Gashem Shookat Baksh vs.

CA
G.R. No. 97336
February 19, 1993

Art. 21 ;
where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the
giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her
and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept
him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article
21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful
injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury
should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue
and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents
agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage."
In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal
knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral
damages will prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of moral damages,
because here mutual lust has intervened together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as
the expenses for the wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
As to the petitioners argument, the court ruled that No foreigner must be allowed to make a
mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.

FACTS:
Herein petitioner, Gashem Shookat Baksh, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano
Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchanged student taking a medical course at Lyceum
Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City. Before August 20, 1987, he courted herein respondent, Marilou
Gonzales, and thereafter proposed to marry her. For the reason of the promise to marry, respondent
was urged to move in with the petitioner at his apartment after securing the formers parents consent
regarding their marriage. It was alleged by the respondent, as also found by the lower courts, that
indeed the couple lived together and was supposed to bear a child but the petitioner gave abortive to
the respondent. It is noteworthy that the respondent is a virgin prior to said moving in with the
petitioner. The respondent further alleged that the petitioner maltreated her which caused her to seek
for the assistance of the barangay council to settle the dispute. As a result of such confrontation, the
petitioner informed the respondent to not live with him anymore because he was married to a girl
residing in Bacolod City. This caused the respondent to file for damages against the petitioner.
 Petitioners Argument: He is a Muslim. Under the Muslim laws, they are allowed to marry for
five times.

Sir: important wedding preparation

ISSUE:
Whether or not the breach of promise to marry by the petitioner is an actionable wrong for the claim of
damages.

RULING:
The Court ruled in favor of the respondent awarding moral damages to the respondent.

Ratio:
Quasi-delict is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or
intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts
is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts are much broader than culpa aquiliana because it
includes not only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false
imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the
Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain
exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be
covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which,
in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is
even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened
the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-
American law on torts.
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, the court hold, that where a man's
promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury
to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should
have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue
and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents
agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage."
In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal
knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral
damages will prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of moral damages,
because here mutual lust has intervened together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as
the expenses for the wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
As to the petitioners argument, the court ruled that No foreigner must be allowed to make a
mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.