Chapter 01

CHASHMA
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

UNIT - 1
FINAL
SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
CHAPTER 1
January 2003
CHASHMA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT-1
FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
CONTENTS
Chapter 1.0 Introduction and General Description of Plant
Chapter 2.0 Site Characteristics
Chapter 3.0 Design of Structures, Components, Equipment, and Systems
Chapter 4.0 Reactor
Chapter 5.0 Reactor Coolant System and Connected Systems
Chapter 6.0 Engineered Safety Features
Chapter 7.0 Instrumentation and Control
Chapter 8.0 Electric Power
Chapter 9.0 Auxiliary Systems
Chapter 10.0 Steam and Power Conversion System
Chapter 11.0 Radioactive Waste Management
Chapter 12.0 Radiation Protection
Chapter 13.0 Conduct of Operation
Chapter 14.0 Initial Test Program
Chapter 15.0 Accident Analyses
Chapter 16.0 Technical Specifications
Chapter 17.0 Quality Assurance

CHASHMA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
UNIT 1
Title Final Safety Analysis Report

Chapter 1: Introduction and General Description of Plant
CHASHMA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

PAKISTAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
Index No.
Compiled by SNERDI
No. P C 1 00620 011 S300 02 GN
1.0-2,4; 1.1-4; 1.2-1, 8, 11,

16, 30, Figure 1.2-29, Figure
1.2-30, Figure 1.2-31; 1.3-
2~46, 51, 52; 1.6-3, 4; 1.7-1, Zia ul Hasan
B 03.03 CFC Yusuf Raza 22; 1.8-7, 10, 12, 15, 20~23 Siddiqui
A 98.02 CFC Dai Anguo - Zhou
Rev. Date Status Reviewed By Modification Observations Approved By
S.C.No. Internal No. PC-00620-011

CHAPTER 1.0
INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PLANT
CONTENTS
Page
1.1 INTRODUCTION 1.1-1
1.2 GENERAL PLANT DESCRIPTION 1.2-1
1.2.1 Site and Environment 1.2-1
1.2.2 Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) 1.2-1
1.2.2.1 Principal Design Criteria 1.2-3
1.2.2.2 Operating Characteristics 1.2-4
1.2.2.3 Safety Considerations 1.2-5
1.2.3 Engineered Safety Features and 1.2-6
Emergency Systems
1.2.3.1 Containment System 1.2-6
1.2.3.2 Emergency Core Cooling System 1.2-10
1.2.3.3 Auxiliary Feedwater System 1.2-11
1.2.3.4 Emergency Electrical System 1.2-12
1.2.3.5 Fire Protection System 1.2-13
1.2.3.6 Main Control Room Habitability 1.2-14
Ventilation System
1.2.4 Instrumentation, Control and Electrical 1.2-14
Systems
1.2.4.1 Instrumentation and Control Systems 1.2-14
1.2.4.2 Electrical Power Systems 1.2-17
1.0-1
AMENDMENT
Page
1.2.5 Turbine and Auxiliaries 1.2-19
1.2.6 Fuel Handling and Storage Systems 1.2-20
1.2.7 Cooling Water, Ventilation, and other Auxiliary Systems 1.2-21
1.2.7.1 Cooling Water Systems 1.2-21
1.2.7.2 Ventilation Systems 1.2-23
1.2.7.3 Other Auxiliary Systems 1.2-25
1.2.8 Radioactive Waste Treatment Systems 1.2-26
1.2.9 Plant Arrangement and Structures 1.2-28
1.3 COMPARISON TABLES 1.3-1
1.4 IDENTIFICATION OF AGENTS AND CONTRACTORS 1.4-1
1.4.1 Applicant 1.4-1
1.4.2 Contractor 1.4-1
1.5 REQUIREMENTS FOR FURTHER TECHNICAL 1.5-1
INFORMATION
1.6 MATERIAL INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE 1.6-1
1.6.1 Chinese Standards and Codes 1.6-1
1.6.2 International Standards and U.S.A. National 1.6-1
Standards
1.6.3 Topical Report 1.6-3
1.7 DRAWINS AND OTHER DETAILED INFORMATION 1-7-1
1.0-2
Page
1.7.1 Electrical, Instrumentation and Control Drawings 1.7-1
1.7.2 Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams 1.7-1
1.7.3 Other Detailed Information 1.7-1
1.8 Conformance to Codes, Standards, Regulatory Guides 1.8-1
1.0-3
AMENDMENT
CHAPTER 1.0
INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PLANT
LIST OF TABLES
Number Title Page
1.1-1 Plant Thermal and Electrical Output 1.1-3
1.1-2 Major Construction Milestones 1.1-4
1.3-1 CHASNUPP-1 Comparison with Similar Facility 1.3-2
QNPP Designs
1.3-2 Comparison of Main Difference Between 1.3-31
CHASNUPP-1 and QNPP
1.3-3 Significant Changes from the PSAR 1.3-34
1.7-1 Electrical Instrumentation and Control Drawings 1.7-2
1.7-2 Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams 1.7-20
1.8-1 Compilation of Applicable Codes, Standards, 1.8-2
Regulatory Guides and Regulation for CHASNUPP-1
1.0-4
CHAPTER 1.0 INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PLANT
LIST OF FIGURES
Number Title Page
1.1-1 Site Location
1.1-2 Site Location
1.1-3 Standard Symbols
1.2-1 Site Boundary and Exclusion Area Boundary
1.2-2 General Layout
1.2-3 Nuclear Aux. System EQP. Arrangement Drawing
- 15.3000, - 11.400 Plan
- 6.000 Plan
+ 0.000 Plan
+ 6.000 Plan
+ 10.500 Plan
+ 15.000 Plan
Roof Plan
1.0-5
Page
1.2-10 Reactor Coolant System Arrangement Drawing
+ 0.000, - 1.800 Plan
+ 3.000 Plan
+ 6.000 Plan
+ 10.500 Plan
+ 15.000 Plan
1.2-15 Fuel Storage Building Arrangement Drawing
+ 0.000 Plan
+ 8.000 Plan
+ 13.300 Plan
Section 1-1
Section 2-2
Section 3-3, Section 4-4
1.0-6
Page
1.2-21 Electrical Building Electrical Arrangement
Drawing + 6.000 Plan
1.2-25 Main Control Room Arrangement Drawing
1.2-26 Emergency Diesel Generators Arrangement Drawing
+ 0.000 Plan (DA)
+ 0.000 (DB)
- 11.400 Plan (DA, DB)
1.2-29 Nuclear Island Arrangement Drawing
Section 1-1
1.2-30 Nuclear Island Arrangement Drawing
Section 2-2
1.2-31 Essential Service Water Pump Station (EW)
Arrangement Drawing Lower Plan
1.2-32 Essential Service Water Pump Station (EW)
Arrangement Drawing Section 1-1
1.0-7
Page
1.2-33 Ultimate Heat Sink Cooling Tower and Water
Storage Tank System Arrangement Drawing
Layout
1.2-34 Ultimate Heat Sink Cooling Tower and Water
Storage Tank System Arrangement Drawing
Cooling Tower Plan
1.2-35 Turbine Generator Building Arrangement Drawing
Layout of the Main Parts
Operating Floor (+14.50M) Plan
Below Operating Floor Plan
Ground Floor Plan
1.2-39 Turbine Generator Building Ventilation Facilities
Arrangement Drawing
Section
1.0-8
CHAPTER 1.0 INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL
DESCRIPTION OF PLANT
1.1 INTRODUCTION
The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) is submitted in support of the application
by Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) for permit to Chashma Nuclear
Power Plant Unit-1 (CHASNUPP-1) operation.
The CHASNUPP-1 FSAR is established in accordance with the format requirements

of US NRC Regulatory Guide 1.70, Revision 3, LWR edition.
PAEC owns the plant and has the overall responsibility to ensure that it is designed,
constructed, and operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
China Zhongyuan Engineering Corporation (CZEC) is the main contractor
responsible for the design, engineering, construction, commissioning, equipment and
material procurement for CHASNUPP-1.
The CHASNUPP-1 is situated at Chashma site in the northwestern region of the Thal
Doab in the Punjab Province. The site is located in the south of Mianwali, near the
Chashma Barrage, and on the left bank of the Indus River. The location of the site is
shown in Fig. 1.1-1, Fig. 1.1-2.
The CHASNUPP-1 is a single-unit. The unit is of 300 MWe Class and includes a
two-loop pressurized water reactor (PWR) nuclear steam supply system (NSSS)
furnished by China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). The nuclear island and
conventional island of the plant utilizes proven design, similar to that of the Qingshan
Nuclear Power Plant (QNPP) in China.
The systems and the major equipment of the nuclear island, including the NSSS, are
designed by Shanghai Nuclear Engineering Research and Design Institute (SNERDI),
and the engineering of the conventional island is designed by East China Electric
Power Design Institute (ECEPDI).
1.1-1
The nuclear steam supply system is designed for a power output of 1002 MWt which
includes 3.4 MWt from the reactor coolant pumps. The corresponding gross electric
output of the turbine generator is 325 MWe and the net output of the plant is around
300 MWe. The NSSS is evaluated for safety analyses at higher power level of 1035
MWt. Specifically, the containment and engineered safety features are designed and
evaluated for operation at the power level of 1035 MWt. Accidents such as loss of
coolant, steamline break, and other postulated accidents having off-site dose
consequences are also analyzed at the power level of 1035 MWt. Table 1.1-1 shows
plant thermal and electric output for each case.
The reactor containment is of prestressed reinforced concrete structure in the form of

a vertical cylinder with a torispherical dome and a flat base. The interior surface of
the containment structure is covered entirely by a leak-proof steel liner. SNERDI will
be responsible for containment design.
The major construction milestones for CHASNUPP-1 are shown in table 1.1-2. The
corresponding anticipated date for commercial operation is April 1999.
The standard symbols used in piping and instrumentation diagrams and other figures
in the FSAR are shown in Figure 1.1-3.
1.1-2
TABLE 1.1-1 PLANT THERMAL AND ELECTRIC OUTPUT
Cases Power Level

Reactor core rated thermal power, MWt 998.6
NSSS rated thermal power output MWt 1002
Engineered safety features design rating MWt 1035
Gross electric power output MWe 325
Estimated electric power by operating auxiliaries

< 25
under normal operation MWe
Estimated net electric power output MWe 300
1.1-3
AMENDMENT
TABLE 1.1-2 MAJOR CONSTRUCTION MILESTONES
Milestones Date
Signing of the contract 31 December 1991
Validation of the contract 25 February 1992
Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) 25 December 1992
Construction Permit 3 July 1993
First Concrete Pour of Nuclear Island 1 August 1993
Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) 1 March 1998
Hydro-test of Reactor Coolant System 28 August 1998
Fuel Loading Authorization 25 October 1999
1.1-4
AMENDMENT
1.2 GENERAL PLANT DESCRIPTION
1.2.1 Site and Environment
The CHASNUPP is located at about 10 km from the Chashma Barrage on left bank of
the Indus River in Mianwali district, about 32 km to the south of Mianwali, 280 km to
the southwest of Islamabad and 1160 km northeast of Karachi. The site is situated at
approximately 71o 25 east longitude and 32o 26 north latitude. The location of the
site is shown in Fig. 1.1-2. The site boundary and exclusion area boundary is shown
in Fig. 1.2-1.
The characteristics of the site and its environs have been investigated to establish
bases for determining criteria for storm, flood, and earthquake protection, and to
evaluate the validity of calculational techniques for the control of routine and
accidental releases of radioactive liquids and gases to the environment. Field
programs to investigate geology and seismology are completed.
The seismic criteria used to design the structures and equipment in the plant are
considered, horizontal ground acceleration for the Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE)
is 0.125g and for the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) is 0.25g.
Various studies and analysis for the geography, demography, meteorology,

hydrology, geology, and seismology of the site have been fulfilled. These results have
been used to CHASNUPP design.
1.2.2 Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS)
The nuclear steam supply system for the plant consists of a pressurized water reactor,
reactor coolant system (SRC), and associated auxiliary systems. The SRC is arranged
as two closed reactor coolant loops connected in parallel to the reactor vessel, each
containing a reactor coolant pump and a steam generator. An electrically heated
pressurizer is connected to the hot leg of one of the reactor coolant loops.
H i g h p r e s s u r i z e d w a t e r c i r c u l a t e s t hr o u g h t h e r e a c t o r c o r e t o r e mo v e
the heat generated by the nuclear chain reaction. The heated reactor
coolant exits from the reactor vessel and passes via the coolant loop
1.2-1
piping to the steam generator. Here it gives up its heat to the feedwater to generate
steam for the turbine generator. The cycle is completed when the water from the
steam generator is pumped back to the reactor vessel. The entire SRC is composed of
leaktight components to ensure that all fluids are contained in the system
pressure boundary.
The reactor core consists of 121 fuel assemblies. Each fuel assembly is composed of
uranium dioxide pellets enclosed in pressurized zircaloy tubes with welded end plugs.
The tubes are supported in assemblies by a spring clip grid structure. Rod cluster
control assemblies are used for reactor control and consist of clusters of cylindrical
stainless steel clad silver-indium-cadmium absorber rods. The absorber rods move
within guide tubes in certain fuel assemblies. Above the core, each cluster of absorber
rods is attached to a spider connector and drive shaft, which is raised and lowered by
a control rod drive mechanism mounted on the reactor vessel head.
The core is of multi-enrichment region type. All fuel assemblies are mechanically
similar, although the fuel enrichment is not the same in all assemblies. In the initial
core loading, three kinds of fuel enrichment have been used. Fuel assemblies with the
highest enrichment are placed in the core periphery i.e. outer region, and other two
groups of lower enrichment fuel assemblies are arranged in a selected pattern in the
central region. In subsequent refueling, one-third of the fuel assemblies is discharged
and fresh fuel is loaded into the outer region of the core. The remaining fuel is
rearranged in the central two-thirds of the core in such a manner as to achieve
optimum power distribution.
The reactor vessel and reactor internals contain and support the fuel assemblies and
control rods. The reactor vessel is cylindrical with hemispherical ends and is clad with
stainless steel.
The reactor coolant pumps are vertical, single-stage, axial-flow pumps of the
controlled leakage shaft-seal type.
The steam generators are vertical U-tube units utilizing Incoloy tubes. Internal
moisture separation equipment reduces the moisture content of the steam to 0.25% or
less at the outlet nozzle under design operating conditions.
1.2-2
The pressurizer is a vertical cylindrical pressure vessel with hemispherical ends, and
is equipped with spray nozzles and electrical heaters for system pressure control.
Auxiliary systems are provided to charge makeup water into the reactor coolant
system, purify reactor coolant, provide chemicals for corrosion inhibition and
reactivity control, cool system components, remove residual heat when the reactor is
shut down, cool the spent fuel storage pool, sample reactor coolant, provide for
emergency safety injection.
1.2.2.1 Principal Design Criteria
The design of the pressurized water, closed-cycle reactor significantly reduces the
quantities of fission products released to the atmosphere. Three barriers exist between
the fission product accumulation and the environment. They are the fuel cladding, the
reactor vessel and coolant loops, and the containment. If the first barrier fails, escape
of fission products through fuel cladding defects would be contained within the
reactor vessel and coolant loops. Breach of the second barrier would release the
fission products to the third barrier, containment, where they would be contained.
The reactor containment is designed to adequately retain these fission products under
the most severe design accident conditions, as analyzed in Chapter 15.
Design criteria are established to ensure the following:
a) The minimum departure from nucleate boiling ratio during normal

operation and anticipated operational occurrences is not less than the limit
value.
b) The maximum fuel centerline temperature evaluated at the design

overpower condition is below that value which could lead to centerline fuel
melting. The melting point of the UO2 is not reached during normal
operation and anticipated operational occurrences.
1.2-3
c) Fuel rod Cladding is designed to maintain cladding integrity throughout
fuel life. Fission gas release within the rods and other factors affecting fuel
design life are considered for maximum expected exposure.
d) The reactor and control systems are designed so that any xenon transients
will be adequately damped.
e) The SRC is designed and constructed to maintain its integrity throughout

the expected plant life. Appropriate means of test and inspection are
provided.
f) Power excursion incidents that could result from any credible reactivity
addition do not cause damage either by deformation or rupture of the
pressure vessel, nor do they impair operation of the engineered safety
features.
g) The combined response of the fuel temperature coefficient, the moderator

temperature coefficient, the moderator void coefficient, and the moderator
pressure coefficient, to an increase in reactor thermal power is a decrease in
reactivity. In addition, reactor power transients remain bounded and
damped in response to any expected change of any operating variable.
1.2.2.2 Operating Characteristics
The reactor is operated by control rod cluster motion, which is required for load-
follow transients and for startup and shutdown, and by the soluble neutron absorber,
boron, in the form of boric acid. The boric acid is inserted during cold shutdown,
partially removed at startup, and adjusted in concentration during core lifetime to
compensate for such effects as fuel depletion and accumulation of fission products
which tend to slow the nuclear chain reaction.
The reactor control system is designed to accept step load increase of 10% and ramp
load increase of 5% per minute over the load range of 15% to 100% of full power.
Similarly, equal step and ramp load reductions are possible over the range of 100% to
15% of full power.
1.2-4
The turbine bypass and atmospheric steam dump capacity permit 100% external load
rejection without turbine or reactor trip.
1.2.2.3 Safety Considerations
Several engineered safety features have been incorporated into the plant design to
reduce the consequences of a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). These safety features
include a safety injection system which automatically delivers borated water to the
reactor vessel for cooling the core under low reactor coolant pressure condition. The
safety injection system also serves to insert negative reactivity into the reactor core in
the form of borated water during an uncontrolled plant cooldown following a steam
line break or an accidental steam release. Another safety feature is the containment
spray system which serves to reduce the containment atmosphere pressure and
temperature and remove heat from the reactor building following a LOCA or a
secondary steam line break accident. This system also serves to remove airborne
elemental iodine from the containment atmosphere following a LOCA.
The reactor is refueled by equipment which handles spent fuel under water from the
time it is removed from the reactor vessel until it is placed in a shipping cask for
shipment from the site. Underwater transport of spent fuel provides an economic and
transparent radiation shield, as well as reliable coolant for removal of decay heat.
The fuel handling system is divided into two areas: the reactor cavity, which is
flooded for refuelling; and the spent fuel storage pool, which is located in the fuel
building and is always accessible to plant personnel. The two areas are connected by a
fuel transfer system which carries the fuel through a fuel transfer tube between the
fuel building and the containment.
Spent fuel is removed from the rector vessel by a refuelling machine and is placed in
the fuel transfer system. In the spent fuel pool, the fuel is removed from the transfer
system and is placed into storage racks. After a suitable decay period, the fuel is able
to be removed from storage and loaded into a shipping cask for removal.
1.2-5
Primary coolant leakage from the reactor vessel closure seals, pressuirzer relief
valves, reactor coolant pump shaft seals, and other identified leakage sources are
piped to the reactor coolant drain tank or pressurizer relief tank. This decreases the
radioactivity released to the containment atmosphere and increases the sensitivity of
detecting unidentified leakage.
The nuclear design analyses and evaluation establish physical locations for control
rods and burnable poisons and physical parameters such as fuel enrichments and
boron concentration in the coolant. The nuclear design evaluation establish that the
reactor core has inherent characteristics which, together with corrective actions of the
reactor control and protective systems, provide adequate reactivity control.
The thermal-hydraulic design analyses and evaluation establish coolant flow

