PAPER

cause defects to be inadvertently formed where there were none, or

adversely affect project economy by increasing construction cost and

I ~ qua ii IIp programme of the foundation works.

Disputes about the cost of remedial works are common between
clients or main contractors and their piling subcontractors when fur-

assurance o"
ther examination shows a pile with an apparent defect to be subse-
quently sound.
Therefore, after implementing a QA programme of integrity testing
on up to 100% of the working piles, using an integrity testing system

sore~ ~i e that may be less than 100'!. reliable at detecting defective and non-
"ounce ai;ions
By Gordon Cameron, PhD research student,
Napier University and Tim Chapman, associate
director, Arup Geotechnics.
The performance of a bored piled foundation is affected by the con-
struction quality of the individual piles comprising the piling system.
For the purposes of quality assurance, a programme of non-destruc-
tive integrity testing (NDT) is usually implemented on a specified per-
centage of the working piles. Traditionally, the proportion of piles to
be tested is decided upon by the foundation designer based on site-spe-
cific knowledge, engineering judgement and his prior experiences of
NDT. This paper shows how the use of statistics and probability theo-
ry may help influence this decision.
Introduction
Bored cast insitu piling is regularly specified in the UK to support the
ever-taller structures that are being built in urban locations. However
the high degree of contractor workmanship, experience and supervi-
sion necessary in construction, coupled with the naturally variable
soil and groundwater conditions on site, makes bored cast insitu piles
particularly vulnerable to structural faults and variable in construc-
tion quality (Thorburn and Thorburn, 1977).
The subterranean nature of their formation makes direct, visual
inspection of the final product impossible in most cases. Faced with
uncertain quality, it is unknown whether the piles will be suitable for
their intended operational function. Therefore to verify satisfactory
construction and detect any defective piles that may exist, non-destruc-
tive integrity testing is usually implemented on a specified percentage
of the pile population.
Blanket inspection of every pile is the most conservative yet widely
adopted quality assurance (QA) strategy in the UK and internationally.
However, when this is impossible, sampling inspection (eg testing less
than 100% of the piles) is conducted. Due to a lack of codified recom-
mendations or quantitative guidance, the number of piles tested in
such a case is traditionally decided upon by the foundation designer. At
its best, this decision is based on detailed construction observations,
site-specific knowledge and engineering judgement; at its worst, this
may be little more than a token number of piles chosen purely to satis-
fy contractual QA obligations.
Furthermore, due to the indirect nature of their examination, few
methods of integrity testing are infallible. A misclassification of the
true pile quality caused by an inaccurate integrity test or an inaccu-
rate interpretation of a test result can either lead to a defective pile
going undetected (false-negative result) and being mistakenly incorpo-
rated into the foundation or a sound pile being wrongly condemned
(false-positive result) and subjected to unnecessary inspection or reme-
dial work.
Incorporating defective piles WNe1:Fscheeewf csehieeeecethegNOINrefpuegosspwecelsrceo
into the foundation system may
adversely affect its performance,
safety or durability, and depend- ~ L::
~ fhe em~ay of glwNNI =::: ==::=swese NNI snc RNI wNh Nepal
~
~ rseaaee
Of the eiennme NNNWN CSSNNNNW gehWg fiWN ~ ihgelhNI SNO meeeaaen"
ing on the redundancy offered by
the piling layout and the robust-
ness of the superstructure, result
~
Chgl Seg Seem eence Wgh S ghNNI PNS InNI Seger Sheger efsaanaaei ennnnmnm
~ SNPPlr Of aamam Of CWIOCIIPNNIr
~ IPoa eoi aatmaeee Of enemas mnaam PIOCONINOS fere PWNMISr SON WNI os eiaeaanaam CeednhNN
defective piles, how confident can a foundation designer be in the con-
struction quality of the entire piling system, and thereby the final
piled foundation? Also, what is the minimum proportion of piles that
should be tested on a project, under certain conditions, to achieve an
acceptable level of quality assurance?
This paper shows how the use of statistics and probability theory
may help answer such questions. Through the use of a statistical
approach, a foundation designer may be able to quantify their level of
confidence in the foundation quality, in addition to deciding on an effi-
cient QA programme of integrity testing. Previously developed statis-
tical approaches have not taken into account the inaccuracy of the
integrity testing process and the likelihood that a wrong diagnosis
could be made regarding the true pile quality. This paper presents and
discusses the results of analyses performed using a more detailed sta-
tistical sampling approach, which considers the reliability of the
integrity testing system.
Bored piling and the occurrence of defects
In general, piling contractors produce bored cast insitu piles to the best
of their ability, following industry best practice to reduce the likeli-
hood of faults. Nevertheless faults can still occur both during and after
construction in a small proportion of a pile population, with the fac-
tors in Table 1 influencing the number of piles affected on a given site.
Thorburn and Thorburn (1977) and Fleming et al (1985) provide a com-
prehensive review of the numerous types of piling fault that can occur
in bored piles along with their variety of causes.
The presence of a piling fault does not necessarily imply that a pile
cannot be used for its intended purpose. Once constructed, there must be
a belief that each and every pile satisfies three general design criteria:
~ Meet serviceability limit state requirements and support a proposed
working load without settling by more than is permissible.
~ Meet ultimate limit state requirements and carry a specified load
with an adequate factor of safety against failure.
~ Remain durable throughout the design life of the structure, such
that the pile is not affected by time dependent activities like corrosion
of the steel reinforcement or chemical attack of the concrete, which
would affect its ability to continue satisfying the first two criteria.
Some faults that occur will be more serious than others, given the
site specific operating conditions of a particular foundation. However,
any fault that is likely to adversely affect performance, safety or dura-
bility of a pile, in either the short or long term, should be considered a
defect, with a pile containing one or more defects being classified as
defective.
Some information on the frequency of defective bored piles, identi-
fied through NDT inspection, can be taken from the results of surveys
published in the technical literature. Davis and Dunn (1974) report
9.7% defective out of a total 717 piles tested on five projects; Fleming et
al (1985) found 1.5% defective out of a total 5,000 piles tested and 1.9%
defective out of a further 4,550 piles tested; Ellway (1987) reports 4.2%
defective of a total 4,400 piles tested; Thasnanipan et al (1988) state 3.3'!a
defective of a total 8,689 piles tested; Lew et al (2002) report 7'!a defec-
tive within a population of 380 piles tested and 1.5% defective of a total
5,000 piles tested. Preiss and Shapiro (1981) suggest that approximately
5% to 10% of the piles on a project could be defective.
Obviously, there are numerous factors influencing the quality of
the piling work in each case, some of which may be noted in Table 1,
W

