39. Mendoza vs.

Arrieta

FACTS: A three- way vehicular accident occurred involving a car owned and driven by
petitioner Edgardo Mendoza, a private jeep owned and driven by respondent Rodolfo Salazar,
and a gravel and sand truck owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie
Montoya. As a consequence of said mishap, two separate Informations for Reckless Imprudence
Causing Damage to Property were filed against Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie Montoya with the
CFI of Bulacan. The trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liability, civil and
criminal, in view of its findings that the collision between Salazars jeep and petitioners car was
the result of the former having been bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya.
Neither was petitioner awarded damages as he was not a complainant against truck-driver
Montoya but only against jeep-owner-driver Salazar. After the termination of the criminal cases,
petitioner filed a civil case against respondents Salazar and Timbol for the damages sustained by
his car as a result of the collision involving their vehicles.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing petitioners complaint for damages
based on quasi-delict against private respondents.

Held: Insofar as Timbol is concerned the answer is yes. The respondent Judge wrongfully
sustained Timbols allegations that the civil suit is barred by the prior joint judgment in a
criminal case filed against him, wherein no reservation to file a separate civil case was made by
petitioner and where the latter actively participated in the trial and tried to prove damages against
Salazar only. For petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based on quasi-
delict. Respondent Judge committed reversible error when he dismissed the civil suit against the
truck-owner, as said case may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless
of the result of the latter. Article 31 of the Civil Code provides that, When the civil action is
based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil
action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter. Timbols submission that petitioner's failure to make a reservation in the criminal action
of his right to file an independent civil action, as required under section 2, Rule 111, Rules of
Court, bars the institution of such separate civil action is untenable. For inasmuch as Article 31
(in relation to Articles 2176 and 2177) of the Civil Code creates a civil liability distinct and
different from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal
Code, no reservation is required to be made in the criminal case. And so, to reiterate, the civil
case filed against Timbol is not barred by the fact that petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal
action, his right to file an independent civil action based on quasi-delict.

But insofar as Salazar is concerned the answer is no. Inasmuch as civil liability co-exists with
criminal responsibility in negligence cases, the offended party has the option between an action
for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2177 of the
Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under section 1
of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is deemed simultaneously instituted with the criminal action,
unless expressly waived or reserved for separate application by the offended party. The
circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the conclusion that petitioner had opted to
base his cause of action against Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpa aquiliana as
evidenced by his active participation and intervention in the prosecution of the criminal suit
against said Salazar. The latter's civil liability continued to be involved in the criminal action
until its termination. Such being the case, there was no need for petitioner to have reserved his
right to file a separate civil action as his action for civil liability was deemed impliedly instituted
in the criminal case.

Salazar cannot be held civilly liable for damages sustained by petitioners car for
considering that the collision between the jeep driven by him and the car owned and driven by
Mendoza was the result of the hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven by Montoya, it
cannot be said that Salazar was at fault. Hence, the right of petitioner to claim damages from
Salazar did not arise. Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-
owner-driver Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil
action must be held to have been extinguished in consonance with Section 3(c) which provides
that, Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil right
arise did not exist

40. Pajarito vs. Seneris

FACTS: Private Respondent Joselito Aizon was charged before the CFI Zamboanga City with
Double Homicide through Reckless Imprudence which caused the Isuzu Passenger Bus he was
driving to turn turtle and as a result Myrna Pajarito and Musa Baring, both passengers on board
the bus sustained injuries which caused their death. When Joselito Aizon entered a plea of guilty,
the court rendered judgement convicting him of offense charged & sentenced him to indemnify
heirs of Myrna Pajarito the amount of P12,000. Writ of Execution was issued against Joselito
Aizon but it was unsatisfied due to his insolvency. Therefore, Petitioner Lucia Pajarito, mother
of Myrna, filed with CFI a motion for issuance of Subsidiary Writ of Execution and served a
copy thereof to Private Respondent Felipe Aizon, employer of Joselito. But Felipe opposed on
ground that he is not the employer because he already sold the vehicle to Isaac Aizon, father of
Joselito, but the deed of transfer has not been executed because the full price has not yet been
paid. CFI denied Petitioners motion for Subsidiary Writ of Execution on the ground that Felipe
Aizon was not a party in the criminal case. CFI ruled that a separate civil action must be filed by
Pajarito against Felipe to enforce subsidiary liability. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subsidiary civil liability established in Article 102 and 103 of RPC
may be enforced in the same criminal case where the award was made, or in a separate civil
action.