parameters which assure that adequate heat transfer is provided between the fuel clad
and the reactor coolant. The thermal design takes into account local variations in
dimensions, power generation, flow distribution, and mixing.
Instrumentation is provided in and out of the core to monitor the nuclear and thermal-
hydraulic performance of the reactor and to provide input to automatic control
functions.
1.2.3 Engineered Safety Features and Emergency Systems
Engineered Safety Features (ESF) provided for this plant have sufficient redundancy
of components and power sources such that, under the conditions of a LOCA or a loss
of secondary coolant accident, they can maintain the integrity of the containment and
keep the exposure of the public and plant personnel below the limits of US10CFR100.
ESF are summarized below.
1.2.3.1 Containment System
a. Containment Building
The containment is a prestressed reinforced concrete structure in the shape of a

cylinder with a torispherical dome and a flat foundation mat.
1.2-6
The cylindrical portion of the containment structure is prestressed by a post-
tensioning system consisting of horizontal tendons and vertical tendons.
The horizontal tendons are anchored at three external vertical buttresses equally
spaced around the containment structures.
The vertical tendons are anchored at the top of the dome stiffening ring girder and at
the ceiling of the stressing gallery in the foundation mat.
The dome is prestressed with crossed tendons that are anchored at the outer face of
the dome stiffening ring girder.
The foundation mat is conventionally reinforced concrete.
The interior surface of the containment shell is steel-lined for leak-tightness. A

protective layer of concrete covers the portion of the liner over the foundation mat.
The containment structure concrete provides biological shielding for normal and
accident conditions.
The containment building is designed so that the leakage to the environment will not
exceed 0.3% per day of the mass of gas contained in the containment, even in the
unlikely event of a LOCA. The containment provides sufficient free volume to
contain the energy released in the event of a LOCA. The internal structures and
compartment arrangement provide equipment missile protection and biological
shielding for maintenance personnel.
The containment building is designed for all credible loading combinations, including
normal loads, loads during LOCA, test loads, and loads due to adverse environmental
conditions. The following are considered:
-- loads caused by the pressure and temperature transients due to accident

conditions,
-- dead loads,
-- thermal loads,
1.2-7
AMENDMENT
-- live loads,
-- earthquake loads,
-- wind loads,
-- external pressure loads,
-- prestressing loads.
This containment building design pressure is greater than the peak pressure that
would occur as a result of the pipe break accidents analyzed in Chapter 6.
b. Containment Spray System (SCS)
The containment spray system comes into operation after an accident that causes an
increase in containment pressure and temperature (loss-of-coolant accident or
secondary steam line break accident).
The system consists of two redundant trains which disperse water throughout the
containment by spray headers in order to condense steam and reduce pressure and
temperature of the containment. In a first stage, it draws water from the refuelling
water storage tank. Sodium hydroxide is blended to this water to increase radioactive
iodine absorption. At a later stage, the accumulating sump water is used as spray
liquid after cooling.
c. Containment Isolation System (SCI)
The containment isolation system ensures containment leak tightness in case of an

accident which could cause release of radioactive fission products from the reactor
core.
Each line which penetrates the containment building and connects to

the reactor coolant system or connects directly to the containment
1.2-8
atmosphere is provided with two isolation valves, one inside containment and the
other outside containment, located as possible to the containment wall. The
containment isolation valve can be automatic valve or check valve locked closed
valve.
The other penetrating lines, i.e. those are connected to a closed system within the
containment, each has a minimum of one isolation valve located outside containment.
This valve is either automatic, locked closed or remote manual operated valve.
All containment isolation valves are capable of tight shutoff against gas leakage with
a pressure equal to the containment design pressure.
Automatic containment isolation valves are tripped closed by signals from the reactor
protection system. Automatic containment isolation of those systems which do not
perform a safeguard function occurs in two steps.
The first phase isolates all process lines penetrating the containment which has no
safety related function. During the first phase the safety injection system is actuated.
First phase isolation is initiated upon receipt of a safety injection signal.
The second phase isolates process lines penetrating containment which were not
isolated during the first phase but has indirectly safety related function.
The second phase containment isolation occurs along with containment spray and is
initiated upon receipt of a containment high-high pressure signal, i.e. containment
spray signals.
Steam line isolation is initiated upon receipt of one of the following signals.
high containment pressure
high steam flow coincident with low-low average reactor coolant

temperature,
1.2-9
high negative rate of steam line pressure,
low steam line pressure.
The safeguard systems may be isolated remote manually by the operator, should this
prove to be necessary under specific circumstances.
Normally closed motor-operated valves may be locked closed by locking the power
breaker in the off position or by electrical interlocks which prevent power from
being supplied to the valve. Operation of remote manual valves used for containment
isolation is under strict administrative control. Locked closed manual valves under
administrative control are locked in the closed position. Air-operated isolation valves
fail to the closed position on loss of air or control signal.
d. Containment Hydrogen Recombiner System (SHR)
The containment hydrogen recombiner system is used to remove the hydrogen

generated inside the containment by zirconium-water reaction, radio-logic
decomposition of water and corrosion of materials following a LOCA, to avoid
hydrogen explosion and combustion.
In order to accomplish this function, the system consists of two parallel, independent,
full capacity trains. Each train includes an air purifier, a blower, a hydrogen
recombiner, piping, valves and instrumentation and control.
In order to prevent local concentration of hydrogen in the containment, the

containment hydrogen mixing system can be used to mix containment atmosphere
during normal power operation and hot shutdown.
1.2.3.2 Emergency Core Cooling System (SECC)
T h e e me r g e n c y c o r e c o o l i n g s y s t e m i s u s e d t o i n j e c t b o r a t e d w a t e r
into the reactor coolant system (SRC) following a LOCA. The system
i n c l u d e s a h i g h p r e s s u r e s a f e t y i n j e c t i o n s u b s y s t e m, a l o w p r e s s u r e
1.2-10
AMENDMENT
safety injection subsystem which is a part of the residual heat removal system, an
accumulator injection subsystem and a boron injection system which is a part of the
chemical and volume control system. In boron injection system, two centrifugal
charging pumps and boron acid transfer pumps deliver borated water (7000 ppm B) to
SRC from the boric acid storage tanks. At the same time, the centrifugal charging
pumps also suck borated water from RWST.
In order to prevent fuel rod damage, to the extent that it would impair effective a
cooling of the core, this system is designed to cool the reactor and to provide
additional shutdown capability following initiation of the following accident
conditions:
a) pipe breaks or inadvertent opening of relief or safety valve in the SRC

which causes a discharge larger than that which can be made up by the
normal makeup system, up to an instantaneous circumferential rupture of
the largest pipe in the SRC.
b) rupture of a control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) causing a control rod

assembly ejection accident.
c) pipe breaks or inadvertent opening of relief or safety valve in the stem

system, up to an instantaneous circumferential rupture of the largest pipe
in the steam system.
d) a steam generator tube rupture.
e) a feedwater pipe rupture.
In the highly unlikely event of a LOCA, the high head safety injection pumps and the
low heat safety injection pumps take suction from the refuelling water storage tank
and inject borated water into the SRC. This provides cooling to limit core damage and
fission products release and ensures adequate shutdown margin. After the inventory
of borated water in the refuelling water storage tank is depleted, the borated water in
the containment sump is recirculated through the reactor core to provide long term
cooling of the core.
1.2.3.3 Auxiliary Feedwater System (SAF)
1.2-11
The auxiliary feedwater system is a safeguard system which ensures a sufficient water
supply to the steam generators for removal of decay heat from the core in case of:
-- total loss of normal feedwater system,
-- loss of reactor coolant, steam or feedwater line break.
The auxiliary feedwater system comprises an emergency feedwater storage tank and
two trains of pumps and feedwater lines with flow control.
Each train consists of one motor-driven pump and one diesel driven pump. The two
trains are perfectly separated.
The emergency feedwater storage tank contains sufficient volume of demineralized

water to remove the core decay heat, reactor coolant pump heat, and the heat stored in
the reactor coolant system. This water volume is calculated to permit:
-- keeping the unit in the hot shutdown state for two hours after reactor
trip,
-- Cooldown until the residual heat removal system (SRH) startup

conditions are reached, with a specified temperature gradient on the
SRC.
During emergency operation, the pumps take suction from the emergency feedwater
tank which is safety Class 3. A long term backup water supply can also be provided
from the demineralized water tank and the fire fighting water system.
1.2.3.4 Emergency Electrical System
a. Diesel Generator
The diesel generators are provided as emergency power. In the event

of complete loss of normal off-site power, the diesel generators are
available as on-site source of power to supply all of the equipment of
1.2-12
the engineered safety features. There are two independent diesel generator trains in
the plant. Each train consists one diesel generator which is designed to supply
adequate and reliable power for ESF under LOCA.
The diesel generator is designed to reach rated voltage, frequency, and able to accept
load within 12 seconds, and capable of carrying rated load according to loading
sequences within about 45 seconds after receipt of a start signal.
The fuel oil tank capacity of each diesel generator train can be operated for a
minimum of 14 days under the condition of rated load.
b. Emergency Lighting System
The emergency lighting system is supplied by 380V AC safety power systems. It

ensures sufficient illumination level in the areas used during shutdown or emergency
when the plant is disconnected from the external electric grid. These areas include the
main control room, emergency control room, passage ways, the control points in the
reactor building, nuclear auxiliary building, and the MV-LV switchboard rooms.
This system will be supplied by diesel generator sets when the loss of normal lighting
occurs. In normal operation, this system and normal lighting system are operating
together.
c. Safety Lighting System
The safety lighting systems provide a proper illumination for some important control
areas, main control room, emergency control room and important exits or entrances.
There are three kinds of power supply methods by storage batteries in the system
when loss of normal AC power supply occurs. The lighting for some important
control zones, main control room, emergency control room important exits is supplied
by automatically changing to DC 220V battery unit and will be returned to AC power
supply after restitution. The lighting for exit of main control room is supplied by
automatically changing to the self-contained Ni-Cd battery. The lighting for operation
in main control room is
1.2-13
directly energized from DC 220V battery.
1.2.3.5 Fire Protection System
Fire protection is achieved at the station through the application of fire prevention,
fire detection, and fire extinguishing methodologies.
Noncombustible and fire resistant materials are used in the plant construction to
minimize the potential for the occurrence of fires and to limit the flam intensity if a
fire should occur. Sufficient separation between the components of redundant safety
systems is provided to maintain the integrity of at least one of the systems so that the
plant may be shutdown safely. Where sufficient separation cannot be achieved, fire
barriers are used between the two safety systems to ensure system integrity.
The general automatic fire detection system is designed to ensure the rapid detection
of a fire, to indicate the location of the fire, and to trip the fire alarm. In general, the
fire detection system gives an alarm without automatically actuating the protection
system. The detector types include those which monitor temperature, flame, smoke,
combustion gases. The detector is chosen depending upon the condition of its
installation; accessibility and environment including hygrometry, temperature,
ionizing radiations, corrosive gases and the ventilation conditions of the room.
A central signaling panel located in the control room displays the information
collected by the fire detection system.
The fire extinguishing systems include mainly the following major features:
-- two aseismatic water storage tanks,
-- fire fighting pumps,
-- a fire fighting network,
-- water spray systems,
1.2-14
-- carbon dioxide fire protection systems,
-- portable extinguishers.
1.2.3.6 Main Control Room Habitability Ventilation System
The main control room habitability ventilation system is designed to maintain the
control room habitable during the postulated conditions resulting from a LOCA, a fuel
handling accident or any other occurrence generating high level airborne radioactivity
at the control room air intake.
The system normally operates in a recycle mode with fresh air makeup. The system is
comprised of two 100% capacity recycle air fans, heaters, filters, cooling coils and
humidifiers. In the event of airborne radioactive contamination of the plant site, fresh
air is taken in through the control room fresh air intakes and routed through a cleanup
unit comprised of prefilters, HEPA filters, and charcoal absorbers.
The air removal rate is about one half of the control room volume per hour with one
train in service and the outside environment contaminated. The temperature of the
control room is maintained within the defined limit.
Transfer from the normal operating mode to the emergency filtration mode for the
fresh air circuit is accomplished automatically by a radiation monitoring system
signal or manually from the control room. This transfer closes the direct fresh air
lines.
1.2.4 Instrumentation, Control and Electrical System
1.2.4.1 Instrumentation and Control System
The instrumentation and control system is used to:
-- monitor various process parameters and environment parameters of the

plant,
1.2-15
AMENDMENT
-- provide the operator with all the information required for the effective
and safe operation of the plant,
-- transfer various signals to the plant control system and the reactor
protection system, these systems maintain certain parameters at
setpoint value by the automatic operation of actuators and initiate
protective actions of the reactor protection system to maintain the plant
in safe shutdown conditions after an accident.
Major instrumentation and control systems are:
a) Reactor Protection System and engineered safety features actuation

system
The reactor protection system and engineered safety features actuation

system provides automatic actions to shut down the reactor whenever
plant conditions reach operational limits and to actuate the engineered
safety features in case when they are needed. The systems are
designed to:
-- automatically activate the appropriate systems, including the reactivity

control systems, so that the normal transient values do not cause fuel
safety limits to be exceeded.
-- detect accidental conditions and activate systems which are safety

related.
The reactor trip system and the engineered safety features actuation
system, is designed to provide redundant (one out of two, two out of
three, two out of four) instrumentation channels for each protection
parameter and two out of four logic circuit trains. These redundant
channels and trains are electrically isolated and physically separated.
Failure of a single protection system channel or system component
shall not prevent normal protective action of the systems.
b) Plant Control System
The plant control system is used to maintain certain parameters
1.2-16
at a setpoint value by the automatic operation of actuators so as to:
-- keep the plant in operation without reaching the operating limits which
would lead to abnormal operation and (or) unacceptable strain on the
equipment; these operating limits are usually indicated first by alarms and
then by the action of automatic logic control devices (steam dump
initiation, opening of safety valves, reactor or turbine trip, etc.),
-- ensure optimal yield by maintaining the parameters controlled as close as

possible to required values specified in the reference thermodynamic cycle,
-- ensure ramp load changes of + 5% per minute over the load range of 15%
to 100% of full power, and allows the plant to accept step load changes of +
10% over the load range of 15% to 100% of full power.
The plant control system comprises major subsystems: reactor power control
system, rod control system and control system interlock, steam generator
feedwater control system, steam dump control system, pressurizer pressure and
liquid level control system, and automatic control systems for conventional
island.
c) Instrumentation System
The instrumentation system includes in-core instrumentation system, nuclear

instrumentation system, control rod position indication system, process
instrumentation system, and seismic instrumentation system. The
instrumentation system provides all necessary informations for operation of
the plant, various signals for displaying, recording, controlling, protecting,
annunciating and alarm function of the equipment and systems operation. In
order to ensure the nuclear safety, redundant channels are electrically isolated
and physically separated.
d) Plant Radiation Monitoring System
1.2-17
The system is intended to check continuously that the operating radioactive
limits and the provisions taken at plant operation are sufficient to prevent
excess exposure of public and plant personnel. This system fulfills the
following functions:
-- protection of nuclear power plant personnel against high exposure to

radiation;
-- protection of the public against exposure to radiation;
-- indirect prevention - barrier monitoring;
-- automatic action to take provisions.
The system includes three subsystems: the process radiation monitoring system, the
effluent radiation monitoring system, and the in-plant area radiation monitoring
system. Some channels of the system which belong to the post accident monitoring
system (PAMS) are designed as Class 1E instrument channels.
1.2.4.2 Electrical Power Systems
a) Transmission and Generation System
Two 220kV lines shall be available for power transmission. The 220kV busbar
connection is of one breaker and a half type, the switchgear is the gas insulated
switchgear (GIS) type. The generator is connected with the main transformer through
a generator circuit breaker. The main transformer and one 220kV line are connected
with 220kV busbars through three 220kV circuit breakers, another 220kV line is
connected with 220kV busbars through two 220kV circuit breakers. Power from the
generator is stepped up from 20kV to the main grid voltage 220kV by the main
transformer, then transferred to the main grid.
b) Electric Power Distribution Systems
-- Classification of auxiliaries
1.2-18
The auxiliaries of the plant are classified according to the following
categories:
Non-permanent auxiliaries, which are necessary for normal operation

of the plant, but their load can be shed in case of an incident leading to
plant shutdown.
Permanent auxiliaries, providing functions which are necessary for

normal shutdown and plant maintenance during shutdown period.
Engineered safety features, providing the emergency using loads to

maintain the plant in a safe condition and bring it to a cold shutdown
in the event of an accident, and to prevent radioactivity leakage and
ensure the integrity of the reactor.
-- Electric Power Supply to Auxiliaries
The non-permanent and permanent auxiliaries are supplied:
Normally from the main generator when the plant is operating via the
stepdown transformer,
Alternatively from the 220kV offsite power source by back feeding to

