List of Cases for Evidence :)
313
1. Ong Chia v. Republic, 328 SCRA
749- ok
2. People v. Valdez, 342 SCRA 25-
ok
3. Zulueta v. CA, 253 SCRA 699-
ok
4. People v. Ador, 432 SCRA 1- ok
5. Salcedo-Ortanez v. CA, 253
SCRA 111- ok
6. People v. Baconguis, 417 SCRA
66- ok
7. People v. Yatar, 428 SCRA 504-
ok
8. People v. Tumimpad, 235 SCRA
483-ok
9. People v. Sartagoda, 221 SCRA
251- ok
10. People v. Carpo, 356 SCRA
249
2. Rule 129
11. Sanado v. CA, 356 SCRA 546
12. People v. Meneses, 288 SCRA
95
13. Siena Realty v. Gal-lang, 428
SCRA 422
14. Republic v. CA, 277 SCRA 633
15. Del Rosario v. People, 358
SCRA 373
16. People v. Estomaco, 256 SCRA
421
17. Southeastern College v. CA,
292 SCRA 422
18. Coca-Cola v. NLRC, 307 SCRA
131
19. Vergara v. People, 374 SCRA
20. Estrada v. Desierto, 356 SCRA
108
21. People v. Peaflorida, 313
SCRA 563
22. People v. Espinosa, Jr., 243
SCRA 7
23. People v. Kulais, 292 SCRA
551
24. State Prosecutors v. Muro, 236
SCRA 505
25. Laureano v. CA, 324 SCRA 414
26. Candido v. CA, 253 SCRA 78
27. People v. Martinez, 274 SCRA
259
28. Salamera v. Sandiganbayan,
303 SCRA 217
29. Francisco v. People, 434 SCRA
122
30. LBP v. Banal, 434 SCRA 543
31. Herrera v. Ballos, 374 SCRA
107
32. Director of Lands v. CA, 196
SCRA 94
33. Mercury Drug v. Libunao, 434
SCRA 404
34. People v. Hermanes, 379
SCRA 170
35. Republic v. Sandiganbayan,
406 SCRA 190
36. Geagonia v. CA, 241 SCRA 254
37. Philippine Bank of Com. V. CA,
195 SCRA 567
38. Republic Glass Corp. v. Qua,
435 SCRA 480
39. Vda. Dealvarez v. CA, 231
SCRA 309
40. Bitong v. CA, 292 SCRA 503
 1. (G.R. No. 127240. March, 27, 2000)
Ong CHIA, petitioner,vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
The trial court granted the petition and
admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship.
The State, however, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, among others for having
failed to state all his former placer of residence
in violation of C.A. No. 473, 7 and to support
his petition with the appropriate documentary
evidence. Petitioner admits that he failed to
mention said address in his petition, but
argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of
Residence containing it had been fully
published, with the petition and the other
annexes, such publication constitutes
substantial compliance with 7.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the documents annexed by the
State to its appelants brief without having
been presented and formally offered as
evidence under Rule 132, Section 34 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence justified the
reversal of of the Trial Courts decision.
HELD:
YES. Decision of the Court of Appeals was
affirmed. Petition was denied.
RATIO:
It is settled that naturalization laws should be
rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor
of the government and against the
applicant. [T]he rule of strict application of the
law in naturalization cases defeat petitioners
argument of substantial compliance with the
requirement under the Revised Naturalization
Law.
[T]he reason for the rule prohibiting the
admission of evidence which has not been
formally offered is to afford the opposite party
the chance to object to their admissibility.
Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of
the right to object to the authenticity of the
documents submitted to the appellate court by
the State.
2. [G.R. No. 129296. September 25, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. ABE VALDEZ y DELA
CRUZ,
accused-appellant.
FACTS:
SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member of the police
force of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya, testified
that at round 10:15 a.m. of September 24,
1996, he received a tip from an unnamed
informer about the presence of a marijuana
plantation, allegedly owned by Abe Valdez y
Dela Cruz at Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde,
Nueva Vizcaya. The prohibited plants were
allegedly planted close to appellant's (ABE
VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ) hut. Police Inspector
Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of
Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya then formed a
reaction team from his operatives to verify
the report. At approximately 5:00 o'clock
A.M. the following day, said police team,
accompanied by their informer, left for the
site where the marijuana plants were
allegedly being grown. After a three-hour,
uphill trek from the nearest barangay road,
the police operatives arrived at the place
pinpointed by their informant. The police
found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They,
then,
proceeded to look around the area where
appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7)
five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in
two rows, approximately 25 meters from
appellant's hut. PO2 Balut asked appellant
who owned the prohibited plants and,
according to Balut, the latter admitted that
they were his. The police uprooted the seven
marijuana plants, which weighed 2.194
kilograms. The police took photos of
appellant standing beside the cannabis
plants. Appellant was then arrested. One of
the plants, weighing 1.090 kilograms, was
sent to the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya
for analysis.
Inspector Prevy Fabros Luwis, the Crime
Laboratory forensic analyst, testified
that upon microscopic examination of said
plant, she found cystolitic hairs containing
calcium carbonate, a positive indication for
marijuana. She next conducted a chemical
examination, the results of
which confirmed her initial impressions. She
found as follows: "SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Exh "A" - 1.090 grams of uprooted suspected
marijuana plant placed inside a white sack
with markings. x x x "FINDINGS: Qualitative
examination conducted on the above stated
specimen gave POSITIVE result to the test for
Marijuana, a prohibited drug." ABE VALDEZ y
DELA CRUZ, the accused, was found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt by trial
court of cultivating marijuana plants
punishable under section 9 of Dangerous
Drugs Act of
1972, as amended and was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of death by lethal
injection.
The accused-appellant contended there was
unlawful search and that the court erred in
declaring
the marijuana plants, as evidence despite
that was the product of an illegal search;
erred in
convicting the accused of violation of section
9 (Dangerous Drugs Act), Republic Act No.
6425
despite of the inadmissibility of the evidence;
and gravely erred in imposing the supreme
penalty
of death upon the accused despite failure of
the court to prove that the land where the
Indian
Hemp were cultivated was a public land on
the assumption that the accused planted.
Issues:
1. Was the search and seizure of the
marijuana plants in this case lawful?
2. Was the used evidence (seizure of
marijuana plants) in the case against Valdez
admissible?
3. Has the prosecution proved that Valdez
was guilty beyond reasonable doubt
HELD:
The marijuana plants seized were product
of an illegal search because of the absence
of search warrant and are therefore
inadmissible in evidence. The voluntary
confession of ownership of marijuana was
in violation of the custodial rights because
of the absence of competent and
independent counsel, and thus,
inadmissible too. In sum, both the object
evidence and the testimonial evidence as
to the appellants voluntary confession of
ownership of the prohibited plants relied
upon to prove appellants guilt failed to
meet the test of constitutional
competence. Without these, the
prosecutions remaining evidence did not
even approximate the quantum of
evidence necessary to warrant appellants
conviction. Hence, the presumption of
innocence on his favor stands.