in failure with consequential
remedial costs or even loss of life.
Alternatively, implementing
unnecessary inspection or reme-
dial work on sound piles may
~ IOCOI ef WWIONSSchlP Seg Sne eiaisea eaenan IINAIg aeneas eennae
~ as~ay Of in eoe meaam arseasies OS NIS Pghgl WWh
~ gflOCIS Of gleeed nnseeaaimam SINI SNONSINC NWhgl ennea>eases INh aammae
~ Npgaeiaa mac NWNNNI Seg CWO hl a maimag pge INNNI IO NNSI CNION hNNI

GROUND ENGINEERING FEBRUARY 2004 35

 PAPER

as well as the specific type of integrity test used, the reliability of

the conclusions drawn and the threshold definition for defective
pile adopted. However the survey results highlight the fact that, in 0 0 0+
0 0+
0 0 0
general, defective bored piles are quite a rare occurrence, nevertheless
may still represent a significant number of the piles on an
0 0 0 0 0 0
individual site. I
Position of column load

offered by the piling layout

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Redundancy
The reliability of a piled foundation (eg its ability to perform as intend- 00 00 0,0 0 0 0 0+
0
ed under operating conditions (Davis, 1999)) is not only affected by the
construction quality of each pile in the population but also the layout
~~ Pile Ptlecap