the main transformer and via the stepdown transformer, or from
another 132kV standby offsite power source via the auxiliary
transformer when the plant is shutdown.
Engineered safety features are supplied via safety busbars.
In normal condition, the safety busbars are supplied from stepdown

transformer or auxiliary transformer;
In the event of loss of both offsite sources, they are supplied by diesel
generator sets.
The safety busbars and the diesel generators each are totally separated
into two trains A and B, which supply the
1.2-19
engineered safety features of the plant. Each diesel generator is
capable of supplying required electrical loads for a simultaneous
LOCA and loss of offsite power.
1.2.5 Turbine and Auxiliaries
The turbine is a three cylinder, tandem compound, quadruple exhaust, 3000-rpm,

condensing turbine. There are two moisture separator-reheaters. The turbine-generator
has a maximum guaranteed rating of 325 MWe gross at 1906.64t/h steam flow with
inlet steam conditions of 5.34MPa(a), 0.5% moisture, exhausting at 0.00574MPa(a),
and zero percent makeup. There are six stages of feedwater heating.
The turbine is equipped with a digital electro-hydraulic control system which uses a
solid-state electronic controller and a high-pressure fluid system to control
valve movement.
The condenser is of the surface, twin pass type. It is of a twin shell construction.
There are two deaerators that utilize extraction steam from the low pressure turbines,
five low pressure feedwater heaters that utilize extraction steam from the low pressure
turbines, three high pressure heaters that utilize extraction and exhaust steam from the
high pressure turbine, three one-half-sized condensate pumps and condensate booster
pumps, and three one-half-sized feedwater pumps. Heaters drains from the three high
pressure feedwater heaters are cascaded to the deaerator, drains from the five low
pressure heaters are cascaded to the condenser.
1.2-20
1.2.6 Fuel Handling and Storage Systems
The reactor is refueled with equipment which handles spent fuel under water for the
entire time from leaving the reactor vessel until it is placed in a cask for shipment.
Underwater transfer of spent fuel provides an economic and transparent radiation
shield, as well as reliable coolant for removal of decay heat.
The fuel handling and storage equipment is located in three main areas as delineated
below.
The reactor cavity is located inside the containment, above the reactor, and is
accessible from the operating floor. It is filled with borated water during reactor
shutdown, for refueling. The cavity is connected to the fuel building via a fuel transfer
compartment and fuel transfer tube. Refuelling operations are carried out by making
use of the following equipment.
-- the reactor handling equipment,
-- a fuel manipulator crane for removal, insertion and rearranging of fuel
assemblies,
-- Changing fixtures for removing the rod cluster control assembly or the
thimble plug assembly from a spent fuel assembly and placing it in a

new fuel assembly,
-- part of the fuel transfer system.
The spent fuel storage area is located inside the fuel storage building. It comprises of
two spent fuel storage pools, a cask loading pit and a cask cleaning pit. The spent fuel
storage pools is continuously kept full of water to cool the spent fuel assemblies
stored therein and to make the area accessible to the operating personnel. The other
pits are only filled with water for refuelling or shipping operations. The following
equipment is provided in this area:
-- part of the fuel transfer system,
1.2-21
-- a spent fuel pool bridge for handling operations in the spent fuel
storage area,
-- spent fuel storage racks,
-- shipping device,
-- a fuel elevator for lowering new fuel to the bottom of the spent fuel
pool where it is then picked up by the spent fuel pool bridge,
-- manual tools.
The new fuel storage area is also located in the fuel building and receives the new fuel
containers. It is comprised of the following facilities:
-- the fuel building bridge crane and the spent fuel pool bridge for
handling new fuel containers, storing new fuel assemblies and
transferring them to the new fuel elevator,
-- new fuel elevator,
-- new fuel examination platform, and
-- manual tools.
The stainless steel lined, reinforced concrete fuel storage pool provides storage for
spent fuel assemblies. These assemblies are stored in vertical racks so spaced as to
preclude criticality in a non-borated cooling water environment. Control of the fuel
storage pool water temperature during normal operation is accomplished by
circulating the fuel pool water through a heat exchanger cooled by the component
cooling water system. Purification and clarification of the fuel storage pool water is
by the use of a filter, strainers, and an ion exchanger.
1.2.7 Cooling Water, Ventilation, and Other Auxiliary Systems
1.2.7.1 Cooling Water Systems
1.2-22
The cooling water systems in operation at the plant include the component cooling
water system (SCW), the essential service water system; the spent fuel pool cooling
and clean-up system (SFP); the essential chilled water systems of the nuclear island;
circulating water system and the closed cycle cooling water system of the
conventional island.
The closed loop component cooling water (SCW) removes heat from various nuclear
equipment in particular safety-related systems and systems from which potential
leakage of radioactive products could occur. The SCW system transfers this heat to
the ultimate heat sink via the essential service water system. The SCW thus provides a
barrier between the potentially radioactive water and the environment.
The component cooling water system consists of two independent, safety-related and
redundant loops. Each loop supplies cooling water to safety-related equipment
necessary in the case of an accident. It also supplies to the redundant component of
the residual heat removal system.
A cooling water distribution network to the non-essential-safety-related equipment is

fed by either redundant loop and be isolated from the safety-related part of the system
by motorized valves.
The essential service water system serves as the heat sink for the component cooling
water system and other safety-related systems. It is capable of providing a sufficient
supply of cooling water under all postulated normal and accidental plant operating
modes. The system is composed of two independent, redundant trains. As a part of the
system, the ultimate heat sink cooling tower and water storage tank system is
comprised of two redundant trains, each train is composed of three cooling towers and
a water storage tank (pool). One train guarantees a sufficient cooling capacity for
dissipating the heat rejected from the component cooling water system, the essential
chilled water system and emergency diesel generator system. This system is started
manually in case of the water source of the intake channel is not available.
The spent fuel pool cooling and clean-up system (SFP) ensures cooling,
1.2-23
purification, filling and draining functions.
This is accomplished by:
-- removal of the residual decay heat released by spent fuel assemblies,
-- purification of the spent fuel pool water, eliminating corrosion and

fission products,
-- maintaining an adequate water level in the spent fuel pool.
The SFP system can also be used for purification of the reactor cavity water during
refueling operation.
Moreover, the refueling water storage tank is designed to supply borated water to
the containment spray and safety injection systems during the injection phase
following a LOCA.
The other cooling water systems are necessary for proper functioning of the plant.
1.2.7.2 Ventilation Systems
Ventilation systems are provided for normal plant operation and for accidents.
These ventilation systems are designed to provide suitable environments for

equipment and personnel. Where appropriate, ventilation zones are arranged within
buildings to promote flow of air from clean areas to areas of potentially greater
radioactive contamination prior to final exhaust.
The ventilation of the reactor building is composed of several systems.
The containment air cooling system removes heat released by equipment in

reactor building, except the reactor pit which is cooled by an independent
ventilation system, to maintain suitable ambient temperature for
equipment operation.
1.2-24
The containment air cleanup system reduces the air concentration in radioactive
iodine and particulates in order to allow limited access during reactor
operation periods.
The containment purge ventilation system operates during reactor shutdown and
maintains adequate ambient conditions. A part of the containment purge system
operates during normal conditions whenever necessary. It purges the containment
atmosphere and can balance the interior and exterior pressure of the containment.
The ventilation of the other buildings in the Nuclear Island is described below.
The nuclear auxiliary building ventilation system is designed to maintain ambient

temperature and airborne radioactivity to an acceptable level and to limit the
radio-activity released through the stack, and to maintain a slight underpressure
in the nuclear auxiliary building with respect to outside atmosphere. It comprises
the primary nuclear auxiliary building ventilation system (VPA), the secondary
nuclear auxiliary building ventilation system (VSA), the nuclear auxiliary
building cooler system (VBC) and the auxiliary feedwater pump building
ventilation system (VAF). The VPA system provides ventilation for safety-
related features equipment rooms. The VSA system provides ventilation for other
rooms of the nuclear auxiliary building. The VBC system is used to provide air
cooling to remove heat rejected by engineered safety features and other
equipment. The VAF system serves the auxiliary feedwater electric pump rooms
and the diesel pump rooms to remove the heat from the pump rooms.
The fuel storage building ventilation system is designed to maintain prescribed

ambient condition for equipment and personnel access, to maintain a slight
underpressure in fuel building with respect to adjacent areas or outside
atmosphere, and to clean iodine in exhaust air in fuel handling hall following a
fuel handling accident to limit airborne activity release thus to reduce the
contamination of environment by exhaust air.
1.2-25
The electrical building ventilation and air conditioning system maintains
adequate temperature, humidity and air removal conditions in the electrical
rooms. This system is comprised of the main control room habitability ventilation
system (VCH), the electrical building ventilation system (VER), the electrical
building cooler system (VEC) and the electrical building smoke exhaust system
(VES).
The VCH system serves main control room, technical support centre, computer room,
ventilation equipment room, kitchen, toilets, etc. to maintain temperature and
humidity of these habitability areas within prescribed limits and to provide
habitability of the area under accident conditions. The VER system serves switchgear
room, cable spreading area, battery room, inverter room, rod control device room,
remote shutdown control room, communication room, electrical power supply room
and others. The system is used to maintain adequate temperature and humidity and
provide exhaust ventilation in a recycle mode with fresh air makeup. The VEC system
is designed to remove the heat rejected from the CRDM power supply unit and to
maintain prescribed ambient temperature of the CRDM power supply room. The VES
system is designed to evacuate the smoke produced in case of an electrical fire.
The emergency diesel generator building ventilation system is designed to

remove the heat rejected by diesel generator and to maintain suitable ambient
temperature for equipment operation.
The essential service water pumping station ventilation system maintains

temperatures compatible with operating requirements of the essential service
water pumps.
1.2.7.3 Other Auxiliary Systems
The chemical and volume control system (SCV) is designed to provide a programmed
water level in the pressurizer and the correct injection flow to the reactor coolant
pump seals. In addition, the SCV controls water chemistry, activity level,
concentration of soluble chemical neutron absorber, and makeup of the reactor
coolant. The SCV also provides for safety injection.
1.2-26
The Residual Heat Removal System (SRH) is designed to remove the residual heat
from the reactor core and sensible heat from the reactor coolant system at a controlled
rate during the second phase (stage B) of normal plant cold shutdown. The system
reduces the reactor coolant temperature to the cold shutdown temperature, or
refueling shutdown temperature. Following a loss of coolant accident in the reactor
coolant system, a major portion of this SRH system is used as low pressure safety
injection subsystem to inject borated water from the refueling water storage tank or
containment re-circulating sump to the reactor core.
The boron recycle system receives and recycles reactor coolant effluent for reuse of
the boric acid and makeup water. The system decontaminates the effluent by means of
demineralization and gas stripping, and uses evaporation to separate and recover the
boric acid and makeup water.
The compressed air system provides compressed air to service and instrument
compressed air subsystems. A supply of dry, oil-free instrument air is provided for
pneumatic instrument air controls and valve operators. A supply of service air is
provided for pneumatic tools and other air operated equipment. These compressed air
subsystems are required for normal plant operation and for startup and shutdown
maintenance purposes but is not required for the safe shutdown of the plant.
The compressed air system is provided with an emergency instrument compressed air
subsystem which supplies compressed air to pneumatic instrument air controls and
valve operators of the safety-related systems. The emergency instrument compressed
air subsystem is supplied by main compressor during normal condition and by
emergency compressor under the event of loss of off-site power.
Sampling system is provided with centralized sampling facilities and local devices for
the reactor coolant system, various auxiliary systems and certain secondary systems.
Process sampling is used for determining chemical and radiochemical conditions of
various fluids used in the plant.
1.2-27
Water supply and drainage systems for reactor building, nuclear auxiliary building,
fuel storage building, electrical building, emergency diesel generator building are
designed to supply domestic water, roof tank water for use of staff members and
washing of sanitary utensils in the lavatory, service water, reused water, and to collect
various drains including sanitary sewage, storm water, production wastewater, acid-
base wastewater and special wastewater, to discharge into the production drainage
and storm water yard pipe network system.
1.2.8 Radioactive Waste Treatment Systems
The radioactive waste treatment systems provide all equipment necessary to collect,
process, monitor, and dispose radioactive liquid, gaseous, and solid wastes that are
produced during reactor operation.
The design objectives of the liquid waste treatment system are to collect and process
radioactive liquid waste generated during plant operation and to reduce radioactivity
and chemical contents to levels acceptable for discharge or plant recycle.
Prior to discharge, equipment is provided in the liquid waste treatment system, for
filtering, evaporating, and demineralization the liquid as required. The treated water
from the filters or demineralizers or the evaporator distillate may be discharged, if it
is within acceptable limits.
The liquid waste treatment system provides holdup capacity for liquid waste produced
by the plant. Two clean drain holdup tanks are used to collect clean drain and to
holdup the liquid waste for 100 days decay, two process drain storage tanks and two
floor drain holdup tanks are sued to collect process drain liquid waste and floor drains
separately.
The evaporation concentrates and the spent demineralization resins produced

during plant normal operation and maintenance are collected, stored, and disposed
by the radioactive waste solidification system. The liquid waste concentrate will be
solidified with cement to produce the solidified products with certain physical and
chemical properties for storage and shipping. The spent resins will be collected in
high or low level spent resin holdup tanks respectively which are sized to accept
10 years products of resin wastes. The solidified products and the
1.2-28
high -level activity drummed waste produced during maintenance are stored in the
solidified product storage building. Various low level solid radwaste is stored in the
low-level waste storage building. The duration of storage is 10 years.
The gaseous waste treatment system provides storage of the radioactive hydrogenated
effluent until they decay down to a value allowable for discharge to the environment.
Hydrogenous waste is routed by waste gas collection header to a buffer tank and
delivered by compressor to decay tanks for decay. The waste gas released from the
decay tanks is controlled by pressure reducing valves in the discharge line, then the
gas passes through the iodine filter of ventilation system and is discharged to the
environment through the plant stack.
1.2-29
AMENDMENT
1.2.9 Plant Arrangement and Structures
The major structures of the plant include a reactor building, a nuclear auxiliary
building, a fuel storage building, and electrical building, a turbine generator building,
a liquid radwaste solidification building, two solid radwaste storage building and
administration and service buildings. General layout of the plant and interior
arrangement of components are shown in Figures 1.2-2 through 1.2-41.
The nuclear island consisted of reactor building, nuclear auxiliary building, fuel
storage building, electrical building and other buildings are constructed on a common
base approximately square foundation mat. The reactor building is located at the
center of the nuclear island, and nuclear auxiliary buildings as well as other buildings
are arranged around the reactor building. The turbine generator building is arranged
nearby the electrical building of the nuclear island.
For purpose of design and analysis, structures are divided in two categories, i.e.
seismic category category-1 and non-seismic category.
1.2-30
1.3 COMPARISON TABLES
1.3.1 Comparisons with Similar Facility Designs
This subsection highlights the principal differences and similarities between the major
design features of this facility and Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant (QNPP). In
Table 1.3-1 and 1.3-2, comparisons with Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant are listed.
Table 1.3-1 documents the major similarities and differences between CHASNUPP-1
and QNPP. In Table 1.3-2, the improvements of CHASNUPP-1 from QNPP have
been listed.
1.3.2 Comparison of Final and Preliminary Designs
Table 1.3-3 provides a listing of significant differences between the final design and
preliminary design of the facility which have occurred since the submittal of the
PSAR.
1.3-1
Table 1.3-1
CHASNUPP-1 COMPARISON WITH SIMILAR FACILITY QNPP DESIGNS
(Sheet 1 of 44)
Chapter/ System/Parameter CHASNUPP-1 QNPP

Section
4 REACTOR
4.1 CORE MECHANICAL DESIGN
Fuel Assemblies RCC canless 15 x 15 RCC canless 15 x 15
Number of fuel assemblies 121 121
UO2 rods per assembly 204 204
Rod pitch (mm) 13.3 13.3
Overall dimensions (mm) 199.3 x 199.3 199.3 x 199.3
Fuel weight (as UO2 ) (kg) 336.74 336.74
Number of grids per assembly 8 8
Loading technique 3-region 3-region
non-uniform non-uniform
AMENDMENT
1.3-2
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 2 of 44)
Chapter / System/Parameter CHASNUPP-1 QNPP

Section
Fuel rods
Number 24684 24684
Outside diameter (mm) 10.0 10.0
Diametral gap (mm) 0.17 0.17
Clad thickness (mm) 0.70 0.70
Clad material Zircaloy-4 Zircaloy-4
Fuel pellets
* Material UO2 sintered UO2 sintered
* Density (% of theoretical) 95 95
* Diameter (mm) 8.43 8.43
* Length (mm) 10 10
AMENDMENT
1.3-3
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 3 of 44)

Section
Rod Cluster Control Assemblies Ag-In-Cd Ag-In-Cd
Neutron absorber 0Cr 18 Ni 11Ti 0Cr 18 Ni 11Ti
Cladding material 321 S.S. 321 S.S.
Clad thickness (mm) 0.5 0.5
Number of clusters 37 37
Number of absorber rods per cluster 20 20
4.1 CORE STRUCTURE

Core Barrel, ID/ OD (mm) 2800 / 2930 2800 / 2930
Structural Characteristics
Core diameter (equivalent) (m) 2.486 2.486
AMENDMENT
1.3-4
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 4 of 44)

Section
Core height (active fuel) (m) 2.90 2.90
Reflector thickness and composition
Top-water plus steel (cm) 26 26
Bottom-water plus Steel (cm) ~ 26 ~ 26
Side-water plus Steel (cm) ~ 40 ~ 40
H2O / U molecular ratio core lattice (cold) 2.065 2.065
Feed enrichment (w / o)
Region 1 2.40 2.40
Region 2 2.67 2.67
Region 3 3.00 3.00
AMENDMENT
1.3-5
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 5 of 44)