HELD:
The Supreme Court REVERSED the decision of
the Regional Trial Court and the appellant
was
AQUITTED
1. and 2.
No. In the instant case, there was no
search warrant issued by a judge after
personal
determination of the existence of probable
cause.
Contention: For the appellee, the Office of
the Solicitor General argues that the records
clearly
show that there was no search made by the
police team, in the first place. The OSG points
out
that the marijuana plants in question were
grown in an unfenced lot and as each grew
about five
(5) feet tall, they were visible from afar, and
were, in fact, immediately spotted by the
police
officers when they reached the site. The
seized marijuana plants were, thus, in plain
view of the
police officers.
Ruling: We find no reason to subscribe to
Solicitor General's contention that we apply
the "plain
view" doctrine. For the doctrine to apply, the
following elements must be present:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the
police who have the right to be where they
are; (c) the evidence must be immediately
apparent;
and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search.
In the instant case, recall that PO2 Balut
testified that they first located the marijuana
plants
before appellant was arrested without a
warrant. Hence, there was no valid
warrantless arrest
which preceded the search of appellant's
premises. Note further that the police team
was
dispatched to appellant's kaingin precisely to
search for and uproot the prohibited flora.
The
seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies
only where the police officer is not searching
for
evidence against the accused, but
inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object. Clearly,
their discovery of the cannabis plants was
not inadvertent. We also note the testimony
of SPO2
Tipay that upon arriving at the area, they first
had to "look around the area" before they
could
spot the illegal plants. Patently, the seized
marijuana plants were not "immediately
apparent" and
a "further search" was needed. In sum, the
marijuana plants in question were not in
"plain view"
or "open to eye and hand." The "plain view"
doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.
We therefore hold, with respect to the first
issue, that the confiscated plants were
evidently
obtained during an illegal search and seizure.
As to the second issue, which involves the
admissibility of the marijuana plants as
evidence for the prosecution, we find that
said plants
cannot, as products of an unlawful search
and seizure, be used as evidence against
appellant.
They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned
tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on
the part of
the court a quo to have admitted and relied
upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence
to
convict appellant.
3. No.
In convicting appellant, the trial court
likewise relied on the testimony of the police
officers to
the effect that appellant admitted ownership
of the marijuana when he was asked who
planted
them. It made the following observation: "It
may be true that the admission to the police
by the
accused that he planted the marijuana plants
was made in the absence of any independent
and
competent counsel. But the accused was not,
at the time of police verification; under
custodial
investigation. His admission is, therefore,
admissible in evidence and not violative of
the constitutional fiat that admission given
during custodial investigation is not
admissible if given without any counsel."
The Constitution plainly declares that any
person under investigation for the
commission of an
offense shall have the right: (1) to remain
silent; (2) to have competent and
independent counsel
preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be
informed of such rights. These rights cannot
be
waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel. An investigation begins when it is
no
longer a general inquiry but starts to focus on
a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when
the
police investigator starts interrogating or
exacting a confession from the suspect in
connection
with an alleged offense. The moment the
police try to elicit admissions or confessions
or even
plain information from a person suspected of
having committed an offense, he should at
that
juncture be assisted by counsel, unless he
waives the right in writing and in the
presence of
counsel.
In the instant case we find that, from the
start, a tipster had furnished the police
appellant's name
as well as the location of appellant's farm,
where the marijuana plants were allegedly
being
grown. While the police operation was
supposedly meant to merely "verify" said
information, the
police chief had likewise issued
instructions to arrest appellant as a
suspected marijuana
cultivator. Thus, at the time the police talked
to appellant in his farm, the latter was
already under
investigation as a suspect. The questioning by
the police was no longer a general inquiry.
Moreover, we find appellant's extrajudicial
confession flawed with respect to its
admissibility.
For a confession to be admissible, it must
satisfy the following requirements: (1) it
must be
voluntary; (2) it must be made with the
assistance of competent and independent
counsel; (3) it
must be express; and (4) it must be in
writing. The records show that the admission
by appellant
was verbal. It was also uncounselled. A verbal
admission allegedly made by an accused
during
the investigation, without the assistance of
counsel at the time of his arrest and even
before his
formal investigation is not only inadmissible
for being violative of the right to counsel
during
criminal investigations, it is also hearsay.
Summary of ruling in no. 3: First, as earlier
pointed out, the seized marijuana plants
were
obtained in violation of appellant's
constitutional rights against unreasonable
searches and
seizures. The search and seizure were void ab
initio for having been conducted without the
requisite judicial warrant. The prosecution's
very own evidence clearly establishes that
the police
had sufficient time to obtain a warrant. There
was no showing of such urgency or necessity
for
the warrantless search or the immediate
seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this
case. To
reiterate, said marijuana plants cannot be
utilized to prove appellant's guilt without
running afoul
of the constitutional guarantees against
illegal searches and the inadmissibility of
evidence
procured pursuant to an unlawful search and
seizure.
Second, the confession of ownership of the
marijuana plants, which appellant allegedly
made to
the police during investigation, is not only
hearsay but also violative of the Bill of Rights.
The
purported confession was made without the
assistance of competent and independent
counsel, as
mandated by the Charter. Thus, said
confession cannot be used to convict
appellant without
running afoul of the Constitution's
requirement that a suspect in a criminal
investigation must
have the services of competent and
independent counsel during such
investigation In sum, both the object
evidence and the testimonial evidence as to
appellant's voluntary
confession of ownership of the prohibited
plants relied upon to prove appellant's guilt
failed to
meet the test of Constitutional competence
3. Zulueta vs Court of Appeals
Caption:
Cecilia Zulueta vs Court of Appeals and
Alfredo Martin
(253 SCRA 699)
GR no. 107383 February 20, 1996
Facts:
Cecilia Zulueta is the Petitioner who offset the
private papers of his husband Dr. Alfredo
Martin. Dr. Martin is a doctor of medicine while
he is not in his house His wife took the 157
documents consisting of diaries, cancelled
check, greeting cards, passport and
photograph, private respondents between her
Wife and his alleged paramours, by means of
forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet.
Cecilia Zulueta filed the papers for the
evidence of her case of legal separation and
for disqualification from the practice of
medicine against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of
the documents and papers and for damages
against Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch X. the trial court rendered
judgment for Martin, declaring him the
capital/exclusive owner of the properties
described in paragraph 3 ofMartins Complaint
or those further described in the Motion to
Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta
and any person acting in her behalf to a
immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin
and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal
damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and
attorneys fees; and to pay the costs of the suit.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court. Zulueta
filed the petition for review with the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
The papers and other materials obtained from
forcible entrusion and from unlawful means are
admissible as evidence in court regarding
marital separation and disqualification from
medical practice.
Ruling/Held:
The documents and papers are inadmissible in
evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring the privacy of communication and
correspondence to be inviolable is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife who
thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands
infidelity, who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced.