of the piling system. Figure 1 shows the layout of a typical piled foun- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
dation. The pile population comprises 100 piles, with five piles forming
each pile group and 20 pile groups forming the piling system. Normally, 00 0+
0 0 0 0 0+
0 0 00
a project team's requirements of a piled foundation are that it must be
constructed as quickly as possible, as cheaply as possible and perform
adequately in operation (Chapman and Marcetteau, 2004).
In the UK piling industry the use of single large diameter bored
00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0+
0 0 0 0+
piles is now often favoured to support a column instead of several
0+
0 0 0 0 0+
0 0 0 0
smaller piles in a group. In many cases the direct piling costs
associated with this type of layout are greater than that for a pile
group, but the substructure costs attributed to a system of single
piles are generally less, due to pile caps being unnecessary. The main
reason for choosing single piles is that the substructure tends to be
constructed more rapidly so long as the rate of concrete supply to
the site is not a constraining factor. However as shown in Table 2, the
consequence of a defect in any individual pile depends on the a non-redundant group as one for which failure of a single pile
redundancy offered by the piling layout. Larger pile groups are will adversely affect the structural column its supports, with limited
inherently more redundant than smaller groups or single pile groups or no ability of other piles supporting the same column to mitigate
due to the reserve capacity offered by neighbouring piles and the its effects.
ability to redistribute load through the soil and pile cap (Zhang et al, Defects are particularly critical for single large diameter piles
2001; Paikowsky, 2003). because if such a non-redundant pile is unable to support its working
Table 2 illustrates the likely consequences of a defect causing a loss load this may lead to excessive settlement of the column it supports,
of pile capacity, when single and multiple piles are favoured for the thereby causing significant distortions in the superstructure. Thus, as
foundation layout. Some pile groups may tolerate the presence of the level of redundancy offered by a pile group diminishes, it becomes
a defective pile without being significantly adversely affected, due to a more crucial to assure the construction quality of every pile to avoid
higher level of redundancy being offered. Paikowsky (2003) defines foundation problems.
~&i !lg'A 1 .' ', '' =i. '' ~f'' ' aat 5 A~~.. 'i 'o .w,~aquas ~af'i tite~
Pile testing
There are two fundamentally dif-
ferent uncertainties associated
with foundation piles that tend to
""+ n'=;-t.s.u ~ 't., - 'tsi-s-.' as'~-;I be investigated through testing:
Pile capacity: Will the pile satis-
factorily withstand a specified
loading?
Pile integrity: Is the pile of the
correct dimensions and structur-
al quality?
Bored pile capacity is tradi-
tionally determined through stat-
':l.'I'f) "t I::-":4"-';i'~'ttg)P:4~'~if~<~~ "".S4~'tiSQ""I'6W~a nit $.:-" W'~"'W=':~~'4'~fbsg<j'"-i ic load testing. The load test
~-,.*4>,"j;,*.,'.,':t'6'nt:.'--, j, "':,'::,'y~~@kj4p@~;:u:,i~>~~'~~~"Wet@t, *'W~:,t"..>';i!inn~A'~~<>at''in".L".~
I',;;,"'i
directly examines pile perfor-
mance and establishes whether
there is enough strength provid-
ed by the pile and enough resis-
tance provided by the surround-
ing ground to support an applied
load with an acceptable amount
't'tltttf" 4 silt"pit i't'it 8 -" i'.~ )I I)itjeintN ~')gqi ettft'w+P%~ of settlement (Fleming et al,
1985).
I'!! Pile integrity is traditionally
,

Q Q ...;,';, *,,,',t determined through non-destruc-

tive inspection. An NDT test indi-
rectly examines pile construction
quality and determines whether
'tw "" ''t, '" .',";.;"Iv. ' ''av't '""* '4 i the insitu pile is of the necessary
eii i:,, '" tte v Ip
specification with correct dimen-
sions, material homogeneity and
Q+ l~tttt '" 'if~!1!.pttttp)f i)!4"'0)j'a'ii'4+lj~.,l~fl)(+~/~4". free of structural faults.
It/<

The direct cost of static load

testing coupled with the pro-
gramme disruption caused by the
test frame's presence on site
makes it prohibitively expensive
to test more than a token propor-
tion of piles. As such, load tests
are limited to about 1% to 2% of
the working piles (Turner, 1997).

