Torts 3

1. Wassmer v. Velez

Facts:

Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love decided to get married on
September 4, 1954. On the day of the supposed marriage, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be that day to postpone
their wedding because his mother opposes it. Therefore, Velez did not appear and was not heard from again.

Beatriz sued Velez for damages and Velez failed to answer and was declared in default. Judgement was
rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff P2.000 as actual damages P25,000 as moral and exemplary damages,
P2,500 as attorneys fees.

Later, an attempt by the Court for amicable settlement was given chance but failed, thereby rendered
judgment hence this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this case.

Held:

Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But formally set a wedding and go
through all the necessary preparations and publicity and only to walk out of it when matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpable and unjustifiable to good customs which holds liability in accordance
with Art. 21 on the New Civil Code.

When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under the same, moral and exemplary damages may not be
awarded when it is proven that the defendanr clearly acted in wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.

2. CELDRAN v CELDRAN

FACTS:Plaintiffs were the children of the deceased, Pedro Celdran, Sr. from the first marriage.Defendants were Josefa
Celdran, spouse of the decreased by the second marriage and their sevenchildren. When the defendants answered on
May 28, 1954, Ignacio Celdran withdrew as one of theplaintiffs, alleging that the documents was falsified. On March 6,
1959, the parties an amicablesettlement, except Ignacio Celdran, recognizing as valid for being satisfied by Ignacio,
upon receipt of P10,000 plus two residential lots. Ignacio appealed to the CA. On March 22, 1963, at the instance of
Ignacio, an information for falsification of public documents was filed by the first marriage.

ISSUE:Whether or not the proceedings in the criminal case on the ground of prejudicial question besuspended, for the
reason that the alleged falsification of document of withdrawal is at issue in the casepending in the CA

HELD:The court held the action poses a prejudicial question to the criminal prosecution for allegedfalsification. The
authenticity of the document was assailed in the same civil action. The resolution in thecivil case be determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal suit pending. As such,it is a prejudicial question which should be
first decided before the prosecution can proceed in thecriminal case. Prejudicial question is one that arises in a case
the resolution of which is a logicalantecedent to the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal; it isdeterminative of the case before the court and jurisdiction to pass upon the same is lodged in
another

The decision of the CA under review is affirmed. The administrative case was held in abeyanceof the high court.

3. JOSE V. LAGON, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MENANDRO V. LAPUZ, respondents

FACTS:

On June 23, 1982, petitioner Jose Lagon purchased two parcels of land located at Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat from the
estate of Bai Tonina Sepi. A few months after the sale, private respondent Menandro Lapuz filed a complaint for torts
and damages against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sultan Kudarat. Private respondent claimed
that he entered into a contract of lease with the late Bai Tonina Sepi over three parcels of land in Sultan Kudarat,
Maguindanao beginning 1964. It was agreed upon that private respondent will put upcommercial buildings which
would, in turn, be leased to new tenants. The rentals to be paid by those tenants, would answer for the rent private
respondent was obligated to pay Bai Tonina Sepi for the lease of the land. In 1974, the lease contract ended but was
allegedly renewed. When Bai Tonina Sepi died, private respondent started remitting his rent to the court-appointed
administrator of her estate. But when the administrator advised him to stop collecting rentals from the tenants of the
buildings heconstructed, he discovered that petitioner, representing himself as the new owner of the property, had
been collecting rentals from the tenants. He thus filed a complaint against the latter, accusing petitioner of inducing
the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him, thereby violating his leasehold rights over it.
Petitioner denied the allegation, thus contending that the heirs were in dire need of money to pay off the
obligations of the deceased. He also denied interfering with private respondent's leasehold rights as there was no
lease contractcovering the property when he purchased it; that his personal investigation and inquiry revealed no
claims or encumbrances on the subject lots.
On July 29, 1986, the RTC decided in favor of the private respondent. Petitioner appealed the judgment to
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court with modification . It held for petitioner
liable for damages, reasoning that he must have known of the lease contract and must have also acted with malice or
bad faith when he bought the subject parcels of land.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the purchase by petitioner of the subject property, during the supposed existence of private
respondent's lease contract with the late Bai Tonina Sepi, constituted tortuous interference for which petitioner
should be held liable for damages. NO

HELD:

The Court, in the case of So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals, laid down the elements of tortuous interference with
contractual relations: (a) existence of a valid contract; (b) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence
of the contract and (c) interference of the third person without legal justification or excuse.

