreted into the urine. Chronic Renal Failure on the other hand, is
a toxic clinical condition associated with renal insufficiency and retention in the blood of
nitrogenous waste products. It may be due to the following:

a).......nephritis

b).......congestive heart failure

c).......couch syndrome

d).......poison

(Reference: Harrisons Principles of Internal Medicine, 11th Edition p. 1155).

"Based on the foregoing medical findings, it would appear that the etiology of deceaseds
ailment which caused his death is not attributable to his employment. Since the ailment is
not deemed work-connected, the instant claim for death benefits cannot be given due
course."[11]

After the ECC denied the Motion for Reconsideration,[12] petitioner appealed to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In affirming the ECC, the Court of Appeals ruled:

"Since petitioner failed to establish any causal connection of the disease which led to the
death of her husband with the nature of his working conditions, and, in particular, that
said working condition had increased the risk of contracting the disease, then the claim
for death benefits must fail. Missc

"The former law on compensation, the Workmens Compensation Act, was replaced by a
novel scheme in the New Labor Code under the title Employees Compensation and State
Insurance Fund. The new law discarded, among others, the concept of presumption of
 compensability and aggravation and substituted one based on social security principles.
The purpose was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employers obligation to
pay workmens compensation and employees right to receive reparation for work-
connected death or disability. x x x

"While as a rule, labor and social welfare legislation should be liberally construed in favor
of the applicant, such liberal construction of labor laws may not be applied where the
pertinent provisions of law are clear and leave no room for interpretation."[13]

Hence, this Petition for Review.[14]

Issue

The lone issue submitted for this Courts resolution is:

"Whether x x x petitioners claim for death benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended, shall
prosper under the increased risk theory."[15]

This Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit. Spped

Main Issue: Compensability of Rios Death

Under the Labor Code, as amended,[16] the beneficiaries of an employee are entitled to death benefits if
the cause of death is a sickness listed as occupational disease by the ECC; or any other illness caused
by employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working
conditions.[17]

The primary and antecedent causes of Virgilio Rios death are not listed as occupational diseases. Hence,
petitioner should have presented substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, showing that the nature of her husbands
employment or working conditions increased the risk of uremia, chronic renal failure or chronic
glomerulonephritis.[18] This the petitioner failed to do.

Petitioner did not adduce any proof of a reasonable connection between the work of the deceased and
the cause of his death. There was no showing that the progression of the disease was brought about
largely by the conditions in Virgilios job. Indeed, petitioner presented no medical history, records or
physicians report in order to substantiate her claim that the working conditions at the Port Area increased
the risk of uremia, renal failure or glomerulonephritis.[19]

As we ruled in Sante v. Employees Compensation Commission,[20] "x x x a claimant must submit such
proof as would constitute a reasonable basis for concluding either that the conditions of employment of
the claimant caused the ailment or that such working conditions had aggravated the risk of contracting
that ailment. What kind and quantum of evidence would constitute an adequate basis for a reasonable
man (not necessarily a medical scientist) to reach one or the other conclusion, can obviously be
determined only on a case-to-case basis. That evidence must, however, be real and substantial, and not
merely apparent; for the duty to prove work-causation or work-aggravation imposed by existing law is real
x x x not merely apparent." At most, petitioner merely claims that: Jospped

"x x x The nature of his work required physical strength in handling cargoes and at the
same time giving full attention in supervising his men as the groups leadman assigned at
Del Pan Area. It is worth mentioning that in the place where the deceased was assigned,
 there were no available comfort rooms to enable him to answer the call of nature. In
effect, delayed urination was a reality, coupled with the fact that being the leadman of his
group, his continuing physical presence at the works premises was indispensable. x x
x"[21]

Such bare allegation does not ipso facto make Virgilios death compensable. Awards of compensation
cannot rest on speculations or presumptions.[22] The beneficiaries must present evidence to prove a
positive proposition.[23]

While this Court has ruled that the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries, [24] it is
likewise important to note that such sympathy must be balanced by the equally vital interest of denying
undeserving claims for compensation. "Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law
ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to which the tens of millions of workers and
their families to look to for compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases and deaths occur." [25] In
this case, this Court has no other course but to apply the clear provisions of the law. [26] Sppedjo

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Purisima, J., abroad, no part.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 137281. April 3, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VIRGILIO LUCENA y SANTIAGO, accused-

appellant.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

For the fatal hacking of Urbano U. Dulay and Lazaro U. Dulay, Sr., accused-appellant Virgilio Lucena y
Santiago was charged with Double Murder in an Information[1] which alleges:

That on or about the 18th day of July 1995 in the Municipality of Aringay, Province of La Union, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and being armed with a
bolo, did then and there, by means of treachery and with evident premeditation and taking advantage of his superior
strength, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence on one URBANO DULAY y
ULAT and LAZARO DULAY, Sr. y ULAT, by hacking them to death with the said bolo and inflicting upon them
mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of their deaths, to the damage and prejudice of their
heirs.

Contrary to law.
 Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty at his arraignment.[2] The case thereafter proceeded to trial. Subsequently,
the court a quo rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused VIRGILIO LUCENA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER for killing Lazaro Dulay and Urbano Dulay on July 18, 1995. This Court appreciated the presence
of alevosia as an aggravating circumstance in the killing of Lazaro Dulay. This court could have appreciated the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling but it was not alleged in the Information.Evident premeditation qualified the
killings to Murder. Taking advantage of his superior strength was also present considering the ages of the victims
and the perpetrator.