36 GROUND ENGINEERINCi EEBRUARY 2004

 PAPER

Reliability of integrity testing

100 The most widely specified forms of non-destructive examination in the
UK are:
External: Sonic Echo (SE) and Transient Dynamic Response (TDR)
)e '- 'a 80 Internal: Cross-hole Sonic Logging (CSL)
These are known as indirect testing methods as they infer structural
features of a pile from its acoustic response to the test. Weltman (1977)
and Turner (1997) review the various NDT methods for assessing pile
integrity along with their attributes under different operating condi-
tions. With these methods, the indirect nature of the integrity inference
means that a high degree of judgement and subjective interpretation is
a 40
required when evaluating the structural quality of each pile tested.
E
Integrity testing reliability can be defined as the degree to which
both the evidence provided by an NDT test and the interpretation of
20- that evidence corresponds with the true state of a pile insitu. As such,
,tl
an inaccurate claim of (in)sufficient pile integrity may arise through
improper test application or a lack of knowledge and experience in
t
4 data interpretation. Hertlein (1998) has examined the reliability of dif-
0 ; 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 25 28 30 ferent integrity testing methods through numerous case histories.
Defective piles (allowed) in the population Furthermore, a detailed discussion of the factors influencing the accu-
racy of internal and external techniques has been provided by Davis
(1999). Some factors influencing the reliability of testing conclusions
are given in Table 3.
ova seaCv Clearly, the appropriateness of the test method for the particular pile
features being searched for is vital. SE and TDR techniques are excel-
lent at detecting transverse cracks, which can have little engineering
However, non-destructive testing is rapid and cheap in comparison, significance, so may thereby yield many false-positive results [Lew et
thereby making it feasible to inspect a large proportion, if not every al, 2002]. TDR tests tend to be more detailed than SE tests due to the
pile on a given site. instrumented hammer used to strike the pile head recording more
quantitative data, and the ability to analyse the results in both the time
Integrity testing guidance and frequency domain.
No codified recommendations are given in any UK piling specification On the other hand, CSL techniques are better at detecting real
(ICE, 1988a, 1988b, 1996) or Eurocode 7 (1997) on what should be the defects, however they are considerably more expensive and time con-
minimum number or percentage of piles integrity tested using suming and so tend to be reserved for large-diameter piles supporting
non-destructive techniques. However in Ciria Report 144, which is one expensive buildings, where the consequence of defects occurring are
of the principal up-to-date references and industry guides for pile more severe.
integrity testing, Turner (1997) makes reference to a statistical When interpreting an integrity test result, the threshold beyond
approach developed by Preiss and Shapiro (1979, 1981) that aims to give which a pile is classified as defective is particularly crucial. Setting a
quantitative guidance on the level of testing necessary under certain tight threshold may produce many false-positive results, whilst a gen-
conditions. erous threshold could provide numerous false-negative results, that is,
Preiss and Shapiro's statistical approach indicates what proportion defective piles slipping through the screening process. It is not uncom-
of piles should be integrity tested to achieve confidence of at least mon for NDT contractors, which are normally subcontractors to the
90% in there being less than a certain number of defective piles piling contractors, to come under commercial pressure to justify
among both the tested and untested piles in the population. "If 10 out thresholds that are seen as too tight (excessively conservative). For this
of 100 piles are allowed to be defective and in the tested sample no reason, industry-wide standardisation of test methods and threshold
defective piles are detected then 20 piles should be tested" [Preiss and criteria based on quantitative assessments is to be encouraged.
Shapiro, 1979). Although there is evidence to suggest that NDT methods can on occa-
A red dashed line in Figure 2 illustrates this point. Similarly, by test- sion, be incorrectly specified, misused or misinterpreted, they remain
ing 70% of the pile population and detecting two defective piles, the a valuable tool for quality assurance of bored cast insitu piles once
probability (or risk) of there being more than six defective piles in the they are built (Hertlein, 1998). They are particularly useful when cou-
population is less than 10%. Therefore in this case, if the foundation pled with accurate piling construction records for highlighting piles
can tolerate six defective piles and the engineer accepts the 10 Yo likeli- that are more likely to be defective.
hood of there being more than the tolerable number defective, then 70
out of 100 piles should be tested. In general, to achieve this 90% level of Background to statistical analysis
confidence in there being no more than a tolerable number of defective By inspecting every pile on site using an integrity test that is perfectly
piles in the foundation, the number of piles that need to be integrity reliable, a foundation designer can be certain of detecting all the defec-
tested: tive piles that may exist and, after their repair, be absolutely confident
~ increases as the number of defective piles detected in the sample in the structural quality of the foundation. However this is an idealised
increases, for a given proportion of defective piles tolerable; situation, as although it is possible and often favoured in practice to
~ decreases as the tolerable proportion of defective piles increases, for implement a 100% testing strategy, the integrity testing conclusions
a given number of defective piles detected in the tested sample. are rarely 100% reliable as previously discussed. Therefore a more
Probabilistic and statistical techniques can be useful in dealing with detailed statistical methodology may be developed by considering the
problems of quality assurance in geotechnical engineering (NRC, reliability of the integrity testing system used (Cameron et al, 2002).
1995). Weltman (1980), Preiss and Shapiro (1979, 1981) and Paikowsky The sequence of events associated with pile construction and
(2003) have all proposed statistical approaches to determine a suitable integrity testing, accounting for the possibility of an inspection error,
number of piles to be tested for quality assurance. However, the are modelled in Figure 3. Foundation quality is expressed by the num-
methodologies have assumed the
physical pile test and the inter-
pretation of the test result to be
100% reliable, without account-
ing for the occurrence of a false-
negative or false-positive inspec-
tion error. Clearly, this is not the '"'RVI 'hi:fp'j'"kdjjvs "::vt
case i O tice as th it ci
non-destructive tests are notori-
ously difficult to interpret, mak-
ing it impossible to be certain in
every case that the correct con-
clusions have been reached.