The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a lawful order from a
court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation
of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. The intimacies between husband
and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other
and in ransacking them for any telltale
evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her
integrity or his right to privacy as an individual
and the constitutional protection is ever
available to him or to her. The law insures
absolute freedom of communication between
the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the
other without the consent of the affected
spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither
may be examined without the consent of the
other as to any communication received in
confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But
one thing is freedom of communication; quite
another is a compulsion for each one to share
what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each
owes to the other.
4. People v. Ador 432 SCRA 1
Facts:
In convicting accused of murder, the trial
court relied on the circumstances, namely:
1. that he was seen fleeing from the crime
scene,
2. that he allegedly surrendered a handgun,
3. that the slug taken from the head of the
victim was fired from the gun he
surrendered,
4. that the victim made a dying declaration
identifying him, and
5. that paraffin test showed that he was
positive for gun powder.
Issue:
Is the conviction proper?
Held:
No. For circumstantial evidence to suffice,
1. there should be more than one
circumstance;
2. the facts from which the inference are
derived are proven and
3. the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, the following are the guidelines
in appreciating circumstantial evidence:
1. it should be acted upon with caution;
2. all the essential facts must be consistent
with the hypothesis of guilt;
3. the facts must exclude every theory but
that of guilt; and
4. the facts must establish such certainty of
guilt as to convince the judgment beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused is the one
who committed the offense.
Measured against these guidelines, the
conviction cannot stand for the following
reasons:
1. the testimony of the prosecution witness
that he saw accused fleeing from the crime
scene is doubtful;
2. the gun surrendered by the accused does
not appear to be the same gun presented
during trial;
3. if the gun is not the same, it is uncertain
where the slug taken from the head of the
victim came from;
4. the dying declaration which mentioned
only the "Adors" can refer to anyone with
that family name; and
5. scientific experts concur in the view that
the result of a paraffin test is not conclusive.
Plainly, the facts from which the inference
that the accused committed the crime were
not proven. Accordingly, the guilt of the
accused was not established with moral
certainty
5. SALCEDO-ORTANEZ V CA
Facts:
Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed
with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for
annulment of marriage with damages
against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez,
on grounds of lack of marriage license
and/or psychological incapacity of the
petitioner.
Among the exhibits offered by private
respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of
alleged telephone conversations between
petitioner and unidentified persons.
Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment
to Rafaels oral offer of evidence. However,
the trial court admitted all of private
respondents offered evidence and later on
denied her motion for reconsideration,
prompting petitioner to file a petition
for certiorari with the CA to assail the
admission in evidence of the
aforementioned cassette tapes.
These tape recordings were made and
obtained when private respondent allowed
his friends from the military to wire tap his
home telephone.
CA denied the petition because (1) Tape
recordings are not inadmissible per se.
They and any other variant thereof can be
admitted in evidence for certain purposes,
depending on how they are presented and
offered and on how the trial judge utilizes
them in the interest of truth and fairness
and the even handed administration of
justice; and (2) A petition for certiorari is
notoriously inappropriate to rectify a
supposed error in admitting evidence
adduced during trial. The ruling on
admissibility is interlocutory; neither does
it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is erroneous,
the ruling should be questioned in the
appeal from the judgment on the merits
and not through the special civil action
of certiorari. The error, assuming
gratuitously that it exists, cannot be
anymore than an error of law, properly
correctible by appeal and not by certiorari.
Petitioner then filed the present petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
W/N the recordings of the telephone
conversations are admissible in evidence
W/N the remedy of certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court was properly
availed of by the petitioner in the Court of
Appeals
Held:
1. No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled An Act
to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and
Other Related Violations of the Privacy of
Communication, and for other purposes
expressly makes such tape recordings
inadmissible in evidence thus:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person,
not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken
word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using
any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a
device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or tape-recorder, or however otherwise
described. . . .
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word,
or the existence, contents, substance,
purport, or meaning of the same or any part
thereof, or any information therein
contained, obtained or secured by any
person in violation of the preceding
sections of this Act shall not be admissible
in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial,
legislative or administrative hearing or
investigation.
Absent a clear showing that both parties to
the telephone conversations allowed the
recording of the same, the inadmissibility of
the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep.
Act No. 4200.
2. Yes and no. The extraordinary writ
of certiorari is generally not available to
challenge an interlocutory order of a trial
court. The proper remedy in such cases is
an ordinary appeal from an adverse
judgment, incorporating in said appeal the
grounds for assailing the interlocutory
order.
However, where the assailed interlocutory
order is patently erroneous and the remedy
of appeal would not afford adequate and
expeditious relief, the Court may
allow certiorari as a mode of redress.
6. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
RUEL BACONGUIS y INSON
417 SCRA 66 (2003), EN BANC (Carpio
Morales, J.)
Facts:
While Lydia Mercado-Lledo was sleeping in
her bedroom, she heard a gunshot and when
she looked at the window, she saw a man
jumping at their fence. The man allegedly
turned his face which enabled Lydia to see
his face. When Lydia went to the sala, she
saw her younger brother Roberto Mercado
bleeding. She thereafter brought him to the
hospital but subsequently died. The
investigating officers found that the
description of the man that Lydia saw
matched that of Ruel Baconguis who was a
suspect in several cases of theft and robbery.
Baconguis was then captured by the police
and was subjected to paraffin testing where
he was found positive for gunpowder nitrates
on both hands. Lydia, upon seeing
Baconguis, told the police that he was the
man she saw. Baconguis denied the
allegations against him. The Regional Trial
Court (RTC), however, gave credence to the
results of the paraffin test and found
Baconguis guilty of Murder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the paraffin test and Lydias
testimony are sufficient to convict Ruel
Baconguis of the crime charge
HELD:
It bears noting that the evidence relied upon
by the prosecution is circumstantial. It is
settled that for circumstantial evidence to
suffice to convict, the following requisites
must be met: 1) there is more than one
circumstance; 2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the
combination of all circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
The value of the in-court identification
made by Lydia, however, is largely
dependent upon the out-of-court
identification she made while Baconguis
was in the custody of the police. In People v.
Teehankee, Jr., the Court held that
corruption of out-of-court identification
contaminates the integrity of in-court
identification during the trial case. The
totality of circumstances test has been
fashioned to assure fairness as well as
compliance with the constitutional
requirements of due process in regard to
out-of-court identification. Under the
circumstances attendant to the
identification of Bocanguis, the Court is not
prepared to hold that the prosecution had
established that Bocanguis was the man
seen leaving the house-scene of the crime
soon after a gunshot was hear. As for the
positive paraffin findings on Bocanguis, it is
well settled that nitrates are also found in
substances other than gunpowder. But even
assuming arguendo that Bocanguis being
positive for gunpowder may be credited as
circumstantial evidence indicating his
culpability, that is only one circumstance,
and since no other circumstance was
established by the prosecution, the first
requirement of circumstantial evidence to
warrant conviction of Bocanguis has not
been met
7. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT"
G.R. No. 150224 (428 SCRA 504); May
19, 2004
FACTS
Accused-appellant was sentenced to death for
the special complex crime of Rape with
Homicide, and ordering him to pay the heirs of
the victim. Appellant was charged to have had
carnal knowledge of a certain Kathylyn Uba
against her will, and with the use of a bladed
weapon, stabbed the latter inflicting upon her
fatal injuries resulting in her untimely demise.
