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The five permanent members of the UN Security CouncilFrance, Russia, China, the UK, and the USA

together account for 88 per cent of the worlds conventional arms exports; and these exports contribute
regularly to gross abuses of human rights. as a report from the control arms campaign, Shattered Lives,
mentions.

Problems of weak arms control policies:

Now ladies and gentlemen, the lack of arms controls is a major factor in the illicit small arms trade as it
allows some to profit from the misery of others. While international attention is focused on the need to
control weapons of mass destruction, the trade in conventional weapons continues to operate in a legal
and moral vacuum. More and more countries are starting to produce small arms, many with little ability
or will to regulate their use.

Perhaps the greatest barrier to resolving debates over gun policy is the lack of comprehensive data.
Although the UN Arms Register tries to keep track of major weapons holdings, there is no global
reporting system for small arms. Some countries make information available about the small arms of
their armed forces and law enforcement agencies; others release estimated data on public ownership.
Most refuse to release anything, release rough estimates or simply do not know.

Permanent UN Security Council membersthe USA, UK, France, Russia, and Chinadominate the world
trade in arms. With earning over a 100 million dollars a year from the import and export of small arms.
Most national arms controls have loopholes or barely enforced.

Key weaknesses lies in lax controls on the brokering, licensed production, and end use of arms. Arms
get into the wrong hands through weak controls on firearm ownership, weapons management, and
misuse by authorized users of weapons.

SOLUTIONS

We must combat the illegal trade in weapons using laws, regulations and control measures. The idea
that arms-exporting countries are primarily responsible for the diversion of weapons to illegal users is a
misconception. While states are clearly important, substantial amounts of weapons enter the illegal
market years after their export. The responsibility for preventing illegal trade must therefore be as
international as the trade itself. In order to do this nations must adopt strict border control measures as
well as strict security to regulate the influx of illegal small arms getting in the country. Furthermore, all
provincial and legal forms of governments must form a framework and survey each year to collect
accurate numbers of illegally owned small arms.
(GSL)

Now ladies and gentlemen, something we have not discussed as yet in the committee is the widespread
access to the black market and dark web serves to obtain small arms and light weapons. Estimates of
the black market trade in small arms range from US$2-10 billion a year. In the US you can buy a hand
gun for 5000 dollars using the black market while in Australia, the same hand gun costs 50,000 US
dollars. It is a matter of concern that in such developed countries such as the US illicit small arms trade is
hardly a hassle to achieve. Now I realize, we are not here to bash other countries however a solution to
eradicate black market sales is to track these arms in order to locate their warehouses.

The supply of arms in defiance of international embargoes and other legal sanctions, and the theft of
arms from government stocks or private citizens. In recent years, there has been a striking growth in the
operations of black-market dealers to satisfy the needs of non-state actors in ethnic and internal
conflicts. Because such actors are normally barred from purchases on the legal munitions market, they
must acquire their weaponry from illicit sources. The growing number of UN arms embargoes has also
produced an increased demand for black-market arms.

Problems caused by small arms transfers (GSL)

This presents a huge obstacle to development in some of these countries. We cannot successfully
measure small arms transfers by financial value as this ignores the potentially huge impact of relatively
small-value transfers. Assault rifles cost only a few hundred dollars each which is why they are easy to
obtain and lead to major instability, with catastrophic effects for civilian populations.

Thus arms transfers involve all countries, whether they suffer the effects of arms or transfer weapons
not only newly manufactured arms, but re-exported, second-hand, surplus, or collected weapons, and
weapons in transit.

In fact, one person dies every minute from gun violence according to the International Action Network
on Small Arms. Small arms are used to kill, and they are also used in forced disappearances, torture, and
for sexual violence, particularly rape and forced prostitution. Conflict and violence fueled by these
weapons often force large numbers of people to flee their homes and refugees and internally displaced
populations are prevented from returning home after a conflict because large numbers of weapons
remain in circulation. Small arms violence also contributes to psychosocial trauma, which takes much
longer than physical wounds to heal. Widespread access to small arms prolongs conflicts

Civilians may not be able to acquire food, supplies, and other assistance; markets may be closed; and
food may be scarce. Aid workers may have difficulty accessing areas of need and development projects
may be cancelled or delayed because of security and crime concerns. All of these conditions contribute
to the failure of post conflict development and reconstruction. Many states have legalized the civilian
possession of small arms. The type of weapons civilians may own and under what circumstances they
may legally own them vary widely from country to country. It is unclear whether permissive gun
ownership laws increase violence, but differing domestic gun laws can contribute to the illegal trade of
small arms from countries with more permissive laws to countries with more restrictive laws.
Guns and other small arms are also the weapon of choice in violent crimes. Debate continues, especially
in the United States, about whether easy access to small arms and light weapons increases or decreases
crime. Some argue that guns are a deterrent that can increase personal security and thus reduce
interpersonal crime. Others argue that the increased availability of small arms, particularly easily carried
and concealed weapons, leads to higher rates of violent death (homicide, suicide, and accidental
deaths), violence, and criminality. What is clear is that gun use intensifies violence and increases the
case-fatality rate in assaults. And armed criminality is particularly violent in post conflict countries where
small arms and light weapons are still readily available and opportunities for unemployed youth are very
limited.