GIIOUND ENGINEERING FEBRUARY 2004 37

 PAPER

CljiiNaeilgigtgteI4(4tugS'eel)fr,,
~ggRtaeymaye~'~f)

,'otal
izr Tolerable number of defechve piles: TD = (ND -nD) + ud = (ND nD) + (nD ddl = ND dd
Unselected defective piles
(ND nDi
* Defectrve piles

r'efectwe
r Defechve piles correctly
inthe population Defective detechon classified defective
(ND) reliability Detected defecdves
r (( - Eil
piles in the number of piles
selected sample c(ass!bed def ectwe
Defectwe piles incorrectly
! x x False-negatnie c(assr(red nondefectrve
(nDt)

inspection error Undetected defectlves Sample size

(Einl (udl (nl
Unselected, hence Total number of piles

t
r
classrhed nondefectwe
Nondefectwe piles nDt)
(N) ln
Non defechve correctly
detection reliabihty c(assrhed nondefechve
r
(i - Eio)
r e)g,t-.~v4<~bWirr 'WQ zmlthv Nondefective piles r
(xxl
r
PA.",'~ksT'='"vnaaH.W straw in the selected sample i
ln nD) False-positive incorrecdy
inspection error classified defective
Norrdefechve piles
(Ein ) f
(p)
in the population

(N NDI
Unselected i
nondefective piles r
(N-ND-n+ nD) !
='-;;w~'1;I'~<,',v4vglvrdcxt ';.P r<Arlm)) 4'~!;"'rue
Known state
state of nature
~r I
Testing process