Evidently, the Prosecution is of the view that this incident presents a continuous offense on the theory that there was
only one criminal resolution on the part of the accused. Hence, the charge is double murder.

This is a heinous crime.

This Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of death (Art. 63, par. 1, Revised Penal Code).

He is also ordered to pay the heirs of Lazaro Dulay, a civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and P25,000.00 for expenses in
connection with his death. Further, he is ordered to pay the heirs of Urbano Dulay a civil indemnity of P50,000.00
and P15,000.00 for expenses in connection with his death. [3]

On automatic review before this Court, accused-appellant alleges that:

I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
ROSALINA DULAY AND DISBELIEVING THE THEORY OF THE DEFENSE.

II

EVEN ASSUMING THAT APPELLANT IS GUILTY FOR THE DEATHS OF URBANO DULAY AND
LAZARO DULAY, THE COURT NONETHELESS ERRED IN APPRECIATING AGAINST HIM THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION AND TAKING
ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH.

The prosecutions version of the incident is summarized thus in the Peoples Brief:

At about 2:00 in the afternoon of July 18, 1995, Rosalina Dulay was inside her house in Barrio Sta. Cecilia, Aringay,
La Union. She was washing clothes near the entrance of the kitchen. Her brother-in-law Lazaro Dulay, also known
as Saroy, was sleeping on the kitchen table while her husband, Urbano Dulay, was sleeping in the second storey of
the house with their two children.[4]

Appellant arrived inside the house and said something to Rosalina. Appellant who was carrying a long and straight
bolo, suddenly hacked the sleeping Lazaro. After hacking Lazaro, appellant went upstairs, awakened Urbano and
hacked him. Rosalina brought her two children to the corn field to hide. Urbano later ran towards the corn field
where he died due to his wounds. Lazaro died inside the house.[5]

Dr. Armando Avena, Municipal Health Officer of Aringay, La Union, conducted the autopsy on the remains of
Urbano and prepared a Post-Mortem Examination Report[6] stating that the cause of death of Urbano was the
massive loss of blood secondary to multiple hacked and stab wounds. The weapon used in the killing of Urbano
could have been a bolo which penetrated six (6) centimeters (cm) and hit the heart. Another wound, a hack wound,
measuring seven (7) cms. in length was found at the right scapular region with the depth of about three (3) cms. at
the posterior aspect.
Dr. Avena also conducted the autopsy on Lazaro or Pertolino Dulay. He prepared a Post-Mortem Examination
Report[7] on the death of Lazaro stating the following findings:

There is a wound hacked 14 cm. linear hitting the anterior neck down to the left lower breast about 6 cm. in depth
hitting the ribs and anterior lower pillars.[8]

Accused-appellant had a different story. He testified that in the morning of July 18, 1995, he was at his house
in Sta. Cecilia, Aringay, La Union, repairing its roof since 7:00 oclock.[9] At noon, he went to the house of Rosalina
Dulay, which was about 100 meters away, to have lunch. [10] He usually ate lunch at Rosalinas house.[11] He reached
the house at around 1:30 oclock in the afternoon.[12] Rosalina was outside the house.[13] When accused-appellant
entered the house, he found the brothers, Urbano and Lazaro Dulay, hacking each other with bolos. [14] Since Urbano,
who was older, was being attacked by the younger Lazaro, accused-appellant intervened to restrain the
latter.[15] While accused-appellant was pacifying Lazaro, Urbano was able to run away. [16] Lazaro, however, turned
to accused-appellant and hacked him with the bolo five (5) times, hitting him in the head and on his left foot above
the ankle.[17] Accused-appellant ran away but was pursued by Lazaro. In order to defend himself, accused-appellant
picked up Urbanos bolo and hacked Lazaro with it.[18] Accused-appellant then left the Dulay residence,[19] leaving
Lazaro lying on the floor, and went home. He brought with him the bolo which he used to defend
himself.[20] Accused-appellant was seen by his brother and was brought to the Health Center in Agoo to have his
bloodied head treated.[21]
In sum, accused-appellant insists that it was Lazaro Dulay who hacked Urbano Dulay and that when he
intervened, Lazaro turned to him, thus forcing him to defend himself. Furthermore, accused-appellant attempts to
destroy the credibility of prosecution eyewitness, Rosalina Dulay, pointing to material and notable points which
engender serious doubts in the truthfulness of the prosecutions version and evidence,[22] to wit: (1) Rosalina was
threatened by the relatives of her husband to testify against accused-appellant; (2) Rosalinas testimony that her
husband was hacked by accused-appellant was not indicated in the testimony of the doctor who conducted the
autopsy on the cadaver of her husband; (3) She testified on direct examination that when Lazaro was attacked he
was downstairs near the table, but on cross-examination she declared that he was sleeping on top of the table; and
(4) The prosecution failed to establish any motive for the accused to kill the two victims.
The issues raised by accused-appellant boil down to a question of credibility. In this connection, it has been
consistently held by this Court that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and
most competently performed by the trial judge, [23] who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and
to assess their credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected in the record. The demeanor of the person
on the stand can draw the line between fact and fancy. The forthright answer or the hesitant pause, the quivering
voice or the angry tone, the flustered look or the sincere gaze, the modest blush or the guilty blanch these can reveal
if the witness is telling the truth or lying through his teeth.[24]
For the reasons stated above, findings of the trial court on matters of credibility are binding and conclusive on
the appellate court, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misinterpreted.[25] In the case at bar, the trial court, which had the unique opportunity to directly
hear the testimony of the prosecution eyewitness Rosalina Dulay, gave credence to her assertion that she saw
accused-appellant hacking the victims. Accused-appellant has not shown sufficient grounds to deviate from the
aforesaid doctrine.
Accused-appellant asserts that Rosalina Dulays testimony was not voluntarily given. He points to a statement
elicited during cross-examination that the relatives of her deceased husband threatened to kill her if she was going to
testify on (sic) the other party.[26] Accused-appellant also makes capital of the fact that Rosalina admits to have
never been threatened by his relatives, while at the same time acknowledging that she stayed twice in the house of
the same relatives when she went to Aringay, La Union sometime after the incident.
This lone discordant note in the testimonial declarations of Rosalina, as adverted to by accused-appellant, will
not extricate accused-appellant from his predicament. The controlling rule in this regard is that the testimony of a
witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in part depending upon the corroborative evidence and the
probabilities and improbabilities of the case.[27] By itself, prejudice against an accused cannot warrant the
disqualification of a witness or the total disregard of the witnesss testimony. [28] Indeed:
The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus deals only with the weight of evidence and is not a positive rule of law;
the rule is not an inflexible one of universal application. Modern trend in jurisprudence favors more flexibility when
the testimony of a witness may be partly believed and partly disbelieved depending on the corroborative evidence
presented at the trial. Thus, where the challenged testimony is sufficiently corroborated in its material points, or
where the mistakes arise from innocent lapses and not from an apparent desire to pervert the truth, the rule may be
relaxed. It is a rule that is neither absolute nor mandatory and binding upon the court, which may accept or reject
portions of the witness testimony based on its inherent credibility or on the corroborative evidence in the case. [29]