Adopt legislation making illicit arms trafficking a crime under state jurisdiction

Mark firearms with manufacturer and importer information

Confiscate illicitly made or transferred firearms

Ensure the security of transferred weapons

Issue licenses for import, export, and transit of arms

Strengthen security at export points

Keep tracing records of illicit trades

Guarantee the confidentiality of shared information and share information on arms production and
transfers with other member states

Provide assistance and cooperation in implementing the convention.

To support CIFTA the OAS also adopted Model Regulations for the Control of the

International Movement of Firearms, Their Parts and Components, and Ammunition

In the end, the Program of Action was agreed to by consensus and did move the debate on small arms
proliferation forward in several significant areas. It contains repeated references to the humanitarian
impact of small arms violence, a relatively new development that will help enlarge the group of
government agencies and NGOs involved in the issue. It calls on states to assess small arms exports
based on their "responsibilities under international law," a critical phrase for NGOs trying to get states
to integrate human rights and humanitarian law into their export decisions. It also recognizes the
importance of demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of ex-combatants; the need for
international rules on the activities of arms brokers; and the responsibility of governments for keeping
close watch over their weapons stockpiles and international borders. Finally, conferees agreed to hold a
review conference in 2006, plus biennial meetings along the way. These meetings will allow NGOs and
governments to keep the momentum moving on the small arms issue and to revisit the Program of
Action formally in a short time frame.

This chapter takes stock of the latest developments in the global small arms process, with a specific
focus on new initiatives and continuing debates relating to transfer controls. Its principal conclusions
include the following:
The failure of the Review Conference to reach a substantive outcome derived from a broad range of
factors, notably the inability of the UN small arms process to accommodate aspects of the issue falling
outside of the traditional arms control/disarmament paradigm.

The global small arms process is crumbling. While not a problem as such, this does pose certain risks,
such as inconsistency among measures and the possible neglect of the universal framework provided by
the UN.

States existing obligations in relation to small arms transfers are extensive. Relevant, binding legal
norms include direct limitations on certain transfers, as well as the rule holding states complicit in
violations of international law committed with arms that they transfer notwithstanding a known (or
knowable) risk of misuse.

While the question of banning arms transfers to non-state actors (NSAs) remains controversial, only
NSAs that are not authorized to import arms by the state where they are located are, in fact, a major
concern. We cannot place arms embargo on NSAs however the only way to stop their supply of illegal
and illicit small arms is to track their weapons and trace the manufacturers in order to locate weapon
warehouses and successfully eradicate the supply from its route.

Guidelines identifying factors to be considered as part of arms transfer licensing decisions can help
states ensure that these are systematic, rigorous, and objective.

Thirty-three states, including most of the major arms suppliers, are members. Its purpose is to
contribute to regional and international security by:

1) promoting transparency in arms transfers among participating states;

2) ensuring that transfers of relevant items do not contribute to excessive and destabilizing
accumulations of arms;

3) complementing existing control regimes for weapons of mass destruction;

4) reducing the need for states to acquire advanced weapons or technologies.


Brokers

Regulators must also consider the role played by individuals who facilitate legitimate arms deals, but
who may also assist in the illegal transfer of weapons to unauthorized users or destinations: arms
brokers. The definition of a broker given by the United Nations is: a person or entity acting as an
intermediary that brings together relevant parties and arranges or facilitates a potential transaction of
small arms and light weapons in return for some form of benefit, whether financial or otherwise.

By working across them various parties involved in arms deals, brokers are able to exploit some
countries' loose controls. By exploiting legislative loopholes and the lack of multilateral cooperation in
arms controls, illicit brokers are often perfectly able to transfer weapons to conflict or crises zones in
violation of arms embargoes. In the past 15-20 years, an increased understanding of the consequences
of illicit brokering, along with ways of tackling it, have been included in several regional and
international initiatives and translated into national legislation.

The UK, for instance, is a signatory of the ATT, and has national legislation to support the
implementation of small arms control measures set up by both regional and international agreements.
This means the UK can prosecute individuals for illegally trading small arms beyond its borders, a crucial
part of arms trade policing. In 2010, for example, two arms dealers were found guilty of breaching the
UKs trafficking and brokering legislation relating to small arms for moving high explosive bombs and
ammunition to Sri Lanka and Israel and sentenced to sixteen years in jail.