r~
I
Observed state based
on teshng process

ber of defective piles remaining, and thus incorporated into the final
piling system, after the implementation of a programme of integrity
testing and subsequent repair.
As shown in Table 2, it may be possible for a foundation to tolerate a
number of defective piles without being significantly adversely affect-
ed, due to the redundancy offered by the piling layout. Therefore, to
assure foundation quality through a programme of non-destructive
testing, at least all but a tolerable number of defective piles must be
detected. The degree of confidence in satisfying this QA criterion (level
of quality assurance achieved) can be quantified through the use of a
statistical procedure. Referring to Figure 3, the statistical analysis
answers the question:
What is the probability of detecting at least all but a tolerable number
of defective piles amongst the (nDt) apparently defective piles detected
and subsequently repaired within a sample of (n) piles tested at random
using an integrity test with a defective and non-defective detection relia-
blllty of I-Efn and I-Efp respectively, given that a total of 1VD defective
piles are assumed to initially exist within a population of (N) piles prior
to the programme of inspection and repair?
This degree of confidence is given symbolically as: Pr[dd~ (ND TD)].
Discussion of results
The results of statistical analyses, for a range of likely practical val-
ues, are given in Figure 4. Each graph shows the number of piles test-
ed versus degree of confidence, within a population of 100 piles for a
given number of defective piles in the population, testing reliability
and tolerable number of defective piles.
Assume that the pile population contains 5'/o defectives. If the foun-
dation can tolerate up to four defective piles (TD = 4) and the integrity
testing system used is 100 zo reliable at detecting defective piles, then a
totally competent testing specialist would be 90'!o confident in detect-
ing at least one defective by testing 37 piles. However if the test is only
60cvo reliable then the same testing sPecialist would be only 71 "o confi-
dent. Furthermore, to achieve the same 90 yo level of confidence, with a
60g" reliable test, 62 piles should be inspected. Thus, to achieve the
same level of quality assurance with the less reliable integrity test,
almost twice as many piles should be tested. Therefore, the results
show that:
~ for a given number of piles tested, a greater degree of quality assur-
ance will be achieved with a more reliable integrity testing system
Used;
~ a more reliable integrity testing system requires a smaller sample of
piles to be tested to achieve a pre-determined level of quality assur-
ance.
A programme of integrity testing is effective if the QA criteria are
satisfied with an acceptable level of confidence and efficient if these
objectives are accomplished with as little effort as possible.
If it is assumed that the cost and time required to test a pile is the
same for each type of integrity test, then to achieve a predetermined
level of quality assurance, the more reliable the test is the more effec-
tive and efficient the testing programme due to the smaller sample of
piles to be tested.
However in reality, the cost and time to test a pile varies with the dif-
ferent NDT methods. For example, testing a pile using a SE or TDR
method may only take a few minutes (10 to 20 piles tested per hour with
good access (FPS, 1999)) and cost typically f3 to y5 per pile in addition
to a site mobilisation fee and minimum testing charge, while a CSL test
may take up to an hour to perform and cost hundreds of pounds
depending on the length of the pile and the number of pre-installed
access tubes.
Accounting for such factors in achieving a predetermined level of
quality assurance, increasing the reliability of the integrity testing
system improves the testing effectiveness, as a smaller sample of piles
must be tested. However the testing efficiency does not necessarily
improve due to the increased time and cost of testing each pile with a
more reliable test method.
Most foundation designers like to believe that they are achieving
high levels of confidence during integrity testing. However, even when
a NDT programme is carried out on an entire pile population, a foun-
dation designer can rarely guarantee that there will be absolutely no
defective piles incorporated into the final foundation.
In fact, the results show that even if blanket inspection of every pile
is performed, in the hope of achieving total quality (ie TD = 0), the inac-
curacy in the integrity testing system only allows for low levels of con-
fidence to be achieved. For example, assume that the population con-
tains 5'zo defectives and the integrity testing system used is 80'ro reli-
able. If a programme of 100'Zo inspection is carried out under these
conditions, the likelihood of detecting all the defective piles in the test-
ed sample is only 32'to. Thus, on the basis of these data, foundation
designers need to allow for either accepting:
~ lower levels of confidence in assuring total quality of the founda-
tion;
~ that the piled foundation should tolerate a number of undetected
defective piles.
Furthermore, for a given level of confidence, the more defective piles
that can be tolerated, then the less integrity testing is required. Thus,
the amount of in built redundancy offered by the piling system (tolera-
ble proportion defective) may influence the decision as to how many
piles should be integrity tested.
It is the general recommendation of many (Turner, 1997; Paikowsky,
2003) that every pile on a given site should be post construction tested
for defects. However, in practice it is often difficult to test 100'Io of the
working piles due a number of factors including cost, time and access.
As foundation construction is usually on a project's critical path, any
delays that may occur during pile testing can adversely affect the
progress of all follow-on activities, the direct cost of which may exceed
the value of the entire piling contract (Chapman and Marcetteau, 2004).
As such, there is a significant advantage in terms of cost and pro-