Section
THERMAL AND HYDRAULIC DESIGN
4.1
Reactor Core Heat Ouput (MWt) 998.6 966.0
Heat Generated in Fuel (%) 97.4 97.4
System Pressure, Nominal (Mpa) 15.2 15.2
System Pressure, Minimum Steady-State (Mpa) 15.1 15.1
Minimum DNBR at Nominal Condition 2.595 2.16
Minimum DNBR for Design Transients >1.45 >1.42
Coolant flow
* Total thermal flow rate (t/h) 24000 24000
* Effective flow rate for heat transfer (t/h) 22800 22800
* Effective flow area for heat transfer (m2) 2.584 2.466
AMENDMENT
1.3-6
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 6 of 44)

Section
* Average velocity along fuel rods, m/s 3.40 3.40
* Average mass velocity 106 kg/h.m2 8.85 8.85
Coolant Temperature (oC)
* Nominal inlet 288.5 288.8
* Average rise in vessel 27.0 26.4
* Average rise in core 27.9 27.0
* Average in core 302.5 302.3
* Average in vessel 302 302
Heat transfer
* Active heat transfer surface area (m2) 2249 2249
AMENDMENT
1.3-7
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 7 of 44)

Section
Average heat flux (w/cm2) 43.3 41.8
Maximum heat flux for normal operation 116.8 129.4
(w/cm2)
Average linear power (w/cm) 135.9 131
Peak liner power for normal operation (w/cm) 366.9 397
Peak liner resulting from over-power transients 432.9 460
operating error (assuming a maximum over-
power of 118%) (w/cm)
Heat flux hot channel factor (FQ) 2.70 3.02
Peak linear power for prevention of centerline >590 >590
melt (w/cm)
Power density (kW per liter of core) 70.9 68.6
Specific power (kW per kg Uranium) 27.8 26.9
Peak fuel center temperature at peak linear 2590 2590
power for prevention of centerline melt (oC)
AMENDMENT
1.3-8
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 8 of 44)

Section
5 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM AND

CONNECTED SYSTEMS
5.1 RCS DESIGN AND OPERATING
PARAMETERS
Plant Design Life (yr.) 40 30
Nominal Operating Pressure (MPa) 15.2 15.2
Total System Volume Including Pressurizer 165.5 165.5
and Surge Line (m3)
System Liquid Volume, Including Pressurizer 148.5 148.5
Water at
Maximum Guaranteed Power (m3)
Pressurizer Spray Rate, Maximum (t/h) 40 40
Pressurizer Heater Capacity (kW) 1350 1350
AMENDMENT
1.3-9
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 9 of 44)

Section
5.1 RCS THERMAL AND HYDRAULIC DATA
NSSS power (MWt) 1002 969
Thermal design flows (m3/h) 16100 x 2 16100 x 2
Total reactor flow (t/h) 24000 24000
Best estimate flows (m3/h) 16800 x 2 16800 x 2
Mechanical design flows (m3/h) 17900 x 2 17900 x 2
Temperature, oC
Reactor vessel outlet 315.5 315.2
Reactor vessel inlet 288.5 288.8
Steam generator outlet 288.5 288.8
Steam generator inlet 272.68 272.6
AMENDMENT
1.3-10
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 10 of 44)

Section
Feedwater Temperature (oC) 220 216
Steam Pressure (MPa) 5.54 5.2
Total Steam Flow (t/h) 1010 x 2 935.5 x 2
System Pressure Drops (MPa)
Reactor Vessel P 0.1649 0.1649
Steam Generator P 0.229 0.229
Piping P 0.0407 0.0407
Pump Head (m) 60 60
5.1 RCS DESIGN PRESSURE SETTINGS (MPa)

Hydrostatic Test Pressure 21.5 21.5
Design Pressure 17.2 17.16
AMENDMENT
1.3-11
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 11 of 44)

Section
Safety Valves (begin to open) 17.2 17.16
High Pressure Reactor Trip 16.3 16.3
High Pressure Alarm 16.0 16.0
Power Relief Valves 16.1 16.1
Pressurizer Spray Valves (full open) 15.8 15.8
Pressurizer Spray Valves (begin to open) 15.4 15.4
Proportional Heater, (begin to operate) 15.3 15.3
Operating Pressure 15.2 15.2
Proportional Heater (full open) 15.0 15.0
Backup Heater On 14.9 14.9
Backup Heater Off 15.0 15.0
Low Pressure Reactor Trip 13.0 12.75
AMENDMENT
1.3-12
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 12 of 44)

Section
5.3 REACTOR VESSEL DESIGN
Design / Operating Pressure (MPa) 17.16 / 15.20 17.16 / 15.20
Design Temperature (oC) 350 350
Overall Height of Vessel and Closure Head 10.705 10.705

(bottom head outside diameter to top of control rod
mechanism adapter ) (m)
Maximum Diameter (m) 5.596 5.596

5.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP DESIGN
Unit Design Pressure (MPa) 17.2 17.2
Unit Design Temperature (oC) 350 350
Unit Overall Height (m) 9.335 9.335
Capacity (m3/h per RCP) 16800 16100
AMENDMENT
1.3-13
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 13 of 44)

Section
Maximum Continuous Cooling water Inlet 40.5 40.5
Temperature (oC)
Suction Temperature (oC) 288.5 289
Discharge Nozzle (mm) 840x70 840x70
Suction Nozzle (mm) 856x78 856x78
Rated Speed (rpm) 1490 1488
Weight (water) (kg) 2.5 x 103 2.5 x 103
Weight (dry) (kg) ~9 x 104 ~8.8 x 104
Pump Moment of Inertia (maximum) (kg.m2) 1750 1750
Motor
Power (kW) 4500 4500
Voltage (volts) 6000 6000
Phase 3 3
AMENDMENT
1.3-14
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 14 of 44)

Section
Frequency (Hz) 50 50
5.4.2 STEAM GENERATOR DESIGN
Design Pressure, Reactor Coolant Side (MPa) 17.16 17.16
Design Pressure, Steam Side (MPa) 7.55 7.55
Design Temperature, Reactor Coolant Side (oC) 350 350
Design Temperature, Steam Side (oC) 320 320
Total Heat Transfer Surface Area (each) (m2) 3088.67 3088.67
Maximum Moisture Carryover (wt %) < 0.25 < 0.25
Overall Height (m) 17.678 17.278
Number of U-Tubes 2977 2977
U-Tube Outer Diameter (mm) 22 22
AMENDMENT
1.3-15
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 15 of 44)

Section
Tube Wall Thickness, Nominal (mm) 1.2 1.2
Number of Manways 4 4
Inside Diameter of Manways, (m) 0.457 0.457
Design Fouling Factor (m2.oC/w) 860 860
5.4.3 REACTOR COOLANT PIPING DESIGN

Inside Diameter (mm) 700 700
Nominal wall thickness, (mm) 70 70
Design/operating pressure (MPa) 17.16 / 15.2 17.16 / 15.2
AMENDMENT
1.3-16
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 16 of 44)

Section
5.4.7 RHRS DESIGN BASES
Residual Heat Removal System Startup 4 hours after reactor 4 hours after reactor
shutdown shutdown
Reactor Coolant System Initial Pressure (MPa) 2.94 2.94
Reactor Coolant System Initial Temperature < 180 < 180
(oC)
Cooldown time, after initiation of RHRS 16 16
Operation (hrs)
Reactor coolant system temperature at end of 93.3 93.3
5.4.7 Cooldown (oC)
RHRS COMPONENTS DESIGN 2 2

Residual Heat Removal Pump Horizontal, Horizontal,
Number Centrifugal Centrifugal
Type 4.51 4.51
Design pressure (MPa)
AMENDMENT
1.3-17
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 17 of 44)

Section
Design temperature (oC) 200 200
Design Flow (m3/h) 450 450
Design Head (mH2O) 80 80
RHR Heat Exchanger
Number 2 2
Design Heat Removal Capacity (kJ/h) 16.83 x 106 16.83 x 106
CHASNUPP-1 QNPP
Tube-side Shell-side Tube-side Shell-side
Design Pressures (MPa) 4.51 0.98 4.51 0.83
Design temperatures (oC) 180 95 180 95
Design flow (m3/h) 450 430 450 405
Inlet temperatures (oC) 60 35 60 32
Outlet temperatures (oC) 50.9 45 50.9 42
Material Austenitic CS Austenitic CS
SS SS
* Fluid Reactor Component Reactor Compone
Coolant Cooling Coolant nt
water
Cooling
water
AMENDMENT
1.3-18
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 18 of 44)

Section
5.4.10 PRESSURIZER DESIGN
Design Pressure (MPa) 17.2 17.16
Surge Line Nozzle Diameter (mm) 273 x 28 273 x 28
Internal Volume (m3) 35 35
5.4.11 PRESSURIZER RELIEF TANK DESIGN
Design Pressure (MPa) 0.69 0.69
Rupture Disc Release Pressure (MPa) 0.69 0.69
Total Rupture Disc Relief Capacity (t/h) 2 x 160 2 x 160
Pressurizer Relief Tank Volume (m3) 32 32
AMENDMENT
1.3-19
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 19 of 44)

Section
6 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES

6.2.1 CONTAINMENT DESIGN
Containment type Steel-lined
post-tensioned
Steel-lined
post-tensioned
pre-stressed concrete pre-stressed concrete
cylinder, hemispherical cylinder, hemispherical
dome roof dome roof
Leakage Rate (% / day) 0.30 0.30
Design Pressure (MPa (g)) 0.26 0.26
Free Volume (m3) >49000 >49000
Diameter /Height (m) 36/57.5 36/62.5
Thickness of Base Slab (m) 3.35 to 10.55 2.5 to 8.0
AMENDMENT
1.3-20
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 20 of 44)

Section
Containment Spray Pump
Number 2 2
Type Horizontal, Horizontal,
Centrifugal Centrifugal
Capacity (m3/h) 500 360
Spray Additive NaOH NaOH
ECCS (SIS) DESIGN

High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps
Number 4 4
Type Horizontal, Horizontal, centrifugal
Centrifugal
Design pressure (MPa) 13.5 13.5
AMENDMENT
1.3-21
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 21 of 44)

Section
Design flow rate (m3/h) 75 75
Maximum flow rate (m3/h) 120 120
Design head (mH2O) 800 800
Design discharge head at shutoff (mH2O) 1060 1060
RHR Pumps
(Covered in 5.4.7 above)
RHR Heat Exchangers
(Covered in 5.4.7 above)
Accumulator design
Number 2 4
AMENDMENT
1.3-22
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 22 of 44)

Section
Normal operating pressure (MPa) 5.0 5.0
Total volume (m3) 56.6 60.0
Water volume at operating conditions (m3) 35.4 40.0
Normal Boron concentration (ppm B) 2000 2400
Boron Storage Tank

Number 2 2
Total volume (m3) 50 46
Nominal boric acid concentration (ppm B) 7000 7000
AMENDMENT
1.3-23
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 23 of 44)

Section
Charging Pumps
Number 2 2
Type Horizontal, Vertical, Centrifugal
Centrifugal
Design pressure (MPa) 22 20.6
Design flow rate (m3/h) 25 25
Maximum flow rate (m3/h) 50 ~ 60 55
Design head (mH2O) 1820 1770
AMENDMENT
1.3-24
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 24 of 44)

Section
Refueling Water Storage Tank
Number 1 1
Total volume (m3) 1888 1850
Water volume (m3) 1660 1750
Boric acid concentration (ppm B) 2000 2400
7 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL Output signal of threshold for To use CMOS

reactor protection system put
to use photoelectrical coupling isolating
isolating for for QNPP.
CHASNUPP-1.
AMENDMENT
1.3-25
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 25 of 44)

Section
8 ELECTRIC POWER
8.2 OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM

Number of Offsite Power Sources 2 2
Capacity 220kV(one), 220kV(each)
132kV(one)
8.3 ONSITE POWER SYSTEM

Main Generator
Type 3-Phase 3-Phase
Rated output (MW) 310 at 20kV 310 at 20kV
Max. Continuous output (MW) 325 325
AMENDMENT
1.3-26
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 26 of 44)

Section
Main Transformer
Type 3-Phase, outdoor 3-Phase, outdoor
Capacity (MVA) 360 360
Environment temperature (oC) 50 50
Cooling Forced oil cooled Forced oil cooled
Voltage ratio 20 / 220 18 / 220
Step-down Transformer
split winding split winding
AMENDMENT
1.3-27
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 27 of 44)

Section
Voltage ratio 20 / 6.3 18 / 6.3
Auxiliary Transformer
Voltage ratio 132 / 6.3 220 / 6.3
Generator Circuit Breaker Yes No(Load break switch

instead)
Breaker at Output of Transformer No Yes
AMENDMENT
1.3-28
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 28 of 44)

Section
Diesel Generator
Number 3 3
Capacity (kW) 3200 2000
Rated voltage (kV) 6.3 6.3
Fuel oil storage capacity, per diesel 14 7
operating at full power (days)
9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS
9.1 FUEL STORAGE AND HANDLING

Spent Fuel Pool Storage Capacity 726 721
(Fuel Assemblies)
(One core = 121 fuel assemblies)
AMENDMENT
1.3-29
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 29 of 44)

Section
Spent Fuel Pools Water Volume (m3) 600x2 560x2
Normal Boron Concentration of Sent Fuel Pool 2000 2400
Water (ppm)
Spent Fuel Pool Water Temperature (oC) 50 55
9.2 WATER SYSTEMS

SCW Design
Essential service wager supply temperature 32 25
(oC)
Component cooling water surge tank
- Number 2 1
- Design pressure (MPa) 0.25 0.345
- Design temperature (oC) 95 95
- Total volume (m3) ~7 5
AMENDMENT
1.3-30
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 30 of 44)

Section
Component cooling water heat exchanger
- Number 4 3
- Design pressure (MPa) 1.0 (both shell & tube side) 1.0 (both shell & tube side)
- Design temperature (oC) 95(both shell & tube side) 95(both shell & tube side)
- Design heat transfer (KJ/h) 2.09107 2.72107
Component cooling water pumps
- Number 4 4
- Type Horizontal Horizontal
- Design flow rate (m3/h) 972 790
- Design head (mH2O) 50 58
AMENDMENT
1.3-31
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 31 of 44)

Section
Ultimate Heat Sink
Number 2(C.J. Link Canal + Cooling 1 (Sea)
Towers & Water Storage
Tanks)
Number of cooling towers(two trains) 3 (each train) -
Cooling capacity of each tower (m3/h) 700 -

Capacity of continuous water supply (days) 30 -
9.3 PROCESS AUXILIARIES

CVCS Design
Seal water supply flow rate (m3/h) 4.0 4.0
Seal water return flow rate (m3/h) 1.8 1.8
AMENDMENT
1.3-32
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 32 of 44)

Section
Letdown flow:
- Normal (t / h) 11.2 11.2
- Maximum (t / h) 19.0 19.0
Charging flow (excludes seal water):
- Normal (t / h) 9.0 9.0
- Maximum (t / h) 16.8 16.8
Temperature of letdown flow (oC) 288.5 288.5
Temperature of charging flow (oC) 270 270
Temperature of effluent directed to 45 45
SBR(oC)
Centrifugal charging pump by pass flow, 7.0 7.0
each (m3/h)
AMENDMENT
1.3-33
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 33 of 44)

Section
SBR Design (Pump & Tanks of SBR)
Feed pump
- Number 2 2
- Design pressure (MPa) 1 1
- Design flow rate (m3/h) 5 4.36
- Design head (mH2O) 58.4 58.4
Recirculating pump:
- Number 1 1
- Design flow rate (m3/h) 56 52.5
AMENDMENT
1.3-34
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 34 of 44)

Section
Monitor tank pump:
- Number 2 2
- Design flow rate (m3/h) 13.5 13.5
Holdup tank
- Number 3 3
- Capacity (m3) 200 200
AMENDMENT
1.3-35
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 35 of 44)

Section
Monitor tank
- Number 2 2
- Capacity (m3) 24 28
9.5 OTHER AUXILIARIES

Plant Fire Protection
Fire fighting water pools 2 2
Capacity of each pool (m3) 1200 600
Fire fighting pump stations 2 2
AMENDMENT
1.3-36
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 36 of 44)

Section
Number of pumps (each station) 2 2
(Further details of fire protection system
are available in section 9.5.1 of FSAR)
10 STEAM & POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM
10.2 TURBINE-GENERATOR
Turbine
Type Indoor, tandem Indoor, tandem compound
compound
Saturated steam Saturated steam
Number of flows 4(2HP and 2LP) 4(2HP and 2LP)
Max. Output (at 21oC cooling water 325 330(18oC)
temperature (MWe)
AMENDMENT
1.3-37
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 37 of 44)

Section
Speed (rpm) 3000 3000
Steam pressure at main stop valve inlet 5.34 5.34
(MPa)
Exhaust pressure at rated output (MPa) 0.00574 0.00490
Steam temperature at main stop valve inlet 268 268
(oC)
Final feed water temperature (oC) 220 221.5
Last blade height (mm) 869 869
Generator
Rated output (MWe) 325 310
Generator rating (MVA) 388 344
Power factor 0.85 0.85
Voltage (kV) 20 18
Speed (rpm) 3000 3000
AMENDMENT
1.3-38
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 38 of 44)

Section
Cooling of generator stator and rotor Water Water
winding
Cooling of stator core Air Air
MSR Design
Number 2 2
Type Chevron plate Chevron plate
Dimensions (m) 14.53.94.3 -
Number of reheater stages 2 2
10.3 MAIN STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM

Main Steam Piping
Number 2 2
AMENDMENT
1.3-39
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 39 of 44)

Section
Main Steam Isolation Valve
Number 2 2
Nominal flow rate (t/h) 977.5 1010
Actuating time (sec.) <5 <5
Atmospheric Relief Valve
Number 4 2
AMENDMENT
1.3-40
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 40 of 44)

Section
Capacity (t/h) 131.3 132
10.4 OTHER FEATURES

Main Condenser
Type Single pressure Single pressure
Number 2 2
Rated pressure (MPa) 0.00569 0.0049
Turbine bypass capacity (% of rated load 70 (to condenser) 70 (to condenser)
main steam flow) 132 (to atmosphere) 132 (to atmosphere)
Capacity to condense steam (kg/h) 1046392 -
Cleaning system Rubber ball Rubber ball
AMENDMENT
1.3-41
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 41 of 44)