There is, furthermore, no standard of human behavior for a person confronted with a shocking incident. One
may immediately report the incident to the proper authorities while another, in fear and/or avoiding involvement in a
criminal investigation, may keep to himself what he had witnessed.[30] Others may come forward to reveal the
identity of the perpetrators of the crime only after the lapse of a considerable length of time. [31]
In this case, it should be noted that right after the incident, Rosalina voluntarily executed a sworn statement
implicating accused-appellant. That she later showed some hesitation should not be taken against her, because the
reluctance of a witness to testify in criminal actions due to reprisal is of judicial notice, [32] and does not impair the
witnesss credibility.[33] The pertinent excerpts of Rosalinas testimony reveal that while her husbands relatives did
threaten her to take the witness stand, it was not for the purpose of falsely testifying against the accused-
appellant, viz:
Q. While you were in Tarlac, Tarlac you were visited by the relatives of your husband, Urbano Dulay?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And they were asking you to testify against the accused Virgilio Lucena, is that correct?
A. They did not tell that, sir.
Q. And when they visited you in Tarlac, Tarlac, what was then the reason for their visit?
A. They delivered to me the subpoena, sir.
Q. And they asked you also to testify?
ATTY. CALOZA:
Already answered, Your Honor.
COURT:
Sustained.
ATTY. GAYMAN:
Is it not a fact that you were also threatened by them to come and testify against Virgilio Lucena?
ATTY. CALOZA:
Objection. No basis, Your Honor.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
Yes, sir. They were threatening to kill me if I am going to testify on the other party.
ATTY. CALOZA:
May we move to strike out the answer of the witness, on the other party, Your Honor.
COURT:
Remain on record the answer of the witness, on the other party.
Q. Were the relatives of your husband threatening you to testify?
 A. They were not telling me that, sir.[34]
Accused-appellant further contends that Rosalinas testimony as to his having attacked Urbano many times was
contrary to the medical findings. This is likewise bereft of merit. On the contrary, her assertion is consistent with the
findings of Dr. Armando Avena that the cause of death was the massive loss of blood secondary to multiple hacked
wounds and stab wounds.[35] It must be remembered in this regard that the detailed testimony of a witness in a
murder or homicide case acquires greater weight and credibility if it corresponds with the autopsy report. [36]
So, too, must fall accused-appellants argument as to the alleged inconsistency in Rosalinas testimony on direct
examination that Lazaro Dulay was near the table downstairs, which concededly conflicts with her claim on cross-
examination that he was sleeping on top of the table at the time he was attacked by accused-appellant. While indeed
these statements are contradictory, the alleged conflict is more apparent than real and refers to minor or trivial
matters which, in fact, serve to strengthen rather than destroy the credibility of a witness to a crime, especially so
when the crime is, as in this case, shocking to the conscience and numbing to the senses. [37]
These supposed inconsistencies hardly dent the credibility of Rosalina who remained steadfast and unwavering
in relating the principal occurrence and positively identifying the accused-appellant as the assailant of the
victims.[38] In other words, as long as the mass of the testimony jibes on material points, the slight clashing of
statements dilute neither the witnesss credibility nor the veracity of the testimony variations in the testimony of
witnesses on the same side in respect to minor, collateral or incidental matters do not impair the weight of their
united testimony to the prominent facts.[39]
For the foregoing considerations, accused-appellants argument with regard to his supposed lack of motive to
kill the victims becomes a moot point. Suffice it to state in this regard that proof of ill motive to commit the crime
becomes irrelevant with the positive identification of the accused. [40] Indeed, positive identification, where
categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter,
prevails over alibi and denial.[41]
In the second assigned error, accused-appellant takes the trial court to task for imposing the death penalty on
him contending that treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength were not attendant in the
commission of the felonies.
With regard to treachery, accused-appellant insists that there was no evidence to show that he deliberately
hacked the victims in such manner as to avoid risk to himself. In the case of Lazaro Dulay, accused argues that he
merely chanced upon Lazaro and there was nothing to show that he planned to kill him while he was
sleeping. Accused-appellant also points out that he had no grudge sufficient to motivate him to plan the killing of
Lazaro.
There is alevosia when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. [42] What is decisive in treachery is that the execution
of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.[43] In this case, Lazaro Dulay
was asleep when he was hacked to death by accused-appellant. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that there
exists the qualifying circumstance of alevosia when one takes the life of a person who is asleep.[44]
As regards the slaying of Urbano, however, treachery can not be appreciated because it is not clear if he was
also asleep when he was assaulted. On the contrary, the evidence shows that Urbano was initially asleep when
accused-appellant entered his house and attacked the sleeping Lazaro on the first floor of his house, but that he woke
up when accused-appellant, after hacking Lazaro, went upstairs and hacked him. In fact, Urbano was even able to
run towards the cornfield where he expired because of the severity of his wounds. [45]
The trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of superior strength vis--vis the
circumstances surrounding the slaying of Lazaro. When treachery qualifies the crime of murder, the generic
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength in necessarily included in the former. [46] In other words, the
generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery. [47]
This aggravating circumstance cannot also be appreciated in the killing of Urbano because to take advantage of
superior strength means to use purposely excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the
person attacked.[48] There has been no showing in this case that accused-appellant purposely employed superior
strength to consummate his nefarious deed, hence, it can not be appreciated against him.
 It, likewise, is unnecessary to consider evident premeditation in the twin killings although this was also alleged
in the information. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, there must be proof, as clear as the evidence of the
crime itself, of the following elements thereof, to wit: (1) the time the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an
overt act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the
decision and the execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequence of his act. [49] The essence of evident
premeditation is that the execution of the crime is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon a resolution to carry
out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.[50]
In this case, the records are bereft of any evidence of any of the above requisites of evident
premeditation. There is absolutely no proof of the time when accused-appellant decided to commit the crime.Neither
is there any showing of how accused-appellant planned the killings, nor of how much time elapsed before he
executed his plan. Absent all these, evident premeditation can not be appreciated.[51]
The resolution of the issues raised in this case will not be complete without a word being made on the
defectively crafted Information indicting accused-appellant for the twin killings of the Dulay brothers. It bears
stressing that an indictment for multiple offenses in a single complaint or information transgresses Rule 110, Section
13[52] of the Rules of Court, which states that a complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in
those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses. Be that as it may, this Court
held in People v. Ramon[53] that:

