SP12.0 Coca v.

Borromeo, 81 SCRA 278 (1978)

MP: Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are
all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the
probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question
of ownership.

FACTS: The spouses Juan Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba died intestate in 1943 and 1948, respectively. They possessed
a homestead, consisting of two parcels of land, located at Barrio Bunawan or Mauswagon, Calamba, Misamis Occidental.
The Pangilinan spouses were survived by the following heirs: (1) Prima Pangilinan, (2) Maria, Eusebio and Apolinar, all
surnamed Yamuta, the children of Concepcion Pangilinan-Yamuta who died in 1961, and (3) Francis, Algerian,
Benjamin, Perla and Francisco, Jr., all surnamed Pangilinan, the children of Francisco Pangilinan who died in 1948 and
who was also survived by his widow, Guadalupe Pizarras. Special Proceeding No. 508 of the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Occidental was instituted on September 5, 1963 for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses, Juan C.
Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba. The lower court in its order of October 2, 1965 directed the administrator to pay
the debt of the estate to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan. It deferred action on the project of partition until the
ownership of the twelve hectares, which were claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan, and the six hectares,
which were claimed by Crispin Borromeo (eighteen hectares in all which were excluded from the inventory in the
courts order of December 6, 1963) is determined in an ordinary action. On May 14, 1966 the heirs of Francisco
Pangilinan filed a supplemental opposition wherein they asked that Lot No. 1920, with an area of eight hectares, which lot
was surveyed at the instance of Concepcion Pangilinan, should be included in the project of partition. The appellant
contend that the lower court, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to decide the ownership of the twelve-hectare
portion of Lot No. 1112. On the other hand, the appellees or the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan counter that the
lower court did not decide the ownership of the twelve hectares when it ordered their exclusion from the project of
partition. So, the problem is how the title to the twelve hectares should be decided, whether in a separate action or
in the intestate proceeding.

ISSUE: Whether the ownership of a parcel of land, whether belonging to the deceased spouses or to their heirs, can be
decided in the intestate proceeding ?

RULING: YES. As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the testate or intestate
proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a separate action. That general rule has qualifications or exceptions
justified by expediency and convenience. Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate
proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its
final determination in a separate action. Although generally, a probate court may net decide a question of title or
ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the
probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.

SP12.1 US v. Chiu Guimco, 36 Phil 917 (1917)

MP: Court cannot make a valid order committing a person to jail for failure to produce the will of a deceased person,
pursuant to section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure, .except when acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the
estates of deceased persons.

FACTS: Joaquin Cruz, a chinese merchant living for many years in the municipality of Gingoog, Province of Misamis,
died while visiting China. Before his departure from the Philippines he had executed a will before Anastacio Servillon, a
notary public, in which Chiu Guimco and Co-Iden were named as executors. Chiu Guimco is Joaquin Cruzs brother.
Guimco, as attorney in fact and manager of the estate of his deceased brother, entered into an agreement with his brothers
Filipina wife, whereby she relinquished her claims to the estate for a consideration. He also entered into an agreement
with Uy Cuan, his brothers Chinese wife, for the distribution of the estate and for the payment of rentals on her interest in
the real estate. No payments have, however, been made by Guimco. Ramon Contreras, acting on behalf of Uy Cuan, wrote
a letter to Guimco urging him to produce the will of the decedent for the institution of lawful proceedings in accordance
therewith. Guimco replied that the will in question had never been in his possession and that he had never seen it. A
complaint was filed under section 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure charging Guimco with the failure to produce the
will within the time required by law. The court found the accused guilty and imposed upon him a fine of P1800.
Subsequently, the court, believing that the will was in his possession, ordered him to produce it but Guimco still failed to
do so. The court ordered the confinement of Guimco in the provincial jail.

ISSUE: Whether the judge was acting within his power when he ordered the commitment of Guimco to the provincial
jail?

RULING: No. Section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 5 of Rule 75), which allows imprisonment of a
person who neglects to deliver a will after the death of the testator without reasonable cause, can only be applied when a
court is acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the administration of the estates of deceased persons. Where
administration proceedings are not already pending, the court, before taking action under this section, should require that
there be before it some petition, information, or affidavit of such character as to make action by the court under this
section appropriate. The remedy provided in section 629 of the Code of Procedure is clearly a totally different remedy,
having no relation with that provided in section 628 (now section 4 of Rule 75). It is not permissible in a prosecution
under Sec. 628 to superimpose upon the penalty of fine therein prescribed the additional penalty of imprisonment
prescribed under Sec. 629. To enforce the production of the will by the accused at a trial under Sec. 628 would virtually
compel him to convict himself, since the mere production of the will by him would be conclusive that he had possession
of it as charged in the criminal complaint. This would constitute an infringement of the provision of law which says that in
a criminal action the defendant shall be exempt from testifying against himself.

SP12.2 Gan v. Yap, 104 Phil 509 (1958)

FACTS: On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure in the University of Santo Tomas
Hospital, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in the City of Manila. On March 17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan initiated
these proceedings in the Manila court of first instance with a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly
executed by the deceased. Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not
left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime. After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the
Hon. Ramon R. San Jose, Judge, refused to probate the alleged will. A seventy-page motion for reconsideration failed.
Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: WON a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who
declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator?