As regards the first element, the existence of a valid contract must be duly established. To prove this, private
respondent presented in court a notarized copy of the purported lease renewal. While the contract appeared as duly
notarized, the notarization thereof, however, only proved its due execution and delivery but not the veracity of its
contents. Nonetheless, after undergoing the rigid scrutiny of petitioners counsel and after the trial court declared it to
be valid and subsisting, the notarized copy of the lease contract presented in court appeared to be incontestable proof
that private respondent and the late Bai Tonina Sepi actually renewed their lease contract. Settled is the rule that until
overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence, a notarized document continues to be prima facie evidence of the
facts that gave rise to its execution and delivery.

The second element, on the other hand, requires that there be knowledge on the part of the interferer that the
contract exists. Knowledge of the subsistence of the contract is an essential element to state a cause of action for
tortuous interference. A defendant in such a case cannot be made liable for interfering with a contract he is unaware
of. While it is not necessary to prove actual knowledge, he must nonetheless be aware of the facts which, if followed
by a reasonable inquiry, will lead to a complete disclosure of the contractual relations and rights of the parties in the
contract.

In this case, petitioner claims that he had no knowledge of the lease contract. His sellers (the heirs of Bai
Tonina Sepi) likewise allegedly did not inform him of any existing lease contract.

After a careful perusal of the records, we find the contention of petitioner meritorious. He conducted his own
personal investigation and inquiry, and unearthed no suspicious circumstance that would have made a cautious man
probe deeper and watch out for any conflicting claim over the property. An examination of the entire propertys title
bore no indication of the leasehold interest of private respondent. Even the registry of property had no record of the
same.

Assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioner knew of the contract, such knowledge alone was not sufficient to
make him liable for tortuous interference. Which brings us to the third element. According to our ruling in So Ping
Bun, petitioner may be held liable only when there was no legal justification or excuse for his action or when his
conduct was stirred by a wrongful motive. To sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted
with malice or must have been driven by purely impious reasons to injure the plaintiff. In other words, his act of
interference cannot be justified.

Furthermore, the records do not support the allegation of private respondent that petitioner induced the heirs
of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him. The word induce refers to situations where a person causes another to
choose one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation. The records show that the decision of the heirs of the
late Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property was completely of their own volition and that petitioner did absolutely
nothing to influence their judgment. Private respondent himself did not proffer any evidence to support his claim.
In short, even assuming that private respondent was able to prove the renewal of his lease contract with Bai Tonina
Sepi, the fact was that he was unable to prove malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner in purchasing the property.
Therefore, the claim of tortuous interference was never established.

4. Carandang v. Santiago

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari against Honorable Vicente Santiago, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, to
annul his order in Civil Case No. 21173, entitled Cesar M. Carandang vs. Tomas Valenton, Sr. et al., suspending the trial
of said civil case to await the result of the criminal Case No. 534, Court of First Instance of Batangas. In this criminal
case, Tomas Valenton, Jr. was found guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide committed against the person of Cesar
Carandang, petitioner herein. Tomas Valenton, Jr. appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals where the case is now
pending.

Petitioner invokes Article 33 of the new Civil Code. The Code Commission itself states that the civil action allowed
under Article 33 is similar to the action in tort for libel or slander and assault and battery under American law. But
respondents argue that the term "physical injuries" is used to designate a specific crime defined in the Revised Penal
Code.

In the case at bar, the accused was charged with and convicted of the crime of frustrated homicide, and while it was
found in the criminal case that a wound was inflicted by the defendant on the body of the petitioner herein Cesar
Carandang, which wound is bodily injury, the crime committed is not physical injuries but frustrated homicide, for the
reason that the infliction of the wound is attended by the intent to kill.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an offended party can file a separate and independent civil action for damages arising from physical
injuries during the pendency of the criminal action for frustrated homicide.
HELD:
Yes. The Article in question uses the words "defamation", "fraud" and "physical injuries." Defamation and fraud are
used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as
means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart
to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this apparent
circumstance in mind, it is evident that the term "physical injuries" could not have been used in its specific sense as a
crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms
in the same article some in their general and another in its technical sense. In other words, the term "physical
injuries" should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with
the latter are general terms.

5. Zapanta v. Montesa

PETITION for prohibition. Petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.
Before his arraignment, he filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a civil action against the complainant, for
the annulment of their marriage on the ground of duress, force and intimidation. Thereafter, he filed a motion in the
criminal case to suspend the proceedings therein, pending the determination of the issue involved in the civil case.
Respondent Judge denied his motion and ordered his arraignment. After entering a plea of not guilty, petitioner filed
the present action for prohibition to enjoin the respondent from proceeding with the said criminal case.

Held:

In People vs. Aragon, 94 Phil., 357; this Court held that if the defendant in a case for bigamy claims that the first
marriage is void and the right to decide such validity is vested in another court, the civil action for annulment must
first be decided before the action for bigamy can proceed. There is no reason not to apply the same when the
contention of the accused is that the second marriage is void on the ground that he. entered into it because of duress,
force and intimidation.