Section
Circulating Water System
Type Once-through system Once-through system
Cooling medium C.J. Link Canal Sea
Number of pumps 4 4
Flow rate (m3/h) 60000 62540
Temperature rise through condenser (oC) 9.2 9.5
Main Feedwater System
Design pressure (MPa) 10 10
Design flow (t / h) 31025 31077
Normal pressure (MPa) 7.7 7.7
Normal temperature (oC) >220 >220
AMENDMENT
1.3-42
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 42 of 44)

Section
Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps
Number of motor pump 2 2
Number of diesel pump 2 1
Rate flow rate, each (m3/h) 48.2 48.2
Design Head (m.H2O) 930 930
Startup Feedwater Pumps

Number of pumps 1 No
Rated flow rate (m3/h) 100 No
AMENDMENT
1.3-43
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 43 of 44)

Section
11 RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT
11.3 GASEOUS WASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM
Waste Gas Compressor
Number 2 2
Type Diaphragm type Diaphragm type
Design capacity (m3/h) 40 40
Gas Decay Tank
Number 6 6
Type Vertical Vertical
AMENDMENT
1.3-44
Table 1.3-1
(Sheet 44 of 44)

Section
Volume, each (m3) 18.4 21.3

0.77 0.8
100 100
Design temperature (oC)
Waste Gas Surge Tank

1 1
Number
5.3 5.5
Volume (m3)
0.6 0.6
90 90
Design temperature (oC)
AMENDMENT
1.3-45
AMENDMENT
Table 1.3.2 Comparison of Main Difference Between
CHASNUPP-1 and QNPP
No CHASNUPP-1 QNPP
Containment
1 Thickness of
Base plate: 3.35~10.55m 3m
2 Height of the fan platform: 29m 52m
3 Height of the containment: 57m 62.5m
Reactor Coolant System
4 The coolant temperature Tc is directly The coolant temperature Th Tc are

measured at the cold leg. The measured by the temperature measuring
temperature Th is measured by the bypass.
temperature measuring bypass.
5 The pipe of discharge gas from the The pipe of discharge gas from the
pressure vessel to pressurizer relief tank pressure vessel is connected to the
is added. containment.
6 The pressurizer relief valve capacity 65 The pressurizer relief valve capacity 50
t/h t/h
7 The pressurizer safety valve capacity 90 The pressurizer safety valve capacity 80
t/h t/h
Boron Recycle System
8 Four makeup water pumps Three makeup water pumps
9 Two exhausted ejectors are added No
Sampling System
10 Two high-pressure sampling containers No

are added.
1.3-46
AMENDMENT
No CHASNUPP-1 QNPP
Component Cooling Water System

11 Four CCW pumps Three CCW pumps
12 Four CCW heat exchangers Three CCW heat exchangers
13 Two CCW surge tanks One CCW surge tank
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean-up System

14 Three refueling water filters Two refueling water filters.
Safety Injection System

15 Volume of the accumulator: 2 x 56.6m3 4 x 30m3
Gaseous Waster Treatment System

16 The low-level waster gas is treated by the It is treated by the Low-Level waste gas
building ventilation system treatment system
17 The high-level waste gas is treated by charcoal It is treated by HE and AC, and then goes to
filter of the building ventilation system, and stack.
then goes to stack.
18 A sump pump in neutron monitoring room is No

added.
Liquid Waste Treatment System

19 A mixed bed demineralizer for clean drain is No
added
20 The resin bed for process drain is cancelled There are two process drain resin bed
21 A vent condenser for the condenser is added No
22 Seven sump pumps Six sump pumps
Radioactive Waste Solidification System

23 There are six spent resin holdup tanks There are three spent resin hold up tanks.
24 Six spent resin ejectors Two spent resin ejectors
25 Nine steam ejectors Four steam ejectors.
Decontamination System
1.3-47
AMENDMENT
Table 1.3-2 Comparison of Main Difference Between

CHASNUPP-1 and QNPP (Continued)
No CHASNUPP-1 QNPP
26 A tank for batching the analytically pure No
NaOH is added
27 A pump for the analytically pure NaOH is No
added
Main Steam Bypass System

28 Main steam relief valves 2 / SG Main steam relief valve 1 / SG
Steam Generator Blowdown System
29 A periodic blowdown flash tank is added. No
30 A periodic blowdown cooler is added. No
31 A periodic blowdown pump is added. No
Laundry System
32 A filter for discharge water is added No
Auxiliary Feedwater System

33 Two diesel auxiliary feedwater pumps One diesel auxiliary feedwater pump
Reactor Structure
34 Among the thirty-seven guide tube
assemblies, four of them are enclosed by No
using stainless shield to prevent the
transverse flow
35 Change the connection of the core-barrel The core-barrel base plate was hung on the
base-plate from being hung on into setting lower end of the core barrel.
on the lower end of the core barrel.
36 Four Thermal couple adaptors are needed There were only two thermal couples
on the PV head for the penetration of adaptors on PV head, and soldering is used
thermal couples, and the mechanical seal as seal welding to thermal couples.
unions are applied to thermal couples.
Instrument and Control

37 High level to trip for reactor protection Reactor protection system put to use high
system is changed to low level to trip level to trip
(Zero level to trip)
1.3-48
AMENDMENT

CHASNUPP-1 and QNPP
No CHASNUPP-1 QNPP
38 AMSAC can be used to trip the Reactor No
39 Separate testing circuitry has been One testing circuitry for all channel
provided for each redundant channel
40 The layout of RPS cabinets have been Redundant RPS cabinets are located in the
changed Redundant RPS cabinets are same room.
located in two separate rooms.
41 8 Detector wells in CHASNUPP design 12 detector wells in QNPP design
42 36 Thermocouples are used. 16 Channels 42 N1E Thermocouple channels are

are 1E qualified used.
43 Uses state-of-the-art Motorola based Solar computers are used

hardware / software architecture
44 Automatic switchover from one computer Manual transfer

to other in case of failure
45 Modems for nuclear data link added No Nuclear Data link present
46 Two reactor power controllers One reactor power controller
47 MCR is now more centralized MCR is less centralized with local control
rooms
48 The processing cabinets are separated No

from MCR
49 MCR contains 16 CRTs with enhanced 8 CRTs in MCR

performance
50 Twenty (20) Class 1E qualified alarms No class 1E alarms are present

added
51 All switches safety related are Class 1E All switches are not class 1E
qualified
52 Core subcooling margin digital indicators No

are added
53 Most control systems are implemented on Spec 200 instrumentation is used

microprocessor based programmable
controllers (KM series) instead of
conventional hardwired
1.3-49
AMENDMENT

CHASNUPP-1 and QNPP
No CHASNUPP-1 QNPP
54 Output signal of threshold (or bistable) for Output signal of threshold (or bistable) for
reactor protection system put to use reactor protection system put to use
photoelectrical coupling isolating. CMOS isolating.
55 The liquid level monitoring is added to the No
reactor vessel
56 The temperature monitoring is added to No
the reactor cavity
57 There are eight CRT in the plant computer Six CRT
system
Electrical System
58 One and a half breaker Two busbar
59 The load-switch breaker is added in the No
output of the main generator.
60 Fast automatic transfer is used between the The auxiliary busbar supplied to the safety
auxiliary busbar and safety busbar busbar can be performed through fast
automatic transfer. The safety busbar to
the auxiliary busbar supplies through
manual transfer.
61 Capacity of DG 3200 kW Capacity of DG 3200 kW /
62 Outpoint terminal voltage of main 18 kV
generator: 20 kV
Nuclear Design and Thermal-Hydraulic Design

63 Boron concentration in the cold state: 2400 ppm
2000 ppm
64 Steam generator restrictor design flow: 200%
(Rated steam flow %)
150%
65 36 reactor core temperature monitoring 40 reactor core temperature monitoring
points. points
Main plant Parameters

66 Core rated power: 998.6MWt 966.0 MWt
67 Plant design lifetime: 40 years 30 year
1.3-50
AMENDMENT
Table 1.3-3 Significant Changes from the PSAR
S. No FSAR Change Reason for Change

1. Gas or steam discharges from To decrease radioactivity into
pressure vessel to relief tank rather containment atmosphere.
than containment atmosphere.
2. Pressurizer relief valve capacity To increase the capacity of
increased from 80 t/h to 65 t/h(each). overpressure protection for ATWS.
3. Pressurizer safety valve capacity To increase the capacity of
increase from 80 t/h to 65 t/h(each). overpressure protection for ATWS.
4. Liquid level monitoring added for To increase safety during refueling
mid-loop operation. and maintenance.
5. Number of main steam relief valve To meet requirement of redundancy.
Changed from 1 (each steam
generator) to 2.
6. Main feedwater motor-operated To minimize closing time.
isolating valve changed to hydraulic
valve.
7. Temperature monitoring added in To monitor severe accident.
reactor cavity.
8. Capacity of diesel generator To meet capacity requirement by
increased from 2000 kW to 3200 increasing emergency power supply
kW. due to changes in the plant
requirements as compared to QNPP.
9. Addition of a startup feedwater To minimize use of auxiliary
pump. feedwater system during normal
plant startup and shutdown.
10. Relocation of diesel generator To accommodate the diesel
building. generators being large in dimensions.
Due to smaller size of the original
DG building, these DGs could not be
accommodated there.
11. All containment tendons grouted To follow the practice of the
reference plant i.e. QNPP
12. Final disposal of surface drainage Since the level of the joint well of
into CJ. Link Canal instead of outfall cooling water disposal was raised, it
drain. was not possible to discharge the
water under gravity.
1.3-51
AMENDMENT
Table 1.3-3 Significant Changes from the PSAR (Contd)
S. No FSAR Change Reason for Change

13. Provision of guy wires on the steel For better support of the stack.
stack.
14. Number of each SG drain lines For effective draining of primary
changed from 1 to 2. side.
15. Provision of embedment for fuel To enable installation of additional
assembly reconstitution equipment. equipment if required in future.
16. Material of RPV CRDM adapters The latter is better in respect of
changed from Inconel 600 to Incoloy thermal fatigue cracking.
690 TT.
17. Provision of 2 SCW chemical For better corrosion control.
additive tanks.
1.3-52
1.4 IDENTIFICATION OF AGENTS AND CONTRACTORS
1.4.1 Applicant
The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) as the owner is the applicant for
the Construction Permit and Operation license for the Chashma Nuclear Power Plant
(CHASNUPP) which is located in the northwestern region of the Thal Doab in the
Punjab Province, Pakistan, approximately 32 km south of Mianwali, 280 km
southwest of Islamabad and 1160 km northeast of Karachi.
As the applicant of the Chashma plant, PAEC takes overall responsibility for the plant
in design, construction, and commissioning. PAEC is responsible for the safe
operation and maintenance of the plant. PAEC has also overall responsibility for
Quality Assurance during the construction and operation of the plant.
1.4.2 Contractor
The contractor of the plant is China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) in Beijing,
China. CNNC is responsible for supplying the equipment, materials and work
necessary for the design, engineering, procurement, construction, erection, testing and
commissioning of complete, licensable plant in accordance with the Contract.
CNNC has authorized its subordinate company, the China Zhongyuan Engineering
Corporation (CZEC) for the implementation of the project management of the
Contract as the Chief Executive of the Contractor. CZEC is responsible for the project
management activities related to the Contract Plant. CZEC has been appointed to take
the responsibility for following services:
-- Technical management during the project period, such services covering

engineering, construction, erection and commissioning of the
CHASNUPP-1 as well as project schedule control.
-- Project management support services including:
1.4-1
Conventional Island (CI) and Nuclear Island (NI) design management,
coordination
CI and NI, BOP procurement
preparation of PSAR and FSAR
manufacturing QC surveillance and expediting
civil construction and plant erection procurement
scheduling activities
engineering and design services covering CHASNUPP overall engineering
commission services
operation management support services
training services for PAEC plant operation staff.
As the general subcontractor for project design, Shanghai Nuclear Engineering

Research and Design Institute (SNERDI) has been appointed to take the responsibility
for the general design of the plant and followings:
--- general layout design
-- process systems design and architect engineering for NSSS and nuclear
island of the plant.
-- design of principal nuclear components: reactor vessel, internals, steam

generator, pressurizer, accumulator, nuclear fuel assembly, major tanks
and heat exchangers.
-- process design and architect engineering for major BOP.
-- NI and major BOP civil design.
1.4-2
As the conventional island designer, East China Electrical Power Design Institute
(ECEPDI) has been appointed to take the responsibility for design of technological
and civil engineering works of the conventional island.
SNERDI and ECEPDI are the major designers of Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant in
China. The QNPP has finished construction, erection, testing and commissioning and
has operated continuously and stably under normal operating condition at rated output
since July, 1992.
As the construction and installation subcontractor, China Zhongyuan Nuclear Power

Construction Company (CZNPCC) has been appointed to take the responsibility for
civil construction and installation of NI, CI and major BOP of the plant. CZNPCC is a
Chinese company experienced in PWR nuclear power plant construction. CZNPCC
has completed the civil construction and erection of the Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant
and takes part in the civil construction and the erection for a large portion of NI of the
Guangdong Nuclear Power Station.
The subcontractor for procurement, Shanghai Nuclear Material and Equipment

Supply Company has been appointed to take the responsibility for material equipment
procurement of the plant.
1.4-3
1.5 REQUIREMENTS FOR FURTHER TECHNICAL INFORMATION
The design of the Chashma Nuclear Power Plant is based upon the concepts and
results obtained from the analyses and tests which have been successfully applied to
the design of the Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant in China. There are currently no areas
of research and development which are required for operation of CHASNUPP-1.
1.5-1
1.6 MATERIAL INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE
1.6.1 Chinese Standards and Codes
In the design, equipment manufacturing, engineering construction, commissioning

and operation of CHASNUPP, the current nuclear safety codes, standards issued by
Chinese Government and the National Nuclear Safety Administration, have been /
will be used. This subsection lists the Chinese Codes, Standards referenced through
this FSAR.
HAF: Nuclear Safety Codes and their associated safety guides.
- HAF 0100-86 Safety codes for nuclear power plant sitting.
- HAF 0200-86 Safety coded for nuclear power plant design.
- HAF 0300-86 Safety code for nuclear power plant operation.
- HAF 0400-86 Safety code for nuclear power plant quality assurance
1.6.2 International Standards and U.S.A. National Standards
Nuclear island design is with main reference to relevant standards of NRC, ANS and
ANSI etc.
The design, manufacturing and inspection of the safety related mechanical equipment,
electrical equipment and instrumentation are in accordance with relevant standards of
ASME and IEEE. While IEC standards are used as main references.
Safety related design in civil engineering used also relevant standards of ASME, ACI,
AISC and ASCE.
This subsection lists the name of organizations which issued these standards
referenced throughout this FSAR.
- IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency.
1.6-1
-- IEEE: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
-- IEC: International Electro Technical Commission
-- US NRC R.G: United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Regulatory Guide
-- ANS: American Nuclear Society
-- ANSI: American National Standards Institute.
-- ASME: American Society of Mechanical Engineers.
-- ASTM: American Society for Testing Materials.
-- ACI: American Concrete Institute.
-- AISC: American Institute of Steel Construction.
-- ASCE: American Society of Civil Engineers.
Applicable standards and codes in the design, manufacturing, construction,

commissioning and operation of the plant are given in the Table 1.8-1.
1.6-2
Amendment
1.6.3 Topical Report
Topical reports which provide information additional to that provided in this FSAR.
Topical Report Section(s)

referenced
Nuclear Design Report 4.3
Criticality Analysis of Storage Rack for New Fuel Assemblies 9.1.1.3
Criticality Analysis of Storage Rack for Spent Fuel Assemblies 9.1.2.2
The Comparison of Calculated versus Measured Parameters of 4.3
the Qinshan NPP during the Cycle.
The Comparison of Calculated versus Measured Parameters of 4.3
the Qinshan NPP during the Startup.
Thermal-hydraulic Design Report. 4.4
The Critical Heat Flux Experiments of Reactor Fuel Bundles 4.4
Calculation of the Fuel Rod Performance Under Steady 4.2
Condition
Control Rod Dropping Test Under Cold Condition and 4.6.3
Misalignment of Control Rod Drive Line.
Seismic Test of Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) 4.6.3
Hydraulic Tests and Calculations for Fuel Assembly 4.2
Fuel Rod Design Report 4.2
Radioactive Shielding Design Specification. 12.2.12.3
Airborne Radioactive Material Source Calculation in Auxiliary 12.2.2
Building of CHASNUPP
Final Report for seismic Analysis of Nuclear Island Structure 3.7
Final Report for Stress Analysis of Containment & Internal 3.7
Structure
Final Report for Stress Analysis of Other Nuclear Island 3.7
Structure
Primary Report for Stress Analysis of Containment & 3.8.1
Foundation.
Fluid Structure Interaction Analysis of Safety Related 3.7
Structure.
1.6-3
Amendment
Topical Report Section(s)

referenced
Settlement and Stability Analysis of NI Foundation 3.7
Reactor Coolant System Design Transient 3.9.1.1
Auxiliary Equipment Design Transient 3.9.1.1
Stress Analysis Report for Reactor Pressure Vessel. 3.9.1.4.5
Stress Analysis Report for Steam Generator. 3.9.1.4.5
Stress Analysis Report for Pressurizer 3.9.1.4.5
Stress Analysis Report for Reactor Internals 3.9.1.4.5
Stress Analysis Report for CRDM Housing 3.9.1.4.5
Response Analysis under LOCA + SSE Conditions for 4.2
Reactor Fuel Assembly
Study and Analysis for the Flow-Induced Vibration of 3.9.2.4
the Core Barrel of a PWR
Piping Stress Analysis Report 3.9.1.4.2
LLB Analysis Report on RCS Loop 3.6.3
The Containment Spray Performance Study on Heat 6.2,15.6
Removal and Iodine Removal
The Model of Large Break LOCA Analysis. 15.6.5
Anticipated Transient without Scram Analysis for 300MW 15.8
NPP
Mass / Energy Release and Containment Pressure / 6.2
Temperature
Transient Analysis
Auxiliary Feedwater System Reliability Analysis 10.4.9
1.6-4
1.7 DRAWINGS AND OTHER DETAILED INFORMATION
1.7.1 Electrical, Instrumentation and Control Drawings
Table 1.7-1 contains a list of electrical, instrumentation and control drawings.
1.7.2 Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams
Table 1.7-2 contains a list of each piping and instrumentation diagram.
1.7.3 Other Detailed Information
Other specific data will be submitted according to requests of the DNSRP