GROUND ENGINEERING YE(tRUARY 2004

 PAPER

laid out by Chapman and

0.40 Marcetteau (2004):
TD = Tolerable number ii ~ good site investigation properly
Q. 35 of defectwe piles gathered together
~ TD = 0 1
~ careful design appropriate for
the particular ground conditions
Q. 30 ~ TD=1 i as part of a coherent design
)
TD = 2 process
e 0.25 l

~ TD = 3 ~ appropriate choice of accept-

o able piling methods
020 ~ TD = 4 ~ clear specification and fair pro-
to I
t
ta 0.15 curement of the piling contract
xo ~ experienced contractor who
0 IQ. has considered all the risks
Q
t
~ independent supervision to
verify that standards are main-

,,3 r J. J,II ,iL

0 05
owi
tained.
o Adopting this doctrine should
)0-10) (1020) (20-30l (3040) (4050) )5060) )60.70! (7080 (8090) l90)00) reduce the likelihood of defects
~o~~~gx~~@S+c..'les
occurring and maximise the like-

Number of piles tested
gramme if some piles could be omitted from testing.
Consider a programme of inspection carried out on a population of
100 piles, assumed to contain 5% defectives, using an integrity test that
is 80% reliable. Under these conditions, Figure 5 shows the increase in
confidence (quality assurance) gained for every additional 10 piles
integrity tested. It is shown that where the foundation can tolerate up
to four defective piles, most benefit comes from the initial piles tested.
However, where the foundation cannot tolerate any defective piles with-
in it, most benefit comes from testing the final piles. Therefore, the
greater the reliance on each individual pile in a population, the more
important it is to check the integrity of every single pile, even when
performing 1009o testing may be disruptive to the construction pro-
gramme.
Figure 5 shows that in some cases the added value gained by the last
piles tested could be judged by the foundation designer not to be worth
the time and money involved in the testing. This is particularly true on
large projects with a rapid construction programme, where the con-
struction manager wants the groundwork contractor to follow on
directly as the piling contractor leaves site.
Often on these projects, there is immense pressure not to integrity
test the final say 20 to of the piles to allow an earlier package handover.
The analysis shows that such an omission may be possible only if the
tolerable proportion of defective piles is high. Hence, there could be pro-
gramme advantages in selecting a more redundant foundation system.
Conclusion
Many engineers like to perform 100% inspection in the hope of detect-
ing all the defective piles that may exist on a site. However, the results
of statistical analyses have shown that even if every pile is tested, the
inaccuracy of the integrity testing system used does not allow for high
levels of confidence to be achieved.
Furthermore, in some cases testing slightly less than 100% of the
piles may be a viable option, with little reduction in the level of quali-
ty assurance occurring but with potential benefit in terms of cost and
programme savings. Nevertheless, it must be highlighted that the only
way that this can happen is by selecting a more redundant foundation
design.
Hence, the redundancy offered by supporting columns on a layout of
pile groups, as opposed to single large diameter piles, may serve as a
major reason for a decrease in the amount of integrity testing neces-
sary for quality assurance of a bored pile foundation.
As in any modelling activity, assumptions and simplifications have
been made to the real life pile construction and integrity testing
sequence to model the problem in a statistical manner.
Notwithstanding, the use of these statistical results, supplementing
experience and sound engineering judgement, may provide a more
rational basis for deciding on a suitable level of integrity testing, there-
by helping to improve foundation safety and construction efficiency.
The paper highlights the folly of absolute reliance on the results of
integrity testing as the sole arbiter of quality in bored pile founda-
tions. While integrity tests have a valuable role to play in the detection
of defects, statistical analysis accounting for inaccuracies in the tech-
niques, indicates that a high level of dependence should not be attrib-
uted to the results of integrity tests alone. Moreover, the best approach