In the instant case, appellant raises the issue
of credibility of witnesses, specifically
assigning as error on the part of the trial court,
the latters giving of much weight to the
evidence presented by the prosecution
notwithstanding their doubtfulness.
ISSUE (1)
Whether appellants contentions as regards
the witnesses credibility are meritorious.
HELD: NO.
The issue regarding the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses should be resolved
against appellant. This Court will not interfere
with the judgment of the trial court in
determining the credibility of witnesses unless
there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which
has been overlooked or the significance of
which has been misinterpreted.
Well-entrenched is the rule that the findings of
the trial court on credibility of witnesses are
entitled to great weight on appeal unless
cogent reasons are presented necessitating a
reexamination if not the disturbance of the
same; the reason being that the former is in a
better and unique position of hearing first hand
the witnesses and observing their deportment,
conduct and attitude. Absent any showing that
the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight which would affect the result of the
case, the trial judges assessment of credibility
deserves the appellate courts highest
respect. Where there is nothing to show that
the witnesses for the prosecution were
actuated by improper motive, their testimonies
are entitled to full faith and credit.
The weight of the prosecutions evidence must
be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule
which provides that an accused can be
convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as
long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is
presented by the prosecution to prove beyond
doubt that the accused committed the crime.
ISSUE (2)
Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence
HELD: Circumstantial evidence, to be
sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form
an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and
reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the
exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of the
crime. To determine whether there is sufficient
circumstantial evidence, three requisites must
concur: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) facts on which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.

ISSUE (3)
In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence,
the appellant contends that the blood sample
taken from him as well as the DNA tests were
conducted in violation of his right to remain
silent as well as his right against self-
incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III
of the Constitution.
Is the contention of appellant tenable?
HELD: NO.
The kernel of the right is not against all
compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion. The right against self-
incrimination is simply against the legal
process of extracting from the lips of the
accused an admission of guilt. It does not
apply where the evidence sought to be
excluded is not an incrimination but as part of
object evidence.
We ruled in People v. Rondero that although
accused-appellant insisted that hair samples
were forcibly taken from him and submitted to
the National Bureau of Investigation for
forensic examination, the hair samples may be
admitted in evidence against him, for what is
proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion
or any evidence communicative in nature
acquired from the accused under duress.
Hence, a person may be compelled to submit
to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin,
blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial
compulsion involved. Under People v.
Gallarde, where immediately after the
incident, the police authorities took pictures
of the accused without the presence of
counsel, we ruled that there was no violation
of the right against self-incrimination. The
accused may be compelled to submit to a
physical examination to determine his
involvement in an offense of which he is
accused.
8. People vs. Tumimpad 235 SCRA 483
FACTS:
Sandra Salcedo at the time of the incident
was a 15-year old Mongoloid and daughter of
Lt. Col.Teofisto Salcedo and Pastora Salcedo.
She had a mind of a five-year old child, who
still needed tobe fed and dressed up. Her
vocabulary was limited and most of the time
she expressed herself bymotions.Col.
Teofisto Salcedo was then Provincial
Commander of Misamis Occidental. Four
security menwere assigned to him, two of
whom were accused Constable Ruel Prieto
and accused-appellantMoreno Tumimpad.It
was on August 7, 1989, when Sandra
complained of constipation. Mrs. Salcedo
then brought herto a doctor in Oroquieta
City for a checkup. Medication was given to
Sandra but her condition did not improve.
Sandra became irritable and moody. She felt
sick and unhappy.The following day, August
8, 1989, Sandra saw Moreno Tumimpad
coming out from the kitchen and told her
mother, "Mama, patayin mo 'yan, bastos."
2Sandra was brought to a doctor in
Oroquieta City for a second checkup. Dr.
Conol, the examining physician, ordered a
urinalysis. Jose C. Lim, a Medical
Technologist, conducted the urinalysis. The
result revealed that Sandra was pregnant.
3During the trial, the accused moved that a
blood test, both "Major Blood Grouping Test"
and "PhenoBlood Typing" be conducted on
the offended party, her child Jacob and the
two accused. The result of the test
conducted by the Makati Medical Center
showed that Jacob Salcedo has a type
"O"blood, Sandra Salcedo type "B," accused
Ruel Prieto type "A" and accused-appellant
type "O."
ISSUE:
W/N Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto are
guilty of the crime of rape?
HELD:
Accused-appellants' culpability was
established mainly by testimonial evidence
given by the victimherself and her relatives.
The blood test was adduced as evidence only
to show that the allegedfather or any one of
many others of the same blood type may
have been the father of the child. Asheld by
this Court in Janice Marie Jao vs. Court of
Appeals 19 :Paternity ---- Science has
demonstrated that by the analysis of blood
samples of the mother, thechild, and the
alleged father, it can be established
conclusively that the man is not the father of
aparticular child. But group blood testing
cannot show only a possibility that he is.
Statutes in manystates, and courts in others,
have recognized the value and the limitations
of such tests. Some of thedecisions have
recognized the conclusive presumption of
non-paternity where the results of the
test,made in the prescribed manner, show
the impossibility of the alleged paternity. This
is one of the fewcases in which the judgment
of the Court may scientifically be completely
accurate, and intolerableresults avoided,
such as have occurred where the finding is
allowed to turn on oral testimonyconflicting
with the results of the test. The findings of
such blood tests are not admissible to prove
9. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (plaintiff-
appellee) vs. JOEL SARTAGODA y
BOCANEGRA, JIMMY BASCUA y Vicente Sta. Ana and Jimmy
LAZARTE, VICENTE STA. ANA y Bascua did not flee, even
GUTIERREZ and JOHN DOE, accused-
appellants.
G.R. No. 97525; April 7, 1993
FACTS
All the three accused-appellants were
convicted by the Trial Court as the
latter found all guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as co-principals of
the crime of Robbery with Rape, and
each sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua with the
accessories provided for by the law.
On appeal:
The accused-appellants fault
the trial court of ignoring the
fingerprint examination report
submitted by the Crime
Laboratory of the PC/INP
Camp Crame which stated
that none of the specimen
latent fingerprints were found
to be positive.
o It is their contention
that since their
fingerprints were not
found in the objects
found in the scene of
the crime they cannot
be held guilty of the
crime charged
beyond reasonable
doubt.
They claim that the fact that
when they had all the
opportunities to do so, prove
their innocence.
When they were allowed to go
home after Vilma failed to
identify them during the first
confrontation at the police
station, they stayed home and
did not flee until they were
again required to appear at
the police station for the
second time. The accused-
appellants in effect posit that
if flight is an indication of
guilt, non-flight or the
decision not to flee, having
the opportunity to do so, is a
sign of innocence.
ISSUE (1): Whether the absence of
fingerprints as accused-appellants
posited, eliminates possibility that
accused could have been at the crime
scene.
