Professional Documents
Culture Documents
MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA , petitioner, vs. HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Local Government,
NICANOR M. PATRICIO, in his capacity as Chief, Legal Service of the
Department of Local Government, and SALVADOR CABALUNA, JR. ,
respondents.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
SARMIENTO , J : p
The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the
Secretary of Local Government), to suspend and/or remove local officials.
The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a member of
the Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746), respectively. cdasia
In the case of Dra. Felicidad Ortigoza, she claims that the petitioner handpicked
her to perform task not befitting her position as Assistant City Health Officer of
Iloilo City; that her office was padlocked without any explanation or justification;
that her salary was withheld without cause since April 1, 1988; that when she filed
her vacation leave, she was given the run-around treatment in the approval of her
leave in connivance with Dr. Rodolfo Villegas and that she was the object of a
well-engineered trumped-up charge in an administrative complaint filed by Dr.
Rodolfo Villegas (Annex B).
On the other hand, Mansuelo Malabor is the duty elected Vice Mayor of Iloilo City
and complainants Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong and
Eduardo Pea Redondo are members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City
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of Iloilo. Their complaint arose out from the case where Councilor Larry Ong,
whose key to his office was unceremoniously and without previous notice, taken
by petitioner. Without an office, Councilor Ong had to hold office at Plaza
Libertad. The Vice-Mayor and the other complainants sympathized with him and
decided to do the same. However, the petitioner, together with his fully-armed
security men, forcefully drove them away from Plaza Libertad. Councilor Ong
denounced the petitioner's actuations the following day in the radio station and
decided to hold office at the Freedom Grandstand at Iloilo City and there were so
many people who gathered to witness the incident. However, before the group
could reach the area, the petitioner, together with his security men, led the firemen
using a firetruck in dozing water to the people and the bystanders.
The Mayor thereafter answered, 4 and the cases were set for hearing. The opinion of the
Court of Appeals also set forth the succeeding events:
xxx xxx xxx
The initial hearing in the Cabaluna and Ortigoza cases were set for hearing on
June 20-21, 1988 at the Regional Office of the Department of Local Government
in Iloilo City. Notices, through telegrams, were sent to the parties (Annex L) and
the parties received them, including the petitioner. The petitioner asked for a
postponement before the scheduled date of hearing and was represented by
counsel, Atty. Samuel Castro. The hearing officers, Atty. Salvador Quebral and
Atty. Marino Bermudez had to come all the way from Manila for the two-day
hearings but was actually held only on June 20, 1988 in view of the inability and
unpreparedness of petitioner's counsel.
The next hearings were re-set to July 25, 26, 27, 1988 in the same venue Iloilo
City. Again, the petitioner attempted to delay the proceedings and moved for a
postponement under the excuse that he had just hired his counsel. Nonetheless,
the hearing officers denied the motion to postpone, in view of the fact that the
parties were notified by telegrams of the scheduled hearings (Annex M).
Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988 and the petitioner
again asked for a postponement to September 26, 1988. On September 26, 1988,
the complainants and petitioner were present, together with their respective
counsel. The petitioner sought for a postponement which was denied. In these
hearings which were held in Manila, the petitioner testified in Adm. Case No. C-
10298 and 10299.
In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary
detention case filed by Pancho Erbite so the respondent ordered the petitioner's
second preventive suspension dated October 11, 1988 for another sixty (60) days.
The petitioner was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Iloilo City. The second
preventive suspension was not enforced. 5
Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition
against the respondent Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in the Regional Trial
Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction.
Presently, he instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an action for prohibition, in the respondent
Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order, preventively
suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in twenty months, and
designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor
Ganzon commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 of the Court of Appeals, a petition for
prohibition, 6 (Malabor, it is to be noted, is one of the complainants, and hence, he is
interested in seeing Mayor Ganzon ousted.)
On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, dismissing CA-G.R. SP
No. 16417. On July 5, 1990, it likewise promulgated a decision, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No.
20736. In a Resolution dated January 24, 1990, it issued a Resolution certifying the petition
of Mary Ann Artieda, who had been similarly charged by the respondent Secretary, to this
Court.
On June 26, 1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the respondent
Secretary from implementing the suspension orders, and restraining the enforcement of
the Court of Appeals' two decisions.
In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we consolidated all three cases. In our
Resolutions of January 15, 1991, we gave due course thereto.