(Directorate of Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection) staff.
1.7-1
Table 1.7-1 Electrical, Instrumentation and Control Drawings
(Sheet 1 of 18)
Engineering Code of Title Revision Date

Drawing
PC1RXE23011S04043SD Electrical Cabling Diagram RX A Apr. 95
PC1RXE28011S04043SD Electrical Circuit and Connection Diagram A July. 95

RX
PC1RXE28012S04043SD Electrical Circuit and Connection Diagram A July. 94

RX
PC1RXE28013S04043SD Electrical Circuit and Connection Diagram A Aug. 94

RX
PC1RXE28014S04043SD Electrical Circuit and Connection Diagram A Sep. 94

RX
PC1RXE23011S04043SD Electrical Cabling Diagram RX A Apr. 95
PC1RXE21011S04043SD Electrical Equipment Arrangement Drawing A Apr. 95
PC1RXE26011S04043SD Electrical Penetration Terminal Wiring A Sec. 95

Drawing RX
PC1RXE28011S04043SD Electrical Circuit Connection Diagram RX A Sep. 95
PC1RXE28012S04043SD Electrical Circuit Connection Diagram RX A Nor. 94
PC1RXE28013S04043SD Electrical Circuit Connection Diagram RX A Aug. 94
PC1RXE28014S04043SD Electrical Circuit Connection Diagram RX A Oct. 94
PC1RXE28015S04043SD Electrical Circuit Connection Diagram RX A Jun. 95
PC1RXE28021S04043SD Electrical Logic Diagram RX A Apr. 94
PC1RXE28022S04043SD Electrical Logic Diagram RX A Apr. 94
PC1RXE28023S04043SD Electrical Logic Diagram RX A May. 94
PC1RXE28024S04043SD Electrical Logic Diagram RX A May. 94
PC1RXE28011S04043SD Electrical Circuit Connection Diagram A Jul. 94
PC1RXE28012S04043SD Electrical Circuit Connection Diagram A Jul. 94
PC1RXE28013S04043SD Electrical Circuit Connection Diagram A Sep. 94
PC1RXE28014S04043SD Electrical Circuit Connection Diagram A Sep. 94
PC1RXE28021S04043SD Electrical Logic Diagram NX A Sep. 94
PC1RXE28022S04043SD Electrical Logic Diagram NX A Sep. 94
PC1RXE28023S04043SD Electrical Logic Diagram NX A May. 94
PC1RXE28024S04043SD Electrical Logic Diagram NX A May. 94
1.7-2
(Sheet 2 of 18)

Drawing
PC1NXE28025S04043SD Electrical Logic Diagram NX A Jun. 94
PC1NXE28041S04043SD Electrical Circuit and Connection Diagram A Sep. 94

NX

NX
PC1NXE28043S04043SD Electrical Circuit and Connection Diagram A Oct. 94

NX
PC1NXE28044S04043SD Electrical Circuit and Connection Diagram A Jul. 94

NX

NX

NX

NX
PC1NXE23011S04043SD Electrical Cabling Diagram DX A Jul. 95
PC1NXE21011S04043SD Electrical Equipment Layout Diagram NX A Dec. 94
PC1NXE21031S04043SD Electrical Drawing SCA NX A Nov. 94
PC1FXE28011S04043SD Electrical Circuit Diagram FX A Aug. 94
PC1FXE28012S04043SD Electrical Circuit Diagram FX A Aug. 94
PC1FXE28021S04043SD Electrical Logic Diagram FX A Jun. 94
PC1FXE28022S04043SD Electrical Logic Diagram FX A Jun. 94
PC1EXE21011S04043SD Electrical Equipment Layout Drawing EX A Nov. 94
1.7-3
(Sheet 3 of 18)

Drawing
PC1EXE28011S04043SD Electrical Circuit and Connection Diagram A July. 94
EX
PC1EXE28012S04043SD Electrical Circuit and Connection Diagram A Nov. 94

EX
PC1EXE28021S04043SD Electrical Logic Diagram EX A May. 97
PC1EXE28022S04043SD Electrical Logic Diagram EX A July. 94
PC1EXE28015S04043SD Non-1E Class 6kV Power System A Dec. 95
PC1EXE28023S04043SD Electrical Logic Diagram EX A Sep. 94
PC1DXE23011S04043SD Electrical Cabling Diagram DX A Oct. 96
PC1DXE28011S04043SD Electrical Cabling Diagram DX A May. 96
PC1DXE28021S04043SD Electrical Logic Diagram DX A May. 96
PC1CIE21011S04043SD Electrical General Layout Drawing A May. 95
PC1CIE21014S04043SD Installation Drawing of outdoor main A Apr. 95

transformer, step-down transformer and
Auxiliary Transformer
1.7-4
(Sheet 4 of 18)

Drawing
PC1TXE23011E04043SD Installation Drawing of Generator B Apr. 96
Compartment and Isolated Phase Bus duct
PC1TXE23021E04043SD One Line Diagram of 6.3kV Auxiliary B Aug. 95

Operation Bus
PC1TXE23031E04043SD One Line Diagram of 6kV Auxiliary B Aug. 95

Common Bus
PC1TXE23041E04043SD 380/220V PC One Line Diagram B Apr. 95
PC1TXE23051E04043SD 380/220V MEE One Line Diagram B Apr. 95
PC1TXE21011E04043SD Installation Drawings of the L.V. Auxiliary B Jan. 96

Transformer
PC1EXE27011E04043SD Control Wiring Drawing of Generator C Dec. 96

Transformer Unit in the Control Room
PC1EXE27012E04043SD Control Wiring Drawing of 132kV B Sep. 96

Transmission Line in the Control Room
PC1EXE27013E04043SD Control Wiring Diagram of 220kV Bus in the B Mar. 96

Control Room
PC1EXE27014E04043SD Control Wiring Diagram of 220kV B Mar. 96

Transmission Line in the Control Room
PC1EXE27015E04043SD Control Wiring Diagram of Unit Auxiliary B Apr. 96

Transformer in Control Room
PC1EXE27016E04043SD Control Wiring Diagram of H.V Standby B Apr. 96

Transformer in Control Room
1.7-5
(Sheet 5 of 18)

Drawing
PC1EXE27017E04043SD Control Wiring Diagram of L.V. Auxiliary B Mar. 96
Transformed in Control Room
PC1TXE23061E04043SD Control Wiring Diagram of A.C. Emergency B May. 96

Load Center
PC1TXE23071E04043SD DC System of Conventional Island B Feb. 96
PC1TXE23081E04043SD Control Wiring Diagram U.P.S. B Feb. 96
PC1TXE23091E04043SD Control Wiring Diagram of Turbine House C Oct. 96

Auxiliary Motor
PC1TXE23101E04043SD Control Wiring Diagram of 6kV Feeder A Sep. 94
PC1TXE23111E04043SD Unit Wiring Diagram of Auxiliary Motor A Oct. 94
PC1TXE21012E04043SD Installation Drawing of 220V Storage B Jan. 96

Batteries
PC1TXE21013E04043SD Installation Drawing of U.P.S. Equipment B Jan. 96
1.7-6
(Sheet 6 of 18)

Drawing
PC1RXC26021S04043SD Penetration Wiring Drawing CCR RX A May. 95
PC1RXC26031S04043SD Penetration Wiring Drawing CRI RX A Dec. 94
PC1RXC26011S04043SD CRDM Coils Wiring Drawing RX A May. 95
PC1RXK11011S04043SD Arrangement Drawing CIN RX A Apr. 95
PC1RXI26011S04043SD Penetration Wiring Drawing CNI RX A Apr. 95
PC1RXI25011S04043SD Instrument Sensing Line System Diagram RX A Mar. 95
PC1RXI23021S04043SD Instrument Equipment and Sensing Line A Nov. 94

Arrangement Drawing RX
PC1RXI23022S04043SD Instrument Equipment and Sensing Line A Dec. 94

Arrangement Drawing RX
PC1RXI25031S04043SD Undetermined leaking Monitoring System A Dec. 94

Working Drawing RX
PC1RXI25041S04043SD Working Drawing CRV RX A Dec. 94
PC1RXI25051S04043SD Working Drawing CIT RX A Jan. 95
PC1RXA25011S04043SD Working Drawing for Radiation monitoring A Mar. 95

System RX
PC1RXJ1011S04043SD Working Drawing CCI RX A Feb. 93
1.7-7
(Sheet 7 of 18)

Drawing
PC1RXJ11011S06443SD Working Drawing CCI RX A Feb. 93
PC1RXJ11012S06043SD Working Drawing CCI RX A July 93
PC1RXJ11014S06043SD Working Drawing CCI RX A Sep. 93
PC1NXT92011S04043SD Communication Drawing NX A Sep. 94
PC1NXI26011S04043SD Local Panel External Wiring Drawing NX A Apr. 95

(SCV)
PC1NXI25011S04043SD Working Drawing for Local Control Room A Jun. 95

Instrument NX
PC1NXI28021S04043SD Working Drawing for Ventilation Diagram A May. 95

for Microcomputer Monitoring Room
Instrument NX
PC1NXA25011S04043SD Arrangement Drawing APR NX A Sep. 94
PC1NXA25014S04043SD Installation Drawing APR NX A Mar. 95
1.7-8
(Sheet 8 of 18)

Drawing
PC1NXA25016S04043SD Working Drawing CBC NX A May. 96
PC1NXA2601S04043SD Equipment Wiring Drawing ARM NX A Apr. 95
PC1NXI28011S04043SD Instrumentation Function Disposal Diagram B Apr. 94

for SBR

for SGW

for SLW

for SFD

for SLD
PC1FXI26011S04443SD Sensing Line System Drawing FX A Apr. 94
PC1FXI26021S04443SD Instrument Cable System Drawing FX A Apr. 94
PC1FXI26031S04043SD Instrument Equipment and Sensing Line A Jun. 94

Arrangement Drawing FX
PC1FXT92011S04243SD Communication Drawing FX A Jun. 94
PC1FXA25011S04543SD Working Drawing AAR FX A Aug. 94
PC1FXA25021S04543SD Working Drawing AFD FX A May. 94
PC1EXC26011S04043SD Cabinet External Wiring Drawing CRC EX B Mar. 95
PC1EXC26021S04043SD Cabinet External Drawing CAD EX B May. 96
PC1EXC26031S04043SD Cabinet External Wiring Drawing CCR EX A Apr. 95
PC1EXC26041S04043SD Cabinet External Wiring Drawing CRI EX B Jan. 96
PC1EXC26051S04043SD Cabinet External Wiring Drawing CRP EX A Oct. 94
PC1EXC26052S04043SD Cabinet External Wiring Drawing CRP EX A Nov. 94
PC1EXC26053S04043SD Cabinet External Wiring Drawing CRP EX A Nov. 94
PC1EXC26055S04043SD Cabinet External Wiring Drawing CRP EX A Jun. 95
PC1EXC26061S04043SD Cabinet External Wiring Drawing CES EX A Dec. 95
PC1EXC26071S04043SD Cabinet External Wiring Drawing CAM EX B Dec. 95
PC1XK26011S04043SD Cabinet External Wiring Drawing CIN EX A Apr. 95
PC1EXK26021S04043SD External Wiring Drawing CNI EX A Aug. 94
1.7-9
(Sheet 9 of 18)

Drawing
PC1EXI28011S04043SD Schematic Diagram for Instrument System A May. 94
EX
PC1EXI28012S04043SD Schematic Diagram for Instrument System A May. 94

EX
PC1EXI28021S04043SD Logic Diagram for Instrument System EX B Nov. 95
PC1EXI28022S04043SD Logic Diagram for Instrument System EX B Nov. 95
PC1EXI28301S04043SD Instrumentation Function Disposal Diagram A Mar. 94

for SRC

for SCV

for SIS

for SRH

for SCS

for SCW

for SCW

for Plant Start-up and Shut-down Feedwater
System
1.7-10
Amendment
(Sheet 10 of 18)

Drawing
PC1EXI28309S04043SD Instrumentation Function Disposal Diagram A Apr. 94
for SMF

for SMS

for SMS

for VWE
PC1EXI28312S04043SD Instrumentation Function Disposal Diagram B Jan. 95

for SPS
PC1EXI28313S04043SD Instrumentation Function Disposal Diagram A Jan. 94

for SHR

for SRD

for SGB

for SCA
PC1EXI28317S04043SD Instrumentation Function Disposal Diagram B Apr. 95

for VCH

for Nuclear Auxiliary Building Cooler
System

for CAM

for CRC

for CIT
1.7-11
(Sheet 11 of 18)

Drawing
PC1EXI28322S04043SD Instrumentation Function Disposal Diagram A Marr. 94
for CCP

for CPL

for CSG

for Main Steam Dump Control System

for Unidentified Leakage Monitoring System

for SFP

for SBR

for WEW

for WES

for WSW

for WCP
PC1EXI28333S04043SD Instrumentation Function Disposal Diagram B May. 95

for VCC

for VCS
1.7-12
(Sheet 12 of 18)

Drawing
for VDC

for VRC

for VHE

for VPS

VPS

for VPS

for VPS

for Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room
Ventilation System

for ARM

for Reactor Axial Power Deviation Alarm
System
1.7-13
(Sheet 13 of 18)

Drawing
PC1EXI26011S04043SD Cabinet Wiring Drawing for Instrument A Jun. 95
System EX
PC1EXI26021S04043SD Relay Cabinet Wiring Drawing for B May. 97

Instrument System EX
PC1EXT92011S04043SD Communication Drawing EX A Sep. 94
PC1EXE26051S04043SD EX Electrical System ESF. Relay Panel A Aug. 95

Electrical Connection Diagram
PC1EXA25011S04043SD Working Drawing for Radiation Monitoring A Jul. 94

System EX
PC1EXA26011S04043SD Relay Cabinet Wiring Drawings for A Sep. 94

Radiation Monitoring System EX
PC1EXI29011E05043SD Arrangement and equipment list of control B Nov. 96

panels for secondary system
PC1EXE27012E04043SD General part in control room B Sep. 96
PC1EXM27051S04043SD Main Board (005CB) Drawing CMC EX A July 96
PC1EXM27061S04043SD Main Board (006CB) Drawing CMC EX A Aug. 95
PC1EXM27071S04043SD Main Board (007CB) Drawing CMC EX A July 96
PC1EXM27081S04043SD Main Board (008CB) Drawing CMC EX A June 95
1.7-14
(Sheet 14 of 18)

Drawing
PC1EXM27131S04043SD Safety Board (013CB) Drawing CMC EX A July. 96
PC1EXM27191S04043SD Safety Board (019CB) Drawing CMC EX A Aug. 95
PC1EXM27201S04043SD Safety Board (020CB) Drawing CMC EX A Oct. 95
PC1EXM27221S04043SD Safety Board (022CB) Drawing CMC EX A Sept. 96
PC1EXM27231S04043SD Safety Board (023CB) Drawing CMC EX A Aug. 95
PC1EXM27271S04043SD Safety Board (027CB) Drawing CMC EX A Mar. 95
PC1EXM29291S04043SD Safety Board (029CB) Drawing CMC EX A June. 95
PC1EXM27301S04043SD Safety Board (030CB) Drawing CMC EX A Apr. 95
1.7-15
(Sheet 15 of 18)

Drawing
PC1EXM27142S04043SD Auxiliary Board (014CB) Drawing CMC EX A Apr. 95
PC1EXM27261S04043SD Safety Board (026CB) Drawing CMC EX A Mar. 96
PC1EXM27171S04043SD Auxiliary Board (017CB) Drawing CMC EX A Feb. 96
PC1EXM27181S04043SD Auxiliary Board (018CB) Drawing CMC EX A Aug. 95
PC1EXM27311S04043SD Auxiliary Board (031CB) Drawing CMC EX A Mar. 96
PC1EXM27241S04043SD Auxiliary Board (024CB/025CB) Drawing A June. 95

CMC EX
PC1EXM27511S04043SD Equipment Layout of MCR, ECR & A Dec. 94

Instrumentation room
PC1EXM27611S04043SD Board & Cabinet Instrumentation Drawing A Jan. 95

CMC EX
PC1EXM27361S04043SD Working Drawing CMA EX A Oct. 96
PC1EXM75011S04043SD Remote Shutdown Panel Drawing CEC EX A Nov. 96
PC1EXU74011S04043SD Working Drawing CPC EX B Dec. 95
PC1EXU74021S04043SD Display Drawing CPC EX B Dec. 95
PC1EXU74031S04043SD Configuration Diagram CPC EX B Dec. 95
1.7-16
(Sheet 16 of 18)

Drawing
PC1TXI28011E05043SD Main Steam System I & C Flow and Logic B 96.5.18
Diagram
PC1TXI26011E05043SD Main Steam System Instrument & Control B Mar. 96

Wiring Diagram
PC1TXI28012E05043SD Extraction & Auxiliary Steam System I & C B Feb. 96

Flow and Logic Diagram
PC1TXI26021E05043SD Extraction & auxiliary Steam System I & C B Apr. 96

Wiring Diagram
PC1TXI28013E05043SD Condensate System I & C Flow and Logic B Feb. 96

Diagram
PC1TXI26031E05043SD Condensate System I & C Wiring Diagram B May. 96
PC1TXI28014E05043SD Feedwater System I & C Flow and Logic B Mar. 96

Diagram
PC1TXI26041E05043SD Feedwater System I & C Wiring Diagram A May. 96
PC1TXI28015E05043SD Condenser Vacuum System I & C Flow and A Feb. 96

Logic Diagram
PC1TXI26051E05043SD Condenser Vacuum System I & C Flow and B May. 96

Logic Diagram
PC1TXI28016E05043SD Turbine Oil System I & C Flow and Logic B Jun. 94

Diagram
PC1TXI26061E05043SD Turbine Oil System I & C Wiring Diagram B July. 94
PC1TXI28017E05043SD Heater Drain System I & C Flow and Logic B Mar. 96