HELD: NO. The SC agrees that a positive
finding of matching fingerprints has great
significance, however, it cannot sustain their
(accused-appellants) theory that from the
negative findings in the fingerprint
examination conducted in the course of the
investigation in the instant case, it must be
concluded that they could not have been at the
scene of the crime.
Negative findings do not at all times lead
to a valid conclusion for there may be
logical explanations for the absence of
identifiable latent prints other than their
not being present at the scene of the
crime. Only latent fingerprints found on
smooth surface are useful for purposes of
comparison in a crime laboratory because
prints left on rough surfaces result in dotted
lines or broken lines instead of complete and
continuous lines. Such kind of specimen
cannot be relied upon in a fingerprint
examination. The latent fingerprints are
actually oily substance adhering to the
surfaces of objects that come in contact with
the fingers. By their very nature, oily
substances easily spread such that when the
fingers slide against the surface they touch, no
identifiable latent print is left, only smudges
instead. Not all police investigators are aware
of the nature of latent fingerprints so as to be
guided accordingly in deciding which objects to
submit for fingerprint lifting and examination.
Noting the interplay of many circumstances
involved in the successful lifting and
identification of proper latent fingerprints in a
particular crime scene, the absence of one
does not immediately eliminate the possibility
that the accused-appellants could have been
at the scene of the crime. They may be there
yet they had not left any identifiable latent
fingerprint. Besides, in the case at bar, only ten
latent fingerprints are involved. The findings in
this particular fingerprint examination are not
sufficient to case even just a reasonable doubt
in their finding of guilt for the crime charged.
ISSUE (2): Whether police line-up is
required by law for proper identification
of the accused.
HELD: NO. Face and body movement of
assailant create lasting impression on
victim. Whether or not there was a
previous police line-up, the fact is that they
were positively identified at the trial. There is
no law requiring a police line-up as essential to
a proper identification. The complainant's
recognition of the accused-appellants as her
attackers cannot be doubted for she had
during the carnal acts ample opportunity to
see the faces of the men who ravaged her. It
is the most natural reaction for victims of
criminal violence to strive to see the
looks and faces of their assailants and
observe the manner in which the crime
was committed. Most often the face of the
assailant and body movement thereof, create
a lasting impression which cannot easily be
erased from their memory.
ISSUE (3) Rule 128, subsequent
circumstance: Whether non-flight can be
considered a proof of innonce.
HELD: NON-FLIGHT NOT PROOF OF
INNOCENCE; CASE AT BAR. They claim
that the fact that Vicente Sta. Ana and Jimmy
Bascua did not flee, even when they had all
the opportunities to do so, prove their
innocence. The accused-appellants in effect
posit that if flight is an indication of guilt, non-
flight or the decision not to flee, having the
opportunity to do so, is a sign of innocence.
The SC does not agree. Although it is
settled that unexplained flight indicates
guilt, it does not necessarily follow that
absence thereof proves innocence,
specially so when there is overwhelming
evidence to establish their guilt.
Disposition: Appealed decision AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the accused-
appellants are held jointly and severally liable
to indemnify Vilma de Belen for multiple rape
and that none of the accused is required to
recognize the offspring
10. [G.R. No. 132676. April 4, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
JAIME CARPO, OSCAR IBAO,
WARLITO IBAO and ROCHE
IBAO, accused-appellants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The accused might as well have
borrowed the famous line of
Shakespeare How this world is given
to lying![1] - when they impute error
to the trial court for relying on the
testimony of a single witness in
convicting them of multiple murder
complexed with attempted murder
for the death of Florentino Dulay,
Norwela Dulay and Nissan Dulay,
and the wounding of Noemi Dulay.[2]
The challenged testimony of witness
Ruben Meriales follows:[3] On 25
August 1996 at about 8:00 o'clock in
the evening while he was watching
television with his family his dogs
barked. His mother who was
apprehensive that their cow might
be stolen prodded him to check the
disturbance. To allay her fears he
stood up, took his flashlight and
trudged the unpaved path towards
his cow that was tied to a mango
tree. Then the noise grew louder
thus arousing his suspicion that
something was really wrong. After
transferring his cow nearer to his
house, he went inside the kitchen,
stood atop the concrete washbasin,
hid himself behind the bamboo slats
and peeped outside to observe. The
darkness helped conceal him from
outside view while the light from the
two (2) bulbs positioned at about
three (3) meters from where he
stood filtered through the slats and
illumined the surroundings. There
was also moon in the sky.
A few minutes later, he saw
barangay captain Jaime Carpo
together with Warlito Ibao
suspiciously stooping near his
barn. He knew Jaime and Warlito
very well. Jaime was his uncle and
Warlito lived in his
neighborhood. Warlito's son Roche
was also there; he was standing by
the mango tree. They were all
looking in the direction of Florentino
Dulay's house which was about a
meter to the south from where he
was. He also saw Oscar Ibao, another
son of Warlito, striding towards
Dulay's hut. As soon as he reached
the hut Oscar lifted the sawali mat
near the wall and hurled something
inside. Oscar then scurried off
towards the nearby creek with
Roche following him. Seconds later,
a loud explosion shook the entire
neighborhood and Teresita Dulay's
screams broke into the night.
Ruben Meriales, rushed outside. He
ran towards Florentino's hut but was
deterred by darkness. He returned
home to take his flashlight and raced
back to lend aid to Teresita. Inside
the hut he was stunned by the
terrifying gore that greeted him - a
bloodied Florentino cradled in the
arms of his weeping widow, Norwela
and Nissan lying side by side on a cot
both doused in blood, and a
motionless Norma whose head was
oozing with blood.
Realizing the exigency of the
situation, he left the crime scene to
borrow the jeepney of Brgy.
Kagawad Edgardo Marquez for the
hapless victims. The neighbors
milling around at once gave up hope
on Florentino so that only Norwela,
Nissan and Noemi were loaded in
the jeepney and rushed to the
Eastern Pangasinan District
Hospital. On their way, Norwela who
had injuries on her chest and lower
appendage died. Nissan who was
five (5) years old and the youngest of
the victims died later due to "shock
from pains" caused by the shrapnel
wounds in her left shoulder,
abdomen and lower
extremities.[4]Noemi luckily
survived. Her attending physician,
Dr. Emiliano Subido, testified that
Noemi was semi-conscious and
vomiting although ambulatory at the
time he examined her. But due to
the seriousness of her wounds and
the hospital's lack of facilities she
was taken to another hospital in
Dagupan City.[5]
In the course of their investigation,
the policemen questioned the
people who might have witnessed
the carnage. Fearful however that
the culprits would return, Ruben
Meriales refused to give any
statement but intimated to Police
Officer Guillermo Osio that he would
go to the police station after the
burial.