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Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary (G.R. No. 93252), that the Department of Local
Government in hearing the ten cases against him, had denied him due process of law and
that the respondent Secretary had been "biased, prejudicial and hostile" towards him 7
arising from his (Mayor Ganzon's) alleged refusal to join the Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino party 8 and the running political rivalry they maintained in the last congressional
and local elections; 9 and his alleged refusal to operate a lottery in Iloilo City. 1 0 He also
alleges that he requested the Secretary to lift his suspension since it had come ninety days
prior to an election (the barangay elections of November 14, 1988), 1 1 notwithstanding
which, the latter proceeded with the hearing and meted out two more suspension orders
of the aforementioned cases. 1 2 He likewise contends that he sought to bring the cases
to Iloilo City (they were held in Manila) in order to reduce the costs of proceeding, but the
Secretary rejected his request. 1 3 He states that he asked for postponement on 'valid and
justifiable" 14 grounds, among them, that he was suffering from a heart ailment which
required confinement; that his "vital" 1 5 witness was also hospitalized 1 6 but that the latter
unduly denied his request. 1 7
Mayor Ganzon's primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) is that the Secretary of
Local Government is devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and remove local
officials, an argument reiterated by the petitioner Mary Ann Rivera Artieda (G.R. No.
93746).
As to Mayor Ganzon's charges of denial of due process, the records do not show very
clearly in what manner the Mayor might have been deprived of his rights by the respondent
Secretary. His claims that he and Secretary Luis Santos were (are) political rivals and that
his "persecution" was politically motivated are pure speculation and although the latter
does not appear to have denied these contentions (as he, Mayor Ganzon, claims), we can
not take his word for it the way we would have under less political circumstances,
considering furthermore that "political feud" has often been a good excuse in contesting
complaints.
The Mayor has failed furthermore to substantiate his say-so's that Secretary Santos had
attempted to seduce him to join the administration party and to operate a lottery in Iloilo
City. Again, although the Secretary failed to rebut his allegations, we can not accept them
at face value, much more, as judicial admissions as he would have us accept them, 1 8 for
the same reasons above-stated and furthermore, because his say-so's were never
corroborated by independent testimonies. As a responsible public official, Secretary
Santos, in pursuing an official function, is presumed to be performing his duties regularly
and in the absence of contrary evidence, no ill motive can be ascribed to him.
As to Mayor Ganzon's contention that he had requested the respondent Secretary to defer
the hearing on account of the ninety-day ban prescribed by Section 62 of Batas Blg. 337,
the Court finds the question to be moot and academic since we have in fact restrained the
Secretary from further hearing the complaints against the petitioners. 1 9
As to his request, finally, for postponements, the Court is afraid that he has not given any
compelling reason why we should overturn the Court of Appeals, which found no
convincing reason to overrule Secretary Santos in denying his requests. Besides,
postponements are a matter of discretion on the part of the hearing officer, and based on
Mayor Ganzon's above story, we are not convinced that the Secretary has been guilty of a
grave abuse of discretion.
The Court can not say, under these circumstances, that Secretary Santos' actuations
deprived Mayor Ganzon of due process of law.
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We come to the core question: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the
President's alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.
It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution 2 0 no longer allows the President,
as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or
removal over local officials. According to both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first,
to strengthen self-rule by local government units and second, by deleting the phrase "as
may be provided by law," 2 1 to strip the President of the power of control over local
governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds support in the debates of the
Constitutional Commission.
The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is significant, as
their argument goes, since: (1) the power of the President is "provided by law" and (2)
hence, no law may provide for it any longer. LLphil
It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question, the Secretary of Local
Government acted in consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the
Local Government Code, we quote:
SECTION 62. Notice of Hearing. Within seven days after the complaint is
filed, the Minister of Local Government, or the sanggunian concerned, as the case
may be, shall require the respondent to submit his verified answer within seven
days from receipt of said complaint, and commence the hearing and investigation
of the case within ten days after receipt of such answer of the respondent. No
investigation shall be held within ninety days immediately prior to an election, and
no preventive suspension shall be imposed within the said period. If preventive
suspension has been imposed prior to the aforesaid period, the preventive
suspension shall be lifted. 2 4
SECTION 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension may be
imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or
city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal
official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective
barangay official.
(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are
joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has
committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is
strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in
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office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the
safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive
suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.
(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed
reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings
against him until its termination. However, if the delay in the proceedings of the
case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not be
counted in computing the time of suspension. 2 5
The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987
Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law" intend to divest the
President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and or remove local officials?
(2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code? (3)
What is the significance of the change in the constitutional language?
It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the
constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right or
the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide
administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as
may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments'
autonomy from congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government affairs.
The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the
legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.
Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local government
units, as in the federal governments of the United States of America (or Brazil or Germany),
although Jefferson is said to have compared municipal corporations euphemistically to
"small republics". 26 Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star,
though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the
Constitution and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest is to wean local
government units from over dependence on the central government.
It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but
subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government code, 2 7 a local tax law,
2 8 income distribution legislation, 2 9 and a national representation law, 3 0 and measures 3 1
designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of
autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of
the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the
local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that
Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has
done, delegate its exercise to the President. Thus:
SECTION 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of
recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government
units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for the
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and
functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units. 3 2
As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to stress,
sub silencio, the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by severing
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congressional control of its affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals, like the power of
local legislation. 3 3 The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as existing
legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to
proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition.
