Techop FMEA Gap Analysis

TECHOP
TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE

(TECHOP)
TECHOP_ODP_04_(D)_(FMEA GAP ANALYSIS)
SEPTEMBER 2012
TECHOP_ODP_04_(D)_(FMEA GAP ANALYSIS)_Ver1.docx 1

TECHOP
CONTENTS
SECTION PAGE
1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 3
1.1 PREAMBLE .............................................................................................................................................................. 3
1.2 TECHOP_ODP......................................................................................................................................................... 3
1.3 TECHOP_GEN......................................................................................................................................................... 3
1.4 MTS DP GUIDANCE REVISION METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................... 4
2 SCOPE AND IMPACT OF THIS TECHOP ............................................................................. 5
2.1 SCOPE ..................................................................................................................................................................... 5
2.2 IMPACT ON PUBLISHED GUIDANCE .................................................................................................................... 5
3 CASE FOR ACTION .............................................................................................................. 6
3.1 WIDE VARIATION IN QUALITY AND SCOPE OF DP FMEAS ............................................................................... 6
3.2 RECOMMENDED ACTION ...................................................................................................................................... 6
4 SUGGESTED IMPLEMENTATION METHODOLOGY ........................................................... 7
4.1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................................... 7
4.2 GUIDANCE FOR USE IN THE PREPARATION OF A GAP ANALYSIS .................................................................. 7
4.3 CARRYING OUT A GAP ANALYSIS ....................................................................................................................... 7
4.4 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................................................... 8
5 MISCELLANEOUS ................................................................................................................ 9
APPENDIX A FMEA GAP ANALYSIS TEMPLATE ...................................................................... 10
2 TECHOP_ODP_04_(D)_(FMEA GAP ANALYSIS)_Ver1.docx

TECHOP
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 PREAMBLE
1.1.1 The Guidance documents on DP (Design and Operations) were published by the MTS DP
Technical Committee in 2011 and 2010, Subsequent engagement has occurred with:
Classification Societies (DNV, ABS).
United States Coast Guard (USCG).
Marine Safety Forum (MSF).
1.1.2 Feedback has also been received through the comments section provided in the MTS DP
Technical Committee Web Site.
1.1.3 It became apparent that a mechanism needed to be developed and implemented to
address the following in a pragmatic manner.
Feedback provided by the various stakeholders.
Additional information and guidance that the MTS DP Technical Committee wished
to provide means to facilitate revisions to the documents and communication of the
same to the various stakeholders.
1.1.4 The use of Technical and Operations Guidance Notes (TECHOP) was deemed to be a
suitable vehicle to address the above. These TECHOP Notes will be in two categories:
TECHOP_ODP.
TECHOP_GEN.
1.2 TECHOP_ODP
1.2.1 Technical guidance Notes provided to address Guidance contained within the Operations,
Design or DP Personnel
1.2.2 The TECHOP will be identified by the following:
TECHOP_ODP_SNO_CATEGORY (DESIGN (D) OPERATIONS (O) DP PERSONNEL
(P).
EG 1 TECHOP_ODP_01_(O)_(HIGH LEVEL PHILOSOPHY).
EG 2 TECHOP_ODP_02_(D)_(BLACKOUT RECOVERY).
1.3 TECHOP_GEN
1.3.1 MTS DP TECHNICAL COMMITTEE intends to publish topical white papers. These topical
white papers will be identified by the following:
TECHOP_GEN_SNO_DESCRIPTION.
EG 1 TECHOP_GEN_00 (TECHOP GUIDANCE).
EG 2 TECHOP_GEN_02-(POWER PLANT COMMON CAUSE FAILURES)
1.3.2 TECHOP as described in 1.2 and 1,3 above will be published as relevant and
appropriate. These TECHOP will be written in a manner that will facilitate them to be used
as standalone documents.
1.3.3 Subsequent revisions of the MTS Guidance documents will review the published
TECHOPs and incorporate as appropriate.