Diagram
PC1TXI26071E05043SD Heater Drain System I & C Wiring Diagram B June. 96
PC1TXI28018E05043SD Closed Cycle Cooling Water System I & C B Feb. 96

PC1TXI26081E05043SD Closed Cycle Cooling Water System I & C B May. 96

Wiring Diagram
1.7-17
(Sheet 17 of 18)

Drawing
PC1TXI28019E05043SD Generator Water Cooling System I & C Flow B Feb. 96
and Logic Diagram
PC1TXI26091E05043SD Generator Water Cooling I&C Wiring B May 96

Diagram
PC1EXI26011E05043SD Arrangement and Cabling Diagram of

B Mar.96
Annunciator For Secondary System
PC1EXI28011E05043SD Automatic Control Block Diagram for A Nov.94

Secondary System
PC1DWI28011E05043SD Chemical Water Treatment System I & C B Nov.95


Wiring Diagram (Make-up)

Wiring Diagram (Make-up) Water Treatment
System

Wiring Diagram (Condensate Treatment
System)

Cabling Diagram
PC1EXI26021E05043SD Turbine DEH Control System I & C Wiring A July 96

Diagram
PC1EXI26031E05043SD Turbine Supervisory Instrumentation System B Sep.96

I & C Wiring Diagram
PC1EXI26041E05043SD Turbine ETS System I & C Wiring Diagram B Oct.96
PC1EXI26051E05043SD MSR System I & C Wiring Diagram B Nov.96
1.7-18
(Sheet 18 of 18)

Drawing
PC1EXI28012E05043SD Wiring Diagram of DEH Miscellaneous B Oct. 96
Items
PC1EXI26061E05043SD Instrument and Control Panels Internal B Nov. 96

Wiring Diagram For Secondary System
PC1EXI26011E05043SD Relay Cabinet Internal Wiring Diagram For B June. 96

Secondary System
PC1EXI26081E05043SD I & C Panels Cabling Diagram For Secondary B Nov. 96
PC1EXI26091E05043SD Relay Cabinet Diagram for Secondary B July. 96

System
PC1EXI26101E05043SD Arrangement and Wiring Diagram in the B Dec. 95

Distribution Cabinet For I & C
PC1EXI26111E05043SD Arrangement and Wiring Diagram in the B May. 96

Power Supply Cabinet for Motor Operated
valves
PC1TXI21011E05043SD Layout of Control Devices on Field for B Dec. 96

Secondary System
PC1TXI26121E05043SD KKM Serial Wiring Diagram A Aug. 94
PC1TXI26111E05043SD KKM Serial I & C Electrical Cabinet TB A Mar. 95

Wiring Diagram
PC1TXI26111E05043SD Miscellaneous Wiring Diagram for I & C (1) B Nov. 96
PC1TXI26111E05043SD Miscellaneous Wiring Diagram for I & C (2) B Sept. 96
1.7-19
TABLE 1.7-2
PIPING AND INSTRUMENTATION DIARGAMS
Drawing Reference
System
Number Rev. Date
Reactor coolant system (SRC) PC117SRC501S03045GN D Dec. 95
Chemical and volume control system (SCV) PC117SCV501S03045DD D Dec. 95
Safety injection system (SSI) PC117SSI501S03045DD D Dec. 95
Residual heat removal system (SRH) PC117SRH501S03045DD D Dec. 95
Component cooling water system (SCW) PC117SCW501S03045DD D Dec. 95
Main steam system (SMS) PC117SMS501S03045DD D Dec. 95
Boron recycle system (SBR) PC117SBR501S03045DD D Dec. 95
Auxiliary feedwater system (SAF) PC117SAF501S03045DD D Dec. 95
Containment spray system (SCS) PC117SCS501S03045DD D Dec. 95
Containment hydrogen recombiner system PC117SHR501S03045DD D Dec. 95

(SHR)
Containment isolation system (SCI) PC117SCI501S03045DD D Dec. 95
Steam generator blowdown system (SGB) PC117SGB501S03045DD D Dec. 95
Sampling system (SAM) PC117SAM501S03045DD D Dec. 95
Spent fuel pool cooling and clean - up system PC117SFP501S03045DD D Dec. 95

(SFP)
Nuclear aux-building common facility room PC117VAC501S06045DD D Dec. 95

ventilation system (VAC)
Nuclear aux-building cooler system (VBC) PC117VBC501S06045DD D Dec. 95
Primary nuclear aux. Building ventilation PC117VPA501S06045DD D Dec. 95

system (VPA)
Nuclear island building stair positive pressure PC117VNP501S06045DD D Dec. 95

supply system (VNP)
1.7-20
Drawing Reference
System
Number Rev. Date
Containment air cooling system (VCC) PC117VCC501S06045DD D Dec. 95
Containment hydrogen mixing system (VHM) PC117VHM501S06045DD D Dec. 95
Containment air clean-up system (VCS) PC117VCS501S06045DD D Dec. 95
Containment purge ventilation system (VPS) PC117VPC501S06045DD D Dec. 95
Reactor cavity cooling system (VRC) PC117VRC501S06045DD D Dec. 95
CRDM cooling system (VDC) PC117VDC501S06045DD D Dec. 95
Administration building and emergency PC117VAE501S06045DD D Dec. 95

centre ventilation (VAE)
Auxiliary feedwater pump building PC117VAF501S06045DD D Dec. 95

ventilation system (VAF)
Electrical building ventilation system (VER) PC117VER501S06045DD D Dec. 95
Electrical building cooler system (VEC) PC117VEC501S06045DD D Dec. 95
Electrical building smoke exhaust system PC117VES501S06045DD D Dec. 95

(VES)
Main control habitability ventilation system PC117VCH501S06045DD D Dec. 95

(VCH)
Main control habitability smoke exhaust PC117VHS501S06045DD D Dec. 95

system (VHS)
Fuel storage building ventilation system PC117VFS501S06045DD D Dec. 95

(VFS)
Emergency diesel generator building PC117VDR501S06045DD D Dec. 95

ventilation system (VDR)
Hot laundry ventilation system (VHL) PC117VHL501S06045DD D Dec. 95
Radwaste solidification building ventilation PC117VWE501S06045DD D Dec. 95

system (VSB)
Essential chilled water system (VWE) PC117VWE501S06045DD D Dec. 95
Essential service water system (WES) PC117WES501S06045DD D Dec. 95
1.7-21
Amendment
TABLE 1.7-2 (Contd)
PIPING AND INSTRUMENTATION DIARGAMS
Drawing Reference
System
Number Rev. Date
Ultimate heat sink cooling tower and water PC117WUH501S06045DD D Dec. 95
storage tank system (WUH)
NI and CI fire protection water distribution PC117WZD501S06045DD D Dec. 95

system (WZD)
NI fire protection system (WZP) PC117WZP501S06045DD D Dec. 95
Fire protection water supply system (WZW) PC117WZW501S06045DD D Dec. 95
1.7-22
1.8 CONFORMANCE TO CODES, STANDARDS REGULATORY
GUIDES
In the design, equipment manufacturing, engineering construction, commissioning

and operation of CHASNUPP, applicable codes, standards, regulatory guides have
been used.
An abstract of the extent of compliance with codes, standards and regulatory guides is
contained in Table 1.8-1
1.8-1
Table 1.8-1
Compilation of Applicable Codes, Standards,
Regulatory Guides and Regulations for
CHASNUPP-1
Chapter Applicable Codes, Standards,

Section Guides and Regulations
1.0 R.G.1.70
Safety series No.50-C-D (Rev.1) (as far as possible)
3.1 GDC
3.2 10CFR part 50 50,55a
GDC 1,2
HAF-0400, R.G1.29, 1.26 (for comment)
ASME sect-III, Div.1
NB, NC, ND, NE, NF, NG
ANSI/ASME B31.1-1986
Chinese Standards, Vendor Specification
3.3
3.3.1 GDC 2
ANSI A58.1-1982
3.4 Appendix A to 10CFR part 100
GDC 2
R.G.1.59
R.G.1.102
3.5 GDC 2,4
R.G. 1.91-78 (for comment)
R.G. 1.115-77
R.G. 1.27-76 (for comment)
Appendix C to ACI349
1.8-2
3.6 GDC4
R.G.1.29
R.G.1.45
ANSI/ANS 58.2-1988
ASME section III-NB, NC, ND
3.7
3.7.1- Appendix A to 10 CFR part 100
3.7.3 GDC2
R.G.1.60
R.G.1.61
R.G.1.92
R.G.1.122
3.7.4 Appendix A to 10 CFR part 100
GDC2
R.G.1.12
10CFR part 50, 55a
3.8
3.8.1 10CFR part 50 50 , 55a
GDC1, 2, 4, 16, 50
R.G.1.90
R.G.1.107
ACI 359-89
R.G. 1.97, 1.136 (for comment)
3.8.2 ASME Sect. III Div.1 Subsect NE
IEEE-317-1983
IEEE-741-86 (section 5.4)
1.8-3
3.8.3 10CFR part 50, 10CFR part 100
GDC1, 2, 4, 50
R.G.1.142, 1.29, 1.60, 1.61, 1.69, 1.92, 1.122, 1.94
ACI-349-85
ANSI N45.2.5
ANSI/AISC N690
3.8.4 10CFR part 50 , 50, 55a, 10CFR part 100
GDC 1, 2, 4
R.G. 1.29, 1.61, 1.60, 1.92, 1.94, 1.142
R.G. 1.69, 1.91, 1.115, 1.143
ACI-349-85, ANSI AISC N690
3.8.5 10CFR part 50 , 50, 55a,
GDC 1, 2, 4
R.G. 1.142, 1.60, 1.61, 1.69, 1.92, 1.94, 1.122
ACI 349-85
3.9
3.9.1 GDC 1, 2, 14, 15, HAF 0304
ASME sect. III-NB, NC, ND, NF, NG
3.9.2 GDC 1, 2, 4, 14, 15
R.G. 1.61, 1.92, 1.20
3.9.3 10CFR part 50 , 50, 55a,
GDC 1, 2, 4, 14, 15
R.G. 1.124, 1.130
3.9.4 HAF 214
GDC 1, 2, 14, 26, 27, 29
R.G. 1.129
ASME sect. III-NB
1.8-4
3.9.5 GDC 1, 2, 4, 10
HAF 214
ASME sect. III-NG
3.9.6 10CFR part 50 , 50, 55a, (g)
GDC 37, 40, 43, 46, 54
ASME Sect. XI
3.9.10 10 CFR 100
GDC 1, 2, 14, 30
R.G. 1.89, 1.92, 1.61, 1.100
IEEE 323-83, 344-87 IEEE 381
IEC 980
3.11 GDC 4
R.G. 1.89, 1.73, 1.63, 1.82, 1.40
IEEE-279, 317, 382, 383, 535, 627
IEEE-323, 334, 381, 420, 572, 628, 649, 650
IEC 780, 980
4.1, 4.2 HAF-0214

HAF0410
ASME, Sect. III
10 CFR 50 App. A
ANSI/ANS 57.5/1983
ASTM C-776-83
ASTN B-353-82
R.G. 1.126
1.8-5
4.3 HAF 0200
HAF 0214
10 CFR 50 App.A
R.G. 1.70
ANSI 57.2-1983 (N210-1976)
4.4 HAF9299
HAF0214
10 CFR 50 App.A
R.G. 1.70
4.5 ASME Sect.III
R.G. 1.37
R.G. 1.44
R.G. 1.31
ASME SFA-5.4, SFA-5.9
R.G. 1.70
4.6 GDC 23
GDC 25
GDC 26
GDC 27
GDC 28
GDC 29
5.0 HAF 0200-91

5.2.1
5.2.1.1 10CFR 50 App. A, GDC 1
10CFR part 50 , 50, 55a
R.G. 1.26
1.8-6
AMENDMENT
Table 1.8-1 (Contd)

5.2.1.2 10 CFR 50 App.A, GDC1
10 CFR 50 , 50, 55a
R.G. 1.84
R.G. 1.85
R.G.1.147
5.2.2 GDC 15, 31
NUREG 0737
BTP RSB 5-2
10 CFR 50, App. A,G
5.2.3 GDC 1, 4, 14, 31
ASME Sec.II
ASME Sec.III
ASME Sec.IX
R.G. 1.31
R.G. 1.36
R.G.1.37
R.G. 1.43
R.G. 1.44
R.G.1.47
R.G. 1.50
R.G. 1.71
5.2.4 GDC 32
10CFR part 50 , 50, 55a
ASME Sec. IX
5.2.5 GDC 2, 30
R.G.1.29
R.G. 1.45
1.8-7
5.3.1 GDC 1, 4, 14, 30, 31, 32
10CFR 50 App. G, H
ASME Sec.III
ASME Sec. V, IX
R.G.1.31
R.G.1.36
R.G.1.37
R.G.1.43
R.G.1.44
R.G.1.50 (with conditions)
R.G.1.65
R.G.1.99
5.3.2 GDC 1, 14, 31, 32
10 CFR 50 App. G, H
10CFR part 50 , 50, 55a
ASME III, App, G
BTP MTEB 5-2
R.G. 1.99
5.3.3 GDC 1, 4, 14, 30, 31, 32, App. G & H
ASME Sec.III, XI
5.4.1 GDC 1, 4
10CFR part 50 , 50, 55a
ASME III, App, G, NB
R.G. 1.14
5.4.2.1 GDC 1, 14, 15, 31, & App. G
ASME Sec.II Part A,B, C
ASME Sec.III NC-2300, NB
ASME Sec. IX
ANSI N45.2.1-1973
R.G.1.37
R.G.1.121
1.8-8
5.4.2.2 GDC 32
R.G. 1.83
NUREG 0452
5.4.6 GDC 2, 4, 19, 34
NUREG 0737
BTP RSB 5-1
R.G.1.1
R.G.1.29
R.G.1.139 (for comment)
5.4.11 GDC 2, 4
R.G. 1.29
5.4.12 GDC 1, 14, 30
10CFR part 50 , 50, 55a
10CFR part 50 , 50, 46 (b)
NUREG 0737
5.4.14 ASME Sec. III NF
6.0 HAF 0200-91

6.1.1 GDC 1,4, 14, 31, 35, 41
10CFR part 50 , 50, 55a
ASME Sec. III
ASME Sec. II, IX
R.G.1.7
R.G.1.31
R.G.1.36
R.G.1.37
R.G.1.43
R.G.1.44
R.G.1.50
6.1.2 ANSI N 101.2
R.G. 1.54
1.8-9
AMENDMENT
Table 1.8-1 (Contd)

6.2.1 GDC 13, 16, 38, 50
6.2.1.1 GDC 31, 16, 18, 50, 64
NUREG 0737 Item II. F.1
R.G. 1.97
6.2.1.2 GDC 4,50
6.2.1.3 GDC 50
10 CFR Part 50 App. K
6.2.1.4 GDC 50
10CFR 50 , 50, 46
10CFR 50 App. K
BTP CSB 6-1
6.2.2 GDC 38, 39, 40
R.G. 1.1
R.G. 1.82
6.2.4 GDC 1, 2, 4, 16, 54, 55, 56, 57
App. K
ANSI/ANS-56.2
NUREG-0737 II .E.4.2
R.G. 1.11
R.G. 1.26
R.G. 1.29
R.G. 1.14 (for comment)
6.2.5 GDC 41, 42, 43
10CFR 50 , 50, 44
10CFR 50 , 50, 46
BT ASB 9-2
NUREG-0737 II .E.4.1, II .F.1
R.G. 1.17
R.G. 1.26 (for comment)
R.G. 1.29
R.G. 1.97
1.8-10
6.2.6 GDC 52, 53, 54
10 CFR 50 App.J
10 CFR Part 100
6.3 GDC 35, 36, 37
GDC 2, 4, 27
10 CFR 50 App. K
10CFR 50 , 50, 46
NUREG 0737:III.D.1,1
II.K.3(10)
R.G. 1.1
R.G. 1.26
R.G. 1.29
R.G. 1.47
6.4 GDC 4, 19
ANS 59.2-95
R.G. 1.52
R.G. 1.78
6.5.1 GDC 41, 42, 43
GDC 19, 61, 64
10 CFR Part 100
ASME 509-1989
ASME 510-1989
R.G. 1.4
R.G. 1.7
R.G. 1.25
R.G. 1.52
6.5.2 GDC 41, 42, 43
ANSI/ANS 56.5-1989
R.G.1.1
6.6 ASME Sec. XI Div. i,
R.G. 1.147
1.8-11
AMENDMENT
Table 1.8.1 (Contd)

7.1 GDC 1
R.G. 1.30, HAF-0400 (IAEA 50-C-D)
IEEE-336, 379, 381, 467, 384, 382, 567, 566, 603
IEC-231A, 964
NUREG 0700
UUREG 0800
7.2 GDC 2, 4, 13, 19 to 25, 29
10CFR 50 , 55a(h)
R.G. 1.22, 1.47, 1.53, 1.62, 1.75, 1.105, 1.118
IEEE 279-1971, 603
IEEE 344, 379, 338, 420; IEC 231A, 671, 780, 980
BTP-ICSB 14, 21, 22
NUREG 0737, 0800
7.3 GDC 2, 4, 13, 19~24, 29, 34, 35, 37, 38, 40, 41, 43, 46
10CFR 50 55, 55a(h)
R.G. 1.22, 1.47, 1.53, 1.62, 1.75, 1.105, 1.118
IEEE 279-1971
IEEE 308-80,334-80, 420-82, 336-85, 382-85, 603-80
IEC 231A-69, 780-84, 980-89
BTP-ICSB 13, 20, 21, 22
NUREG 0737, 0800
7.4 GDC 2, 4, 13, 19, 34, 35, 38
R.G. 1.22, 1.47, 1.53, 1.62, 1.75, 1.105, 1.118
IEEE Std. 279-1971, 420-82, 566-79, IEC231A, 965-89
BTP-ICSB 21, 22
NUREG 0700, 0800
7.5 GDC 2, 4, 13, 19
R.G. 1.22, 1.47, 1.53, 1.75, 1.97, 1.105, 1.118
R.G. 1.151, (with exception)
R.G. 1.11 with supplement of ISA-S67-02
NUREG 0737, 0696, 0800
BTP-ICSB 21, 22
IEEE 420
1.8-12
7.6 GDC 2, 4, 13, 19
R.G. 1.22, 1.47, 1.53, 1.62, 1.75, 1.105, 1.151
R.G. 1.118
IEEE std.279, 308, 420, 603
NUREG 0737, 0800
BTP-ICSB 3, 4, 21, 22
7.7 GDC 13, 19
R.G. 1.51, R.G. 1.11 (ISA-S67-02)
IEEE 279-1971 paragraph 4.7, 566, 567, 420, 384
BTP-ICSB14
NUREG- 0737, 0800
8.1- HAF 0200-1986
8.3 HAF 0207-1988
HAF 0208-1988
GDC 2, 4, 17, 18, 50
R.G. 1.32, 1.6, 1.22, 1.29, 1.30