Regrettably for accused-appellant, however, he has failed to timely question the above defect, and he may thus
be deemed to have waived this objection to the multiplicity of charges. In People vs. Conte,[54] this Court has
ruled:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Under Sections 1 and 3 (e) of Rule 117, the appellant before entering his plea, should have moved to quash
the complaint for being duplicitous. For his failure to do so, he is deemed to have waived this defect (Section
8, Rule 117, Rules of Court; People vs. Dulay, 217 SCRA 132 [1993]; People vs. Basay, 219 SCRA 404
[1993]; People vs. Ducay, 225 SCRA 1 [1993]). Hence, pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 120, the court could
convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each and every
one of them.[55]

Given the foregoing factual backdrop, the penalties imposed on accused-appellant must be modified. In the
case of the killing of Lazaro U. Dulay, treachery qualified the offense to Murder, punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death.[56] While the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength was alleged, this is absorbed
in alevosia. Evident premeditation was likewise alleged but it cannot be appreciated in the absence of evidence that
the execution of the criminal act was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the
criminal intent during a space of time to arrive at a calm judgment. [57] In the absence of any other aggravating
circumstance to justify the imposition of the death penalty, only reclusion perpetua, the lesser penalty, should be
imposed.[58]
On the other hand, the killing of Urbano U. Dulay was not attended by any qualifying aggravating
circumstance, thus, accused-appellant should be convicted of the lesser offense of Homicide, which is punishable
by reclusion temporal.[59] In the absence of any modifying circumstance, the imposable penalty shall be in the
medium period.[60] Since accused-appellant is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should
be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty whose minimum must be within the range of prision mayor, the penalty
next lower in degree, and whose maximum shall be within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium
period. Taken in the light of the prevailing facts of the case, this Court deems it proper to impose upon the accused-
appellant an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with all the accessory penalties prescribed by
law.[61]
It appearing that civil indemnity awarded is in accordance with controlling case law on the matter and that the
other damages awarded are borne out by the evidence on record, the same are likewise sustained.
 WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 31, in Criminal Case No.
A-3036, is MODIFIED as follows:
Accused-appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder for the killing of
Lazaro U. Dulay, Sr., and is sentenced to serve the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Accused-appellant is likewise found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide for the
killing of Urbano U. Dulay, and is sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day
of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum.
The Decision under review, insofar as it orders accused-appellant to pay the heirs of Lazaro Dulay the sums of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 for expenses in connection with this death, and to pay the heirs of
Urbano Dulay the sums of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P15,000.00 for expenses in connection with his death,
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 146327-29. June 5, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ERNIE BARO, appellant.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It must avoid pushing the judge
to the pitfall of either convicting the innocent or acquitting the guilty. The hornbook rule is that where there is
reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted. It would be far more acceptable to acquit the guilty erroneously
than to convict the innocent wrongly.