On 4 September 1996, or a week
later, Ruben kept his promise and
went to the police station where he
gave his statement to Police Officer
Osio. He named Jaime Carpo,
Warlito lbao, Oscar lbao and Roche
Ibao as the perpetrators of the
crime. He further said that
Florentino was killed because he was
about to testify against Roche Ibao
for the murder of his brother Delfin
Meriales.[6]
On 3 October 1996, solely on the
basis of Ruben's testimony, a
criminal complaint for the murder of
Florentino Dulay and his two (2)
daughters Norwela, and Nissan as
well as the frustrated murder of his
daughter Noemi was filed against
Jaime Carpo, Warlito Ibao, Oscar
Ibao and Roche Ibao. Warrants for
their immediate arrest were issued
by the municipal circuit trial court.
On 25 October 1996 Jaime Carpo
was taken into custody by the police,
while Roche Ibao eluded arrest until
9 December 1996 when he was
apprehended by police officers in La
Union. With Roche's arrest, Oscar
and Warlito realized the futility of
hiding and surrendered themselves
to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in La Union.
At the trial, the prosecution
presented Ruben, Noemi, Dr.
Rosalina O. Victorio, Dr. Emiliano
Subido and Police Officers Virgilio
dela Cruz, Jovencio Tapac and
Guillermo Osio as witnesses.
Police Officer Osio testified that on
the night of 25 August 1996 after
receiving a report of an explosion
in Brgy. Baligayan, he together with
Police Officers Julius Aurora, Ricardo
Lugares and Jovencio Tapac
immediately responded. They were
able to gather several grenade
shrapnels and a grenade shifting
lever from the crime scene. He
spoke with the weeping Teresita
Dulay who told him that she
suspected the accused of having
perpetrated the assault. He likewise
conferred with Ruben Meriales who
named the same set of suspects and
who promised to give his statement
to the police after the funeral.
After speaking with Teresita and
Ruben, he summoned his colleagues
to go with him to Warlito Ibao's
house which was just across the
road. Warlitos house was dark and
its front door was locked. He called
out but there was no answer. They
then proceeded to Oscar's house
which was also padlocked and
unoccupied. He went to Roche's
house and peeped inside before they
left.[7] Against their positive
identification by Ruben, the four (4)
accused interposed alibi claiming
that they were somewhere else
when the Dulay hut was
blasted. They likewise assailed
Ruben's testimony for being a
fabrication and insisted that he lied
to get back at them because Roche
was a suspect in the killing of his
brother Delfin Meriales. Jaime and
his wife Veronica Carpo were one in
testifying that in the evening of 25
August 1995 Jaime was at home
in Brgy. Libsong, a hundred and fifty
(150) meters away from the house
of the Dulays in Brgy.
Baligayan. When he heard the loud
explosion, he summoned
his tanods to check whether the
blast happened within
their barangay. When he learned
that the explosion occurred in the
adjoining Brgy. Baligayan, he went
home to sleep. Brgy. Baligayan is
separated from his barangay by a
creek and could be reached in ten
(10) minutes. However, on the night
of the incident, the creek was neck
deep such that one had to make a
detour through a mountainous route
for about thirty (30) minutes to
reach Brgy. Baligayan.[8]
Jaime testified that Ruben
implicated him because the latter
was angry at him. Ruben's grudge
supposedly started when Jaime
sided with the Ibaos in the murder
case instituted by the Merialeses
against Roche for the death of Delfin
Meriales. As a matter of fact on 10
December 1996 while he was
incarcerated at the Balungao District
Jail, Ruben supposedly visited him
asking his forgiveness for having
named him as one of the
perpetrators of the crime. Ruben
subsequently pleaded with him to
reveal the names of those
responsible but when he claimed
ignorance, Ruben left in a huff.
Warlito, Oscar and Roche Ibao
testified that on the night of the
explosion their family was having a
farewell party for the family's only
girl Maribel Ibao who was leaving for
Hongkong. They heard the blast but
they did not bother to check. They
denied having heard the police
officers call for them an hour after
the explosion. Roche further
asserted that he did not have a
house in Brgy. Baligayan as reported
because he lived with his parents-in-
law in Brgy. Libsong. However, on
the night of the blast, he slept at his
parents' house as all of his siblings
and their families were there. He
only learned of the bloodbath the
following morning when they went
home to his in-laws. His wife Jovelyn
corroborated his testimony in the
same manner that Remedios
supported the story of her husband
Warlito.[9]
In convicting Jaime Carpo, Warlito
Ibao, Oscar Ibao and Roche Ibao of
the multiple murder of Florentino,
Norwela and Nissan Dulay and the
attempted murder of Noemi Dulay
the trial Court gave full credit to the
testimony of Ruben.[10] It accepted
his straightforward testimony and
ruled that "at no instance
throughout the twin testimonies of
Meriales did the Court notice a
twitch of falsehood on his
lips."[11] Accordingly, in accordance
with Sec. 6, RA 7659, and Art. 48
of The Revised Penal Code the trial
court imposed upon all of the
accused the supreme penalty of
death and ordered them to solidarily
indemnify the heirs of the deceased
as well as Noemi Dulay in the
amount of P600,000.00.[12]
Forthwith, the case was elevated to
this Court for automatic
review. After the filing of briefs, the
accused filed an Addendum to
Appellant's Brief urging that the
favorable results of their lie detector
tests with the NBI be admitted into
the records.[13]
A lie detector test is based on the
theory that an individual will
undergo physiological changes,
capable of being monitored by
sensors attached to his body, when
he is not telling the truth. The Court
does not put credit and faith on the
result of a lie detector test inasmuch
as it has not been accepted by the
scientific community as an accurate
means of ascertaining truth or
deception.[14]
The explosion by means of a hand
grenade on the night of 25 August
1996 resulting in the death of
Florentino, Norwela and Nissan
Dulay and in the wounding of Noemi
Dulay is an admitted fact. The
identity of the perpetrators, as
tenaciously questioned by the
accused, depends upon the
credibility of Ruben Meriales.
In this appeal, accused-appellants
challenge the veracity of the
testimony of Ruben Meriales
primarily on two (2)
grounds: first, Ruben's testimony in
court is different from and is
contradictory to his affidavit of 4
October 1996; and second, Ruben is
not a disinterested witness because
he has a grudge against the
Ibaos. Consistent with giving due
deference to the observations of the
trial court on credibility of witnesses,
we agree with the court a quo when
it believed Ruben Meriales more
than the defense
witnesses.[15] Indeed, the trial court is
best equipped to make an
assessment of witnesses, and its
factual findings are generally not
disturbed on appeal unless it has
overlooked, misunderstood or
disregarded important facts,[16] which
is not true in the present case.
The twin arguments therefore raised
by accused-appellants against the
testimony of Ruben Meriales are
devoid of merit. A scrutiny of the
records reveals that his testimony is
not inconsistent with his affidavit of
4 October 1996 inasmuch as the
former merely supplied the details of
the event which the latter failed to
disclose. But assuming that there
was any inconsistency, it is settled
that whenever an affidavit
contradicts a testimony given in
court the latter commands greater
respect.[17] Such inconsistency is
unimportant and would not even
discredit a fallible witness.[18] The
mere fact that Ruben admitted
harboring resentment against the
Ibaos for the murder of his brother
Delfin does not confirm that he
fabricated his story. His frankness in
admitting his resentment against the
Ibaos should even be considered in
his favor.[19] There is likewise nothing
unnatural in Ruben's attitude of
concealing himself behind the
kitchen wall instead of warning the
Dulays of the looming danger to
their lives. It is a well-known fact
that persons react differently to
different situations - there may be
some who will respond violently to
an impending danger while there
may be others who will simply
assume a cravenly demeanor. In this
case, Ruben was ruled by his fear
rather than by his reason, but for
this alone, his credibility should not
be doubted.