HELD: Yes. Under Art. 100 of the RPC, a person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable. Hence, the institution of the criminal action carries with it the institution of the civil action
arising therefrom, except when there is a separate civil action or reservation of the latter on the
part of the complainant. Pursuant to Art. 103, in relation to Art. 102 of the RPC, an employer
may be subsidiary liable for the employees civil liability in a criminal action when: (1) the
employer is engaged in any kind of industry; (2) the employee committed the offence in the
discharge of his duties; and (3) he is insolvent and has not satisfies his civil liability. However,
the subsidiary liability of the employer arises only after conviction of the employee in the
criminal case. The employer becomes ipso facto subsidiary liable upon his drivers conviction
and upon proof of the latters insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only the
employees primary liability but also his employers subsidiary liability for such criminal
negligence. The decision convicting the employee is binding and conclusive upon the employer,
not only with regard to the civil liability but also with regard to its amount because the liability
of the employer cannot be separated but follows that of his employee. To allow an employer to
dispute the civil liability fixed in the criminal case would be to amend, nullify, or defeat a final
judgment rendered by a competent court. Considering that Felipe Aizon does not deny that he
was the registered operator of the bus but only claims that he sold the bus to the father of the
accused. Therefore, it would serve no important purpose to require petitioner to file a separate
and independent action against the employer for the enforcement of the latters subsidiary civil
liability. Such would only prolong the litigation and would require the heirs of the deceased
victim to incur unnecessary expenses. The proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary
liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgement.

50. Caedo vs. Yu Khe Thai

Petitioners: Marcial T. Caedo, Juana Caedo and their children, riding in the Mercury Car
Respondents: Yu Khe Thai (owner of car), Rafael Bernardo (driver), in a Cadillac

FACTS: At 5:30 in the morning, on Highway 54 (now EDSA) in the vicinity of San Lorenzo
Village, Marcial Caedo was driving his Mercury car from QC to the airport (southbound) to
bring his son who was going to Mindoro. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac
of Yu Khe Thai, driven by Bernardo, going to Wack Wack from Paraaque (northbound.)
Considering there was no traffic at that time, both cars were traveling a fairly moderate speeds
Caedo at 40-50kph, Bernardo 48-56kph. In front of the car of Bernardo and Yu Khe Thai was a
carretela going in the same direction. The carretela was towing another horse by means of a short
rope coiled around the carretelas post. The carretela had two lights, one on each side.

Bernardo, instead of slowing down or stopping behind the carretela, veered to the left in order to
pass. As he did, his car caught the rim of the carretelas left wheel, wrenching it off and carrying
it along as the car skidded to the other land, colliding with Caedos car. Caedo, tried to avoid the
collision by going farther to the right, but was unsuccessful.
Caedo and the members of his family were injured because of the accident, so they filed this suit
for recovery of damages from Bernardo and Yu Khe Thai.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Bernardo (driver of Yu Ke Thai) was responsible for the accident.
2. Whether or not Yu Ke Thai is also liable as employer of Bernardo.
HELD:
1. Bernardo in the Cadillac. The collision was directly traceable to Bernardos negligence.
He tried to beat Caedos car or squeeze between Caedos car and the carretela. He should
have known that passing the carretela was a risky maneuver, but he still took a gamble.
The first clear indication of his negligence was his claim that he was almost upon the
carretela when he saw it in front of him, only 8 meters away. The carretela had two lights,
one on each side, which should have given him sufficient warning to take necessary
precaution. Even if he claims he didnt see the lights of the carretela, the carretela should
have been visible to him if he had been careful, as it must have been in the beam of his
headlights.

2. No, Yu Khe Thai cannot be held solidarily liable with Bernardo.

Art 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the
former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the
misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found
guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next
preceding two months.

Under Art. 2148, if the causative factor was the drivers negligence, the owner of the
vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by
the exercise of due diligence.

However, in the case of Chapman vs. Underwood: (important)

An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his
driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent
acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to
direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for
such acts, both criminally and civilly, for the results produced by the acts
of the chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of
negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to
prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal
law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at the time the
act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor.
The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for
such a length of time that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver
act his own.