The Case

Ernie Baro appeals the Decision[1] dated October 30, 2000 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City (Branch 86), finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of rape and sentencing him
to reclusion perpetua for each count. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding the accused Ernie Baro guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of rape committed against Roda Ongatan and hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the offense charged and to indemnify the victim Roda Ongotan
the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus costs. [2]

Three Complaints, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-98-76279, Q-98-76280 and Q-98-76282 were filed
against appellant for raping Roda Ongotan on January 5, 1995, March 5, 1995 and April 16, 1996. Except for the
dates of the commission of the offense, the three Complaints were similarly worded as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of January, 1995 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, by means of force and
intimidation did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the room where the undersigned
complainant was sleeping, and covered her mouth, poked a knife at her neck, undressed her and removed her panty,
and thereafter have carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her consent. [3]

During his arraignment on August 3, 1998, [4] appellant, with the assistance of his counsel de oficio,[5] pleaded
not guilty to all three charges. After trial in due course, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision.

The Facts
Version of the Prosecution

In its Brief,[6] the Office of the Solicitor General presents the prosecutions version of the facts as follows:

Roda Ongotan was an adopted daughter of Rodrigo and Leticia Ongotan. Rodrigo and Leticia have eight (8) other
children, namely: Ricardo, 21 years old; Ronald, 20 years old; Rogelio, 19 years old; Roberto, 18 years old; Rose,
16 years old; Rochelle, 13 years old; Rodel, 10 years old and Racquel, 8 years old. They lived in a two-storey house
at 104 Zusuaregui, Old Balara, Quezon City. Rodas family occupied the second floor of the house, which had three
(3) bedrooms. The first bedroom was occupied by Roda s parents and three (3) sisters. The second bedroom was
occupied by the brother of Rodas mother, Vivencio Padora, while the third bedroom was occupied by Roda. Rodas
five (5) brothers sleep in the sala. Rodas bedroom was adjacent to the kitchen. Her room was about two armslength
wide and one-and-a-half armslength long. It had no door and only a curtain covered and separated it from the rest of
the house. Appellant, who was the uncle of Rodas mother, slept just outside Rodas bedroom. When the rape
incidents occurred in 1995 and 1996, the ground floor of the Ongotan house was rented by Teresita Ongotans (the
sister of Rodas father) family.

On January 5, 1995, around 5:00 a.m., Roda had just awakened and was still lying down when appellant entered her
room. Appellant immediately covered her mouth with a handkerchief and threatened to kill her if she shouted. Using
his left hand, appellant poked a knife (balisong) at her. Appellant was then wearing a white shirt and black short
pants while Roda was wearing an orange-colored short pants and a pink dress. Appellant took off his short pants and
removed Rodas short pants and underwear. He forcibly spread her legs and inserted his penis into her vagina. Roda
could not remember how long was appellants penis remained inserted in her vagina. After raping her, appellant
dressed up and left her room.

On March 5, 1995, Roda went to bed around 8:00 p.m. Around 5:00 a.m. the following day, Roda was awakened by
the presence of appellant inside her bedroom. Upon seeing appellant, Roda asked him what he wanted from
her. Appellant told her to be quiet and immediately covered her mouth with a handkerchief. Appellant wound the
handkerchief around Rodas head. Appellant then told her that should she shout or report what was happening to
anyone, he would kill her. Thereupon, appellant raised her duster. Roda resisted, but her strength was no match for
appellants. Appellant told her not to resist and to make her immobile, appellant poked a knife (balisong) at the left
side of her neck. Roda started to cry when she realized the futility of her resistance to appellants lustful
intention. Thereupon, appellant removed her underwear. When this was removed, appellant lowered his maong
pants and underwear. Then, using his knees which were placed between Rodas legs, appellant forced her legs
apart. Appellant inserted his penis into Rodas vagina. Roda could not do anything but cry as she felt weak. When
appellant inserted his penis into her vagina, Roda felt pain. She could not remember how long appellants penis
stayed inside her vagina. When appellant was finished with her, he dressed up and removed the handkerchief around
her head. When morning came, Roda did not tell her mother of the incident out of fear of appellant.