in ensuring quality of piled foundations is to follow the basic princi-
~
lihood that suspected piles will
have already been identified
prior to integrity testing. The
findings of this paper reinforce
these well-accepted principles.
Acknowledgefnents
The authors gratefully acknowledge the comments given during the
preparation of this paper by Dr Allen Davis, Dr Mike Duncan, Mr
Bernie Hertlein, Mr Tom Pelnik, Dr Hugh St John, Prof Kenneth Preiss
and Mr Aaron Zdinak.
Cameron G, Wamuziri SC. Smith IGN and Chapman TJP (2002) Statistical sampling
schemes for integrity testing of piled foundations, Proceedings of United Engineering
Foundation International Conference on Probabilistics in Geotechnics: Technical and
economic risk estimation, Graz. Austria, 15-19 September 2002, p129.136.
Chapman TJP and Marcetteau A (2004) Achieving economy and reliability in geotechni-
cal design for a building project. The Structural Engineer. in print.
Davis AG (1999) Assessing the reliability of drilled shaft integrity testing,
Transportation Research Record 1633, TRB, National Research Council, Washington DC,
p108-116.
Davis AG and Dunn CS (1974) From theory to field experience with the non-destructive
vibration testing of piles, Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, Vol. 57, Part
2, p571-593.
EIIway K (1987) Practical guidance on the use of integrity tests for quality control of cast
insitu piles, Proceedings of the first international conference on foundations and tun-
nels, London, p228-234.
Eurocode 7 (1997) Geotechnical Design Part I - General rules, DDFNV 1997-1:1995,
European Committee for Standardisation.
Federation of Piling Specialists (1999)The essential guide to the ICE specification for pil.
ing and embedded retaining walls, The Institution of Civil Engineers, Thomas Telford
Limited, London.
Fleming WGK, Weltman AJ, Randolph MF and Elson WK (1985) Piling engineering,
Surrey University Press.
Hertlein BH (1998) Integrity testing friend or foe?, Proceedings of the 23rd Annual
Members Conference of the Deep Foundations Institute, Geosystems for future trans.
portation systems, Seattle, Washington.
ICE (1988a) Specification for piling. The Institution of Civil Engineers, Thomas Telford
Limited, London.
ICE (1988b) Specification for piling Contract documentation and measurement, The
Institution of Civil Engineers, Thomas Telford. London.
ICE (1996) Specification for piling and embedded retaining walls. The Institution of Civil
Engineers, Thomas Telford, London.
Lew M, Zadoorian CJ and Carpenter LD (2002) Integrity testing of drilled piles for tall
buildings, Structure Magazine, National Council of Structural Engineers and the ASCE,
October 2002.
National Research Council (1995) Probabilistic methods in geotechnical engineering, US
National Academy Press.
Paikowsky SG (2003) Load and resistance factor design for deep foundations, Report
NCHRP 24-17, National Cooperative Highway Research Program, Transportation
Research Board, National Research Council in 2003.
Preiss K and Shapiro J (1979) Statistical estimation of the number of piles to be tested on
a project, RILEM Commission on Non-Destructive Testing, Stockholm.
Preiss K and Shapiro J (1981) Statistical considerations in pile testing, Congress on the
Mechanics of Soils, Stockholm, p799-802.
Thasnanipan N, Maung AW and Baskaran G (1988) Sonic integrity test on piles founded
in Bangkok subsoil signal characteristics and their interpretations, Proceedings of the
Fourth International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering, St
Louis, Missouri, 9-12 March, p1086-1092.
Thorburn S and Thorburn JQ (1977) Review of the problems associated with the con-
struction of cast in place concrete piles, DoE and CIRIA Piling Developnient Group,
Report PG2.
Turner MJ (1997) Integrity testing in piling practice, Construction Industry Research
and Information Association, CIRIA Report 144.
Weltman AJ (1980) Pile load testing procedures, DoE and CIRIA Piling Development
Group, Report PG7.
Weltman AJ (1977) Integrity testing of piles: a review, DoE and CIRIA Piling
Development Group, Report PG4.
Zhang L, Tang W and Ng CWW (2001) Reliability of axially loaded driven pile groups,
Journal of Geotechnlcal and Geoenvl ronmental Engineering, vol. 127, No. 12, p1051-1060.

40 GROl)ND ENGINEERING FEBRUARY 2004