The basis of the master's liability in civil law is the relationship of paterfamilias. The
theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and
susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it
in order to prevent injury or damage.

In this case, Bernardo has been Yu Khe Thais driver for around 20 years prior to the
accident and Bernardo has had no record of violation of traffic laws and regulations. No
negligence for having employed by him at all may be imputed to his master. The car was
not running at an unreasonable speed. Yu Khe Thai had reason to rely on the skill and
 experience of his driver. The time element was such that there was no reasonable
opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver
accordingly. According to Yu Khe Thai, he thought that if he sounded a sudden warning
it might only make this driver nervous and make the situation worse.

The test of imputed negligence under Art. 2184 is, to a great degree, necessarily
subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as
are professional drivers. The test of his (the car owners) negligence, within the meaning
of Art. 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he
should do in order to avoid the accident.

57. Villanueva vs. Rosqueta

FACTS: Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta (Rosqueta), formerly Deputy Commissioner of the

Revenue Collection and Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs (the Bureau), tendered her
courtesy resignation from that post on January 23, 2001, shortly after President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office. But five months later on June 5, 2001, she withdrew her
resignation, claiming that she enjoyed security of tenure and that she had resigned against her
will on orders of her superior.

Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President Arroyo appointed Gil Valera (Valera) to respondent
Rosquetas position. Challenging such appointment, Rosqueta filed a petition for prohibition,
quo warranto, and injunction against petitioner Titus B. Villanueva (Villanueva), then
Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, and Valera with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila in Civil Case 01-101539. On August 27, 2001 the RTC issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO), enjoining Villanueva and the Finance Secretary from implementing
Valeras appointment. On August 28, 2001 the trial court superseded the TRO with a writ of
preliminary injunction. On November 22, 2001 while the preliminary injunction in the quo
warranto case was again in force, petitioner Villanueva issued Customs Memorandum Order 40-
2001, authorizing Valera to exercise the powers and functions of the Deputy Commissioner.

During the Bureaus celebration of its centennial anniversary in February 2002, its special
Panorama magazine edition featured all the customs deputy commissioners, except respondent
Rosqueta. The souvenir program, authorized by the Bureaus Steering Committee headed by
petitioner Villanueva to be issued on the occasion, had a space where Rosquetas picture was
supposed to be but it instead stated that her position was under litigation. Meanwhile, the
commemorative billboard displayed at the Bureaus main gate included Valeras picture but not
Rosquetas.

On February 28, 2002 respondent Rosqueta filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of
Quezon City against petitioner Villanueva in Civil Case Q-02-46256, alleging that the latter
maliciously excluded her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia. Further, she claimed that
he prevented her from performing her duties as Deputy Commissioner, withheld her salaries, and
refused to act on her leave applications. Thus, she asked the RTC to award her P1,000,000.00 in
moral damages, P500,000.00 in exemplary damages, and P300,000.00 in attorneys fees and
costs of suit.

RTC dismissed the case. CA reversed granting Villanueva to pay P500,000.00 in moral damages,
P200,000.00 in exemplary damages and P100,000.00 in attorneys fees and litigation expenses.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Rosqueta is entitled to moral damages.

HELD: Yes. Petitioner Villanueva cannot seek shelter in the alleged advice that the OSG gave
him. Surely, a government official of his rank must know that a preliminary injunction order
issued by a court of law had to be obeyed, especially since the question of Valeras right to
replace respondent Rosqueta had not yet been properly resolved. That petitioner Villanueva
ignored the injunction shows bad faith and intent to spite Rosqueta who remained in the eyes of
the law the Deputy Commissioner. His exclusion of her from the centennial anniversary
memorabilia was not an honest mistake by any reckoning. Indeed, he withheld her salary and
prevented her from assuming the duties of the position.

The CA correctly awarded moral damages to respondent Rosqueta.

Here, respondent Rosquetas colleagues and friends testified that she suffered severe anxiety on
account of the speculation over her employment status. She had to endure being referred to as a
squatter in her workplace. She had to face inquiries from family and friends about her
exclusion from the Bureaus centennial anniversary memorabilia. She did not have to endure all
these affronts and the angst and depression they produced had Villanueva abided in good faith by
the courts order in her favor. Clearly, she is entitled to moral damages.