Enforcement of arms control agreements has proven difficult over time. Most agreements rely on the
continued desire of the participants to abide by the terms to remain effective. Usually, when a nation no
longer desires to abide by the terms, they usually will seek to either covertly circumvent the terms or to
simply end their participation in the treaty. This was seen in Washington Naval Treaty[3] (and the
subsequent London Naval Treaty[4]), where most participants sought to work around the limitations,
some more legitimately than others.[5] The United States developed better technology to get better
performance from their ships while still working within the weight limits, the United Kingdom exploited
a loop-hole in the terms, the Italians misrepresented the weight of their vessels, and when up against
the limits, Japan simply left the treaty. The nations which violated the terms of the treaty did not suffer
great consequences for their actions. Within little more than a decade, the treaty was abandoned. The
Geneva Protocol[6] has lasted longer and been more successful at being respected, but still nations have
violated it at will when they have felt the need. Enforcement has been haphazard, with measures more
a matter of politics than adherence to the terms. This meant sanctions and other measures tended to be
advocated against violators primarily by their natural political enemies, while violations have been
ignored or given only token measures by their political allies.[7]
Effects of small arms trade

With growing access to small arms, nations train and subject children to gruesome forms of violence as
there are an estimated 300,000 child soldiers in the world. Small arms linger long after conflicts are over
and Hinders Development and Rebuilding. As the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs
describes, Small arms and light weapons destabilize regions. This is because they Spark, fuel and prolong
conflicts; Obstruct relief programs; Undermine peace initiatives; Exacerbate human rights abuses;
Hamper development; and Foster a culture of violence. Illicit drugs production thrives on territory
outside the control of recognized governments, and 95 per cent of the worlds production of hard drugs
takes place in contexts of armed conflict. Valuable natural resources are illegally exploited by armed
groups and their state sponsors, ruining millions of lives and impeding local development, as has
occurred in DRC. International trade suffers and illicit markets thrive, to the detriment of national
economies.

Loopholes of arms treaties

More recent arms control treaties have included more stringent terms on enforcement of violations as
well as verification. This last has been a major obstacle to effective enforcement, as violators often
attempt to covertly circumvent the terms of the agreements. Verification is the process of determining
whether or not a nation is complying with the terms of an agreement, and involves a combination of
release of such information by participants[8] as well as some way to allow participants to examine each
other to verify that information.[9] This often involves as much negotiation as the limits themselves, and
in some cases questions of verification have led to the breakdown of treaty negotiations (for example,
verification was cited as a major concern by opponents of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
ultimately not ratified by the United States).[10][11]

Nations may remain in a treaty while seeking to break the limits of that treaty as opposed to simply
withdrawing from it. This is for two major reasons. To openly defy an agreement, even if one withdraws
from it, often is seen in a bad light politically and can carry diplomatic repercussions. Additionally, if one
remains in an agreement, competitors who are also participatory may be held to the limitations of the
terms, while withdrawal releases your opponents to make the same developments you are making,
limiting the advantage of that development.

While the UN Conference did not live up to the high expectations of many governments and NGOs, it did
provide the opportunity to build on regional action while establishing the need for, if not the prospect
of, international action. The failure of the Conference to agree on adequate steps at the international
level has placed the onus on regional institutions and initiatives as the major driving force for addressing
the small arms problem on the ground. The attention paid to the issue of the illicit arms trade by the UN
and its Member States has the potential to spur new regional initiatives, advance the implementation of
initiatives already underway and provide financial and technical vehicles that will support such
implementation. Representatives and Member States of regional organizations were diligent during the
conference proceedings in making sure that actions taken in the international arena were consistent
with the unique and particular needs of the worlds regions and sub-regions in terms of priorities,
approaches and experience.
1.) Expanding the Background Check System:

The federal background check system is an effective mechanism that prevents prohibited purchasers,
such as convicted felons, the dangerously mentally ill and domestic abusers from accessing guns. Yet
glaring loopholes in our laws allow prohibited individuals to access firearms through unlicensed dealers,
or private sellers. By closing these loopholes and requiring background checks at gun shows and
online, we can ensure that guns stay out of the hands of those prohibited by federal law. In states with
background checks on all handgun sales, 46% fewer women are killed by intimate partners, there are
48% fewer firearms suicides and 48% fewer law on-duty police officers are shot to death.

2.) Preventing Domestic Violence Homicides:

The link of domestic abuse and gun violence cannot be overstated- the mere presence of a gun in
domestic violence situation increases the risk of homicide for women by five times. We need federal
legislation that strengthens our nations guns laws and further prevents domestic abusers from
accessing guns we can keep guns out of dangerous hands and improve the safety of women and
families.

3.) Enact Strong Laws against Gun Trafficking and Stiffen Penalties for Straw Purchasers:

Every year, hundreds of thousands of guns are diverted from legitimate commerce into the criminal
marketplace and are eventually recovered at crime scenes. But currently, prosecutors have no clear and
effective statute to use to punish gun traffickers. The government must work to make gun trafficking a
federal crime and ensure enhanced penalties for kingpin gun traffickers, corrupt gun dealers and straw
purchasers.

4.) Strengthening the National Instant Criminal Background Check System:

An International Criminal background System (ICS) must be established to block the sale of firearms to
known criminals and prohibited users. States must submit records to ICS every year, more must be done
to give incentives and support states in their work to improve their record reporting laws and systems.
Governments must continue to work to ensure that all records of prohibited purchasers are submitted
to the background check system.

5.) Invest in Dedicated Funding for Research About the Causes & Impact of Gun Violence:

Through actions of NGOs public health research about gun violence must take place, many states refuse
to seriously invest in research to understand the connection between gun violence and public health.
They should allocate dedicated funding to firearms injury prevention research at the Centers for Disease
Control.

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