RULING: NO. The court ruled that the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not
be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The loss of the holographic will
entails the loss of the only medium of proof. Even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost
holographic will, we think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and
inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that clear and distinct proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6. 11.

SP12.3 Gutierrez v. Villegas, L-11848, 31 May 1962

MP: The judicial approval of the partition on the basis of the alleged deed of assignment did not have the effect of making
the party making the assignment lose his standing in the proceedings.
FACTS: On November 11, 1954, Irene Santos died intestate, leaving as her only heirs her surviving spouse Jose D.
Villegas and two nieces daughters of a deceased brother, Rizalina Santos Rivera and Adela Santos Gutierrez.
Thereafter, the surviving spouse filed with the Rizal CFI, Pasay City Branch, a petition for Letters of Administration
and was appointed administrator of the estate. Respondent presented in the probate court an unverified
manifestation signed by Adela Gutierrez, accompanied by a public instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihan at
Salinan. The said kasulatan states that that all her rights, interests and participation in the estate subject of this
proceeding now belong to her sister, Rizalina Santos Rivera, and that hereafter she will not take part in the above-
entitled proceedings and is not entitled to the service of any pleadings, motion, order or decision filed or
promulgated therein.

In a verified manifestation presented before the probate Court on January 25, 1955, Adela averred that the deed of
assignment of her rights, participation and interest in the estate of Irene Santos and the first manifestation were obtained
thru fraud practiced by the administrator upon her and were vitiated by mistake or undue influence. Alleging that she was
made to sign said documents without knowing the contents thereof.

Adela sought for the nullity of the deed of assignment and asked the court to furnish her all copies of pleadings filed or to
be filed in the intestate proceedings, it appearing that the administrator presented pleadings in Court without serving her
copies thereof.

An opposition was interposed by the administrator, who alleged that the movant, although originally a party to the probate
proceeding, has voluntarily and expressly desisted from being so, and that having assigned by sale, all her rights, interests
and participations in the estate, she has no longer any legal standing in the case.

ISSUE: The only question for determination in this incident is whether or not Adela Santos Gutierrez has a right in
this probate proceeding.

RULING: it cannot be successfully denied that Adela Santos Gutierrez is an indispensable party to the proceedings
in question. Her interest in the estate is not inchoate, While it is true that she executed a deed of assignment, it is
also a fact that she asked the same to be annulled. Although Adela had filed a manifestation dropping herself from
the proceedings and presenting therewith the supposed Deed of Assignment, the record, nevertheless fails to show
that action thereon had been taken by the probate Court. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-
heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction (Art. 1082, NCC). No serious argument can be offered to deny the co-heirship
of appellee in the estate under probate. It appearing (if We assume the due execution of the Deed of Assignment),
that the transaction is in the nature of extrajudicial partition, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot
just divest the court of its jurisdiction over the estate and over their persons, by the mere act of assignment and
desistance.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, We find the Order appealed from to be in conformity with the law and jurisprudence.
The same should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against the appellants Jose D. Villegas and
Rizalina Santos Rivera, in both instances.

SP12.4 Co v. Rosario et al., GR No. 160671, April 30, 2008

MP: Settled is the rule that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules
regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators; Courts may appoint or remove special
administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules; The exercise of such discretion
must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principles
FACTS: Luis Co(petitioner) and Vicente Yu was appointed as special administrator by the RTC of Makati City of the
estate of the petitioners father, Co Bun Chun but the heirs opposed the petitioners appointment as special administrator.
So, the petitioner nominated son, Alvin Milton Co for appointment as co-administrator of the estate.

The RTC appointed Alvin as special co-administrator.

After 4 years, the RTC revoked and set aside the appointment of Alvin on the basis that that Alvin had become unsuitable
to discharge the trust given to him as special co-administrator because his capacity, ability or competence to perform the
functions of co-administrator had been beclouded by the filing of several criminal cases against him, which, even if there
was no conviction yet, had provided the heirs ample reason to doubt his fitness to handle the subject estate with utmost
fidelity, trust and confidence.

Petitioner sought for motion for reconsiderationbut was denied. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
to the CA but the CA dismissed the petition.

Hence, the instant case.

ISSUE: Is the removal by the lower court of Alvin to be a special administrator proper?

RULING: YES. The High Court ruled that settled is the rule that the selection or removal
of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal
of regular administrators. Courts may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than
those enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion. As long as the said discretion is exercised without grave
abuse, higher courts will not interfere with it. This, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or
to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. The exercise of such
discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principles.

Thus, even if a special administrator had already been appointed, once the court finds the appointee no longer
entitled to its confidence, it is justified in withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect thereto. The
special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control and who is expected
to work for the best interest of the entire estate, especially with respect to its smooth administration and earliest
settlement.

In this case, we find that the trial courts judgment on the issue of Alvins removal as special co-administrator is
grounded on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. It is not characterized by patent and gross
capriciousness, pure whim and abuse, arbitrariness or despotism, as to be correctible by the writ of certiorari.