TECHOP
1.3.4 Communications with stakeholders will be established as appropriate to ensure that they
are notified of intended revisions. Stakeholders will be provided with the opportunity to
participate in the review process and invited to be part of the review team as appropriate.
1.4 MTS DP GUIDANCE REVISION METHODOLOGY
1.4.1 TECHOP as described above will be published as relevant and appropriate. These TECHOP will be written
in a manner that will facilitate them to be used as standalone documents.
1.4.2 Subsequent revisions of the MTS Guidance documents will review the published TECHOPs and incorporate
as appropriate.
1.4.3 Communications with stakeholders will be established as appropriate to ensure that they are notified of
intended revisions. Stakeholders will be provided with the opportunity to participate in the review process
and invited to be part of the review team as appropriate.

TECHOP
2 SCOPE AND IMPACT OF THIS TECHOP

2.1 SCOPE
2.1.1 TECHOP_ODP_04_(D)_(FMEA GAP ANALYSIS). This TECHOP addresses the wide
variation in the scope and quality of DP FMEAs for DP vessels of all types entering service
or following conversion for dynamic positioning.
2.2 IMPACT ON PUBLISHED GUIDANCE
2.2.1 This TECHOP impacts MTS DP Vessel Design Philosophy Guidelines Part II, Section 22.

TECHOP
3 CASE FOR ACTION

3.1 WIDE VARIATION IN QUALITY AND SCOPE OF DP FMEAS
3.1.1 All dynamically positioned vessels of DP Equipment Classes 2 & 3 are required to be
single fault tolerant in respect of defined failure criteria appropriate to the equipment class.
Fault tolerance should be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the classification society.
These requirements are traditionally satisfied by carrying out a Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis (FMEA) which is validated by DP FMEA proving trials.
3.1.2 There is wide variation in the quality and scope of FMEAs being approved as
demonstrating such fault tolerance. Failure to detect single point failures and vulnerability
to common cause failures in the design of DP systems leaves the vessel vulnerable to loss
of positron and heading when the undetected failure mode occurs while carrying out DP
operations.
3.1.3 The potential consequences of such failures depend on the nature of the work but typically
include:
Damage to the DP vessel and/or vessels operating in the vicinity.
Damage to infrastructure and subsea installations.
Damage to the environment.
Financial losses.
Risk to life.
Loss of reputation.
3.1.4 Even when a poor quality FMEA is not approved and is rejected by class the fact that a
significant amount of design and construction work has often been completed by the time
the FMEA is rejected means that there may be a need for significant and costly rework to
correct issues not identified by the FMEA. This can delay vessel delivery and jeopardize
contracts if the vessel is not available to perform the work on time.
3.1.5 Classification societies recognise the importance of a good quality FMEA and the
significant risks associated with an incompetent analyses and trials program. Guidance is
now available in the form of a recommended practice for FMEA of Redundant Systems.
Such guidance goes a long way to addressing the shortfalls but is not yet universally
applied.
3.1.6 Note: In this context the term DP system implies all equipment involved in maintaining
position and heading including power generation propulsion and control systems. This is
the official definition from IMO MSC 645 although the term DP system is sometimes used
informally to refer to the DP control system.
3.2 RECOMMENDED ACTION

3.2.1 FMEA stakeholders should review and comment upon FMEAs submitted as part of the
approval process. The most effective and objective way to confirm whether a DP FMEA is
competent is to carry out a formal gap analysis between the document submitted and the
industry guidance on FMEAs referenced in this TECHOP.
3.2.2 A significant deviation from the scope and methodology recommended in the referenced
guidance indicates that the FMEA may not have been executed in a competent manner
and the DP vessel may not have the required level of fault tolerance.
3.2.3 FMEA stakeholders should then ensure the identified deficiencies are addressed which
may require comprehensive rework of the FMEA and proving trials.

TECHOP
4 SUGGESTED IMPLEMENTATION METHODOLOGY

4.1 INTRODUCTION
4.1.1 The purpose of this TECHOP is to help ensure FMEAs for DP Vessels:
Are competently executed.
Analyze all DP related systems.
Consider the influence of the industrial mission on the DP redundancy concept.
Are effectively validated by the DP FMEA proving trials.
4.2 GUIDANCE FOR USE IN THE PREPARATION OF A GAP ANALYSIS

4.2.1 There are several sources of information on the scope and details of failure modes and
effects analysis:
MTS DP Vessel Design Philosophy Guidelines Part II.
DNV Recommended Practice for FMEA of Redundant Systems, RP-D102.
IMCA Guidance M166 Guidance on Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, April
2002.
IMCA M206 A Guide to DP Electrical Power and Control Systems.
IMCA Information Note M04/04 - IMCA Study Methods of Establishing the Safety
and Reliability of DP Systems 2004, Appendices D & E in particular.
4.2.2 New sources of guidance are published periodically and further revision of the MTS DP
Vessel Design Philosophy Guidelines will reference these sources as they become
available.
4.2.3 Of the publications listed above IMCA M04/04 is potentially the most suitable as
Appendices D& E can be used as a checklist to determine whether the scope of the FMEA
is adequate and provides guidance on the types of failure modes in each system. IMCA
M04/04 is now several years old and in need of some update. Additional information can
be obtained from the other publications.
4.2.4 DNV Recommended Practice for the FMEA of Redundant Systems RP-D102 provides an
excellent methodology for producing concise FMEAs suitable for shipyard use and class
approval. This methodology is focused on identifying single point failures and internal and
external common cause failures that can defeat the redundancy concept. There is less
focus on providing educational material for the vessels crew and the industrial mission of
the vessel is only considered in so far as it could cause the DP system to fail. The RP
focuses strongly on identifying non-compliances but there is less emphasis on identifying
vulnerabilities that are not single point failures but which are capable of reducing the
vessels availability for work by removing or reducing its fault tolerance. If applied
diligently, this methodology does identify those aspects of any redundancy concept that
require careful scrutiny.
4.3 CARRYING OUT A GAP ANALYSIS

4.3.1 An FMEA gap analysis is typically prepared using a spread-sheet format into which are
listed all the systems, failure modes and other important issues that should be considered
by the FMEA under review using the publications listed above as a guide.

TECHOP
4.3.2 Against each issue to be considered is entered a brief comment as to whether the issue
has been satisfactorily addressed, partially addressed or omitted completely. It is usual to
provide a cross reference to the section in the FMEA under review when providing detailed
discussion of issues in the FMEA document.
4.3.3 A simple colour coding scheme can be used to identify the severity of the omission as
follows:
Green Analysis satisfactory.
Yellow Analysis incomplete.
Red - Analysis omitted.
4.3.4 The ratio of yellows and reds to the overall number of issues can be used to provide an
indication of the level of deficiency in percentage terms.
4.3.5 A summary report discussing the problems and major deficiencies is usually provided
along with suggestions on how to remedy the situation and complete the analysis to the
required level.
Note: The most useful time to carry out an FMEA gap analysis is on the draft revision of
the FMEA when it is submitted to the vessel owner for review prior to submission to class
for approval. It may be difficult to influence further development after class has approved it
with comments. A similar process can be applied to the DP FMEA proving trials.
4.3.6 An example gap analysis spread sheet is provided in Appendix A.
4.4 CONCLUSION
4.4.1 There is very significant variation in the quality and scope of DP vessel FMEAs currently
being approved. An FMEA gap analysis is a useful quality indicator and should be carried
out whenever there is concern regarding the scope, competence and veracity of an FMEA.
There is a significant amount of useful guidance on FMEAs and DP systems design
against which any analysis can be judged.

TECHOP
5 MISCELLANEOUS
Stakeholders Impacted Remarks
MTS DP Committee To track and incorporate in next rev of MTS
DP Operations Guidance Document Part 2
Appendix 1.
Communicate to DNV, USCG, Upload in
MTS website.
USCG MTS to communicate- FR notice impacted
when Rev is available.
DNV MTS to Communicate- DNV RP E 307
X impacted.
Equipment vendor community MTS to engage with protection suppliers

Consultant community MTS members to cascade/ promulgate.

Training institutions MTS members to cascade/ promulgate.
X
Vessel Owners/Operators Establish effective means to disseminate
information to Vessel Management and
Vessel Operational Teams.
Vessel Management/Operational Establish effective means to disseminate
teams information to Vessel Operational Teams.

TECHOP
APPENDIX A FMEA GAP ANALYSIS TEMPLATE

TECHOP
DP FMEA GAP ANALYSIS - FMEA DOCUMENT NUMBER XXXXX REVISON X
CROSS CONCERNS
REFERENCE ID REGISTER
SYSTEM TO FMEA DETAILS NO. REFERENCE CONCERN CONCERN RESPONSE
Applicable rules 1
Vessel class notation 2
FMEA standards 3
Main machinery outline 4
Critical activity mode
5
identified
Redundancy concept
6
overview
Redundant levels of
7
power
Previous FMEA
8
analysis
Vessel modifications 9
Worst case failure
10
design intent
Summary/conclusion 11
Action items 12
System drawings 13

TECHOP

CROSS
REF.
TO RESPONSE
ID FMEA / FROM FMEA
NO TEST CONCER CONTRACTO
SYSTEM SUBSYSTEM ITEMS FOR ANALYSIS . NO. N R
Storage tanks including ballast 1
Fuel transfer facilities 2
Contamination control 3
Day/service/settling tanks 4
Tank level indications 5
Quick closing valves and their panels/levers 6
Fuel modules including DO to HO changeover 7
Automated valves 8
Pumps, mechanical and electrical 9
Flowmeters, supply and return 10
Filters, suction and discharge 11
Marine Auxiliary System Fuel
Pressure alarms 12
Supply lines 13
Return lines with valves 14
Coolers 15
Electrical supplies to pumps and automation 16
Valve actuation 17
Effects of most common leaks 18
Leak protection 19
Leak alarms 20
Flexible lines 21
Hot surface protection 22
Generator CW valves fail as set 23
Marine Auxiliary System Remote valve control
System split along lines of redundancy concept 24

TECHOP

CROSS
REF.
TO RESPONSE
ID FMEA / FROM FMEA
Valves for DP essential services fail safe 25
Storage 26
Transfer 27
Filling 28
Sump arrangement 29
Level alarms and watchkeeping procedures 31
Pressure alarms 32
Alarm and shutdown modes 33
Lubricating oil Alternator bearings 34
Filters 35
Coolers 36
Automated valves 37
Purification and cross connection 38
Oil mist detectors 39
Priming pumps and readiness for standby starts 40
Pre-lub for BOR 42
Sea chests 43
Filters 44
Biocide treatment 45
Marine Auxiliary System Seawater cooling
Cross-connections 46
Remote/Automatic valves, actuation and control 47
Emergency shell isolation, actuation and control 48

TECHOP

CROSS
REF.
TO RESPONSE
ID FMEA / FROM FMEA
Recirculation valves 51
Blowdowns 52
Coolers 53
Emergency cross-connection 54
Leaks 55
Fuel valve cooling 56
LTFW 57
HTFW 58
Marine Auxiliary System Freshwater cooling Header tanks 60
Temperature control, running and standby 61
Electrical supplies for pumps and temp control 62
Air/hydraulic power for temp control valves 63
Thermostatic valves 64
Coolers 65
Fresh water generation 66
Remote/Automatic valves 67
System cross-connection 68
Marine Auxiliary System Freshwater cooling
Tank level alarms 69
Alarms and shutdowns 70
Emergency cross-connection 71
Leaks 72

TECHOP

CROSS
REF.
TO RESPONSE
ID FMEA / FROM FMEA
Flexible pipes 73
Turbochargers 74
Rig savers 75
Dump valves 76
Charge air Jet assist 77
Coolers 78
Air temperature control 79
Control valves, including actuation and control 80
Start air 81
Compressors 82
Receivers 83
Compressed air
Operating modes 84
Reducing valves 86
Electrical supplies 87
Marine Auxiliary System Compressed air
Compressor automation 88
Pressure alarms 89
Compressed air Emergency start air 90
Leaks 91
Starting methods 92
Marine Auxiliary System Emergency generator
Mode indication -emergency/harbour 93
Engine manufacturer's engine safety system 94
Engine management and
Power supply segregation 95
safety system
VMS interface 96

TECHOP

CROSS
REF.
TO RESPONSE
ID FMEA / FROM FMEA
Shutdowns 97
Switchboard interface 98
Emergency load up ramps 99
Emergency shut down 100
Separation of control and safety systems 101
Slow turning 102
Start interlocks 103
Starting time 104
Engine failure response 105
Power station concept 106
Power generation Generators HV/LV, AC/DC 107
Separation between redundant system 108
Independent/common 109
Worst case failure 110
DP config. 111
Transit config. 112
Maintenance activity config. 113
Current - not to exceed rated value 114
Power generation Generators
Voltage limits 115
Power sharing 116
Frequency limits 117
Harmonics to be maintained within defined limits 118
Power factor 119
Earth system 120

TECHOP

CROSS
REF.
TO RESPONSE
ID FMEA / FROM FMEA
Alternator type 121
Power management 122
Temperature control 123
Synchronisation 124
Dead bus connection 125
Interlocks 126
Bus ties 127
Transfer of fault 128
Split along lines of redundancy concept 129
Ventilation and HVAC
Supports time to terminate 130
Ventilation and HVAC Condensation 131
Protection scheme 132
Generator protection Switchgear - circuit breakers and contactors 133
Differential protection 134
Over current protection 135
Over/under excitation 136
Over/under voltage protection 137
Power generation
Over/under frequency 138
Reverse power protection 139
Generator protection
Neg sequence protection 140
Temperature alarms - shutdowns 141
Lub oil pressure alarms - shutdowns 142
Earth fault protection - zero sequence protection 143
Excitation protection 144

TECHOP

CROSS
REF.
TO RESPONSE
ID FMEA / FROM FMEA
UPSs - rating, type, split 145
Load imbalance protection 146
Arc detection 147
Directional protection 148
Advanced protection for generators 149
Isochronous/droop 150
Governors Speed/load control 151
PMS connection 152
Overload protection - load reduction function 153
Mechanical backup governor 154
Common rail injection 155
Governors
Rack position indication 156
Thrust limitation 157
Sharing lines 158
Ride through capability 159
Effect on system voltage, clearing SC faults 160
Power generation
Effect of starting heavy consumers 161
Voltage dip
Effect on contactors 162
Effect on power electronic drives 163
Effect on instrumentation and control systems 164
Type of regulator 165
Droop characteristics 166
AVR
Failure mode - to over excitation 167
Reactive power sharing 168

TECHOP

CROSS
REF.
TO RESPONSE
ID FMEA / FROM FMEA
Control by power management 169
Excitation alarms 170
Excitation protection 171
Interaction with thrust limitation 172
Current boost systems 173
Excitation support 174
PMG 175
Cross current compensation 176
Power generation AVR
Interface with protection for alternator 177
Interface with HV switchgear 178
Continuity of electrical power 179
Ability to restore propulsion capability 180
Alarms for component failure 181
Spinning reserve 182
Efficient generator management 183
Diesel automation 184
Control of engine starting requirements 185
Power management Power management scope
Control of engine specific requirements 186
Selection on generator running order 187
Load dependent starting of generators 188
Load dependent stop 189
Alarm start 190
Blackout prevention system 191
Auto reconfiguration 192

TECHOP

CROSS
REF.
TO RESPONSE
ID FMEA / FROM FMEA
Advanced power reservation 193
Interface with electronic governor 194
Interface with AVR 195
Interface with engine management system 196
Reactive power sharing 197
Net frequency control 198
Asymmetric load sharing 199
Protective functions 200
Power management scope
Maintain harmonics within limits 201
Control of switchboard fault levels 202
Control of regenerated power 203
Power available calculator 204
Bus tie status 205
Generator circuit breaker status 206
Power management Transducers & Status
Transducer's power supplies and failure modes 207
Dead bus and blackout detection 208
Hierarchy 209
Redundancy concept 210
Centralised or distributed 211
System segregation 212
Architecture
System independence and duplication 213
Switching and protective functions 214
Common mode failures 215
Hidden failures 216

TECHOP

CROSS
REF.
TO RESPONSE
ID FMEA / FROM FMEA
Autonomy of main machinery 217
Operator error 218
Start/stop/running order 219
Load dependent starting Spinning reserve 220
Interface with engine protection 221
Connection of synchronous generators 222
Voltage control 223
Frequency control 224
Synchronising Reduce power transfer across bus tie 225
Crash sync of generators and switchboards 226
Connection of a stopped generator 227
Loss of sync due to mechanical failure 228
Speed droop 229
Power management
Isochronous 230
Load sharing Compensated droop 231
Each generator to carry a proportional load 232
Avoid cascade failure 233
Load dependent start protection 234
Start blocking 235
Heavy consumer protection 236
Blackout prevention Load limitation/shedding 237
Thrust limitation/reduction 238
Trusted tripping 239
Preferential tripping 240

TECHOP

CROSS
REF.
TO RESPONSE
ID FMEA / FROM FMEA
Interfaces with other blackout protection 241
Other systems interaction 242
Trusted priority 243
Blackout prevention
Heading priority 244
process/drilling priority 245
Process phase back 246
Generator starting 247
Dead bus connection 248
Blackout restart
Protection against faulty gen. connection 249
Lock outs of healthy generators 250
Power management Normal power plant configurations for DP 251
Other configurations for DP CAM & TAM 252
After defined worst case failure 253
Static power estimate Active power 254
Reactive power 255
Current and power factor 256
Load acceptance and rejection 257
Drilling PMS 258
Crane 259
Interfaces
Pipe lay systems 260
Other process 261
Compare worst case failures at all levels 262
Protection, Interlocks and
Power distribution Switchgear fault levels 263
cross connections
Protection system philosophy 264

TECHOP

CROSS
REF.
TO RESPONSE
ID FMEA / FROM FMEA
Under voltage release and delays 265
Bus tie breakers and tie lines 266
Cable routes 267
Interlocks 269
Short circuit fault protection 270
Earth fault protection 271
Motor starting and protection 272
Tables of DP related consumers 273
List MCCs and distribution boards 274
Common backup systems 275
Reliance on switching of power to switchboards 276
Reliance on switching of power to MCCs 277
Maintaining DP ready signal during switching 278
Transformer cooling fan supplies 279
Emergency generator starting 280
Shore power interlocks and inter trips 281
Back feeding from emergency generator 282
Gearbox 283
Clutch 284
Propellers and steering CPP 285

Main propellers
gear Speed control 286
Interaction of variable speed control 287
Power supplies, main, auxiliary and backup 288

TECHOP

CROSS
REF.
TO RESPONSE
ID FMEA / FROM FMEA
Pumps 289
Hydraulics 290
Lube oil 291
Cooling 292
Operating modes 293
Failure to ahead condition 294
Defaults 295
Control stations, alternative controls 296
Control power supplies main/alternative 297
Ready signal requirements 298
Alarms 299
Control loop protection 300
Interface with rudder 301
Steering gear Pumps 303
Hydraulics 304
Cooling 305
Operating modes 306
Defaults, especially on loss of propulsion 307
Propellers and steering Control stations, alternative controls 308

Steering gear
gear Alternative controls 309
Emergency controls 310
Control power supplies 311
Ready signal requirements 312

TECHOP

CROSS
REF.
TO RESPONSE
ID FMEA / FROM FMEA
Angle indication 314
Mechanically linked rudders on twin screw vessels 315
Failure to 'hard over' 316
High lift rudders for DP 317
Alarms 318
Location 319
Type 320
Specification 321
Thrusters General layout Prime movers 322
Main power 323
Auxiliary power 324
Utilities 325
Gearbox 326
Clutch 327
CPP 328
Speed/torque control 329
Interaction of variable speed control 330
Thrusters Tunnel and azimuth thrusters Power supplies, main, auxiliary and backup 331
Pumps 332
Hydraulics 333
Lube oil 334
Cooling 335
Operating modes 336

TECHOP

CROSS
REF.
TO RESPONSE
ID FMEA / FROM FMEA
Defaults 337
Control stations, alternative controls 338
Control power supplies main/alternative 339
DP ready signal requirements 340
Barred zones 341
Mode selection switches 342
Rate of turning 343
Ramp rate 344
Trusted control modes 345
Combinators, speed and pitch 346
Pitch rate 347
Alarms 348
Tunnel and azimuth thrusters Control loop protection 349
Interface with rudder 350
Pumps 352
Hydraulics 353
Thrusters Cooling 354
Control stations 355
Azimuth thrusters
Alternative controls 356
Emergency controls 357
Control power supplies 358
DP ready signal requirements 359

TECHOP

CROSS
REF.
TO RESPONSE
ID FMEA / FROM FMEA
Angle indication 361
Alarms 362
Azimuth control loops 363
General description 364
System architecture 365
Vessel management Redundancy concept 366

General
system System segregation 367
System independence and duplication 368
Hidden failures 371
General
Multiple independent failures 372
Vessel management
Operator error 373
system
Switchboard PLC comms Reaction of engines to PLC failures 374
Component susceptibility to overheating 375
Air conditioning
Provision of A/C redundancy 376
Layout 377
Network 378
Communication 379
Separation 380
DP Control Systems Architecture
Independence 381
Duplication 382

TECHOP

CROSS
REF.
TO RESPONSE
ID FMEA / FROM FMEA
Hidden failures 385
Multiple independent failures 386
Virus protection 387
Operator error 388
Vendor FMEA 389
Changeover switch between main and backup 390
Computers and consoles
Changeover switch between DP and manual 391
Thruster stops normal and emergency 392
Computers and consoles
Backup DP updated by main DP system 393
Heading 394
Motion 395
Wind sensors 396
GNSS (Satnav) 397
Hydro acoustic 398
Taut wire 399
DP Control Systems Microwave - Artemis 400
Sensors Laser - Fanbeam 401
Riser angle 402
Pipe tension 403
Crane angle 404
Seapath 405
Radius 406
Radascan 407
Survey package 408

TECHOP

CROSS
REF.
TO RESPONSE
ID FMEA / FROM FMEA
Provision of DP status lights 409
DP alert and communication Location of alarms and indication 410
Automatic functions related to position failure 411
Cable route for thruster control and feedback 412
Cable routes
Philosophy of cable routing in respect of fire 413
Cable routes Cable routes to vessel sensors and reference 414
Independent and isolated from main DP system 415
DP Control Systems
Backup DP system Backup updated from main DP system 416
Backup should have separate climate control 417
Effect on DP 419
Isolation of batteries 420
ESDs Failure modes of control system 421
Protection against inadvertent operation 422
No single button for ESD 0 423
No direct acting ESD 0 at external locations 424
Emergency shut downs Hardwired 425
Available within easy reach of DPO 426
Thruster emergency stops
Button layout representative of thruster locations 427
Line monitored 428
Failure modes of actuators and valves 430
Group emergency stops
Failure modes of control system 431
Cable route considerations 432

TECHOP

CROSS
REF.
TO RESPONSE
ID FMEA / FROM FMEA
Cause and effects for fans and flaps 434
Effect on loss of ventilation 435
Ventilation provided following redundancy concept 436
Fans
Alarms for compartment temperature 437
Effect of pressure drop on engine crankcase 438
Actuation power and control power 439
Link to ESD and F&G 440
Flaps Remote indication 441
Effect of pressure drop on engine crankcase 443
Actuation power and control power 444
Emergency shut downs Watertight doors
Remote indication 445
Control system 446
Pipe work and valves 447
Fire fighting systems
Division between compartments 448
Commonality between engine rooms 451
Quick closing valves Failure mode of valves 452
Protection of valves 453

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TECHOP

TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE

TECHOP_ODP_04_(D)_(FMEA GAP ANALYSIS)_Ver1.docx 1

2 TECHOP_ODP_04_(D)_(FMEA GAP ANALYSIS)_Ver1.docx

TECHOP_ODP_04_(D)_(FMEA GAP ANALYSIS)_Ver1.docx 3

4 TECHOP_ODP_04_(D)_(FMEA GAP ANALYSIS)_Ver1.docx

2 SCOPE AND IMPACT OF THIS TECHOP

TECHOP_ODP_04_(D)_(FMEA GAP ANALYSIS)_Ver1.docx 5

3 CASE FOR ACTION

3.2 RECOMMENDED ACTION

6 TECHOP_ODP_04_(D)_(FMEA GAP ANALYSIS)_Ver1.docx

4 SUGGESTED IMPLEMENTATION METHODOLOGY

4.2 GUIDANCE FOR USE IN THE PREPARATION OF A GAP ANALYSIS

4.3 CARRYING OUT A GAP ANALYSIS

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APPENDIX A FMEA GAP ANALYSIS TEMPLATE

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Propellers and steering CPP 285

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Propellers and steering Control stations, alternative controls 308

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Vessel management Redundancy concept 366

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