The Court, however, finds the award of P500,000.00 excessive. As it held in Philippine
Commercial International Bank v. Alejandro, moral damages are not a bonanza. They are given
to ease the defendants grief and suffering. Moral damages should reasonably approximate the
extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done. Here, that would be P200,000.00.

The Court affirms the grant of exemplary damages by way of example or correction for the
public good but, in line with the same reasoning, reduces it to P50,000.00. Finally, the Court
affirms the award of attorneys fees and litigation expenses but reduces it to P50,000.00.

63. SHINRYO VS. RRN

FACTS: Petitioner Shinryo (Philippines) Company, Inc. (hereinafter petitioner) is a domestic

corporation organized under Philippine laws. Private respondent RRN Incorporated (hereinafter
respondent) is likewise a domestic corporation organized under Philippine laws. Respondent
filed a claim for arbitration against petitioner before CIAC for recovery of unpaid account which
consists of unpaid portions of the sub-contract, variations and unused materials in the total sum
of P5,275,184.17 and legal interest in the amount of P442,014.73. Petitioner filed a counterclaim
for overpayment in the amount of P2,512,997.96. The parties admitted several facts before the
CIAC. It was shown that petitioner and respondent executed an Agreement and Conditions of
Sub-contract (hereafter Agreement signed on June 11, 1996 and June 14, 1996, respectively.
Respondent signified its willingness to accept and perform for petitioner in any of its projects, a
part or the whole of the works more particularly described in Conditions of Sub-Contract and
other Sub-contract documents.

Respondent was not able to finish the entire works with petitioner due to financial difficulties.
Petitioner paid respondent a total amount of P26,547,624.76. On June 25, 2005 [should read
2003], respondent, through its former counsel sent a letter to petitioner demanding for the
payment of its unpaid balance amounting to P5,275,184.17. Petitioner claimed material back
charges in the amount of P4,063,633.43. On September 26, 2003, respondent only
acknowledged P2,371,895.33 as material back charges. Thereafter, on October 16, 2003,
respondent sent another letter to petitioner for them to meet and settle their dispute.

On January 8, 2004, respondent sent another letter to petitioner regarding the cost of equipment
rental and the use of scaffolding. Thereafter, on August 12, 2004, petitioner sent a letter to
respondent denying any unpaid account and the failure in their negotiations for amicable
settlement.

CIAC rendered judgment in favor of the claimant and respondent is ordered to pay claimant.

CA promulgated the assailed Decision affirming the decision of the CIAC. The CA upheld the
CIAC ruling that petitioner failed to adduce sufficient proof that the parties had an agreement
regarding charges for respondent's use of the manlift.

After the motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence this petition. Petitioner relied on the
principle of unjust enrichment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the principle of unjust enrichment (accion in rem verso) is applicable in
this case.

HELD: Yes. Petitioner's reliance on the principle of unjust enrichment is likewise misplaced.
The ruling of the Court in University of the Philippines v. Philab Industries, Inc.is highly
instructive, thus:

Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the efforts or
obligations of others, but instead it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense
that the term unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully.

Moreover, to substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must unequivocally prove
that another party knowingly received something of value to which he was not entitled and that
the state of affairs are such that it would be unjust for the person to keep the benefit. Unjust
enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect of failure to make remuneration of or for
property or benefits received under circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable obligation to
account for them; to be entitled to remuneration, one must confer benefit by mistake, fraud,
coercion, or request. Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a
prerequisite for the enforcement of the doctrine of restitution.

Article 22 of the New Civil Code reads:

Every person who, through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall
return the same to him.

In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must be present: (1) that the
defendant has been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of
the defendant is without just or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based
on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.

An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary action, available only when there is no
other remedy on contract, quasi-contract, crime, and quasi-delict. If there is an obtainable action
under any other institution of positive law, that action must be resorted to, and the principle of
accion in rem verso will not lie.[9]

As found by both the CIAC and affirmed by the CA, petitioner failed to prove that respondent's
free use of the manlift was without legal ground based on the provisions of their contract. Thus,
the third requisite, i.e., that the enrichment of respondent is without just or legal ground, is
missing. In addition, petitioner's claim is based on contract, hence, the fourth requisite that the
plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict is also
absent. Clearly, the principle of unjust enrichment is not applicable in this case.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED.

CA decision- Affirmed.