On April 16, 1996, around midnight, Roda was at the kitchen preparing the food to be brought by her parents and
five (5) siblings on their trip to the province. After she had prepared their baon, her parents, four (4) brothers and
one (1) sister left the house. Only Roda, Rochelle, Rodel and appellant were left in the house. Thereafter, she put to
sleep Rochelle and Rodel who slept at their parents bedroom. Roda did not sleep because she was afraid of appellant
who was with them in the house. Before her parents left, Roda had pleaded with them not to leave. She could not tell
them the reason out of fear of appellant.She could not ask them either to bring them all because no one would be left
at the house. Neither could she go with them because no one would look after her young brother and sister.

Thereupon, Roda saw appellant already inside her room and appellant, upon seeing her immediately covered her
mouth to prevent her from making any noise. Appellant used a handkerchief to cover her mouth and poked a knife at
her neck. Roda resisted but appellant was stronger. As they were still standing, appellant ordered her to lie
down. Appellant told her not to report the incident to anyone. Thereupon, appellant took off his short pants, and
followed that by removing Rodas short pants and underwear. When this was done, appellant forced her legs open
and inserted his penis into her vagina. Roda could not do anything but cry. She could not remember how long
appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. After appellant raped her, he ordered her to dress up and threatened her
that should she report what had happened to anyone, he would kill her.

On December 17, 1997, Roda summoned enough courage to file a complaint against appellant. She first confided in
her aunt, Antonia Espos, about her unfortunate ordeal in the hands of appellant. Her aunt assured her that she would
help her file charges against appellant.

Dr. Cristina Freyra, a Medico-Legal Officer at the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, EDSA, Q.C., stated
that she performed a genital examination on Roda Ongotan on December 16, 1997. At the time of Rodas
examination, Roda was fifteen (15) years old. Dr. Freyras examination revealed that Rodas hymen had deep-healed
lacerations at 3:00 and 9:00 oclock positions and a healed laceration at 5:00 oclock position. Dr. Freyra opined that
these lacerations could have been caused by a hard blunt object like an erect male organ. Dr. Freyra concluded that
Roda was in a non-virgin state physically.[7](Citations omitted)

Version of the Defense

On the other hand, appellant narrates in his Brief[8] his version of the facts as follows:

Accused-appellant, Ernie Baro, was a former resident of Catubig, Northern Samar. He was engaged in copra
farming from the plantation of his parents prior to November 15, 1996, when he came to Manila with his wife and
three (3) children to find work upon the request and invitation of his niece, Leticia Ongotan.

In Manila, accused-appellant Ernie Baro and his wife, with their three (3) children, the eldest being 3 years old and
the youngest at 1 year old, stayed at the place located at Orocoy St., Montessorie, Manila.Later on, they transferred
to the house of his niece, Leticia Ongotan at 104 Scout Zuzuarigue St., Old Balara, Quezon City, where they stayed
for about 1 year. Th[e]reat, accused, Ernie Baro met herein complainant Roda Ongot[a]n, who later on charged him
of three (3) counts of rape on December 17, 1997, allegedly committed by him on January 5; March 5, 1995 and
April 16, 1996. The herein accused vehemently denied the charges despite his denial, the trial court nonetheless
found him guilty of the charge.[9] (Citations omitted)

Ruling of the Trial Court

The RTC gave credence to complainants testimony, citing the principle that when a woman says she has been
raped, she says all that is necessary to prove her accusation. It also held that her delay in reporting the incidents did
not at all affect her credibility, for the delay had satisfactorily been explained. Furthermore, it ruled that the Medico-
legal Report and the testimony of the examining physician bolstered her claim that she had experienced violent
sexual intercourse at a young age.[10]
The RTC did not give credence to the alibi and the denial interposed by the accused. It ruled that neither would
prevail over the positive testimony of complainant and that, as between a positive identification of the accused by
the victim herself and an alibi, the former is to be given greater weight, especially when the victim has no motive to
testify falsely against the accused.[11]
Hence, this appeal.[12]

Assignment of Errors

In his Brief, appellant faults the court a quo with the following alleged errors:
I

The lower court erred in giving full faith and credence to the testimony of complainant, Roda Ongotan y Padora,
despite its inherent incredibility, contradictions and implausibility.

II

The lower court likewise erred in disregarding accused-appellants defense of alibi despite having clearly satisfied
the legal criteria for its being, and supported by the attendant milieu and circumstances of the case.[13]

The Courts Ruling

The appeal is meritorious. This Court believes that the guilt of appellant was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt.

First Issue:
Credibility of Complainants Testimony

Appellant submits that the RTC erred in according full faith and credence to complainants testimony despite its
inherent incredibility, contradictions and implausibility.
We agree. While it is true that it may be the sole basis for convicting the accused in a rape case, [14] the
complaining witness testimony must be credible.[15] In reviewing rape cases, this Court has always been guided by
the following principles: (a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility -- while it may be difficult for the
prosecution to prove, it is usually more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) in view of
the intrinsic nature of the crime in which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant
must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merits -- it cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. [16]
After a painstaking review of the records of the case, this Court finds several circumstances creating reasonable
doubt as to appellants guilt. These are: (1) delay in filing the Complaint, (2) failure of the prosecution to prove
appellants moral ascendancy over complainant, (3) lack of support from the records for the RTCs finding of violent
sexual intercourse between appellant and complainant, and (4) discrepancies in the complainants testimony.