Apropos Jaime's imputation that
Ruben had admitted to him while in
jail that he lied in his testimony, we
find this accusation farcical as
nothing was ever offered in support
thereof. The lone corroborative
testimony, which was that of Roche,
does not inspire belief since Roche
himself admitted overhearing the
conversation while Jaime together
with other prisoners was
constructing a hut outside of his cell
at about three (3) meters away. As
correctly hinted by the prosecution,
the noise generated by the
construction made it unlikely for
Roche to hear conversations three
(3) meters away.[20]
The defense proffered by the
accused is alibi. But this is futile. By
his own admission, Jaime was only a
hundred and fifty (150) meters away
from the scene of the crime. In fact,
it would only take him thirty (30)
minutes, at the most, to be at the
place of the Dulays.
More so for the Ibaos who
acknowledged that they were having
a party just a stone's throw away
from the crime scene at the time of
the explosion. Curiously though, if
they were indeed reveling inside
their house on that fateful night,
then we cannot comprehend why
they did not go out to investigate
after hearing the blast. Besides, it
was rather strange for the Ibaos not
to have joined their neighbors who
had instantaneously milled outside
to view the mayhem. Their conduct
indeed betrayed them.
Further, the immediate flight and
tarriance of the Ibaos to La Union
until Roche's arrest cannot but
demonstrate their guilt and desire to
evade prosecution.[21]
The trial court also correctly ruled
that accused-appellants conspired in
perpetrating the offense
charged. From the detailed account
of Ruben, Jaime and Warlito
positioned themselves near the hay
barn while Roche casually stood by
the mango tree. As observed by the
trial court, the presence of Jaime,
Warlito and Roche inescapably gave
encouragement and a sense of
security to Oscar, the group's
preceptor.Surely, the latter was
emboldened to commit the crime
knowing that his co-conspirators
were not far behind.
Under the doctrine enunciated
in People v. Tayo,[22] the crime
committed may otherwise be more
approriately denominated as murder
qualified by explosion rather than by
treachery. However, since it was
treachery that is alleged in the
Information and appreciated by the
trial court, the explosion of the
grenade which resulted in the death
of Florentino, Norwela and Nissan,
and the wounding of Noemi can only
be multiple murder complexed with
attempted murder.[23] The crime
committed against Noemi Dulay was
correctly denominated by the trial
court as attempted murder
considering that none of her injuries
was fatal. Her attending physician
even made conflicting statements in
the assessment of her wounds, to
wit: although he said that Noemi
could have died from the shrapnel
wound in her head, he specifically
ruled out the possibility of
"intercerebral hemorrhage"[24] and
despite the seriousness of the
possible complications of her injuries
she would suffer from physical
incapacity for only ten (10) to
fourteen (14) days.
As none of her wounds was severe
as to cause her death, accused-
appellants not having performed all
the acts of execution that would
have brought it about, the crime is
only attempted murder.[25]
Since the three (3) murders and
attempted murder were produced
by a single act, namely, the
explosion caused by the hurling of a
grenade into the bedroom of the
Dulays, the case comes under Art. 48
of The Revised Penal Code on
complex crimes. Article 48 provides
that the penalty for the more serious
crime, which in the present case
is reclusion perpetua to death,
should be applied in its maximum
period.As the crime was complexed,
the death penalty was properly
imposed by the trial court.
At this point, we take exception to
the court a quo's award of damages
in the "negotiated amount of
P600,00.00." It appears that under
the auspices of the trial court
counsel for the defense entered into
an oral compromise with the public
prosecutor, which was subsequently
ratified by the private complainant,
limiting the amount of civil liability
to P600,000.00. We note the
discourse between the court and the
counsel for both parties regarding
the award.
PROS. CORPUZ: x x x x (W)e would like to
enter into stipulation the civil aspect of the
case.
COURT: Are the accused confident that they
could be acquitted in this case? Atty Sanglay?
ATTY. SANGLAY: I think so, your Honor.
COURT: What about Atty. Rafael?
ATTY. RAFAEL: We are confident, your Honor.
COURT: All right. So you can easily
stipulate. First of all, how much do you want
Fiscal?
PROS. CORPUZ: P1,282,740.00, your Honor x
xxx
COURT: x x x x Agree gentlemen of the
defense?
ATTY. SANGLAY: P600,000.00, your Honor.
COURT: Do you agree Fiscal?
PROS. CORPUZ: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: All right so P600,000.00 is the agreed
liquidated amount in case of conviction
without necessarily having to interpret this
stipulation as admission of guilt on the part
of any of the accused. All right so we will
dispense with the testimony on the civil
aspect x x x x
COURT: x x x x Are you the private
complainant in this case?
TERESITA DULAY: Yes, sir.
COURT: If the accused get convicted and I
will hold them severally liable for you of
damages in the liquidated sum of
P600,000.00 as agreed upon by the counsel,
will you be satisfied? x x x x
TERESITA: Yes, sir.
COURT: So let that be of record. Will you sign
the note so that there will be evidence.
(At this juncture private complainant Teresita
Dulay affixed her signature at the bottom
right margin of the stenographic notes page
2 hereof).[26]
Article 1878 of the Civil Code and
Sec. 23 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court set forth the attorney's power
to compromise. Under Art. 1878 of
the Civil Code, a special power of
attorney is necessary "to
compromise, to submit questions to
arbitration, to renounce the right to
appeal from a judgment, to waive
objections to the venue of an action
or to abandon a prescription already
acquired." On the other hand, Sec.
23, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
provides, "(a)ttorneys have authority
to bind their clients in any case by
any agreement in relation thereto
made in writing, and in taking
appeal, and in all matters of ordinary
judicial procedure, but they cannot,
without special authority,
compromise their clients' litigation
or receive anything in discharge of
their clients' claims but the full
amount in cash."
The requirements under both
provisions are met when there is a
clear mandate expressly given, by
the principal to his lawyer
specifically authorizing the
performance of an act.[27] It has not
escaped our attention that in the
present case counsel for both parties
had no special power of attorney
from their clients to enter into a
compromise. However, insofar as
Teresita was concerned, she was
apprised of the agreement and in
fact had signed her name as
instructed by the court, thereby
tacitly ratifying the same. As for
accused-appellants, the aforecited
dialogue between the court and
counsel does not show that they
were ever consulted regarding the
proposed settlement. In the absence
of a special power of attorney given
by accused-appellants to their
counsel, the latter can neither bind
nor compromise his clients' civil
liability. Consequently, since Atty.