R.G. 1.75, 1.40, 1.47, 1.53, 1.62
R.G. 1.9, 1.63, 1.73, 1.89, 1.100, 1.106
R.G. 1.93, 1.120, 1.129
R.G. 1.128
R.G. 1.70
R.G. 1.118
R.G. 1.108
IEEE 279-1971
IEEE 308-1980
IEEE 317-1983
IEEE 323-1983
1.8-13
IEEE 334-1980
IEEE 338-1987
IEEE 344-1987
IEEE 379-1988
IEEE 382-1980
IEEE 383-1974
IEEE 384-1981
IEEE 387-1984
IEEE 420-1982
IEEE 422-1986
IEEE 484-1987
IEEE 450-1980
IEEE 336-1985
IEEE 765-1983
IEEE 485-1983
IEEE 535-1986
IEEE 603-1980
IEEE 650-1979
IEEE 741-1986
IEEE 946-1985
9.1.1 GDC 2, 61, 62
R.G. 1.29
ANS 57.1, 57.3
9.1.2 GDC 2, 4, 61, 62
R.G. 1.13 (for comment), 1.29, 1.117, ANS 57.2/ANSI
N210
9.1.3 GDC 44, 45, 46, 2, 4
GDC 61, 63
R.G. 1.13 (for comment), 1.26 (for comment), 1.29,
1.52, 8.8
*
9.1.4 GDC 2, 4, 61, 62

R.G. 1.13 (for comment), 1.29
ANS 57.1/ANSI N208
ANS 57.2/ANSI N210
1.8-14
AMENDMENT
Table 1.8.1 (Contd)

9.2.1 Sec 9.2.4, 9.2.5
9.2.2 GDC 44, 45, 46, 2, 4, 5
R.G. 1.29
IEEE 279-71
9.2.3 GDC 5, 2
R.G. 1.29
9.2.4- GDC 60, 2, 44, 45, 46
9.2.5 HAF 0206
GBJ 102-87
GBJ 13-86
GBJ 14-97
R.G. 1.27 (for comment), 1.29
BTP ASB 9.2
9.2.6 GDC 44, 45, 46, 2
R.G. 1.29
9.2.7 GDC 2
GBJ 19-87
GBJ 235-82
GBJ 236-82
GBJ 242-82
GBJ 243-82
ANS 59.1-86
HAF 201-86
HAF 202-86
HAF 0400-91 R.G. 1.29
9.2.8 GDC 2
GBJ 19-87
GBJ 235-82
SDJ 1-84
SDGJ 23-81
GBJ 41-79
R.G. 1.29
1.8-15
9.3.1 GDC 5, 1, 2
R.G. 1.29
ANSI/ANS-59.3
HAF 0304-87
9.3.2 GDC 60, 1, 2, 13, 41
GDC 14, 26, 63, 64
10 CFR 20 20.1(c)
R.G. 1.26, 1.29, 8.8, 1.97
NUREG 0737II .B.3
9.3.3 GDC 60, 2, 4
R.G. 1.29
9.3.4 GDC 33.35 , 1, 2, 29, 60, 61
GDC 5.14
R.G. 1.26, 1.29
NUREG 0737 III D.1.1
9.3.5 GDC 5, 33, 1, 2, 14, 29, 35, 60, 61
R.G. 1.29, 1.26
NUREG 0737 III D.1.1
9.4.1 GDC 2, 4, 19, 60
R.G. 1.29, 1.78, 1.95, 1.52, 1.140
ANSI/ASME N509-1989
ANSI/ASME N510-1989
ANSI/ANS 59.2-1985
1.8-16
9.4.2 ANSI/ANS 56.6
HAF 0202, 0209
GDC 2, 60, 61
R.G. 1.29, 1.52, 1.140, 1.13 (for comment)
GBJ 19-87
TJ 36-79
GBJ 16-87
GBJ 242-82
GBJ 243-82
ASME/ANS 59.2-1985
ASME N509-1989
ASME N510-1989
9.4.3 GDC 2, 60
R.G. 1.29, 1.40
ASME N509-89, 510-89
ANSI/ANS 56.6-86, 59.2-85
9.4.4 SDJ 1-84
SDGJ 9-86
GBJ 19-87
GBJ 16-87
TJ 36-79
9.4.5 GDC 2, 4, 17, 60
R.G. 1.29, 1.52, 1.140
ASME N509-89, 510-89
ANSI/ANS 59.2-85, 56.6-86
9.5.1 GDC 3
10 CFR 50 50.84
R.G. 1.78
HAF 0202
BTP 9.5.1
1.8-17
9.5.4 GDC 2, 4, 17
R.G. 1.9, 1.137
IEEE 387
ANSI N195
9.5.5 GDC 2, 4, 17, 45, 46
R.G. 1.9
IEEE 387
ASME B & PV-NE-1989
9.5.6 GDC 2, 4, 17
~ 9.5.8 IEEE 387-84
10.2 GB5578-85, GB8117-87

GB755-87, GB7064-86, GB7409-75
IEC34-1, IEC34-3, IEC2A (13-1978)
IEC (593-1982)
HAF 0304 R.G. 1.68
10.3 GDC 2, 4, 34 R.G. 1.26, 1.115, 1.29
HAF 0200, HAF 0211, HAF 0212
10 CFR 50 App. A
ASME BPV-III-1-NC
ANSI B31.1
GB 12145-89, SDGJ2-85
10.3.6 GDC 1.35
R.G. 1.37
HAF 0404
ANSI N45.2.2, N45.2.3
ASME III App. I
ASTM A-370-E-208
1.8-18
10.4.1 GDC 60
R.G. 1.68
HEI-84
HAF 304
10.4.2 DLGJ 23-81, SDJ 1-84
GDC 60, 64
10.4.3 R.G. 1.26
10.4.4 SDJ 1-84, DLGJ 23-81
GDC 4, 34
R.G. 1.68, HAF 304
10.4.5 GBJ 14-87, GDC 4
10.4.6 GB 12145-89, SDGJ 2-85, GDC 14
10.4.7 GDC 2, 4, 44, 45, 46
DLGJ 23-81, SDJ 1-84
ASME NOTWDPS-1 Part II
ANSI B31.1, R.G. 1.29
10.4.8 GDC 1, 2, 14, R.G. 1.26, 1.29
10CFR50, 10CFR20, NUREG-0017
GB 6249-86, GB 9135-88
10.4.9 GDC.2, 4, 5, 19, 34, 44, 45, 46
R.G. 1.29
ANSI/ANSI 51.1-1983
ANSI/ANS 51.10-1979
NUREG 0737, ASME III-1-ND
11
11.1 GDC 60
10CFR20, 10CFR50
R.G. 1.112
ANSI/ANS 18.1-1984
NUREG-0017
RG 1.140
1.8-19
AMENDMENT
Table 1.8.1 (Contd)

11.2 GDC 60, 61, HAF0200
10CFR20, 10CFR50 NUREG0017 Rev1
R.G. 1.109, R.G. 1.112
R.G. 1.26
ANSI/ANS 55.6-1979
ANSI/ANS 51.1-1983
R.G. 1.143 ****
11.3 GDC 3, 60, HAF 0200
10CFR20, 10CFR50 R.G. 1.140
R.G. 1.109, R.G. 1.111
R.G. 1.143**** (SGW decay tank OBE only)
ANSI/ANS 55.41979
ANSI/ANS 51.1-1983
NUREG 0017 Rev1
11.4 GDC 60, 63, HAF0200
10CFR20, 10CFR50, GB11086-89
ANSI/ANS 55.1-1979 No.6.1, No. 6.2.5.6 which are
equivalent to
IAEA Safety series No 6 and 10 CFR 71,
R.G. 1. 143****
11.5 GDC 60, 63, 64, R.G. 4.15
10CFR20 NUREG 0017-Rev1
R.G. 1.97, R.G. 1.21, NUREG0737
ANSI N13.1-1969, R.G. 1.143****
ANSI N13.10-1974
IEC532, 951-1
IEEE Std, 603-1991
1.8-20
AMENDMENT
Table 1.8.1 (Contd)

12.1 10CFR50, 50.34 10CFR 19
10CFR20, 20.1(c) R.G.1.33
R.G. 1.8, NUREG-0737
R.G. 8.8*, NUREG-0761*
R.G. 8.10
R.G. 1.70
12.2 10CFR50, App.A.GDC61
10CFR20, 20.101; 20.103; 20.104;
20.106; 20.107
R.G. 1.4
R.G. 1.7
R.G. 1.112
ANSI/ANS 18.1-1984
NUREG-0017
NUREG-0737
12.3 10CFR50, App.A.GDC19, GDC61
12.4 10CFR20, 20.1(C); 20.101; 20.103;
20.104; 20.203
R.G. 1.4 ANSIN 101.6
R.G. 1.7 NUREG0737
R.G. 1.52, 10CFR20.207
R.G. 1.69, IEC-1031-1990
R.G. 1.70, ANSI N 13.1-1969,
R.G. 1.97, 10CFR70 Section 70.24***,
R.G. 8.2, RG 8.12***, ANSI N 16.2***,
R.G. 8.8,
R.G. 8.10,
R.G. 8.19
1.8-21
AMENDMENT
Table 1.8.1 (Contd)

12.5 10CFR50, App.A.GDC64
10CFR20, 20.1(C); 20.101; 20.103;
20.105; 20.201; 20.202;
20.203; 20.204; 20.205;
20.207; 20.401; 20.402
10CFR50 50.34
R.G. 1.8 R.G. 8.2
R.G. 1.33* 10CFR19*
R.G. 1.70 10CFR 20 Article 405
R.G. 1.97 10CFR 20 Article 408
R.G. 8.3 R.G. 8.8, 8.10*, 8.13*, 8.15, 8.27*, 8.14*
R.G. 8.4 NUREG0041*, NUREG0731*, NUREG0737,
IEC 532-76, ANSI N13.2-1969*, ANS3.1-1978*
R.G. 8.7, ANSI N13.6-1972*
R.G. 8.15, R.G. 8.6
R.G. 8.28, R.G. 8.9*, R.G 8.20*, R.G. 8.26*
R.G. 8.29, IEC-1283-1995,
ANSI-N42.3-1969
13.0
14.0 HAF0300, 0304
15.1.1 GDC 10, 15, 26, ASME Sect. III

15.1.2
15.1.3
15.1.4
15.1.5 GDC 27, 28, 31, 35
15.1.5.1 10 CFR Part 100, 100.11
15.2.1 - 15.2.5 GDC 10, 15, 26: ASME Sect. III
15.2.6 GDC 10, 15,21, 26, ASME Sect. III
1.8-22
AMENDMENT
Table 1.8.1 (Contd)

15.2.7 GDC 10, 15, 21, 26, ASME Sec. III
15.2.8 GDC 27, 28, 31, 35, ASME Sect. III
15.3.1-15.3.2 GDC 10, 15, 26, ASME Sec. III
15.3.3-15.3.4 GDC 15, 27, 28, 31, ASME Sect. III
10 CFR 100 100.11
15.4.1 GDC 10, 20, 25
15.4.2 GDC 10, 20, 25
15.4.3 GDC 10, 20, 25
15.4.6 GDC 10, 15, 26, ASME Sec. III
15.4.7 10 CFR 100, GDC13
15.4.8 GDC 28; 10CFR100, 100.11
R.G. 1.77
15.5.1-15.5.2 GDC 10, 15, 26;
ASME Sec. III
15.6.1 GDC 10, 15, 26
15.6.2 10CFR100, 100.11
15.6.3 10CFR100, 100.11
15.6.5 GDC 35
10CFR50, 50.46 and App.K
10CFR100, 100.11
R.G. 1.4
15.7.3 GDC 60
15.7.4 GDC 61, 10CFR100, 100.11
15.7.5 GDC 61, 10CFR100, 100.11
15.8 NUREG 0800
16 10CFR50, 50.36, 50.34, NUREG -0452-1987
1.8-23
17 HAF 0400 Rev.1 (91)
17.1 HAF 0400
17.1.1 HAF 0400
17.1.2 HAF 0401
17.1.3 HAF 0400, HAF 0407
17.1.4 HAF 0402
17.1.5 HAF 0406
17.1.6 HAF 0403
17.1.7 HAF 0408
17.1.8 HAF 0408
17.1.9 HAF 0408
17.1.10 HAF 0408
17.1.11 HAF 0408
17.1.12 HAF 0402
17.1.13 HAF 0409
1.8-24
Note:
(1) Nuclear safety criteria and general requirements defined in the codes and
standards shall be applicable. However, in certain areas, such as material,
fabrication and welding process, testing, etc., Chinese national industrial
standards will be used and followed without jeopardizing the safety function.
(2)
* These codes and standards relate to operation and will be applicable to plant
operators.
** Chinese codes and standards are used in their place.
*** CZEC will provide a US reference station that when Keff < 0.95, these codes /
standards are not required.
**** For equipment classification and its relevant requirements of radwaste

treatment system. ANSI / ANS 51.1-1983 is followed except for gaseous
decay tanks which will be designed for OBE.
(3) The following abbreviations are used in the compilation table.
ACI American Concrete Institute

AEC U.S .Atomic Energy Commission
AISC American Institute of Steel Construction
ANS American Nuclear Society
ANSI American National Standard Institute
ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers
ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials
BTP Branch Technical Position (attached to SRP)
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
GDC General Design Criterion (10 FCR Part 50.App.A)
HEI Heat Exchange Institute (U.S.A)
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IEC Institute of Electro technical Commission
NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
1.8-25
NUREG N.R.C. Report
R.G. Regulatory Guide
SRP Standard Review Plan
HAF Nuclear Safety Code and Guide of P.R. China
GB National Standard of China
GBJ National Standard of P.R. China issued by National
Construction Commission
SDJ Standard issued by Electrical Power Ministry of China
SDGJ Standard issued by Electrical Power Ministry of China
DLGJ Standard issued by Electrical Power Ministry of China
TJ Standard issued by Public Health Ministry of China
1.8-26

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CHASHMA

NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

Chapter 1.0 Introduction and General Description of Plant

Chapter 2.0 Site Characteristics

Chapter 3.0 Design of Structures, Components, Equipment, and Systems

Chapter 4.0 Reactor

Chapter 5.0 Reactor Coolant System and Connected Systems

Chapter 6.0 Engineered Safety Features

Chapter 7.0 Instrumentation and Control

Chapter 8.0 Electric Power

Chapter 9.0 Auxiliary Systems

Chapter 10.0 Steam and Power Conversion System

Chapter 11.0 Radioactive Waste Management

Chapter 12.0 Radiation Protection

Chapter 13.0 Conduct of Operation

Chapter 14.0 Initial Test Program

Chapter 15.0 Accident Analyses

Chapter 16.0 Technical Specifications

Chapter 17.0 Quality Assurance

Title Final Safety Analysis Report

CHASHMA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

No. P C 1 00620 011 S300 02 GN

1.0-2,4; 1.1-4; 1.2-1, 8, 11,

A 98.02 CFC Dai Anguo - Zhou

Rev. Date Status Reviewed By Modification Observations Approved By

S.C.No. Internal No. PC-00620-011

INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PLANT

1.1 INTRODUCTION 1.1-1

1.2 GENERAL PLANT DESCRIPTION 1.2-1

1.2.1 Site and Environment 1.2-1

1.2.2 Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) 1.2-1

1.2.2.1 Principal Design Criteria 1.2-3

1.2.2.2 Operating Characteristics 1.2-4

1.2.2.3 Safety Considerations 1.2-5

1.2.3 Engineered Safety Features and 1.2-6

1.2.3.1 Containment System 1.2-6

1.2.3.2 Emergency Core Cooling System 1.2-10

1.2.3.3 Auxiliary Feedwater System 1.2-11

1.2.3.4 Emergency Electrical System 1.2-12

1.2.3.5 Fire Protection System 1.2-13

1.2.3.6 Main Control Room Habitability 1.2-14

1.2.4 Instrumentation, Control and Electrical 1.2-14

1.2.4.1 Instrumentation and Control Systems 1.2-14

1.2.4.2 Electrical Power Systems 1.2-17

1.2.5 Turbine and Auxiliaries 1.2-19

1.2.6 Fuel Handling and Storage Systems 1.2-20

1.2.7 Cooling Water, Ventilation, and other Auxiliary Systems 1.2-21

1.2.7.1 Cooling Water Systems 1.2-21

1.2.7.2 Ventilation Systems 1.2-23

1.2.7.3 Other Auxiliary Systems 1.2-25

1.2.8 Radioactive Waste Treatment Systems 1.2-26

1.2.9 Plant Arrangement and Structures 1.2-28

1.3 COMPARISON TABLES 1.3-1

1.4 IDENTIFICATION OF AGENTS AND CONTRACTORS 1.4-1

1.4.1 Applicant 1.4-1

1.4.2 Contractor 1.4-1

1.5 REQUIREMENTS FOR FURTHER TECHNICAL 1.5-1

1.6 MATERIAL INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE 1.6-1

1.6.1 Chinese Standards and Codes 1.6-1

1.6.2 International Standards and U.S.A. National 1.6-1

1.6.3 Topical Report 1.6-3

1.7 DRAWINS AND OTHER DETAILED INFORMATION 1-7-1

1.7.1 Electrical, Instrumentation and Control Drawings 1.7-1

1.7.2 Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams 1.7-1