Delay in Filing the Complaint

In rape, the complainants delayed disclosure of the crime to kith or kin or persons of authority does not always
warrant the conclusion that the woman was not sexually molested or that her charges against the accused are
baseless and fabricated.[17] However, the delay must be adequately and satisfactorily explained; otherwise, it would
generate doubt as to the guilt of the accused.[18]
In the present case, the first rape was allegedly committed by appellant on January 5, 1995. After two months,
on March 5, 1995, he purportedly raped complainant again. More than a year after the second rape, on April 16,
1996, the third rape supposedly occurred. Complainant reported the alleged crimes only on December 17, 1997, or
more than two years after the first rape and more than a year after the third one allegedly occurred.
Her explanation for the delay was the threat of appellant to kill her if she reported the incident to anyone. Note
that at the time she reported the incident, he was still residing with her family. She herself testified that he left their
residence only on December 16, 1997,[19] after she had confided the alleged rapes to her aunt and had herself
examined by a doctor. Hence, the threat of death, if any, was still hanging precariously over her at the time. She
merely said that she no longer wanted to ruin her life, so she decided to reveal the rapes to her aunt. The relevant
portion of her testimony reads thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What prompted you to tell the story to your auntie despite the fact that one year has lapsed already?
A: Because I dont want to ruin my life anymore because it [is] already ruined. [20]
The above quote does not, however, explain the gaps between the dates of the three instances of the alleged
rapes. The prosecution failed to show satisfactorily what finally prompted complainant to report the purported crime
after a period of two long years from the time first rape supposedly took place and to disregard the threats allegedly
made by appellant.

Proof of Moral Ascendancy

The RTC erred in stating that appellant had exercised moral ascendancy over complainant. This was not
proven during the trial. Neither do the records show that he exercised moral ascendancy over her.He is in fact not
much older than her brothers. It was not shown whether he was her benefactor -- a source of financial support -- or
whether he exercised discipline over her. In other words, there is no proof beyond reasonable doubt that it was his
moral ascendancy that prevented her from putting up a resistance. [21] Presumptions of moral ascendancy cannot and
should not prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence.

Violent Sexual Intercourse Not Borne by the Records

The trial court likewise erred when it held that the Medico-legal Report and the testimony of Dr. Ma. Cristina
Freyra of the PNP Crime Laboratory indicated that the lacerations in the vagina of complainant showed that she had
experienced violent sexual intercourse during her younger years, and that such experience caused those
lacerations. The Report merely indicated that healed lacerations were found in her hymen at the 5, the 3, and the 9
oclock positions. We reproduce pertinent portions of the Report as follows:

FINDINGS:

GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL:

Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female subject. Breasts are hemispherical with pale brown areola
and nipples from which no secretion could be pressed out. Abdomen is flat and soft.

GENITAL:
There is moderate growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coadapted with pinkish brown labia
minora presenting in between. On separating the same disclosed an elastic, fleshy-type hymen with shallow, sealed
laceration at 5 and deep-healed lacerations at 3 and 9 oclock positions. External vaginal orifice offers moderate
resistance to the introduction of the examining index finger. Vaginal canal is narrow with prominent
rugosities. Cervix is normal in size, color and consistency.

CONCLUSION:

Subject is in a non-virgin state physically.

There are no external signs of recent application of any form of trauma at the time of the examination.[22]

Furthermore, during her testimony, Dr. Freyra admitted that such lacerations [23] could have been caused by any
hard blunt object or even by a finger or a vibrator. [24] She never mentioned violent sexual intercourse. This fact is
clear from the Transcript of Stenographic Notes, which we quote:
Q: What was [sic] your findings if any in connection with your examination?
A: On examination, there were deep-healed lacerations at 3:00 and 9:00 oclock positions and there was healed
laceration at 5:00 oclock position.
Q: Could you tell us what could have caused the lacerations?
A: Any hard blunt object could produce the lacerations.
Q: Could you mention any?
A: An erect male organ.
Q: Could you tell us the size of that male organ that caused the laceration?
Atty Venturanza:
The question of the prosecutor is quite misleading. What was stated by the witness is any hard blunt object
and she just mentioned as one of the objects is an erect male organ and now he [is] asking the size.
Court:
Lay the basis.
Fiscal Jamolin:
If you said that one of the causes of the laceration is an erect male organ. On the basis of this possibility,
could you tell us the size of that male organ that caused the lacerations?
A: It could be any size but it should be bigger. [B]y 1 cm. [i]norder to produce laceration, the diameter of the
hard thing that entered the hymen should be bigger by 1 cm. [25]
It must be noted that the healed lacerations found in complainants hymen were not proven to have been caused
by rapes that supposedly happened two years earlier. Such lacerations may simply mean that, depending on the
changes observed in the affected tissues, a period ranging from four days to one month passed from the time they
had been inflicted up to the time they were examined.[26]