The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere
supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her
control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression
because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority as this Court
has held, 3 4 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884, this
Court had occasion to discuss this scope and extent of the power of supervision
by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power of
control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was
emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things
which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. Thus in that case the
Court has made the following digression: "In administration law supervision
means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former
may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of
the latter." But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the
power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not
include the power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public
service so requires, as postulated in Section 64(c) of the Revised Administrative
Code. . . . 3 5
xxx xxx xxx
"Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter." 36 "Supervision" on the other
hand means "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties." 3 7 As we held, 3 8 however, "investigating" is not inconsistent
with "overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering".
The impression is apparently exacerbated by the Court's pronouncements in at least three
cases, Lacson v. Roque, 3 9 Hebron v. Reyes, 4 0 and Mondano v. Silvosa, 4 1 and possibly, a
fourth one, Pelaez v. Auditor General. 4 2 In Lacson, this Court said that the President
enjoyed no control powers but only supervision "as may be provided by law," 4 3 a rule we
reiterated in Hebron, and Mondano. In Pelaez, we stated that the President "may not . . .
suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against
him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board." 4 4 However,
neither Lacson nor Hebron nor Mondano categorically banned the Chief Executive from
exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but
because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority. Thus, according to Lacson:
In Hebron, we stated:
Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified by
law, the same must be deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the absence
of express or clear provision to the contrary which does not exist with respect to
municipal officers. . . . 4 6
In Pelaez, we stated that the President can not impose disciplinary measures on local
officials except on appeal from the provincial board pursuant to the Administrative Code.
48
Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President the power (to suspend remove) it
was not because we did not think that the President can not exercise it on account of his
limited power, but because the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in those cases in
which the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty
in sustaining him. 4 9
The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of the
Constitutional Commission to defeat the President's powers. The Court believes that the
deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because although Commissioner Jose
Nolledo would exclude the power of removal from the President, 5 0 Commissioner Blas
Ople would not. 5 1
The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the
Local Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we said, "supervision" and "removal" are not
incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger
expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite of
the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect. 5 2
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and
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accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization."
5 3 The Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of
the national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political
adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy,
however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the
central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of
federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the
Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than
precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-government.
As we observed in one case, 5 4 decentralization means devolution of national
administration but not power to the local levels. Thus:
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of
power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the
base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more
responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national
development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate
on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them,
but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has
no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with
his own.
The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit another
matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact that since the
Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of
600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima facie findings. The Court
is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office (assuming that Mayor Ganzon is
guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600 days of
suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out of office. As we held: 5 6
2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His
term of office does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and the
suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full discharge of his
functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of
October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. It is a basic assumption of the electoral
process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services
of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them
could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance,
criminally. In either case, his culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be
a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A
preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an
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unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter
he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified.
Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the
only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. They were
deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that
sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this
preventive suspension had outrun the bonds of reason and resulted in sheer
oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an
unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted. 5 7
The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above
reasons, 5 8 and so also, because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local
government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held, 5 9 is simply "to prevent
the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and
authority over possible witnesses" 6 0 or to keep him off "the records and other evidence."
6 1 It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an
erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not exceed sixty days, 6 2
which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise
sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved
their purpose in a shorter span.
Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the
accused is held to insure his presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the
respondent) enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and until found guilty. cdphil
Suspension finally is temporary, and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be
imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held, 6 3 a longer suspension is unjust and
unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote
possibility on Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest
of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension
permanent.
It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the Mayor's guilt has not
been proven. Worse, any absolution will be for naught because needless to say, the length
of his suspension would have, by the time he is reinstated, wiped out his tenure
considerably.
The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing the efforts of the respondent Secretary to
see that justice is done in Iloilo City, yet it is hardly any argument to inflict on Mayor
Ganzon successive suspensions when apparently, the respondent Secretary has had
sufficient time to gather the necessary evidence to build a case against the Mayor
without suspending him a day longer. What is intriguing is that the respondent Secretary
has been cracking down, so to speak, on the Mayor piecemeal apparently, to pin him
down ten times the pain, when he, the respondent Secretary, could have pursued a
consolidated effort.
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior
from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of Interior is
exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the
petitioner commits another or other crimes and abuses for which proper charges
are filed against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension
shall not be a bar to his being preventively suspended again, if warranted under
subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local Government Code.
The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C . J ., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
7. Id., 21.
8. Id.
9. Id., 27.
10. Id., 28.
11. Id., 30.
12. Id., 31-32.
13. Id., 34-35.
14. Id., 36.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id., 38.
18. Id.
19. By virtue of the Temporary Restraining Order the Court issued on June 26, 1990.
31. See supra, sec. 14, providing for regional development councils to be organized by the
President.
62. Supra.
63. Layno, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra.