14.

Insular Life vs NLRC (March 12, 1998)

FACTS:

Petitioner entered into an agency contract with respondent delos Reyes

authorizing the latter to solicit for life insurance and he would be paid compensation in
the form of commissions. It contained the stipulation that no ER-EE relationship shall be
create. However, delos Reyes was prohibited by petitioner from working for any other
life insurance company and violation of this company was a ground of termination.
Petitioner and private respondent entered into another contract where the latter
was appointed as Acting Unit Manager under its office. One of the duties of delos Reyes
is to supervise and coordinate the underwriters. It was similarly provided in the
management contract that the relation of the acting unit manager and/or the agents of his
unit to the company shall be that of independent contractor.
Private respondent worked concurrently as agent and Acting Unit Manager until
he was notified by petitioner that his services were terminated. So, he filed a complaint
on the ground of illegal dismissal and for not paying him salaries and separation pay.

ISSUE: W/N ER-EE relationship exists between Insular Life and delos Reyes

HELD: Yes.
Both petitioner and respondent NLRC treated the agency contract and the
management contract entered into between petitioner and de los Reyes as contracts of
agency. There exist major distinctions between the two arrangements. While the first has
the earmarks of an agency contract, the second is far removed from the concepts of
agency in that provided therein are conditionality that indicates an employer-employee
relationship.
Private respondent was appointed as Acting Unit Manager only upon
recommendation of the District Manager. This indicates that private respondent was
hired by petitioner because of the favorable endorsement of its duly authorized officer.
Then, the very designation of the appointment of private respondent as acting unit
manager obviously implies a temporary employment status which may be made
permanent only upon compliance with company standards.
On the matter of payment of wages, petitioner points out that respondent was
compensated strictly on commission basis, the amount of which was totally dependent
on his total output. But, the managers contract, speaks differently. Under the contract,
de los Reyes must meet with the manpower and production requirements as Acting Unit
Manager.
As to the matter involving the power of dismissal and control by the employer,
respondents duty to collect the companys premiums using company receipts is further
evidence of petitioners control over respondent.
Thus, exclusivity of service, control of assignments and removal of agents under
private respondent;s unit, collection of premiums, furnishing of company facilities and
materials as well as capital described are but hallmarks of the management system in
which herein private respondent worked. Private respondent de los Reyes was an
employee of herein petitioner.
Wherefore, petition of Insular Life is denied.

54. Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union vs

Confessor
Facts:
Bank and the Union signed a five-year collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
with a provision to renegotiate the terms thereof on the third year. Prior to the expiration
of the three-year period but within the sixty-day freedom period, the Union initiated the
negotiations. On February 18, 1993, the Union, through its President, Eddie L.
Divinagracia, sent a letter containing its proposals covering political provisions and
thirty-four (34) economic provisions. The Bank attached its counter-proposal to the non-
economic provisions proposed by the Union. The Bank posited that it would be in a
better position to present its counter-proposals on the economic items after the Union
had presented its justifications for the economic proposals.

Before the commencement of the negotiation, the Union, through Divinagracia,

suggested to the Banks Human Resource Manager and head of the negotiating panel,
Cielito Diokno, that the bank lawyers should be excluded from the negotiating team.
The Bank acceded. Meanwhile, Diokno suggested to Divinagracia that Jose P. Umali, Jr.,
the President of the National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE), the federation to
which the Union was affiliated, be excluded from the Unions negotiating panel.
However, Umali was retained as a member thereof.

Except for the provisions on signing bonus and uniforms, the Union and the Bank failed
to agree on the remaining economic provisions of the CBA. The Union declared a
deadlock. On the other hand, the Bank filed a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP)
and Damages before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in Manila. It contended that the Union demanded "sky high
economic demands," indicative of blue-sky bargaining. Further, the Union violated its
no strike- no lockout clause by filing a notice of strike before the NCMB. Considering
that the filing of notice of strike was an illegal act, the Union officers should be
dismissed.

Issue:
Whether or not the Union was able to substantiate its claim of unfair labor
practice against the Bank arising from the latters alleged interference with its choice
of negotiator; surface bargaining; making bad faith non-economic proposals; and refusal
to furnish the Union with copies of the relevant data;

Ruling:

ART. 243. COVERAGE AND EMPLOYEES RIGHT TO SELF-

ORGANIZATION. All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural
enterprises and in religious, charitable, medical or educational institutions whether
operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or
assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective
bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural
workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their
mutual aid and protection.

Article 248(a) of the Labor Code, considers it an unfair labor practice when an employer
interferes, restrains or coerces employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization or the right to form association. The right to self-organization necessarily
includes the right to collective bargaining. Parenthetically, if an employer interferes in
the selection of its negotiators or coerces the Union to exclude from its panel of
negotiators a representative of the Union, and if it can be inferred that the employer
adopted the said act to yield adverse effects on the free exercise to right to self-
organization or on the right to collective bargaining of the employees, ULP under Article
248(a) in connection with Article 243 of the Labor Code is committed. In order to show
that the employer committed ULP under the Labor Code, substantial evidence is
required to support the claim. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

The circumstances that occurred during the negotiation do not show that the suggestion
made by Diokno to Divinagracia is an anti-union conduct from which it can be inferred
that the Bank consciously adopted such act to yield adverse effects on the free exercise
of the right to self-organization and collective bargaining of the employees, especially
considering that such was undertaken previous to the commencement of the negotiation
and simultaneously with Divinagracias suggestion that the bank lawyers be excluded
from its negotiating panel. It is clear that such ULP charge was merely an
afterthought. The accusation occurred after the arguments and differences over the
economic provisions became heated and the parties had become frustrated.
The Duty to Bargain Collectively
Surface bargaining is defined as going through the motions of negotiating without any
legal intent to reach an agreement. The Union has not been able to show that the Bank
had done acts, both at and away from the bargaining table, which tend to show that it did
not want to reach an agreement with the Union or to settle the differences between it and
the Union. Admittedly, the parties were not able to agree and reached a
deadlock. However, it is herein emphasized that the duty to bargain does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. Hence, the
parties failure to agree did not amount to ULP under Article 248(g) for violation of the
duty to bargain.

Estoppel not Applicable In the Case at Bar

The approval of the CBA and the release of signing bonus do not necessarily mean that
the Union waived its ULP claim against the Bank during the past negotiations. After all,
the conclusion of the CBA was included in the order of the SOLE, while the signing
bonus was included in the CBA itself.

The Union Did Not Engage In Blue-Sky Bargaining

The Bank failed to show that the economic demands made by the Union were
exaggerated or unreasonable. The minutes of the meeting show that the Union based its
economic proposals on data of rank and file employees and the prevailing economic
benefits received by bank employees from other foreign banks doing business in the
Philippines and other branches of the Bank in the Asian region.

In sum, we find that the public respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the questioned order and
resolutions. While the approval of the CBA and the release of the signing bonus did not
estop the Union from pursuing its claims of ULP against the Bank, we find that the latter
did not engage in ULP. We, likewise, hold that the Union is not guilty of ULP.

94. WISE AND CO. VS. WISE CO., INC.

EMPLOYEES UNION
G.R. No. L-87672 October 13, 1989

WISE AND CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.

WISE & CO., INC. EMPLOYEES UNION-NATU AND HONORABLE

BIENVENIDO G. LAGUESMA, in his capacity as voluntary Arbitrator,
respondents.

FACTS:

The management issued a memorandum circular introducing a profit sharing scheme for its
managers and supervisors the initial distribution. The respondent union wrote petitioner asking for
participation in this scheme but it was denied by petitioner on the ground that it had to adhere strictly to
the CBA. Petitioner distributed the profit sharing benefit not only to managers and supervisors but also
to all other rank and file employees not covered by the CBA. This caused the respondent union to file a
notice of strike alleging that petitioner was guilty of ULP because the union members were
discriminated against in the grant of the profit sharing benefits. Management refused to proceed with
the CBA negotiations unless the last notice of strike was first resolved. The union agreed to postpone
discussions on the profit sharing demand until a new CBA was concluded. After a series of conciliation
conferences, the parties agreed to settle the dispute through voluntary arbitration. The voluntary
arbitrator issued an award ordering petitioner to likewise extend the benefits of the 1987 profit sharing
scheme to the members of respondent union. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the grant by management of profit sharing benefits to its non-union member
employees is discriminatory against its workers who are union members.

HELD:

NO. Under the CBA between the parties, there is a clause where the employees are classified
into those who are members of the union and those who are not. The grant by petitioner of profit
sharing benefits to the employees outside the bargaining unit falls under the ambit of its managerial
prerogative. It appears to have been done in good faith and without ulterior motive. In the case of the
union members, they derive their benefits from the terms and conditions of the CBA contract which
constitute the law between the contracting parties. Both the employer and the union members are bound
by such agreement. There can be no discrimination committed by petitioner thereby as the situation of
the union employees are different and distinct from the non-union employees. Indeed, discrimination
per se is not unlawful. There can be no discrimination where the employees concerned are not similarly
situated.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is GRANTED reversed the decision of voluntary arbitrator.

134. Norma Mabeza vs NLRC

April 18, 1997
Labor Standards Wages
Facilities vs Supplements

FACTS:
Mabeza was an employee hired by Hotel Supreme in Baguio City. In 1991, an
inspection was made by the DOLE at Hotel Supremeand the DOLE inspectors
discovered several violations by the hotel management. Immediately, the owner of the
hotel, Peter Ng,directed his employees to execute an affidavit which would purport that
they have no complaints whatsoever against Hotel Supreme.

But Mabeza refused to certify said affidavit with the fiscals office so this led to
her dismissal. She sued Peter Ng and one of her complaints against him is underpayment
because her wage was less than the minimum wage. Peter Ng argued that the reason for
such low payment was because she was being given free lodging, water, electricity and
water consumption by the hotel.

ISSUE:
Whether or not such amenities provided by the hotel be considered as facilities
which are deductible from Mabezas wage.

HELD:
No. There are requisites before such can be done and they are:1.Proof must be
shown that such facilities are customarily furnished by the trade.2. The provision of
deductible facilities must be voluntarily accepted in writing by the employee.3. Facilities
must be charged at fair and reasonable value. None of these were complied with in the
case at bar. More significantly, the food and lodging, or the electricity and water
consumed by Mabeza were not facilities but supplements. A benefit or privilege granted
to an employee for the convenience of the employer is not a facility. The criterion in
making a distinction between the two not so much lies in the kind (food, lodging) but the
purpose. Considering, therefore, that hotel workers are required to work different shifts
and are expected to be available at various odd hours, their ready availability is
a necessary matter in the operations of a small hotel, such as Hotel Supreme.