Sanglay and Atty. Rafael had no
specific power to compromise the
civil liability of all accused-
appellants, its approval by the trial
court which did not take the
precautionary measures to ensure
the protection of the right of
accused-appellants not to be
deprived of their property without
due process of law, could not
legalize it. For being violative of
existing law and jurisprudence, the
settlement should not be given force
and effect.
In light of the foregoing, the award
of damages must be set aside and a
new one entered with all the
circumstances of the case in
mind. For the death of Florentino,
Norwela and Nissan Dulay, civil
indemnity at P50,000.00 each or a
total amount of P50,000.00 is
awarded to their heirs. This is in
addition to the award of moral
damages at an aggregate amount of
P150,000.00 for their emotional and
mental anguish. With respect to
Noemi, an indemnity of each death or an aggregate amount
P30,000.00 would be just and of P300,00.00. In addition, accused-
proper. All taken, an award of appellants are ordered to pay Noemi
P330,000.00 is granted. Dulay P30,000.00 as indemnity for
Four (4) members of the Court her attempted murder. Costs against
maintain their position that RA 7659, accused- appellants.
insofar as it prescribes the death In accordance with Sec. 25 of RA
penalty, is unconstitutional; 7659, amending Art. 83 of The
nevertheless they submit to the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of
ruling of the Court, by a majority this Decision, let the records of this
vote, that the law is constitutional case be forthwith forwarded to the
and that the death penalty should be Office of the President for possible
accordingly imposed. exercise of executive clemency or
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision pardoning power.
of the trial court finding accused- SO ORDERED.
appellants JAIME CARPO, OSCAR
IBAO, WARLITO IBAO and ROCHE
IBAO GUILTY of the complex crime
of multiple murder with attempted
murder and sentencing them to the
supreme penalty of death is
AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that they are
ordered to pay the heirs of the
deceased Florentino, Norwela and
Nissan, all surnamed Dulay,
P50,000.00 as death indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages for
Rule 129
Saado vs Court of Appeals
356 SCRA 546
Nature of Particular Acts
FACTS: Saado was issued by the now defunct Philippine
Fisheries Commission an Ordinary Fishpond Permit
covering an area of 50 hectares. On July 16, 1973, Saado
executed a contract with Nepomuceno wherein the latter
agreed to develop 30 hectares of the 50 hectares covered
by Saado's fishpond permit. Two days later, the parties
modified this earlier agreement by excluding the area of 10
hectares already cultivated and fully developed and
providing that the contract is renewable on terms
acceptable to both of them.
On September 28, 1979, the Director of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources recommended to the then Ministry of
Natural Resources the conversion of Sanados fishpond
permit into a 25-year fishpond loan agreement which
covered a reduced area of 26.745 hectares. Accordingly, a
Fishpond Lease Agreement was issued.
On July 17, 1981, Saado filed a complaint against
Nepomuceno with the RTC for recovery of possession and
damages, alleging that Nepomuceno failed to deliver
Saados share of the net harvest among other things. While
this case was pending, the then Minister of Agriculture and
Food canceled the Fishpond Lease Agreement, forfeiting
the improvements thereon in favor of government. Later,
said order was reconsidered to the extent that Nepomuceno
was given priority to apply for the area and that his
improvements thereon were not considered forfeited in
favor of the government.
Saado elevated the matter to the Office of the President
but appeal was dimissed. Meanwhile, the trial court
rendered a decision over Saado's complaint for recovery
of possession in his favor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Office of the
President in cancelling petitioner's lease agreement should
be given weight
RULING: Yes. The action of an administrative agency in
granting or denying, or in suspending or revoking, a
license, permit, franchise, or certificate of public
convenience and necessity is administrative or quasi-
judicial. The act is not purely administrative but quasi-
judicial or adjudicatory since it is dependent upon the
ascertainment of facts by the administrative agency, upon
which a decision is to be made and rights and liabilities
determined. As such, the July 31, 1989 decision of the
Office of the President is explicitly an official act of and an
exercise of quasi-judicial power by the Executive
Department headed by the highest officer of the land. It
thus squarely falls under matters relative to the executive
department which courts are mandatorily tasked to take
judicial notice of under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court. Judicial notice must be taken of the organization of
the Executive Department, its principal officers, elected or
appointed, such as the President, his powers and duties.
The rendition of the subject July 31, 1989 Malacaang
decision is premised on the essential function of the
executive department which is to enforce the law. In
this instance, what is being enforced is Presidential Decree
No. 704 which consolidated and revised all laws and
decrees affecting fishing and fisheries. Such enforcement
must be true to the policy behind such laws which is "to
accelerate and promote the integrated development of the
fishery industry and to keep the fishery resources of the
country in optimum productive condition through proper
conservation and protection" (Section 2, P.D. No. 704).
Further, the issue of whether or not petitioner is still
entitled to possession of the subject fishpond area is
underpinned by an ascertainment of facts. And such task
belongs to the administrative body which has jurisdiction
over the matter the Ministry of Agriculture and Food.
The policy of the courts as regards such factual findings is
not to interfere with actions of the executive branch on
administrative matters addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies. This policy is specially applicable in
the grant of licenses, permits, and leases, or the approval,
rejection, or revocation of applications therefor. Such
respect is based on the time-honored doctrine of separation
of powers and on the fact that these bodies are considered
co-equal and coordinate rank as courts. The only exception
is when there is a clear showing of capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment or grave abuse of
discretion, which we find absent in the case at bar.
The reasons given by the Office of the President in
dismissing petitioner's appeal are quite clear. Transferring
or subletting the fishpond granted to a licensee without the
consent or approval of the administrative body concerned,
as well as the failure to develop the area required by the
fisheries rules, are definitely solid and logical grounds for
the cancellation of one's license. Withal, if petitioner
disagrees with the decision of the Office of the President,
he should have elevated the matter by petition for review
before the Court of Appeals for the latter's exercise of
judicial review. Nowhere in the record do we find such
action on petitioner's part.
Understandably, to restore petitioner to the possession of
the fishpond area is to totally disregard the July 31, 1989
decision of the Office of the President which can hardly be
described as an unrelated matter, considering its patent
implications in the result of both Civil Case No. 2085 and
CA-G.R. CV No. 23165. For how could the appellate court
award possession to the very same party whose license has
been cancelled by the executive or administrative officer
tasked to exercise licensing power as regards the
development of fishpond areas, and which cancellation has
been sustained by the Office of the President? Petitioner
must remember the essence of the grant of a license. It is
not a vested right given by the government but a privilege
with corresponding obligations and is subject to
governmental regulation. Hence, to allow petitioner to
possess the subject area is to run counter to the execution
and enforcement of the July 31, 1989 decision which would
easily lose its "teeth" or force if petitioner were restored in
possession.
RATIO: The action of an administrative agency in granting
or denying, or in suspending or revoking, a license, permit,
franchise, or certificate of public convenience and necessity
is administrative or quasi-judicial. The act is not purely
administrative but quasi-judicial or adjudicatory sisince it
is dependent upon the ascertainment of facts by the
administrative agency, upon which a decision is to be made
and rights and liabilities determined.