Discrepancies in the Testimony of Complainant

More damaging to the prosecution, the discrepancies in the testimony of complainant cast doubts on appellants
guilt.
 First, during her testimony on September 17, 1998, complainant said that she was surprised when appellant
entered her room on the night of March 5, 1995.[27] On January 22, 1999, she again testified that she was shocked to
see appellant inside her room on the night of January 5, 1995. [28]
For reasons known only to the prosecution, complainant testified on the second rape before she testified on the
first one. Stranger still is her statement that she asked him what he wanted from her when she saw him in her room
the second time.[29] We note that she had allegedly been raped by him already prior to that date. Thus, she need not
have asked him what he wanted from her. By then, she should have at the very least been able to guess his evil
intentions and felt alarmed accordingly.
Second, the house where the rapes allegedly took place was described during the trial as not bigger than one
half of the courtroom.[30] It was occupied by at least twelve people, most of whom were members of her immediate
family. At any given night, at least ten people would be asleep there. We cannot help but wonder why she allowed
appellant to commit such dastardly act three times, with her parents and four fully grown brothers within shouting
distance. Considering the cramped space and the quietness of the night, the faintest cry from her would have been
heard by one or more of her family members who were in that same house.
Third, complainant described each rape in a very uniform and even seemingly systematic manner. Each rape
always started with appellant entering the room and complainant asking what he wanted from her. It always began
with appellant covering her mouth with a handkerchief and pulling down her underwear. There was no difference at
all in the way the rapes were committed. The manner in which she described them engenders the suspicion that her
testimony had been coached, rehearsed, or contrived.

Second Issue:
Alibi as a Defense

Appellant's Alibi a Plausible Excuse

Alibi, the plea of having been somewhere other than at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, is
a plausible excuse for the accused. Contrary to the common notion, alibi is not always a weak defense. Sometimes,
the fact that the accused was somewhere else may just be the plain and unvarnished truth.
But to be valid for purposes of exoneration from a criminal charge, the defense of alibi must be so airtight that
it would admit of no exception.[31] The rule is well-settled that in order for it to prosper, it must be demonstrated that
the person charged with the crime was not only somewhere else when the offense was committed, but was so far
away that it would have been physically impossible to have been at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity
at the time of its commission.[32] The reason is that no person can be in two places at the same time.
This Court has ruled in numerous cases that where the accused was only thirty minutes [33] or just a few
kilometers from the place where the crime was committed, [34] the defense of alibi will not prosper.
Complainant alleges that appellant raped her three times -- one on each of the following dates: January 5, 1995,
March 5, 1995, and April 16, 1996. During his testimony, appellant stated that he was in Catubig, Northern Samar
until November 15, 1996, when he came to Manila upon the invitation of complainants mother. [35] He likewise
testified that it would take twenty-four hours for a bus to travel from Catubig, Northern Samar, to Manila. [36] It
would have been highly unlikely for him to take the 24-hour bus ride to Manila, commit the dastardly act upon
complainant, and then return to Catubig, Samar, by taking another 24-hour bus ride. He would have had to do so
three times in order to commit the three alleged rapes on the dates given.
No evidence was adduced by the prosecution to prove that appellant was indeed in Manila when the alleged
rapes were committed. It would have been a simple matter for it to present the testimony of complainants mother,
Leticia Ongotan, to contradict his testimony. It would also have been a simple matter for it to present the testimony
of any of the brothers or the sisters of complainant to establish exactly on what date he had arrived in Manila.
 Truly, the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits. It cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of that for the defense. In the present case, the testimony of appellant that he was in
Catubig, Northern Samar, on the dates when the alleged rapes were committed remain uncontradicted by the
prosecution. Moreover, he testified that it was upon the invitation of complainants mother, his niece, that he moved
his family to Manila in November 1996 or seven months after the last rape allegedly occurred.

The Constitutional Presumption of Innocence

Indeed, when a woman says she was raped, she in effect says all that is necessary to prove her
accusation.[37] Still, the presumption of innocence of the accused should not be thrown out of the window and
forgotten altogether. Such presumption holds until the contrary is proven. Every circumstance favoring it must be
taken into account in a criminal case. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with innocence and the other with guilt, then the evidence does not pass the
test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. [38]
In order to convict the accused of a crime, the prosecution must produce evidence showing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.[39] A person charged with a serious crime stands to lose not only reputation, but also liberty and
maybe even life. Because of the gravity of the charge and the great loss involved in the present case, the prosecution
should not have rested easy on haphazard facts and hastily thrown-in principles, forgetting in the process their duty
of overcoming the presumption of innocence of the accused in a criminal action.
The prosecution should take an active and direct part in the trial of the case, since it has the onus probandi of
showing the guilt of the accused.[40] Even if it is, perhaps, the inadequacy of details in the prosecutions evidence
rather than the actual facts themselves that makes it difficult for this Court to arrive at definite conclusions, still we
cannot pin responsibility on appellant. The moral conviction that may serve as basis for a finding of guilt in a
criminal case should be that which is the logical and inevitable result of the evidence on record, exclusive of any
other consideration. Short of this minimum requirement, it is not only the right of the accused to be freed; it is, even
more, this Courts constitutional duty to acquit them. Only then may there be fealty to the constitutional presumption
of innocence.[41]
The innocence of a defendant in a criminal case is always presumed until the contrary is proven. [42] Where two
probabilities arise from the evidence, the one compatible with the presumption of innocence will be
adopted.[43] Mere suspicion is not enough to take away ones liberty and destroy ones reputation. Guilt must be
proven by proof as clear as daylight, by evidence so airtight that no room is left for any reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed Decision issued on October 30, 2000 by the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86, is hereby REVERSED and appellant ACQUITTED, with costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., (Chairman), abroad, on official leave.